Aristotle's Ethics Commentary

Introduction

In pursuit of a commentary on Aristotle's Ethics I quickly learned that this work was
one of the most difficult treatises to interpret and analyze; there is simply too much here;
each page and each line being simply dense with possibilities for discussion and
examination. Therefore I actually kept commentary limited only to those passages which
I found needlessly controversial or unintelligible or to explaining points which were
implied or even apparently dropped -the reader and student would very much like to
know what happened to such strands and how they could be completed. Additionally, I
did not import my own morals into such a work, for the interpreter must beware of bias as
much as the historian, and must let a work explain itself as much as possible, by making
his interpretation only from the text which is furnished him.

Of course does this not make me merely a summarizer? Even if so, such a
compendious work like "Ethics" deserves a summary; for the student especially lacks the
time to finish this, one of the most complex and lengthy of Aristotle's works.

All Bekker numbers refer to the 2001 Modern Library Paperback Edition of The Basic
Works of Aristotle.

BOOK I

At (1094a) Aristotle begins his work on Ethics. According to him there are various arts
and actions in human life, but if these ends all fall under a single end, this will be the
greatest end and the art which aims to reach it would be the best. Note that acts which
produce/are productive create an external object and thus the external object is of greater
value than the act while other acts are done for their own sake and therefore require
nothing external from which one imputes value to the act.

At (1094a 20) Aristotle mentions that if there is a chief end for which all things are
done, and if we cannot go to infinity in ends, or equivalently if we cannot always find a
purpose for having a purpose, then obvioulsy the knowledge of this end would be the
highest good. And at (1094b 10) Aristotle concludes his argument by saying that this chief
good must be known only through a chief art, and an art concerned with the good of
many things, which art Aristotle identifies with politics -a subject about which he will
explain in greater detail in another treatise.

At (1094b 15) and again at (1094b 25) Aristotle says that the student of this science
(whether of his politics or his ethics I don't know) should be content with the somewhat
indefinite conclusions of this science since it deals with human acts and the
circumstances of human acts so that the data being variable, so must the conclusion.

At (1095a 5) Aristotle gets more specific by stating that a young man, due to his
passions and lack of experience, is no good student of political science. Yet at (1095a 10),
Aristotle adds, that the same is true of people young-at-heart for these may be old but still
show a childlish indiscipline.

At (1095b 15) Aristotle pursues his theory of the chief good. Now, there are several
theories which Aristotle attempts to analyze and criticize and the first theory of the
highest goood is that good is pleasure. As a first premise Aristotle asserts that there are
three life-styles: of pleasure, of politics, and of contemplation. Of pleasure Aristotle
asserts that this life seems to be best insofar as the rich and powerful are also seen to live
lavishly however, Aristotle also says that this life is "suitable to beasts" at (1095b 20)
when he compares this life to Sardanapallus -an Assyrian king who had sex with men and
women and who imolated himself with his riches rather than fight the approaching
Persian army. At (1095b 25) Aristotle concludes that the life of politics -which is
concerned with honor as its chief good -is too superficial to be the best good since honor
is given for something else and as a recognition of the honorable which thereby seems to
be better than honor itself. So then perhaps the life of honorable acts -of virtue -is the best
but then again, Aristotle says, though one were virtuous he could live in great misery
-sickness, poverty, etc. But no one would call this the best life unless -and here Aristotle
shows his immense practicality -"he were maintaining a thesis at all costs" (1096a ).

Additionally the life of wealth and money-making is not the greatest good for money
is hard to accrue and it is essentially a use-value not a good-in-itself.

At (1096a 10) Aristotle begins his demolition of the Platonic theory of the good
-namely that the highest good is the "Form of the Good" a subsisting "divine"/or "quasi-
divine" thing. Firstly, he observes, contra the argument that platonic forms must exist
because all things are comparable and so just as the measured has a measure so too the
comparable has a single thing to which it is compared (which in this case would be what
the Platonists called their suprabeing, the Form, and more specifically here, the form of
"The Good"), for the same reason Aristotle concludes that there is no "Form of the
Good"; for the many meanings of the word good means that there cannot be one meaning
for all of them or to which they could be strictly commensurable. Secondly just as there is
one "Form" of good so too there must be one knowledge of good derivable from it. But
there are many such knowledges -for instance medicine is of the bodily good, military
science is of victory in warfare, etc. Nor would this "Form" of the good be any more
good for being a suprabeing or eternal; for the quality of moral perfection is not increased
by eternity. But at (1096b 10) Aristotle answers the objection: "that only things good-in-
themselves (like health, knowledge and the healthful/simple pleasures) are identified with
the "Form of the Good"." At (1096b 15) Aristotle then critiques this objection by asking
what things are good-in-themselves? For if we answer that those things desirable only for
their own sake are good truly, would they not still be good if they were to be desirable for
something else, as well as being desirable for themselves? And if the only truly good
thing was the "Form of the Good" then this moral theory is a purely empty tautology that
denies the first premise of ethical science; that it is possible for you to act so as to be
good. Lastly, if things were truly good, and all in the same sense of the phrase, then these
would also be one in definition with the primary good -the "Form of the Good". However
there are many goods, like courage, honor, etc. which are not by definition the same.

But starting at (1096b 30) Aristotle, says that even if it were true that there was a
supragood like "The Form of the Good" it would be useless to know it, since man should
attain what is good for his nature and not that good which is objectively highest in the
universe. And yet, Aristotle asks, "Perhaps, however, someone might think it worthwhile
to recognize this with regard to the goods that are, attainable and achievable ; for having
this as a sort of pattern, we shall better know the goods which are good for us, and if we
know them shall attain them (1096b 35)." But Aristotle rejects this, and concludes that
such an aid is unnecessary to the Ethicist, for one does not need to learn the theoretical
superfluity of health to become a doctor but to be acquainted with actual health as it
exists concretely, so too in this case.

At (1097b) Aristotle, says that since the good is the final end, and there are multiple
types of end, some being instrumental, others being for themselves, and others still being
both desired for themselves and for other things, then the most final of these and most
desirable only for itself, must be the chief good. But happiness is evidently this good -and
though Arisotle doesn't explicitly say this, I think I am not going too far out of bounds to
give another explanation to Aristotle's words, namely, that happiness is desriable for itself
because it cannot be explained by some higher final cause/purpose -for what other
purpose would one be happy except to be happy? Therefore happiness is the chief good.

But happiness is to be an activity since it cannot be a product nor production, for

production is loved only for the external product -as Aristotle said before. So then what is
the activity of happiness? At (1098a) comes some of Aristotle's most important words; for
here he details both his theory on the activity of happiness and his psychology insofar as
it bears upon ethics. For he says, that human happiness cannot be nutrition since this
seems particular to plants, nor of sensation since this is particular to animals. So then
perhaps the rational life is one psychological good peculiar to man and his happiness. But
here Aristotle crucially divides the rational element into two parts that which obeys and
that which possesses reason. Therefore, the life in accord with reason is the good life.

At (1098b 10) Aristotle distinguishes three goods: those of the body, of the soul, and
external goods. The goods of the body are classed, as I presume Aristotle would say,
though he doesn't establish it here, as "relating to the soul" on account of the body's being
a tool or extension of the soul, according to classical thinkers, and the soul being divided
into two or more parts some of which relate to the body. He then says that since this view
of the good coheres with other thinker's view and with popular views or at least doesn't
oppose it, then his is likely correct. Likewise, since the good is deemed to be either of
external, bodily or rational good, then too his views seem true since they overlap with all
of these accounts.

Beginning at (1098b 30) and ending at (1099a 30), Aristotle says that also, those who
identify happiness with virtue, are also somewhat correct providing that it makes, "no
small difference whether we place the chief good in possession or in use, in state of mind
or in activity. For the state of mind may exist without producing any good result, as in a
man who is asleep..." For such a person may have the habit of virtue without the
excercise of it. Here several things bear repeating: that for Aristotle habits will wither
without actions and that productive actions are less valued than active states. However,
sleep is not an active state so Aristotle does not mean to compare production versus
action in this paragraph, but habit to habit-in-action. But at (1098b 15) Aristotle did
describe happiness as an activity of the soul and not an external activity, yet here he is
naming virtuous acts as happiness too? It must be then that for Aristotle, virtuous acts are
not external or productive acts.

And the acts of virtuous people are pleasant because the man who is virtuous is
pleased by his virtue and since virtue is good in itself, it follows that the pleasure he feels
is also good for itself.

And at (1099b ) Aristotle concludes that we need external goods -like health, beauty,
and wealth to be happy too since these can be instruments for virtue.

At (1100a 10) Aristotle asks the question, "must no one be called happy while he
lives?" For fortune is changeable and so then too must be external goods and so then
must happiness. But Aristotle points out several sides of the problem: If only the dead are
to be happy then how can happiness be an activity? But if the dead are happy, nonetheless
their happiness will be affected by the lives and fortunes of their descendants. This latter
observation seems foreign to us -for how can a dead man become either happier or less
happy from those things which happen to the living? But the answer I think, -though
again, Aristotle did not pose nor answer the question -is that the dead are affected by the
living in a way similar to how a castaway is affected by news of his family or memories
of his past life. And we may assume that since Aristotle did believe in an afterlife-of-sorts
and though the communication between the living and dead is not actual, still it has the
potential to be -for we may assume that Aristotle believed that the living would die and
meet their ancestors -in this way their happiness could be in theory and in the abstract be
changed.

By (1100a 20) Aristotle has concluded that the life of virtue is one where happiness is
stable even if external events are not. But the happiness which springs from virtuous acts
when undertaken in the miseries of life, is different from full and complete happiness,
about which he will describe later.

At (1102a 5) Aristotle focuses more intensly on the study of virtue itself and what is its
nature. This subject, according to Aristotle, will also form a part of political science, for
politics should aim at making men good, whereas ethics aims to make a particular man
good. Here again Aristotle sketches his theory of psychology insofar as it bares on the
question at hand. For Aristotle at (1102b 15) divides the soul into the rational and
irrational parts and says that the latter opposes the former according to the strength or
weakness of the former. At (1102b 30) he describes it more fully. For the irrational soul is
a part of the rational soul and is the commanding or disobeying part whereas the rational
part is the reasoning and understanding part.

BOOK II

At (1103a 15) Aristotle says that the virtues are divided into two parts just as there are
two parts to the rational power. For the reasoning part there is intellectual virtue and for
the desiring part there is moral virtue. Both virtues are formed by habit not by nature. He
proves this in two ways firstly, because what we do by nature we cannot undo yet with
morals this is possible. And secondly at (1103a 30), because in natural things acts proceed
from power, but in virtue it is the opposite -the power to be good comes from repeated
good acts.

At (1104a ) Aristotle completes his description of the moral virtues as to their

dynamics, stating that just as natural objects are destroyed by excess or defect so too is
virtue destroyed by excessive or defective acts viz-a-vis right reason, while that act is
moderate, which is in accord with reason.

At (1104b 5) Aristotle begins his discourse on pleasure and pain and on the differences
in character. He says that the pleasure and pain of an act signals one's state of
character/emotional state. For though virtue is not per se, about emotions, the practice of
virtue or vice leads to certain emotional states which are accompanied by their
corresponding virtues or vices. And for the following reasons, does the ethicist study
emotions -for according to Aristotle, the temperate man will be pleased at his temperance
and will perform acts of temperance without pain while those who are chagrined are
either merely continent or incontinent and those who are very pained at such acts are self-
indulgent and intemperate.

At (1104b 35) Aristotle concludes that there are three objects of choice which different
pains and pleasures differently dispose us to. These objects are the noble, the useful and
the pleasant. How Aristotle deduced or derived these objects we do not know, but I think
an Aristotelian answer would be that each is ascending up from those things valued for
other things -and this is the useful; those valued as good in themselves and this is the
pleasant; and those things valued for bringing happiness and these are the noble. Further
these may be derived from as the characteristic ends of the three character states -for the
heroic, as Aristotle will name him, desires the noble, the virtuous desires the (truly)
pleasant, and the self-indulgent man will desire the useful.

At (1105b 15) Aristotle then says that the virtuous man, in order to do any of his acts,
must already in a sense, be virtuous before he can do a virtuous act. Then what comes
first the act or the habit? Here Aristotle answers by saying that the premise of this
question this is not fully true. For people are not virtuous simply by performing from
some natural disposition -kindness, good humor, etc -but only if they do so by right
reason and with that purpose in mind. For it is not enough that there be an appropriate
result, as in the arts, for in the arts the result/product is most important and he who can do
the opposite is considered the most skilled. Not so in ethics for here the man who can
only be good is considered really good and his acts are only good if done in a certain way
and so the value of his acts spring from how they are done and not that they are done.

At (1105b 20) Aristotle then says that there are three things found in the soul: passions,
states of character and faculties. And these, in my opinion and explanation of Aristotle's
schema -for he seems to assume such important and controversial things, as an axiom
without further justification -are derivable from each other; for the passions are feelings,
faculities are the means of using these feelings, and states of character are the ways in
which our soul is related to these feelings. The virtues and vices then, must be either
passions or faculties or characters. But they cannot be passions since these are mere
feelings and neither blameable nor laudable without knowledge, and much less can they
be the capacities for using feelings (faculties). Then they must be characters.

But at (1107a 10) Aristotle says that some acts and feelings admit of no mean or
intermediate between excess and defect. Yet the moderate was seen to be the mark aimed
at to achieve virtue. However that is because for Aristotle, the moderate is also an
extreme -of excellence -relative to the two extremes which are vices. Then the student
should not wonder that Aristotle describes temperance as both a mean and as having no
mean.

At (1108b 25) Aristotle also says however, that the extremes are more opposed to each
other than to the mean,but he means this, as I interpret but not as he explicitly says, from
the point of view of the matter concerned -the continuum of emotions- and not regarding
the form -its virtuousness and rationality.

He also says at (1109b) that there are several rules for finding the mean though this is
hard. Here he states that one rule is to avoid pleasures or embrace pains. For we are easily
drawn to excess by what pleases us, so that if we are to avoid this we must take equally
strong action in the opposite direction. We should also be suspicious of pleasure in
general and we should consider ourselves to have gone too far by acting in a way that is
conspicuous or above/below the average in certain circumstances and situations. But in
general it is hard to find the mean.

BOOK III

At (1109b30) Aristotle says that virtue must be concerned with what is voluntary for
the involuntary can never have moral value. By (1110a) Aristotle says that the involuntary
is that wherein the moving principle proceeds from something external. He even explains
this with the example of one moved by the wind. Note then the very strict definition of
involuntary - it includes only things in which the will power has no say and which is
almost automatic.

At (1110a 5) Aristotle asks but what of actions that involve cost and benefit, that is,
actions undertaken out of fear of some cost to be avoided or desire for some benefit to be
attained? Much like, as he says at (1110a 10) the sailors who throw goods overboard on a
ship during a storm, these actions are to be considered voluntary but not absolutely since
abstractly no one would ever want to throw their goods away. For Aristotle it is only
those burdens which "overstrain human nature and which no one could bear. (1110a 25)"
which are excusable.

At (1110b 10) Aristotle makes the point that acts cannot be compulsory and so
involuntary simply by reason of there being some benefit or cost to them, since then even
the noble acts would be involuntary and plus even pleasing things would be involuntary.

Further at (1110b 20) Aristotle says that things done because of ignorance are yet still
not involuntary nor are they voluntary unless there be pain. For pain is of the involuntary
just as, for Aristotle, pleasure is of the voluntary since, for Aristotle even says that no one
chooses pain. Therefore, the man who, to take an example of St. Thomas Aquinas, kills
his enemy in an accident in hunting, is for Aristotle a non-voluntary agent/actor. For he
feels neither pain or sorrow nor does he have knowledge so that he is in between the
voluntary and the involuntary.

Continuing on at (1110b 25) Aristotle says that ignorance is not always an excuse as in
the case of those who allow themselves to be drunk and so to become ignorant of their
actions. And indeed according to Aristotle every bad man is ignorant of what he should
do and of the good, but then if ignorance alone makes something involuntary then there
would be no evil men. But it is ignorance of the varying facts and circumstances of an act
which are excusable.

So then what are the things of which a man could be ignorant? By (1111a 20) Aristotle
lists completely that of which a man could be ignorant. For in nature as in human acts we
may distinguish the actor, the thing acted upon and the ways and modes of the act and
these things are distinguishable apriori -for on inspection they are all similar and like a
function which is mirrored by its inverse. For the notion of actor is the mere reverse of
the notion of acted upon, while the notion of the mode of action is derivable either (a)
from the notion of modes of acting and modes of receiving or (b) from the notion of the
range or continuum over which the act is done, which range being itself like a substance
and so capable of having the notion of reception applied to it, appears like a thing being
modified or receiving a "mode of action". But we may also derive it from applying
Aristotle's categories like relation or habit to two substances and then applying that of
quality or affectation to the habits. Now, human acts then, can be completely and totally
understood by these notions at least as to their results in so far as they are acts. But again
Aristotle did not make this point, but it is my interpretation which I append merely to
make his work more intelligble. So Aristotle says that we may be ignorant of either the
modes of action -how and with what we act and the object acted upon -the who or what
we are acting upon; and the actor itself -we may be ignorant of ourselves. However we
cannot be ignorant of ourselves or of all of these, as Aristotle protests, without being mad,
but we may be ignorant of the first two in certain cases.

Now on to the rest of Aristotle's text. At (1111a 25) Aristotle says a curious thing,
namely that animals act voluntarily, so that it must appear to the reader that animals can
be either good or bad. But Aristotle's meaning will become clear for Aristotle will make
choice as opposed to volition one of the linchpins (along side practical wisdom) of his
ethical theory. For choice is that which makes a merely voluntary act into a human act
and though the voluntary is laudable and blameable it is not for that reason a human act
or evil or good but evil and good are only possible when something has been chosen.

At (1111b 10) Aristotle describes choice. According to Aristotle it is neither appetite,

wish, opinion or anger. For if choice were appetite, then choice would be contrary to
choice just as an appetite for sweet is against an appetite for bitter. But choice is not wish
for wish is indeterminate -it may be for anything -and it is not opinion since opinion can
be of many things and also opinion is not normative whereas choice is. It is not anger for
we are sometimes angry without choice and again the incontinent man acts with appetite
but not with choice. Choice can then only be about what is deliberated upon but what is
deliberation?

At (1112a 20) Aristotle deliberates on deliberation saying, first what it is not: that it is
not about absurd topics, or about topics either unchangeable or mediate in themselves
-such as geometric or meterological topics, nor are they about topics which are
unchangeable to us for instance, the best government for a foreign country.

At (1112b 15) Aristotle continues his discourse on deliberation by ennuciating that

deliberation is about means since the end is already assumed before hand and further,
only possible means are included, that is, those which are affected by our efforts.

At (1113a 15) Aristotle makes an aside about wish showing that though all wishes are
for what is good, it is only the apparent good which is wished for by the bad man while
the truly good is that which is wished by the good man. At (1113b 5) Aristotle says that
since virtue is concerned with means then choices can be virtuous and too since virtue is
in our power of choice, so is vice.

At (1114b ) Aristotle responds to an objection, which says that since each man has a
different type of character for whatever reason -some being more sexual others less, and
some being more violent others more for instance -then these people are not responsible
for their choosing the evil since they choose what is good insofar as they are guided
thereto by their emotional dispositions. But Aristotle replies that though this be true,
people are responsible for putting themselves in a disposition -as the drunk is
respsonsible by taking the first drink. Either that or no one is good except people who are
born that way and by way of heredity. But then at (1114b 15) Aristotle says this is
ridiculous for then virtue and vice will be equally involuntary.

At (1115a 5) Aristotle proceeds to his definition of courage and says that it is a mean
between fearfulness and daring and that it is of a fear of some evil (that is of some
dishonor, disgrace, vice, or hurt, pain etc.). But at (1115b 10) Aristotle says that not every
fear is cowardly since disgraceful and shameful action should be feared. At (1115b 10)
Aristotle says something very unique: that the courageous man is still fearful in the face
of danger but fights on for honor and this is what is true courage.

Beginning at (1116a 17) and ending at (1117a 25) Aristotle dissects the parts of courage
and shows that passions like anger make a person less courageous since it takes away
volition. While also, experience and ignorance of danger also takes away courage since
both remove the fear factor. Likewise to be forced to be courageous as a drafted soldier
dilutes the courage while a confident personality also makes courage less possible since,
courage requires fear and the confident are sure of victory. At (1117a 30) Aristotle sums
up this position by saying, "Though courage is concerned with feelings of confidence and
fear, it is not concerned with both alike, but more with the things which inspire fear; for
he who is undisturbed in the face of these and bears himself as he should towards these is
more truly brave than the man who does so towards the things which inspire confidence."

The rest of this book I leave to the reader since Aristotle's meaning is obvious.

BOOK IV

Much of book four is simple enough that I pass over it without interpretation and
commentary. However, I would like to note that for Aristotle, a virtue requires external,
material objects to be a virtue: for to be liberal requires some wealth, and for
magnificence, one requires great wealth. Therefore those without the external object will
lack the virtue. However the virtues are still possible for such men but not all of the
virtues and not by any path: the courageous man is temperate -insofar as he does what a
courageous man does and the liberal and magnificent man benefits the public and the
private and so acquires honor and practices pride -Aristotle's term for justified self-
respect -and so also practices justice in their dealings to maintain that honor just as the
courageous man practices justice by being made the arm of the defense of the state.

Yet it is my opinion that Aristotle would not disagree that, there is a possiblity for all
the virtues to be connected together in that the courageous man is liberal by sacrificing
his life and the magnificent man is courageous by using his personal fortune to save the
state from bankruptcy.

BOOK V

At (1129a) Aristotle next concerns himself with justice. By (1130b 5) Aristotle is

finished with the preliminary analysis, concluding that there is a general justice whereby
a man who is good, is therefore good to others, just as the sun is healthy since it gives
light. However there is a particular justice and this is the proper sense, and it is the sense
in which a man is good in his obligations to others. This sense may be compared by
metaphor as how something is healthy because it is a wholesome cure not in as much as it
is sunlight. At (1130b 30) Aristotle divides justice into two parts, one which deals with the
proportional equality between man and the other which deals with the arithmetical/strict
equality between man -for the first is about what and how much is distributed to different
classes and parts of the state and the other is based on what is to be exchanged between
citizens of one class. At (1132a ) Aristotle describes this second justice in greater detail by
writing that though a man is rich or powerful the law does not take that into account
when he is found to have committed adultery.

At (1133a 5) Aristotle begins discussing that motive -reciprocity -that forms states. And
in doing so he outlines a very rudimentary form of economics which shows that exchange
is proportional and need not be of equals. Such a discovery seems to be one step removed
from Ricardo's law of comparative advantage and is again an instance of Aristotle's
intellectual fecundity.

At (1134b 10) Aristotle distinguishes between the justice of a master and that of a
father. For, there can be no strict injustice between a man and his chattel nor to children
since for Aristotle, children are sort of parts of the parents. Now to Aristotle, since the
wife and husband are more like equals, it follows that justice is somewhat more possible.

At (1136a 15) Aristotle asks if it is possible to treat yourself unjustly. Aristotle

essentially answers by saying that, by definition, since a man always desires what is good
for himself, he cannot treat himself unjustly. Further at (1136b 25) Aristotle makes clear
that though a man distribute goods unjustly the man who accepts this distribution does
not necessarily act unjustly though he is part of an unjust exchange.

Next at (1137a 30) Aristotle treats of the equitable. For the equitable according to
Aristotle, is a higher type of justice -a judgment which fixes the failings of law and of
accidental injustice.

At (1138a 15) Aristotle says again, that a man cannot do injustice to himself since this
would require that the same man subtract and add to his fair share of things. Thus ends
Book V.

BOOK VI

So at (1138b 20) Aristotle discusses the nature of what he calls "the right rule" which is
the reasonableness or mode of rationality which determines the mean. Here Aristotle
states that "In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there
is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks,and heightens or relaxes his activity
accordingly..." As such, Aristotle is saying that what seems to be moderate to any person
depends on what character-state that person is in. For if he was merely speaking of the
right rule for the good man, then he would hot have said "In all". But it should be no
surprise to either reader or student that Aristotle explains the right rule with so broad a
description because he often times uses metaphor and analogy where a more precise
method is impossible, as he himself even admits in this work.
 At (1138b 35) Aristotle begins his exposition per se, with a division of the virtues
between the moral and the intellectual. Continuing on at (1139a 5) Aristotle says that just
as there is a rational and an irrational element and about which latter the moral virtues
deal, so too in the intellectual virtues there are two objects: (1) that part of the rational
element dealing with science and pure knowledge and (2) that part of the rational element
which is calculative/deliberative. Let us see where in which rational part Aristotle means
to locate this virtue of "the right rule".

At (1139a 25) Aristotle makes clearer what he means by comparing the acts of the
irrational and the rational, for whereas the former is concerned with desire the latter is
with truth and as the one is of the good the other is of the true. And since choice is,
according to Aristotle deliberate desire, then the choice must be both true and good. But
accordingly, the intellectual part which deals with choice must be the deliberative and not
the theoretical for the latter is speculative and abstract -"contemplative" is Aristotle's
term. Concluding he says at (1139b 10) that, "The work of both the intellectual parts, then,
is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these
parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts."

At (1139b 35) Aristotle finishes his account of scientific knowledge, namely that it is
not the same as practical wisdom/knowledge of the right rule, because it is about
unchanging things. And at (1140b ) Aristotle extends his point, by saying that neither can
it be art since art is about making and production but not about action which is an end in
itself, that is, activity or operation. After at (1140b 10) Aristotle, then says that those who
are generally credited with practical wisdom are those who seem to know what is good
for themselves and for all others. It follows then that a man who has not practical wisdom
is not good at all -which is what Aristotle seems to imply at (1140b 15). Having
established the essence of practical wisdom, Aristotle at (1140b 25), now must decide
what type of rational element it belongs to.

So to help us understand Aristotle's argument better we should return to the list of

powers, faculties and habits which occurs at (1139b 15): practical wisdom, art,
philosophic wisdom, scientific knowledge, intuitive reason, and the broader faculties of
opinion and judgment. Keeping these in mind, at (1140b 30) Aristotle begins to -as far as
I can tell -scientifically categorize and divide these different qualities and describes
science as that which demonstrates whereas at (1141a 5) he separates this from intuitive
reason since the latter rather intuits or understands the first principles and therefore
operates without demonstration.

At (1141a 25) Aristotle makes two important points which separates wisdom from
practical wisdom: (1) that a wise man knows the highest objects and (2) that the
practically wise man knows himself. For paraphrasing Aristotle, if what is good for fishes
and for humans is different but what is wisdom is nonetheless the same -because the same
subject matter is for both the objectively highest -then the practically wise will be
different from the simply wise. Accordingly at (1141b 10) Aristotle describes practical
wisdom, stating that it is about what is good for man and that it requires not just abstract
knowledge of the good but also particular knowledge of what is good or this-thing-is-
good. As such the student and reader should draw the conclusion here implied by
Aristotle, that intuitive reason is not practical wisdom nor then could practical wisdom be
lodged in the rational element which is scientific.

Continuing on to (1141b 20) and (1141b 25) Aristotle clarifies the differences between
practical wisdom and politics by saying that the latter is of what is good for the group and
the former what concerns the individual and his household.

Aristotle then poses the question of what is excellence in deliberation which he begins
to answer at (1142b). He finishes answering at (1142b 30) that deliberative excellence is
merely a synonym for that true calculation which is guided by practical wisdom and
which occurs quickly. For it happens quickly by habit, and is a true apprehension of the
means which is necessary to the true and good end.

At (1143b 20) Aristotle brings up a very large difficulty: for what reason would the
good man need practical wisdom as a virtue of a part of the rational element since,
practical wisdom, being intellectual, can never be a virtue any more than knowing how to
lose weight or of how to eat healthy, is the same as acting to lose weight or acting to eat
healthy.

So at (1144a) Aristotle answers the objections by stating that moral virtue cannot exist
without the rational element of practical wisdom any more than a man is a doctor because
he does the things which a doctor does, say even cures people, yet without the inner
knowledge needed to produce health. Plus practical wisdom produces morality as health
produces health instead of how an external cure produces it, for it is a part of and also all
of, virtue entire. In anycase, the intellectual virtue considered by Aristotle here, is
according to him, a virtue, and so a good, and so in itself desirable, even if it has no part
in making moral virtue.

BOOK VII

At (1145a 15) Aristotle begins a more indepth study of character states saying that there
are three: heroism, virtue, and continence. The opposites of these are brutishness, vice,
and incontinence. Now what Aristotle further says bears some analyzing for how can
Aristotle claim that heroism and its opposite -the brutish -are beyond vice and virtue due
to one is so much above virtue and the other so much below it (1145a 25)? First, because
of these differences between the moral and the character state, I believe when Aristotles
speaks of character states, he is speaking of emotional states, some of which go along
with virtue, but in anycase are per se emotional. And for him then, one type of emotional
state must be much more valuable and desirable even than virtue and the other degraded
in value far below even vice -but how? For even if these states are voluntary they may
not be chosen. Whether the presense of such character traits is imputable to the actions of
a man would, I think for Aristotle, seem besides the point, for the brute is terrible and
must be extirpated regardless of whether he terrible by actions or by nature and the
"divine" as Aristotle terms it, must be lovable regardless of whether he is so by birth or
by choice. Such is I believe, how Aristotle would want us to understand the relation
between the good and the heroic and the vicious and the brutish -for the philosopher did
not explicitly tackle this question though it seems one of the most important.

At (1147b 15) Aristotle then finishes a rather lengthy discussion on incontinence and its
causes. Suffice to say, for Aristotle, incontinence, is an emotional state -since its first
genus appears to be those things which are praised and blamed (1145b 10), and these latter
being acts of emotion so too then are their objects. Now because incontinence is an
emotion it is not a vice, but it may be compared to a drunken state -which for Aristotle
can be sometimes and for concrete reasons vicious. And it is a drunken state wherein a
man may not abide by his practical wisdom due to a lack of sense or a powerful sensation
and both in anycase can obscure the minor premise in moral reasoning -namely that "this
thing here is bad and should be avoided" (1147a 20).

At (1147b 20) Aristotle discusses more about incontinence and self-indulgence. For the
self-indulgent are different from the incontinent because they actively enjoy and seek out
pleasures. To state Aristotle's conclusion in metaphor, whereas the incontinent are
mastered by pleasures and pains the self-indulgent surrenders himself and enslaves
himself to pleasures. And this marks their prime difference. Therefore, Aristotle says that
because the self-indulgent are more pleased by what they do, they must then be in a
worse condition since they will not easily budge from what they want (1150b 30).

At (1152b ) Aristotle takes a detour onto a question on pleasure. But the things he
writes here are significant nonetheless. And at (1152b 10) Aristotle lays down the reason
why pleasure is not considered good -though he disagrees with this thesis. For either (1)
pleasure is seen as ignoble or dirty, (2) pleasure is seen as unhealthy, or (3) pleasure is
viewed as a process of production. Now Aristotle agrees that those pleasures which are
dirty or unhealthy are bad, and in someway not really pleasure, in the sameway that a bad
movie is not really entertaining though some might enjoy it (1152b 30). For Aristotle the
virtuous man is a true connoisseur of pleasure and vice versa; for the highest pleasure lies
in virtue for there is nothing more pleasant than to be good and good without any bodily
needs. Further, pleasures are not a process of production, they are an activity (1153a 10)
and therefore there are no arts of pleasure just as there are no arts of any other activity
-like there is no art to breathing. For Aristotle pleasure is both its own reason and its own
explanation.

At (1154a 10) Aristotle concludes this book by asking why necessary pleasures are said
to be more desirable than luxurious pleasure, and also, why then does it seem the latter
are mostly chosen? Basically Aristotle says that the necessary are more desirable because
they are necessary however the luxurious are more chosen because they expel pain and
they are more tangible/sensible and so they are better known and remembered to people.

BOOK VIII

In this book Aristotle discusses friendship. Now friendship doesn't seem to be a virtue
however, it is seemingly connected with the character states that we encountered in Book
VII. I infer this from the fact that although Aristotle divides friendship into three
essentially different parts -that of useful, pleasant, and virtuous friendship, only one of
these has to do with virtue. And yet all of these involve a relation motivated by some
character state/emotional state. Therefore these seem to overlap in some way. However,
would Aristotle say that this makes friendship into a expression of the worst as well as the
best in man, according as a vulgar man has vulgar friendships but a good man has noble
ones? Aristotle never discusses this point and it is a question which I leave open to the
reader.

What is clear is that at (1159a 15) Aristotle solves a problem about his account of
friendship. For though friendship occurs only between those who render equal utility,
pleasantness, or goodness to each other, it happens that friendship can exist between
unequals too. How then is this possible? Only if as in the case of the mother who loves
her children though they abhor her, it is possible for both parties to do their utmost to
have affection for each other to the best of their abilities -for Aristotle claims that one
party must fall short.

BOOK IX

Book IX is a continuation of Aristotle's discussion of friendship however it is farily

accessible and I don't think requires much commentary. Briefly summarized, it is about
certain applications of the general knowledge of friendship gained in the previous book
and applied to political arrangements and to economics. Aristotle also mentions how the
friendship between unequals is always open to fraying because they both want opposite
and unequal things from the relationship and they both feel opposite and reciprocal things
towards each other so that there is always somewhat of a misunderestimating of each
other's motives.

BOOK X

Aristotle concludes his Ethics with a final discourse on pleasure. Here at (1172b 10)
Aristotle discusses the objections past thinkers had to judging pleasure as a good. First
they were convinced that pleasure was not good since it could be made better by the
addition of some other good. But Aristotle says, what good exists that could not be better
with something else? Secondly they claimed that pleasure was evil due to it being
contrary to neutrality which is good and a moderate point between pleasure and pain. But
Aristotle says, if pleasure is bad then why would not people flee from it as much as from
pain, and if neutral then why would anyone choose it? Third they claimed that pleasure
was merely a healing or correction and so was not a good but a reparation of evil. Here
however, Aristotle says that this only applies to curative pleasure and all those things
which are shamefully pleasant -since they exist soley to quench a desire/exist only as a
use-value. Fourth they said that pleasure was not good since it was either a movement of
becoming or it was incomplete in another way, as having degrees. But Aristotle says that
even virtue has degrees and pleasure is not a motion or becoming but rather an activity
and so has no start or ending point and is complete as far as it goes. All these objections
and their answers are made by (1174a 15) at which point, Aristotle begins a new topic.

Here Aristotle asks, what is the nature of pleasure and he also establishes the meaning
of happiness in concrete detail. Now of pleasure he concludes that it must be the highest
type of act of the highest type of power in man. And just as all things are pleased by their
life, so too man is pleased by his particular type of life which is that of reason. So
pleasure stems it appears, from the strength of rationality in a man. And Aristotle makes it
clear that this is what happiness is at (1177a 15) when he calls happiness "contemplative".

But surprisingly, he says that the contemplative life is too grand an aim for most men,
if any at all, and at (1178a 10) he states that the life of virtue according to reason is more
attainable but also happy, since the just and brave and etc. are acting according to reason
though they are not contemplative.

Such is the finale to Aristotle's Ethics.

Take-Away Quote: "...possession of virtue seems actually compatible with being asleep,
or with lifelong inactivity, and, further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes; but a
man who was living so no one would call happy, unless he were maintaining a thesis at
all costs."
Study Questions:
(1) Does Aristotle mean to define happiness with pleasure and with contemplation? Or
are they somehow overlapping but nonetheless seperate in definition?
(2) In light of the common experience that pleasure in general is temporary -as are many
sense experiences -do you think Aristotle's exhalted view of pleasure is defensible?
(3) Is it possible to argue from Aristotelian premises, that friendship between the
"bruitsh" is the same as or is just as undesirable as, having an enemy?