Three

NYU Press
Chapter Title: Bosnia: The Lessons of History?

Chapter Author(s): Brendan Simms
Book Title: This Time We Knew

Book Subtitle: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia
Book Editor(s): Thomas Cushman, Stjepan G. Meštrović
Published by: NYU Press. (1996)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qfngn.6
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THREE
Brendan Simms
Bosnia: The Lessons o f History ?
And s o it came that the high priests, scribes an d phari-

sees assemble d a t a town the y calle d Genev a an d the y
held counci l there o n how they coul d bes t abando n th e
nation o f Bosnia . The y wer e le d b y Thorwal d an d b y
David, Lor d o f th e fantas y lan d o f Owenia . An d th e
Bosnian presidenc y sa w tha t it s hou r ha d struc k an d
spake: "My soul is sad unto death." And they sai d unto
the men assembled: "Truly, truly I say unto you, one of
you here will betray me." But they were wrong, for not
one, but al l of the m would betray Bosnia . And behold!
Britain whispered t o David, Lord of Owenia, "Betray it
and the Nobel peace prize will be yours." Germany and
the Unite d State s said : "What ha s i t done , we can find
no fault with it?" Britain and France however said: "It is
better for a whole nation t o die, than that we would al l
be dragge d int o a hellhole. " And the y le t i t b e boun d
and handed it over so that it should be crucified.
— Brendan Simms, "Bosnian Passion"
U ntil comparatively recently , the idea that one could learn from histor y
was axiomatic . "Histories, " Franci s Baco n onc e wrot e "mak e me n
wise." Bu t th e close r w e ge t t o th e presen t th e mor e skepticis m take s
over. Fro m Hegel' s familiar , almos t cliche d dictum , "Th e on e thin g on e
learns from histor y i s that nobody eve r learns anythin g fro m history, " it is
but a shor t ste p t o Alan Taylor' s pessimisti c belie f tha t al l w e lear n fro m
the mistake s o f histor y i s ho w t o mak e ne w ones . I n ou r da y i t i s
customary fo r historian s t o play safe , t o insis t tha t histor y ma y infor m o r
edify us , but never provide u s wit h lesson s fo r th e future. Th e intellectua l
credentials fo r thi s attitud e ar e impressive . Jacob Burckhard t tell s u s tha t
65
66 • Brendan Simms
history make s u s no t cleve r fo r today , bu t wis e forever . Si r Herber t

Butterfield questione d whether historians were "any wiser than the rest of
their contemporarie s o n political matters. " Indeed , Butterfiel d sa w real
danger in the manipulation o f history to provide "patterns whic h we can
immediately transpose into the context of contemporary politics." l
And yet, if we scratch the surface, we find that the notion that history
has muc h t o teach u s is a persistent one . In The Use of History, A . L.
Rowse write s that "Thoug h yo u may hardly sa y that ther e ar e historical
laws of the regularity and exactness of the laws of physical science, there
are generalization s possible , o f somethin g lik e a statistica l character. "
Rejecting th e idea tha t "histor y neve r repeat s itself, " h e went o n to say
that "there is no one rhythm or plot in history but there are rhythms, plots,
patterns, eve n repetitions . S o that i t is possible t o make generalization s
and t o draw lessons." 2 Simila r view s ca n be found amon g professiona l
historians. In The Practice of History the late Sir Geoffrey Elto n writes,
"Its lesson s ar e not straightforward didacti c precepts , eithe r instruction s
for actio n (th e searc h fo r parallel s t o a give n situation ) o r a universa l
norm." "Nevertheless, " h e continues , " a soun d acquaintanc e wit h th e
prehistory of a situation or problem does illumine them and does assist in
making presen t decisions ; an d thoug h histor y canno t prophesy , i t can
often mak e reasonable predictions." 3 Historians of international relations
are particularly prone to drawing lessons from history. Norman Rich even
subtitled his book about the Crimean wars A Cautionary Tale. Nor did he
leave any doubt at whom his work was directed: to "the future leader s of
the world—i n othe r words , to students—i n th e hope tha t the y an d all
others interested in international affair s wil l find this cautionary—as did
the author." 4
In short, the case for and against the lessons of history is fairly finely
balanced. Perhap s th e last wor d amon g th e authorities shoul d be left t o
the great high priest of whiggery, G. M. Trevelyan. Trevelyan, who had a
great deal more sense than he is often given credit for, once said, "History
repeats itsel f an d history neve r repeats itsel f ar e about equally true . The
question i n an y give n case , i s whic h par t o f histor y i s goin g t o repea t
itself."5
This goes to the heart of the matter. What is important is not whether
history i s repeating itsel f i n Europe today , bu t which part o f histor y i s
doing so. Of course, one could still criticize my argument on the a priori
basis that there are no lessons to be drawn from history. But if one accepts
that historical analogies can be helpful, then the proof of the pudding will
Bosnia: The Lessons of History? • 6 7
be i n th e eating . I n tha t cas e th e questio n mus t be , d o th e analogie s

convince? I t i s onl y afte r hearin g ou t th e comparison s tha t on e wil l b e
able t o judge whethe r thi s essa y doe s mor e tha n conver t th e preciou s
metal of historical understanding into the dross of political polemic.
•• •
But befor e goin g o n t o discus s th e historica l parallel s t o th e Bosnia n

horrors, we should call to mind the various interpretations o f the war and
the facts on which they are based.
1. Th e first is the Serb view. It is that this is a war of self-defense fo r

a Serbian people haunted by a fear o f a repeat of the genocide suffered a t
the hands o f the Croat puppet fascis t stat e during World War II. On this
reading th e Serbia n peopl e ar e th e victim s o f a long-thought-out Croat -
German-Vatican-Muslim plo t t o destro y th e ol d Yugoslavia an d erec t i n
its plac e eithe r a Fourt h Reich , a reru n o f th e genocida l Croa t puppe t
fascist state , an Iranian-style Muslim theocracy, or some bizarre combina-
tion of all three.
2. Th e second view is the standard view of Western governments and
more specifically , th e vie w o f th e Britis h government . Thi s i s tha t th e
conflict in Yugoslavia is essentially a civil war, though an unusually tragic
and viciou s one , for whic h al l side s ar e mor e o r les s equall y t o blame.
While there is general agreement that the Serbs have committed the most
atrocities, ther e i s als o a broa d consensu s tha t th e conflic t involve s n o
vital Western interest an d thus does not justify th e use of Western troops
to check Serbian aggression.
3. Th e third vie w i s on e that I share . This vie w hold s that , whateve r
opportunistic acts of Croat aggression may have taken place subsequently,
the root caus e o f th e wa r lie s i n a psychologically an d logisticall y wel l
prepared program of Serbian aggression.
•• •
In th e fac e o f th e greates t Europea n upheava l sinc e 1945 , involving a n
enormous displacemen t o f populatio n (a t leas t 2. 5 millio n a t th e lates t
tally), more than 100,00 0 deaths, most of them not battle casualties but in
consequence o f deliberat e terro r accompanyin g th e practic e o f ethni c
cleansing, mass rape, expulsion, concentration camps, and integral nation-
alism run riot, it is hardly surprisin g tha t commentators hav e resorted to
historical analogy in an effort t o find their bearings.
Predictably, the specter of the Third Reich, the Holocaust, and appease-
ment was frequently invoked . Lady Thatcher warne d i n December 199 2
of th e ris k o f a secon d holocaust . Mar k Thompso n speak s o f th e "fina l
solution" of Bosnia-Herzegovina.6 The deportation of the Muslim popula-
tion in railway boxcars led the American journalist Roy Gutman to speak
of "Thir d Reic h practices. " He compares th e fat e o f Muslim s t o that of
the Armenians and Milosevic to Hitler. Citing George Santayana's dictum
that those who disregard th e past ar e bound t o repeat it , Gutman argue d
that th e lesson o f World War II i s tha t ther e mus t neve r b e genocid e i n
Europe again. 7 Eli e Wiesel mad e the lin k betwee n th e tw o crime s clea r
when in an address at the opening of the Holocaust Memorial in Washing-
ton, D.C. , he rebuked Clinto n fo r hi s inactio n ove r Bosnia . Th e Labou r
M.R Malcol m Wicks made the same point in April 199 3 when he wrote,
"Yesterday i n Washingto n th e Holocaus t Memoria l wa s opened . Th e
timing could not have been more momentous. Will its opening challenge
us to prevent a Bosnian holocaust, or mock our pretensions that we have
learned thi s century' s mos t importan t lesson?" 8 Perhap s th e most plain -
tive o f suc h call s wa s tha t o f Brend a Katten , chairma n o f th e Zionis t
Federation: "As Jews, we are quite horrified a t what is going on: we lost
a lo t o f ou r peopl e i n th e 1930 s becaus e th e gate s wer e close d o n us .
What is sad, is that we don't learn from history."
This analysis was not shared by the majority o f commentators, though
their sens e o f historical analog y wa s no les s acute . Instead, the y argue d
that histor y showe d tha t onl y nation-state s "worked, " tha t Bosni a wa s
unviable o n thi s coun t an d wa s thu s doome d t o fail . Other s argue d tha t
history ha d show n interventio n alway s made things worse ; that i t led to
open-ended commitments , ende d i n Vietna m traumas , an d achieve d n o
purpose. Other s stil l evince d a deep-seate d abhorrenc e fo r al l thing s
Balkan, and adapted Bismarck's bon mot to argue that the Balkan peoples
were not wort h th e bones o f a single Britis h grenadier . Above all , these
pundits rejecte d analogie s wit h th e Thir d Reich , Hitler , th e Holocaust ,
and appeasement . "Comparison s wit h Hitler ar e intoxicating an d shoul d
be avoided," wrote Conor Cruise O'Brien. H e went on to state, indisput-
ably, that "It was by seeing Nasser as Hitler that Anthony Eden got Britain
into Suez." 9 In the Sunday Telegraph Fran k Johnso n argue d tha t history
taught us to stay out of the Balkans. 10 Allan Massie saw similar dangers
in intervention. 11 "Russia, " h e wrote , "migh t abando n sanction s agains t
Serbia an d com e t o the defens e o f it s traditiona l ally : shade s o f 1914. "
Before hi s conversio n t o th e caus e o f intervention , Andre w Mar r i n
the Independent spok e o f th e pro-interventionist s a s "Mr . Gladstone' s

inheritors," referring t o th e Bulgaria n agitatio n o f 1876; 12 more o f thi s
presently. One of those warning of a new Vietnam was the war photogra-
pher Do n McCullin : "Wha t mos t people see m t o forge t abou t Bosni a i s
rule one: read history. Certainly it' s go t the makings o f anothe r Vietnam
where you just tie up thousands of troops and lose in the end."
Other more imaginative parallels can be drawn. If Timothy Garton Ash
spoke of th e period 1989-9 0 a s a rerun o f 1848 , another "springtim e of
the nations, " th e year s 1991-9 3 ca n b e compare d t o 1849-5 0 wit h th e
unsettling discover y o f incompatibilit y o f libera l revolutionar y nationa l
aims in Transylvania, Posnania, and elsewhere. Another persuasive paral-
lel migh t b e wit h th e immediat e aftermat h o f Worl d Wa r I . Th e post -
hegemonic chao s o f th e year s 1918-23 , in whic h th e smalle r Europea n
and Near Eastern state s struggle d fo r th e Habsburg, tsarist, and Ottoman
inheritances, bear s a clos e resemblanc e t o th e struggl e fo r th e Sovie t
succession w e ar e witnessin g today . Onc e agai n w e hav e turmoi l i n
Moscow, breakawa y movement s o n th e forme r Sovie t peripher y an d i n
the Balkans. We have a host of new countries wit h recondite currencies.
We have, onc e again , worryin g sign s o f a n American withdrawa l fro m
Europe, a hint o f neo-isolationis m even . Disturbin g thoug h thes e sign s
may be, the essential message of such a comparison is a comforting one .
Because thoug h ther e wa s muc h unpleasantnes s i n th e year s 1918-23 ,
things eventually sorted themselves out. Then as now the lesson seems to
be no t t o ge t involved , fo r th e tw o mos t spectacula r intervention s afte r
World Wa r I , th e expedition s t o Russi a an d th e Chana k crisis , wer e
notorious failures . S o perhap s i t shoul d hardl y surpris e u s t o find th e
Greek-Turkish populatio n exchange s o f th e 1920s , which involve d mil -
lions of people and enormous human suffering, bein g touted in UN circles
as a model for Bosnia.
But numerous though the possible historical parallels may be, it is the
Balkan crisis of 1876-78 and the events of the 1930s to which commenta-
tors and politicians return again and again.
•• •
In 187 5 the peasants of Bosnia rose against their Ottoman rulers. Against
the hope s an d expectation s o f th e Britis h governmen t th e Turk s wer e
unable t o put the insurrectio n dow n quickly . Durin g th e followin g year ,
the revolt sprea d t o Bulgaria. I f th e struggl e i n Bosnia ha d show n scan t
regard fo r humanity , th e Bulgaria n insurrectio n soo n degenerate d int o
massacre, as Turkish irregulars, the so-called bashi-bazouks, were loosed

on the largely defenseles s Christia n population. This provoked a n outcry
in Britai n wher e a vociferou s sectio n o f th e public , le d b y th e prim e
minister, William Gladstone, began to demand intervention, or at least an
end t o th e traditiona l pro-Turkis h an d anti-Russia n polic y o f Disraeli' s
Conservative administration . The parallels with the present da y are com-
pelling. I t i s mor e o r les s th e sam e geographi c are a tha t i s a t issue ,
although the roles of victim and perpetrator in the public mind have been
neatly reversed . I f i n 187 6 it wa s the hapless Orthodo x peasantr y bein g
raped an d massacre d b y bestial Turkish soldiery , toda y i t i s the Musli m
civilians who were at the mercy of crazed Serbian Chetniks. The reaction
of the British government and the Foreign Office i s also similar.13 In 1876
they urged the Turks to stamp out the revolt quickly and their misgivings
about Turkish policy stemme d not from th e casualties involved bu t fro m
the lengt h o f tim e th e Ottoman s wer e takin g t o ge t t o grip s wit h th e
insurrection. Toda y suc h feeling s ar e mor e subterranea n bu t the y ar e
nonetheless widespread i n government circles. As for the Foreign Office ,
the scarcel y conceale d desir e tha t th e Serb s shoul d "ge t o n wit h it " i n
Bosnia is attested by many leaks and the general thrust of British policy.14
There i s another strikin g parallel, namely, the efforts o f the British gov -
ernment to establish some kind of moral equivalence between victim and
perpetrator. I n 187 6 th e undersecretar y a t th e Foreig n Office , Bourke ,
spoke o f th e insurrectio n a s bein g "fomente d b y foreigner s (i.e . th e
Russians)" an d "ho w sanguinar y wer e th e intention s an d act s o f th e
insurgent Christians." The Daily Telegraph spok e of the "wholesale mas-
sacre of Moslems whenever found , an d they di d not fail t o ill-treat bot h
women and children.. . . They point to their bleeding little ones—did they
remember humanit y whe n they fel l upo n the Turk? Their villages ar e in
flames, and the y protest , ye t the y cheerfull y se t Ottoma n hamlet s i n a
blaze." Much in the same way the Foreign Office an d the British govern-
ment hav e waste d n o opportunit y toda y i n drawin g attentio n t o th e fac t
that there are no innocent parties in the Yugoslav conflict.15 At the popular
level this argument was an effective one , for nobody likes to be accused
of gullibilit y o r failing t o understand wha t is, in another classi c Foreig n
Office phrase , a "very comple x situation. " In the media this vie w foun d
expression i n headline s suc h a s "N o Nic e Guy s Lef t [i n Bosnia ] a s
Patience Runs Out" or "They Are All Baddies at Odds in Bosnia." 16
But perhaps the most arresting similarity between the two phenomena
lies in the extraordinary public debate generated by the massacres and the
response o f th e Britis h governmen t t o suc h pressures . I f th e Bulgaria n

agitation was, in Richard Shannon' s words, "by far the greatest and most
illuminating revelatio n o f th e moral susceptibilit y o f th e Hig h Victoria n
public conscience, " the n th e Bosnia n agitatio n o f 1992-9 3 i s th e near -
est equivalen t i n moder n times , th e closes t ou r jaded an d compassion -
fatigued ag e will ever get to the moral fervor of Gladstonian liberalism.
Unsurprisingly, there is also a sense of deja vu about the anti-interven-
tionist camp. If in 187 6 Disraeli and others pointed to the British interest
in upholding Turkish power in Europe agains t the Russians, today Hurd,
Hogg, and Rif kind justify thei r passivity i n terms of th e absenc e o f an y
vital Britis h interes t i n th e stabilit y o f th e Balkans. 17 There i s the sam e
defiance, almos t willful cynicis m i n the face o f the outrage of what they
regard a s the chattering classes , the strictures o f facile Utopian s ignorant
of th e realities o f power politics . Nor i s thi s all . There i s als o the sam e
strange specte r o f alliance s cuttin g righ t acros s the whol e party-politica l
and cultural spectrum . In 1876 , for example , stron g suppor t for th e Bul-
garian agitation came from Gladstone and many Liberals, from the Welsh,
Anglo-Catholics (Puseyites) , anti-Ultramontane Catholic s (pro-Newman -
ites, anti-Manning an d Wisemanites), from nonconformis t ministers , and
from a selection of newspapers and journals, including the Methodist, th e
Church Review, and th e Daily News. Oppositio n t o th e agitatio n cam e
from the Daily Telegraph, the Conservative Party, low church evangelicals
in th e Churc h o f Englan d (excep t Lor d Shaftesbury) , th e pop e an d th e
English Roma n Catholi c church , Ireland , th e Jewis h community , an d
the poet Swinburne . Today, suppor t fo r interventio n i n Bosnia ha s been
expressed b y Lord Callaghan , Michae l Foot , an d Lady Thatcher, writer s
such a s Malcol m Bradbury , trad e unio n grandee s suc h a s Bil l Morri s
(general secretary of the Transport and General Workers' Union, Britain's
biggest union) , th e trenchan t anti-Marxis t an d politica l gur u Edwar d
Heath, and also Bruce Kent (vice president o f the Campaign for Nuclea r
Disarmament), th e Reveren d Ia n Paisley , Denni s Skinner , Ton y Benn ,
Max Hastings, and Alan Clark . Then a s now interventionis t rhetori c ha s
been see n a s merel y a vehicl e fo r a politica l comeback . Thu s Disrael i
accused Gladstone, who had come out of retirement to lead the Bulgarian
agitation, of "taking advantage of such sublime sentiments" and applying
them "fo r th e furtheranc e o f thei r siniste r ends. " Th e Times spoke o f
Gladstone's "rhetorical inebriation."
Much th e sam e ha s bee n sai d o f Margare t Thatcher' s sensationa l
interview i n Apri l 1993 , whe n sh e accuse d th e Britis h governmen t o f
"complicity i n genocide. " I t wa s the n tha t Malcol m Rifkin d dismisse d

her charges a s "emotional nonsense." Finally, perhaps the Bosnian ques-
tion wil l follo w th e nin e days ' wonde r o f th e Bulgaria n agitatio n int o
oblivion. Doubtles s th e Britis h governmen t take s comfor t fro m th e fac t
that the agitation fizzled out after th e failure o f the Straits conferenc e o f
1877 an d wa s utterl y negate d b y th e surg e o f popula r anti-Russia n an d
pro-Turkish jingois m tha t followe d th e outbrea k o f th e Russo-Turkis h
War of 1877-78.
But only perhaps. What if the Balkan crisis of today is more than just
a flash i n th e pan ? Wha t i f ther e i s a clea r Wester n an d thu s Britis h
national interest to be defended i n the former Yugoslavia? 18
•• •
Of course, there are obvious ways in which the current situation does not
resemble th e 1930s . First o f all , Milosevic i s no Hitler. Though h e may
possess a fairly highl y developed murderous instinct, it pales in compari-
son to the sheer scale of Hitler's crimes. Second, Serbia does not possess
even a fraction o f th e strength , cohesion , an d talen t tha t mad e th e Ger -
mans such a formidable threat to European peace in the 1930 s and 1940s.
Similarly, th e horror s inflicte d o n th e Musli m an d Croa t people s o f th e
former Yugoslavia cannot be equated with the planned an d industrialized
destruction of a whole people we call the Holocaust. Horrific though it is,
"ethnic cleansing " i s no t strictl y speakin g "genocide " i n th e sens e w e
mean whe n referrin g t o th e Third Reich , Cambodia , o r Stalin' s Russia .
And yet the lack of an indisputable equivalence with the 1930s and 1940s
should no t surpris e us . For i f th e paralle l wer e that obvious, this pape r
would be redundant, fo r i n that case we should be doing nothing else in
Western Europe than discussing the Serbian threat night and day. In short,
I am not saying that the drive for a Greater Serbia corresponds exactly to
Nazi expansionism. What I am saying is that the Balkan massacres are, if
not of genocidal dimensions, then easily the nearest thing to genocide in
Europe w e hav e witnesse d sinc e Worl d Wa r II . Similarly , th e politica l
culture and behavior of present-day Serbi a are, if not the pure Nazism of
Hitler's Germany , the n a t leas t th e mos t frightenin g exampl e o f expan -
sionism an d integra l nationalis m ru n rio t tha t w e hav e see n fo r fifty
years. Perhap s eve n mor e significant , th e respons e o f th e Wes t t o thi s
phenomenon bear s mor e tha n a passin g resemblanc e t o th e polic y o f
appeasement adopted in the face of the German threat.
•• •
The Abyssinian war that began in 193 5 has a strangely familiar ai r about
it. As i n th e cas e o f Bosnia , i t wa s argue d tha t Abyssinia shoul d neve r
have been admitted to the League of Nations in the first place. When the
crisis blew , a Britis h governmen t revie w swiftl y establishe d tha t ther e
were insufficien t Britis h interest s a t stak e t o justify resistanc e t o Italia n
aggression; Britain , i n particula r Dougla s Hur d an d Malcol m Rifkind ,
take exactly th e same line on Bosnia today . Then a s now, comparatively
few peopl e i n authorit y seeme d t o make th e point tha t i t wa s collectiv e
security, not the individual country, that was ultimately at issue.
As for the Spanish Civil War, the scope for comparison with contempo-
rary event s i s practically unlimited . Franco' s rebellio n brok e ou t i n July
1936. Within a month France an d Britain had imposed a n arms embargo
on bot h sides , muc h i n th e sam e wa y a s th e Unite d Nation s di d i n
Yugoslavia a t the end of 1991 . In both cases the West treated th e recog-
nized and democratically electe d government of an embattled stat e on an
equal footin g wit h th e rebels . I n bot h case s th e effect s wer e fa r fro m
evenhanded, fo r i n th e Spanis h instanc e Italia n an d Germa n weapon s
were supplied to the rebels in an abundance that the Soviet Union did not
match for the government side , while in Yugoslavia the embargo directly
favored th e Serb s who , havin g planne d th e wa r wel l i n advance , ha d
already helped themselves to most of the old federal armory . And in both
cases the British and French governments have celebrated their policy as
the height of responsibility. There are further similarities . For example, in
April 1993 , when Western governments still put on a pretense of concern
for the Bosnian Muslims, a common argumen t advanced against a liftin g
of the arms embargo was that it would enable the Russians to supply the
Serbs, as if they had not enough arms already. This was very redolent of
the logic of Arthur Greenwood, deputy leader of the Labour Party i n the
1930s, who sai d tha t fo r ever y weapo n sen t t o Spain , th e German s an d
Italians would sen d fifty to the insurgents. He rather overlooke d th e fac t
that th e Axis countrie s wer e alread y sendin g a s muc h a s the y could . I n
1936 the deputy speake r of the Spanish parliament made an impassioned
appeal t o th e Labou r Part y conferenc e t o allo w Spanis h democrat s t o
defend themselves; surely this was not too much to ask? In the same way,
the Bosnian prime minister Haris Silajdzic becam e a familiar an d forlor n
figure on Wester n television , arguin g tha t i f th e wes t wa s unwillin g t o
defend th e Bosnians against aggression and massacre they should at least

allow them the opportunity of defending themselves .
Moving forwar d a couple o f year s t o th e Sudete n crisi s o f 1938 , the
parallels between the roles of Konrad Henlei n an d Radovan Karadzic as
the respective leaders of a nationalist irredenta are obvious, although one
may credi t th e latte r wit h a muc h greate r autonom y fro m hi s puppe t
master. Onc e agai n th e British governmen t wa s quick t o stat e that ther e
were no British interests at stake. In the words of the permanent undersec-
retary a t the Foreign Office, Alec Cadogen "(the foreign policy ) commit-
tee is unanimous tha t Czechoslovaki a i s not wort h the bones o f a single
British grenadier . An d the y ar e quit e righ t too. " After th e Czech s wer e
abandoned t o their fate i t wa s not lon g before th e customary vilificatio n
of the victim followed. According to Sir Thomas Inskip, minister for the
coordination of defense, Czechoslovakia "was an unstable unit in Central
Europe," and h e "could se e no reason wh y w e shoul d tak e an y step s to
maintain such a unit in being." The chancellor of the exchequer, Sir John
Simon, pronounced that "Czechoslovakia was a modern invention, a very
artificial creatio n with no real roots in the past." All this is highly redolent
of th e anti-Bosnia n rhetori c o f Wester n statesme n today : Bosni a ha s n o
historical justification (neve r mind its medieval statehood), is not a nation-
state an d thu s not viabl e (neve r min d th e Swis s example) , shoul d neve r
have been recognized, and so on. It may be that these critics had a point,
but only in the same way they would have had a point about Czechoslova-
kia in 1938. After all , the national composition of the Czech state in 1938
was as follows: approximately six million Czechs, three million Germans,
two million Slovaks, and well over half a million Hungarians. This is not
so very differen t fro m th e ethnic breakdown i n prewar Bosnia: wit h just
over 40 percent Muslims, 39 percent Serb s and about 1 8 percent Croats.
If i t i s righ t t o abando n th e Bosnia n stat e toda y o n th e groun d o f it s
"unviability," i t wa s certainl y th e heigh t o f realis m fo r Chamberlai n t o
throw the Czechs to the wolves in 1938.
The Czech parallel also helps us understand one of the more distressing
aspects o f th e Bosnia n War , namely , th e conflic t betwee n th e Bosnia n
government an d Croa t separatists . Fo r afte r Czechoslovaki a ha d bee n
abandoned b y the West in 1938 , both the Poles an d Hungarians steppe d
in to clai m thei r shar e of th e carcass i n Teschen an d souther n Slovakia ,
respectively. Predictably , th e failur e o f th e West t o uphol d internationa l
law triggered a frantic scrambl e for territory at the expense of the victim;
it would, however, be absurd to claim that the opportunist behavior of the
Poles an d Hungarians pu t them o n par with the origina l aggressor , Naz i

Germany. Th e opportunis t behavio r o f th e Croat s i n Bosni a shoul d b e
seen in the same light. This conflict wa s eagerly seize d on by the British
government a s evidence o f th e moral equivalenc e o f "al l sides " and the
inherent "complexity " o f th e situation . Ye t th e Croat-governmen t split ,
which in Bosnia was effectively a Croat-Muslim split , was substantially a
response t o th e Wester n polic y o f noninterventio n agains t th e origina l
Serb aggression. If there was to be no salvation from the West, the Croats
argued, then why not grab what was left o f Bosnia, before th e Serbs took
everything? Thi s conduc t wa s immoral , shortsighted , and—a s i t turne d
out—suicidal, but to argue that it makes for a moral equivalence with the
original Serb aggression is to accept the logic of the appeasers.
But the parallels do not end there. We findthe same schizophrenia over
the role of the League of Nations, or in our case, the United Nations. Then
as now Western governments made the international body responsible for
the implementatio n o f collectiv e security . Thi s mean t effectively—an d
the aggressors of the 1930 s and of today were not slow to figure this out
for themselves—tha t collectiv e securit y wa s bein g uphel d b y nobody .
When Britain and France said the invasion of Abyssinia was a matter for
the League o f Nations , this wa s a green ligh t fo r furthe r aggression . I n
the sam e way , when th e West abdicated responsibilit y fo r Bosni a t o the
European Community and then to the United Nations they issued an open
invitation t o th e Serb s t o pres s thei r advantage . Bu t ther e ar e ye t mor e
parallels. Ther e i s th e sam e stres s o n retrenchmen t an d th e nee d fo r
financial stability. Onc e agai n ther e i s n o stomac h fo r th e additiona l
financial burden resultin g fro m a rigorou s defens e agains t aggression .
Another similarit y lie s in the strang e alliance o f pacifist fundamentalist s
and conservative timeserver s create d b y fear o f military involvement . In
the 1930 s the appeasers were men such as Chamberlain and Baldwin, but
also Labou r grandee s suc h a s th e strongl y pacifis t Ponsonb y an d Lans-
bury. Today, it is men of such diverse views as Malcolm Rif kind and Tony
Benn who have set their faces agains t Balkan involvement. Likewise , in
the 1930 s suc h politica l opposite s a s Churchil l an d Bevi n preache d th e
gospel of resistance, much in the same way as Margaret Thatcher, Paddy
Ashdown, and Michael Foot call for intervention today.
We hear the same risible rhetoric to cover up our own inadequacy. Just
after th e Munic h agreemen t Chamberlai n wrot e t o th e archbisho p o f
Canterbury that he was sure that "some day the Czechs will see that what
we did wa s t o sav e the m fo r a happier future. " Ho w familia r thi s mus t
sound to the Bosnians who were told that the arms embargo and Western
neutrality wer e "i n thei r ow n bes t interests. " To interven e o r t o suppl y
arms, ran and still runs the British government's argument, would simply
be t o "prolon g th e agony. " Th e shee r nonsens e an d insolenc e o f thi s
argument are obvious. After all , what if the British government had been
refused ai d against the Nazis in 1940 on the grounds that it might prolong
our agony?
There is one last parallel. In November 193 7 Hitler's adjutant Friedrich
Hossbach drew up a document that set out the Fuhrer's intention to wage
aggressive wa r agains t hi s neighbors . I n Septembe r 198 6 th e Serbia n
Academy o f Science s i n Belgrad e formulate d a memorandu m tha t pro-
vided the blueprint for Serbian expansionism. Of course, unlike the Hoss-
bach protocol it was not an official governmen t document, still less was it
a detaile d politico-militar y pla n wit h a timetable attached . Bu t w e may
assume that such timetables and plans were devised in due course, for the
Greater Serbia envisaged in the memorandum was henceforth singlemind -
edly pursued by Milosevic. In fact the authors demanded the creation of a
new an d vastl y expande d Serbia n republi c ou t o f th e ruin s o f th e ol d
Yugoslavia. Thi s wa s t o includ e Ser b settlement s i n Croatia , muc h o f
Bosnia, the whole o f Kosovo, and Vojvodina. This phase in the creation
of Greate r Serbi a ha s almos t bee n completed . I t remain s t o b e see n
whether Milosevi c o r hi s successor s wil l no w cal l i t a day , o r whethe r
they will be emboldened to carry the war into Macedonia and beyond.
•• •
In th e las t analysis , o f course , an y objection s t o suc h comparison s wil l

probably b e political, not historical. If one does not shar e my belief tha t
Serbian expansionis m i s a threa t t o th e securit y o f Europ e a s a whole,
then one can hardly be expected to be persuaded by my historical analo-
gies. Yet if I am in danger of turning into a kind of modern-day Churchil-
lian Don Quixote, charging at the windmills of supposed threats to peace,
might m y critic s no t b e i n peri l o f slippin g int o th e complacenc y an d
misjudgments o f th e 1930s ? Thi s i s th e lesso n o f histor y I se e bein g
ignored so fatally i n our own time. Because in disputing whether there is
British interest at stake in the Balkans today we are effectively disputin g
which part of history, to recall Trevelyan's formulation, is repeating itself.
Are we back in 1876-7 8 o r in 1938 ? The question i s the more dramatic
because in 1938 Chamberlain's "peace with honour" were the same words
that Disrael i ha d brough t bac k i n triump h fro m th e Congres s o f Berli n
Bosnia: The Lessons o f History? • 7 7
and t o whic h h e adde d hi s ow n immorta l an d infamou s gloss , " I believ e

it i s peac e fo r ou r time. " On e coul d no t hel p bein g reminde d o f thi s i n
May 199 3 when , afte r obtainin g th e entirel y worthles s signature s o f
Karadzic an d Milosevi c t o a Bosnia n peac e accord , Davi d Owe n an -
nounced tha t "now i s the time to talk of peace," just days before hi s hope s
were trashe d b y th e Bosnia n Ser b parliament . Similarly , on e coul d no t
help but hav e a n eeri e feelin g abou t th e choic e o f word s Warren Christo -
pher, th e ne w America n secretar y o f state , use d t o describ e th e Bosnia n
crisis in early summe r 1993 . It was, he said , " a humanitarian crisi s a long
way fro m home , i n th e middl e o f anothe r continent. " Eve r sinc e Nevill e
Chamberlain spok e o f Germa n aggressio n agains t Czechoslovaki a a s " a
quarrel i n a faraway countr y betwee n peopl e of whom w e know nothing, "
one neve r though t t o hea r suc h a formulatio n fro m th e lip s o f a Wester n
politician again .
NOTES
This piece started life as a paper presented to various audiences in Britain and the
former Yugoslavia . I a m particularl y gratefu l t o Draze n Katunari c fo r enablin g
me to address the Croatian Writers' Festival in Zagreb in December 1994. 1 also
thank Anit a Bunyan , Stjepa n Mestrovic , Michae l Foot , Jil l Craigie , an d Alai n
Finkielkraut for their useful comments . Needless to say, they are not responsible
for an y shortcoming s thi s piec e migh t have . Fo r reason s o f space , note s hav e
been kept to a minimum.
1. Herber t Butterfield , History and Human Relations (London : Macmillan ,
1951), 161, 173 .
2. A . L. Rowse, The Use of History (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1946) ,
17, 20.
3. G . R. Elton, The Practice of History (London: Methuen, 1967) , 7.
4. Norma n Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale (Hanover , N.H.:
University Press of New England, 1985) , xix.
5. G . M. Trevelyan, "Stray Thoughts on History (1948)," in An Autobiography
and Other Essays (London: Longmans, 1949), 84.
6. Mar k Thompson , A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia (Ne w York:
Pantheon Books, 1992), 314.
7. Ro y Gutman , A Witness to Genocide: The 1993 Pulitzer Prize-Winning
Dispatches on the "Ethnic Cleansing" of Bosnia. (New York: Macmillan, 1993) ,
178.
8. Independent, April 24, 1993.
9. Independent, February 2, 1993.

10. Sunday Telegraph, February 14 , 1993.
11. Sunday Telegraph, November 12 , 1992.
12. Independent, December 2, 1993.
13. Se e Richard Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1876 (Has-
socks: Harvester Press, 1975), passim.
14. Se e th e critiqu e b y Mar k Almond, Europe's Backyard War: The War in
the Balkans (London: Heinemann, 1994) , 321.
15. Se e insightful comment s in Thompson, op. cit., 326.
16. Victori a Clark and Michael Ignatieff, Observer, January 31 , 1993.
17. Se e some of the evidence marshaled by Almond, op. cit., 307, et passim.
18. I have attempted to make the case for a strong British interest in Conser-
vative BOW Group paper P610 "The Case for Intervention " (May 1993) ; M706
"The Last Chance" (July 1993) ; P725 "Why the Americans Are Right" (October
1994); M739 "The National Interest " [wit h Alexander Nicoll] ; and in a number
of newspaper articles.

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NYU Press

Chapter Title: Bosnia: The Lessons of History?

Book Title: This Time We Knew

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Bosnia: The Lessons o f History ?

And s o it came that the high priests, scribes an d phari-

history make s u s no t cleve r fo r today , bu t wis e forever . Si r Herber t

be i n th e eating . I n tha t cas e th e questio n mus t be , d o th e analogie s

But befor e goin g o n t o discus s th e historica l parallel s t o th e Bosnia n

1. Th e first is the Serb view. It is that this is a war of self-defense fo r

the Independent spok e o f th e pro-interventionist s a s "Mr . Gladstone' s

massacre, as Turkish irregulars, the so-called bashi-bazouks, were loosed

response o f th e Britis h governmen t t o suc h pressures . I f th e Bulgaria n

"complicity i n genocide. " I t wa s the n tha t Malcol m Rifkin d dismisse d

defend th e Bosnians against aggression and massacre they should at least

Poles an d Hungarians pu t them o n par with the origina l aggressor , Naz i

In th e las t analysis , o f course , an y objection s t o suc h comparison s wil l

and t o whic h h e adde d hi s ow n immorta l an d infamou s gloss , " I believ e

9. Independent, February 2, 1993.

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