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 Determinism and Free-will in Femi Osofisan’s Women of Owu

Abstract

This paper examines the concept of determinism and free-will in Osofisan’s Women of

Owu. The problem of determinism and human’s freedom has engaged the attention of thinkers

and philosophers since time immemorial and is rightly considered as one of philosophy’s

perennial issue, regarding which the most disparate views have been held without a definite

conclusion.1 If human actions are determined and what would befall a man is known in advance,

then why are human beings morally held responsible for their action? Human beings cannot be

held morally responsible for their actions if such acts are already determined by external forces.

On the other hand, if humans are morally responsible for their actions, then external forces or

determinant cannot be held responsible for such human’s fortune or misfortune.

This paper attempts to proffer a solution to the lingering problem or debate between

determinism and free-will by reconciling, synthesizing and harmonizing the two views. The

paper concludes that determinism and free will are in a way compatible.

Keywords: Determinism, Freewill, Choice and Responsibility.

Introduction
 Many interpretations have been read to the works of Femi Osofisan. As such, there is no

clear-cut ideological stance or interpretation to Osofisan work. In the words of Niyi Osundare as

posited by Muyiwa Awodiya, “what one can talk about in Osofisan’s play are tendencies, not

hard-and-fast or clear cut ideological stance…tendencies that range from liberal through the

radical to the revolutionary”.2 Osofisan’s works, in the words of Olu Obafemi largely deal

“urgently with contemporary social problems in Nigeria with the aim of raising mass awareness

of a positive revolutionary alternative to the present decadence.”3 By this Obafemi means

Osofisan imbues the common masses, representing different strata of the lower depths of the

society with positive, optimistic and revolutionary potentials.4 As such, Osofisan’s works are

widely and largely read from a socio-political point of view. Chidi Amuta gives credence to this

when he posits that “Osofisan’s works are characteristic not just by their accent on political

commitment but also on a certain ideological predilection that is class-partisan and sees socio-

political salvation mainly in terms of the revolutionary transformation of society.”5

Many have situated Osofisan’s Women of Owu within the compartments of

postcolonialism and postmodernism, however, none or few scholars have explored the play

within the context of determinism and freedom.

This paper examines Femi Osofisan’s Women of Owu to espouse the concept and

problem of determinism and free-will. The problem or debate on who is responsible for human

action has lingered on since time immemorial. Many scholars argue that human actions are

determined by some forces other than humans themselves. Others argue that human is a free

moral agent. Kant argues that the best and most convincing proof of human freedom comes from

man’s moral experience. In other words, man’s moral experience compels us to believe that man

is free. Suffice this to mean that there will be nothing like moral codes, criminal codes, offence
and punishment if man is not free. As such, our moral and legal systems would be meaningless if

man is not free.6 Given the two views or theories, this paper attempts to proffer a solution to the

lingering problem or debate between determinism and free-will by reconciling, synthesizing and

harmonizing the two views and by arguing that determinism and free will are in a way

compatible.

Exposition and Critical Analysis

Osofisan’s Women of Owu has contributed to the lingering problem and debate between

determinism and free will. Osofisan’s identifies and throws open the problem and debate

between determinism and free will. As such, one way to examine Women of Owu is from the

context of determinism. Another way is from the context of free will. It is therefore imperative to

do the literary clarification of the two philosophical concepts.

Determinism
Determinism is the philosophical doctrine that all events transpire in virtue of some

necessity and are therefore inevitable. Determinism is "the idea that every event is necessitated

by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature".7 In other words,

determinism is the view that every event is completely determined by prior causal factors.

Catarina Belo defines determinism “as the theory that every event or substance in the world has

a definite and necessary cause such that it could not have been otherwise. This view presupposes

a strict necessary causality ruling the world, so that everything is necessarily conditioned by its

cause or causes, which can be said potentially to ‘contain’ their effect and produce it under

determinate conditions.”8 From Catarina definition, one can draw on “both the notion of
necessity, which on its own means that something has to be as it is, and the notion of causality,

that is the production of an effect, or being the result of a cause.”9 There are various forms of

determinism and definitions above in a nutshell capture what various forms could mean. It is also

imperative at this point to briefly distinguish between ‘hard determinism and ‘soft determinism.’

Hard determinism is the view that social forces outside human control shape everything they do.

Proponents of this position are relatively uncommon, but Spinoza, Holbach, Priestley, C.D

Broad, B.F Skinner, Galen Strawson, and Bruce Waller defend this view, or ones similar to it. 10

Soft determinism on the other hand, is the view that human actions are free if they proceed out of

their own volition. As such, determinism as concerned in this paper refers to ‘hard determinism’.

If it is possible to predict all that will happen in the future as granted by determinism, then are

human beings really free? If determinism is true, then there can be no freedom in the sense

required for morality, also there won’t be moral justification and legitimacy for punishment and

there is no point in making value judgments of any kind about other people. As such, people

cannot be said to be “better” or “worse” but are only different. Thus, the notion of sin and

morality become incoherent. If determinism is true, then human cannot be thought of as in any

way “special” or “higher” than animal or physical objects, since what distinguishes human from

animal is the ‘basic instinct’, that is the ability to reason and make choices.

Free- will

Free will can be defined as the ability to select a course of action as a means of fulfilling

some desire. David Hume defines free will or liberty as “a power of acting or of not acting,

according to the determination of the will.”11 Jonathan Edwards on his own defines free will as

those which proceed from one's own desires.12 Free will for René Descartes, is “the ability to do

or not do something”13. By this Descartes means, the ability to make an inform choice or the
ability to choose between two alternative. As such, Descartes further opines that “the will is by

its nature so free that it can never be constrained”14. Suffice this to mean that for one to be truly

free to make a choice, one must be free from any constrain. Merriam Webster dictionary defines

free will as “freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by

divine intervention”.15 As such, free will is the ability to choose between different possible

courses of action. Many philosophers believe that the concept of free will cannot be separated

from choice and moral responsibility. Put differently, many philosophers suppose that the

concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. As such,

acting with free will satisfies the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action.

The notion of free will or freedom is closely linked with the notion of choice and responsibility.

In other words, the concept of free will makes human beings accept moral responsibility for his

or her actions. As such, there will be nothing like moral codes, criminal codes, offence and

punishment if man is not free. Moreover, our moral and legal systems would be meaningless if

man is not free.

The concept of freedom forms one of the cardinal pillars of emphasis among existential

philosophers and the libertarians. For them, since man exists, he is condemned to be free.16 In

other words, the existentialist and libertarians “see freedom as the structure of man’s being and a

basic condition of human existence.”17 Freedom is the freedom of choosing and deciding not to

choose is another freedom of choice itself. As such, choice is inseparable from freedom, “hence,

to be free is ipso facto to be compelled to make a choice”.18 This freedom of choice compels man

to assume total responsibility for his action and inaction.

There are concerns about threats to the possibility of free will. Determinism as a theory

poses a threat to the concept and possibility of free will. The debate about free will and
determinism has been going on for centuries. It affects all our ideas about morality and human

actions. This debate is generated from the underlying questions as to whether one have control

over ones actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent. Ayer identifies two

assumptions about free will and determinism that generated the debate between the two theories.

In Ayer’s words, "It is commonly assumed that men are capable of acting freely, in the sense that

is required to make them morally responsible, and that human behavior is entirely governed by

causal laws: and it is the apparent conflict between these two assumptions that gives rise to the

problem of the freedom of the will."19

Ayer’s assumptions above can simply syllogised:

1. humans are capable of acting freely

2. determinism is true

3. acting freely and being causally determined are incompatible

By this Ayer means these assumptions are jointly incompatible. Ayer's argues that an action is

free if it is unconstrained. In Ayer’s words:

If I am constrained, I do not act freely. But in what circumstances can

I legitimately be said to be constrained? An obvious instance is the
case in which I am compelled by another person to do what he wants.
In a case of this sort the compulsion need not be such as to deprive
one of the power of choice. ... Thus, if the man points a pistol at my
head I may still choose to disobey him: but this does not prevent its
being true that if I do fall in with his wishes he can legitimately be
said to have compelled me. And if the circumstances are such that no
reasonable person would be expected to choose the other alternative,
then the action that I am made to do is not one for which I am held to
be morally responsible.20

Ayer’s view is further elaborated in the following syllogism:

An action is free if and only if:

(1) one would have acted differently if so chosen;

 (2) ones actions voluntary;

and

(3) No one compels one to act

From the above, Ayer argues that in order to be free, one’s action should be free from inner

constraint and as well be free from outer or external constraint. In other words, Ayer argues that

when one is constrained, one does not act freely. Ayer argues that one is constrained to act if

there is only one possible choice to make in a particular situation. As such, being constrained

implies being caused to do something. When one is caused to do something, he is often caused to

do it by judging the expected outcome to be better than an alternative. For example:

‘A’ is held at gunpoint and asked to disclose government secrets or be shot.

‘A’ discloses these secrets, and is NOT shot.

While one may say that ‘A’ was caused to disclose the secrets, via threat, it may be wrong to say

that ‘A’ was constrained to the point that NOT disclosing the secrets wasn’t an option. However,

Ayer argues that when one is faced with two evil choices, one is right in choosing the lesser evil.

As such, Ayer’s posit that the ‘A’ should not be held responsible for disclosing government

secret since ‘A’ was constrain to choose. In other words, for Ayer, moral responsibility requires

not the absence of a cause, but instead the absence of a constraint. For Ayer, one is constrained

to do something when someone else forces or prevents one from doing something. As such for

Ayer, one is not morally responsible when one is being constrained to act. Ayer’s position here is

not satisfactory.

Aristotle seems to present a more plausible and satisfactory view of this sort of case when

he asserts that such actions done from fear of greater evils are mixed, but are more like voluntary

actions.21 In spite of the horrible threat the agent still acts intentionally. It is quite obvious that his
reason for complying is to avoid the threat being carried out. In other words, obviously freedom

is severely impaired in this sort of case however, the agent has acted intentionally in choosing

the lesser evil, as such, for Aristotle, the agent should accept responsibility for his/her action.

In Osofisan’s ‘Women of Owu’, Adejumo was predestined to bring destruction to Owu

In Osofisan’s words:

ADUMAADAN: Well, his brother’s death does not move me.

Right from birth that man brought the curse of death with him
From heaven. But, against the priest’s instructions, you refused.
To have him destroyed. Now it is he who has destroyed
Us all, exactly as predicted. Because of you,
Because of your pride which you disguised as a mother’s love.
Now I am a widow about to be mated with the very man
Who murdered my husband!22

Also in Osofisan’s words:

IYUNLOYE: Since you are looking for blame, why not start
With this woman here? She it was after all who mothered the man
Who captured me. Ask her, and she herself will confess that
At his birth, the priests ordered his immediate
Execution. They warned that he was evil,
That if he was left to grow up, he would bring disaster
To Owu. They said he would seduce a woman, and through
That act cause the death of many. But she chose instead
To hide him and nurse him to manhood.
So who but her’s to blame? It may be the weakness of a loving
Mother, but I am the victim of it: I have been the helpless
Tool of fate, used in spite of myself to fulfil a prophecy.23

Prince Adejumo was predestined from birth to bring the downfall of Owu. In defiance of the

priest’s advice of executing the child from birth, the mother instead chose to keep him. As such,

Erelu Afin, the mother of Adejumo has the choice of either executing the baby at birth in order to

avert the evil predestined or keeping the baby to aid the evil brought. It was revealed that

Adejumo will bring the downfall of Owu through a woman and his lust for the woman. As such,
when Owu invaded Apomu, Prince Adejumo lusts after the beauty of Iyunloye and he took her

as a wife. In Osofisan’s words,

IYUNLOYE: When the Owu forces attacked us at the market

At Apomu, you were not around, remember?
You had gone back to Ife then to bring more supplies.
You must have heard what the soldiers did to us,
You are now a soldier yourself!
They sacked our stalls, looted our wares,
Killed the men and – what they did to the women!
In desperation, I had to buy my life with the only asset
I had – my beauty! It’s the truth, my husband!
Akogun Awalona led the assault, ask him!
He brought me to Owu, and gave me
To the king’s youngest son.24
Osofisan elaborates further in his words,

IYUNLOYE: I know I hurt you, but it was not me, believe me.
Just my misfortune as a pawn in the hands of men! Beauty
Makes all women vulnerable to the greed of men, as
You know, and when the men are powerful, our will
Is nothing! Such men just ride over us as they wish…25
In the same vein, in Ola Rotimi’s The Gods are not to Blame, Odewale was predestined

to kill his father and marry his mother. In order to avert this evil, the priest advised that the baby

should be executed. Gbonka, the guard to carry out this assignment took pity on the child and

spare the child’s life by abandoning him in the forest.26

The downfall of Adejumo in Women of Owu and Odewale in the gods are not to blame is

attributed to human’s characterization. In other words, humans are characterized by some basic

features, namely, ‘facticity’, ‘existentiality’ and ‘fallenness’,27 which inform their living. While

man’s facticity reveals his limitations, existentiality reveals man’s possibility, the possibility to

make himself what he wants to be.28 Man fallenness shows the tendency to alienate himself from

his true self and live an inauthentic life.

 The downfall of Adejumo in Women of Owu and Odewale in the gods are not to blame is

attributed to their tragic flaws which form their characterization. Adejumo’s singular flaw of lust

brings the downfall of Owu. Though he was predestined to bring the downfall, he exercised his

freedom and his choice to lust for a woman contributed to the downfall.

Odewale in the gods are not to blame was afflicted with a behavioural handicap. He is

quick-tempered, a tragic flaw which prompts him to commit his first major crime of patricide.

The question that immediately follows from the above is: who is to accept responsibility

for Adejumo and Odewale’s actions more so that those actions had been foreseen? Osofisan in

an attempt to answer the question asserts:

Erelu: You were given this life. You chose to waste it.
In a senseless quarrel over a women.29

He elaborates further in his words:

Erelu: A father can only chew for a child; he cannot swallow for her
If only you had read your history right, the lessons
Left behind by the ancestors! Each of us, how else did we go
Except by the wrath of war? Each of us,
Demolished through violence and contention! Not so?
But you chose to glorify the story with lies! Lies!
Our apotheosis as you sing it is a fraud!30

By this, Osofisan means that though man’s action may be foreseen or known in advance, man is

never constrained in acting freely. Ola Rotimi also attempts to provide an answer to this question.

Ola Rotimi in his words as posited by Odewale,

Odewale: “No, no! Do not blame the Gods. Let no one blame the powers. My

people, learn from my fall. The powers would have failed if I did not let them use me. They knew

my weakness: the weakness of a man easily moved to the defence of his tribe against others.”31

By this Ola Rotimi means that though the gods have foreknowledge of what to happen, they did

not caused it. In other words, though man’s action may be foreseen, he is not constrained from
exercising his freedom, as such; man should be responsible for his action. Thus, this form the

title of the play The Gods are not to Blame.

Osofisan in conclusion of his work argues that a lot of people in the society end up

throwing up their hands or leaving it to God every ill that exist in the society. This no doubt is

typical of Nigerian people and situation. Osofisan argues that nobody or God will come to man’s

aid but that man himself must rise up to the challenges. In other words, Osofisan believes that

only man can change their society. That is, the ability and power to change the society resides

solely in no other person or forces than man himself. He argues that man can change the society,

change the politics through demonstration, agitations and revolt to bad governance and rulers. In

his words:

Chorus Leader 2: We did not know, we common folk! Forgive us,

It is the rulers who write history-
Chorus Leader 1: It is the hunter who compose the story of the hunt –
Chorus Leader 2: It is the revellers, not the slaughtered cows,
Who record the fable of the feast!

Erelu: Then the deer must train themselves to seize the gun from
Their hunters! The cows to take over the narration of
Their own story…32

Summary and Conclusion

Words like: “We are nothing but pencil in the hands of the creator” denote

determinism. Determinism however has posed a great problem to freedom and responsibility in

human action. If determinism is granted, then man cannot be said to be free and man cannot be

said to be responsible for his action. However, the objection of the moralist and advocate of

freedom to determinism is that it makes us deny the fact of man's responsibility as a moral agent.

It is imperative however to note that ‘hard determinism’ is a figment of imagination and is

inconsistent with rational thought. It is imperative to note from daily experience that man is
responsible, that he has to answer to himself and to others for the conduct which is the outward

expression of his nature. We cannot deny or ignore man’s responsibility and we must not give it

an interpretation that is inconsistent with clear and logical thinking.33

This paper attempts to reconcile, synthesize and harmonize the two concepts,

determinism and freedom. As such, determinism and free will are in a way compatible. Van den

Enden presents a better understanding, clarification and insight to this work when he asserts, in

his words, “people are not sanctioned because they could have acted otherwise than they did.

They are sanctioned because they behaved willingly against moral or legal rules. It is the will to

behave contrary to these rules that is considered as non-acceptable, whether this will is "free" or

"determined". The will as such is taken into account, not the question whether the actor could

have acted otherwise. Normative practice is a practical means for influencing or changing the

will of people who are subjected to socially established moral and legal rules, in order to make

them conform to these rules. This practice does not derive its justification from any metaphysical

belief concerning intrinsic fault or guilt in a subject (for having done what he did), but from the

social agreement upon the desirability of influencing people so that the objects of their will be in

accordance with the objectives of the law and morality, to which they are subjected”34
 NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Catarina, Belo. Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes, (The Netherlands:

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007), p.1

2. Awodiya, Muyiwa P.(ed) Femi Osofisan: Interpretative Essays II. Lagos: CBAAC,

2002, . 38

3. Obafemi, Olu. Contemporary Nigerian Theatre: Cultural Heritage and Social Vision.

Lagos: CBAAC, p. 168, 2001.

4. Adeseke, Adefolaju Eben (2014). “The Theoretical Postulates and Creative Outputs of

Femi Osofisan”. European Journal of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities, Vol.

2, No (2), 2014, p. 33.

5. Amuta, Chidi. The Theory of African Literature: Implication for Practical Criticism.

(London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1989), p. 167.

6. Omoregbe, Joseph. Metaphysics Without Tears: A Systematic Historical Study, (Lagos:

Joja Educational and Research Pub. Ltd., 1996), p.35.

7. Hoefer, Carl, “Causal Determinism”, in Edward N. Zalta, ed. The Stanford Encyclopedia

of Philosophy (Winter 2009 edition).

8. Catarina, Belo. Op. Cit. p. 2.

9. Ibid.

10. Derk Pereboom, Living without Freewill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2001), p. xviii.

11. Hume, David (1748), An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (1748, sect.viii, part
1).

12. Edwards, Jonathan, Freedom of Will, ed, P. Ramsey. (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1957), .112.

13. Descartes, Rene, Medication on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of

Descartes, vol. I – III, translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch,

D. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)

14. ________Passions of the Soul, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I – III,

translated by Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R., & Murdoch, D. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.41.

15. See online Merriam-Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary for this definition

16. Agidigbi, Blessing. Issues and Themes in Existentialist Philosophy, (Benin City: Skylight

Prints, 2006) , p.23.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ayer, A.J. “Freedom and Necessity”, in Philosophical Essays (London:

Macmillan, 1954), p.558

20. ______. Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan, 1954), p.279.

21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.III, 1110a-b.

22. Osofisan, Femi. Women of Owu, ( Ibadan: University Press Pls. 2006), p.40
23. Ibid. p.51

24. Ibid. p.52

25. . Ibid. p.57

26. Rotimi, Ola. The gods are not to blame, Oxford University Press Plc, 1971

27. Agidigbi, Blessing. Op. Cit. p.41

28. Ibid.

29. Osofisan, Femi. Op. Cit. p.65

30. Ibid. p.66

31. Rotimi, Ola. Op. Cit. p.71

32. Osofisan, Femi. Op. Cit. p.66

33. Ritchie, E. “The Ethical Implications of Determinism”, The Philosophical Review, Vol.

2, No. 5 (Sep., 1893), p. 542

34. Enden, H. Van den. “Thomas Hobbes and the Debate on Free will”, Philosophica 24,

1979, p.206