Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. The following is the procedure to put the feeder for trial and belt stretching :
1. Verify that all the 4 feeder doors are open and proper tools available for belt tracking and tension adjustme
2. Verify that the load cells and calibration weight are mounted and the belt is tightened properly and equally
3. Verify SSF (REMOTE/OFF/LOCAL) switch is in OFF (PCR).
4. Verify SSC (Conveyor RUN/OFF) switch is in OFF (PCR).
5. Verify SSL (REV/OFF/FWD) is in OFF (Local).
6. Verify SLF (Feeder OFF/RUN) is in OFF (Local).
7. Verify incomer main switches CS-1 and DS-1 are OFF.
8. Adjust Coal on belt, Discharge plugged and Shear Pin Failure switches.
9. Charge incoming power supplies.
10. If OK, put ON DS-1 and CS-1.
11. Check voltage across transformer T1 secondary (X1 and X2) is 115 VAC.
12. Check voltage across transformer T2 secondary (1X1 and 1X2) is 95 VAC.
13. Check voltage across transformer T2 secondary (1X1 and 1X3) is 115 VAC.
14. With no demand applied at TBC-6 :72 and 73, adjust MIN FEEDRATE pot (R23) in A2 (ISF) card to get 1.0
15. With 20.00 mA demand applied at TBC-6 :72(+) and 73(-), adjust SPAN pot (R18) in A2 (ISF) card to get 5
16. Remove demand signal.
17. Put SSL to LOCAL.
18. Press Phase failure reset button and proceed to local.
19. Put switch SSL to FORWARD.
20. Briefly (for 3 to 4 seconds) put Switch SLF to RUN. Feeder belt should start.
21. Verify direction of belt rotation and correct if required.
22. Put SLF to RUN briefly and verify correct rotation of belt.
23. Put SLF to OFF, SSL to REVERSE, again SLF to RUN briefly and verify reverse rotation of feeder. Keep the b
24. Put Switch SSC in RUN(PCR) and check for correct rotation of Cleanout conveyor. Rectify if required.
25. Start feeder in forward direction. It should run at about 300 RPM. Cleanout conveyor should also run.
26. Check and adjust for proper belt tracking.
27. When belt tracking is OK for about 3 to 4 minutes, increase speed demand by giving 16 mA at TBC-6 : 72(
28. Check and adjust for proper tracking and belt tension.
29. Let the feeder run for 6 to 8 hours under constant watch and intermittent adjustment for proper belt tensio
at a time.
Maximum allowable
Design pressure Working
is usually pressure
the pressure set(MAWP) Vsengineer,
by process Design pressure
based on the r
pressure based on the actual characteristics of the vessel/equipment (which is u
process engineer). Maximum allowable working pressure is always greater than
Permissive,
The PERMISSIVES,interlock - Difference
are some conditions that need to be satisfied before you can
only when there
INTERLOCK: is sufficient
During suction
the process, pressure. fails, interlocks are activated. For
if a condition
level of drum goes low.
An interlock can also be a permissive, but the converse is not true. For the comp
pressure is a permissive, the compressor will not shutdown, if there is insufficien
start. But if insufficient suction pressure was an interlock, the system will shutdo
value. But once shutdown, all the permissives need to be satisfied before the sy
Hot boltingis a method of replacing the bolts on a live line. Normally done one
Hot bolting
there is no other reasonable choice.
The
• Thecriteria typically
operating followed
pressure mustisbesomething
less thanlike:
75% of the MAWP as allowed under
system to be hot bolted.
• The flange must have a minimum of 8 bolts
• The process temperature must be between 4°and 71° C.
• All flangesfor
Monitoring and associated system
hydrocarbons is also aequipment
must during must
thebe adequately
operation. supported,
Generally the
tightening
• The gasket operation.
area must not show signs of leakage. Piping, flanges, and bolts mu
their integrity.
• Existing flange bolts/nuts must be tight and of the correct size and grade.
Hot Bolting" Calculations
perform a Hot Bolt procedure (ie, removing one bolt at a time for maintenace pu
Section VII calculator (Mr. Pedersen's), but when you reduce the number of bolts
diameter. If I remove half the bolts (to accurately reflect the increased distance
bolt stress for MAWP is too conservative as compared to removing only one bolt
either
I have MAWP or seating
never heard perspective-
of anyone whichever
taking one bolt at is
a greater).
time for maintenance purpose
to me.
RossABQ - yes, one bolt at a time...but not necessarily "replacing" - we often jus
on it (the lubricant issue is a whole other can of worms), and then re-install the
AND on vessel manways....most often in preparation for turnaround maintenanc
some corrosion or when when find a "short bolt" (ie, a bolt that is too short and
acquired at one time or another) or when we find a nut or bolt that is not the co
the bolt and/or nut. desertfox - I don't believe it is "extrememly dangerous" - the
companies have specific procedures for this operation (I have copies of the BP, C
Bolting). Folks, thanx for your interests...and look forward to your thoughts and
Hot bolting is fairly common, I've been around it quite a bit before. It's simply re
time. That being said, hot bolting should be usedo nly when there is no otehr re
The
• Thecriteria typically
operating followed
pressure mustisbe
something
less thanlike:
75% of the MAWP as allowed under
system to be hot bolted.
• The flange must have a minimum of 8 bolts
• The process temperature must be between 40°and 160° Fahrenheit.
• All flangesfor
Monitoring and associated system
hydrocarbosn is also aequipment must
must during thebe adequately
operation. supported,
Generally the
tightening
• The gasket operation.
area must not show signs of leakage. Piping, flanges, and bolts mu
their integrity.
•
InExisting flange
my opinion, thebolts/nuts
answer tomust
yourbe tight
stud and
bolt of the correct
question is.... "it size and grade. dep
depends"....!!!It
bolt. If the bolt is of large diameter and of expensive materials, it pays to be car
be replaced
process as aDaging,
we call mater of policy
the addition of a collodial graphite lubricant. We run eac
existing Dag and the disassembled studs and nuts are run through the Daging b
assembled with a full nut engagement on each end of the stud. I would say less
the rejected studs are recovered by lite duty mechanics. It is a very rare occurre
piping is reassembled. Some of the studs in use are over 40 years old as witness
found in service. At various times I've removed a sample of studs and physically
approaching rejection. There is problem sometime with meaning of "hot bolting"
operating conditions. "Hot bolting" and "hot torquing" are two separate operatio
sevral problems with "hot torquing" were people forget the proper tightening se
Systems in a Boiler
A Boiler mainly contains following systems :
1. Feed water system.
2. Steam system.
3. Air system.
4. Flue gas system.
5. Fuel handling system.
6. Ash handling system.
Boiler Mountings
Fittings on a Boiler which are required for its safe and efficient operation are call
1. Safety valve
2. Water level sight glass (gauge glass)
3. Pressure gauge
4. Blow down valve
5. Main steam stop valve
6. Feed water check valve (NRV)
7. Air Vent
8. Start-up vent
9. Manhole
Boiler Accessories
The devices which are used in a Boiler as an integral part and help to run the Bo
1. Super heater
2. De-super heater
3. Economizer
4. Air Pre-heater
5. Soot Blower
6. Feed Pump
7. ID and FD fans
8. Ash Removal system
9. Fuel supply system
10. Dosing system
11. Deaerator
Steam Generation
In a Boiler In A Boiler..contd
fuel is burnt to get heat energy which is converted from chemical ene
produce steam from feed water.
arranged around the furnace and flue gas path. Water tube arrangement made
circulated in these tubes. Water comes to water wall from Boiler drum, and circu
difference in density which is created due to difference in temperature, water cir
Natural Circulation.
During circulation of water in tubes, steam is generated and collected at the upp
corresponding to Boiler drum pressure. This steam is further heated in Superhea
Boiler Drum is filled with fresh feed water. The feed water, before entering into d
flue gas path. Most of the heat of the flue gas is utilized inside the Boiler. Still co
heat is utilized in Economizer to heat up the feed water.
For burning of fuel, required Oxygen is obtained from atmospheric air. Air is requ
Forced Draught (FD) fan. This air is heated at air pre-heater (APH) before being s
in energy. Air pre-heater is placed at the flue gas path after Economizer. Air pre-
flue gas to the cold air, which is to be used in furnace. By heating the air, burnin
flue gas would not be used to heat up feed water at Economizer and air at Air Pr
Finally the flue gas passes through Electrostatic Precipitator (ESP) and exhauste
particle in the flue gas is trapped and clean gas escapes to atmosphere.
Ash which is produced in the Boiler due to combustion of solid fuel is collected a
and ESP. This ash is disposed off with the help of suitable ash handling system.
Start-up of Boiler within 2 Hrs of Tripping of Boiler is known as the Hot Start-up o
1. Ensure the Drum level of Boiler. It should be at Normal water level.
2. Start Air Compressors.
3. Start Boiler Feed water Pump.
4. Start ID fan with ID damper in Zero position.
5. Open Start-up vent.
6. Slowly open damper of ID fan. Watch Drum level.
7. Regulate Boiler pressure by opening start-up vent.
8. Super heater temperature has to be maintained with the help of attempera
9. Raise the Boiler pressure upto 45 Kg/cm2 and temperature to 485 deg C.
10. Open the drains of Main steam line in between Main Steam Stop Valve (MSS
11. Open By-pass valve of MSSV.
12. Condensate, if any, will be drained out and main steam line heating will be
13. After ensuring proper Main steam line heating, open Main
14. steam stop valve.
15. Close all drains in main steam line.
16. Charge ESP when flue gas temperature at Economizer outlet reaches 160 d
17. Put drum level controller and attemperator controller in Auto mode.
18. Regulate the pressure of Boiler with the help of start-up vent.
19. Close Start-up vent as per the steam demand of TG set.
20. Normalize ID fan damper by gradual opening and loading of Boiler.
Charging of De-areator
It removes the dissolved gases from the condensate mechanically by following t
1. Henry’s Law
2. Dalton’s Law of Partial Pressure.
· According to Henry’s Law, Solubility of dissolved gases decreases by incre
Deaerator water temperature increases and soluble gases in condensate depart
· According to Dalton’s Law of Partial Pressure Pm= Ps+Pa
Where Pm= Partial pressure of Mixture
Ps= Partial pressure of Steam
Pa= Partial pressure of Air
· The partial pressure of air present inside the Deaerator comes out
· through Deaerator vent for equilibrium state.
Procedure Of Charging
1. Ensure DM Storage Tank level is more than 60%.
2. Start DM Transfer Pump by opening Recirculation valve.
3. Ensure Deaerator level is 60%. If the level is less then take the make up wate
4. Open all drain lines of Pegging PRDS line and observe that condensate is com
5. Slowly open Pegging PRDS pressure Control Valve and ensure that condensat
6. Gradually increase the pressure to 2.8 Kg/cm2 by increasing pegging PRDS p
7. Slowly heat the Deaerator by opening the heating line isolation valve and rai
8. Open the before and after isolation valve of Deaerator Pressure Control valve
increase the Deaerator pressure upto 2 kg/cm2 .After that put the Deaerator Pre
9. Start LP Dosing pump.
10. In LP Dosing Hydrazine is used. Hydrazine removes oxygen by chemical rea
11. EQUATION- N2H4+O2=2H2O+N2
12. By adding Hydrazine dissolved oxygen becomes water and Nitrogen gas re
WHRB Interlocks
1.
2. If Drum
This is tolevel becomes
protect very tubes.
the Boiler low i.e.At25%
low then
DrumIDlevel,
fan Trips
heatand
fluxEmergency
input has toc
starvation takes place.
3. If PCC out let temperature rises to 1050 deg C then ID fan damper become
4. This protection is incorporatedto protect the Boiler tubes from overheating.
5. If all BFPs trip then ID fan damper becomes Zero and Emergency cap open
6. When all running BFPs Trip, then Drum level falls drastically. To protect the
7. If Deaerator level becomes very low i.e.25% then All BFPs Trip.
8. Running of BFPs at Low Deaerator Level is harmful for the Pump.
9. If Ash ash
10. When SiloSilo
levelis is
athigh,
high all ashthen
level handling systems
conveying morestop.
ash from ash handling s
prevent this, it is better to stop the systems and unload ash from Ash Silo.
11. Boiler
12. This Main steam
protection is to stop
avoidvalve will not opendue
line hammering if by-pass MOV of
to presence of condensate
MSSV is in clo
in
towards Turbine side.
13. Boiler
14. If feedFeed
waterWater MOVinwill
is empty not open ifand
Economizer by-pass
in theMOV
pipe of Feed
line water
after FeedMOV is iM
water
opening FW by-pass, MOV will lead to overloading of BFP, resulting BFP Trip.
15. ESP trips, if Ash Hopper level is high.
16. ESP has high voltage. Ash has presence of combustibles.
17. This protection is to safeguard ESP at Ash Hopper level high.
18. ESP can not be charged without starting of Purge Air Blower.
20. This is to Seal the ESP by the air from Purge Air Blower before charging it.
22. ESP can not be charged till flue gas inlet temperature reaches 160 deg C.
23. This is to avoid deposition of moisture and oil content influe gas on ESP.
c.
WhenUnitUnitgetting
comes into Island
to Island modeit follows the load connected to the Generator
mode,
load and exporting to Grid.
At the time of Islanding, Generator will follow the load connected in this Unit and
load and allow the steam to pass through Turbine. The surplus amount of steam
This drum pressure will exert a downward thrust to the drum level and it decrea
d.
If anyWhether CBD
operating valve, EBD
personnel has valve
openedor any
IBD valve opened?
of these valves without proper reaso
Ensure first then close the valve or regulate it observing the drum level.
b. Whether Instrument air compressor tripped and air lock unit at feed control
If Instrument air compressor trips, then air lock unit of control valve at feed cont
it was, before supply of instrument air. This is known as stay put condition. If air
stay put condition, then when supply of instrument air fails, it leads to 100% ope
instrument air compressor as early as possible and regulate the feed station con
c. Whether Start-up vent has opened or safety valve popped up?
pressure in drum. If the steam demand in TG has reduced to a large extent then
instant drum level falls rapidly. When start-up vent is operated to release the su
increases rapidly. In this case at first ensure for what reason the pressure in Boil
then give blow down to regulate it. Because at higher side drum level, the steam
to super heaters and turbine will take place, which is very much harmful.
d. Whether Start-up vent has opened or safety valve popped up? Continued…
because if the control valve is closed completely, the feed water in Economizer
due to heat in flue gas and when feed water supply through Economizer will be
hammering in Economizer tubes due to presence of steam. This may lead to Eco
start-up vent and dump the surplus steam in Condenser. Ensure that the safety
observed.
e.
If drum Whether drum levelistransmitter
level transmitter is malfunctioning?
malfunctioning then observe the level in hydrastep a
personnel about this.
d. Whether
This case ID fan
happens damper
when has temperature
flue gas closed to zero
atposition?
Post Combustion Chamber rea
damper closes. It means heat supply to Boiler has cut off. It results in less steam
temperature, immediate load reduction has to be carried out in Generator to avo
e.
If any Whether hand
person has lever ofthe
operated Safety
handvalve
leverhas been operated?
of safety valve without proper commu
Boiler steam pressure decreases and drum level increases.
b.
During Whether Soot Blowing
soot blowing, steam is in progress?rises because more steam is required f
temperature
increased by opening the ID fan damper. So during soot blowing, main steam te
control valve fails to control the rise in main steam temperature in auto mode, t
d. Whether forget to open before and after isolation valves of attemperation C
This situation comes during cold start-up of Boiler, if the inspection and checkin
During initial period, this thing cannot be noticed but at the time of main steam
flow of water cannot be established as before and after isolation valves are in cl
inspection and checking before start-up.
b.
If LoadWhether Load
set point set point isisgiven
in Generator giveninmore
Generator more
than the thangeneration
steam the Steamingenerat
Boiler
steam temperature decreases
c. Whethercomes
This situation valve sheet
duringofLow
Attemperation control
Load operation valve If
of Boiler. is heat
eroded?
input to Boiler i
generation. At that time, feed water passes due to eroded valve sheet of attemp
temperature.
d.
supply Whether IDfrom
to Boiler damper
Kiln has become
stops ZeroSodue
suddenly. to PCCin
it results outlet
rapidtemperature High?
decrease in main
attemperation control valve has to be taken to Manual mode from Auto mode an
controlled.
b. Whether
This may home
happen position
after limit switch
completion of sootisblowing
malfunctioning?
by Long Retractable Soot Blow
position feed back of the LRSB due to malfunction. If this case happens then imm
checked. Limit switch at home position has to be rectified by Instrumentation de
Steam
Steam Turbine
turbine is a mechanical device that extracts thermal energy from steam a
turbine consists of several sets of blades. Some set of blades are fixed at casing
rotor ( Moving Blade) .
Fixed blades convert potential energy of the steam into kinetic energy and direc
kinetic energy in to force, caused by pressure drop and result in rotation of turbi
through control valve. This steam after passing through different stages of blade
in a condenser and condensate then reused in boiler.
1. Impulse Turbine
2. Reaction Turbine
1) IMPULSEturbine
In Impulse TURBINE:
instead of set fixed blades a set of nozzles are fitted in the ca
and velocity of steam increases. This high velocity jet of steam contains significa
passed through a set of moving blades, where pressure of the steam remains co
2) REACTION TURBINE:
In reaction turbine fixed blades are fixed in the casing. Shape of these blades is
same as shape of nozzle. Moving blades are fixed to the rotor. Fixed blades guid
designed that steam glides over the blades. Steam while gliding over moving bl
produce the rotates the rotor.
1. Casing
2. Rotor
3. Moving Blade
4. Fixed Blade
5. Steam Sealing System
6. Bearing
Ø Joural Bearing
Ø Thrust Bearing
7. Gland
8. Exhaust Hood
9. Emergency Stop Valve
10. Governing Valve And Control Valve
11. Barring Devices.
12. Governing Systems
v CASING
Casing of turbine plays important role for the performance of a turbine. This is t
attached to this. Casing facilitates to accommodate moving parts and provides p
the temperature of steam for operating turbine is high so, normally Cr, Mo alloy
metal joint sealing is done to ensure no leakage of steam.
v ROTOR
Rotor is the moving part of a turbine which extracts work from steam. This is the
manufactured by forging. Rotor consist of shaft moving blade and inter stage se
axial thrust of rotor during various load conditions. Rotor of the turbine is allowe
allowed to remain stand still when it is hot. Due to its self weight there is a chan
v Moving Blades
Enthalpy of steam is converted into rotational energy as it passes through turbin
moving and fixed blade. As in each step pressure of steam decreases, its volume
steam. Blade has to withstand high pressure and temperature of steam. Good t
damping property, low ductility, resistance to corrosion and erosion is essential.
1. Tip
2. Profile
3. Root
v Fixed Blades
Fixed blades facilitate expansion of steam and guide it to flow over subsequent
turbine casing are called diaphragms. It holds vane shaped nozzles or fixed it
MAIN COMPONENTS OF STEAM TURBINE
1. JOURNAL BEARING
Journal bearing is a cylinder, which surrounds the shaft and is filled with some fo
hard metal and soft metal at the inner cylindrical part. In this bearing a shaft or
lubricating oil, separating the shaft and bearing through a fluid film by dynamic
soft metal called as white metal or Babbitt. This is a tin or lead based alloy.
To putejector
Main main ejector
is to beinto line,
taken following
into steps
line once to beisfollowed
turbine loaded. :Starting ejector is to
steps to be followed.
1. Ensure Condensate Extraction Pump (CEP) is running .
2. Ensure cooling water inlet and outlet valves of the ejector condenser are op
3. Vent out air from water box of the ejector condenser by opening rotametre v
4. Open ejector condensate trap before and after isolation valve
5. Fill up the “U” tube by water locally
6. Open flash box stand pipe isolation valve
7. Close all drain valves of ejector
8. Open the main isolation valve of the ejector steam line
9. Slowly open the air line valve of the ejector and observe vacuum is increasin
When vacuum is
Once Auxiliary stable, are
systems theninthe slowly ejector
operation and fullcan be stopped
vacuum by closing
is obtained inside,air va
cond
started in two different conditions.
1. Cold Start-Up
2.
In coldHot Start-Up
startup turbine is started from cold condition. In this case, special care is
thermal expansion. As both rotor and casing are in cold condition it requires tim
rotor are in hot condition. So it can be started within a short period.
Startup Curve
To allow proper thermal explanation of casing and rotor, the turbine manufactur
Ø steam should not enter immediately to turbine as it may damage the turbine
Ø Manufacturers suggest soaking time for low idle speed and high idle speed for
means
Soakingtotime
holdisthe turbinefor
different atcold
the particular
startup andspeed for a particular
hot startup. time, then
Manufacturer’s allo
advice
up curve in cold startup and hot start up conditions.
Turbine
To start Rolling Preparation..contd
rolling of turbine, some steps are followed depending upon mode of star
(Hydraulic or Electro Hydraulic)
TG Rolling
1. Reset the governor from wood yard SOS
2. Reset from HMI
3. Engage trip lever and ensure build up of trip oil pressure at governing cons
4. Open E.S.V. (Emergency Stop Valve) from H.M.I.
5. Check physically the opening of ESV (Emergency Stop Valve)
6. Give run command from HMI
7. Observe the rise in rpm gradually. RPM goes up and after reaching 1000 rpm
minutes in hot start up and 30 minutes in cold startup (in case of auto rolling).
8. Ensure oil pressure is normal. Check vibration and any abnormal sound
9. First stop barring gear then stop jack oil pump (J.O.P)
10. After
11. Get the relay reset
completion of before 2000
the hold timerpm
at 1000 rpm, R.P.M. goes from low idle spe
otherwise
12. increase 2500
After reaching the speed
rpm, manually
it holds for 15 minutes in case of hot startup and 3
auto rolling, hold the speed as per advice of manufacturer.
13. Close the TG casing drain, inlet steam line drain, warm up vent, warm up dra
14.Check the lube oil pressure at different bearings and check bearing temperat
15. After completion of high idle speed (2500 rpm) soaking time. R.P.M. will rise
16.Maintain lube oil pressure and temperature at different bearings as per the m
17. Maintain TG inlet pressure and temperature as per design
18. Give clearance to synchronize to generate power.
Turbine
In PowerAuxiliary System
Plant other than turbine, there are other associated systems. The syste
important components and systems for auxiliary systems are :
1. Oil System
2. Condensate System
3. Gland sealing System
4. Ejector and Vacuum System
5. Cooling water System
6. Condenser
Oil System
Lubricating oil is supplied to the bearings and used for governing of turbine. Mai
1. Lubricate the bearings.
2. Cooling of bearings.
3. Flush out metallic debris.
4. Control speed of the turbine. \
Principles of Lubrication
To maintain a film of lubricant between the surfaces in running condition any on
1. Hydro dynamic lubrication
2. Hydrostatic lubrication
3. Elasto-hydrodynamic lubrication
Hydrodynamic Lubrication
Also called Full Flood Lubrication/Wedge film lubrication
Wedge film formation due to geometry & speed.
a. In hydrodynamic principle fluid viscosity is not sufficient to maintain a film
to support the load until the fluid film is established, the required pressure gene
b.
c. The
The wedge film of
formation lifts the journal
a thick andthat
fluid film allows
willcomplete
separate separation
two surfaces and supp
other.
By feeding oil from an external source under heavy pressure into the pocket ma
lifted
Whenand the floated
journal on fluid films.
reaches a speed sufficient to create hydrodynamic films the ex
continue to operate in hydrodynamic manner.
Oil tank
The tank base is made sloped to one side, so that the sediment in oil can be col
opening drain valve. The tank has level measurement facility to give alarm for lo
level at any instant. Suitable tapings are provided to facilitate oil suction for oil p
system, connection for oil centrifuge, fill up of fresh oil etc.
One oil mist fan is provided on the tank to vent out any oil vapor and keep the t
Oil Pump oil from the oil tank to various lubrication points and controlling purpos
To pump
provided. These pumps are :
1. Main oil pump ( M.O.P )
2. Auxiliary oil pump ( A.O.P )
3. Emergency oil pump ( M.O.P )
Oil Coolers
Normally two oil coolers of 100% capacity are provided to cool down entire oil su
bearings for lubrication. Governing oil is not cooled at oil cooler. This oil taken ou
one is kept as standby. Online changeover facility is provided to take the standb
while
Beforeturbine is running.
changeover, it is to be ensured that the standby cooler is filled with oil an
lock and oil
Oil cooler is supply
a shell to
and bearings may
tube type interrupt.
heat exchanger. Cooling water flows inside the
for oil cooler is obtained from main cooling water system of power plant. Regula
cooling water
To increase andsupply line.
decrease oil temperature, cooling water flow is decreased and in
Always the cooling water outlet valve is regulated to vary flow of cooling water.
as sufficient cooling water will not available inside tub and tube may damage.
Drain point is provided at the cooler to drain out settled sediment at bottom of t
Oil
Oil Filters
coming out from cooler is passed through oil filter to remove any contaminat
removable filter cartridge. Like cooler there are two filters of 100% capacity eac
filtered up to
Differential 20-25 micron
pressure across level on these
the filter filters before
is measured whichcirculating in bearings.
indicates the choking co
indicates, filter is choked and needs cleaning.
Before changeover of oil filter when turbine is in operation, it is to be ensured th
inside. Filter cartridge of standby filter is always to be kept clean, so that at any
Oil Centrifuge..contd.
Centrifuge is a machine which separates water and solid particles from oil. This
bowl inside the separator. Due to centrifugal force, heavier particles are displace
oil is displaced towards center of the bowl, where it is collected and sent back to
WORKING PRINCIPLE
High pressure motiveOF EJECTOR
steam enters to ejector chest through nozzle and then exp
velocity. Increased velocity causes reduced pressure which socks vapour.Diffus
exhausted to condenser.
Condenser
Condenser is an important Auxiliary equipment of any steam turbine. Exhaust st
condensed in vacuum. By maintaining vacuum in condenser, maximum energy
increases. Condensate obtained is utilized again at boiler for steam formation.
There are different types of condenser. Some of the important types of condens
1. Jet type condenser
2. Air condenser
3. Surface condenser
Surface Condenser
This type of condenser is widely used at power plants. Cooling water is not mixe
pure and can be used in boiler. This is a shell type and tube type heat exchange
inside the shell in which cooling water flows. Condenser neck is connected to th
in-between
Steam from to facilitate
turbine flows thermal
at the expansion.
shell side of condenser and cooling water flows
are :
- Shell - Hot well
- Air outlet - Tube
- Rapture disk - Water box
Overhead Tank
Oil accumulator is provided on the governing or control oil line of the turbine. Th
momentary fluctuation
In the accumulator of oilgas
an inert pressure during oil
filled bladder pump change
is provided. over or sudden
Gas pressure op
inside th
pressure.
During normal operation, oil pressure of the line compress the bladder and oil is
pressure at the line drops, the bladder is expanded, due to the inside gas pressu
momentary oil pressure fluctuation.
Oil Accumulator
Oil accumulator is provided on the governing or control oil line of the turbine. Th
momentary
In fluctuation
the accumulator of oilgas
an inert pressure during oil
filled bladder pump change
is provided. over or sudden
Gas pressure op
inside th
pressure.
During normal operation, oil pressure of the line compress the bladder and oil is
pressure at the line drops, the bladder is expanded, due to the inside gas pressu
momentary oil pressure fluctuation.
Emergency Situation In Steam Turbine
Steam Turbine is a critical rotating equipment. High temperature and pressure s
the rotating part is high. There is always chance of severe misshapen leading to
Incase of any system goes wrong generation of power may be interrupted for a
power plant engineer should be trained enough to face any emergency situation
1) Overspeed
come out. Failure of blade root can cause severe accident and damage to turbin
with mechanical and electrical over speed trip arrangements. Tripping limits are
110% of rated speed. These overspeed tripping limits are to be checked regular
limit and checked at suitable intervals. At any circumstance overspeed tripping
work, immediately stop the turbine by applying emergency trip push button. For
limit is 7865 rpm.
2 ) Failure Of Lubrication Oil System :
Lubrication Oil is used to lubricate and cool down bearing metal. Sometimes the
pumps, leakage in oil line or choking of oil filter. This condition may damage bea
reason, the turbine is required to be stopped as soon as possible. Low lube oil h
trip the turbine immediately. If lube oil header pressure becomes 1kg/cm2, oil s
resuming oil supply, if possible, turbine is to be rotated manually to find out any
3. High Vibration
blades and damage of any rotating part may create heavy vibration. Damage of
and rotating parts of the turbine are closed spaced. Due to disturbance in rotor
Rubbing creates high vibration and abnormal sound, so at any case high vibratio
the turbine should be stopped immediately and turbine internals to be inspected
logic is incorporated with turbine to trip the turbine when turbine front and rear
box front and rear journal bearing goes to 340 microns.
4) High Bearing Temperature
High bearing temperature occurs due to inadequate oil flow in the bearing or me
temperature damages Babbitt material of the bearing. In case of high temperatu
supply to bearing is to be checked and if required bearing is to be opened for ins
provided to turbine. For different bearing 1150C is a tripping limit.
5) Failure
When Of Barring
turbine Device
is stopped in hot condition, it is to be put on barring. In some situ
found not working. It is not recommended to keep the rotor in standstill conditio
barring arrangements provided to change the rotor position by 180◦C continuou
6) High Condenser Hot Well Level
Due to problem in condensate extraction pumps, sometimes the condensate can
becomes high. In this situation there is possibility that water level in condenser
Condenser vacuum reduces drastically in this condition. If at any case water ent
and damages the turbine. Load is to be reduced on turbine in this situation. If si
9) High Steam Parameter
Like low steam temperature and pressure, high steam temperature and pressure
temperature may damage turbine as the metrology of the turbine is designed fo
10) Low Condenser Vacuum
Due to vacuum in condenser the steam from turbine is easily exhausted into con
exhaust of steam of turbine. This creates back pressure inside turbine. Vacuum
ejectors, or leaking condenser air line. Standby ejector or starting ejector is to b
arrested promptly or cooling water supply to be increased. If vacuum is not impr
vacuum protection logic is provided to trip the turbine when condenser vacuum
11) Failure Of Cooling Water Systems
Due to failure of cooling water pumps or choking in cooling water circuit, cooling
turbine exhaust steam cannot be condensed. This will increase the pressure of t
condenser may rapture, heavy back pressure will be created in turbine. In this c
normalize cooling water supply. If situation does not improve then turbine is to s
Both the
1. In TG
the fails and
above Grid
cases not available
( Total : (BLACK OUT
blackout condition CONDITION)
) ensure availability of DG em
CPP within 10 seconds (i.e. Boiler main steam stop valve, Auxiliary oil pump, Ba
discharge
2. Ensure valve, CPPpressure
from field area lighting
gauge & that
Jacklubrication
oil pump &continues
TG steaminstop
bothvalve ) b
the TG
TG bearings and returns to main oil tank by drain header )
3. Ensure from HMI & field that Emergency oil pump is running through DC pow
4. Start the Jack oil pump of TG.
5. If emergency power is not available within 10 seconds, then immediately con
try
6. toAfter
resume emergency
resuming power aspower,
of emergency quicklyclose
as possible, with stop
main steam the help of of
valve Shift In C
all the
start-up vent.
7. In blackout condition, ensure that Kiln stack cap will remain 100% open till th
or partially closed, then contact Kiln control rooms to open the same through Sh
8. In blackout condition, all the boilers will be in hot box-up condition.
9. Ensure emergency stop valve of TG is in closed condition
10. Close the TG inlet motorised valve .
11. Closeresuming
12. After all the boilers feed pump
of emergency discharge
power, motorised
auxiliary valves.
oil pump will start in auto mo
emergency oil pump
13. After resuming of from panelDG,
1000kva and put itstart
power in auto
onemode.
feed pump of CPP-1 and sup
up to 40% .
Difference
They are notbetween
built with BPCS
safetyand SIS and are not dedicated to the task. Becaus
in mind
have diagnostic routines searching for faults. Click here for more information on
opposite of process control systems. They are dormant, or passive. They sit ther
action. An example would be a pressure relief valve. Normally the valve is close
If the pressure never exceeds that value, the valve never operates. Many failure
valve is plugged, there is no immediate indication. A PLC could be hung up in an
would not be able to recognize the problem. There is a need for extensive diagn
systems should be incorruptible – need to be kept to a fixed set of rules and acc
highly reliable and be able to respond instantly when a hazardous situation deve
A recently published study by Great Britain’s HSE broke the safety lifecycle into
Hazards Assessment/SIF Specification
SIF Design and Verification
Operation and Maintenance
Not surprisingly the study concluded that 44% of all SIS/SIF related errors occur
the lifecycle. The study goes further to state that many of these errors occurred
interactions of one SIF to the rest of the process. In essence, the activation of o
caused unforeseen demands, and hazards in other areas of the process.
systems, shouldn’t we really call them keep running systems?” His premise was
enamored with or “sold on” the “fail-safe” design. Not only is this not required b
activation of a SIF can in fact cause hazards elsewhere that may not have been
specification phase of the lifecycle.
tolerant” without increasing hardware count or cost. In the example below, you
arrangement, which based strictly on voting architecture is an extremely reliable
pressure sensor and associated high pressure alarm. In this case the SIF design
003. By using the comparative process indication the engineer could have impl
between the SIF sensor indication and the comparative BPCS sensor indication.
would be almost as reliable, with 1/3 less cost to install and maintain.
Below is a list of common initiating events that should be considered during the
lifecycle. How well we manage or reduce the probabilities associated with initia
of risk. (e.g. plan for the best, but prepare for the worst).
Type of Initiating Event Examples
External Events High Wind
Seismic Event
Flooding
Lightning
Vehicle Impact
Fire or Explosion in an adjacent area
Equipment Failures BPCS (basic process control system) component failure.
Utility failure.
Vessel/Piping failure due to wear, fatigue, or corrosion.
Vessel/Piping failure caused by specification, design, or manufacturing defect.
Vessel/Piping failure caused by over or under pressurization.
Vibration induced failure (e.g. rotating equipment)
Failures caused by inadequate maintenance/repair.
Failures caused by temperature extremes.
Failures resulting from flow surge or hydraulic hammer.
Human Failures Failure to properly execute a task, by omitting steps, or
Failure
At this to observe
point or respondtoappropriately
it is necessary differentiate to conditions
initiating or prompts
events by the
from latent systc
or root
or latent causes. In general, root or latent causes create latent weaknesses in a
the system, these
• “Inadequate weaknesses
operator give
training” is rise to an
not an initiating
initiating event.
event, butFor
is aexample:
potential und
type.
• “Inadequate test and inspection” is not an initiating event, but is a potential u
failure’ type
that manages instrumentation and controls. Ensuring that these two groups can
the two need to share the responsibility of hazards assessment and SIF specifica
common management platform. APM’s Asset Safety work process is enabled th
TUV certified SIF design verification and periodic validation platform that encom
with requirements specification can be reduced, functional safety can be improv
application of a little common sense and a work platform that pro-actively mana
1-The difference between documents "instrument index" and "instrument I/O list
Instrument index consist of types of instrument installed in the plant whereas in
Systems...
3-Is data sheets preparation regarding "PCV" and "PSV" in instruments scope of
are in maintenance then in case there is new installation of PSV or PRV or CV the
data from Process Engineering/Project Engineering and prepare a data sheet...Si
you should start with simplest Control Valve rather than jumping directly to PSV
CV/PSV/PRVs... and basics of CV sizing remains same most of the time.. but it m
Valve...
4-What is difference between "Fail close" and "Fail open" position of control valv
Both terms are used when Safe State of Valve is considered..(Please refer to Pla
valve)... Fail Close or Fail Open means in case of failure of air supply, 4-20mA or
determined safe position i.e. Close or Open respectively...
5-The difference between "RTD" and "thermocouples".Which is better for temper
Principle of operation for both is different...
RTD is relatively more accurate and exhibit linear characteristics from low to me
less accurate but exhibit linear characteristics from low to very high ranges tem
6-What is difference between "FFB (Foundation field bus) " and "conventional" p
There
7-Whyis"digital
not such thingsare
signals" as used
Conventional
for on/offProtocol... Please
operations?? andre-phrase
analogueyour quest
signals for
difference of both methodologies.
Because
A word ofyou can't use
advice... Thisitforum
other is
way
for around.... Please re-phrase
discussion/problem your
solution... question
Some wit
questio
suggest you to buy & read few instrumentation & control system books.... It wou
if you ask question too the point and if necessary give an explanation with some
Have a few more comments on a few of your questions.
concerned. But for maintenance, it depends from plant to plant since responsibi
organizations. As an example, the plant I work at, designing & sizing of all kinds
They will develop data sheets which they will then hand over to the instrument
procured, the project engineer (mechanical engineer) will have it installed in the
electrical and pneumatic connections. As for the PSV, that is completely out of In
Process Engineer
7- I agree and installation
with Sameen andpossible
that it is not maintenance falls
to have under
it the domain
other of station
way round. Dig
purposes, generally the requirement is to have infinite intermediate values betw
through use of digital signals.
PHA may be carried out at following different stages of life cycle of a plant i.e.
1. Conceptual Stage PHA (when only basic technology / design is known)
2. Detailed PHA (when 70%~90% design is locked and complete details are ava
3. Pre-Startup PHA
4. Baseline PHA (after successful commissioning has been carried out)
5. Cyclic PHA (once in 5 years for HHP)
6. Decommissioning or Mothball PHA
Now PHA itself consists of two Parts
1. Consequence Analysis, which is further classified into
a. Qualitative Consequence Analysis
b. Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA)
2. Process Hazard Review or PHR (which can be done using anyone or a combina
a. HAZOP (Hazard & Operability) Study
b. What-if Method Study
c. Checklist Method
d. FMEA (Failure Mode & Effect Analysis)
e. FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)
In addition sometimes, various other studies are carried as part of PHR, such as,
Following few outlines could help to asses the criticality of new site.
by
Theashfaqanwer
accident that» occurred
25 Nov 2010, 05:06
on board the offshore platform Piper Alpha in July 19
property damage.
It was caused by a massive fire, which was not the result of an unpredictable “a
questionable decisions. Most of them were rooted in the organization, its structu
My findings
1. PTW permitaretoaswork
below:-
system is not up-todate at that time. Now a days PTW ha
person issuing the permit can only withdraw a permit after unlocking the lock w
Operations.
2. The facility is designed for pumping oil only, it can not be modified for Gas ex
extraction.
3. No NRVs non return valves are placed on branch pipe lines connecting with m
SIL
The concept of safety integrity levels (SILs) was introduced during the developm
quality or dependability of a system which has a safety function – a measure of
perform that function.
Following are 2 popular methods of determining SIL requirements to process ind
– risk graph methods
- layer of protection analysis (LOPA
But all these methods requires a lot of data, assumptions & calculations.
Is there any
Actually keytoavaiable
I need determineto determine
SIL prior toSIL requirement
design for any
a protection specific
system for process
an amm
ammonia in it. Should it be SIL-1 or 2 or 3?
ANSI S84.04 requires that companies assign a target SIL for all Safety Instrment
team may determine that certain critical systems require that a SIL be assigned
that is necessary to mitigate the risk associated with the process to an acceptab
choices must then be verified against the target SIL.
commonly used methodology. If the risk is unacceptable then it is reduced or eli
only after all the non-SIS protection layers have been considered. HAZOP’s ident
hazards. Target SILs are assigned to SIF’s of the SIS identified in the PHA studies
target SILs. As in the case with PHA studies, the assignment of Target SILs must
experience. Methodologies used for determining SILs include, but are not limited
•Consequence only
•Risk Graph
•Layered Risk Matrix
•Risk matrix
•Layer of protection
•Fault tree
selection ofanalysis
SIL 2 or SIL 3 forces the SIS design toward device redundancy and d
the approach that "a safety system is a safety system and therefore should be S
escape is possible, someone will be injured or killed or the impact will be on-site
documentation in justifying the SIL choice, and ensures consistency across proce
comes to assigning SILs. The choice involves examining safety, community, env
must be developed at the corporate level to ensure that the choice of SIL is cons
and that the assignment method is congruent with the existing characteristics o
can however be used as a conservative guide,
SIL 4 --- For hazards that can lead to Catastrophic Community Impact
SIL 3 --- For hazards that can lead to Employee and Community Impact
SIL 2 --- For hazards that can lead to Major Property and Production Protection. P
SIL 1 --- For hazards that can lead to Minor Property and Production Protection
Pipeline hydrotesting
one section of corroded piping are composite wrapped at corroded location to w
the pipeline. My question is for calculating hydrotest pressure whether only rem
without composite wrapping or both will be considered. Any reference standard
test pressure recommended by the construction code. What's the code in this ca
piping sections just because of one composite repair. I would have only accepte
design pressure if following ASME B31.3 as construction code.
Re: IS Isolators
Let me & Functional
explain this Safety??
by example. A device is Intrinsically safe if it does not carry e
circuit or over-current condition exists causing ignition conditions at the device.
which lie outside
The purpose of anofIntrinsically
the Classified (Zone0
Safe /Div1)(or
instrument area in using
loop a control cabinet,
an IS and
isolator) is fu
q
used to limit chances of an explosion as stated in Wasif's explanation. However,
the operating equipment in case of a parameter/process upset, often by initiatin
chances of explosion and not to improve or alter the availability of the system. A
again there will be no impact on the availability of the system), but you may run
which might itself cause an explosion. In that case, I'd say Yes, you are affecting
make the overall system more safe, but it does not affect the availability provide
other components in the SIS system. Of course, SIL rating of the isolator will also
and responded accordingly.
Dear Ali, IS Isolators are part of the SIS loops.. we agree on that.. Since SIL Calcu
level.. Therefore, availability figures of IS Isolators & all possible scenarios of fail
concept that IS Isolators are used to reduce probability of explosion in the hazar
availability of system..In functional safety there are two things which are greatly
1) Safety when all components are integrated together & Safety at component l
2) Availability of smallest items can affect the availability of the whole system (s
In simple words, failure of IS Isolators will result in failure of loop functionality.. w
""High Availability does not always ensure Safety""A safe device is made with in
A available device is made with intention to maximize availability... My query wa
Isolator failures & what kind of IS Isolator failures we should look in to when des
RBV or MOV?
RBV is a Remote Block Valve. Its basically an isolation valve or ESD valve.Questi
operated valves
your process or motor operated
requirements. valves for purposes
Most significantly, of isolation
the closure of a natural
time. Especially with lg
closure, but you don't need slam-shut, otherwise a surge can occur. Then, since
consider the supply of power to the MOV - check with your electrical disciplines
require. Additionally, you will need a 415V UPS, since MOVs on emergency servi
regular power supply will not do. So you can compare the cost of installing a 415
areas against the option of pneumatic valves. The point is, you can use a suitab
are more reliable. And in most cases, pneumatic valves will also prove to be mo
background study on all the requirements of both cases, you'll get a clearer pict
Thanks Absar. The central idea im taking here is that there is nothing against sta
pneumatic valves.Because
Electro-hydraulic. It basically
youcomes down tonot
will definitely technical and
be using economic feasibility.
conventional electrica
yeah, there is nothing in the standards against using EH valves, because SIL-3 c
application of those is rarely every feasible, so a background study is a must he
tolerant than the 1oo1 configuration but safety level will be compromised since
out service (for instance during maintenance) and in that case, even if the other
configuration is also referred to as a 2-1-0 scheme. It is estimated to be three tim
half as safe as a simplex (single channel) configuration. This is because both cha
trip, and both must operate for the system to achieve the safe state, and herein
1oo1 scehem. In the 1oo2D configuration the convention used will be that only o
case of a single failure, its diagnostic contact will open the output channel and r
continues to be performed by the remaining channel. The system can then be sa
normally the scheme operates with a 2-1-0 configuration but reverts to 2-0 sche
However, such a scheme depends greatly on the system's internal diagnostics.
other for faults. The internal diagnostics are designed such that at least one of t
operation. In addition what also determines how safe/available a system is the
QMR scheme is at least compatible with the TMR scheme since both have the sa
Another aspect is comparison of PFD(avg) expressions for each system. Referrin
that the Quad (2oo4) architecture is comparable to the ultra safe 1oo3 architect
By comparison, TMR (2oo3) is comparable to the 1oo2D architecture in that both
This comparison concludes that the QMR (2oo4) architecture provides an order o
(2oo3) or 1oo2D architecture, and is a major technological enhancement in safe
architectures.
1oo2: PFD avg. = (λ^DU)^2 x (TI/3)^2 + . . .
1oo3: PFD avg. = (λ^DU)^3 x (TI/4)^3 + . . .
2oo3: PFD avg = (λ^DU)^2 x (TI)^2 + . . .
2oo4: PFD avg = (λ^DU)^3 x (TI)^3 + . . .
This
Just aisthought
the reason why
- first, I listed
the level the schemes in does
of redundancy the order that Iadid
not imply in the
safer start Eve
system. of m
system (as proven by many FMEDA reports that can be viewed from websites of
for the particular SIL level, the level of redundancy of the system, in my opinion
What
part ofis the
the link...
overall "Inherent
safety Safetyon
that depends & the
Functional Safety of safety-related s
correct function
out their intended functions (safety functions) under defined error conditions an
process on the other hand, has a low level of danger even if things go wrong. In
one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by reducing the
hazardous operations in the plant.In simpler words, inherent safety implies that
of a failure, the level of danger will be low and therefore would not result in serio
the other hand is a concept applied to a safety system in place reduce or mitiga
process from going wrong in the first place.
even if things go wrong. It is used in contrast to safe systems where a high degr
not be confused with intrinsic safety which is a particular technology for electric
perfect safety cannot be achieved, common practice is to talk about inherently s
avoids hazards instead of controlling them, particularly by reducing the amount
operations in the plant.”
Functional Safety is the part of the overall safety of a system or piece of equipm
correctly in response to its inputs, including the safe management of likely oper
in
Share
When you see a talk about safety, your first expectation is probably something o
are typical fodder for safety “toolbox talks.” What I’d like to discuss in this post,
into your process control system.
First off, a disclaimer: I am an engineer, although not (yet) a PE and I have no ce
years of experience in working around heavy equipment, much of it quite dange
properly managed. In that time, a picture of what process safety is and how to a
proper implementation of a safe process system, safety concepts must be desig
design is complete and drawings are available, a deep review of them begins. T
process hazard analysis (PHA). This analysis looks at the hazards of the process,
occurrence. From this, a hazard mitigation plan is developed. There are several
developed to quantify these risks. Be sure to choose one applicable to your proc
The first line of defense in any process is the basic process control system (BPCS
process parameters within safe limits, and to alarm and/or take action when tho
certainly have shown that there are some risks in your system that have sufficie
mitigation that is more reliable than a standard BPCS can provide.
That is where the safety system comes in. A properly-designed safety system w
include operator-initiated devices like E-stop buttons), and through logical analy
condition be detected, the safety system will then shut down the process in a pr
from the process and put it into a safe condition. Note that process design here
actuators must be designed to fail both electrically and mechanically in a safe c
1. It is usually separate from the BPCS. There are safety controllers that integrat
are still distinct. More common are systems that have completely separate hard
2. Redundancy is almost always a requirement. In all but the most benign and ri
degree of reliability. To achieve this, redundant circuits, devices, and even contro
from allowing the safety function to fail when called upon.
3. The safety system is self-monitoring. Safety output devices (relays, valves, VF
ensure that they do indeed move to a safe state when called upon to do so. Sho
bring the process to a safe shutdown state, and the safety system must then pre
component is repaired or replaced. In addition, most safety systems have the ab
reliable operation,
4. Devices though
in the safety they may
system mustrequire special
be rated wiring
for safety and/or
duty. programming
Devices such as c
so on, are available for duty in safety systems. Be sure to confirm that the devic
specialized materials and designed for high reliability.
Process safety has become a more critical focus of industry in the past twenty y
services intended to achieve a high degree of reliability in shutdown systems. A
plummeted and it is no longer a difficult or expensive task to find vendors and s
priority, in my mind, that engineers take the time to understand how safety syst
employers’ and clients’ property, surrounding communities, environment, emplo
Safer Set-Up
Figure 2. Modified design requires less inventory of SO2 and eliminates equipme
Simply put, the concept of inherently safer design is: “What can’t happen can’t
Any number of design features can contribute to preventing something from hap
can provide absolute certainty against an occurrence. Minimization, moderation
certainty. Instructions and procedures can help but offer the least degree of cert
facility.
Every strategy doesn’t have to result in the complete elimination of the hazard o
assembly impossible (or at least very difficult) or design to accommodate the er
Where doable at a reasonable cost, this may be an attractive strategy because i
cylinder example, mistake proofing might include using unique connections for t
containment) to correct the error before an undesirable outcome occurs, or, if n
the chlorine cylinder, a mistake tolerant strategy might involve isolating chlorine
system.
Putting
To The Strategies
illustrate To Use
the application of inherent safety strategies, let’s look at several rea
chloride (AlCl3) handling, a utility station and an electrical switchgear.
Sulfonic acid plant design. Reacting sulfur trioxide (SO3) dissolved in sulfur diox
This is an exothermic reaction that boils off SO2 as its primary means of heat re
allow intimate contacting between alkylate and SO3, which otherwise would onl
flammable. The SO2 and SO3 are both inhalation toxics.
The heat of reaction boils the SO2 and SO3 from the reactor. In the traditional pl
vapor and allow the return of SO3 and any knocked-out liquid to the reactor. A c
liquefied SO2 for recycling to the reactor.
Following inherently safer design principles, the process was modified to elimina
standard pumps with seal-less ones (Figure 2). This very significantly reduced th
removed two pieces of rotating equipment, each of which had the potential to le
refrigerant is used, the bulk of the SO2 now is at a temperature not far from its b
a
Theleak. However, these
minimization process safety
and moderation improvements
strategies enhancedwere achieved
process by—using
safety an
but opp
inherently safe: exchanger as knockout pot and provide for gravity drain of coo
• Use the cooling
requires relocation of the SO3 injection point.)
• Find a safer solvent than SO2.
Figure 4. In the
In addition, evenevent of drain-line
greater plugging,
inherent safety maywater will overflow
be possible at the the
by avoiding air break
proces
alternatives that are made via inherently safer processes.
skin results in burns. Low-pressure nitrogen is used to unload AlCl3 from delivery
from which it is conveyed into the reactor. The AlCl3 is a very fine powder, some
nitrogen is returned to a silo that can contain as much as 80,000 lb of AlCl3. It th
to the silo. What passes through the filter is scrubbed from the nitrogen in a pac
as the nitrogen rises and is released from an elevated vent stack. The slightly ac
wastewater sewer.
This is a fairly simple process — but what happens if the p-trap plugs? Water wil
towards the silo. Because the top of the vent from the scrubber is considerably h
eventually will reach the silo, resulting in a highly exothermic reaction and gene
The normal way to address this issue would have been to install level sensors in
scrubbing water. An elegant and inherently safer design was to provide an air br
top of the funnel is at an elevation considerably lower than that of the filter — th
the top of the funnel. Little-to-no pressure head was required to get the water th
This modification
It’s difficult to putwas
this far less costly
inherent safetythan installing
strategy into the
anysafety
of the critical devices
four basic ones.firs
It
the scenario of water backing into the silo non-credible.
Aluminum chloride handling, part 2. Figure 5 shows the situation that existed at
AlCl3 passes at a controlled rate through a rotary feeder into the reactor. The Al
feeder and the reactor. An operator’s natural inclination is to blow the plug free
close by. Fortunately, there’s never enough catalyst in the standpipe to cause a
What can go wrong in this situation? If the valve between the bleeder where the
the nitrogen overpressures the day pot, blowing the rupture disk and sending fin
To make the situation more mistake tolerant, the nitrogen source within a hose l
well below the set pressure of the rupture disc on the AlCl3 day pot. To prevent a
that regulated nitrogen, a safety valve that relieves to an elevated location limit
This didn’t prevent one ambitious operator from stringing two nitrogen hoses to
working unsuccessfully for several hours to remove a clogged drop line using th
Utility station. The use of a hose connected to a utility station is one of the most
facilities. Figure 6 depicts a typical set-up for a utility station near the point of us
What could go wrong here? How could this set-up be improved?
coded in a fashion that allowed even those suffering from color blindness to dist
darkness. The distinct connector and color of each hose made mismatching, and
process very unlikely. In addition, the arrangement of the utility station was mod
one more barrier to mistakenly using nitrogen to drive a tool in a confined space
Utility
Figure Station
6. Use of similar types of connections makes it easy to connect a hose to
color-coding makes for
It remains possible hookup
somemistakes
ambitious unlikely.
soul to prepare a crossover connection b
must carefully control these utility station fittings.
This is an switchgear.
Electrical application of the mistake
Figure 7 depictsproofing form of
an electrical inherentlyinsafer
switchgear design.
2,300-V service
lockout pointthe
Where does forlock
isolating
go toaensure
large pump
that thewhen it needs can’t
equipment service.
be re-energized whil
placed in plain view on the handle that opens the cabinet door. However, the loc
disconnect switch that can be pulled out when the switch is in the off position.
You could try training your personnel on the proper location for the lock. You cou
goes. Then you could realize operators will hang the lock in the wrong location b
location — and put another sign on the wrong location that says: “Lockout lock d
becomes just background noise.
We tried all these things before happening upon a solution that worked — cuttin
An operator knows a lock must be placed on the switchgear. Now, if the operato
think about it and either come up with the right — and only — solution or ask. T
Is this inherently safer switchgear? Yes.
Does it fall into one of the four basic inherent safety strategies? Not really, altho
The Key To Success
Application of inherent safety principles is just one aspect of making safety seco
equally effective as the basic four and may be economically feasible when none
mandating the use of inherent safety is like placing signs throughout the workpl
have translated the mindset into practical application.
You achieve expertise in the practical application of inherent safety principles th
application of inherently safer solutions. This experience is what makes a safety
earn a living. You train your brain to spot applications for solutions you’ve seen
solve new problems. The end result is a mindset that makes safety second natu
http://managementstudyguide.com/planning_advantages.htm
15-Aug-14
Graeme Ellis, principal safety consultant at ABB Consulting, has been responsibl
guidance on behalf of the Energy Institute. Here, he outlines the benefits this m
as presented at the unveiling of the new guidance at Hazards 24, IChemE’s lead
Edinburgh in May 2014.
Stock image
Process safety accidents normally involve the failure of several protective barrie
assure performance. But what about the alternative? The ‘inherently safe appro
consequences through initial design rather than relying on ‘bolt-on’ protection th
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) defines this ‘inherently safe’ approach to
eliminate hazards, or reduce their magnitude, severity, or likelihood of occurren
layout.”
Whilst there are good examples of inherently safe designs in a range of industri
lack of design methods to ensure opportunities are systematically identified and
amongst project leaders in the upstream and downstream energy industry, awa
safety features.
unnecessary risks in design safety cases for the UK offshore oil and gas sector.
guidance up-to-date to meet new regulations and be more widely applied throug
has been broadened to large and small organisations covering offshore producti
and power generation stations.
The guidance proposes that companies should develop procedures to ensure th
reviewed throughout the design lifecycle. This should mean that all opportunitie
assessed.
It is recognised that implementing improvements will in practice be subject to c
should consider total project and lifecycle costs, as inherent safety options may
reducing the overall capital and operating expenditure.
For major projects in the energy industry, an inherent safety workshop at the co
(Hazard Identification) studies required during the subsequent front-end enginee
Cost-benefit analysis
Following the inherent safety workshop several design options may need to be
route. Some form of cost-benefit analysis will often be required to choose betwe
judgement by an experienced study team should be sufficient.
It is at this point that a HAZID study at the subsequent FEED stage further iden
further measures are required to reduce risks to a tolerable level. HAZID study t
reduction measures to reduce the event likelihood, rather than first looking for i
procedures for HAZID studies are reviewed, to ensure that the team is encourag
Failure to comply with requirements such as those stated in the EU Safety Offs
‘Seveso III’ Directive, could result in significant delays and costs at later stages o
On the other hand there is the US OSHA PSM standard, a standard which requir
Process Hazard Analysis to identify and assess hazards, but has no specific requ
an increasing awareness of the importance of ISD in the US, and some States ar
new process designs.
been made on the choice of equipment. At this early stage, the design only app
achieving substantial reduction in risks, and potentially reducing the overall lifec
increasingly fixed, it becomes more difficult and costly to make changes and the
overall process become limited.
The new ISD guidance (Energy Institute, 2014) outlines how the effective applic
following benefits:
• unlike traditional approaches to process safety that require expensive 'add-o
provides
• an opportunity
the principle to identify
of 'minimisation' improvements
challenges large that can reduce
inventories overall capita
of dangerous subs
cost and weight, particularly beneficial for offshore platforms;
• eliminating or reducing hazards early in the design will avoid potential delays
• reduction in process equipment and 'add-on' safety systems reducing the tim
• less reliance on 'add-on' safety systems decreases maintenance, repair and i
•
In reducing
many casesthethe
number of hazardous
benefits activities
of an inherent safetyand hence number
improvement of personnel
option will be cle
between options that need detailed assessment to resolve. There may also be c
such as cost implications, operational flexibility, personal preferences, available
Conclusions
Inherent safety is not a new topic but the process industry has often failed to m
approach and reap the benefits including reduced lifecycle costs. Whilst internat
safety and can perpetuate risk reduction using ‘bolt-on’ safety systems, global r
safety improvement options have been effectively assessed using structured tec
The main additional requirement for design teams is to carry out structured inh
the greatest opportunity exists to benefit from applying inherent safety. The inh
latter stages of design, but should nevertheless be actively encouraged during H
traditional ‘bolt-on’ safety systems.
The most inherently safe process will not always be the most attractive econom
teams should be aware that technology continues to evolve, and inherent safety
project should be retained for consideration on future projects. The design stage
process facilities that pose the potential for significant harm to both people and
Legislating for Inherent safety in the US: Reflections on the ongoing debate
10-Feb-14
Kehinde Shaba
0
There has been a recent public exchange of views between the head of the US C
Dooley (head of the American Chemical Council, an industry trade association).
argued (in a New York Times Op-Ed piece) that enshrining Inherently Safer Desig
significant reduction in safety incidents, with several recent large incidents cited
Is Inherent Safety legislatable?
Whether or not implementing inherent safety into law will improve achieve safe
evidence on application of similar principles (As Low as Reasonably Practical [AL
Precautionary Principle, Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Cost [
well known that European countries—especially the northern European ones—ha
It is worth noting that these concepts generally tend to be qualified when used i
versus other competing considerations such as risk, benefit and cost. It goes wit
action should always be weighed against the cost required to achieve it. Additio
public policy.
The success of such initiatives goes beyond codifying requirements in law. There
place not least a highly competent regulator and most importantly “buy in” by a
instructive and definitive – it is difficult to achieve commitment without involvem
The case
Dooley against…
writes1 that “Inherently safer approaches are already considered by com
principles, surely implementing them in legislation shouldn’t be an issue? It seem
reaction to an activity already engaged in by industry.
impractical and would create a regulatory requirement that has been recognised
as ‘monumentally difficult’ ”. This is a point worthy of note. Philosophies such as
implemented in performance based regulatory regimes where emphasis is place
the outcome. US legislation is for the most part, largely prescriptive (i.e. very pa
ISD
It is would
fair to work in that
say this environment
initiative would
can present be monumentally
significant difficult.
challenges, but the Europea
question here is whether the concerned stakeholders are willing to come togeth
otherwise—that will help improve the current safety standards, which it is fair to
Statement from CSB Chairperson Rafael Moure-Eraso on the Passing of Noted Ch
Click here to see CSB video excerpts from Dr. Trevor Kletz
safety, Dr. Trevor Kletz. Starting as a research chemist in the United Kingdom, D
in chemical process safety, safety culture, and as an advocate – indeed the fath
processes. One of his seminal papers was entitled, “What You Don’t Have Can’t
refocused the emphasis from individual lapses to systems failures and safer des
safety management thinking.
professor of the Texas A&M University and Visiting Professor of Chemical Engine
particularly attached to the work of Dr. Kletz as his commentary – excerpted from
our 2008 CSB safety video, “Anatomy of a Disaster,” which tells the story of the
workers and injured 180 others.
In the video, Dr. Kletz says, “There's an old saying that if you think safety is exp
And, not only in damage to plant and in claims for injury, but also in the loss of t
the company’s reporting and learning culture: “Well, after an accident, manager
happening,’ as the case may be, ‘if I'd known it, I'd have stopped it.’ Now this is
is going on. And, he can do that by going round and by keeping his eyes open a
These are typical of the ways in which this wonderful man, so committed to pre
such plain and effective language. Consider this typically pointed comment – als
prevention should be about looking for root causes, and not individual blame: “
were due to human error and this is true in a sense but it's not very helpful. It's
The titles of just some of Dr. Kletz’s many authoritative books display his keen f
“Lessons from Accidents,” “Process Plants – a Handbook for Inherently Safer Des
Industry.”
So today we mourn the loss of Trevor Kletz, whose lifetime of work has unquest
prevented – a legacy we will try to emulate at the CSB.
2.
2-Mar ± 1.0 mm
500 0C
>± 100 0C
&
actual
load > 100
mw
(16.67% of
600MW )
6. HP CASING TOP-BOT Diff temp
Very high 2-Mar
actual
load > 45
mw
7. (7.5% of
2-Mar 600MW )
actual
load > 45
mw
8. (7.5% of
2-Mar 600MW )
1050 MM
MOT level
(0-1600mm)
9.
FIRE PROT'N CHECK 1 & 2 2-Mar From Top
<48 M3/hr
15.
STATOR WNDG. FLOW V. LOW 2-Mar
< 73.88 %
<1.33
M3/hr
17.
FLOW MAIN BUSH 'R' V. LOW 2-Mar
<1.33
M3/hr
18.
2-Mar
< 73.88 %
19.
<1.33
M3/hr
19.
FLOW MAIN BUSH 'T' V. LOW 2-Mar
Relay
186/286
GROUP
Operated
20.
GEN PROTECTION 2-Mar
MAV 42 CP 016
By draining the pr. P P P
MAV 42 CP 017 Ch- 1
switches in
MAV 42 CP 018 combination Ch- 2 P P P
Simulation DONE
MAD 11 CY 011 FROM THE Panel.
MAD 12 CY 011 16% &84%
MAD 13 CY 011 Ch- 1 P P P
(0-50%-100%) Ch- 2 P P P
Simulation DONE
MAA 50 CT 021 FROM THE Panel.
MAA 50 CT 022 (84% ) Ch- 1 P P P
By simulation
MAA 50 CT 054 A/B (Bot)
By simulation
from Panel both P P P
MAA 50 CT 055 A/B (Top) Ch- 1
Load & Temp
MAA 50 CT 056 A/B (Bot) points Ch- 2 P P P
MKF 83 CF 021 A
By draining the
flow switches in
combination & also P P P
Ch- 1
by reducing the
By draining the
MKF 83 CF 021 B flow switches in
combination & also P P P
MKF 83 CF 021 C Ch- 1
by reducing the
flow. Ch- 2 P P P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
200 mw protections
1
MAIN BOILER
Type
Natural Circulation
Dry Bottom
Single Drum
Tangential Fired
Balanced Draft
Radiant Reheat Type with Direct Corner Fired
Pulverised Coal System
Coal Analysis
F.C – 25% ; V.M – 20% ; Moisture – 15% ; Ash – 40%
CV – 3200 kcal / kg
U.H.V = 8900 – 130 (A + M) kcal UHV – Useful Heat Value
A – Ash
M – Moisture
Superheater
DRUM
PLATEN PENDENT
SUPERHEATER SUPERHEATER
FURNACE
S
T
A
C
K
ID
FAN
2
Platen Superheater
Heat transfer is mainly due to Radiation.
Q T4 (Temperature)
Temp v (velocity of steam)
Pick up (C) T (Temperature difference between
heating and heated media)
MW
Pendent Superheater
Heat transfer is mainly due to Convection.
Q T (Temperature)
Temp v (velocity of steam)
Pick up (C) vg (Volume of flue gas)
MW
Normal Operating Values
STEAM CIRCUIT
270C 354C 413C 518C 540C
LTSH PLATEN
SH
FINAL
SH
BOILER
DRUM
HP
TURBINE
3
161 ksc 160 ksc 147 ksc
Temperature Limits No. of coils in Boiler
Boiler Tube Metal Temperature LTSH – 120
Platen SH – 29
NORMAL MAX. Final SH - 89
LTSH 445 485 Reheater Front – 59
Platen SH 540 565 Reheater Rear - 59
Final SH 544 565 Economiser – 145
Reheater 575 605
FLOW (T/Hr) OXYGEN v/s LOAD
NCR MCR
Steam at Final SH outlet 603 670
Steam at Reheater outlet 533 593
Water at Economiser 592 670
Coal flow (Design) 147 162
Coal flow (Worst) 180 200
Primary Air at APH outlet 194 207
Secondary Air at APH outlet 551 555
Total Combustion Air 790 874
100 150
Recommended Boiler Chemistry Limits
Drum operating pressure (kg/cm2) 60-125 125-165 165-180
Total dissolved solids (ppm) 100 50 25
Sp. Conductivity at 25 C (mho-cm) 200 100 50
Phosphate (ppm) 5-20 5-10 3-7
pH at 25 C 9.1-10 9.1-9.8 9.1-9.8
Silica (ppm) < 0.02 < 0.02 < 0.02
Coal Bunker
Weight Distribution Of Ash :
Bottom Ash hoppers – 20%
Economizer hoppers – 5%
APH hoppers – 5%
E.S.P hoppers – 70%
4
Safety Valves Setting :
VALVE NO. SET PRESSURE
(kg/cm2)
RESET PRESSURE
(kg/cm2)
DRUM : B1 175.8 168.8
DRUM : B2 179.3 170.3
DRUM : B13 181.1 172.0
SH : S-32 163.3 158.4
CRH : R-9 45.5 44.1
HRH : R-19 42.7 41.4
Flue gas path
PLATEN SH REHEATER FINAL SH
1155’C 1014’C 757’C 497’C
LTSH
412’C
ECONOMISER
143’C
DRAFT (mmwcl)
PLATEN SH Inlet -
REHEATER Inlet -6
ECONOMISER Inlet -25
APH Inlet -37
FLAME
S
T
A
C
K
DRUM
ID
FAN
APH
5
ESP Inlet -153
ID FAN Inlet -200
BOILER AUXILLARIES
Secondary Air Path
320 mmwcl 257 mmwcl 163 mmwcl
From Atm. 313C To Furnace
(Windbox to Furnace DP =
140 mmwcl)
FD FAN
Start permissives
1. Control oil pr adequate (> 8 ksc)
2. Blade pitch minimum
3. Discharge damper close
4. Bearing temp. Normal (< 60 C)
5. Control & Lub oil temp. Normal (< 55 C)
Interlock
1. I.D Fan running
Protection
1. Electrical protection
2. Bearing temp high:
Motor – 80 C (A), 95 C (T)
Fan – 90 C (A), 105 C (T)
3. I.D fan trip.
4. Control oil pr. < 6.0 kg/cm2
5. Post purge trip from FSSS.
SCANNAR AIR FAN
Interlocks
1. Closing of discharge damper from fan trip or stop.
FD
FAN-A
APH-A
FD APH-B
FAN-B
6
2. DC scannar air fan will start from AC scannar air fan trip.
3. Emergency damper will open from both FD fans trip.
Primary Air Path
779 mmwcl 740 mmwcl 687 mmwcl
Mill-A
CAG HAG
Mill-B
646 mmwcl Mill-C
Mill-D
Mill-E
Mill-F
318C
PA FAN
Start permissives
1. IGV minimum
2. Discharge damper close
3. Bearing temp. normal (< 60 C)
4. FSSS start permit (Boiler MFR reset & all cold air dampers are < 5% open)
5. One FD Fan running.
Protection
1. Electrical protection
2. Bearing temp high :
Motor – 85 C (A), 95 C (T)
Fan – 95 C (A), 105 C (T)
3. P.A header pr. low. 475 mmwcl (A), 375 mmwcl (T)
4. Boiler trip
PA APH-B
FAN-B
PA
FAN-A
APH-A
7
SEAL AIR FAN
Interlocks
1. Closing of discharge damper from fan trip or stop.
2. Seal air discharge to cold air duct DP low.
3. Auto starting of seal air fan on PA fan starting.
MILL
Permissives
1. PA Fan running.
2. Ignition Permit.
3. Feeder remote.
4. Seal air pressure adequate (> 200 mmwcl)
5. Mill outlet temperature less than 220 F.
6. No unsuccessful start command is persisiting.
7. No pulveriser trip.
8. Tramp iron gate open.
Protections
1. EPB pressed.
2. Seal air P low (<125 mmwcl for more than 1 min.)
3. Boiler MFR trip.
4. PA header pressure lo – lo (475 mmwcl – 2/3 logic)
5. Motor electrical protection.
6. If any PA fan trips , top elevation running mills trip and rest 3 mills remain in service.
COAL FEEDER
Protection
1. Discharge Plugged
2. Belt Deviation – 1st Step (A) ; 2nd Step (T)
3. Mill trip to Feeder trip
4. Hot air gate closed
8
Flue Gas System
-153 mmwcl
-200 mmwcl
-37 mmwcl
-25 mmwcl
ID FAN
Start permissives
1. IGV minimum
2. Discharge damper close
3. Bearing temp. normal (< 60 C)
Interlock
1. Gas path through
2. Air heater running
Protection
1. Electrical protection
2. Bearing temp high :
Motor – 75 C (A), 80 C (T)
Fan – 95 C (A), 105 C (T)
3. Both APH trip
4. Post purge trip from FSSS.
ESP PASS-A
ESP PASS-B
ESP PASS-C
ESP PASS-D
ECONO
MISER
APH-A
APH-B
ID
FAN-A
ID
FAN-B
C
H
I
M
N
E
Y
9
HFO TRIP VALVE
Permissives
1. Boiler MFR is reset
2. HFO pressure is adequate ( >10 kg/cm2 )
3. HFO header temp > 95 C
Protection
1. HFO pressure low (< 3 kg/cm2 )
2. HFO temp low (< 90 C)
3. Boiler trip
BOILER PROTECTIONS:
1. Flame failure
2. Loss of all fuel
3. Loss of 220V DC to FSSS.
4. Elevation power failure.
5. Boiler load < 30% and air flow <30%.
6. Furnace pressure hi-hi (+100)
7. Furnace pressure lo-lo (-75)
8. Drum level hi-hi (+225)
9. Drum level lo-lo (-225)
10. Reheater protection
11. All BFP’s stopped.
12. Boiler both manual trip buttons pressed.
13. Turbine trip and boiler load > bypass capacity (60%)
14. Loss of ACS power.
15. Both ID fans off
16. Both FD fans off
Loss of All Fuel Protection Logic:
¾ ignitors of any elevation ‘ON’ (ARMED)
HOTV closed
All oil nozzle valves closed
Feeder OFF
OR
AND
Loss of All
Fuel
TRIP
10
Boiler Flame Failure logic :
Boiler will trip on flame failure when all elevations are ‘VOTED’ in FSSS console.
Conditions for VOTED in a single elevation:
Feeder OFF
Elevation power failure
3/4 Safe Scanners intensity < 20%
Flickering Freq.< 2.5 Hz (OIL)/ 26 Hz (COAL)
2/4 nozzle valves not proven
Flame failure protection is armed when 1st feeder is taken into service.
Ignition Permit criteria for different Mills :
MILL-A
¾ nozzle valves of AB elevation are proven
Mill-B loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
MILL-B
¾ nozzle valves of AB elevation are proven
Mill-A loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
Mill-C loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
OR &
Ignition Permit
for Mill-A
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-B
&
OR
AND
VOTED
11
MILL-C
¾ nozzle valves of CD elevation are proven
Mill-B loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
¾ nozzle valves of AB elevation are proven
Mill-B loading > 50%
Mill-D loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
MILL-D
¾ nozzle valves of CD elevation are proven
Mill-C loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
Mill-E loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
MILL-E
¾ nozzle valves of EF elevation are proven
Mill-D loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
¾ nozzle valves of CD elevation are proven
Mill-D loading > 50%
Mill-F loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-C
&
&
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-D
&
OR
&
Ignition Permit
for Mill-E
&
&
12
MILL-F
¾ nozzle valves of EF elevation are proven
Mill-E loading > 50%
Boiler load > 30%
Drum Level Protection
TURBINE
IPT LPT
(20 X 2) (8 X 2)
ESV 39 ksc IV 34 ksc
334 C 535 C CONDENSER
0.1187 ksc
36 ksc 34 ksc 49 C
335 C 538 C
147 ksc
535 C
OR &
Ignition Permit
for Mill-F
REHEATER
HPT
(25 X 1)
HPBP LPBP
HW
OR
ACS(L)
HYD(R)
ACS(R)
ACS(L)
ACS(R) HYD(L)
BOILER TRIP
13
Turbine Diff. Expansions :
ALARM TRIP
HP Turbine + 4.5 + 5.5
-6
IP Turbine + 5.0 + 6.0
-5
LP Turbine + 25.2 + 30.2
-12
Cut-in / Cut-out speeds :
1. BARRING GEAR
Cuts In – 250 rpm
Cuts Out – 200 rpm
2. J.O.P
Cuts In – 540 rpm
Cuts Out – 510 rpm
TURBINE PROTECTIONS
Main Steam temperature very low ( < 460 C )
Condenser back pressure high ( > 220 mm Hg )
Bearing lub oil pressure lo – lo ( < 2 kg / cm2 )
Axial shift of turbine shaft ( + 1 mm & -1 mm )
Over-speeding ( > 3330 rpm )
Boiler trip to turbine trip.
Manual trip Push Button pressed.
Fire Protection – 1
1) Push Button pressed
2) Operates automatically when MOT level is
< - 50 mm Alarm appears.
< - 100 mm Protection operates.
When Fire Protection – 1 acts,
Vacuum breaker opens.
Turbine comes on barring gear.
When MOT level < - 150 mm MOT level low alarm appears if TG is on barring
gear.
Fire Protection – 2
Does not operate automatically. It is operated manually by pressing the Push Button.
Then Fire Protection – 1 acts automatically.
When Fire Protection – 2 acts ,
JOP – 2 and EOP starts.
Vaccum breaker opens.
Turbine does not come on barring gear.
14
THERMAL POWER PLANT EFFICIENCY
TURBINE THERMAL STRESS
Surface and Mid metal temperature probes in Casing :
55 % (TM)
95 % (TS)
Rotor Mid metal temperature calculation :
TM = TS [ 1 – (0.692 e –t/T1 + 0.131 e –t/T2 + 0.177 e –t/T3) ]
Where,
TS – Surface Temperature T1 – 2408.31
TM – Mid metal Temperature T2 – 457.08
t – Time in minutes T3 – 56.62
T1, T2, T3 are computed using rotor material thermo-dynamic properties and shaft dia.
Margin Calculation:
T = TS – TM
Thermal Stress T
Margin = T permissible – T actual
PLANT = BOILER X THERMAL CYCLE X TURBINE INTERNAL X TURBINE MECHANICAL X GENERATO
(30-40%) (75-90%) (35-40%) (88-90%) (99%) (98-99%)
15
T PERMISSIBLE
T
Upper Margin
Operating point
T ACTUAL
0
TM
Lower Margin
T PERMISSIBLE
TURBINE OIL SYSTEM
Gov. Rack
Shut-Off valve
LPBP Signal Oil
Lub Oil (Brg.- 1 to 6)
MOT
Barring Gear
Jacking Oil (Brg.- 1 to 6)
M
A
I
N
H
E
A
D
E
R
MOP
CONTROL OIL HEADER
COOLER
MAIN
OIL
TANK
AOP
EOP
JOP
16
TG Oil Pumps Start Criteria :
1. Lub oil pr. < 7.0 ksc A.O.P – 1 starts
2. Lub oil pr. < 6.5 ksc A.O.P – 2 starts
3. Lub oil pr. < 2.2 ksc E.O.P starts
4. Jacking oil pr. < 90 ksc Stand-by J.O.P starts
BOILER FEED PUMP
Start permissives :
1. De-aerator level adequate ( 700 mm )
2. Bearing temperature normal ( < 60 C )
3. Lub oil pressure normal ( 2 kg / cm2 )
4. Suction valve full open.
5. Booster pump suction pressure adequate ( > 3 kg / cm2 )
6. Cooling water pressure adequate ( 2.5 kg / cm2 )
7. Re-circulation valve 100% open.
8. Scoop position is minimum.
Protections :
1. Bearing temperature high ( > 85 C for pump & > 90 C for motor )
2. De-aerator level lo – lo ( < -230 mm )
3. Lub oil pressure low ( < 1 kg / cm2 for 5 secs)
4. Discharge flow high ( > 430 T / Hr for 20 secs)
5. Working oil temp high ( > 130 C )
6. Suction pressure low ( < 9 ksc for 30 secs)
CONDENSATE EXTRACTION PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Hotwell level very low.
2. Discharge pressure < 14 ksc.
3. Electrical protection.
4. Auto starting of stand-by pump from discharge header pressure < 16 ksc.
ACW PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Both pumps trip from tank level lo-lo.
2. Auto starting of stand-by pump when running pump trips.
3. Auto starting of stand-by pump when discharge header pressure < 3 ksc.
17
ARCW PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Auto starting of stand-by pump when running pump trips.
2. Auto starting of stand-by pump when discharge header pressure is low.
GENERATOR SPECIFICATIONS
Rated parameters :
1. Max continuous MVA rating : 247 MVA
2. Max continuous MW rating : 210 MW
3. Rated terminal voltage : 15.75 kV
4. Rated stator current : 8625 Amps
5. Rated power factor : 0.85 Lag
6. Excitation current at MCR condition : 2600 Amps
7. Slip ring voltage at MCR condition : 310 V
8. Excitation current at no load : 907 amps
9. Slip ring voltage at no load : 102 V
10. Rated speed : 3000 rpm
11. Rated frequency : 50 Hz
12. Efficiency at MCR condition : 98.47 %
13. Direction of rotation as viewed from
slip ring : Clockwise
14. Phase connection : Double star
CAPABILITY CURVE
MW
Turbine Limit
Thermal Limit
Stability Limit Rotor Current = Load Angle
= Phase Angle
Stator Current
MVAR
18
Excitation System
Excitation Power 0.7 – 0.8 %
1.6 MW
BUS-I
400 KV
BUS-II
(1½ Breaker Scheme)
GT
Tie X’r Excitation X’r
SCR
15.75 kV/575V
AC
(Station DB)
Field Breaker Field Flasher
DC
(DCDB)
Arrangement of Thyristors in a single bridge :
3 AC Input Field Winding
ROTOR
DC Output
G
AVR
19
VDC = 1.35 VAC cos
‘’ is the firing angle of thyristor. It is usually between 5 – 30 .
Four such bridges are connected in parallel. Total field current is shared by all the four
bridges. Each thyristor in every bridge is provided with the Snubber circuit which protects
the thyristor from heating.
Snubber Circuit of SCR
L Voltage surges are partially charged in the Capacitor ‘C’
thereby saving the SCR from high voltages. Also the
Inductor ‘L’ limits the surge current to some extent.
Resistor ‘R1’ restricts the charging current of Capacitor.
SCR R1 ‘R2’ is discharge resistor of Capacitor.
C R2
Hydrogen gas cooling system
1. Generator gas volume : 56 m3
2. Nominal pressure of hydrogen : ( 3.5 kg / cm2 )
3. Nominal temperature of Cold gas : 40 C
4. Purity of hydrogen : > 97 %
5. Relative humidity of hydrogen at
nominal pressure : 60 %
6. Nominal temperature of cooling
water inlet : 37 C
7. Nominal flow of cooling water : 350 m3 / hr
8. Hot gas temperature (alarm) : 75 C
Stator water cooling system
1. Nominal pressure at inlet to winding : 3.09 kg / cm2
2. Nominal temp. at inlet to winding : 40 C
3. Stator water flow : 27 m3 / hr
4. Stator water conductivity : < 5 mho / cm
5. Stator water expansion tank vaccum: 200 – 300 mm of Hg
20
STATOR WATER PUMP
Protection & Interlock:
1. Expansion Tank level low.
2. Auto starting of stand-by pump from stator water pressure < 2.8 ksc.
Seal oil system
1. Seal oil temperature after cooler : 20 – 40 C
2. Seal oil outlet temperature : 40 C
3. Differential pressure across duplex filter : 0.4 kg / cm2
4. Seal oil pressure at turbine & excitor
end : 5.9 kg / cm2
DC Seal oil pump starts when :
1. T.E seal oil pr. < 3.8 ksc
2. E.E seal oil pr. < 3.8 ksc
3. AC Seal oil pump discharge pr. < 4.5 ksc
GENERATOR PROTECTIONS
1. Generator Differential (Relay – 87G )
2. Stator Earth Fault
(i) Main Protection (Relay – 64G1)
(ii) Stand By Protection (Relay – 64G2)
3. Rotor Earth Fault
4. Stator Inter – Turn Fault (Relay – 50G1)
5. Loss of Excitation / Pole Slipping (Relay – 40G )
6. Negative Phase Sequence (Relay – 46G)
7. Low Forward Power (Relay – 32G1)
8. Reverse Power (Relay – 32G2 )
9. Over-voltage (Relay – 59G )
10. Local Breaker Back – up Protection
11. GT Over fluxing (Relay – 99GT)
12. Stator water flow low (< 13 m3 / hr)
13. Stator water conductivity high (> 20 mho / cm )
OFFSITE
CW PUMPS
Type : BHM-100 , Single Stage
Motor HP : 950 KW
Make : BHEL
21
Capacity : 16,000 cu. m/hr
Bowl Head : 16.36 mmwcl
Speed : 420 rpm (Nominal)
No. of Stage : One
Max. Working pr. : 2 ksc
Impeller Type : Mixed flow
No. of Vanes : Four
Max. Bearing Temp : 70 C
BFV UNIT – 1
BFV UNIT – 2
BFV UNIT – 3
BFV INTERCONNECTION VALVES
COMPRESSOR
Discharge Pressure : 8 ksc
Free Air Delivery : 25 . 68 cu. m/min
No. of Cylinders : 4
Speed : 670 rpm
Protection
1. Air delivery temperature after intercooler high (> 48 C).
2. Lub oil pressure low ( < 1 ksc).
CW-1
CW-2
CW-3
CW-4
CW-5
CW-6
CW-7
22
Air Drying Plant
Exhaust to Atm.
De-pressurise
Inlet
Outlet
Re-pressurise
From Atm.
Steps for ADP change-over :
1. Close exhaust valve.
2. Pressurize stand-by ADP.
3. Give ADP change-over command from panel.
4. De-pressurize.
5. Open exhaust valve.
6. Start blower.
7. Switch on the heater.
AD
1
AD
2
HEATER
BLOWER-1
BLOWER-2
23
DIESEL – GENERATOR
Manufacturer : NGEF
Excitation System : Brushless
Engine BHP : 720
Stroke : 4
Rated Speed : 1500 RPM
Cooling : Stationary water cooled
D-G auto starting is from under-voltage in EMCC.
415 V
50 Hz
EMCC Unit – 1
EMCC Unit – 2
EMCC Unit – 3
ADDITIONAL INFO ON OFFSITE EQUIPMENTS
Capacity of some pumps :
1. L.P Fly Ash Water Pump : 450 m3/hr.
2. H.P Fly Ash Water Pump : 375 m3/hr.
3. Bottom Ash L.P Water Pump : 375 m3/hr.
4. Seal Water Pump : 90 m3/hr.
5. Fly Ash Slurry Pump : 600 m3/hr.
6. Fuel Oil Pump : 100 m3/hr.
Fuel Oil Tank
DG
1
DG
2
2826 M3
24
OPERATION GUIDELINES OF MAJOR EQIPMENT
EHC related emergency situations and remedial actions
Sl
no
Emergency situation Observations Action to be taken
1 M/C is on EHC. Power
supply failure in Pressure
control rack/load control
rack / transfer circuit rack
leading to zero EHC output .
Starting device will become
off automatically due to
EHC fault.
Load zero
Machine on bar with
ESV & IV open
(Turbine not tripped)
EHC fault alarm
( Spd. contr. Active
when Load contr.
P.S.fails—spd. Ref.
Can be increased)
Confirm HP/LP bypass
opening, isolate EHC
from governing rack and
parallely reduce starting
device position from UCB
Reduce boiler firing to
restrict rise in boiler
pressure.
2 M/C is on EHC. Admission
control rack power supply
fails leading to zero EHC
output. Starting device will
become off automatically
due to EHC fault.
Load zero
Machine on bar with
ESV & IV open
(Turbine not tripped)
EHC fault alarm
Zero starting device
feedback
Zero speeder gear
feedback.
Confirm HP/LP bypass
opening, isolate EHC and
parallely reduce starting
device position from local
Reduce boiler firing to
restrict rise in boiler
pressure..
3 M/C is on EHC pressure
control mode and Throttle
pressure set point becomes
zero. EHC output will
increase.
EHC output may go
to 100%. Starting
device will track to
100%, resulting
wide opening of
HP/IP control
valves.
Tracking should be made
off manually and starting
device to be reduced
manually to adust the load
and pressure.
EHC may be isolated.
4 M/C is on EHC, Tracking on
and Strating device becomes
inoperative due to motor
failure/overload/ jamming.
During increase in
boiler firing Boiler
prassure will
increase due to load
restriction by
starting device
EHC output will go
to 100%
Switch off the electrical
module of starting device
and increase starting
device position from local
so EHC can take control.
5 Starting Device gets
continuous close command
due to malfunctioning of
command circuit. Hydraulic
governing will take control,
Starting device
position and Load
will come down
gradually
Boiler pressure will
Try to switch off the
electrical module
immediately before stop
valves closes. Increase
starting device from local
25
load will reduce gradually,
ultimately stop valves will
close and turbine will trip.
start increasing
resulting in opening
of HP/LP bypass.
so that EHC can take
control. Parallely reduce
boiler firing.
6 Speeder Gear gets
continuous close command
due to malfunctioning of
command circuit. Ultimately
complete unloading and
generator motoring may take
place.
Speeder gear
position and Load
will come down
gradually
Boiler pressure will
start increasing
resulting in opening
of HP/LP bypass.
Try to switch off the
electrical module
immediately before stop
valves closes. Increase
Speeder gear from local
so that EHC can take
control. Parallely reduce
boiler firing.
7 Trim device operated due to
malfunctioning/power
supply failure of solenoid
Trim device
operated alarm
IP control valves
will get throttled in
case of partial load
operation.
reduce boiler firing to
restrict rise in boiler
pressure.
8 M/C is on EHC, power
supply failure in CCA panels
only.
All indication lamps
in atrs console will
go off.
EHC output and
Load will become
zero due loss of
GCB close feedback.
All ATRS drives
will become
inoperative
Confirm HP/LP bypass
opening, isolate EHC,
Adjust starting device
from local. Reduce boiler
firing.
9 Unloading due to
malfunctioning of TSE
margin circuit.
TSE indicator will
show abnormal
margins and load
will come down
Speed controller will
be active if load
comes below
10%(block load)
10 Loss of speed signal
AOP & JOP will
take auto start
Lub oil pressure will
come down in case
of breakage of MOP
shaft
26
GENERATOR GAS PURGING AND FILLING
PURGING OUT HYDROGEN BY CARBON DI OXIDE
PREPARATION
1. Make arrangements for hot water, which will be required during CO2 charging.
2. Check for any leakages in CO2 manifold
3. Ensure sufficient number of CO2 cylinders
4. Inform fire fighting
5. Ensure availability of Flash Evaporator
6. Reduce barring gear speed or do hand barring if conditions permit.
7. Inform Chemistry Department about the program.
ACTIVITY:
1. Depressurise the generator casing by venting Hydrogen out to atmosphere slowly by following
instructions /directions given at the gas valve manifold.
2. Bring down hydrogen pressure to 0.2 ksc
3. Set the valves to CO2 charging and HYDROGEN purging position and pressurise generator
casing to 0.4 ksc by CO2.
4. Purge out the gen casing gas mixture by maintaining 0.1 ksc gas pressure.
5. Do gas analysis after charging 15 cyliders.
6. Purge LLD lines, Gas Driers by CO2 for removing any entrapped Hydrogen.
7. Repeat gas analysis after charging every 5 nos of CO2 cylindrers or at suitable intervals .
8. After attaining about 80% CO2 purity put the barring gear in service for at full barring speed for
15minutes for removing any Hydrogen pockets inside casing.
9. Continue hydrogen purge out till aCO2 purity of 98% is achieved.
PURGING OUT CARBON DI OXIDE BY AIR
PREPARATION
1. Ensure availability of dry compressed air .
2. Clean the air filter
3. Connect the air hose to the air inlet line.
ACTIVITY
1. Purge out CO2 by air.
2. Do gas analysis after at least 30 mins. of air purging.
PURGING OUT AIR BY CARBON DI OXIDE
PREPARATION
1.Make arrangements for hot water, which will be required during CO2 charging.
2.Check for any leakages in CO2 manifold
27
3.Ensure sufficient number of CO2 cylinders
4.Inform fire fighting
5Ensure availability of Flash Evaporator
6.Reduce barring gear speed or do hand barring if conditions permit.
7.Inform Chemistry Department about the program.
ACTIVITY:
1. Depressurise the generator casing by venting Air out to atmosphere slowly by following instructions
/directions given at the gas valve manifold.
2. Bring down Air pressure to 0.2 ksc
3. Set the valves to CO2 charging position and pressurise generator casing to 0.4 ksc by CO2.
4. Purge out the gen casing gas mixture by maintaining 0.1 ksc gas pressure.
5. Do gas analysis after charging 15 cyliders.
6. Purge LLD lines, Gas Driers by CO2 for removing any entrapped Air.
7. Repeat gas analysis after charging every 5 nos of CO2 cylindrers or at suitable intervals .
8. After attaining about 80% CO2 purity put the barring gear in service for at full barring speed for
15minutes for removing any Air pockets inside casing.
9. Continue Air purge out till aco2 purity of 98% is achieved.
PURGING OUT CARBON DI OXIDE BY HYDROGEN
PREPARATION
1. Ensure availability of HYDROGEN Cylinders.
2. Ensure availability of NON SPARKING TOOLS.
ACTIVITY:
1. Bring down CO2pressure to 0.2 ksc
2. Set the valves to HYDROGEN charging and CO2 purging position and pressurise generator
casing to 0.4 ksc byHYDROGEN.
3. Purge out the gen casing gas mixture by maintaining 0.2 ksc gas pressure.
4. Do gas analysis after charging 15 cyliders.
5. Purge LLD lines, Gas Driers by HYDROGEN for removing any entrapped CO2.
6. Repeat gas analysis after charging every 10 nos of HYDROGEN cylindrers or at suitable intervals
.
7. After attaining about 80% HYDROGEN purity put the barring gear in service for at full barring
speed for 15minutes for removing any CO2 pockets inside casing.
8. Continue CO2purge out till a HYDROGEN purity of 98% is achieved.
9. After conferming HYDROGEN purity pressurise Gen.casing to 3.4 Ksc.
28
COOLING PROCESS OF BOILER IN STAGE-1 & STAGE-2
After shutting down the boiler follow the steps to cool the Boiler.
1. Keep one set of ID & FD fan in service in cross path i.e. ID-A with FD-B or ID-B with FD-A.
2. In Stage-2 a) for both SAPH keep gas outlet damper closed while gas inlet & air inlet & outlet
dampers open.
b)for both PAPH keep gas inlet & outlet and air inlet & outlet dampers open.
3. Depressurize the boiler to 10 kg/cm2 by keeping HP – LP bypass system charged then close MSV
and open SH header drains.
4. Evacuate RH coils completely keeping only LP Bypass charged for a while.
5. Adjust Secondary air flow at around 30% of MCR.
6. Do not open manholes and do not break sealing of trough of boiler to prevent unaccountable air
ingress.
7. Control drum top bottom metal temperature difference within 50ºC. If the difference goes beyond
that regulate air flow and take FW to drum and drain through EBD. Keep CBD closed.
8. Open SH header vents and drum vents at 7 kg/cm2 and 2 kg/cm2 drum pressure respectively.
9. When drum metal temperature comes to <150ºC drain water wall through LPD.
10. After drum metal temperature comes to 120ºC sealing of trough may be drained and FD fan is to
be stopped. Keep ID fan running.
11. Record the parameters as given in the format.
Time
S
Afl
o
w
APH
gas
I/L
temp
FW
flow at
Eco
I/L
FW
temp at
Eco O/L
Drum Metal Temperature
Top/Bottom
Left Centre Right
29
HP HEATER CHARGING PROCEDURE OF STAGE-1 UNITS
A) CHARGING FROM WATER SIDE :
01: Open FW outlet drains and vents partially for venting and warming up.
02: Open the manual isolation valves before group bypass pneumatic valves FW 36 & 37 and
check instrument air supply
03: Open FW inlet and outlet valves of HPH 5 & 6 and close individual heater bypass valves.
04: Close all the shell side drains and vents including stand pipe drains & vents.
05: Open the isolating valves before and after emergency drip valve keeping watch on
condensor vaccum.
06: UNLOCK BOTH THE GROUP BYPASS VALVES . FW 35 FIRST THEN FW 34.
07: Open the HPH charging line valves slowly and watch water coming out of the vents and
drains
of the heaters. Close dump valve FW-73.
08: Close vents and drains after proper venting and warming up. Pressure gauge at HPH-6
outlet line
will show almost BFP discharge pressure.
09: Give INSERVICE command to group bypass valves.
10: Confirm full lift of spindle of both FW-34 & 35 from local.
11: Close HPH charging line isolating valve
12. B) CHARGING FROM STEAM SIDE:
13. 1: Ensure that heaters are charged from water side.
14. 2: Open the isolating valves of deaerator side drip and cascading drip of HPH- 6
3: Open the shell vents to condensor slowly keeping watch on condensor vacuum.
4: Ensure instrument air supply to all drip control valves.
5: Open ES-6A and 5A slowly and warm up shell side of the heater. Shell side pressure ,HP
heater
FW outlet temperature and drip temperature will start to increase..
6. After long shut down or maintenance of HPH, shell side is to be flushed. Keep Emergency
drip manual valves closed & shell drain(at minus metre) open. Keep watch on drip level and
vac. Normalise after clear water comes from shell drain.
30
7: After around 30 minutes of heating, open ES-6 and ES-5 slowly and observe drip level to
come
to normal value.
8: Observe HP heater outlet temperature to increase.
C: ISOLATION PROCEDURE OF HP HEATERS:
1. Open ES-6A and ES-5A
2. Close ES-6 and ES-5 slowly. Keep watch on drip level so that HP heaters do not get
bypassed from level protection. Observe increase of load.
3. Close ES-6A and ES-5A. Keep watch on vacuum.
4. Keep open manual isolating valve before dump valve FW-73 . Otherwise, open HP heater 6
outlet line drain valve to avoid frequent opening and closure of group by pass valve during
bypassing of HP heaters from feed water side.
5. Give BY PASS command to group by pass valve after 5 min. of closing of Extraction valves.
6. Confirm full closure of group bypass valve from local.
7. LOCK BOTH THE GROUP BYPASS VALVES.
8. Close isolating valves before and after the emergency , normal and cascading drip line.
9. Open shell side drains and vents. Keep watch on vacuum.
10. Ensure full closure of ES-5/5A,6/6A and depressurisation of shell side.
11. Open FW side drains and vents.
31
CONDENSER BACK WASHING PROCEDURE OF STAGE-I UNITS
01: Ensure supply healthiness and availability of Electrical Operator in front of module of
CW valve 2 & 5.
02: Be prepared for manual operation of valve CW 2 & 5 in case of any emergency.
03: Reduce load to less than 120MW keeping watch on vac.
04: Keep both main ejector in service for safety.
05: Close air evacuation manual valve of pass A.
06: Rotate butter fly valve CW 2 by 90 without stopping. Confirm full rotation of the valve from
arrow indicator on the valve mounting.
NOTE: Butterfly valve CW2 must not be left at intermediate position. It must be brought to final
position by manual operation if stuck up midway.
07: Open air evacuation manual valve of pass A . Confirm condenser vacuum to regain to at least to
original value.
08: Close air evacuation manual valve of pass B.
09: Rotate butter fly valve CW 5 by 90 without stopping. Confirm full rotation of the valve from
arrow indicator on the valve mounting
NOTE: Butterfly valve CW5 must not be left at intermediate position. It must be brought to final
position by manual operation if stuck up midway .
10: Open air evacuation manual valve of pass A . Confirm condenser vacuum to regain to at least to
original value.
11: Stabilise vacuum and normalize load .
32
CEP SUCTION STRAINER BACKWASHING PROCEDURE
1. Ensure the CEP is not running and SLC is Off.
2. Isolate the 6.6 KV breaker of the CEP.
3. KEEP THE DISCHARGE VALVE OPEN .
4. Close the suction valve.
5. Close the vacuum equalising valve.
6. Close the gland sealing inlet valves.
7. Open the strainer drain valve and watch whether air is sucking or water is draining.
8. If air is sucking then close the drain valve. Further tighten the suction & vacuum equalising valve
then repeat step 7.
9. After completion of draining, open the backwasing line valve very slowly and observe water
coming out gently from strainer drain. Continue backwashing for 2 to 3 minutes. DO NOT FULL
OPEN THE BACKWASING VALVE AS OVER PRESSURISATION MAY DAMAGE
SUCTION LINE FLANGE GASKET OF THE STRAINER.
CEP NORMALISATION AFTER BACKWASHING
1. Close the backwashing valve.
2. Close the strainer drain valve.
1. Open the gland sealing inlet valves.
2. Open the vacuum equalising valve wait for sometime.
3. Open the suction valve slowly to full open position.
4. Normalise the 6.6 KV breaker.
5. Check the availability and keep the discharge valve open.
6. After selecting the running pump switch ON the SLC.
33
VACUUM PULLING IN STAGE-1
1. Ensure one CEP is running through main ejectors and GSC.
2. Ensure CW is following through condenser. (CW inlet/outlet valves are about 30%opened.
condition. If valves are not in opened condition then in coordination with UCB-1 open the
valves.
3. Line up one gland steam exhauster ( suction valve open and power supply on)
4. Main ejector and GSC drips are in lined up condition.
5. Ensure Vac breaker in opened condition.
6. Isolating valve before seal steam controller in closed condition and upstream drain to
atmosphere in opened condition.
7. Atmosphere drain of ejector steam header (below main ejector) is in opened condition and
ejector steam header drain to condenser closed condition.
8. Ensure manual isolating valves(CA-1,2 near condenser: CA-3,4 near main ejector) are in
opened condition
9. Open the isolating valve of ejector steam and gland steam at dearator floor.
10. Put into service one starting ejector and open warm up drain valve(as 87) of seal steam header.
11. Open the isolating valve before seal steam controller.
12. At about condenser pressure 600 mm Hg start seals steam exhauster and charge seal steam. Put
seal steam controller on auto, observe seal steam header pressure and close vacuum breaker.
13. At about condenser pressure 500mm Hg put main ejectors in service.
14. Line up the drain from atmosphere to condenser of seal steam line & ejector steam header at
5.5 mt.
VACUUM KILLING IN STAGE-1
1. Close the MS stop valves at boiler end(MS-301/MS-302)
2. Depressurise MS line and RH line by opening HP-LP by pass.
3. Closes all the mal drains which were opened during unit shutdown and line up atmospheric
drains of MS/HRH strainer.
4. After closing HP-LP bypass watch MS pressure (digital). If it increases then manually tighten
the MS stop valves.
5. If it remains at 1 KSC then reduce vacuum by taking out ejectors. Wait for VAC dropping upto
500mm Hg.
6. When back pressure is about 500 mm Hg then close the seal steam control valve and close the
seal steam isolating valve at 5.5 mt. Keep open the VAC breaker. Open atmosphere drain of
seal steam line and ejector steam line (At 2.5 mt).
7. Open the starting ejector air valves and watch the back pressure which should be less than
760mmHg.
8. Check from local whether steam is coming out from FAC breaker or not.
9. If steam is not coming out then close ejector & gland steam root valves at deaerator floor.
34
BFP ISOLATION STAGE-1
1. Ensure that pump is not running and lead/lag selection switch is in normal position.
2. Close the discharge valve and isolate the power supply.
3. Isolate the 6.6KV breaker.
4. Close recirculation valve at deaerator floor.
5. Close the suction valve slowly and watch local suction pressure.
6. If suction pressure increases then open the suction valve and manually further close the discharge
then repeat step-4 till suction pressure remains constant.
7. Open booster discharge vent valve.
8. Open booster pump suction drain and main pump discharge drain.
9. After completion of draining issue the PFW.
BFP NORMALISATION STAGE-1
1. Close the drain valves and keep open vent valves.
2. Crack open the suction valve, watch suction pressure and vent the system.
3. After proper venting close the vent valves.
4. Open the suction valve fulluy.
5. Open the recirulation valve at deaerator floor.
6. Normalise power supply of discharge vavle.
7. Normalise 6.6 KV breaker.
8. Check availability.
9. After Opening the discharge valve keep the selector switch in lead position.
35
CEP ISOLATION STAGE –1
10. Ensure the CEP is not running and SLC is Off.
11. Isolate the 6.6 KV breaker of the CEP.
12. Close the discharge valve and isolate power supply.
13. Close the suction valve.
14. Close the vacuum equalising valve.
15. Close the gland sealing inlet valves.
16. Open the strainer drain valve and watch whether air is sucking or water is draining.
17. If air is sucking then close the drain valve. Further tighten the suction & vacuum equalising valve
then repeat step 7.
18. After completion of draining issue PFW
CEP NORMALISATION STAGE –1
7. Close the strainer drain valve.
8. Open the gland sealing inlet valves.
9. Open the vacuum equalising valve wait for sometime.
10. Open the suction valve slowly to full open position.
11. Normalise the power supply of discharge valve and open it.
12. Normalise the 6.6 KV breaker.
13. Check the availability and kept open the discharge valve.
14. After selecting the running pump switch the SLC.
VELOCITY AND PRESSURE DROP IN PIPES
VELOCITY AND PRESSURE DROP IN PIPES
Velocity
The velocity of hydraulic fluid through a conductor (pipe, tube or hose) is dependent on flow rate and
cross sectional area. Recommended fluid velocities through pipes and hoses in hydraulic systems are as
follows:
Service Velocity (ft/sec) Velocity (m/sec)
suction/intake 2 - 4 0.6 – 1.2
return 4 – 13 1.5 - 4
pressure/discharge 7 - 18 2 – 5.5
Use values at the lower end of the range for lower pressures or where operation is continuous. Refer to
the flow/velocity nomograms on pages four and five for more information, alternatively, fluid velocity
can be calculated using the following formula:
v = Q × 0.408
D²
Where
v = velocity in feet per second (ft/sec)
Q = flow rate in US gallons per minute (USgpm)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in inches (in)
In metric units
v = Q × 21.22
D²
Where
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
Q = flow rate in litres per minute (L/min)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm)
Pressure drop
Friction between the fluid flowing through a conductor and its inside wall causes losses, which are
quantified as pressure drop. Pressure drop in conductors is an important consideration for the designer
especially in systems where long pipe or hose runs are necessary. The pressure drop over a length of
pipe or hose can be calculated using the following formula, which for ease of calculation uses metric
units. Before proceeding to the pressure drop calculations, the following variables need to be known:
Flow rate in litres per minute (L/min) Q
Inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm) D
Kinematic viscosity of fluid (at operating temperature) in centistokes (cSt) ν
Density of the fluid in kilograms per cubic metre (kg/m³) ρ
Length of the pipe, tube or hose in metres (m) L
1. Calculate fluid velocity:
v = Q × 21.22
D²
Where
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
Q = flow rate in litres per minute (L/min)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm)
2. Calculate the Reynolds Number (Re):
Re = 1000 × v × D
ν
Where
Re = Reynolds Number
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in millimetres (mm)
ν = kinematic viscosity of fluid (at operating temperature) in centistokes (cSt)
3. Calculate the friction factor (f)
The formula used to calculate the friction factor is dependent on the magnitude of the Reynolds
Number.
If the Reynolds Number is less than 2300, flow is laminar and the following formula is used to
calculate the friction factor:
f = 64
Re
Where
f = friction factor
Re = Reynolds Number < 2300
If the Reynolds Number is between 2300 and 4000, flow is transition and greater than 4000 flow is
turbulent. For Reynolds Numbers greater than 2300 and less than 100,000 the following formula can be
used to calculate the friction factor:
f = 0.3164 × Re - 0.25
Where
f = friction factor
Re = Reynolds Number > 2300 and < 100,000
In instances where the Reynolds Number is greater than 100,000, friction is highly dependant on the
roughness of the conductor’s inner surface. In these cases Colebrook’s equation, which considers pipe
roughness, is used to calculate the friction factor. However, due to the relatively low fluid velocities
and high fluid viscosities present in hydraulic systems, Reynolds Numbers of this magnitude should not
be encountered.
4. Calculate the pressure drop:
Finally, pressure drop can be calculated using the following formula:
Δp = v² × f × L × ρ
2D
Where
Δp = pressure drop in Pascals (Pa)
v = velocity in metres per second (m/sec)
f = friction factor
L = length of pipe or hose in metres (m)
ρ = density of the fluid in kilograms per cubic metre (870-890 kg/m³ for hydraulic oil)
D = inside diameter of pipe or hose in metres (m)
Conversions
SUS (32 – 99) cSt = 0.2253 × SUS – (194.4 ÷ SUS)
SUS (100 – 240) cSt = 0.2193 × SUS – (134.6 ÷ SUS)
SUS (> 240) cSt = SUS ÷ 4.635
US gallon × 3.785 = litre
inch × 25.4 = millimetre
inch × 0.0254 = metre
feet × 0.3048 = metre
lb/ft³ × 16.02 = kg/m³
Pascal (Pa) ÷ 100000 = bar
Pascal (Pa) × 0.000145 = psi
4 of 5