Reg doctrine

1. Republic vs. Bantigue, GR. No. 162322 March 14, 2012

A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary has approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and
disposable.

2. DENR Sec. v. Yap, GR No. 167707 Oct. 8, 2008

The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of public domain belong to the State and the State is the
source of any asserted rights to ownership of lands and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.

- Open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and uninterrupted, peaceful possession and occupation
commencing June 12, 1945.

Land classification cannot be changed due to change in actual appearance of land, must be positive act
of govt.

Immovable and Movable

1. Associated Insurance v. Iya and Spouses Valino

building is by itself an immovable property
Since the court is called upon to apply the law (Article 415[1], NCC), there is no other conclusion
except that the house is a real property — it is so whether it is erected on a land belonging to
another. Real reg over chattel

2. Tumalad v. Vicencio 122 SCRA 296

A deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for the
purposes of said contract, "is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is
based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel"
(they didn’t say chattel mortgage but it was by way of saying ceding, selling or transferring a
property by way of chattel mortgage)

3. Standard Oil Company v. Jaranillo

Registrar of the Registry of Deeds duty is ministerial in character

4. Prudential Bank v. Judge Panis

Buildings may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage
would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable
property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land
5. Mindanao Bus. Co. vs. City Assessor
par. 5
Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be "essential and
principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
"unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established."
Not those merely incidental

6. Sibal v. Valdez
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.

7. Davao Sawmill v. Castillo

-agreement that all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the party of the
second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part
to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; which do not include the machineries
and accessories in the improvements.
Under such conditions the tenant in putting in the machinery was acting but as the agent of the
owner in compliance with the obligations resting upon him, and the immobilization of the
machinery which resulted arose in legal effect from the act of the owner in giving by contract a
permanent destination to the machinery.

Those properties were personal in nature, and as a consequence absolved the defendants from
the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff

8. Manila Electric Company vs Board of assessors (oil storage)

While the two storage tanks are not embedded in the land, they may, nevertheless, be
considered as improvements on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil
industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of
permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its
operations.
Real property by other law as “improvement”

9. Caltex vs City Assessors

Real Property Tax Code, real property

10. Board of Assessment Appeals vs Meralco (overruled the appealed case)

Steel towers does not fit 1, 3, and 5

11. Sergs vs PCI

chocolate factory, real by destination but estoppel kicks in because of an agreement.
12. Tsai v CA
Even if they were bolted and cemented, estoppel kicks in
The inclusion of the said property is improper and Ruby Tsai is a purchaser in bad faith.

Public dominion and Public lands

1. Municipality of Cavite vs Rojas

Town or public plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are beyond the commerce of man and so cannot
be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The municipality cannot pass a
resolution subjecting the plaza for lease.

2. Valiao vs Republic of the Philippines

The case is a petition to the judgment of CA denying the registration and ownership of the
Republic on the lot in question declaring that these lands were not classified as alienable and
that the classification of lands of the public domain is an exclusive prerogative of the legislative
and executive department of the government and in the absence of such classification, the lands
remain as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess land when not supported by any other evidence.

3. Maneclang vs Intermediate Appellate Court

fishpond in a creek. Public domain, even if they already did some “improvements” to it.

4. Secretary Salas vs Honorable Jarencio

In the case at bar, the property, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its
private or proprietary capacity. ? But since the City did not actually use said land for any
recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it
was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of
Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property

5. CITY OF MANILA vs GARCIA

School and squatters. Mayor Fugoso “lease contracts”, no power to give any. Land was for a
school

6. Salvador H. Laurel, petitioner, vs. Ramon Garcia

Roppongi, outside the commerce of man. A property continues to be part of the public domain,
not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

7. CLEMENCIA B. VDA. DE VILLONGCO vs Moreno

Pampanga and Manila Bay fishponds coastal waters not a part of the exception.
8. Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles
sale of an abandoned road was valid as the City Council of Cebu considered it not included in the
City Development Plan.

9. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Morato

Doctrine: When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed the realm of the public domain and accordingly cannot be a
subject of a free patent. Natural appropriation

10. LEVY D. MACASIANO vs HONORABLE DIOKNO

. The streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local
governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific
authority is vested upon them by Congress.
11.

POSSESSION

1. Yu v. De Lara, et.al. L16084, November 30, 1964

A person who occupies the land of another by tolerance has an implied promise to vacate the
land upon demand, default or non compliance to such will render the possessor liable and an
ejectment case of unlawful detainer is the right course of action within one year from the last
formal demand.

2. German Management & Services v. CA, G.R. No. l-76216 September 14, 1989

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner’s drastic
action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine
of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such justification is unavailing
because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536
of the Civil Code which states, “(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.’’
 3. Monasterio Pe vs. Tong
Accion reinvindicatoria may be filed upon prescription of one year from the last formal demand.

4. Sps. ONG vs. SOCORRO PAREL and CA G.R. No. 143173. March 28, 2001 (boundary dispute pala)
When the complain fails to aver the facts of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the proper
remedy should either be Accion publiciana or Accion reinvindicatoria in RTC.
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was
unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she should present
her claim before the regional trial court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and
not before the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible
entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested
from another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same for more than
one year by resorting to a summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his
possession thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the circumstances
contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment

5. Ayala vs Ray burton

No. The only basis for such finding is that the Deed Restrictions and Special Conditions was a
Contract of Adhesion were pre-printed and prepared by AYALA, and that RBDCs participation
thereof was only to sign the Deed of Sale with the said restrictions and conditions. A contract of
adhesion in itself is not an invalid agreement. This type of contract is as binding as a mutually
executed transaction

6. Fajardo v. Freedom to Build; 337 SCRA 115 (2000)

In sum, the Court holds that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the
Restrictive Covenant, petitioner spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent
that it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits. Deed of restriction

7. People v. Pletcha, GR.R. No. 19029 June 27, 1977

farmer 1 v 4. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force not only to
prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is sort of self-defense. It is
lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not
possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights
constitutes a justifying circumstance under our penal laws.
The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of
property

Accession

1. PNB v De Jesus
Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties, one of whom has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a
 case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses
ownership of the land by sale or otherwise for, elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is
the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant.

2. Balucanag vs. Francisco

o, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under Art. 448 of the
New Civil Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner of the land who
believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's interest in the land is derived
only from a rental contract. Neither can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A
possessor in good faith is a party who possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner
but discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not be its legal owner.
It cannot apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and
not the owner of the premises.

3. Pecson vs. CA G.R. No. 115814 May 29, 1995 4 door case

With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever is the
owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying
indemnity. However, it does not apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the
works on his own land who later on loses ownership by sale or donation.

this is contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be
the present market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties.
[the trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the
indemnity therefore Pecson has the right to retain the improvements and the income thereof.
The case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the current market value of the
apartment bldg and ordered the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until
payment of indemnity.

4. Ignacio vs. Hilario GR No. L-175 April 30, 1946

The owner in good faith has to make a choice. He cannot dispense the options under the law
and then eject the builder in good faith. This is because both are in good faith.

But when can the owner in good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the building
he erected?

This is only available if after the owner in good faith chose to sell his land to the builder in good
faith and the latter fails to pay the value of the land within the agree period. Only then can the
owner in good faith compel the builder in good faith to remove the building he erected.

5. Quemuel v. Olaes GR No. L-11084, April 29, 1961

In Quemuel vs. Olaes, the Court categorically ruled that the right to appropriate the works or
 improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner.
Under Article 448, the
1) right to appropriate the works or improvements or
2) to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land belongs to the owner of the
land.
The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right to reimbursement for the
improvements; the builder, cannot compel the owner of the land to sell such land to the former.
This is assuming that the plaintiffs are builders in good faith.
But the plaintiffs are not builders in good faith. From the pleadings and the documentary
evidence submitted, it is indisputable that the land in question originally belonged to the
government as part of the Friar Lands Estate and the title thereto was in the name of the
government, until it was purchased by Agapita Solis who applied, thru the Bureau of Lands, to
purchase the land by installments.

6. Depra vs. Dumlao GR No. L-57348 May 16, 1985

Res judicata doesn't apply wherein the first case was for ejectment and the other was for
quieting of title.

7. Reynante vs. CA GR No. 95907, April 8, 1992 (Pond and nipa palms)
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such
accretion, it does not automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have
not registered this with the proper entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription,
which was what occurred in this case.

Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession of these lands for more than 50
years, the SC rightly held that the land belongs to him.

8. Sulo ng Nayon vs. Nayong Pilipino GR No. 170923; January 20, 2009
Ruling: No. In the case at bar, petitioners have no adverse claim or title to the land. In fact, as
lessees, they recognize that the respondent is the owner of the land. What petitioners insist is
that because of the improvements, which are of substantial value, that they have introduced on
the leased premises with the permission of respondent, they should be considered builders in
good faith who have the right to retain possession of the property until reimbursement by
respondent. We affirm the ruling of the CA that introduction of valuable improvements on the
leased premises does not give the petitioners the right of retention and reimbursement
which rightfully belongs to a builder in good faith. Otherwise, such a situation would allow the
lessee to easily “improve” the lessor out of its property. His right are governed by Art 1678 of
the Civil Code

9. Floreza v. Evangelista , 96 SCRA 130 (1980)

Agree with CA that Art. 448 is inapplicable because it applies only when thebuilder is in good
faith (he believed he had a right to build).Art. 453 is alsonot applicable because it requires both
 of the parties to be in bad faith. Neither is Art. 1616 applicable because Floreza is not a vendee a
retro. The house was already constructed in 1945 (light materials) even before the pacto de
retro was entered into in 1949.Floreza cannot be classified as a builder in good faith nor a
vendee a retro who made useful improvements during the pacto de retro, he has no right to
reimbursement of the value of the house, much less to the retention of the premises until he is
paid.

His rights are more akin to a usufructury under Art. 579, who may make on the property useful
improvements but with no right to be indemnified thereof, He may, however, remove such
improvements should it be possible to do so without damage to the property.

2.From the time the redemption price was paid in January 3, 1955, Floreza’s right to use the
residential lot without rent ceased. He should be held liable for damages in the form of rentals
for the continued use of the lot for P10monthly from January 3, 1955 until the house was
removed and the property vacated by Floreza or his heirs.

10. Tan Queto v. CA, et al. GR 35648, Feb. 27, 1987

Assuming Tan Queto recognized Restituta as the owner; bad faith of one neutralizes the bad
faith of the other

Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as conjugal, Tan Queto nursed the belief that
the lot was actually Restituta’s (making him in bad faith), still Restituta’s failure to prohibit him
from building despite her knowledge that construction was actually being done, makes her also
in bad faith. The net resultant of mutual bad faith would entitle Tan Qyeto to the rights of a
builder in good faith (Art. 448, Civil Code), ergo, reimbursement should be given him if Restituta
decides to appropriate the building for herself (Art. 448, Civil Code).

7. Tan Queto an owner-possessor

Tan Queto having bartered his own lot and small house with the questioned lot with Juan (who
has been adverted to by a court decision and by the OCT a conjugal owner) may be said to be
the owner-possessor of the lot. Certainly he is not merely a possessor or builder in good faith
(this phrase presupposes ownership in another); much less is he a builder in bad faith. He is a
builder-possessor (jus possidendi) because he is the owner himself.

11. Torbela vs. Sps Rosario and Banco Filipiino GR No. 140553 December 7, 2011
However, in the case at bar, both Torbela siblings and Rosario are deemed in bad faith. The
Torbelas knew Rosario built on the land and even allowed him to use the land to obtain a loan
from DBP. Rosario on the other hand consciously built on land he knew was not his. They both
had knowledge and did not oppose.
Art. 453 states that when both parties are in bad faith, the case shall be treated as though both
were in good faith thus the application of Art. 448.
 448 allows the Land Owner 2 options in the case at bar. Either indemnify Rosario and
appropriate the lot to himself or ask Rosario to buy the lot or the rent rate. This case was
remanded to the RTC for the Torbelas to make such decision.

Still following the rules of accession, civil fruits such as rent belong to the owner of the building.
Rosario has rights over the rent and improvements and shall continue until the Torbela siblings
have chosen an option from 448.

Quieting title

1. Realty Sales Enterprise vs. IAC (G.R. No. L-67451 September 28, 1987)
NO, they should not be consolidated. The Supreme Court emphasized thatthe action filed by
Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove clouds from title to real property. By
asserting its own title to the property in question and asking that Carpo's title be declared null
and void instead, and by filing the third-party complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly
asking the court to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are governed by
Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title of the Civil Code and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar
Remedies of the Rules of Court.

Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in personam,
but being against the person in respect of the res , these proceedings are characterized as quasi
in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is
conclusive only between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]). The ruling in this
case is therefore without any prejudice to this Court's final determination of G.R. No. L-46953 –
a case involving the validity of the compromise agreement between the parties in this case.

2. Lucasan v. PDIC (GR No. 176926 July 4, 2008)

To avail of the remedy of QUIETING OF TITLE, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of action; and the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown in fact invalid or inoperative despite it prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Stated simply, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or at least an equitable title over
the real property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case. Lucasan admitted that he failed
to redeem the property during the redemption period, on account of his ten limited financial
situation. It was only 15 years later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties.
Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right ha had over the lots.

The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way operate to restore whatever right he
had over the subject properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations to the
mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed were subsisting at the time of the
registration of the notice of embargo and certification of sale.

Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition for consolidation of ownership
after the expiration of the redemption period. with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem ans that the sale thereby becomes
absolute, the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere
confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.

Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title to or interest over the subject
parcels of land; hence, he cannot validly maintain an action for quieting of title.