January - February 2019 ISSN 2243-8173-19-01

The Organic Law for the

What’s inside?
Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao: Leading the
a) Discussion Philippines towards genuine and
a.1) Paradoxical nature meaningful local autonomy
of the BOL
This Policy Brief was prepared by Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco, LL.M for IAG.

a.2) Relationship of the

national government to
the BARMM INTRODUCTION

a.3) Utilizing the

Intergovernmental
Last July 26, 2018, President Rodrigo Duterte signed Republic Act No.
Relations (IGR) 11054 or the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Mechanisms is Vital Muslim Mindanao (hereafter referred to as BOL).

a.4) Understanding the

The Commission on Elections (Comelec) scheduled two separate days for
Block Grant
the plebiscite for the ratification of the BOL.1 Residents of the Autonomous
a.5) Transition Period Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), Isabela City in Basilan, and Cotabato
Priorities City will be able to vote on January 21, 2019. While residents of Lanao
del Norte, the towns of Aleosan, Carmen, Kabacan, Midsayap, Pikit, and
b) Conclusion Pigkawayan, and areas petitioning to be part of the Bangsamoro territory
will vote on February 6, 2019.

1 See Article XV of the BOL.

This Policy Brief is published bimonthly.

Editor: Benedicto R. Bacani Associate Editor: Ramie P. Toledo Lay-out Artist: Hazelyn A. Gaudiano
 Given the gravity of such a landmark piece of legislation, last December 7, 2018 the Institute
for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) and Konrad Adenaeur Stiftung (KAS) Philippines
conducted a multi-stakeholder roundtable discussion (RTD) to explore the constitutional,
legal and political ramifications of the BOL. 2
The BOL will have an impact on the country’s constitutional order because the creation of an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is mandated by Sections 15-21 of Article X of the
1987 Constitution. Correspondingly, any analysis of the BOL must first and foremost reckon
with the fundamental requirement that it must not contradict these provisions in the charter.
3
Indeed, any appreciation of the BOL cannot deviate from these very provisions.
The BOL will likewise impact the broader legal framework of the country because under
Section 20 of Article X, the organic act of the autonomous region (i.e. the BOL) will be subject
to national laws as well. The BOL itself contains provisions that contemplate interaction with
national laws (ex. Article VI on Intergovernmental Relations).
Lastly, the BOL will definitely affect the current political environment for as they say, “all
politics is local”. The political configuration of the ARMM has always been tied to Malacañang
power plays. There is certainly no reason to believe that the path leading to the creation of
the BARMM will be any different. Given that 2019 is an election year, local politicians in the
areas to be impacted by the plebiscite will definitely have an active campaign period, to say
the least.
The aim of this policy report is to lay out issues that have emerged from the RTD in an
organized and coherent manner. It must be conceded though that a bias towards the success
of the BOL in the plebiscite pervaded amongst the participants. This belief however was not
at all based on mere wishful thinking.
The participants recognized that the BOL’s passage was the result of the collective hard
work of the national government, through the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC),
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), civil society organizations within the ARMM and
in Mindanao, academic institutions and various community groups. This palpable solidarity
behind the BOL is still strong. Thus accounting for the inherent optimism in the RTD.
2 Speakers in the RTD include Commissioner Joe Lorena, Atty. Ishak Mastura, Director James Jimenez, Assemblywoman Irene Tillah and
Mayor Ampatuan.
3 There are currently two petitions filed in the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the BOL. One filed by Gov. Sakur Tan and the
other filed by the Philippine Constitution Association.
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Of course, the declaration of support from President Duterte is the ultimate boost of
confidence in the ratification of the BOL.4 Needless to say, if an unequivocal and impassioned
endorsement from the president is issued, then this will most likely seal the deal for the BOL
in the plebiscite.
A BOL loss in the plebiscite will mean the ARMM carries on. But its “failed experiment”
tag cannot be taken lightly. The discussion in this policy brief will still be relevant in finding
improvements for the ARMM. Nevertheless, institutional reforms to the current regional
autonomy regime, sans the BOL, deserves its very own RTD.
With this policy report, the hope is that the BOL, both in the coming plebiscite process and
its implementation, will not be viewed through rose-colored glasses, but would instead be
seen with insight and resolve. Accordingly, this report is guided by two overarching themes,
namely the principles of rule of law and shared responsibility.
The distinction between “rule of law” and “rule by law” must be emphasized. The former refers
to a principle of governance whereby all actors in the political system including the state
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated.
The latter arises when the political leadership of the state makes laws and regulations with
the intent to further discrimination between the different political groups or religious groups
or gender or ethnicities or to institutionally marginalize these groups.
Hence, a “rule by law” approach to the BOL will not be sustainable. As will be shown here,
only under a regime of “rule of law” will the BOL achieve its avowed aspirations of peace and
prosperity for the Bangsamoro region.
Furthermore, any discussion now should be about a shared vision of moving forward.
Meaning, the BOL discourse should lead to the appreciation that everything that happens
in this piece of land called Bangsamoro is shared by all. Indeed, there should be amongst
Filipinos both a shared understanding of what has been created and a shared commitment
to making the new system work.
4 See https://pia.gov.ph/news/articles/1011314.
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 DISCUSSION
I. Paradoxical nature of the BOL
The BOL is not an ordinary piece of legislation. It is both a national law and an organic act.
This dual nature demands a nuanced view of the BOL, specifically with regards to its proper
implementation.
As a national law, the central government (i.e Executive Department) is expected to be
fully committed to the BOL in terms of using all the available resources for the information
drive, the plebiscite and in ensuring the security of all the affected areas and the safety of
all participants of this electoral exercise.
More importantly, the central government also has a major role to play to make sure the
Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) is properly organized. It must be noted that President
Duterte has a key part in the composition of the BTA. Without disregarding the significance
of the MILF in shepherding the BOL to its current place, fitness and merit should be the
prime consideration of the President in appointing the members of the BTA. Indeed, this is
one point where the principle of rule of law becomes utterly relevant.
As an organic act, the BOL is part and parcel of the Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination.
In fact, it is a legal platform through which the Bangsamoro people assert regional autonomy.
Correspondingly, it is incumbent upon the Bangsamoro people to be proactive in relation
to the information drive both for the specifics of the BOL and the details of the plebiscite.
Civil society organizations, academic institutions and community groups within the broader
Bangsamoro community also bear the responsibility of bringing vital information to all
concerned, from the urban areas to the far-flung villages.
Crucially, they also bear the responsibility of ensuring only the truly deserving people are
appointed by the President in the BTA. This is a much tougher task, but it is one that the
Bangsamoro community cannot avoid.
Therefore, the Bangsamoro community must embrace this dual nature of the BOL. While
they can, and should, demand the central government to leave no stone unturned in ensuring
the success of the BOL, both in the plebiscite and implementation stages, the Bangsamoro
community nevertheless must also mobilize.
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Absolute blind reliance on the central government will no longer suffice. Indeed, the only way
to hold the national government accountable with regards to the BOL is for the Bangsamoro
community to be fully and actively engaged every step of the way.
II. Relationship of the national government to the BARMM
Acceptance of the dual nature of the BOL has to be carried over in defining the relationship
of the national government to the BARMM. Note the new articulation of the supervisory
power of the president in the BOL.
The ARMM law provides that “Consistent with the Constitution and basic policy on local
autonomy, the President of the Republic shall exercise general supervision over the
Regional Governor to ensure that his or her acts are within the scope of his or her powers
and functions.56
Such specificity in articulation is no longer the case in the BOL, to wit: “The President shall
exercise general supervision over the Bangsamoro Government to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.” There is now ambiguity as to how this power is to be exercised by the
President.
Because the Bangsamoro Government will be parliamentary in structure, it is only natural to
ask to who shall be subject to this power? The Chief Minister, the Cabinet, or the Regional
Parliament?
There is no definitive resolution yet on this particular issue. But the broader articulation
in the BOL could pave way to a new convention as to how the national government, as
represented by the President, relates to the regional government.
With the BARMM, the understanding of the President’s supervisory power can be more
consistent to the prescription of the International Guidelines on Decentralisation and
Strengthening of Local Authorities issued by the UN-HABITAT which specifically emphasizes
that supervision over local elected officials must be “confined to a posteriori verification of
the legality of the acts and should respect the autonomy of the local authority.”7 In the
5 See Section 1 of Article V of RA No. 9054.
6 See Section 1 of Article VI of RA No. 11054.
7 Approved by the Governing Council of UN-HABITAT on April 20, 2007 as a key instrument to promote good governance at all levels and
to strengthen local authorities. Generally considered in international development as soft law in all matters pertaining to decentralization of
government.
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 context of international law, this constitutional power of the President should not actually
countenance the central government over exerting influence over local affairs.
This nuanced comprehension of the supervisory power of the President sanctions a
practice of only getting involved when there is a clear violation of the BOL. Meaning,
as a matter of policy, the President and the central government will always defer to the
Bangsamoro government and will only step-in if there is a patent contravention of the
Constitution, national laws and the BOL. Regional autonomy will be the rule and the
exercise of supervision will only be the exception.
Of course, the premise of this new convention is a Bangsamoro government functioning
properly and within the bounds of the BOL. Therefore, asserting genuine and meaningful
regional autonomy comes hand in hand with good governance.
III. Utilizing the Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) Mechanisms is Vital
It is worth recalling that the purpose of the BOL is to fulfil the mandate of the Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) to strengthen regional autonomy for the Bangsamoro.
Obviously, the BOL is merely a partial fulfilment of the CAB, but for the moment it is a
sufficient legal platform to assert Bangsamoro autonomy.
The CAB specifically provides that the relationship between the Central Government and
the Bangsamoro Government shall be asymmetric. This prescription aims to distinguish
the Bangsamoro regional government with other local government units. Meaning, its
relationship with the national government should be fundamentally different from the
relationship of other local governments to the central bureaucracy.
Whilst the word “asymmetric” to describe the relationship of the national government
and the Bangsamoro government is not found in the BOL, the statute itself is proof that
the Bangsamoro regional governance infrastructure vastly differs from the current local
government structure under the Local Government Code of 1991.
First of all, the BOL establishes a ministerial regional government structure with a
strong mandate for a disciplined political party system. This framework is unique to the
Bangsamoro. Critically however, when employed for the purpose it was designed for, the
parliamentary structure makes maintaining good governance over region more probable.
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Moreover, the BOL also institutes a robust fiscal autonomy regime, the centrepiece of which
is the block grant. This fiscal framework is also unique to the Bangsamoro and when utilized
properly and strategically, can indeed lead the Bangsamoro to genuine self-governance.
Therefore, the word “asymmetric” may be absent in the BOL, but the regional governance
structure established by this law is certainly distinct from the regular local government
apparatus. The political and fiscal autonomy of the Bangsamoro government is clearly more
substantial that other local governments.
More critically, the creation of various coordinative bodies such as the National
Government-Bangsamoro Government Intergovernmental Relations Body, the Philippine
Congress-Bangsamoro Parliament Forum, Fiscal Policy Board, Joint Body for Zones
of Joint Cooperation, Infrastructure Development Board, Energy Board and Sustainable
Development Board are the features of the BOL which clearly demonstrate that the
Bangsamoro government has an elevated status over other local governments in terms of
its relationship with the central government.
Through these IGR mechanisms the Bangsamoro government can be at par with the national
government when it comes to the decision-making process involving particular development
and governance mandates. This is so contrary to the status of other local governments
where most often than not, decisions have been made for them by the national government.
Furthermore, the BOL specifically commands that the Bangsamoro government shall be
represented in the departments, offices, commissions, agencies and bureaus of the national
government that implement and enforce policies, programs, and projects of the national
government in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.
Such a statutory command essentially characterizes the Bangsamoro government as a
partner of the central bureaucracy within the Bangsamoro region. Contrary to the treatment
of local governments as mere agents of the national government.
These particular IGR mechanisms in the BOL, through the mandate to coordinate and
resolve issues on intergovernmental relations, can empower the Bangsamoro government
to fend off unwarranted national government intrusion in regional affairs.
Crucially, given its access to the block grant, it is paramount for the Bangsamoro government
to have a firmer claim on its autonomy than the regional government it is set to replace.
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 Otherwise, this vastly increased fund transfer may also fail to deliver the development
outcomes many of the people in the Bangsamoro region are hoping for.
By design, the fiscal autonomy provisions and the IGR mechanisms in the BOL are venues
for the Bangsamoro government to assert true autonomy against the traditional domination
of the central government. Nevertheless, if the new generation of Moro leaders will not see
themselves as equals with the national politicians and bureaucrats, then the pathologies of
the past regional regime will persist.
Therefore, it is now incumbent upon the Bangsamoro community to get more excited
about learning the specifics of the BOL’s IGR mechanisms. It will certainly be a big boost
if experts in this field are brought in to share potent IGR strategies and techniques to
prospective members of the BTA and to Bangsamoro community organizations.
The political and fiscal governance mechanisms instituted in the BOL are true platforms to
exercise effective self-governance. The caveat of course is that the Bangsamoro leadership
must assert complete compliance of the BOL. Even if doing this means battling with the
national government again, but this time within the confines of the IGR framework.
IV. Understanding the Block Grant
It must be noted that the institution of the block grant is a highly welcomed innovation of
the BOL. It represents a fundamental shift in the fiscal position of the regional government.
The block grant will be automatically released to the Bangsamoro government and will
be subject to its full control. This is a significant departure from the current arrangement
wherein the ARMM is treated similarly to a line agency of the national government.
This institution of the block grant necessitates the in-depth study of its mechanics.8 Note
that the BOL specifically provides, “The Parliament shall pass an annual appropriations
law allocating the block grant to various agencies and programs according to the powers
and functions of the Bangsamoro Government.”9 Clearly, the proper use of the block grant
requires the prospective members of the Bangsamoro government to understand the
details of this new fiscal arrangement.
8 See Sections 15-22 of Article XII of the BOL.
9 See Section 19.
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Note as well that the BOL states, “The Parliament shall assign the highest budgetary priority
to education, health, and social services as may be provided in its appropriations law.”10 The
proper utilization of the block grant therefore demands the involvement in the budgetary
process of academic institutions, policy and research centers and think-tanks based in the
Bangsamoro territory. Accordingly, these groups and other civil society organizations in the
Bangsamoro region must likewise undertake a thorough education of the mechanics of the
block grant.
In sum, ensuring the correct disposition of the block grant necessarily includes the clear
understanding of rules and regulations to hold the Bangsamoro government accountable.
Fairness dictates that prospective members of the new regional government and the broader
Bangsamoro community are unequivocally on the same page with regards to these rules
and regulations.11
Civil society organizations in particular must be deeply familiar with these rules and
regulations governing the block grant. The BOL calls upon them to engage the Bangsamoro
government in terms of development planning and execution. But more importantly, the
Bangsamoro people will rely on them to function as an anti-corruption watchdog. Fulfilling
this responsibility is warranted to ensure the block grant is not hijacked by unscrupulous
politicians and their cronies, both at the national and regional levels.
V. Transition Period Priorities
The BOL is essentially an overhaul of the current regional autonomy framework. The
transition from the ARMM to the BARMM will be extremely challenging. At the top of the “most
difficult” list would be the organization of the BTA “which shall be the interim government in
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region during the transition period.”12
The organization of the BTA will hardly be a matter of course. The BOL specifies that,
“The Moro Islamic Liberation Front shall lead the Bangsamoro Transition Authority, without
prejudice to the participation of the Moro National Liberation Front in its membership.”
13
Pertinently, this prescription is not helpful at all and in fact allows room for tension between
the two traditional rivals. A peculiarity that must be carefully navigated in the organization of
the BTA.
10 See Section 19.
11 Section 19 states: “In the allocation of the block grant, the national laws and the budgeting rules and regulations implemented by the
Department of Budget and Management and Department of the Interior and Local Government applicable to local government units shall
apply.”
12 See Section 2 of Article XVI of the BOL.
13 See Section 2.
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Furthermore, the BOL also states, “The Bangsamoro Transition Authority shall be
composed of eighty (80) members, who shall be appointed by the President: Provided,
That, in addition, the elected officials of the Autonomous Regional Government in Muslim
Mindanao shall automatically become members of the Bangsamoro Transition Authority
and shall serve until noon of the 30th of June 2019: Provided, Further, That non-Moro
indigenous communities, youth, women, settler communities, traditional leaders, and other
sectors shall have representatives in the Bangsamoro Transition Authority.”
It cannot be overemphasized enough that while paying due deference to the principal
contribution of the MILF, President Duterte must give prime consideration to fitness and
merit in appointing members of the BTA. Keeping in mind that this office will exercise
legislative and executive powers of the Bangsamoro autonomous region during the
transition period.
Of course, the immense power vested in the BTA raises questions as to how this should
be wielded, given its transitory existence. Should they be contemplating the enactment of
substantive laws on local government, environment, land use, civil service and so forth? Or
should the BTA focus on organizing the regional bureaucracy and managing the transition
from ARMM to BARMM?
Pertinently, the BOL provides that one of the priorities of the BTA is “Organization of the
bureaucracy of the Bangsamoro Government during transition, including the approval
and implementation of a transition plan, and the institution of a placement process for
hiring of personnel during transition. This also includes the setting up of offices and other
institutions necessary for the continued functioning of government and delivery of social
services in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region, as well as, those necessary for the
smooth operations of the first elected Bangsamoro Government in 2022”.14
Re-organizing the regional bureaucracy necessarily involves the fate of the current civil
servants in the ARMM. Fair play and the rule of law dictate that their smooth transition to
the BARMM, or to elsewhere, must be ensured by the BTA and the national government.
The BOL also directs the BTA to work on the “Enactment of priority legislations such as the
Bangsamoro Administrative Code, Bangsamoro Revenue Code, Bangsamoro Electoral
Code, Bangsamoro Local Government Code, and Bangsamoro Education Code”. 15
14 See Section 4 (c) of Article XVI of the BOL.
15 See Section 4 (a) of Article XVI.
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It can be argued however that given the substantive nature of these proposed laws, it would
be more appropriate to have a duly elected legislative body, such as the Bangsamoro
Parliament, to draft and enact them according to the legislative procedure mandated by the
BOL. 16
Another urgent item in the challenging to-do-list is the familiarization of the BTA and the entire
Bangsamoro community to the new parliamentary structure of the regional government.
Learning parliamentary principles and methods, specially getting up to speed with its lexicon,
is absolutely necessary for the BARMM to succeed.
In this new set-up, the relationship of the regional government to the local government units
within the region has to be revisited. Will the supervisory power of the President be delegated
to the Chief Minister or will there be a parliamentary oversight instead? Determining the
resolution to this issue will not be easy because it will be deeply connected to how the
disposition of the block grant is ultimately configured.
Moreover, in a ministerial executive department, the policy direction of the regional
government is determined by the majority party in the parliament. Hence, voters have to be
educated how to determine from the very start what the candidates stand for. Simple slogans
like No to Drugs, Yes to Federalism or Tuwid na Daan are just not enough because they can
actually mean anything. Voting for candidates with this kind of a platform is like giving them
carte blanche authority to do everything they want if they form government. Clearly, voters
must be taught how to discern political programs and agendas more rigorously.
Furthermore, the legislative agenda of the parliament is dictated by the majority party as
well. Minority parties will most likely be unable to file any bills without making any deals with
the majority. Because political parties are vital in a parliamentary system, voters must also
be taught how to review and evaluate party objectives and behaviour.
Indeed, another urgent matter to attend to during the transition period is the organization
of political parties itself. Political parties in the Bangsamoro cannot be monopolized by
traditional politicians. Membership in one should not be limited to elites and traditional
families, keeping in mind that a robust political party system will ensure the parliament
functions properly.
16 See Sections 25-26 of Article VII.
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 Notably, civil society will play a crucial role in political party building, specifically in terms
of providing warm bodies for memberships. But they can also contribute significantly in
offering policy ideas to political parties in the Bangsamoro territory.
A case of “business as usual” will bring disastrous results for the BARMM. Bangsamoro
politicians and voters alike must see their role in a parliamentary system. So education
and training for the needed changes is absolutely necessary.
MILF Chairman, Murad Ebrahim, is absolutely correct that governing the region will be
a tremendous challenge for the new leaders of the Bangsamoro government. Hence,
transitioning the MILF from a “revolutionary organization” to being responsible for the full
implementation of the BOL, which began years ago, must continue at a faster pace.
Parliamentary procedures, inter-agency relations and management, values-based
leadership, fiscal policy formulation and sustainable development management are just
a few examples of the competencies the new Bangsamoro regional government leaders
and officials need to learn under such a limited timetable.
Asserting Bangsamoro autonomy with the conscious view towards good governance
requires capacity-building to be an utmost priority from day one of the transition period.
CONCLUSION
Barring a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the Supreme Court, the two plebiscite
dates will push through. Although concerns about conducting the plebiscite in two separate
days, with a long period in between, have been raised with the Comelec.
Events in the first day can potentially influence the voters in the second day. So if this
two-day plebiscite does push through, then measures to prevent this kind of contingency
must be in place. However, as to whether the Comelec will change their plan remains to
be seen given their difficulty in resolving the petitions for inclusion in the plebiscite. The
application of the term “contiguous” is highly contentious and will be extremely difficult to
resolve.
The collective hope for the BOL is that it comes with a clear path to peace and
development in Muslim Mindanao. And as demonstrated in this policy brief, this path
entails the massive redesigning of the regional autonomy framework. First by vesting
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in the regional government substantial political and fiscal authority. Second, and more
importantly, by instituting mechanisms to encourage the genuine engagement of the
Bangsamoro community in the governance of the region. Very clearly demanding more
effort and resources be devoted to the rebuilding of the regional bureaucracy.
This policy brief also shows that the BOL can provide the political space for new politics in
the Bangsamoro. Note though that this not mean replacing traditional political families in
the region for obviously this will be impossible to achieve. But the parliamentary structure
of the regional government can give currently marginalized peoples in the Bangsamoro,
such as sectoral organizations, former combatants and ethnic groups, a chance at having
substantial representation. Ostensibly, the new governance structure offered by the BOL
presents a better chance at addressing the long-standing socio-economic inequality
plaguing the region.
Accordingly, it must be emphasized that the BOL is intrinsically linked to the CAB’s
prescriptions on Normalization and Transitional Justice. Indeed, it is an integral component
of a broader state effort to combat terrorism and violent extremism. This truly gives credence
to the assertion that the success of the BOL, both in the plebiscite and its implementation,
is in the best interest of the entire nation.
There is now a palpable public effort in ensuring a win for the BOL in the plebiscite. Some
local politicos in the Bangsamoro are openly riding on this wave of support for the BOL,
while some are silently hedging from a possible loss in the plebiscite. This behaviour is to
be expected and hopefully will be offset by the comprehensive education campaign by the
Comelec and civil society organizations in the Bangsamoro region.
Nevertheless, the importance of local politicians in the success of the BOL and in the
Normalization process must not be underestimated. They also share in this responsibility
and can be held accountable accordingly.
As a conclusion to this policy report, it is worth noting again that the BOL is merely a partial
fulfilment of the CAB. Hence, pass or fail in the plebiscite, the Bangsamoro struggle for
right to self-determination will continue. A Bangsamoro sub-state within a federal system
is still the ultimate goal.
But a fully-functioning regional autonomy framework under the BOL could definitely be
the perfect motivation for the whole country to undertake charter change and allow the
Bangsamoro people to attain this prime objective.
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 Shaping Public Policy
for Peace and Good Governance

The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) is an independent and

non-partisan think tank founded in 2001 to generate ideas on making
autonomy an effective vehicle for peace and development in the Southern
Philippines. IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
in the Philippines.

KAS is in 5th floor, Cambridge Center Building, 108 Tordesillas Corner

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telephone 894 - 3737.

Views and opinions expressed in IAG publications are those of the authors
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