Legal Ethics Cases Digest

COMPILATION OF DIGESTED CASES
FOR P.A.L.E CLASS UNDER ATTY. ISAIAS GIDUQUIO
1. A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000sdf

LESLIE UI vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO
Facts:
Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on
grounds of immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children.
According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him about the relationship between
them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said respondent to stop
their illicit affair but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is
a victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had
known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese
woman who is already in Amoy, China. Moreover, the two got married
in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their relationship. When respondent knew of
the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship. Respondent further
claims that she and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his
children to allow them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent however
presented a misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.
Issue:
Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves
to be barred from the practice of law?
Ruling:
NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations.
It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once
a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. If good moral
character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 1

Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. Respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was
with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered as an
immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral
norms of society and to opinion of good and respectable member of the
community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same
must be grossly immoral, that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards.
Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon

discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession.
2. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of

Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN,
ET AL.
Facts:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful

candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest
and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all
subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams
the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting
of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-
1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered

and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against,
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than
those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill
no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it.
Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying

substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June
21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since
it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice
of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
Issues:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession
and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is
CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of
the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary
power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in
this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not
the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of
the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to
Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the

Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C.
may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the
rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate
the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare
minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation

5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the
entire law is void.
Ruling:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and
w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval
of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the
candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the
candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o
getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed
whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)
3. [B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER
OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ
Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from
taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to
take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely:
Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and
Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21,
2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and
his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in
his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact
that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement
letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to
have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his
Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed
against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former
professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing
in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law,
Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies
the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to
him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed
of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor
a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is
still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
Issue:
WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and
shall subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the
Roll of Attorneys
Ruling:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a

Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a
Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of
the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and
academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of
right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned
in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there

is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer.
By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of
fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to
impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
4. [A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

MELANIO L. ZORETA vs. ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G.
SIMPLICIANO
Facts:
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of

COntract and Damaes against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC)
dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial
Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano
was the latter’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a dully
commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications issued by teh CLerk of
Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as
evidenced by presented documents.
Issue:
WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the

Rules of Court.
Ruling:

Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the
lawyer’s oath to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear
that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. “A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, “Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). The lawyer violates, likewise,
Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
5. A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON
ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact
SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL v ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR
Facts:
Atty. Homobono t. Cezar entered into a Deed of Assignment for the price of
P1.5M in favor of Marili C. Ronquillo, a Filipino citizen residing in Cannes, France
his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and lot and obligated himself to
deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with Crown
Asia, the townhouse developer Respondent received P750,000.00 upon
execution of the Deed of Assignment and was able to encash the first check of
P187,500.00
Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that

respondent has not paid in full the price of the townhouse and he also failed to
deliver a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia.
Complainant ordered stop payment on the second check of P187,500.00.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Homobono t. Cezar should be disbared or suspended for

deceit and grossly immoral conduct
Ruling:
YES. SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 3 YEARS.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath;
(6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the
subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or
assign said property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.
Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the
money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino
Worker for 10 years, is morally reprehensible.
Respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in
him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they
are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession whether or not the attorney is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar; cannot rule on the issue of the
amount of money that should be returned
6. [G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000]

REMEDIOS F. EDRIAL, MAURO EDRIAL JR., MARYLENE
EDRIAL, ILDEFONSO EDRIAL, ROSALIND EDRIAL, MARY JEAN
EDRIAL, and SUSAN EDRIAL-VALENZUELA vs. PEDRO QUILAT-
QUILAT, GABRIELA QUILAT-QUILAT, ISIDRA QUILAT-QUILAT,
and ESTANISLAO QUILAT-QUILAT
Facts:
Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat

-- filed an action for recovery of a parcel of land against Petitioners Remedios,
Mauro Jr., Marylene, Idelfonso, Rosalind, Mary Jean - - all surnamed Edrial --
and Susan Edrial-Valenzuela.The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6315
and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City.
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal because, in issuing the questioned Orders,
the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.In giving petitioners more than ample time to complete their
presentation of evidence and in granting their Motions for Postponement, the
judge was accommodating them more than they actually deserved.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in denying the petitioners prayer due to their ―inexcusable
delay.
Ruling:

No. Counsel's excuses are unsatisfactory and unacceptable. The CA ruled that
petitioners were given "more than enough time" to complete their presentation of
evidence. Respondents rested their case as early as September 1992.
Petitioners' lawyer, at his own request, was allowed to start presenting evidence
only on April 12, 1993. From that day until April 26, 1996 or for a period of three
years, counsel presented only two witnesses. The trial judge was in fact liberal in
granting petitioners' Motions for Postponement. But enough was enough; when
they attempted to delay the trial some more, the trial judge finally and correctly
refused to go along.
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining

extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, shall not let the period
lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for their failure to do
so (Rule 12.03). Moreover, they should avoid any action that would unduly delay
a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes (Rule
12.04).
For the benefit of the bench and bar, worth repeating is the CA's reminder to
petitioners' counsel of his duty to his client and to the court:
"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the

administration of justice.Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its
ends-the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of
cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with
the primary task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice."
7. [G.R. No. 131541. October 20, 2000]

THERMOCHEM INCORPORATED and JEROME O. CASTRO
vs. LEONORA NAVAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
On May 10, 1992, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, Eduardo Edem was driving a
"Luring Taxi" along Ortigas Avenue, near Rosario, Pasig, going towards Cainta.
Prior to the collision, the taxicab was parked along the right side of Ortigas
Avenue, not far from the Rosario Bridge, to unload a passenger. Thereafter, the
driver executed a U-turn to traverse the same road, going to the direction of
EDSA. At this point, the Nissan Pathfinder traveling along the same road going to
the direction of Cainta collided with the taxicab. The taxicab was then dragged
into the nearby Question Tailoring Shop, thus, causing damage to the said
tailoring shop, and its driver, Eduardo Eden, sustained injuries as a result of the
incident. Private respondent, as owner of the taxi, filed a damage suit against
petitioner, Thermochem Incorporated, as the owner of the Nissan Pathfinder, and

its driver, petitioner Jerome Castro. After trial, the lower court adjudged petitioner
Castro negligent and ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to pay private
respondent actual, compensatory and exemplary damages plus attorney's fees
and costs of suit.
Issue:
Whether or not Castro was Negligent.
Ruling:
Decision modified. Award is reduced in half, considering the contributory

negligence of the driver of private respondent's taxi.
The Supreme Court held that the driver of the oncoming Nissan Pathfinder
vehicle was liable and the driver of the U-turning taxicab was contributorily liable.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the fact that a party had no opportunity to
avoid the collision is of his own making and this should not relieve him of liability.
The driver of the taxi is contributorily liable. U-turns are not generally advisable
particularly on major streets. The taxi was hit on its side which means that it had
not yet fully made a turn to the other lane. The driver of the taxi ought to have
known that vehicles coming from the Rosario bridge are on a downhill slope.
Obviously, there was lack of foresight on his part, making him contributorily liable.
Most public utility drivers disregard signs and traffic rules especially during the
night when traffic enforcers manning the streets disappear with the light. In
driving vehicles, the primary concern should be the safety not only of the driver or
his passengers, but also his fellow motorists.
8. A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO FLORA QUINGWA v
ARMANDO PUNO
Facts:
Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of

the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an educated
woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. The
respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the
hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to
respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness
and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy supported by a

certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how intimate the relationship
between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she
gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her.
The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for
disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.
Ruling:
YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that
the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). It is essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege to
maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is
not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the
charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under
any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as
enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a
settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers
cannot be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded
and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that
members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves
in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession
of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or
education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the
dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of
justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a

consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
9. A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ATTY. FE T. TUANDA
Facts:
Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift
the suspension from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of
the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one Herminia A.
Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale on
commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry
worth P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding
receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to settle her
obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but
was found guilty of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing CheckLaw). The
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and imposed further
suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the offense
involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her
suspension to be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on
top of the fines imposed to her in violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing
further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee (Herminia A.
Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.
Ruling:

NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found
guilty involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order
of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First

Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section,
and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is
a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public
order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interest of parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of
the community at large. Putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade
and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. The crimes of which respondent was convicted
also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land."
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of

Suspension. Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until
further orders from this Court.
10. [A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005]

MARIA ELENA MORENO vs. ATTY. ERNESTO ARANETA
Facts:
Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which
amounts to P11, 000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored
because the account against which is drawn is closed. Thereafter the case was

forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the records of this case back to this
Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the
Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case.
The Report further made mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been convicted by final judgment of
estafa through falsification of a commercial document.
Issue:
Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks

drawn against a closed account.
Ruling:
The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is a
manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held
that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one year’s
suspension from the practice of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial
payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has,
apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been
indefinitely suspended. Considering that he had previously committed a
similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves moral turpitude, we
are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held
that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a
crime involving moral turpitude. As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, “the review of respondent's conviction no
longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been
executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy
of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say that,
by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.”
11. [B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES
Facts:

Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of
his IBP dues from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that
after admission to the Bar he worked at the Civil Service Commission then
migrated to the US until his retirement. His contention to be exempt is that his
employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his law profession and he
did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he pays his IBP
annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer.
His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the
law.
Issues:
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time
that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of

property without due process?
Ruling:
1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If

the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of

which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of
dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of
the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being
one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but
a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of

the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a

privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment
of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
12. A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule
of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-
Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition
to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to
the IBP.
Ruling:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a

member of as distinguished from bar associations in which membership is
merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only
compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer

to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the
regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its payment
is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction
over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to
pay their annual dues.
13. A.C. No. 5039

Spouses EDUARDO and TERESITA GARCIA v Atty. ROLANDO S.
BALA
Facts:
Complainants Spouses Garcia engaged the services of respondent Atty. Bala to

appeal to the CA the adverse Decision of the Department of Agrarian Relations
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Instead, Atty. Bala erroneously filed a Notice of
Appeal with the DARAB. Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, appeals from the
decisions of the DARAB should be filed with the CA through a verified petition
for review. Because of Atty. Bala‘s error, the prescribed period for filing the
petition lapsed, to the prejudice of his clients.Spouses Eduardo and Teresita
Garcia filed before this Court a Letter-Complaint against Atty. Rolando S. Bala.
The Court required Atty. Bala to comment on the Complaint. He failed to

comply; thus, he was presumed to have waived his right to be heard. In its
Resolution, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Investigating IBP Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa found Atty. Bala guilty of

violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Board of Governors of
the IBP passed a Resolution which adopted with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating commissioner. It recommended that Atty.
Bala should be reprimanded and suspended from the practice of law for six
months; and that he should return, within thirty days from his receipt of the
Decision, the amount of P9,200, with legal interest from the filing of the present
Complaint with this Court.

Issue:
WON Atty. Bala should be disciplined.
Ruling:
Yes. He should be disciplined. Atty. Rolando S. Bala is found guilty of

negligence and conduct unbecoming a lawyer; he is suspended from the
practice of law for six months.
Rule 18.03 provides that ―a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them.
A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
authorized by law, and is expected to rely on the lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense.
Evidently, respondent failed to champion the cause of his clients with

wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Despite adequate time, he did not
familiarize himself with the correct procedural remedy as regards their case.
Worse, he repeatedly assured them that the supposed petition had already
been filed.
Since he effectively waived his right to be heard, the Court can only assume
that there was no valid reason for his failure to file a petition for review, and that
he was therefore negligent.
Under the present factual circumstances, respondent should return the money
paid by complainants.
14. A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and
Deputy Clerk of Court,
Facts:
This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar
Confidant during the 1971 Bar Examination emanating from the revelation of
one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his confidential
letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified
as Ramon Galang was raised before the result was released to make him pass
the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar examiners and the

Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It
appears that each of the 5 bar examiners were approached by Lanuevo with
the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the grades of the bar
examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review
the grades obtained in all subjects by an examinee and when he finds a
candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and low grade in
one subject he can bring it to the examiner for reconsideration to help the
candidate pass. In good faith of trust and confidence to the authority of
Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and reconsider
the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation also revealed
that Ramon Galang was charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the
Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his application to take the bar
examination.
Issues:
WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-
correct the examination result of a bar candidate.
Ruling:
The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to
convince each examiner individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in
order to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the Court. His duty
as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks
after they are corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the
general average of the bar candidate. All requests for re-evaluation of grades
from the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the facts
fully established that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of
Galang without the authority of the Court, he has breached the trust and
confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken
out from the rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently
concealing the criminal charges against him in his application for the bar exam
while under oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar
examiners acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case but
reminded to perform their duties with due care.
15. AC-5365. April 27, 2005

Spouses OLBES VS. Atty. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
Facts:
Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for
security of a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre
filled up four of the five checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All

checks were dishonored. Thus, Atty. Deciembre fled a case for estafa against
the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case
against Atty. Deciembre with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. In the
report, Commissioner Dulay recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.
Ruling:
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with

conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law,
but also known to possess good moral character. “A lawyer is an oath-bound
servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for
truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking
the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law,
and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal
profession. It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility
was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks
by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite
respondent’s full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the
checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a
commercial document, resorted to for his material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that
are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The standards
of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely enables one to
escape the penalties of criminal laws. Considering the depravity of the offense
committed by respondent, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP of
suspension for two years from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity
for employing deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the
filled-up checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome. Thus,
he is sentenced suspended indefinitely from the practice of law effective
immediately.
16. A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A. NICOLAS vs.
Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO
Facts:

Atty. Macatrio D. Arquillo represented opposing parties in one a case before the
before the National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch
in San Fernando, La Union. Herein, complainants accuse Atty. Arquillo of
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and/or violation of his oath as attorney by
representing conflicting interests. The case was filed with the IBP-Commission
on Bar Discipline which found Atty. Arquillo guilty of the charge and
recommended a penalty of suspension for 6 months. The governors of the IBP
increased the penalty for 2 years.
Issue:
Whether or not the acts of Arquillo merits his suspension from the practice of
law.
Ruling:
The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor,

fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients.
Corollary to this duty, lawyers shall not represent conflicting interests, except
with all the concerned clients’ written consent, given after a full disclosure of the
facts. When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties, there is a
conflict of interests, the existence of which is determined by three separate
tests: (1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is required to fight for
an issue or claim, but is also duty-bound to oppose it for another client; (2)
when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an attorney to perform an
act that may injuriously affect the first client or, when called upon in a new
relation, to use against the first one any knowledge acquired through their
professional connection; or (3) when the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of an attorney’s duty to give undivided fidelity and
loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance of that duty. An attorney cannot represent adverse interests.
It is a hornbook doctrine grounded on public policy that a lawyer’s
representation of both sides of an issue is highly improper. The proscription
applies when the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general
matter, however slight such conflict may be. It applies even when the attorney
acts from honest intentions or in good faith.
In accordance with previous rulings from this court Atty. Arquillo is suspended
for 1 year from the practice of law.
17. A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC July 22, 2005

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S.
SORREDA.
Facts:

Atty. Noel S. Sorreda wrote a letter addressed to the Chief Justice over his
frustrations of the outcome of his cases decided by the Supreme Court. The
letter contained derogatory and malignant remarks which are highly insulting.
The Court accorded Atty. Sorreda to explain, however, instead of appearing
before the court, he wrote another letter with insulting remarks as the first one.
The court was thus offended with his remarks.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Sorreda can be held guilty of contempt due to the remarks
he has made in his letters addressed to the court.
Ruling:
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court

or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment
serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of
court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As officer of the court,
Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and
to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.[24] No less must this
be and with greater reasons in the case of the country’s highest court, the
Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, to which his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.
The use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified
nor can it have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members
of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Hence, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment
and constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice. Free expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s
irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court
and its magistrates. Thus, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of
contempt of court and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
amounting to gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the
Bar.
18. A.C. No. 6192 June 23, 2005

Heirs of Herman Rey, represented by ARACELI Vda. DE
ROMERO vs. Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr.
Facts:

Atty. Venancio Reyes is counsel for Heirs of Herman Rey for which they are
intervenors in a civil case involving multiple sale of a piece of land. There were
three buyers however, and to settle the case, they had agreed to a
Compromise Agreement. The Compromise Agreement, dated June 16, 1995,
was signed in three stages, first by Elizabeth Reyes and her husband, then by
complainants and their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte Jr., and last, by Antonio
Gonzales, Veronica Gonzales for and on behalf of V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc.
and by herein respondent. Later, the RTC which houses the records of the case
was destroyed by fire, thus The complainants filed a motion for reconstitution of
the records of the case, which was granted by the RTC of Bulacan. The
documents attached to the motion were the basis for the reconstituted records.
Because of the circumstances of signing of the Compromise Agreement, the
copy submitted to the RTC bore only the signatures of Elizabeth Reyes, her
husband, complainants, and that of their counsel, Atty. Renato Samonte. After a
lapse of two (2) years from the date of the Compromise Agreement, V.R. Credit
Enterprises, Inc. still has not complied with its obligation toward complainants.
Hence, complainants filed a motion for issuance of writ of execution against
V.R. Credit Enterprises, Inc. for such failure. Atty. Reyes filed a motion for the
case was premature. Later he raised the issue that the Compromise Agreement
was not valid since it was not signed by Veronica Gonzales. Hence, the RTC
rued that the Compromise as unenforceable. Thus, herein, complainants filed
this administrative case against Atty. Venancio Reyes Jr. charging him with
willful and intentional falsehood, in violation of his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar. IBP investigating commissioner found him guilty of violation of
his oath.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Venancio Reyes is administratively liable.
Ruling:
Lawyers are indispensable instruments of justice and peace. Upon taking their
professional oath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law. Verily,
when they appear before a tribunal, they act not merely as the parties’
representatives but, first and foremost, as officers of the court. Thus, their duty
to protect their clients’ interests is secondary to their obligation to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice. In assailing the legality of the
Compromise Agreement, he claims good faith. He maintains that he should not
be faulted for raising an allegedly valid defense to protect his client’s interests.
The records show, however, that his actions bear hallmarks of dishonesty and
doublespeak. Atty. Reyes is one of negotiating panel in the compromise
agreement. He impressed upon the parties and the trial judge that his clients
were bound to the Compromise Agreement. Then, suddenly and conveniently,
he repudiated it by falsely alleging that one of his clients had never signed it.
True, lawyers are obliged to present every available remedy or defense to

support the cause of their clients. However, their fidelity to their causes must
always be made within the parameters of law and ethics, never at the expense
of truth and justice. In Choa v. Chiongson this principle was explained thus:
“While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to
his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law” Thus, herein, Atty. Venancio Reyes, was
ordered suspended for 1 year.
19. A.C. No. 6590. June 27, 2005

JESUS M. FERRER vs. ATTY. JOSE ALLAN M. TEBELIN
Facts:
Ferrer obtained the services of Atty. Tebelin in a case against Global Link as a
result of a vehicular accident through the falut of Global Link’s driver. Ferrer
paid Atty. Tebelin P5, 000.00 as acceptance fee and gave him all pertinent
documents. However, Ferrer filed an administrative case against Atty. Tebelin
alleging that the said lawyer abandoned his case. However, Atty. Tebelin
expressed his willingness to return the money and denied having abandoned
the case. However, during the proceedings, herein Ferrer died. Atty. Tebelin
was nowhere to be found in his given address.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Tebellin may still be held liable despite the death of the
complainant.
Ruling:
The court held that Atty. Tebelin may still be held liable despite the death of the
complainant. The death of a complainant in an administrative case
notwithstanding, the case may still proceed and be resolved. As in the case
of Tudtud v. Colifores, the court ruled that “The death of the complainant herein
does not warrant the non-pursuance of the charges against respondent Judge.
In administrative cases against public officers and employees, the complainants
are, in a real sense, only witnesses. Hence, the unilateral decision of a
complainant to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his death, as
in the case at bar, does not prevent the Court from imposing sanctions upon the
parties subject to its administrative supervision.” This Court also finds
respondent, for ignoring the notices of hearing sent to him at his address which
he himself furnished, or to notify the IBP-CBD his new address if indeed he had
moved out of his given address. His actuation betrays his lack of courtesy, his
irresponsibility as a lawyer. This Court faults respondent too for welting on his
manifestation-undertaking to return the P5,000.00, not to mention the

documents bearing on the case, to complainant or his heirs. Such is reflective
of his reckless disregard of the duty imposed on him by Rule 22.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: Rule 22.02 – A lawyer who withdraws or is
discharged shall, subject to a retaining lien, immediately turn over all papers
and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his
successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information
necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
Thus, the court suspended Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin from the practice of law
for Two (2) Months and is ordered to return to complainant’s heirs the amount
of P5, 000.00, with legal interest.
20. A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484. January 15, 2004

DORCAS PETALLAR VS. JUDGE JAUNILLO PULLOS
Facts:
Complainant Dorcas Petallar averred that after the preliminary conference in a

case for forcible entry, he, as plaintiff and the defendants were ordered to
submit their respective position papers and evidence. Two months from the
submission of their position papers, complainant personally went to the Court to
verify the judgment had been rendered. He caused his lawyer to file a motion
for rendition of judgment which was duly received by the court on August 6,
2001 but still no judgment was rendered on December 27, 2001 when the
complaint was filed. Hence, complainant Petallar charged Judge Juanillo
Pullos, former presiding judge of the MCTC of Surigao del Norte of violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.02 & Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as
well as Rule 140, Section 4 & Rule 70, Section 10 & 11 of the Rules of the
Court for undue delay in rendering a decision in a case for forcibly entry.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent be held liable for undue delay in rendering

judgment.
Ruling:
Respondent is guilty of undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show

that the parties had filed their respective position papers as early as February
2, 2000. thus, respondent had until March 4, 2000. Had there been
circumstances which presented him from handling down his decision within the
prescribed period, respondent should have at least requested from the Court
for an extension within which to render judgment. Failure to resolve cases
submitted for decisions within the period fixed by law constitutes serious
violation of Article III, section 16 of the Constitution. Judges must perform their
official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the judiciary is to be

preserved. A judge cannot by himself prolong the period for deciding cases
beyond that authorized by law. Without any order of extension granted by the
court, failure to decide a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross
inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
21. AC No. 5442. January 26, 2004

COMPLAINTS FOR DISBARMENT; FORMAL INVESTIGATION
MERCEDES NAVA VS. ATTY. BENJAMIN SORONGON
Facts:
Respondent Atty. Sorongon had been the counsel of complainant Mercedes

Nava for years. The former informed her of his intention to withdraw as her
counsel in two of her cases due to a stroke that paralyzed his right body but
proposed to be retained in two other criminal cases with lesser paper works. He
filed his withdrawal on December 4, 1996 and was granted by the court.
Complainant alleged that while she continuously paid for the respondent’s
services, the latter represented other clients with hostile interests and cases
filed against her. Complainant cried that respondent assisted one Francisco
Atas in filing a formal complaint for 11 counts of violation of B.P. 22 against her.
She sent a letter to respondents expressing her disbelief and reminding him of
his ethical and moral responsibility as a lawyer. Complainant prayed that an
investigation be conducted regarding this unfortunate actuation and deplorable
behavior as well as respondent’s double standard attitude.
Thereafter, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline issued a resolution
suspending respondent from the practice of law for one year considering his
clear violation of the prohibition against representing conflicting interest.
Issue:
Whether or not a formal investigation is mandatory in complaints for

disbarment.
Ruling:
In complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a mandatory

requirement. The court may dispense with the normal referral to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines if the records are complete and the question raised is
simple. Similarly, if no further, factual determination is necessary, the court may
decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleading on record.
Complaints against lawyers for misconduct are normally addressed to the
Court. If, at the outset, the Court finds a complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit, it out rightly dismisses the case. If, however, the Court deems it
necessary that further inquiry should be made, such as when the matter could
not be resolved by merely evaluating the pleadings submitted, a referral is

made to the IBP for a formal investigation of the case during which the parties
are accorded an opportunity to be heard. An ex parte investigation may only be
conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice.
22. AC No. 4256. February 13, 2004

ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT
RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT
JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS. ATTY. WARFREDO
TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS VILLARIN
Facts:
Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and

respondent Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage
against the latter and Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy of the birth
certificate of a child of the respondent and also stated that they were married in
May 1, 1990 in Isabela, Province.
The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the

complaint within 10 days but they failed to comply. Copies of the resolution,
complaint and its annexes were returned to both respondents unserved with
notation “moved”, same as when served personally. Complainant was required
anew to submit the correct, present address of respondents under pain of
dismissal of her administrative complaint. She disclosed respondent’s address
at 12403 Develop Drive Houston, Texas in a handwritten letter.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both
respondents be disbarred. The Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be
disbarred while the complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin was
returned to the IBP for further proceedings or it appears that a copy of the
resolution requiring comment was never “deemed served” upon her as it was
upon Atty. Alejandro.
Issue:
Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit

relationship with another woman are grounds for disbarment.
Ruling:
Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to

complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin.
Although the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a
subsequent bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment

proceeding is warranted against a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who had borne him a child.
We can do no less in this case where Atty. Alejandro even fled to another
country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint
against Atty. Villarin was referred back to the IBP.
23. AM No. 4401. January 29, 2004

VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY; FAILURE OF COUNSEL TO FILE BRIEF
BIOMIE SARENAS-OCHAGABIA VS. ATTY. BALMES OCAMPOS
Facts:
Complainant Biomie Sarenas-Ochagabia and her aunts engaged the services

of respondent Atty. Balmes Ocampos in a civil case for recovery of possession
and ownership of a parcel of land. An adverse decision was rendered against
complainants. Atty. Ocampos filed a Notice of Appeal at their behest. The Court
of Appeals gave them 45 days from notice to file their brief but Atty. Ocampos
was granted a 90-day extension. The extended period lapsed without an
appellant’s brief being filed, hence their appeal was dismissed. The dismissal
was not challenged, but complainants filed a complaint contending that
respondent violated his duty to inform them of his failure to file appellant’s brief
and of the dismissal of the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has exercised due diligence for the protection of the
client’s interests.
Ruling:
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of

protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. By failing to file appellant’s
brief, respondent was remiss in the discharge of such responsibility. He thus
violated the Code of Professional which states:
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after attaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the
same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
That respondent accepted to represent complainants gratis et amore does not
justify his failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty. Every
case deserves full attention, diligence, and competence regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or free.

Until his final release from the professional relation with a client, a counsel of
record is under obligation to protect the client’s interest. If a party has a counsel
of record, a court does not recognize any other representation in behalf thereof
unless in collaboration with such counsel of record or until a formal substitution
of counsel is effected. Since respondent had not then withdrawn as counsel as
he in fact filed a motion for extension of time to file brief, he was under
obligation to discharge his professional responsibility.
24. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005

Yumol vs Atty. Ferrer, Sr.
Facts:
The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human Rights, files a disbarment

case against respondent, Attorney IV said commission on ground for grave
misconduct. The respondent was found to have issued 2 orders awarding
custody of a child to a complainant in the Commission, ordered a bank to
reinstate the bank account of the said complainant, engaging in private
practice, notarizing public documents, and attending court hearings while filling
up his DTR at the Commission as present at the same time. The case was
referred to the IBP and the investigating commissioner recommended
suspension for 2 years which was modified by the IBP Board to 6 months.
Issue:
WON respondent has committed gross misconduct arising from the following
alleged acts:
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a government
employee;
2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of case against
him for engaging in private practice.
Ruling:
The court held on the following:

1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to engage in
private practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission Resolution) subject to
some conditions with indispensable requirement to secure approval from the
CHR. In the absence of such approval, the respondent is not allowed in private
practice and proved to have falsified his attendance in the DTR while appearing
in court at the same time without approved leave of absence.
2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR authorized his
practice as a notary public.

3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is merely to investigate
all forms of human rights violation. They cannot try and decide cases.
With the above constituting grounds for suspension of lawyers stated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the court ruled to modify the suspension of
1 year as sufficient sanction.
25. A.C. No. 4148

Tapucar vs Tapucar
Facts:
Disbarment was filed against Atty. Lauro Tapucar by his wife on grounds for
gross immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under
scandalous circumstances. Prior to the disbarment case, an administrative
case was filed against Atty. Tapucar in connection with his co-habitation in
which he was penalized with 6 months suspension without pay. He continued
the illicit affair that gave rise to another charge against him on grounds for
conduct unbecoming for a court officer and gross immoral conduct which
caused his dismissal and separation from the service as a judge. He continued
his cohabitation that born 2 children and he eventually marry the paramour in
the subsistence of his previous marriage and completely abandoned his real
family. The wife migrated in the States but was receiving complaints from their
children left in the Philippines who are humiliated with said act of Atty, Tapucar.
This caused the wife to institute a disbarment case to shield their daughter with
her daughter-lawyer representing her case. The IBP commissioner
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Tapucar.
Ruling:
The court held that it is a settled rule that good moral character is a precedent
condition for admission in the legal profession and must be remain intact to
maintain one’s good standing as member in the Bar. The facts showed that
despite previous sanction to Atty. Tapucar, he continued his illicit affair and he
even showed arrogance in the face of charges against him in the presence of
the IBP commission. Thus, he was disbarred and his name was stricken out
from the rolls of attorneys.
26. B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

In Re: Argosino
Facts:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar

applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death
of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through reckless
imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2 years
imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by
the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam and passed but was not
allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath
of office averring that his probation was already terminated. The court note that
he spent only 10 months of the probation period before it was terminated.
Issue:
WON Argosino may take oath of office.
Ruling:
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar
members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by the court to produce
evidence that would certify that he has reformed and have become a
responsible member of the community through sworn statements of individuals
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino
for a significant period of time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the
law profession. The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be
furnished to the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.
27. B.M No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente Ching
Facts:
Vicente Ching is born from a Filipino mother and a father of Chinese national
on April 11, 1964. He took the bar exam subject upon submission of proof of his
Phil. Citizenship. He passed the bar at the age of 35 years old. There was a
question regarding his citizenship therefore he was not allowed to take oath.
The Solicitor General was asked to give comment on the case at bar.
Issue:
WON Ching can be admitted to take oath in consideration of the status of his
citizenship.
Ruling:

The court ruled that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and
continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which
the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose
Mother is a Filipino Citizen." He should elect his Phil. Citizenship within a
reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of majority which is 21 years
old at that time. With almost 14 years that elapsed upon reaching his age of
majority, Ching failed to exercise such right of citizenship election beyond a
reasonable period of time therefore he cannot be admitted in the Phil. Rolls of
atty. for being a Chinese citizen.
28. B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

Tan vs Sabandal
Facts:
Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to
finally take oath and practice the law profession after considering his plea for
forgiveness and showing willingness to reform along with testimonials attesting
to his good moral character among which is a testimonial by the IBP
Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its
President, a counsel for the in-laws of Sabandal, without the authorization of
the IBP Board members. The court allowed the IBP to manifest testimony to
certify as to the good moral character of the respondent and asked for a
comment from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested
that they see no impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the
RTC Judge informed the court of the civil case against the respondent
concerning the mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which turned
out to be a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a free patent. The
civil case however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged of
any crime. Subsequently, Tan already forgave the respondent and withdrew her
opposition for the taking of oath of office of the respondent while the other 2
petitioners leave upon the court to decide.
Issue:
WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office
Ruling:
The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have
concealed the civil case brought against him in the course of his series of
petitions to be allowed to take oath together with the testimonies attesting to his

good moral character without any mention of the pending case against him.
The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the
respondent. Although there were testimonials on his good moral characters
those were made without any knowledge of the case against him. The
commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty. With the practice of law a
matter of privilege and not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member
of the law profession therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the
respondent to take oath.
29. A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336 July 25, 1996

JOCELYN TALENS-DABON v JUDGE HERMIN E. ARCEO
Facts:
Complainant, Jocelyn C. Talens-Dabon, Clerk of Court V of the Regional Trial

Court of San Fernando Pampanga, charged Judge Hermin E. Arceo, the
Executive Judge thereat with gross misconduct. The complaint was later
amended to include immorality.
One afternoon, the respondent called up the complainant to report to his room.
Because of the news about the respondent’s reputation of sexual harassment,
complainant had been cautious in entering the room of the respondent making
sure that all exits from the room are all open. Inside the room, respondent gave
a poem to the complainant showing his affection to the complainant which the
complainant was offended for the poem expresses of sexual desires of the
respondent towards the complainant. Out of disgust, complainant quickly tried
to exit the room but was locked and then the respondent came behind her then
kissed her and almost raped her. Thus, came this complaint against the
respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has violated Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial

Ethics?
Ruling:
The Court held, the integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it
is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the
community that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the
strict manner by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not
necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served.
Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must

possess the highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness,
both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people be reassured
that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, we have

the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartially of the judiciary.
The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of morality and
decency which every member of the judiciary must observe. A magistrate is
judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent
that such private morals are externalized. He should not only possess
proficiency in law but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people
look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
The Court also stressed that, all trial judges should endeavor to conduct
themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws and the
Code of Judicial Ethics that they be exemplars in the communities and the
living personification of justice and the Rule of Law.
WHEREFORE, Judge Hermin E. Arceo is hereby DISMISSED from the service

for gross misconduct and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned
and controlled corporations.
30. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1461 - June 26, 2001

RICARDO DELA CRUZ v HON. HERMINIA M. PASCUA
Facts:
In the instant administrative complaint, filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), complainant Dela Cruz alleges that respondent judge
committed falsification when she issued the order dated August 28, 1995
deferring the hearing of Sp. Proc. Case No. 0743-T until further orders. In her
order, she stated that a "Petition by Appeal on Certiorari" was filed with this
Court by Nena Ocaña and Nelson Cuaresma questioning her (respondent

judge's) order denying their motion for intervention. According to them, they did
not file such petition with this Court. Respondent judge must be referring to the
appeal by certiorari of Ocaña and Cuaresma to the COMELEC.
Complainant also alleges that respondent judge violated Section 17 (par. 1),
Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC by delaying the disposition
of his election protest. On December 26, 1995, she issued an order directing
motu propio that the election protest be archived, stating that "this Court cannot
take action on this case because of the fact that Nena Ocaña and Nelson
Cuaresma have gone to the Supreme Court . . ." Because the case was
archived, there was a delay of more than six (6) months from the time the
hearing was deferred on August 28, 1995 up to the time the records were
retrieved from the archives and set again for hearing on February 29, 1996.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
The Court held, pursuant to this Court Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92, as
amended, a judge may order that a civil case be archived only in the following
instances:
"a) When the parties are in the process of settlement, in which case the
proceedings may be suspended and the case archived for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days. The case shall be included in the trial calendar on
the day immediately following the lapse of the suspension period.
b) When an interlocutory order or incident in the civil case is elevated to, and is
pending resolution/decision for an indefinite period before a higher court which
has issued a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
c) When defendant, without fault or neglect of plaintiff, cannot be served with
summons within six (6) months from issuance of original summons."
None of the above instances is present in this case.
By issuing the said orders, respondent judge was negligent in her duties,
tantamount to inefficiency, which, in turn, caused the undue delay in the
disposition of complainant's election protest. Her conduct violates Section
17(1), Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:
"The court shall decide the election contest within thirty (30) days from the date
it is submitted for decision, but in every case within six (6) months after its filing,
and shall declare who among the parties has been elected, or in a proper case,
that none of them has been legally elected. The party who in the judgment has

been declared elected shall have the right to assume the office as soon as the
judgment becomes final."
The period that complainant's protest was dormant can be reckoned from
August 28, 1995, when respondent judge issued her order postponing the
hearing of the election protest, up to February 8, 1996, when she ordered that
the records be retrieved from the archives and that the election protest be
revived.
Clearly, the hearing of the election protest was delayed for almost six months,
all because of respondent judge's negligence in the performance of her duties
which bears on her efficiency.
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates, among others, that a judge
should perform his official duties with DILIGENCE. The same Canon
specifically provides that a judge should maintain professional competence and
decide cases within the required periods.
This Court has ruled that inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the
judiciary as the incompetent and dishonest ones. Any of them tarnishes the
image of the judiciary or brings it to public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and
must then be administratively dealt with and punished accordingly.
All told, this Court views the conduct of respondent judge improper and
censurable. She should have remembered that she is presumed to be
conscious of her duties under the Code of Judicial Conduct. Indeed, as a
member of the Bench, she should be the embodiment of competence and
assiduousness in her responsibilities. Unfortunately, respondent judge failed to
live up to this standard. By issuing the orders in question, she evidently
manifested inefficiency and overtly transgressed basic mandatory rules
adopted to assure the expeditious resolution of cases.
31. A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 September 8, 2004

LUCILA TAN v Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE
Facts:
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120, both entitled People of the
Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial
Court of San Juan, Metro Manila, then presided by respondent judge. Before
the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of his staff
to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano,
near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The staff member told her that respondent
was asking for P150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases.

She was shown copies of respondent judge’s Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos.
59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints against the
accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of
the cases as soon as she remits the amount demanded. The staff member
allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No.
59440. Complainant, however, did not accede to respondent’s demand
because she believed that she had a very strong case, well supported by
evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge.
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He

instead stated that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him in exchange
for a favorable decision.
As the investigation ensued, and during presentation of evidences, it was found

out that the evidence presented by the complainant is more trustworthy than
the evidence presented by the respondent due to conflicting statements of
respondent’s witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Ethics?
Ruling:
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as

the documentary evidence presented by both parties, we find the complainant’s
version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail,
but she also presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft
decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given to her by a
member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a
member of complainant’s staff met with her, showed her copies of respondent
judge’s draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and
demanded, in behalf of respondent judge, that she pays P150,000.00 for the
reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for complainant
to obtain a copy of a judge’s draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not
through the judge himself or from the people in his office. And an ordinary
employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a case’s
disposition if not assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of

judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. This is not without reason. The exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the people’s confidence in the
judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and

the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is
therefore paramount that a judge’s personal behavior both in the performance
of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to
be beyond reproach.
Respondent’s act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and
show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside
the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct
required to be observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross
misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without

salary and other benefits for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
32. A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001

Mamba v Garcia
Facts:
On August 23, 1996, a complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No.1866

(illegal possession of firearms) was filed against a certain Renato Bulatao by
the Cagayan Provincial Police Command before the sala of respondent Judge
Dominador L. Garcia of the Municipal Trial Court, Tuao, Cagayan. Respondent
set the preliminary investigation on September 4, 1996, but the same was
subsequently postponed and reset to October 23, 1996 as respondent was not
present, although the complaining officer, P/Sr. Inspector Danny F. Salvador,
appeared in court. On October 23, 1996, the preliminary investigation was
again reset to October 30, 1996. On October 29, 1996, the accused, Renato
Bulatao, complained to the NBI that at the scheduled preliminary investigation
on September 4, 1996, P/Sr. Inspector Salvador demanded P30,000.00 from
him in consideration of the withdrawal of the criminal case against him.
According to Bulatao, the demand was reiterated by Salvador and respondent
judge on October 23, 1996. As Bulatao told them that he could not afford it, the
amount was reduced to P6,000.00.
Based on Bulataos report, the NBI set out to entrap Salvador and respondent
judge. The NBI gave Bulatao 12 pieces of P500.00 marked bills amounting to
P6,000.00, which the latter would give to Salvador and respondent the next
day.

Accordingly, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of the following day, October 30,
Bulatao met the NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former
representative of the 3rd District of Cagayan, where the entrapment was
planned. Bulatao was given a tape recorder to record his conversation with
whoever will receive the money. At 9 a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial
Court and waited for his case to be called. At 10:30 a.m., respondent went out
of his chambers and talked to SPO2 Jonathan Santos and SPO4 Carlos Poli,
representatives of P/Sr. Inspector Salvador in the preliminary investigation.
Respondent then called Bulatao and led him and the two police officers to the
office of the MTC court personnel. Inside, respondent asked Bulatao if he had
the money with him. When he answered in the affirmative, respondent took
them to his chambers and left them there as he proceeded to his sala. After
handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went out of respondent's
chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside respondent's
court then rushed to the judge's chambers and arrested the two police officers
after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their possession.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial

Ethics?
Ruling:
In this case, the acts of the respondent judge were clearly improper as he
facilitated, if not participated in, the obviously unauthorized/illegal transaction
between the two (2) police officers and the accused Renato Bulatao for the
settlement/dismissal of the latter's criminal case, in consideration of a sum of
money, particularly since the offense charged against Bulatao is a grievous one
and that it is one which is not allowed by law to be compromised.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only
impropriety but even the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct. This
includes not taking an undue interest in the settlement of criminal cases
pending before them as this may compromise the integrity and impartiality of
their office. As the visible representation of the law and of justice, their conduct
must be above reproach and suspicion. By acting as an accomplice to P/Sr.
Inspector Salvador, respondent judge violated not only the law but also the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
33. A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014 March 4, 2009

NILDA VERGINESA-SUAREZ v JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG AND
COURT STENOGRAPHER III CONCEPCION A. PASCUA
Facts:

Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2014 stemmed from the Complaint-Affidavit
dated November 25, 2005 and Letter dated January 11, 2006 filed before the
OCA by Suarez against Judge Dilag and Pascua allegedly for collecting
P30,000.000 from litigants in consideration of favorable judgments in cases for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez supported her
accusation with a sworn statement of a certain Belen Trapane who allegedly
paid the amount of P30,000.00 to Pascua to obtain a favorable judgment in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage lodged before the court presided by
Judge Dilag. She also attached an anonymous letter addressed to former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which stated that Judge Dilag charged the
amount of P30,000.00 for a favorable judgment in every annulment case.
Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions rendered by
Judge Dilag on several cases.
The OCA observed that the controversies between the parties were replete with
substantial factual issues, and so it recommended a formal administrative
inquiry. As a result of the inquiry they found that Judge Dilag is liable for: (1)
"gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct" for
signing conflicting decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc, and Del Rosario cases; (2)
"gross ignorance of the law and procedure" in handling Joyce Moreno v. Alvin
Moreno and Eliodoro Perez v. Adelita Perez; and (3) "gross negligence and
inefficiency" for failing to administer proper supervision over his staff when a
fake registry return receipt was effected in Cayabyab v. Cayabyab and entries
of judgment were effected in Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno, Angelito and
Yolanda Roldan, and Dinoso v. Corpuz. The Investigating Justice also found
Pascua guilty of the administrative charges of graft and corruption.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence to

uphold and maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is
expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is
presumed to have more than a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure.
Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no
administrative sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not apply where the issues are so
simple and the applicable legal procedures evident and basic as to be beyond
possible margins of error. In the case at bench, respondent Judge failed to
follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him liable to
administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.

Respondent judge argued that the insinuations of the OCA that malice and
fraud attended the dispositions of these cases have not been sufficiently
proven. The argument fails. In the case of Ora vs. Judge Almajar [A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1599, October 14, 2005], the Supreme Court, while finding that there
was no allegation that respondent judge therein was motivated by bad faith,
malice or corruption, nevertheless, held him administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law. The pertinent portions of the decision read:
Respondent judge is charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to
warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and
patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not
only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by
bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders would be
intolerable.
In the case at bar, there was no allegation whatsoever that respondent judge
was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he issued the premature
warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, however, we hold him administratively liable
for his unfamiliarity with the rules on the conduct of preliminary investigations.
We have always exhorted judges to be conversant with basic legal norms and
precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to
follow developments in the law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted
position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the
public who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be
proficient in the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be
faithful to the law and be the embodiment of professional competence.
Considering that Judge Dilag had already been administratively sanctioned in

Ma. Teresa De Jesus v. Judge Renato J. Dilag wherein he was fined in the
amount of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, Judge Dilag’s already
grave offenses are further aggravated. Therefore, this Court imposes upon
Judge Dilag the extreme administrative penalty of dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
34. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1616 October 17, 2007

MARY JANE VALLENTOS JAMIN v JUDGE MANUEL A. DE
CASTRO, MCTC, JAGNA and GARCIA-HERNANDEZ, BOHOL
Facts:
The instant administrative case stemmed from a complaint for rape filed by
herein complainant Mary Jane Vallentos Jamin (Jamin, for short) against Judge

Manuel A. de Castro of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna and
Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. A waitress/entertainer in a bar charged the
respondent with rape. That the rape incident allegedly occurred in the early
evening of March 29, 2005 at the bodega of a videoke bar located at the public
market of Guindulman, Bohol where she was then employed as a waitress and
this is evidenced by her narration of the incident and corroborated by her co-
worker. But after sometime complainant recanted her statement.
In his counter-affidavit dated April 21, 2005, respondent judge denied the
charge of rape and described the filing thereof as a malicious attempt by some
people who had been harassing him to destroy his reputation and image as a
judge. While not denying his presence at the videoke bar on the night of March
29, 2005, respondent judge explained that he went to the place not to drink or
sing, "but only to see the interior lay-out of the newly constructed bar" owned by
his junior process server and the latter’s wife. He admitted, however, having
teased and hugged both Jamin and Ybañez, but in the spirit of fun.
Meanwhile, the OCA submitted a Report, styled as Memorandum dated April 7,

2006. In it, the OCA, while expressing its inability to pin down the respondent
judge for rape, nonetheless found the latter guilty of gross misconduct and
immorality, acting as he did beyond the tolerable bounds of decency, morality
and propriety. The report thus recommended that the respondent judge be
dismissed from the service with the usual accessory penalties attached to
dismissal. Disbarment, after due proceedings, was also recommended.
The OCA would later submit a supplemental Report dated October 23, 2006 to
inform the Court that the complainant personally came to the office of Senior
Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño to report, under oath, the threat
made by the driver of Judge de Castro, a certain "Awe" Tubig, should she
pursue the rape case against the respondent judge which may ultimately result
in the denial of his retirement benefits. The OCA also informed the Court that
the complainant, when asked, confirmed the veracity of the allegations in her
affidavit-complaint filed against the respondent judge with the Bohol Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
Time and again, the Court has adhered to the exacting standards of morality
and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe. As a
dispenser of justice, a magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also
by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized.

He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise possess
moral integrity, for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man. We
said so in a slew of cases, notably in Castillo v. Calanog, thus:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times … a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of his official duties and
in private life should be above suspicion.
On the whole, all roads logically lead to the conclusion that the respondent
judge has indeed failed to behave in such a way that will promote confidence
and respect for the judiciary. He deported himself in a manner most
unbecoming a judge as a model of moral uprightness. We need not repeat the
narration of the lustful acts committed by him, in order to conclude that he is
indeed unworthy to remain in office. The audacity under which the same were
committed and the seeming impunity with which they were perpetrated shock
one’s sense of morality.
35. A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009

VENANCIO INONOG v JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City
Facts:
The present administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of

Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on
April 26, 2005, charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint
involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which
respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because complainant
parked his superior’s vehicle at the parking space reserved for respondent
judge.

Respondent judge initiated the proceeding for indirect contempt by issuing an
order dated March 18, 2005 directing the complainant to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt. On the same day respondent judge
issued another order, finding complainant guilty of contempt and sentenced him
to suffer imprisonment for a period of five (5) days and to pay a fined of
P1,000.00.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve

order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice.
The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges
but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been
enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost
restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.
Respondent judge’s act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a
clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by law.
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit
that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which
are indispensable qualities of every judge. Respondent judge himself has
characterized this incident as a "petty disturbance" and he should not have
allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he would even waste valuable
court time and resources on a trivial matter.
Considering that this is not the first time that respondent judge committed the
same offense and in Nuñez, which had similar factual antecedents as the case
at bar, the Court already saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the amount of
P40,000.00, it is proper to impose on him the same penalty in this case.
36. A.M. No. RTJ-09-2183 July 7, 2009 [formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2346-
RTJ]
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN v PRESIDING JUDGE VICTORIA
VILLALON-PORNILLOS, RTC, BRANCH 10, MALOLOS CITY, BULACAN
Facts:

Some "Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan," denominating themselves as such,
filed a five-page Anonymous Administrative Complaint of August 31, 2005
against Presiding Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos (respondent) of Branch 10 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City.
Petitioners imputed upon respondent various charges of graft and
corruption in the form extorting millions of pesos in exchange for a favorable
decision, immorality by having amorous relationship with his driver and
bodyguards, and, malfeasance and misfeasance in the performance of her duty
as a judge by causing undue delay in resolving cases brought before her sala.
The OCA conducted an investigation and found out that petitioner is not guilty
of all charges against her except the last charge and additional violation of the
code of borrowing money from lawyers and assigning a non-lawyer as ex-parte.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
The Court held, Judges are mandated to "perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness." Prompt disposition of the court’s business is attained through
proper and efficient court management, and a judge is remiss in his duty as
court manager if he fails to adopt a system of record management.
Respondent defied the duties to "dispose of the court’s business promptly and
decide cases within the required periods," to "diligently discharge administrative
responsibilities, maintain professional competence in court management, and
facilitate the performance of the administrative functions of other judges and
court personnel," and to "organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity."
A judge being expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on
them promptly without undue delay, it is incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can
affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. Proper and efficient court
management is as much his responsibility. As the judge is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of official functions, he/she is charged with
exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official
documents in his/her custody are intact. Hence, the necessity of adopting a
system of record management and of organization of dockets in order to bolster
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.

WHEREFORE, Judge Victoria Villalon-Pornillos, Presiding Judge of Branch 10
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, is found guilty of violating paragraph
7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (borrowing money from a lawyer in
a case pending before her court) which is also a gross misconduct constituting
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, aggravated by, inter alia, undue delay
in rendering decisions or orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules,
directives and circulars. She is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any government agency or instrumentality. Immediately upon
service on her of this decision, she is deemed to have vacated her office and
her authority to act as judge is considered automatically terminated.
37. A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535 March 12, 2004

DR. CONRADO T. MONTEMAYOR v JUDGE JUAN O. BERMEJO,
JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 3, Manila
Facts:
The instant administrative case traces its roots from an unlawful detainer case
filed by Benjamin and Desmond T. Montemayor against Lolita Marco. The case
was raffled to Metropolitan Trial Court Judge, Hon. Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. (Judge
Bermejo), the respondent herein.
In the instant complaint, Dr. Montemayor asserts that the respondent Judge
failed to decide the case within the period provided under Section 11, Rule 70
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules of Court) which is within 30 days.
He alleges that Judge Bermejo "did not bother to check defendant’s
preposterous claim that she received a copy of the Judgment only on
December 5, 2002, even if it was released more than forty-five (45) days earlier
on October 16, 2002." He stresses that even if the defendant received a copy
of the Judgment on December 5, 2002, still, Judge Bermejo should have
reckoned the period to appeal from the time the defendant’s counsel received a
copy of the Judgment and not when the defendant received it herself. What is
more, the registry return card showing the date the defendant’s counsel
received a copy of the Judgment was missing from the records.
Dr. Montemayor adds that the Order dated January 6, 2003 giving due course
to the defendant’s appeal and requiring the latter to post a supersedeas bond
within 10 days from receipt thereof was released by registered mail more than
one month later on February 11, 2003, and personal service thereof was made
on April 9, 2003, or more than three months after the issuance thereof. The
motive for the belated service was purportedly to give the defendant more time
to post a supersedeas bond. Dr. Montemayor also faults the respondent Judge
for granting the defendant’s Urgent Motion for Extension to post a supersedeas
bond in violation of Section 13, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three (3) Motions for Execution
and two (2) Motions to Require Defendant’s Counsel to Inform the Court the
Date He Received a Copy of the Judgment.
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of the
records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of
the appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to
him, it was only after the respondent Judge received the defendant’s
supersedeas bond that the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003
directing the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the records of the case to the
appellate court.
The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the rendition of
judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case
submitted for resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of
judgment on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
Section 11, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides a period of 30 days for the
court to render judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This
period shall be counted from the receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or
the expiration of the period for filing the same.
Section 11, Rule 70 echoes Section 10 of the Rule on Summary Procedure

which governs unlawful detainer cases, among others. The latter provision
similarly mandates the resolution of such cases within 30 days after receipt of
the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing
the same.
Clearly, the reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of
judgment should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position
papers of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as
provided by the Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming
the case submitted for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the
judge. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding
cases beyond that authorized by the law.
The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejo’s Order
requiring them to submit their respective affidavits and position papers.

Assuming, however, that the court received the defendant’s Position Paper on
August 14, 2002, as respondent Judge claims, judgment should have been
rendered on September 13, 2002. Instead, the decision was dated October 10,
2002, or nearly a month after the lapse of the mandatory period for rendition of
judgment and almost two months from the receipt of the defendant’s Position
Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay and, thus, administratively
liable.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr., of

Branch 3 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila guilty of delay in the rendition
of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is also
declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is fined
the amount of P10,000.00.
38. A.M. No. RTJ-94-1195. February 26, 1997

Spouses ROMEO P. NAZARENO and ELISA A. NAZARENO v
JUDGE ENRIQUE M. ALMARIO
Facts:
Sometime in 1990, when respondent was about to retire from service talked to
Elisa that he is nearing his retirement and he needs a lot of money. Since sps.
Nazareno has a pending criminal case in the trial court of the respondent,
respondent asked for an amount of money and in one occasion asked for the
payment of the food of his staffs and friends’ Christmas party. The amount
being an estimate of P50,000.00 all in all.
Petitioner felt aggrieved filed a complaint against the respondent. In his

defense, he denied all the allegations.
Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
After a close and careful study of the records of the proceedings before
investigating Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, the Court finds sufficient
evidence to find respondent Judge Enrique M. Almario liable for gross
dishonesty and misconduct. His conduct undoubtedly is unbecoming a member
of the bench.

The time honored rule is that a public official whose duty is to apply the law and
dispense justice, be he a judge of a lower court or tribunal or a justice of the
appellate courts, should not only be impartial, independent and honest but
should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest.
It has to be stressed once more to all who are sworn to render decisions in
actual controversies that a decision which correctly applies the law and
jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when
rendered by a magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and
honest. It is thus the duty of members of the bench to avoid any impression of
impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary which in recent
times has been the object of criticism and controversy.
In the present case, respondent's denial of the charges leveled by

complainants that he had asked for and accepted food contributions on at least
two (2) occasions from litigants (herein complainants) is contradicted by his
own witnesses, Roldan Alcantara and Jose R.. Salvadora, Jr., who are both
employees of the court. Nothing in the testimonies of these two (2) court
employees shows any motivation other than to tell the truth.
On the charge of having accepted P20,000.00 from the Nazareno spouses and
receiving cash in exchange for his salary check which he never gave to Mrs.
Nazareno, the Court agrees with the conclusions of Justice Morales that
complainant Elisa Nazareno had convincingly proven having given: a)
P10,000.00 to respondent judge on two (2) occasions and b) cash for
respondent's salary check. As correctly observed by Justice Morales, the
testimony of Mrs. Nazareno was undented even when subjected to an
extended cross examination by respondent judge.
In sum, the Court finds the charges of gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a judge as having been sufficiently substantiated. Judge Enrique
M. Almario deserves no less than the penalty of dismissal from the service.
However, based on the records of this case, respondent judge had already
compulsorily retired in July 1995. The proper penalty, therefore, in lieu of his
removal from office, is forfeiture of all his retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, respondent former Judge Enrique M. Almario is hereby found

GUILTY of gross misconduct and dishonesty, while in office. The Court hereby
ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all leave and retirement benefits to which he
may be entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment in the government
service, including government owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
39. A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699. October 15, 2003

VERNETTE UMALI-PACO, BERNARDINO D. NG, ORLANDO H. HABITAN
and JOSEPHINE F. ANDRADA v REINATO G. QUILALA

Facts:
Complainants filed an administrative complaint against Judge Reinato G.

Quilala, acting clerk of court Aida C. Lomugdang and court stenographer Lilia
N. Batu of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, of Makati City. Acting on the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the Court
docketed the complaint as a regular administrative matter which it then referred
to Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Complainants were officers of the Philippine Retirement Authority, the

defendant in an action for specific performance, entitled "Philippine Retirement
Authority Members Association Foundation, Inc., (PRAMA) vs. Philippine
Retirement Authority (PRA),” docketed Civil Case No. 01-112. Complainants
charged respondent judge with bias and partiality on various occasions, among
which was when respondent judge, during the hearing on plaintiff’s application
for a writ of preliminary injunction, led and coached Ramon Collado, a witness
for PRAMA, and instructed the latter’s counsel on what questions to ask. On
06 March 2001, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion of
PRAMA to set the case for hearing without giving the counsel for PRA an
opportunity to oppose it. On 20 March 2001, at the hearing on the prayer of
PRAMA for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
respondent judge remarked that he could very well issue the writ ex parte,
impressing upon the plaintiff that he was in a position to resolve the application
without having to hear the evidence for defendant PRA. In the same hearing,
respondent judge unceremoniously interrupted Atty. Vernette Umali-Paco, the
collaborating counsel for PRA and one of herein complainants, while Atty.
Umali-Paco was explaining a matter propounded by the court.
Complainants further averred that during the hearing on the afternoon of 19

February 2001, respondent judge delegated to his acting clerk of court Aida C.
Lomugdang, who was not a member of the bar, the task of receiving evidence
from the parties, as well as of ruling on any objections which might be proffered
thereon, thereby ignoring Section 9, Rule 30, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure which requires (1) that the parties agree to the delegation in writing,
(2) that the clerk of court be a member of the bar, and (3) that the clerk of court
would not issue rulings on any objections which might be interposed. The non-
compliance with the procedural rules was alleged to have been obliterated from
the certified transcript of stenographic notes where, in connivance with
respondent judge, respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu had made it to appear
that the session was presided over by Judge Quilala himself. In the assailed
stenographic notes, the statements issued by Lomugdang were shown to have
been made by Judge Quilala although the judge was neither present nor even
in his chambers during the hearing.

Issue:

Ethics?
Ruling:
With respect to the charge that respondent judge left his chambers on the
afternoon of 19 February 2001 and that he delegated to acting clerk of court
Aida C. Lomugdang, who was not even a lawyer, the task of receiving evidence
for the parties, the pertinent rules of procedure indeed were obviously ignored.
Section 9, Rule 30, of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Sec. 9. Judge to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court. --- The judge
of the court where the case is pending shall personally receive the evidence to
be adduced by the parties. However, in default or ex parte hearings, and in any
case where the parties agree in writing, the court may delegate the reception of
the evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The clerk of court
shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the admission of
exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission of his
report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.”
The rule is unequivocal and admits of no further discussion; neither agreement

by the parties nor their acquiescence can justify its violation.
Respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu, likewise, was also remiss, albeit

without any apparent ill-motive, in her duty to accurately record the proceedings
before the court. The afternoon session was clearly separate from the morning
hearing. A transcript of stenographic notes should be a faithful and exact
recording of all matters that transpire during a court proceeding. The Court
cannot with certitude pass upon the various other claims of complainants, such
as respondent judge’s refusal to recuse himself from the case, his contempt
orders, and the like, which are appurtenant to Civil Case No. 01-112 and not to
this administrative matter.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds (a) respondent Judge Reinato G. Quilala guilty
for conduct unbecoming a judge and of violating Section 9, Rule 30, of the
Rules of Court, and he is hereby penalized with a fine of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos; (b) respondent acting clerk of court Aida C. Lomugdang
guilty of having acted in contravention with the rules on the reception by her,
albeit upon the directive of respondent judge, of evidence without herself being
a member of the bar, and she is hereby SEVERELY REPRIMANDED; and (c)
respondent stenographer Lilia N. Batu to have been remiss in her duty to
accurately reflect the circumstances surrounding the proceedings in the

afternoon hearing of 19 February 2001, and she is ADMONISHED to
henceforth be circumspect in her duties. Respondents are each warned
against committing any further infraction on their part.
40. A.M. No. 2360-MJ August 31, 1981

SPOUSES TEODORICO MARFIL and TEODORA ESPAÑOLA v JUDGE
ORLANDO CUACHON, 5th Municipal Circuit Court of Isabela, MOISES
PADILLA, Negros Occidental
Facts:
Respondent Judge was the wife whose aunt filed a case of illegal squatting
against complainant before the latter’s MCC trial court. Respondent then take
cognizance of the case and according to respondent conducted his preliminary
investigation then issued an arrest warrant against the complainant, thus, the
complainant was arrested and was detained. Complainant, after learning the
respondent is impartial due to his ties to the complainant against the
complainant, filed a motion to quash the criminal action instituted against the
complainant and due to inaction of the respondent to the motion to quash,
complainant filed complaint against the respondent for being impartial.
In his defense, he avers that upon know that he was related to the complainant
against Marfil, he set a hearing for an amicable settlement between parties then
he announced in court his motion to inhibit himself from the case.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge violated the Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Ethics?
Ruling:
The Court held the complaint is meritorious. Paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137
of the Revised Rule of Court clearly provides, no judge or judicial officer shall
sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is peculiarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of an parties in interest, signed by them and
entered upon the record.
Strict compliance with the stringent rule on disqualification on account of

relationship between the judge and one of the parties serves not only to protect

the rights of the parties and assure an impartial administration of justice but
also to prevent erosion of the people's confidence in the judiciary. It is in the
essence of due process that a judge, sitting in a case, be at all times wholly
free, impartial and independent.
It is an admitted fact that the aggrieved party in Criminal Case No. 449 is the
aunt of respondent's wife. However, notwithstanding such relationship and the
above-quoted prohibition, respondent took cognizance of the case, conducted
a preliminary examination, issued a warrant of arrest by virtue of which
complainant was detained and set the case for hearing on February 12, 1980.
These actuations of respondent Judge opened to question his ability to act with
the cold neutrality of an impartial Judge.
Respondent judge is hereby REPRIMANDED with warning that a repetition of

similar act will be dealt with more severely.

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COMPILATION OF DIGESTED CASES

FOR P.A.L.E CLASS UNDER ATTY. ISAIAS GIDUQUIO

1. A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000sdf

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 1

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon

2. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 2

 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 3

Under the authority of the court:

3. [B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 4

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 5

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there

4. [A.C. No. 6492. November 18, 2004]

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of

WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 6

5. A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that

Whether or not Atty. Homobono t. Cezar should be disbared or suspended for

YES. SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 3 YEARS.

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 7

6. [G.R. No. 133625. September 6, 2000]

Respondents Pedro, Gabriela, Isidra and Estanislao - all surnamed Quilat-Quilat

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 8

The Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers, after obtaining

"Being an officer of the court a lawyer is part of the machinery in the

7. [G.R. No. 131541. October 20, 2000]

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 9

Whether or not Castro was Negligent.

Decision modified. Award is reduced in half, considering the contributory

8. A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 10

Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 11

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a

9. A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990

Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 12

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of

10. [A.C. No. 1109. April 27, 2005]

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 13

Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks

11. [B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 14

2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of

1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 15

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a

12. A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his

The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a

By: TIMOTHY CARL ALVELDA 16

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.