1.

PEOPLE vs CITY COURT OF MANILA 154 SCRA 175 (1987)

FACTS:
Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan was accused of violating Section 7 of RA 3060(An Act
Creating the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures) in relation to Article 201(Immoral doctrines , obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent shows) of the RPC.

On April 07, 1972, two information were filed against the accused. The first one, filed for
violation of RA 3060, alleged that the accused, without having previously submitted to the Board of
censors for Motion Pictures for preview and examination, exhibited a motion film in a public place.

The second one, filed for violation of Article 201, alleged that the accused exhibited motion
pictures “depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private
parts doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene
and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building,
Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue.”

Accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in the criminal case for ground
of double jeopardy as the case pending against him for violation of RA 3060, allegedly contains the same
allegations in the criminal case.

Respondent City Court (City Court of Manila, Branch 6) dismissed the criminal case on the basis
that the allegations in the two information are identical and the plea entered in one case by the accused
herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case.

Petitioner contends that the accused could not invoke the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings
in another case for the same offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was double jeopardy in the case at hand.

HELD:

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1)
a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or
a frustration thereof.

All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was
charged, do not make out only one offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words,
the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly
passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense
defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral
motion pictures.
 The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two(2) laws
involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other.

It is evident that the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The gravamen of the offense defined
in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture which has not been previously
passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or
immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public showing constitutes a
criminal offense.

2. PEOPLE vs RELOVA GR No. L-45129

FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of
Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the
ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975,
Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with
a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been
installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the
building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric
current consumption in the plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription
for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery
that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case
was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas
Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of
Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first
offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the
approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance,
where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint
against Mr.Opulencia.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second
offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity
punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

HELD:
Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as
tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double
jeopardy. The first would be that “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense and the second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act”. In the case at bar, it was very
evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double
jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two
charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance
shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that
Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from
the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia

3. PEOPLE vs HOLGADO GR No. L-2809

FACTS:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight
illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and
without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for
about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. Upon arraignmet, he
pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no
evidence was presented to indict the latter. The court did not inform the accused to have an attorney
nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of one.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

HELD:
Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : “If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by
the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of
attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney.” This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record
does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to
the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea of guilty. No investigation was opened by the
court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the
supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the
court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that
the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that
a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above
all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court.

4. TATAD vs SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. L-72335

FACTS:
The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal
Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges
of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S.
 Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became
widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of
a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1,
1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos
by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.
On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By
October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by
the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as
consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services
rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three
(3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for thecalendar years 1973,
1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived
accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It
was denied hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

HELD:
YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which
require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and
their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a
case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent
court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded
or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed
reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

5. ALONTE vs SAVELLANO JR. 287 SCRA 245

FACTS:
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s house
who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the
prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was
pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the
change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila
RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her
desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere.
Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua.
Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie
when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her
desistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD:
The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to
animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of
waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous
petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.

6. PEOPLE vs MINGOA GR No. L-5371

FACTS:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of
Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the
provincial auditor, the defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public
funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and sentenced
to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case here on
the ground that it involved a constitutional question.

The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon examination of his books and accounts on
September 1, 1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found short in the sum above-named and that,
required to produce the missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to the examining officer that
some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to show
and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in
court and presented no evidence in his favor.

We agree with the trial judge that defendant's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot
overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found
missing. As His Honor observes, if the money was really lost without defendant's fault, the most natural
thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did
not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do
his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further as the prosecution
points out in its brief, that defendant had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine
his accounts, and that for some time before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the
town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant had really malversed
the fund in question and that this story about its loss was pure invention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent

HELD:
NO. The fact is that the trial court did not believe defendant’s explanation that the money was
lost, considering it mere cloak to cover actual misappropriation. That is why the court said that “whether
or not the defendant is guilty of malversation for negligence is of no moment…” the presumption of
misappropriation is found on Art. 217 of the RPC which provides that failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by and duly
authorized officer, shall prima facie evidence that he has put the missing funds or property to personal
use. The legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proven they shall be prima facie
evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be
rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the interference of
the one from the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two
in common experience.

7. PEOPLE vs NOQUE GR No. 175319

FACTS:
Accused Joselito Noque was caught in a buy-bust operation conducted by SPO4 Norberto
Murillo on January 30, 2001. Two Informations were filed before the RTC of Manila docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 01-189458 and 01-189459 charging of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of a regulated drug. The trial court convicted the accused on both charges. The trial court held that while
the Informations alleged methamphetamine hydrochloride as the drug seized from the appellant, the drug
actually confiscated which was ephedrine, which by means of chemical reaction could change into
methamphetamine. Thus, the trial court ruled that the appellant can be convicted of the offenses charged,
which are included in the crimes proved. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA held that the
designations and allegations in the informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
regulated drugs. Hence, the accused appealed the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not
violated.

HELD:
The appeal is bereft of merit. As correctly observed by CA, the offenses designated in the
Informations are for violations of Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, which define and penalize the crimes of
illegal sale and possession of regulated drugs. The allegations in the Informations for the unauthorized
sale and possession of “shabu” or methamphetamine hydrochloride are immediately followed by the
qualifying phrase “which is a regulated drug”. Thus, it is clear that the designations and allegations in the
Informations are for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of regulated drugs. Ephedrine has
been classified as a regulated drug by the Dangerous Drugs Board in Board Resolution No. 2, Series of
1988.
 The CA correctly ruled that Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, can be applied by
analogy in convicting the appellant of the offenses charged, which are included in the crimes proved.
Under these provisions, an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. At any rate, a
minor variance between the information and the evidence does not alter the nature of the offense, nor does
it determine or qualify the crime or penalty, so that even if a discrepancy exists, this cannot be pleaded as
a ground for acquittal. In other words, his right to be informed of the charges against him has not been
violated because where an accused is charged with a specific crime, he is duly informed not only of such
specific crime but also of lesser crimes or offenses included therein.

1688
Prepared by: Katrina S. Diploma 1

8. BELTRAN vs SAMSON G.R. No. 32025 September 23, 1929

FACTS:
The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to
take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for
the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified. The respondent contend that the petitioner is not entitled to
the remedy applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge,
upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses
to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without
prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.

The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional
provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 which reads: "Nor shall
he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As to its scope, this privilege is not
limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
compelled to write for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether he
wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified

HELD:
Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that ascertain
writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-examination, write in open court in
order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. Here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a
specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the
circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to
obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or
specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is not reason for trampling upon
a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of in
nocent persons.
 9. GANDICELA vs LUTERO GR No. L-4069

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the petitioner against the respondent judge
of the Municipal Court of the City of Iloilo.
The petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in an information filed by
the City Fiscal of Iloilo on May 12, 1950. When the trial of the case was finally set on July 17, 1950, "the
City Fiscal appeared for the prosecution and informed the court that there was a private prosecutor
authorized to present the case in court, and that he is not ready to enter into trial for Fiscal Daguay is the
one handing this case, who is at present appearing in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo." The court,
"taking into consideration that Attorney Mapa has not entered had appearance in this case and that this
case has been dragging along for so many weeks, today being the last day set for trial, hereby orders that
this case be dismissed without prejudice on the part of the City Fiscal, City of Iloilo, to file another
information, with costs de oficio."

The petitioner contends that "The dismissal of the case without prejudice by the respondent judge
upon the failure of the prosecution to enter into trial violates the constitutional right of your petitioner to a
speedy trial; the respondent judge ought to have dismissed the case definitely;" and alleges "That there is
no appeal nor any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law from the
aforementioned order of the respondent judge, except the petition for certiorari and mandamus."

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the right to speedy trial against respondent Lutero

HELD:

According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon the merits
at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after defendant has pleaded to the charge, the
dismissal of the case shall be definite a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is
dismissed upon the petition or with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without
prejudice or not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the
defendant's action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not be
prosecuted again for the same offense.

If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to speedy trial, he should ask, not for the
dismissal but for the trial of the case. If the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and the
court believes that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of the accused to
a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and proceed with the trial and require the fiscal to
present the witnesses for the prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his evidence and
consequently fails to proved the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court, upon the motion of
the defendant, shall dismiss the case.

Besides, the respondent judge, in dismissing the case without prejudice on the part of the fiscal to
the file another information, has acted, not only within the court's jurisdiction, but correctly, because the
case was dismissed with the express consent of the accused or petitioner, who move for the case. If the
defendant or petitioner did not move for the dismissal and the respondent dismissed the case, the
dismissal would be definite or a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, even if the court or judge
erroneously states in the order of dismissal that it be without prejudice on the part of the city fiscal; to file
another information, because the court can not change the nature and legal effects of such dismissal, and
the petitioner can not be prosecuted again for the same offense. But where a defendant expressly consents
to, by moving for, the dismissal of the case against him, as in the present case, even if the court or judge
states in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice on
the part of the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.

10. PEOPLE vs MARIO SERZO GR No. 118435

FACTS:

The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our Rules of
Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the accused is given
the option to be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or refuses to exercise this
option during arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for him.While the right to be represented
by counsel is absolute, the accuseds option to hire one of his own choice is limited. Such option cannot be
used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally
important rights of the state and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

Alfredo Alcantara Y Casabal never knew that death was just around the corner inevitably meeting
his way. That fateful night of August 22, 1990, Alfredo together with his wife Adelaida Alcantara were
staying inside their house comfortably watching television when at around 11:30 in the evening, Susana
Serzo, mother of the accused, and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at their doorsteps and
pleading for help to bring out her grandchildren who were being held inside their house by her son, the
accused in this case. Unhesitatingly, the couple heeded their call and went with them at their house,
located just across the private complainant’s residence. The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren
and to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just
armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed
Alfredo at his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life. However, accused was able to
overpower him thereby causing his fall in the canal where he was repeatedly stabbed by the
accused. Adelaida Alcantara shouted for help but was likewise attacked by the accused as she was only
half-meter away from her husband. However, Adelaida fortunately was able to hold the hand of the
knifewielder and persistently fought the accused. At that moment, the commotion had already caught the
attention of the residents within the vicinity who responded to help her thereby causing the accused to
flee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel

HELD:

NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of
the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics,
trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy
and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a
recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to
take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA
7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's
and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as
long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

11. PEOPLE vs MORIAL GR No. 129295

FACTS:

On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandibas were killed and robbed. As a part of the
investigation and as a result of a witness’ testimony, Edwin and Leandro Morial were asked several
questions by the policemen and were invited to the police station for continuing investigation. They were
turned over to SPO4 Andres Fernandez and later interrogated again after they woke up at past 6 in the
morning. That investigation conducted by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that he
was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements
were reduced into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have a
counsel, whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez volunteered
to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was contacted by the former
and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the morning. After Leandro agreed to answer
voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against him as evidence in court, the investigation was
conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence of the counsel. After “all the material points” were
asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if he can leave due to very important engagement. The latter
agreed to the lawyer’s request. But before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to
answer questions in his absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4
Fernandez continued with the investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which
the latter answered.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Leondro Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.
HELD

Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation;
therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-accused.
The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that Atty. Aguilar only left
after Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar
rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the “material points”, referring to the
participation of the three accused to the crime. Both are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires
that “any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted.”
Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and to
answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right to counsel
and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these rights cannot be
waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In the case at bar, no such
written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
12. PEOPLE vs REY SUNGA, et al.

FACTS:
Upon the discovery of the mutilated body of a high-school girl at a coffee plantation, an
Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for Rape with Homicide against several
suspects including Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as principals, and
Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice.
Rey Sunga et al. filed with the RTC a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of the
prosecution‘s evidence, there being no direct evidence against them. In the same proceeding, a motion
was granted to discharge Locil to become a state witness while deferring the resolution of the bail
petition.
Through the testimony of Locil, the RTC reached to a decision convicting Sunga and Lansang as
principals of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of death, and
Pascua as principal in the crime of Rape.

ISSUE:
Whether the guilt of Sunga et al. has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged

HELD:

The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or

implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral
certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be
substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances
and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest.
As an exception to the general rule on the requirement of corroboration of the testimony of an
accomplice or co-conspirator-turned state witness, her testimony may, even if uncorroborated, be
sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a
straightforward manner and full of details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of
deliberate afterthought.
The Court is not in fact prepared to accord Locil credibly as a witness. Who can trust one who, in
her early teens, gets pregnant, flees home and stays in a boarding house albeit she has no visible means
of income to pay therefor, and carries an alias name to evade being traced by her mother and aunt?
Evidence to be believed should not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.
The observations pertaining to both the weak, incomprehensible voice with which Locil gave her
testimony, the improbability with which she was precisely made by appellants to be a witness to their
crime, and the failure of her description of Pascua‘s eyes to match the latter‘s actual physical feature
cannot but engender serious doubts as to the reliability of her testimony against all appellants. The Court
thus finds her uncorroborated account to have failed the jurisprudentially established touchstone for its
credibility and sufficienacy, that of straightforwardness and deliberateness, as evidence to warrant
appellants‘ conviction.

13. PEOPLE vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO 398 SCRA 567

FACTS:

Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with “AAA”, three (3) years of age,
a minor and against her will and without her consent.
“AAA” described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her
testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape.
However, the prosecution did not offer the victim‘s certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents
in evidence.
Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic
review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa

HELD:

A person‘s appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in rape cases,
the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.
Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient
to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity
between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from
the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relative‘s
testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person‘s appearance, as object
evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following
United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved
(below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victim‘s age from
her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists.
A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old.
The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and the testimony of
the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that “AAA” was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only
the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

14. PEOPLE vs ARDEL CANUTO 528 SCRA 366 (2007)

FACTS:
The testimony of the victim that she felt nothing when the rape was committed does not negate
the commission thereof. AAA, a 15-year old girl, was allegedly raped by Ardel Canuto. Six (6) months
later, AAA related the incident to her aunt DDD who accompanied her to a hospital where she was
medically examined by a doctor. The examination showed that AAA‘s genitalia had an old
hymenal laceration. AAA then filed a case against Canuto and the Regional Trial Court convicted Canuto
of rape, sentencing him to a penalty of death. After a review of the case by the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s decision with modification consisting of an increase in the
amount of civil indemnity and moral and exemplary damages awarded to AAA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding Canuto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged

HELD:
In his Brief filed with this Court, Canuto maintains that the lower courts erred in convicting him,
the prosecution having failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court said that the
fact that AAA felt nothing while she was being raped by Canuto does not negate the commission of the
crime. A 15-year-old naive barrio lass, threatened with death or serious injury if she repulses the
sexual advances of the accused, can only cower in fear and yield into submission. As for AAA‘s delay of
almost six months in reporting the incident to the authorities, People v. Francisco, People v. Marcelo and
People v. Bayani enlighten. In these cases, this Court declared that a six- month delay in reporting the
rape to the authorities does not impair the credibility of the private complainant or indicate a fabricated
charge if satisfactorily explained. In AAA‘s case, the fear instilled in her by Canuto that he would kill her
and her kin if she reported the questioned act could explain the delay, especially given her awareness
that appellant had been previously convicted and detained for killing someone. Besides, many victims of
rape never complain or file criminal chargesagainst the rapist, they preferring to silently bear the
ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender‘s making good his
threats.

15. TEEHANKEE JR. vs. MADAYAG, ET. AL., G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992

FACTS:
On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio
Teehankee Jr. allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence, but before the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus
motion for leave of court to file the amended information. The amended information filed on October 31,
1991 charges Teehankee of murder.
The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner refused
to be arraigned on the amended information contending the lack of a preliminary investigation thereon.
The judge, then, ordered the plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to
present its evidence. The petitioner's counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the
proceedings because of the legal issue raised. So, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to
represent the petitioner.
 The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's
admittance of the amended information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the
crime charged in the amended information.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be
admitted.

HELD:
Yes. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be
placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following
have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range
of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does
not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; 13 (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely
affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of
the crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the
essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation, be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning
and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for
both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of consummated murder
likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of frustrated
murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the
amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged,
but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder.
This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent
thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

16. MENDOZA vs. BORJA GR Ono. L-45667

FACTS:
Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not arraigned.
That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and rendered a
decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to the Court o First
Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the failure to arraign him is a
violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without
requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor
General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was noarraignment.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

HELDL:
Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed as
to why he was indicted and whatpenal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is
also not just due process that requires anarraignment. It is required in the Rules that an accused, for the
first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he
is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the
crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the
state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed
him. Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being
thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on
him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view
of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is
nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November
16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is
remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due
respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

17. PEOPLE vs. RAMON QUIAOIT, JR. G.R. No. 175222 July 27, 2007
FACTS:
At around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac PNP received a report from a
confidential informant that someone was selling shabu at the Golden Miles, a videoke bar located in
Barangay San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on said information, a team was immediately organized by PNP
Provincial Director Rudy Gamido Lacadin to conduct a surveillance in order to verify the information and
perform a buy-bust operation.
Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the
movements of appellant who was with the confidential informant at that time. Later, the informant
introduced PO1Baquiran to appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu. According to PO1
Baquiran's testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
in front of The Golden Miles' comfort room which was located at the back of said establishment. In
return, he gave appellant a marked P500.00 bill. As soon as the exchange between appellant and
PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter gave his companions the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head.
PO2 Dueñas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to arrest appellant. The plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance was later marked RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas. On their way back to Camp Makabulos,
the informant allegedly told the buy-bust team, through a text message, that appellant still had in his
possession illegal drugs other than that which he had sold to PO1Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the
camp, they frisked appellant and this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which were similar
to those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran. The seized crystalline substance was subjected to test and the
result shows that it was “shabu”.The appellant contends that the arrest was illegal since he was framed up
by the police and the court should consider the arrest as a result of instigation and not entrapment contrary
to the arresting officers claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrest of the accused a result of instigation or inducement?

HELD:
No. The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is clearly drawn. In
thecase of People v. Quintana, the Court explained the distinction between the two: In instigation,
theinstigator practically induces the accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a
co-principal; in entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing
thelaw breaker in the execution of his criminal plan.Instigation and inducement must be distinguished
from entrapment. The general rule is that instigationand inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of
filing criminal charges, is to be condemned asimmoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of
means and ways for the purpose of trapping andcapturing the law breaker, is sanctioned and permissible.
And the reason is obvious. Under the firstinstance, no crime has been committed, and to induce one
to commit it makes the instigator a co-criminal.Under the last instance, the crime has already been
committed and all that is done is to entrap andcapture the law breaker. In the case at bar, the Court finds
appellant's claim of instigation to be baseless.

18. PEOPLE vs. MAHINAY 302 SCRA 455

FACTS:

Appellant Larry Mahinay worked as a houseboy with Maria Isip, one of his tasks was to take care
of Isip’s house which was under construction adjacent to the latter’s residence. The victim was a 12-year
old girl who used to frequent the residence of Isip.
On the late evening of 25 June 1995, the victim was reported missing by her mother. The
following morning, the Appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and disappeared.
The victim’s body was found, lifeless, at around 7:30 am that same day. She was found in the
septic tank wearing her blouse and no underwear. The autopsy showed that the victim was raped and was
strangled to death.
Upon re-examining the crime scene, policemen found a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown
belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by the victim’s mother to belong to her daughter. Also,
they found a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of the appellant. Also found in the yard,
three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants
and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant’s belongings.
The appellant was soon arrested and executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated
how the crime was committed. The trial ensued and the lower court convicted him of the crime of Rape
and was sentenced to death.
The case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

ISSUE:
 1. WON the appellant’s extra-judicial confession was validly taken and in accordance with his rights
under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights; and

2. WON the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution sufficient to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt

HELD:
The conviction of the appellant is affirmed.

The Court ruled that the appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken within the ambit of the law
as evinced by the records and testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his
constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights.

As to the second issue, the appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to warrant a conviction of his guilt. However, the Court ruled otherwise.

The Court recalled the Rule on Evidence and settled jurisprudence. Absence of direct proof does
not absolve the appellant because conviction may be had with the concurrence of the following requisites
as stated in the Rules of Court:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
The Court recalled the ruling in People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.
And also in People v. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 citing People v. Abitona, 240 SCRA 335, that facts and
circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight
and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
The Court agreed with the trial court’s decision in giving credence to several circumstantial
evidence, which is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
The Court also updated the Miranda rights with the developments in law that provided the rights of
suspects under custodial investigation in detail

19. ALVERO vs. DIZON GR L-342, 4 MAY 1946

FACTS:
On 12 February 1945, while the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army,
accompanied by men of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest, having been
suspected of collaboration with the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay,
Rizal. On or about 4 October 1945, Alvero was accused of treason, in criminal case 3 of the People's
Court; after which, on 1 December 1945, he filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly
seized and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the
prosecution presented certain papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said
petition was denied. At the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and
documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits. On 26 February
1946, the judges issued an order denying the petition for the return of the documents, and admitted as
competent evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. On the same date that said order was
issued, denying the petition for the return of said documents, Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said
order, which was also denied. Alvero filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alvero’s home can be used as
evidence against the latter.

HELD:
The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest Alvero, as a collaborationist
suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of military operations, is
unquestionable, under the provisions of article 4, Chapter II, Section I, of the Regulations relative to the
Laws and Customs of War on Land of the Hague Conventions of 1907, authorizing the seizure of military
papers in the possession of prisoners of war; and also under the proclamation, dated 29 December 1944,
issued by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, as Commander in Chief of the United States Army, declaring his
purpose to remove certain citizens of the Philippines, who had voluntarily given aid and comfort to the
enemy, in violation of the allegiance due the Governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of
the Philippines, when apprehended, from any position of political and economic influence in the
Philippines and to hold them in restraint for the duration of the war. The purpose of the constitutional
provisions against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and
property, and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does
not prohibit the Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or
under authority of state law. Herein, as the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain
papers and documents from the residence of Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the
Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the
possession of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the CIC of the
United States Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers and documents, as evidence for the
prosecution against Alvero, at the trial of his case for treason, before the People's Court, cannot now be
legally attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other
constitutional ground, as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in similar cases

20. PEOPLE VS. ANDRE MARTI GR 81561, 18 JANUARY 1991

FACTS:
On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of
the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying
with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes)
attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich,
Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ,
Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect the packages as Marti refused, who
assured the former that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown
corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with
masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job
Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the Narcotics Section of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages was opened, yielding dried
marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and
took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of the
said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated
address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an Information was filed against Marti for
violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal
Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the State.

HELD:
In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court
sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes
into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that
which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been
committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on
the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed
only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only
be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative
of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

21. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO GR L-19550, 19 JUNE 1967

FACTS:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren
I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal
Court of Manila), Judge Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag (Court
of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon
City) issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks,
HJohn J. Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to any
peace officer, to search the said persons and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as
"the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the Supreme Court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and
things found and seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.

ISSUE:
Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested warrants that allowed seizure of
documents, papers and other effects in the corporate offices, and other places besides their residences.

HELD:
Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and
that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and the
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied
with in the contested warrants. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the
contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched
for and seized. The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants. However, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants
in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the
corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first group,
Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock
or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

22. BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP GR 64261, 26 December 1984

FACTS:
 On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon
City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C
& D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and
"We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be
in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized. A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search warrants, and
to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al. from using the
articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v. Burgos).

ISSUE:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the
issuance of search warrants.

HELD:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for
a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. Herein, a statement in the effect that Burgos "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and
are all continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under PD
885, as amended" is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. Further, when the search warrant applied for is
directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice.

23. PEOPLE VS. MOLINA GR 133917, 19 FEBRUARY 2001

FACTS:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana
pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, Gregorio Mula y Malagura
(@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no
occasion to see him prior to 8 August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon
received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that
morning. Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3, Matina, Davao
City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team
were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and Molina passed by. At
that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded
their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where
Mula and Molina were accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point,
Mula, who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if
possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana
leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996,
the accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the
marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of
their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial
court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied. The accused
waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court
rendered the decision, finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122,
Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

ISSUE:
Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the
seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their possession.

Held:
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence
of a probable cause. Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under
Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.
Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search). The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the
search. Still, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. Herein, Mula and Molina manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, they could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit
or have committed a crime. It matters not that Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to
the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion"
of the arresting officers that Mula and Molina were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it
not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, Mula and Molina could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable
or otherwise. Further, it would appear that the names and addresses of Mula and Molina came to the
knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested, and such cannot lend a semblance of
validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of Mula and
Molina does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their
person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against them.

24. PEOPLE VS. SALANGUIT GR 133254-55, 19 APRIL 2001

FACTS:
On 26 December 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the Regional Trial Court, Branch
90, Dasmariñias, Cavite, to search the residence of Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he
was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and
Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Español. At about 10:30
p.m. of said day, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence
of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police operatives knocked on Salanguit’s door, but nobody opened
it. They heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the door
open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes
and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance,
and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having a total
weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit refused to
sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning,
Quezon City, along with the items they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the
confiscated evidence. The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those
contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425
grams and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for
violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-
64357 and Q95-64358, respectively) were filed on 28 December 1995. After hearing, the trial court
rendered its decision, convicting Salanguit in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation
of Section 16 and 8, respectively, RA 6425, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
minimum of 6 months of arresto mayor and a maximum of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional,
and reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00, respectively. Salanguit appealed; contesting his
conviction on the grounds that (1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility
in evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the
employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug
paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain view
doctrine.”

HELD:
The warrant authorized the seizure of "undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia."
Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the
search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the
seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to
which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit's residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being
founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. With respect to,
and in light of the "plain view doctrine," the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was
recovered on Salanguit's person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested
to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal
Case Q-95-64357 only.

25. PASION VDA. DE GARCIA VS. LOCSIN GR 45950, 20 JUNE 1938

FACTS:
On 10 November 1934, Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the
justice of the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the
person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia at Victoria, Tarlac, for "certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search warrant was issued
upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and
he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia keeps and conceals in her house and store at Victoria, Tarlac,
certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of
which is contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion de Garcia in
Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and,
without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution
thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents
were seized by Almeda and a receipt therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized
were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by it
to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several
occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia, through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the
return of the documents seized. On January 7, and, by motion, on 4 June 1937, the legality of the search
warrant was challenged by Pasion de Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the
documents demanded. By resolution of 5 October 1937, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de
garcia's motion of June 4 for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on
the latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order of 3 January 1938.
Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.

ISSUE:
Whether the lack of personal examination of witnesses renders the warrant void.

HELD:
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined
by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable
cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized. These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure,
particularly with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of the
officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court. Herein, the existence of
probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to
accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that
he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to be
seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the
meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as
required by law. Instead, they were turned over to the provincial fiscal and used by him in building up
cases against Pasion de Garcia. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case
pending against Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration
purposes is not without basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of the peace of Tarlac,
Tarlac. In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or object to
the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of constitutional right. It is, as Judge
Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not
dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of
either contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

26. MATA VS. BAYONA GR 50720, 26 MARCH 1984

FACTS:
Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game
by "selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets' without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned." Mata claimed that during the
hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Jufe of
the City Court of Ormoc replied, "it is with the court". The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal
who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has
made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T.
Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court
made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not
attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does
not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata's motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari,
praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to
comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated
under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
HELD:
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined
by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must before issuing
the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce
and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented
to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them
to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving
it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.

27. YOUSEF AL-GHOUL VS. COURT OF APPEALS GR 126859,

FACTS:
On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95 and 55-95 for
the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Kalookan City. On 1 April 1995, the police searched Apartment 8, in the same compound and found one
(1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines and 20 live M-16
ammunitions, 1 Bar of demolition charge, 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634 and other nos. were placed with
magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliber handgun with 5 live ammunitions in its
cylinder, 1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliber ammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade, 1 roll
of detonating cord color yellow, 2 big bags of ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance, 22
detonating cords with blasting caps, ½ and ¼ pound of high explosives TNT, 1 timer alarm clock, 2 bags
of suspected gun powder, 2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance, 1 small box of plastic bag
of suspected dynamites, One weighing scale, and 2 batteries 9 volts with blasting caps and detonating
cord. The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at the apartments were
acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz. Yousef Al Ghoul, Isam Mohammad
Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-Riyami, Ashraf Hassam Al-Yazori, and Mohammad
Abushendi were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 123, in informations
(Criminal Cases C-48666-67) accusing them with illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1866. Thereafter, they were arrested and detained. They filed
a motion for bail on 24 May 1995, the resolution of which was held in abeyance by the RTC pending the
presentation of evidence from the prosecution to determine whether or not the evidence presented is
strong. On 7 February 1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being offered for
whatever purpose that they maybe worth" after the prosecution had finished adducing its evidence despite
the objection by the petitioners on the admissibility of said evidence. On 19 February 1996, the RTC
denied their motion for bail earlier filed. As their action before appellate court also proved futile, with the
appellate court dismissing their special civil action for certiorari, they filed the petition for review before
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the search and seizure orders are valid, and the objects seized admissible in evidence.
HELD:
As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing
so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded. Exclusion of
unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45
caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against Al-Ghoul, et. al. In contrast, the search
conducted at Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The search warrants specifically mentioned
Apartment 2. The search was done in the presence of its occupants, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule
126, Revised Rules of Court. The articles seized during the search of Apartment 2 are of the same kind
and nature as those items enumerated in the search warrant. The items seized from Apartment 2 were
described with specificity in the warrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not
require a technical description. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be
described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as
they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, however, the
articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance
between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described
as a class or species would suffice.

28. PEOPLE V. RAMOS GR 85401-02, 4 JUNE 1990

FACTS:
On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo
City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos) was selling
marijuana at the corner of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City. Tests buys were made using
marked money. The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place where appellant was
selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of marijuana. Ramos was requested to take
out the contents of her wallet. The four marked five-peso bills used in the test buys were found among her
possessions and were confiscated after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall yielded
20 sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the
wares she was selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a
statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal. The marijuana sticks
confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for analysis, and
thereafter were confirmed to be marijuana. The defense contends however that she assented to the
invitation of the NARCOM operatives for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores
the fruits that she sells) were fruitless. She claimed that she was forced to affix her signature on the four
5-peso bills by one Sgt. Sudiacal, purportedly to be the same money which was used to buy marijuana
from her, but which she insists was her money being saved for the rentals. She was later brought to the
Fiscal’s Office after investigation, where she signed a document. She claimed she was not assisted by any
counsel during the investigation, neither during the time she signed the document at the Fiscal’s Office.
Two informations were filed against Ramos, one for sale (Criminal Case 5991) and the other for
possession of marijuana (Criminal Case 5990). After trial, the RTC Olongapo City (Branch 73) found her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5990 for violating Section 8 of RA 6425 and sentenced
her to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day and a fine of P6,000. She was likewise found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case 5991 for violating Section 4 of RA 6425 and was sentenced to life
imprisonment and a fine of P20,000. Ramos sought reversal of the decisions with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
 Whether Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can, where illegal
drugs were found, under her control.

HELD:
The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her legitimate
wares were being sold. Ramos he was the only person who had access to the trash can. The same was
under her immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the
table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the
immediate occupancy and control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual
possession. In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It is only necessary that the
defendant must have dominion and control over the contraband. These requirements are present in the
situation described, where the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash can placed under the stall
owned by Ramos. In fact, theNARCOM agents who conducted the search testified that they had to ask
Ramps to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was
positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another person to use the trash can. The trash can was
obviously not for use by her customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in
evidence and the trial court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.

29. People vs. dela Cruz GR 83260, 18 April 1990

FACTS:
After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust" operation was
conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as
Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice, Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as
poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30 p.m. of 4 May
1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to
buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. At the scene, it
was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz
that he was buying P10.00 worth of marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one
aluminum foil of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to Arcoy. After
ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal
to his teammates by scratching his head and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the
vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De
la Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la
Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana. Juan de la Cruz y Gonzales and
Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal Case 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila with violation of Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425,
as amended. The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
provided by law; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
each to pay one-half of the costs. From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed. In a letter of the
Warden, Manila City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was informed of the death of de la Cruz on 21
February 1989. Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz was dismissed in the Supreme Court resolution
of 25 September 1989. The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran.

ISSUE:
Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation violates Beltran’s
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
HELD:
A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor
induces the accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated.
Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the
offense. While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from one's person
without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is not necessary, the search being incident to a
lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a matter of
judicial experience that in the arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the
malefactors were invariably caught redhanded. There being no violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are admissible in evidence.

30. People v. Kalubiran GR 84079, 6 May 1991

Facts: Nestor Kalubiran was arrested on 12 July 1985, in Dumaguete City, by Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) elements. His arrest was the result of a "buy-bust" operation in which Pat. Leon Quindo
acted as the buyer while the other team members lay in wait to arrest Kalubiran at the pre-arranged signal.
Quindo approached the accused-appellant, who was with a group of friends in front of the Gamo
Memorial Clinic, and asked if he could "score," the jargon for buying marijuana. Kalubiran immediately
produced two sticks of marijuana, for which Quindo paid him a previously marked P5.00 bill. Quindo
then gave the signal and Cpl. Levi Dorado approached and arrested Kalubiran. Dorado frisked the
accused-appellant. He recovered the marked money and found 17 more sticks of marijuana on Kalubiran's
person. The other team members, namely M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor and Sgt. Ruben Laddaran, came later
in a jeep, where they boarded Kalubiran to take him to the police station. The 19 sticks of marijuana were
marked and then taken to the PC Crime Laboratory, where they were analyzed, with positive results.
Kalubiran contended however that one Quindo approached and frisk him on the same night, and found
nothing on him. However, he was called back by one Villamor, who told him at gun point to board the
jeep and taken to PC headquarters, then to the police station. He was released the following day with the
help of a lawyer. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Dumaguete City found Kalubiran guilty as
charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a P20,000 fine. Kalubiran appealed.

ISSUE:
Whether Kalubiran should be made to answer for the 19 sticks of marijuana found in his
possession during his arrest.

HELD:
Kalubiran was arrested in flagrante delicto as a result of the entrapment and so came under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, authorizing a warrantless arrest of any person actually
committing a crime. The search was made as an incident of a lawful arrest and so was also lawful under
Section 12 of Rule 116. In addition to the Rules, there is abundant jurisprudence justifying warrantless
searches and seizures under the conditions established in the case. However, Kalubiran was accused only
of selling the two sticks of marijuana under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act when he should also
have been charged with possession of the 17 other sticks found on his person at the time of his arrest. It is
unfortunate that he cannot be held to answer for the second offense because he has not been impleaded in
a separate information for violation of Section 8 of the said law.