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The ambitions in Copenhagen Pledges:

Country case studies of drivers and
barriers
ab ac a
Peter Stigson , Katarina Buhr & Susanna Roth
a
IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, P.O. Box 210 60,
Stockholm 100 31, Sweden
b
School of Business, Society and Engineering, Mälardalen
University, Västerås, Sweden
c
Centre for Climate Science and Policy Research, Linköping
University, Norrköping SE-60174, Sweden
Published online: 26 Jul 2013.

To cite this article: Peter Stigson, Katarina Buhr & Susanna Roth (2013) The ambitions in
Copenhagen Pledges: Country case studies of drivers and barriers, Greenhouse Gas Measurement
and Management, 3:1-2, 21-36, DOI: 10.1080/20430779.2013.812010

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 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management, 2013
Vol. 3, Nos. 1–2, 21–36, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20430779.2013.812010

RESEARCH ARTICLE
The ambitions in Copenhagen Pledges: Country case studies of drivers and
barriers
Peter Stigsona,b*, Katarina Buhra,c and Susanna Rotha
a
IVL Swedish Environmental Research Institute, P.O. Box 210 60, Stockholm 100 31, Sweden; bSchool of
Business, Society and Engineering, Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden; cCentre for Climate Science
and Policy Research, Linköping University, Norrköping SE-60174, Sweden
(Received 19 December 2012; final version received 3 June 2013)
Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 06:38 02 October 2013

The climate pledges under the Copenhagen Accord have been evaluated by researchers in
quantitative terms, but less attention has been provided on insights into what drove
countries and what political barriers impeded countries to submit a pledge and the
ambitiousness of the pledges. This article therefore highlights what the drivers and barriers
are under the Copenhagen Accord and assesses whether the political considerations can be
expected to differ from the positions under a binding climate regime under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. By means of case studies the research
finds that the political origin differs and in general views that the Accord is viewed as
adding to transparency and legitimacy of the negotiations. Moreover, while the pledges can
be viewed as a separate regime, it should be complemented by emissions trading to spur
increased ambition. The research also identifies that the pledges are commonly viewed as
binding and that barriers are increasingly viewed as drivers seeing that costs of climate
action is viewed as lower than inaction.
Keywords: UNFCCC; Copenhagen accords; Pledges; drivers; barriers; ambition

1. Introduction
A limited progress of the international climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) contributed to the Copenhagen Accords (CA) being
adopted at the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 15) in Copen-
hagen, December 2009. The Accords introduced the possibility for Annex I parties to the Con-
vention to voluntarily1 submit a pledge of economy wide emission reduction targets by 2020
and non-Annex I parties implementing nationally appropriate mitigation actions to slow their
growth in greenhouse gas emissions. These so-called pledges are not associated with rules and
stipulations regarding their contents and are essentially non-binding.
While some have criticized the COP 15 and the Accords as disappointments (BBC, 2009;
Egenhofer & Georgiev, 2009; Rogelj et al., 2010), some see the Accords as a feasible, albeit
not perfect, way to move forward in the negotiations (BBC, 2009; Stavins, 2009). Moreover,

*Corresponding author. Email: peter.stigson@ivl.se

1
Note the interpretation here that a voluntary regime means that it is voluntary to submit a pledge. After sub-
mitting the pledge, it may be binding or non-binding, i.e. a voluntary regime is not inherently understood as
non-binding.

© 2013 Taylor & Francis

 22 P. Stigson et al.

the pledges have jointly been criticized as insufficient in achieving the +2°C target, as stipulated
in the Accords (den Elzen, Hof, & Roelfsema, 2011; den Elzen, Roelfsema, Hof, Böttcher, &
Grassi, 2012; Jotzo, 2010; UNEP, 2011; de Vit & Höhne, 2012).
As a consequence, leading up to Cancun and the COP 16, the pledges under the Accords were
subject to discussion and negotiations in workshops under the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), inter alia aiming to clarify their contents in terms of cal-
culations and assumptions as well as to increase their ambitions. At COP 16, the pledges were also
officially inscribed into UNFCCC. At COP 17 in Durban, decisions were taken on a common
reporting format for pledges, with the aim to provide more clarity into calculations and assump-
tions. These decisions and the resulting information will benefit discussions under the Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (AWG-ADP), clarifying positions
from the broad range of parties having submitted a pledge.
The literature has mainly focused on quantitative analyses in evaluating whether the pledges
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will be sufficient to reach the +2°C climate target (see above), calculations, assumptions and com-
parability (Jotzo, 2010), efforts needed to accomplish this (Wada, Sano, Akimoto, & Homma,
2012), the pledges’ economic implications (Dellink, Briner, & Clapp, 2010; Lim, 2011; Peterson,
Schleich, & Duscha, 2011), international support (Fukuda & Tamura, 2010; Neuhoff, 2009) and
how the additionality of associated emission reductions can be assessed (Okubo, Hayashib, &
Michaelowa, 2011). While being important research topics, this provides little insight into ex-
post evaluations of the pledges’ origins in terms of contents and ambitions. Qualitative analyses
in literature are scarce in terms of a specific focus on the pledges, but some research touches
upon the subject in terms of the consensus rule (Dryzek & Stevensson, 2011). Much research is
available on drivers for climate change in general and for the KP, the former applies to the analysis
and is included, albeit it will be argued that lessons from KP apply to the pledges to a lesser extent.
Qualitative insight of what can be learnt from present pledge-and-review climate initiatives,
i.e. voluntary pledges under the CA, is thus lacking in literature. Gaining better knowledge of
such initiatives is however important seeing that China and US advocate a voluntary global
climate regime (UNFCCC, 2013; U.S. Department of State, 2011). Moreover, Point Carbon’s
2013 Carbon Market Survey indicates that 39% of the respondents believe that a post-2020
regime (2012 and 2013) will be pledge-and-review, while those anticipating a binding agreement
have dropped from 34 to 27% from 2012 to 2013 (Point Carbon, 2013). The research therefore
aims to make initial contributions to the qualitative understanding of such a development through
analyses of priorities and barriers in formulating climate policy under a pledge-and-review
regime, thus providing insight into the pledges’ origin. It furthermore aims to contribute to the
literature on the Copenhagen Pledges through a research approach that is complementary to
the past research and the on-going process within the UNFCCC. The purpose is to support the
on-going discussions under the UNFCCC in general and specifically the processes under the
AWG-LCA and AWG-ADP to enhance action and raise the level of ambition of the Parties
(UNFCCC, 2011). It is therefore interesting to evaluate the pledges’ political origin, as this
gives insights supporting the on-going discussions and evaluations on strengthening the
pledges’ ambition and progressiveness. Looking at all pledges, only very minor changes have
been made to them since their submission to UNFCCC, which means that the origin still lies
in the process of drawing up the pledge as they are inscribed today.
Thus, the key research question is What is the political origin in terms of the pledges’ design,
and how does this differ between countries? Against this background and by means of interview-
based case-studies of three Annex-I and non-Annex I parties respectively, the article provides

. A comparison of the KP and CA in terms of forming national climate positions under the
UNFCCC
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 23

. A descriptive account for political origins in the pledges of the parties

. An analysis of similarities and differences in political origin of pledges and parties.

The outline of the article is as follows. After describing the research method, we provide
some additional background on differences between commitments under the CA compared to
the KP. This is followed by a section on how pledges are perceived and were developed in
the countries that were case studied; explanations of drivers and barriers per country, as key
determinants in the design of national pledges, follow thereafter. A short summary precedes
the discussion and analysis on political origins in terms of differences and similarities per key
drivers and barriers.

2. Method
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The research is qualitative and based on pledges, interviews, observations at negotiations, a lit-
erature review and dedicated material. A full qualitative analysis of all parties that have submitted
pledges requires very extensive research and methodologically the article therefore builds on case
studies of six parties to the convention:

. Annex I – European Union (EU), United States (US) and Australia

. Non-Annex I – China, India and Brazil.

The countries studied were selected on the basis of their general weight in global green-
house gas emissions as well as differences in energy consumption and conversion as well as
industrial activities. The interviews were semi-structured and the respondents were chosen
against their seniority and active role in the process of drawing up the pledge, the role of
their organization in drawing up the pledge and by recommendation of selected respondents.
All respondents were active in senior roles in each country’s formation of climate policies
and as staff participating in UNFCCC processes at the time of the COP 15 (Table 1).
The respondents from the EU, being a bloc of countries, were selected on the basis of
the rotating Presidency in the Union, meaning that the respondents were those representing
the EU at COP-15 and in the preceding period of developing the negotiation agenda.
Additional interviews were carried out with a senior representative from the European Com-
mission and its main body for international climate strategy and climate negotiations as well
as a key EU representative in the AWG-LCA workshops on the pledges. In total, 21 inter-
views were carried out with senior negotiators, advisors to heads of states, senior manage-
ment of responsible departments and ministries and senior staff of expert commissions on
climate policies ahead of COP 15. The reason for targeting then active negotiators is the
focus on the political origin. The respondents were offered anonymousness to provide a
more open interview. The interviews were carried out during mid-2011, i.e. after Cancun
and prior to Durban.
The observations of the negotiations were both real life and virtual. The workshops at the
AWG-LCA 14 in Bangkok, April 2011, were viewed through UNFCCC webcasts. The AWG-
LCA 14 in Bonn, June 2011, as well as COP 16 and 17 were observed in person.
The literature review focussed on the information regarding political positions on the Copen-
hagen Accords and Cancun Agreements with a view on pledges. This included research on pol-
itical drivers and barriers in the design of pledges. The project also received dedicated literature
from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Australia, stating an official view on the
project’s research questions, complementing the interview responses.
 24 P. Stigson et al.

Table 1. Interviewees per country and position during time of negotiating pledge
Country Respondent Sector Position
EU 1 EU Member State Representative Negotiator
(Ministry)
2 European Commission Adviser to negotiators
3 EU Member State Representative Negotiator
(Ministry)
4 EU Member State Representative Negotiator
(Ministry)
US 5 State (Department) Negotiator
6 State (Department) Negotiator
Australia 7 Academia Scientific Advisor
8 State (Department) Negotiator
9 State (Department) Negotiator
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China 10 State (Ministry) Negotiator

11 Academia Scientific Advisor
12 State (Ministry) Negotiator
13 Academia Scientific Advisor
14 Academia Scientific Advisor
India 15 State (Ministry) Advisor
16 State (Ministry) Climate Policy Manager
17 Academia Scientific Advisor
18 State (Bureau) Climate Policy Manager
Brazil 19 State (Ministry) Negotiator, Climate Policy
Manager
20 State (Ministry) Negotiator, Climate Policy
Manager
21 State (Ministry) Negotiator, Climate Policy
Manager

3. Comparing the political origin of the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Pledges
Analysing the political origin of the pledges raises the question of whether political considerations
in negotiations under a pledge-and-review regime and in declaring a pledge are likely to be differ-
ent to the position towards the KP negotiations and the national commitment thereunder. While
there are natural similarities, as both regimes are international and part of the UNFCCC agenda,
there are also substantial differences. It is therefore difficult to fully draw on lessons from the KP
process, speaking in favour of analysing the origin specifically of the pledges (Table 2). These
differences partly originate in the CA as a pledge-and-review regime taking a more bottom-up
approach in comparison to the KP.

Table 2. Differences between developing commitments under the Copenhagen Accords and the Kyoto
Protocol
Issue Kyoto Protocol Pledges
Year of decision 1997 2009
Compromise Consensus Only national considerations
Rules According to standards (MRV, etc) Flexibility in design
Conditionality Conditionality not accepted Conditionality accepted
Bindingness Predominately viewed as binding Ambiguous views if binding
Spatial focus Global cap National cap
MRV, measuring, reporting and verification.
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 25

The origins of KP and pledges are different in that the former was adopted in 1997, while most
pledges were developed in 2009 and 2010. During these 12 years, the attention to climate
change action has undergone a very rapid development with respect to attention by policymakers,
industry and other actors. The result is that many countries, in comparison to 1997, have
developed comprehensive climate policy agendas and generally have the possibility to tackle it
with a much larger range of political and technical measures. As highlighted by respondent
(2): ‘we are much better informed now so the information that the pledges and discussions
thereunder has brought to the negotiations have a higher value and significance than what
was brought to the negotiations and commitments under the KP’, resulting in a process which
is ‘a much more serious exercise politically and [focusing] on emission numbers and possible
actions’.
The rules on consensus also differ and the absence of a consensus process means that the
process is more flexible. This contributes to several differences. Firstly, pledges are based on
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national negotiations and positions rather than a least common international denominator
achieved through negotiations. Secondly, while the KP has common modalities in a number of
areas, the pledges have large differences, resulting in difficulties in understanding and comparing
them due to disparate calculations and assumptions. However, the interviews identify positive
opinions regarding the pledges bringing more information to the table in terms of issues and part-
ners, which is seen as adding to the transparency and legitimacy of the UNFCCC process (respon-
dents 2, 9, 14, 18). For example, respondent 18 regards the CA process to ‘infuse trust and
confidence both externally and internally as it opens up for self-assessment and addresses uncer-
tainty, which was prevalent with respect to binding agreements and top-down targets’. The lack of
common rules for calculations and assumptions, as well as reporting, may be argued to oppose
this view. However, this can be contested, as the respondents’ base this argument on that the
pledges highlight political priorities in terms of what is opted in and what is opted out of the
pledges, potentially elucidating some contentious issues in the multilateral context. Nevertheless,
the potentially negative effects on transparency and legitimacy due to a large number of pledges
and their disparity should not be neglected. Thirdly, the lack of a consensus rule also means that
the pledges can be conditional upon one or more aspects. For Annex I parties, almost 90% are
conditional and for non-Annex I parties about 60% are conditional (Buhr, Roth, Stigson, & Karls-
son, 2012).
Additionally, while the KP is binding, its compliance mechanism is yet to be proven. The
views among the respondents on whether the pledges are binding are furthermore ambiguous.
The differences in bindingness can arguably be questioned, as the respondents depict a situation
where case-studied countries generally see the pledges as legally binding through inscribing them
in national legislation. They are also viewed as politically binding as being officially declared
under the UNFCCC (see Section 5).
Hence, the political origins of the pledges are interpreted as largely being different to that of
positions under the KP for several reasons. Therefore, an account of the drivers and barriers for
ambitions under the CA, as one of the central regimes under the UNFCCC, contributes to an
understanding of the origin of climate pledges, what may increase ambitions and insights for
further analyses to clarify the pledges as is sought after by the UNFCCC.

4. Drivers and barriers in international climate ambitions

Against this background, a descriptive account of drivers and barriers is provided, supporting a
discussion on key aspects that may affect the political inclination, willingness and acceptance
of the studied countries to change their climate ambition, i.e. the political feasibility of such
changes. This knowledge complements research on calculations and assumptions as well as
 26 P. Stigson et al.

Table 3. Drivers and barriers for pledges under the Copenhagen Accord
Issue Drivers
EU Leadership on climate action
Promote ambition of others
Economy of early action
Avoid lock-in
Long-term policy guidance
US Show new leadership (compared to
earlier administration)
Clean technology market
Australia Leadership on climate action
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Barriers
Dependence on fossil fuels for some Member States
Burden-sharing between Member States
Competitiveness (especially US, China and India)
Lack of political coherence on climate
State of economy
Lack of policy/legislation
Competitiveness and ambition of others (especially
China and EU)
Resource intensive economy

Support for a pledge-and-review Population increase

regime
Access to carbon markets Competiveness (especially China and Japan)
Competiveness
China Domestic policy priorities Social development objectives, including poverty
alleviation and other environmental concerns
Clean technology market Lack of international climate funding
International pressure
India China’s pledge Lack of international climate funding
Energy efficiency and security
Growing rate of emissions from A1
parties
Competiveness
Brazil Presidential election Social development
Public opinion Competitiveness (especially China and India)
Leadership on climate action
Reduce deforestation
International perceptions on climate
action

conditional aspects. The results are presented for each country individually and are thereafter syn-
thesized in the discussions.
Drivers are interpreted as political considerations that support a political will to submit a
pledge as well as the progressiveness of the pledge. Barriers are interpreted as impediments to
a progressive climate ambition due to concerns relating to competing political considerations
(e.g. competitiveness and energy security). Barriers can be trade-offs, where climate policy objec-
tives compete with other political objectives. The drivers and barriers are not weighed against
each other as the interviews did not intend to identify priorities among these perspectives.
Table 3 summarizes the drivers and barriers to submit a pledge as well as the ambitiousness of
the pledge.
Describing the political considerations in not only developing the pledges in terms of the
ambition but also including a general account of the broader political vision behind submitting
a pledge, the following drivers and barriers are the key topics analysed per country:

. The political landscape

○ The contextual origin of the pledge and its ambition
. National context
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 27

○ First-mover considerations
○ Juridical considerations
○ Economic circumstances
. Supranational considerations
○ Competitiveness and other countries
○ International pressure

○ Differentiated responsibilities

4.1. EU
In interviews with EU representatives, it has been pointed out that the pledge and its ambition
originates from the common EU policy on climate change, developed ahead of and providing
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key input to the negotiations at COP 15 (respondents 3 and 4). Being designed before Copenha-
gen, the EU respondents (2–4) argue that such important drivers were to present an early and
fairly ambitious position.
Highlighting the general focus on other parties in drivers and barriers in designing the pledges,
respondents 2 and 3 identify that a driver was to provoke others to bring strong climate commit-
ments to Copenhagen as ‘we were the first ones to present our ambition’ (respondent 2). This
included the promise of potentially increasing the ambition if others committed to similar ambi-
tions, aiming to provoke others to bring similar and preferably ambitious agendas to COP 15.
According to respondent 4, the key countries of interest for EU are the following countries:
US, Canada, Japan, Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico and South Africa. However, in terms of estab-
lishing the level of the pledge’s ambition, the focus on other countries was less influential, owing
to the fact that the respondents view EU’s position in the negotiations as being developed before
others and that there as such was not much to compare with (respondents 2 and 3). The attention to
competitiveness focussed on the industry in terms carbon leakage and employment rate concerns
(respondent 4).
Moreover, the pledge reflects what could be accepted by the different member states, i.e.
reflecting a collective account of political feasibility (respondents 2–4). In other words, the
least common denominator was determined by the member states that identified strong ambitions
as challenged by their energy systems and economies with heavy reliance on fossil fuels. In
addition, new member states host many of the most cost-efficient abatement measures, causing
them to argue that their burden share is unreasonably large. The income differences between
member states also mean that priorities on climate change differ. Moreover, some have large ship-
ping industries, resulting in key businesses sectors being highly reliant on fossil fuels.
Respondent 4 argues that EU views itself as a long-term global leader on climate action and
that there is public support and demand for proactive decisions and goals. Respondent 4 also
shares the view that while the sentiment that ‘it pays to act on climate change’ has grown stronger,
the Stern perspective that acting now at least reduces costs compared to inaction is probably pre-
dominant in the EU and many other countries. Hence, in terms of what is required to increase the
pledge, respondent 4 identifies that it could be in self-interest, if evidence would show that it pays
off (e.g. clean tech and security of energy supply) – i.e. benefits of a likewise higher ambition
level can be expected. Respondent 1 also argues that pursuing a 30% reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions, which is the higher conditional level of EU’s pledge, has economic benefits
through avoiding lock-in and removal of infrastructures prior to their economic life time as
well as creating resilience towards price-shocks. Respondent 2 similarly argues that ‘we have
moved from a discussion on what others are doing and a stricter focus on climate change mitiga-
tion to positive aspects for the economy, the green race, the value of a healthy population, etc.’
 28 P. Stigson et al.

Another driver, according to respondent 3, was that the industry voiced strong concerns about a
long-term policy perspective and consequently policymakers are striving to develop a longer
outlook for guiding the policy developments.
In the future perspective and the perspective of science and evidence-based policymaking,
respondent 3 argues that the next Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change is likely to become an important document in influencing drivers in EU and
elsewhere.

4.2. United States

From an overall perspective, according to respondents 5 and 6, the pledge is a vision of the Obama
administration that aimed to show new US leadership on climate change both nationally and inter-
nationally. However, the least common denominator in the US was determined by political com-
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promises between the House of Representatives and the Senate (respondents 5 and 6). In other
words, it is a political balance between respecting the Senate while not undercutting the
House. The barrier identified by the respondents, resulting in this compromise was the conten-
tiousness of the climate issue and differing opinions on how it should be addressed, being
well-known to the administration as a result of controversies under the KP, and a sense that
there was little point in ‘going beyond what we thought we could possibly pass in Congress’
(respondent 5).
The competition was highlighted from the perspective that the state economy is critical and
that ‘When unemployment rises from 5–10% over 1 year, it is not easy to pass anything that
could worsen the situation. Recession is an obstacle’ (respondent 5). Special reference was
made to the shaky economy of recent years and ‘[that we need to] balance cost trade-offs in
terms of competitiveness and economic development’ (respondent 6). Two specific aspects in
relation to competitiveness were, however, pinpointed in more detail. Firstly, the comparability
with major economies, in which the House of Representatives put a special emphasis on China
and competitiveness, and whether China competes in a fair way in terms of trade (respondent
5). As a result, at the time there were discussions of introducing a border carbon adjustment,
which were seen as questionable under WTO rules (respondent 5). Coping with competitiveness
concerns interestingly boils down to that ‘all is conditional on a broad agreement, such as the
Copenhagen Accords’ (respondent 6). Secondly, an aspect which can be seen both as a driver
and a barrier is that of green technology leadership potentially creating job opportunities as
well as increasing costs: ‘There is a growing awareness that if we do not develop clean energy
technologies, we are going to have to buy the technology from elsewhere’ (respondent 6).
Both respondents 5 and 6 argue that the policy situation in the US also includes that moving
beyond the pledge would require new legislation to complement the Clean Air Act. An important
barrier in forming the ambition was therefore the difficulties to pass climate legislation in the US.
An example of this being the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also called the
Waxman–Markey Bill, which was passed in the House but not in the Senate. Working within the
boundaries of existing legislation to meet an ambition was consequently seen as a precondition for
declaring an official pledge. While many pledges are quite concise, respondent 6 explains a per-
ceived vagueness of the pledge as being a result of climate legislation at the time working its way
through the senate and that it consequently was difficult to be more precise about exact numbers.

4.3. Australia
From the views of the Australian respondents (7–9) as well as the dedicated report on the pledges
to this study (DCCEE, 2011), it is clear that Australia wanted to tangibly support the CA, as being
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 29

viewed as a positive initiative due to its large inclusion of parties and emissions as well as con-
tribution to transparency. The latter is identified by respondent 8 as a crucial driver for ambitions
under the conditional nature of Australia’s pledge, especially in terms of the measuring, reporting
and verification and the domestic legal status of other parties’ pledges (respondents 7 and 9). In
terms of the pledge’s ambition, one of the central elements driving Australia’s climate ambitions,
according to respondent 9, is the resource consumption and demographic situation of the country.
Respondent 9 also argued that the CA does not mean ‘much deviation from the current architec-
ture of the KP in defining country commitments’, viewing that the KP was also built up by an itera-
tive bottom-up process and that the compliance mechanism thereof is yet to be proven. The pledge
is seen as politically binding, although not binding by international law, describing that ‘Australia
takes its international political commitments seriously and we expect others to do the same’
(DCCEE, 2011).
Australia has a highly resource-insensitive economy and trying to meet challenges of a peak in
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oil production is seen as ‘representing very real challenges and requiring a lot of effort’ (respon-
dent 9). As a result, a driver for climate policy was decoupling mitigation as an economic burden
and rather to proceed with the climate policy framework as an imperative for economic develop-
ment, especially in terms of the country’s resource wealth and heavy dependence on exports
(respondent 9). The high resource intensity contributes to competitiveness being a concern for
Australia (respondent 8), but concerns thereof are in general terms downplayed by the Australian
White Paper on a low-pollution future (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). It is therefore
described that many of Australia’s emission intensive industries will maintain or improve the
international competitiveness with globally coordinated action. Nevertheless, carbon leakage is
mentioned as a concern, necessitating assistance to certain trade exposed industries.
Moreover, singling out as the only studied country, Australia highlights a population increase
as a driver for climate policy. The population is expected to grow by 40% to 2020, which is seen
as a significant challenge for climate policy and as a central element on the agenda of decisions
needed to maintain an ambitious climate agenda (respondent 9).
Pointing to a link between the CA and KP, which was not highlighted by other respondents,
Australia’s ambition is hinging on the access to carbon markets and their international develop-
ment due to their importance in fulfilling the pledge. However, this could be built up by bilateral
or regional trade mechanisms.
In terms of specific countries which Australia looks at to design their pledge, the respondents
do not highlight any other countries that were of particular interest. The pledge, however, speaks
of ‘major developing countries’ and ‘advance economies’ in different conditional terms as part of
meeting different mitigation levels.
Reflecting on possible drivers to increase the pledge, respondent 8 argues that a lack of pro-
gress in the negotiations opened up for first mover advantages and that this was an opportunity
that Australia was meaning to utilise through its conditional pledge.

4.4. China
The Chinese respondents highlight the origins of the pledge as generally stemming from political
priorities of a ‘reasonable increase of the economy’, i.e. coordinated economic and social devel-
opments linked to energy use and related emissions. The level of ambition was a result of discus-
sions and negotiations with provinces and industries, aiming to find a balance in development
patterns (respondents 11 and 14). This included a focus on trade-offs between climate actions
and other priorities, such as ‘social development, well-being, poverty reduction, environmental
protection etc., and obviously forest issues’ (respondent 11). One key driver, along these lines,
which is supported by all Chinese respondents, is to increase the share of non-fossil fuels and
 30 P. Stigson et al.

adjusting the current energy infrastructure in light of finite fossil fuel sources, the aim being to
provide a basis for a stable and predictable development.
Being both a driver and a barrier, a central element is to deal with climate change as an aspect
that may hinder a development towards a status similar to that of industrialized countries and that
a clean-tech industry may provide opportunities for both mitigation and economic development.
From a supranational perspective, the target was mainly set against historical emission perspec-
tives and the current development patterns of A1 parties (respondents 10–13). Furthermore, to the
context of supranational perspectives, the Chinese respondents argue that after setting the target
against this background, there is no influence from other parties in the context of changing the
pledge. However, respondent 11 referred to the principles of the KP and respondent 12 to A1
parties not delivering on climate funding.
Providing insights into supranational drivers from another perspective than taking a role as
leaders’ in the negotiations, such as voiced by the EU, Australia and Brazil, respondent 12
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relates to negotiation aspects, saying ‘frankly speaking, it’s mainly because of international
pressure’ and ‘to avoid being in the focus of arguments on commitments’. Other respondents
(11 and 13) also bring up that the time to formulate a pledge was right, as it included a political
will and insight regarding the need to change the development pattern – ‘Even if there was no
Copenhagen Accords, China would have this kind of target (respondent 14)’. Along these
lines, respondent 11 argues that the government also used the CA as an opportunity to adjust
the industry structure in China.

4.5. India
The general level of India’s ambition was impeded by mistrust that funding from developed
countries would materialise (respondents 15–17). Respondent 15 clarifies by arguing that
there would be no support to ‘the so-called emerging economies’ and India therefore pledging
‘what was thought to be achieved with own resources’ without affecting other areas of devel-
opment and impeding growth. Similar to many responses from A1 parties, respondent 15
argues that an overall driver to submit a pledge was to motivate ‘more ambitious targets
from developed countries as India is interested in a robust outcome on the principles of
equity’. Respondent 18 also highlights the attention to A1 parties in choosing 2005 as the
base year, as India was originally planning to inscribe 1990 but did not to avoid this being
‘a limiting factor’.
Respondents 15 and 17 do not identify any drivers in particular, rather referring to the com-
promise above. As identified by respondent 18, however, the first of the two key drivers in
India was the national circumstances, where a target linked to energy intensity ‘made sense
domestically, both looking at competitiveness and ensuring energy security’. The second key
driver was the geopolitical situation where the international community increasingly started
to pressure emerging economies to take on binding targets. When China announced its
target, it strongly contributed to India following along the same path (respondents 15 and
18). A contributing factor to this pressure is identified as China overtaking the US as the
world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (respondent 16), hence also highlighting attention
to NA1 parties.
The intensity-based target in the pledge was thus a result of both China choosing such a target
as well as the lack of funding to go for a more stringent target. The intensity target was also sup-
ported by a ‘reduction in energy intensity in the last few years’ (respondent 18).
The Indian respondents (15–18) also agree with the Chinese position, arguing that developed
countries must deliver on technology transfer and financial support to stimulate actions exceeding
voluntary ambitions based on domestic capacities.
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 31

4.6. Brazil
The COP 15 in Copenhagen coincided with the presidential election of 2010, which resulted in
climate change being a central topic in the presidential campaigns (respondent 21). Both these
events resulted in intensive media attention to climate policy and growing public opinion on
climate action, both working as drivers (respondents 20 and 21). Respondent 21 furthermore
argues that a proactive climate position was never far off seeing that Brazil identifies itself as a
traditional leader on climate change and that controversies between big emitters such as the
US and China provided an opportunity ‘to occupy a position of leadership in the international
arena’. Similar to other countries, Brazilian respondents (19 and 20) identified that there was a
lack of political leadership under UNFCCC and that this was a contributing driver.
Another driver was to reduce deforestation, which was not an exclusive driver for a climate
pledge, but a general political focus in Brazil (respondents 20 and 21). However, owing to the
advanced position of deforestation in policy priorities, respondent 21 argues that this sector is
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a key part of the pledge’s ambitiousness and according to respondent 20, land-use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) accounts for 60% of the pledged target.
Initially being a trade-off and impediment for climate action, respondent 20 argues that it was
realized that the Brazilian agricultural and forestry sectors had much more to gain, than to loose,
from an ambitious climate agenda, moving these sectors’ concerns into drivers. The logic being
that these sectors, if perceived as green and climate compliant, could increase their international
market shares. For example, respondent 20 argues that there were signs towards a development
where European customers reduced beef purchases from Brazilian cattle. This background,
according to respondents 20 and 21, strongly contributes to the biggest priority in Brazil’s
pledge being LULUCF.
The influence of international competitiveness on the pledge’s design was highlighted through
respondent 19 in that ‘the main aspect was always the fear to block the country’s development’.
However, while some respondents in other countries specified that their pledge was developed
with attention to other countries, the Brazilian respondents (19–21) argue that while eyeing devel-
oped countries as well as China and India, other countries did not influence the pledge to any sig-
nificant extent.

5. Discussion
The results above are not aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of all drivers and barriers,
but rather point to what aspects that was identified as most important by the respondents. The
drivers and barriers are not weighed against each other as the respondents within a country or
bloc (i.e. EU) typically referred to similar aspects. The aspects included above should thus be
viewed as a group of aspects that are collectively prioritized in the design of the pledge. This
includes that one respondent may highlight a driver or barrier, not mentioned by other respon-
dents. Similarly, differences exist between parties, and the following section will highlight dissim-
ilarities as well as similarities of the general political landscape, aspects that can strengthen action
both individually and collectively, and bottom-up pledge-and-review processes as part of the
UNFCCC agenda.

5.1. The political landscape in general

Respondents from the studied parties highlighted that the situation at the time of COP 15 typically
provided a political feasibility to submit a pledge, except for the US where the respondents gave
the opposite account. The reasons providing this possibility, however, differed in varying degrees
relating to national and supranational considerations. The EU, Australia, China and Brazil pointed
 32 P. Stigson et al.

to national drivers, such as public support and climate policy proactiveness as political argument
to appeal to voters. National considerations were also central to the US pledge, but then as a
barrier. India and China pointed to supranational drivers in terms of growing pressure on devel-
oping countries to commit to climate action. A Chinese respondent clarifies the dual position
through ‘China itself has already realized that it’s time to change the development routine and
pattern. Even without the Accords, China would also have this kind of strategy target’ (respon-
dent 13). It is, however, unclear how and to which extent that international pressure could work as
a driver also to increase the ambition. In India, respondent 17 says that the pledge is ‘an indication
of what India was prepared to do voluntarily using domestic means’ as they did not see it feasible
to condition the pledge on developed country assistance. Australian respondents singled-out in
highlighting population growth as one of the most important challenge to policymakers in provid-
ing a framework that would support a sustainable and growing society.
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5.2. Barriers, drivers and strengthening pledges

The most common concern to establish a barrier is that of competitiveness, mentioned specifically
by all parties except China. This was expected seeing the general structure of national energy
systems, as they are typically highly dependent on fossil fuel sources and climate action thus gen-
erally raising production and transportation costs. While there are examples of countries having
decoupled the economic growth from carbon dioxide emissions, most commonly, there is a strong
link between the both. Hence, negotiations on setting a cap on national emissions under the
UNFCCC and elsewhere effectively also negotiate the manoeuvring space for economic develop-
ments, especially for developing countries. Such views can be exemplified by respondent 6, in
arguing that it was central for US to ‘balance costs in terms of competitiveness and economic
development’.
In terms of what the respondents express on possibilities to increase the pledge, the interviews
identified a diverse set of issues. References were made to scientific and practical evidence that
the challenge posed by anthropogenic GHG emissions is larger than expected as well as that it
would pay off to meet this challenge forcefully rather than evaluating what others do and what
is most effective.
The references to economic effects and science-based policymaking could argue that the
IPCC should increase attention to the economic effects of climate change in different regions
and of different measures. This could exemplify the potential for positive effects for early-
movers and relate to the Stern Report’s (2007) argument that it will cost more to deal with mitiga-
tion and adaptation the longer we wait. It would furthermore be in line with the EU and US
respondents arguing green sector developments as a driver for increased ambition, avoiding tech-
nological lock-in and building resilience towards price-shocks on the oil market. Respondent 6 in
the US similarly identifies that there was a ‘growing awareness that if we do not develop clean
energy technologies, we will have to buy them from elsewhere’. Emphasising another developing
country perspective, Brazil and respondent 19 describes another picture in ‘We debated a little
about international competitiveness, indirectly, but the main aspect was always the fear to be
blocking the country’s development.’ This reflects Brazil’s experiences where an ambitious
pledge was supported by the notion of negative effects on traditional sectors such as beef pro-
duction. There is consequently a development where barriers, such as competitiveness, increas-
ingly work as drivers, e.g. due to green industrial policy. Evidence of such positive effects
should thus be evaluated by researchers and highlighted under the UNFCCC to support the
goal of increasing the ambition of the pledges. Respondents from EU and Brazil clearly empha-
size that a major driver was to push the negotiations and stimulate progressive ambitions, arguing
a traditional leadership on climate. However, leadership in an area may also have the effect that it
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 33

is excluded from the pledge. In the case of Brazil, the advanced position on renewable energy
sources excluded it from the pledge as additional drivers were seen as superfluous.
There is a clear divide between the A1 and NA1 parties in how they view drivers and barriers
under the CA; many of which is inherited from the KP process in specific and UNFCCC in
general. One such aspect is the financial support promised by A1 parties. The NA1 parties are
asking for this support to be realized; in the case of India, the pledged ambition has been devel-
oped against what can be accomplished through own means, seeing that they are unsure that the
support will be materialized.
Of the studied parties, all A1 countries included attention to other countries as a barrier, affect-
ing competitiveness and trade. In terms of the attention to other countries by NA1 parties, the
interviews highlighted expectations that developed countries would live up to the pledged
support to mitigation and adaptation.
The industrial structure in some EU member states and Australia gave rise to comments on
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trade-offs in terms of protecting energy and emission-intensive heavy industries and an ambitious
pledge. The effects on pledges and climate policy ambitions, however, differed. The Australian
position, on one hand, pointed to a comprehensive climate framework as potentially benefitting
the domestic industries and driving support to CA and emissions trading through what is argued
as comparably ambitious positions. In the EU, on the other hand, respondents argued that opposi-
tion to a strong ambition by some member states reduced the climate goal.

5.3. Enhancing action through accountability

The research provides insights into drivers that may contribute to strengthen the pledges in the case-
studied countries, barriers and trade-offs there between. However, another way of strengthening the
pledges is to improve the accountability in terms of calculations and assumptions. This is, however,
difficult as many parties would like to adhere to KP rules, while others see a fully voluntary and
non-binding approach as favourable. The latter can be exemplified through remarks by US nego-
tiators at the AWG-LCA 14 in Bonn, saying that the US is not a signatory to the KP and will thus not
abide by the rules therein. The way forward should thus be informed by on one hand the trade-off
between a greater inclusion of parties, partly due to the voluntary nature of the CA, and on the other
hand potentially higher level and uniform stipulations on accountability. In theory, it would be
possible to identify an optimal level in these regards, where a joint and predictable climate ambition
reaches its highest level, let be that some parties would then not take part. A more detailed analysis
of this is, however, beyond the scope of this research.

5.4. The UNFCCC and Copenhagen Accords

Although the parties share climate policy concerns, such as competiveness, a more comprehen-
sive view shows that the drivers and barriers are as disparate as the pledges. In Brazil, for
example, the responses indicate that climate commitments will always be evaluated based on
their trade-offs or compliance with agricultural and forestry priorities. In Australia, a key con-
sideration is a population increase, while political dead-locks are the key aspects in the US.
The question therefore arises if such a disparate situation in climate policy formation lends
itself to being formalised in a strict regime, as KP, where calculations and assumptions are
uniform and built by consensus. The question is relevant given that this appears to be the
general focus under the UNFCCC and the desired outcome of the Durban Platform. This can
be compared to the situation in the EU where the ambition was held back by a consensus
process leading to a lower least common denominator.
Moreover, carbon markets are an important tool for some key countries in fulfilling their
pledges or any other climate ambition. As a consequence, uncertainties regarding the future of
 34 P. Stigson et al.

carbon markets will reflect negatively on other climate regimes, such as the CA, even though
these latter regimes may not focus specifically on emissions trading mechanisms. While a
higher inclusion of countries and emissions as well as the abovementioned positive views by
countries could arguable support the CA as a successor of the KP, alternatively as a bridge
between KP periods or another binding regime, its efficacy and ambitiousness will still be
hinging on a credible outlook for trading emissions. To which extent that this applies to other
countries’ climate ambitions should thus be further analysed.

6. Conclusions
The description of drivers, barriers and their trade-offs point to a number of key aspects for the
case-studied countries in designing their pledges and what could strengthen them. Overall, the
respondents point to a sense of urgency at the time of COP15 in accomplishing something con-
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structive and that the CA provided enough flexibility and gathered enough support to motivate the
majority of parties to submit a pledge. But, there was also national support to move ahead with
climate ambitions due to a more diverse set of aspects – e.g. energy security, development con-
cerns and clean-tech developments – that together pointed to something needed to be accom-
plished regardless of advancements under other tracks of the UNFCCC.
The majority of respondents are positive to the CA as a contribution to concerted climate
effort, offering a broad inclusion of parties and aspects in a more open forum than the KP, but
still in a formal setting with a framework that could bring in, and aims to stimulate ambitious
climate commitments. The submission of a pledge was thus by some seen as a way of supporting
the new regime. As a result of the large number of pledges, the CA is seen as increasing the trans-
parency and legitimacy of the UNFCCC. While being a voluntary pledge-and-review regime, it is
predominately seen as binding by the senior negotiators interviewed in the research. Hence,
despite the CA’s arguable deficiencies in being non-binding, having low accountability and
high disparity in terms of calculations, assumptions, reporting and verification, the non-consensus
style is seen as having strong merits.
The research identifies the political origins of the pledges as being largely different to that of
positions on the KP due to several reasons. In terms of drivers and barriers there are differences,
but most essentially barriers appear to be increasingly viewed as drivers and that evidence of posi-
tive effects of a low-carbon development in terms of a clean-tech sector and other gains would
likely to support the goal under UNFCCC to increase the pledges’ ambition.
In terms of reaching the objective under the UNFCCC and AWG-ADP to enhance action by
Parties, the research identifies, inter alia, that emissions trading is continuously important to
provide a flexible mechanism that some parties see as essential to increase their ambition. This
potentially challenges the views of CA as a separate regime. Moreover, information that could
potentially enhance actions is the upcoming IPCC 5th assessment report and economic impli-
cations of needed climate actions, respectively, showing evidence of national risks of inaction
and economic benefits of action in the shorter term. There is thus an interest among the negotiators
to share and promote such knowledge both nationally and internationally to gain support for a
more proactive climate agenda on different levels. In conclusion, drivers were generally associ-
ated with global aspects, such as competitiveness, international emissions trading international
pressure and green technology trade. Barriers were conversely more associated with national con-
siderations, such as energy security, resource intensive economies, recession and political feasi-
bility. As such, the research identified a larger focus of the respondents on dealing with barriers
and trade-offs as a way to enhance ambition.
The results contribute to the understanding of how climate ambitions are being developed
under a pledge-and-review regime. Analysing the ambitions specifically of such regimes is
 Greenhouse Gas Measurement & Management 35

important due to its support by large emitting nations as well as viewed as the most likely post-
2020 regime in surveys. The results provide input into the AWG-ADP on aspects that can provide
opportunities and obstacles in enhancing action and raising the level of ambition of the Parties.
While the aspects highlighted by the respondents are country specific, they represent drivers
and obstacles by some major emitters and are thus recommended for inclusion in such future ana-
lyses of the pledges.

Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the Swedish Energy Agency for funding under the International Climate
Politics Programme as well as two anonymous reviewers.
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