decemBER 8, 2018
The ‘Feel True’ Politics of Demonetisation
Will the obliteration of foul facts diminish the power of truth?
I
t is a truism that politicians practise fabrication of lies,
underplay data and blatantly distort facts when it is expedient.
Arguably, the threshold for defining the “expedient” is
determined by their political urgency to camouflage the breach
of promises made by them, especially when a “fate-determining”
election is in the wake. Based on our experience with the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) government in the last few years, it will not
be an oversimplification to straightforwardly link the government’s
habitual and unapologetic lies about various economic and social
policies to the flurry of promises that Narendra Modi had made
to his electorate in 2014, but failed/cared less to fulfil after coming
to power. However, there are defenders of these deceptions, too,
who strive to legitimise such anomalies of the present govern-
ment as “hyperbolic truth” (mind you, not “lies”) and a clarion
call for changes to “cleanse” India (of the age-old economic
delinquencies) which “only this” government could dare to think
of. Despite being backed by rhetoricians’ defences, the BJP’s recent
economic deceptions are far from tenable by robust economic
logic, with the government’s self-proclaimed “ethical move” of
demonetisation having to bear the major share of culpability.
More than mere denial/distortion of contrary evidences, the
despotic and egoistic disdain with which the BJP government
subverts such facts to legitimise its mendacity, should be a bigger
concern. The recent incident where the union agricultural ministry
had to backtrack an evaluation report carrying the (adverse) effects
of demonetisation on the farm sector, supplant it by a new version
with differing results, and show cause the concerned officials on
charges of violation of protocol, exuded not only the brazenness
of the government but also its recklessness, in a way saying “it’s a
lie, but then who cares.” The moot question now, in fact, is, who
should care? While the government is expected to care for its
accountability obligations, the electorate and opposition cannot
evade their responsibilities of holding the government accounta-
ble at least for its “explanatory” obligations (that is, answer for
misgovernment). But, with the introduction of high-octane dem-
agoguery based on prejudices, sentiments, and sensations caused
by the “transpositioning of lies” on political opponents (abetted
to a large extent by social media’s selection biases and immediacy
of propagating aversive emotions), Indian democracy is encoun-
tering the shrinkage of spaces for dialogues, let alone discourses.
Thus, it is no wonder that the current political discourse misses
out the intellectual content of demonetisation. In the farmer
Economic & Political Weekly EPW decEMBER 8, 2018 vol lIii no 48
protests/marches held across the country throughout this year,
and particularly the last one in Delhi on 30 November 2018, the
political parties in the opposition may have succeeded in
harnessing the popular (rural) sentiment on the predictable
lines of agrarian distress like support/farm-gate prices, indebted-
ness and loan waivers, etc, but (in)advertently (dis)missed the
transition of context set by the ineradicable economic damage
from demonetisation. For instance, instead of the demand for
raising the minimum support price (MSP), which cannot benefit
farmers unless backed by strong procurement, building up an
electoral consensus for a robust procurement strategy was more
warranted, particularly against the contractionary effect of
“cash-strappedness” on rural employment and income.
The kind of “post-truth” politics that the BJP has brought into
the Indian political domain has created affiliative truths with
both supporters’ and opposers’ responses/reactions being equally
affective and/or based on cherry-picking of data. For example,
the opinion piece by the BJP’s Member of Parliament (MP) Varun
Gandhi, “Job Creation at Farmer’s Doorstep” in the Hindu, dated
3 December 2018 and Congress president Rahul Gandhi’s election
campaign in Dholpur, Rajasthan on 10 October 2018, high on
promises for job creation, are works of similar ephemeral
political interests of securing the vote bank. And in tandem,
none provides any clarity on fundamental questions. How is
non-farm diversification plausible when the informal sector, a
major buttress of rural non-farm employment, is reeling from the
shock of demonetisation, and the goods and services tax (GST)?
Or given the absolute decline in employment in the unorganised
manufacturing, construction, trade and transport sectors, how
will the promise of new job creation materialise?
It is perturbing to find that while challenging the ruling govern-
ment’s falsehoods, the protestors/opposition are not only con-
tending on the soft subjects, but also in an identical language of
“morality” that defeats economic judgment. In that way they miss
out/dismiss hard matters, which could have been critical to voters’
“informed” choice of their leaders/government. Such acts of
omission are tantamount to the government’s relentless dismissal
of facts. In the absence of concerted efforts by the opposition/
protestors to scrutinise the agrarian issues in the context of the
structural alterations caused by demonetisation, there is the im-
minent risk of the BJP government’s hyperbolic report to appear
authentic and hence befuddle electoral choices. But, it is heartening
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EDITORIALS

to find that the BJP’s lies have also galvanised a moral outrage in embedded in the BJP’s “moral” call for change. The 2019 elec-
the “reverse” direction. With a section of the civil society the tions, in fact, will be a test of strength of the Indian democracy
claims of “change” have not gone unexamined, and for them to leverage the sensibility of this civil society in finding a new
demonetisation is an outraged response to the partisan politics language of rebuttal of this post-truth politics.

8 decEMBER 8, 2018 vol lIii no 48 EPW Economic & Political Weekly