EDITORIALS
What Is beyond a Statue
Does the politics of neo-liberalisation trump diplomatic goodwill?
O
“ ne person’s hero may well be another’s villain”—is an
apt tag line for the politics of statuary, which in the
recent times has evidenced the vandalisation/removal
of several political statues in the name of national determina-
tion. A fresh addition to this list is the removal of M K Gandhi’s
statue from the premises of the University of Ghana at the
behest of some academics/professors of the university. Accord-
ing to the governments of both countries, this statue has been
a symbol of commemoration of the first tri-nation presidential
tour of Africa from India in 2016, while to several ordinary
Ghanaians Gandhi’s political persona is no different from
that of any “racist” imperialist. In fact, Gandhi’s statues have
been a part and parcel of the anti-colonial, anti-racial icono-
clasm in Africa for quite some time now, from the whitewash-
ing of a statue in South Africa in 2015 to the halting of the
construction of another in Malawi to celebrate the Indian
President’s recent visit there. But, what is curious in all these
cases is that the governments, who had showcased these
statues as gesticulations of bilateral ties, are conspicuous by
their absence/detachment (bordering on nonchalance) in the
face of public condemnation. If the reticence of the govern-
ments is validating the indictment of racism against Gandhi,
then what does political statuary embody, in actuality?
While the hagiography of Gandhi (and hence his statue as
tokenism) is endorsed as a convenient strategy of soft-power
politics for both India and Africa, it also provides room for the
governments to play the card of “nation state” at expedience.
For the Ghanaian state, for instance, “racism” can then be ex-
pediently relegated to mere “colourism,” sidestepping the un-
comfortable local history of “ethnocentrism” (enslavement of
other ethnic groups by the Akan kingdoms), which has culmi-
nated into the present-day electoral divide along Akan/non-
Akan “tribe” lines, and the alleged regional concentration of
political clout and opportunity. However, high levels of outmi-
gration from the ethnic hinterlands to more cosmopolitan/eco-
nomically opportune parts (the South, at large) of the country,
are confounding the conventional political strategies of en-
cashing the ethnic alliances. Moreover, it is arguable whether
an average Ghanaian today, largely in the age spectrum of
25–30 years, is influenced by/cognisant of these local legacies.
These aspects have weakened the decisiveness of the ethnic/
cultural factor in the country’s electoral democracy, but could
not annihilate it.
More so, given the blurry line of (policy-based) differentia-
tion of the two dominant political parties, the National Demo-
cratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP). Despite
their self-proclaimed difference in political legacies and ideo-
logies, both parties have largely followed the neo-liberal rec-
ommendations of international financial institutions, thereby
ascribing increasing legitimacy to the gross domestic product
(GDP)/growth-oriented version of the developmentalist discourse,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW decEMBER 22, 2018 vol lIii no 50
and correspondingly vouching for private and/foreign invest-
ments to lead this growth. With inexplicit differentiation,
politics in Ghana has become disposition-/personality-driven,
rather than issue-driven and consequently based on sloganeer-
ing and promises of immediate material support for individu-
als and groups. In such a context the “youth” voters’ electoral
choice is largely driven by the “perception” of a politician/gov-
ernment representing them/their (socio-economic) concerns,
either politically or culturally, often leading to “skirt and
blouse” voting (choosing the presidential and parliamentary
candidates from two contending parties within the same
constituency).
Such indeterminacy potentially undermines the role of
political incumbency in electoral successes. Simultaneously, it
offers an open window to patron–client relationships. In the
urban areas the state’s legitimacy among the urban elites
rests with its ability (or the impression of it) to “manage” the
economy to restore its “growth,” particularly in the existing
scenario of faltering GDP, returning inflation, looming power
shortages, and burgeoning optimism regarding the oil sector
revenue. In the rural areas, the appeal of transformative
politics is hollowed out by the historical regional bias for
development. The emerging populist demand from the long-
neglected northern region, to bring in more of non-governmen-
tal organisation-style interventions, is a new litmus test for in-
cumbent governments. Again, both the parties are heavily de-
pendent on foot soldiers, rank-and-file members drawn largely
from among low wage labourers, who do much of the grass-
roots organising, campaigning, and sloganeering for party
leaders. In exchange for their votes and/assistance to turn out
the votes, foot soldiers expect jobs.
But, patron–clientelism is a highly volatile dynamic in a
political system with limited material resources. Where more
than half of the government’s expenditure budget is dependent
on bilateral/multilateral aids, and almost four-fifths of the
state’s expenditure from its own revenue goes in paying the
wages of the government employee, how will any government
create jobs? Ghana is not the only African country faced
with such constraints. While in many others, the deepening
of neo-liberalism/globalisation is accompanied by compromise
of democracy in the name of (factionally slanted) national (self)
determination to camouflage such evasion of the state
in the domain of social accountability, Ghana still holds the
reputation of being one of Africa’s strongest democracies. But,
misappropriating sentiments of “stratified” colourism through
mute relics, to bypass the responsibility of state failure to the
Asian/Indian diasporic politics, does not speak well of the sus-
tainability of this democracy. It brings home institutional
weaknesses/inefficiencies that could eventually make the
country negotiate this democracy if the state lacks the apparatus
to rein in the terms of economic integration.
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