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G.R. No.

79538
Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc
October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber
license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984
by sending letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope without need of interference by the
courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine issues within their specialty and resolve
the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon
their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s duty to develop and conserve the country’s
natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot
interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled
that petitioner cannot seek affirmative relief.

G.R. No. 79538. October 18, 1990

FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC.,petitioner ,

vs.

THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OFENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THEBUREAU OF
FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENTAND REALTY CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

On October 12, 1965, petitioner entered into a timber license agreementwith the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
represented bythen Secretary Jose Feliciano, wherein it was issued an exclusive license tocut, collect and remove timber except
prohibited species within a specifiedportion of public forest land with an area of 54,920 hectares located in themunicipality of Maddela,
province of Nueva Vizcaya from October 12, 1965until June 30,
1990.However, on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of ForestDevelopment (Bureau), Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a m
emorandumorder stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirinoprovinces, and cancelling the logging concession of
petitioner and nine otherforest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and amemorandum order of the Minister of
Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.Subsequently, petitioner’s timber license agreement was cancelled.
He senta letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which soughtreconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support
thereof itscontributions to forest conservation and alleging that it was not given theopportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation
of its logging operations,but no favorable action was taken on his letter;Barely one year thereafter, approximately one-
half of the area formerlycovered by petitioner’s TLA was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development andRealty Corporation under a new
TLA which was set to expire on July 31,2009, while the other half was allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc.without the benefit
of a formal award or license. The latter entities werecontrolled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President FerdinandMarcos.

Soon after the change of government in February 1986, petitioner sent aletter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and
another letterdated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto Maceda of the Ministry
of NaturalResources [MNR], seeking: (1) the reinstatement of its timber licenseagreement which was cancelled in August 1983 during
the Marcosadministration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to TwinPeaks Development and Realty Corporation
without public bidding and inviolation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of
anorder allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in theconcession area. However, petitioner's request was
denied. Petitionermoved for reconsideration reiterating, among others, its request that thetimber license agreement issued
to private respondent be declared null andvoid. The MNR however denied this motion. Petitioner subsequentlyappealed from the
orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. TheOffice of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive SecretaryCatalino
Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner filedwith the Court a petition for

certiorari,

with prayer for the issuance of arestraining order or writ of preliminary injunction,ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to seek
the nullification of the Bureau orders cancelling his timber license agreement and the grantingof TLA to private respondent, which were
issued way back in 1983 and1984, respectively.HELD:NO. The failure of petitioner to file the petition for

certiorari

within areasonable period of time renders the petitioner susceptible to the adverselegal consequences of laches. Laches is defined as
the failure or neglect foran unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which byexercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, or to asserta right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the partyentitled thereto has either
abandoned it of declined to assert it. The rule isthat unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce analleged right
may, depending upon the circumstances, be destructive of theright itself. Verily, the laws did these who are vigilant, not those who
sleepupon their rights. In the case at bar, petitioner waited for at least threeyears before it finally filed a petition for

certiorari

with the Court attackingthe validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984. Consideringthat petitioner, throughout the period
of its inaction, was not deprived of theopportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating
atthe time, its delay constitutes unreasonable and inexcusable neglect,tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of

certiorari

requiring thereversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor whichbars the issuance of a writ of

certiorari

in favor of petitioner and againstpublic respondents herein. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that

the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sounddiscretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activitiescoming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.More so where, as in the present
case, the interests of a private loggingcompany are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing
publicpolicy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the widelatitude of discretion possessed by the government in dete
rmining theappropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources,and the proper parties who should enjoy the
privilege of utilizing theseresources. Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principalinstruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it canhardly be gainsaid that
they merely evidence a privilege granted by theState to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent orirrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest productstherein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded bythe
Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are notdeemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause.
FELIPE YSMAEL v. DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR No. 79538, 1990-10-18

Facts:

petitioner sent a letter dated March 17, 1986 to the Office of the President, and another letter dated April 2, 1986 to Minister Ernesto
Maceda of the Ministry of Natural Resources [MNR],... (1) the reinstatement of its timber license agreement which was cancelled in
August 1983 during the Marcos administration; (2) the revocation of TLA No. 356 which was issued to Twin Peaks Development and
Realty Corporation without public bidding and... in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations; and, (3) the issuance of an order
allowing petitioner to take possession of all logs found in the concession area

October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources,... license to cut, collect... and remove timber except prohibited species within a specified portion of public forest land

Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum
order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and

Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires... not given the opportunity
to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging operations... one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87
was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Realty Corporation under TLA No. 356 which was set to expire on July 31, 2009, while
the other half was... allowed to be logged by Filipinas Loggers, Inc. without the benefit of a formal award or license;... latter entities
were controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Ferdinand Marcos

Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause... of the Constitution, but only a privilege which
could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so demands,... It should be recalled that [petitioner's] earlier request for
reinstatement has been denied in view of the total ban of all logging operations in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya,... Quirino
and Ifugao which was imposed for reasons of conservation and national security.

The Ministry imposed the ban because it realizes the great responsibility it bear [sic] in respect to forests.

per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November 26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was...
lifted.

petitioner waited for at least three years before it finally filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed
Bureau actions in 1983 and 1984.

its delay constitutes... unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches.

Issues:

whether or not public respondents herein acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to
overturn administrative orders issued by their... predecessors in the past regime.

Ruling:

the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within
a reasonable period.

The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for... certiorari is the "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from
the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same"

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's
natural resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of... all timber license agreements entered into, and permits or
licenses issued, under the previous dispensation.

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation
of forest lands and the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system.

While there is a desire to harness natural resources to amass profit and to meet the country's immediate financial requirements, the
more essential need to ensure future generations of Filipinos of their survival in a viable environment demands effective and...
circumspect action from the government to check further denudation of whatever remains of the forest lands.
A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in... matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies

Timber licenses, permits and license... agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.

In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR
evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate... corrective
measures by the department.

petitioner having failed to make out a case showing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents herein, the Court finds
no basis to issue a writ of certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED.

Principles:

The rule of... res iudicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the...
party entitled thereto has either abandoned it of declined to assert it.

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992

SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,


vs.
HON. ALFONSO G. ABAD, as Judge RTC, Br. 22 of Pagadian City, COURT OF APPEALS, ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO
BUGTAI, respondents.

Manuel V. Trinida for petitioner.

Adolf Leo P. Boncavil for private respondents.

PRINCIPLE: Among these exceptional cases for exhaustion of administrative remedies are:

1) when the question raised is purely legal; 10

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 11

3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 12

4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 13

5) when the claim involved is small; 14

6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 15

7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 16

8) when strong public interest is involved; 17

9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; 18 and

10) in quo warranto proceedings.19

FACTS:

ISSUES:

1. whether or not there is a need to exhaust all admin rem?

2. whether it falls under the exceptional case that the question is purely legal?

3. whether it falls under the exceptional case that it shall cause irreparable damage to the environment?

HELD:

1. NO. PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF DENR SEC

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine
above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the
explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction,
exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and disposition of all lands of
the public domain," 20 and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the
enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations 21 here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment
clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express
powers before the courts of justice may intervene.

2. NO.The case involves presentation of supporting evidence which must first be viewed by the DENR SEC.
The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents have charged,
both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, that the petitioner
has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations. The charge involves factual issues
calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated first by the administrative authorities, employing
their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of
review.

3. NO. Not satisfactorily shown that this is one of the extraordinary circumstance to justify an exception to the rule of exhaustion of
admin rem.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest, the record
does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify deviation from the
doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In fact, this particular submission must
fall flat against the petitioner's uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped its operations under the TLA in compliance with
the order of the DENR.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the wrong alleged
in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner, it will be necessary first to
determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been violated. To repeat for emphasis,
determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management Bureau of the DENR. The application of the
expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still
necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REM:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution
of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of
the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, 8 which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the
complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to
dismiss and the court may then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of
non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the other departments. The theory is
that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed to their particular expertise and that errors
committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important
consideration is that administrative decisions are usually questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
which are allowed only when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that
strict enforcement of the rule could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden
their heavily loaded dockets. 9
CASE DIGEST: Leonardo Paat vs CA G.R. no. 111107 (266 SCRA 167)
Concept: Doctrine of Prior Resort

Facts:
May19, 1989. The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver of the truck was not able to produce the
required documents for the forest products.
Jovitio Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), issued an order of confiscation of the truck and
gave the owner 15 days to submit an explanation. Owner was not able to sumbit an explanation and the order of the CENRO was
enforced.
The issue was brought to the secretary of the DENR. While pending, the owner filed a suit for replevin against the Layugan. Layugan
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the owner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Trial court ruled in favor of the owner.
CA sustained Trial Court’s decision

Issue: W/ON the trial court has jurisdiction?

Held. No. This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter
that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.

Paat v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 111107

10 January 1997

Facts:

On May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by DENR because the driver could not produce the
required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Four days later, Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO, issued an
order of confiscation and asked the owners to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited within fifteen days. Private
respondent, however, failed to do so. R.E.D. Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the
forfeiture of the truck. de Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration but was subsequently denied. The letter was forwarded to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to the respondent’s wishes. During the pendency of the resolution, however, the respondent filed a suit for
replevin. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss but was later denied by the RTC. Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
and the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the confiscation of the truck was valid.

Held:

Yes. The suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and forfeiture issued by the
DENR in pursuance to the authority given under P.D. 705, as amended. The provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment
by E.O. 277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No. 277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 could never be clearer.
CASE DIGEST: PAAT VS. CA
11:05 AM

G.R. No. 111107

Leonardo Paat vs. CA

January 10, 1997

The truck of private respondent was seized and confiscated by the DENR because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck. Private respondents filed before the courts a suit for replevin (recovery of personal property) despite the pending
administrative resolution. Private respondents contended that the DENR had no legal authority to seize the items and that said authority lies on the court as
provided for in Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.

RULING:

The Court held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of
all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Private respondents could not say they were deprived of due process, knowing
that an administrative proceeding is pending before the DENR, who was yet to render a resolution on the controversy.

The Court also ruled that private respondents miserably failed to prove the wrongful detention of the subject truck confiscated. It should be noted that the truck was
seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D.705 as
amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the
petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

The Court clarifies that with the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of
theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code.

PAAT vs CA

266 SCRA 167 (1997)

FACTS: The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because the
driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO
ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required explanation. The
DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck.
Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC
against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that
private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because
the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE:

• Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.

• Whether or not the petitioner’s contention is correct that the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to
perform seizure and forfeiture of the truck under the law

• Whether or not the petitioner is guilty for violating Sec 68-A of PD 705

HELD:

• The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought.
The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.

The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings
of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part of
the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in
view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower
court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

• SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all
cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative,
may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances
used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations and policies on the matter.”

It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to
confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose
of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should
be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must be read in
such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

• Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than qualified
theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided
for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have committed an act
constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O.
277 and the provision of Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
“SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. - Any person who shall cut , gather , collect
, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private
lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx.” (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277
)

“SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

‘Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without license. -Any person who shall cut, gather,
collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private
land, without any authority, or possesstimber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)

With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering, collecting, removing,
or possessing forest products without authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase “ shall be guilty of qualified theft
as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ” and inserted the words “ shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code ”. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room
for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Daylinda A. Lagua, et al. v. Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, et al.

G.R. No. L-44649, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 260Syllabus:

Presidential Decree No. 705, upon which the respondent court based its order, does not vest any power inthe Bureau of Forest
Development to determine whether the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to makesuch determination a pre-requisite before
an action for damages may be maintained.

Facts:

This petition for mandamus originated from a complaint for damages which was instituted by the petitionersagainst the private
respondents for closing a logging road without authority.The private respondents contended that the acts complained of by
the petitioners arose out of the legitimateexercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc. of its rights as a timber
licensee, more particularly inthe use of its logging roads. Therefore, the resolution of this question is properly and legally within the
Bureau ofForest Development.The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts have jurisdiction over
thesame. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for holding that the Bureau of Forestry Developmentmust first
determine that the closure of a logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted.

Issue:

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over an action for damages arising from the closure of a logging road.

Ruling:

Yes. The trial court has jurisdiction. “Presidential Decree No. 705 upon which the respo

ndent court based itsorder does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development must first determine that the closure of
a loggingroad is illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.Moreover, the
complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the alleged illegal closure of thelogging road. Whether such
closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the petitioners and amatter to be disproved by the private respondents.
This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding.It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine the unlawful closure of apassage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such
closure. Not every activity inside a

forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development.”


LAGUA VS CUSI, 160 SCRA 69 (1983)

FACTS:

A memorandum was issued preventing the passage of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel on the
national highway loading towards where the vessel was berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant
Eastcoast closed the road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their passage thereof while the
vehicles and trucks of other people were curiously not disturbed and were allowed passess on the same road. It resulted that the loading
of logs on the M/S "Kyofuku Maru" was discontinued. When Plaintiffs Laguas were already resuming the hauling operations of their
logs towards the Japanese Vessel, again that same road, only the day before ordered by the BFD to be opened for use and passage by
plaintiffs, was closed to them by Defendant Eastcoast's security men upon a radio message order of Defendant Maglana. Even the vessel
M/S "Kyofuku Maruwas" ordered by Defendant Maglana to untie her anchor contrary to existing laws, rules and regulations of the
Bureau of Customs and the Philippine Coastguard.Given no recourse in the face of the blatant and illegal closure of the road in defiance
of BFD orders to the contrary by the Defendant Eastcoast through the order of Defendant Maglana, Plaintiff Laguas had to depart
postpaste to Mati, Davao Oriental, from Baganga where the shipment and the road closure were made, to seek the assistance of the PC
thereat. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss argued that petitioner Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name
was not registered as an "agent" or "dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.The Court agrees with the defendants that under the law,
the Bureau of Forest Development has the exclusive power to regulate the use of logging road and to determine whether their use is in
violation of laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Bureau of Forest Development has the jurisdiction to determine first the legality of closure of logging roads before
the case be directed to the regular courts

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 705 upon which the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest Development to
determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to make such determination a pre-requisite before an
action for damages may be maintained. Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to be established on the part of the
petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding.
It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of a passage way, much
less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Bureau of Forest Development. As we have held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Court of appeals (145 SCRA 100, 110):
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CELESTINA NAGUIAT

(GR.NO. 134209, Jan. 24, 2006)

Facts:

This is an application for registration of title to four parcels of land by CelestinaNuguiat located at Botolan, Zambales.
Applicant(respondent) alleges that she is theowner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the
LIDCorporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, JosefinaMoraga, and Fausto Monje and their predecessor

in-interest who have been inpossession thereof for more than 30 years.The Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ground
that neitherthe applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusiveand notorious possession and
occupation of the lands in question since June12, 1945 orprior thereto; that the monuments of title and tax payment receipts of
applicant do notconstitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bonafide acquisition of the landsapplied for, and that the parcels of
land applied for are part of the public domainbelonging to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

Issue

:Whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forestor other inalienable lands of the public domain and the
applicants registration of titlewill prosper.

Held

Applicant’s registration of title for said parcels of land will not prosper because

the said land is a public forest lands. Forest lands unless declassified and released bypositive act of the Government so that they may
form part of the disposable andagricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of private appropriation.Forests, in the context
of both Public Land act and the Constitution classifyinglands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and
nationalparks do not necessarily refer to a large tract of woodland or an expanse covered bydense growth of trees and underbrush.Here,
respondent never presented the required certification from the propergovernment agency or official proclamation reclassifying the
land applied for asalienable and disposable. For unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverseoccupation thereof in the
concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into privateownership and be registered as title

Republic vs Naguiat

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:

Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant
alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge,
said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.

Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact
that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.

ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain?

HELD:

No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be
acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Yngson vs. Secretary of Agriculture

G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983

[G.R. No. L-36847. July 20, 1983.]

SERAFIN B. YNGSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE HON. SECRETARY

OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE

GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ, Defendants-Appellees

Facts:

The subject matter of the case at bar are the same mangrove swamps with an area of about 66 hectares, more or less, situated in sitio
Urbaso, barrio Mabini, municipality of Escalante, province of the Negros Occidental. In view of the potentialities and possibilities of said
area for fishpond purposes, several persons filed their applications with the Bureau of Fisheries, to utilize the same for said purposes.
The first applicant was Teofila Longno de Ligasan who filed her application on January 14, 1946, followed by Custodio Doromal who filed
his on October 28, 1947. Both applications were rejected, however, because said area were then still considered as communal forest
and therefore not yet available for fishpond purposes."On March 19, 1952, petitioner-appellant Serafin B. Yngson filed a similar
application for fishpond permit with the Bureau of Fisheries followed by those of the respondents-appellees, Anita de Gonzales and
Jose M. Lopez, who filed their respective applications with the same bureau on March 19 and April 24, 1953. When the applications
were filed by the aforesaid parties in the instant case, said area was not yet available for fishpond purposes and the same was only
released for said purpose on January 14, 1954. The conflicting claims of the aforesaid parties were brought to the attention of the
Director of the Bureau of Fisheries who issued an order on April 10, 1954 awarding the whole area in favor of the petitioner-appellant
and rejecting the claims of the respondents-appellees (pp. 1-3, Rec. on Appeal). Appellants Anita V. de Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez
appealed the order of the Director of Fisheries to the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources where their appeals were
docketed as D.A.N.R. Cases Nos. 901 and 901-A (p. 3, Rec. on Appeal). "In an order dated April 5,1955, the Honorable Secretary of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources set aside the order of the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and caused the division
of the area in question into three portions giving each party an area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered by their respective
applications (pp. 4-5, Rec. on Appeal). The petitioner-appellant asked that the orders of the public respondents be declared null and
void and that the order of the Director of Fisheries awarding the entire area to him be reinstated.

Issue:

Whether or not the Priority Rule established in FISHERY ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 14 is applicable to fishpond applications

Ruling:

The mangrove swampland was released and made available for fishpond purposes only on January 14, 1954. It is clear, therefore, that
all five applications were filed prematurely. There was no land available for lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the time all
five applicants filed their applications.After the area was opened for development, the Director of Fisheries inexplicably gave due course
to Yngson’s application and rejected those of Anita V. Gonzales and Jose M. Lopez. The reason given was Yngson’s priority of application.
we reiterated the rule that the construction of the officer charged with implementing and enforcing the provision of a statute should
be given controlling weight.All the applications being premature, not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over
another. The priority given in paragraph "d" of Section 14 is only for those applications filed so close in time to the actual opening of the
swampland for disposition and utilization, within a period of one year, as to be given some kind of administrative preferential treatment.
Whether or not the administrative agencies could validly issue such an administrative order is not challenged in this case. The validity
of paragraph "d" is not in issue because petitioner-appellant Yngson is clearly not covered by the provision. His application was filed
almost two years before the release of the area for fishpond purposes. The private respondents, who filed their applications within the
one year period, do not object to sharing the area with the petitioner-appellant, in spite of the fact that the latter has apparently the
least right to the fishpond leases. As a matter of fact, the respondent Secretary’s order states that all three applications must be
considered as having been filed at the same time on the day the area was released to the Bureau of Fisheries and to share the lease of
the 66 hectares among the three of them equally. The private respondents accept this order. They pray that the decision of the lower
court be affirmed in toto.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against
Petitioner-Appellant.
G.R. No. L-36847 July 20, 1983
SERAFIN B. YNGSON
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE and NATURAL RESOURCES, ANITA V. DE GONZALES and JOSE M. LOPEZ
Facts: A number of people, including the petitioner and private respondents, applied for a permit to utilize 66 hectares of mangrove
swamps for fishpond purposes, but were not granted, the area still being considered to be communal forest. When the area was
released for said purpose, the three private parties in this case had conflicting claims on the same. Initially, the Bureau of Fisheries
awarded the whole area in favor of petitioner. However, the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources later ordered the division of the
area into three portions, one part for each of the petitioner and the private respondents. Not satisfied with the portion received,
petitioner appealed the order.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the whole of the area concerned.
Held: No. It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until timber or forest lands are released
as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell, or otherwise
dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases, and other modes of
utilization. The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of the
public domain while such lands are still classified as forest land or timberland and not released for fishery or other purposes. All the
applications in this case were premature; therefore not one of the applicants can claim to have a preferential right over another. The
interpretation by the Office of the President was held to be an exercise of sound discretion which should not be disturbed.
Ramos vs Dir. of Lands39 Phil 175, Gr. No. 13298, Nov 19, 1982

Facts:

One Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, in the year 1882. He took advantage of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, to obtain a possessory
information title to the land, registered as such on February 8, 1896. Parcel No. 1, included within the limits of the possessory
information title of Restituto Romero, was sold in February, 1907, to Cornelio Ramos, the instant petitioner, and his wife Ambrosia
Salamanca. Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Opposition was entered by the Director of Lands on
the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that
the first parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the objectors and excluded parcel No. 1 from registration. So much for the
facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Issue:

The question at once arises: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to
give title to the entire tract of land?

Ruling:

The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
(Barr vs. Gratz's Heirs [1819], 4 Wheat., 213; Ellicott vs. Pearl [1836], 10 Pet., 412; Smith vs. Gale [1892], 144 U. S., 509.) Of
course, there are a number of qualifications to the rule, one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with reference
to the portion actually in possession of the claimant. It is here only necessary to apply the general rule. The claimant has color of title;
he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the
community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment. (See arts. 446, 448, Civil Code.) If in this instance, we give judicial
sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land
can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property
collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court
convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated,
should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry matters.
But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence
will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libraryWe hold that the
petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection
6, of section 54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13,
1894, and his possessory information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law libraryJudgment is reversed and the lower
court shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhibit A, without special finding as
to costs. So ordered.

Facts:
 In 1882, Restituto Romero y Ponce apparently gained possession of a tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province
of Nueva Ecija.
 Ponce obtained a possessory information title of the land (by taking advantage of the Maura Law or Royal Decree of Feb. 13,
1994) and registered the land in 1896.
 In 1907, the part of the land (Parcel 1) was sold by Ponce to petitioner Ramos and to his wife Ambrosia Salamanca.
 Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
 The Director of Lands and Director of Forestry opposed the application on the following grounds: Ramos had not acquired a good
title from the Spanish government; The first parcel was forest land.
 RTC and CA ruled against Ramos.
 It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to Ramos at least held this tract of land under color of title.
Issue: Is that actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire
tract of land?

Held: YES.
The doctrine of constructive possession indicates the answer. The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a
tract under claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

Ramos has a color of title, is in good faith and had been in OPN possesion
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith; and he has had open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the
property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on the supposition that he premises
consisted of agricultural public land.

Important law: Act NO. 926


Subsection 6 of section 54, of Act No. 926, entitled The Public Land Law, as amended by Act No. 1908, reads as follows:

6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors and interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, under a bona fide claim of
ownership except as against the Government, for a period of 10 years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July, nineteen hundred
and four (July 26, 1904), except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land
under the provisions of this chapter.

There was no satisfactory evidence to support the claim that the land is a forest land
Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the Government as
to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of
Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who
speaks with authority on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.

Ruling:
 Ramos proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked registration, under the provisions of subsection 6, of section
54, of Act No. 926, as amended by Act No. 1908, with reference to the Philippine Bill and the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894,
and Ponce’s possessory information.
 RTC shall register in the name of the applicant the entire tract in parcel No. 1, as described in plan Exhib
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL

Facts:
The land involved in this case consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz.
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land for more than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was
forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. Both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the land is
mangrove land.
Issue: Whether or not mangrove swamps, or manglares, are part of our public forest lands.
Held: Yes. Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in
Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy is
accepted and invoked by the executive department. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject
of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.

G.R. no. L-24548

Facts:

1. On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the license of logging operations on a public forest land in
Olongapo.
2. On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which
gives the power to the Director of Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area covered thereby is not more
than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordinary timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
3. On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by the acting secretary, revoking the authority
delegated to the Director of Forestry which incidentally was the same date the license for petitioner was signed.
4. Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to the Court.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio

2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretion in revoking the license

Held:

1. Yes.

a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impression that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date
the authority of the Director of Forestry was revoked.

b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 1963 it was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release,
no right is acquired by the licensee.

c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964.
Therefore, petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under such void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise.

Tan vs. Director of Forestry (2009)

Facts:
The Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olangapo, Zambales.
One of the bidders is petitioner Tan who was later then awarded such lot. On April 22, 1963, Ordinary Timber License No. 20-'64, in the
name of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry Estanislao R. Bernal without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Office of the Director of Forestry.
It was not signed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources as required by Order No. 60. And because of this, that Timber
license was declared void ab initio and directed to stop the logging operations of Wenceslao Vinzons Tan. Petitioner averred that the
respondents-appellees unlawfully, illegally whimsically, capriciously and arbitrarily acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or
with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber license without just cause, by denying petitioner-appellant of the
equal protection of the laws, by depriving him of his constitutional right to property without due process of law, and in effect, by
impairing the obligation of contracts.

Issue:
Whether or not the timber license was valid or not.

Held:
No. Court fully concur with the findings of the trial court that petitioner- appellant's timber license was signed and released without
authority by then Acting Director Estanislao R. Bernal of Forestry, and is therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in general
memorandum order No. 46 dated May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only
where the area covered thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner contained 6,420.
In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any
license. However, granting that the timber license was valid, still respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. As pointed
out, the rules and regulations included in the ordinary timber license states: "The terms and conditions of this license are subject to
change at the discretion of the Director of Forestry, and that this license may be made to expire at an earlier date, when public interests
so require". A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
Republic v. Court of Appeals (154 SCRA 476)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENTAND THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AND MARTINA CARANTES FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THEHEIRS OF SALMING
PIRASO,respondents.G.R. No. 56948; September 30, 1987

Facts:

In 1968, Martina Carantes for and in behalf of the heirs of Salming Piraso filedin the CFI of Baguio an application for the registration of
the land, which the latterclaimed to be in their possession and occupation openly, continuously, exclusively,notoriously since 1915. The
Director of lands, through the Solicitor General and theDirector of Forestry, opposed the application on the ground that the said
portionland is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve as shown in the reports andtestimonies of the district foresters. The CFI
granted the application, which was also affirmed by the CA. Thegovernment’s failure to show

that the disputed land is more valuable for forest purposes isone of the reasons for the CA’s ruling. It also noted the failure to prove
that trees are thriving inthe land.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the land in dispute is alienable and disposable.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that the petitioner clearly proved thru the reports andtestimonies of the district foresters that the land applied for
registration is a part of a forestland. As to the claim of the applicants that they have been in possession of the land since 1915, the court
cited its decision in

Director of Forestry v. Munoz (23SCRA 1184),

where it stated that possession of forest lands, no matter how long,cannot ripen into private ownership.

In its decision, the Court also addressed the CA’s ruling by citing its decisionin

Heirs of Amunatequi v. Director of Forestry (126 SCRA 69, 75),

where it ruled, “Aforested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose suchclassification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forestcover. xxxForestlands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.xxxThe
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have tobe descriptive of what the land actually looks like.xxx” The
Court again reiterated that there must first be a formal Governmentdeclaration that the forestland has been re-classified into alienable
and disposableagricultural land, before private persons in accordance with the various modes of acquiring public agricultural lands can
acquire it.

Republic vs. CA and Karantes

125 SCRA 476, Gr. No. L-56984, September 30, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Director of

Forest Development and the Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and MARTINA CARANTES for

and in behalf of the Heirs of SALMING PIRASO, Respondents.


Facts:

"It having been proven convincingly that this land was owned and possessed by the late

Salming Piraso and later by his successors-in- interest, who are his children for a period

of more than thirty years up to this date, they have shown to have a registerable title on

the property which the Court therefore confirms and affirms in accordance with the law.

Let the land so described in the technical description of the survey made of the same

and in accordance with the corresponding plan be so registered." (p. 50, Rollo)

On May 9, 1968, respondent Martina S. Carantes for and in behalf of the Heirs of

Salming Piraso filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Land

Registration No. N-287, covering the following described property

On January 13, 1970, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an

opposition to the application for registration stating, among others.

"That neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to

said parcel of land the same not having been acquired by them either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title under the Royal

Decree of February 13, 1894;

"That the whole area applied for registration is within the Central Cordillera Forest

Reserve established under Proclamation No. 217, dated February 16, 1929;

"That the area sought to be registered is neither released for disposition nor alienation;

and that the herein applicant has no registerable title over the whole parcel of land

either in fact or in law." (p. 14, Rollo)hanrobles.com.ph]

Issue:

1. Whether or not the land in question is part of the public forest within the Central

Cordillera Forest Reserve;

Ruling:

It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private

appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private

property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161; Adorable v. Director of

Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v. De la

Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes & Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68

SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court

of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered

disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the
land by the applicants prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and

alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b)

of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). In this case, there

is no showing of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in question is

disposable or alienable. This is a matter which cannot be assumed. It calls for proof.

The reports and testimonies of Land Inspector Bartolo and Forester Zapatero support

the contention of the petitioner that the area applied for by the applicant is forest land

within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. In the case of Ramos v. Director of Lands

(39 Phil. 175) we have stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Great consideration, it may be stated, should, and undoubtedly will be, paid by the

courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on Forestry

matters."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is no factual basis for the conclusion of the appellate court that the property in

question was no longer part of the public land when the Government through the

Director of Lands approved on March 6, 1925, the survey plan (Psu-43639) for Salming

Piraso. The existence of a sketch plan of real property even if approved by the Bureau

of Lands is no proof in itself of ownership of the land covered by the plan. (Gimeno v.

Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 623). The fact that a claimant or a possessor has a sketch

plan or a survey map prepared for a parcel of land which forms part of the country’s

forest reserves does not convert such land into alienable land, much less private
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals G.R.No. 120865-71
(251 SCRA 42) 1995

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the policy towards
environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will deteriorate further
if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the LLDA and enumerated
the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay Region”.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive jurisdiction &
authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took
advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen
permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems
and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with
the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force
for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA
4850 as amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

ISSUES:
1.Which agency of the government – the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region – should exercise jurisdiction over
the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

RULING:
1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region.
On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The
provisions of RA 7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna
de Bay and the lake region.

Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute.The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication.

The power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to
grant permits for fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring
activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police power which is the most
pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA
which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a “cease and
desist order” and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de
Bay. Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the LLDA has the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated
therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine

GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that
these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to
the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However,
the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include
the right to alienate the same.
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment of live fish and lobster
outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years. In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a
resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitiones Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine
merchants were charged for violating the above ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now
allege that they have the preferential rights as marginal fishermen granted with privileges provided in Section 149 of the Local
Government Code, invoking the invalidity of the above-stated enactments as violative of their preferential rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the enacted resolutions and ordinances by the local government units violative of the preferential rights of the
marginal fishermen?

RULING:

No, the enacted resolution and ordinance of the LGU were not violative of their preferential rights. The enactment of these
laws was a valid exercise of the police power of the LGU to protect public interests and the public right to a balanced and healthier
ecology. The rights and privileges invoked by the petitioners are not absolute. The general welfare clause of the local government code
mandates for the liberal interpretation in giving the LGUs more power to accelerate economic development and to upgrade the life of
the people in the community. The LGUs are endowed with the power to enact fishery laws in its municipal waters which necessarily
includes the enactment of ordinances in order to effectively carry out the enforcement of fishery laws in their local community.

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