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PEOPLE V.

TOMIO
G.R. No. 74630 September 30, 1991
202 SCRA 77

FACTS:
 Tatsumi Nagao (Nagao), a Japanese national, arrived in Manila on April 29, 1986 for a five-day
vacation tour and was billeted at the Holiday Inn at Pasay City.
 On May 2, 1986, while Nagao was having lunch, was approached by Maida Tomio (Tomio) and
Mitamura, both Japanese, and offered themselves as his guides in Manila. Mitamura accompanied
Nagao for dinner. Before Mitamura left the restaurant, he placed a pack of cigarettes on Nagao’s
shirt pocket. Nagao was later approached by five policemen in plain clothes who searched his person
and found the pack of cigarettes which was supposedly marijuana. At the police station, Tagahiro
Nakajima alias Yamada (Yamada) and Tomio acted as his interpreters. They told Nagao that they had
paid the police U.S. $100,000.00 for his release.
 Upon Nagao’s release, Nagao returned to his hotel, Holiday Inn, escorted by the appellants and a
policeman. His escorts did not allow him to leave the hotel. From Holiday Inn, Nagao was transferred
to Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, then to Philippine Village Hotel and to Virra Condominium.
Nagao called his father asking for money, who initially refused to pay three million yen, but he
eventually agreed when Sato talked to him. After Tomio and Yamada brought Nagao to RCBC to
withdraw U.S. $1,850.00, they were met by policemen and Tomio and Yamada were arrested.
 Tomio and Yamada (accused-appellants) were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention for ransom. The information was filed with RTC Manila.
 The accused-appellants argued that they did not always guard Nagao as Nagao was able to watch
movies, eat at a Japanese restaurant, go to a sauna bath, and in one occasion accompanied a girl
outside the hotel to see her off. Also, while they were at Virra Condominium where they stayed for
two or three days together in one room, Nagao sometimes held the key to the room. Also, the reason
they went along with Nagao to the RCBC bank on May 12 was that he did not know how to go there
so they brought him to the bank so that he could withdraw the remittance from Japan which was
intended as payment for his hotel accommodation and other expenses.
 The trial court ruled that the accused-appellants were guilty as charged.

ISSUES:
1. Does RTC Manila have jurisdiction over the case filed against accused-appellants?
2. If RTC has jurisdiction over the case, was it correct in holding the accused-appellants guilty of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention?

RULING:
Held 1: YES.
Rationale:
 On 2 May 1986, the day when they made their initial, but crucial move on the target, the
complainant (hereinafter referred to as Mr. Nagao), appellants, through the overt act of
accused Tomio Maeda alias Sato Toshio and another Japanese, brought complainant "some
other places in Manila" after they succeeded in getting his trust and confidence, following a
conversation over lunch in a coffee shop at Holiday Inn Hotel.
 The essential ingredients of the crime charged were thus committed in various places.
 The case can, therefore, be filed with the appropriate court in any of the places where the
complainant was brought to by appellants in the pursuit of or in connection with the crime
charged. Section 15 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that subject to existing laws,
in all criminal prosecutions, action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.

Held 2: YES.
Rationale:
 To show that they commiserated with him, they made it appear that they advanced the
money to the police. We are, however, convinced that the accused-appellants never
advanced the money. That is why they stuck to the complainant like "a leech," as vividly
described by the trial court, after he was eventually "released" by the police. There is no
doubt in Our mind that during the period from 3 May 1986 until the accused-appellants
were arrested on 12 May 1986, complainant was moved from one hotel to another by the
appellants, effectively depriving him of his liberty. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, while it may be conceded that complainant had the freedom of locomotion, he "did
not have the freedom to leave the hotel premises at will and go wherever he pleased."
 What then was the money they advanced to the police? Nothing. However, they succeeded in
making it appear to Mr. Nagao, after they came out of the room at the Southern Police
District, that they advanced the amount to the police, for which reason he was released. This
was part of the stratagem to give a semblance of legality to the demand for ransom.
 Even granting for the sake of argument that, in effect, there was created a simple loan
contract between appellants and Mr. Nagao, as asserted by appellant Tomio Maeda, the
deprivation of the former's liberty until the amount shall have been fully "paid" to them, is
still kidnapping or illegal detention for ransom.

Decision: The decision of the RTC is affirmed.

G.R. No. 90423 September 6, 1991

FRANCIS LEE, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND PELAGIA PANLINO DE CHIN, respondents.

ART. 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong.

If the coercion be committed for the purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent
him from so doing, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.

Facts:

At about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 20, 1984, the complainant Maria Pelagia Paulino de Chin, 23
years old, was fetched from her house upon the instruction of the petitioner Branch Manager Francis Lee of
Pacific Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as bank). The petitioner confronted the complainant
about a forged Midland National Bank Cashier Check No. 3526794, which the latter allegedly deposited in
the account of Honorio Carpio. During the said confrontation, the petitioner Francis Lee was shouting at her
with piercing looks and threatened to file charges against her unless and until she returned all the money
equivalent of the subject cashier check. Accordingly, the complainant was caused to sign a prepared
withdrawal slip, and later, an affidavit prepared by the bank's lawyer, where she was made to admit that she
had swindled the bank and had return the money equivalent of the spurious check. It was about six o'clock
in the afternoon of the same day when the complainant was able to leave the bank premises.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of petitioner in simply "shouting at the complainant with piercing looks" and "threats
to file charges against her" are sufficient to convict him of the crime of grave coercion.

Held:

Petitioner's demand that the private respondent return the proceeds of the check accompanied by a threat to
file criminal charges was not improper. There is nothing unlawful on the threat to sue. In the case of Berg v.
National City Bank of New York (102 Phil. 309, 316), We ruled that:

... It is a practice followed not only by banks but even by individuals to demand payment of their accounts
with the threat that upon failure to do so an action would be instituted in court. Such a threat is proper
within the realm of the law as a means to enforce collection. Such a threat cannot constitute duress even if
the claim proves to be unfounded so long as the creditor believes that it was his right to do so.

The circumstances of this case reveal that the complainant, despite her protestations, indeed voluntarily,
albeit reluctantly, consented to do all the aforesaid acts.
Bearing in mind her involvement in the deposit and encashment of the check, the complainant admitted to
being nervous upon being informed that the check was spurious.

We find that complainant's lengthy stay at the bank was not due to the petitioner's threat. It was rather due
to her desire to prove her innocence

Further, We find that contrary to complainant's allegations in her affidavit, it was not the petitioner who
suggested the encashment of the RCBC Time Deposit Certificate but her sister; and that again, it was not the
petitioner who agreed to the sister's suggestion but Cruz, the PRO Manager, Foreign Department of the bank

Moreover, while complainant claimed that her freedom of movement was restrained, she, however, was able
to move about freely unguarded from the office of the petitioner situated at the ground floor to the office of
Cruz at the mezzanine floor where her sister found her.

The most telling proof of the absence of intimidation was the fact that the complainant refused to sign the
promissory note in spite of the alleged threats of the petitioner. American authorities have declared that
"(t)he force which is claimed to have compelled criminal conduct against the will of the actor must be
immediate and continuous and threaten grave danger to his person during all of the time the act is being
committed. That is, it must be a dangerous force threatened 'in praesenti.' It must be a force threatening
great bodily harm that remains constant in controlling the will of the unwilling participant while the act is
being performed and from which he cannot then withdraw in safety.

Against this backdrop, We hold that coercion did not exist in this case. Consequently, the petitioner should
be acquitted.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one hereby entered
ACQUITTING the accused of the crime of grave coercion.

SO ORDERED.

Jose Timoner vs People

FACTS:

Jose Timoner, the petitioner, was convicted by the Municipal Court of Daet with the crime of Grave Coercion,
as penalized under Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, because of the complaint by Pascual Dayaon,
Lourdes Rabustillos and others. Timoner, then Mayor of Daet, together with two uniformed policemen,
Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and six laborers, was acting on the recommendation of Dra. Allegre,
the Municipal Health Officer, to close among other structures that were along the sidewalk, the barbershop
of Dayaon and store of Rabustillos. Timoner filed a complaint in the CFI of Camarines Norte against
Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls, alleged that the stalls constituted public
nuisances as well as per se. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which was the Intermediate
Appellate Court then, however, the CA affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Petitioner claimed that
their actions was done in abatement of a public nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Timoner committed Grave Coercion

HELD:

The petitioner was acquitted of the crime charged. He did not commit Grave Coercon as the elements of
Grave Coercion 1) that a person is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected
by violence, threats or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no
right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any
lawful right. required that he acted not under the authority of the law. As the then Mayor of the City,
Timoner had the authority to act on behalf of the recommendation and his constituents’ right to public order
and safety, and that such stalls along the sidewalk affected the community and general public, as it is in a
public place, and was annoying to all who come within its sphere. The Supreme Court did contend that the
barbershop did constitute a public nuisance, as defined under Article 694 and 695 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Furthermore, it had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer.
PEOPLE VS REYES (G.R. NO. L-21528- L-21529)

FACTS:

The petitioner, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite
City. He led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the
United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin,
mamatayka;","Agustin, mamamataykarin" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col.
Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving
harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt.
McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col.
Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the
demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank
Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon
suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's residence, but they told him that they would like the
people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that they
did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."

At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the
demonstration he became apprehensive about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel
thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out of the station, using his (Monzon's)
car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of Reyes.
He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the
demonstrators saw Hallare they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed
the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to led behind. After Hallare and his companions
had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.

The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it
twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket
and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putangina mo. Agustin, mawawalaka.
Agustin lumabaska, papatayinkita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the premises.
Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the
house.

On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged with grave threats and grave oral
defamation

On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for
grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The defense counsel objected to the motion on the
ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment
"would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint
trial proceeded.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the amendment of information for grave threats is substantial


2. Whether or not petitioner should be charged with grave threats only.

HELD:

1. NO.

After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave
threats as defined in Article 282 1 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged
therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction upon his person of a
wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition.
Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned
provision the particular manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such
that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as charged originally.
Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes
so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Petitioner was
not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article 282, which
provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was
made subject to a condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the
information conformable to the evidence to be presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment
which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.

2. YES

The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact
that placards with threatening statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing
Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration conducted in front thereof, culminating in
repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats were
made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat
would be carried into effect. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a
temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident.

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putanginamo". This is a
common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express
anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on
the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant
against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio,
insofar as Criminal Case No. 2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with
respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs against petitioner.

Topic: Kidnapping and Illegal Detention

(Brief summary of the case: Where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic purpose of killing, the
crime is only murder and this is true even if before the killing, the victim was taken from one place to
another. From the acts of the accused, it cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain
or deprive the victims of their liberty and the fact alone that ransom money was demanded did not per se
qualify the crime to kidnapping in the absence of other elements.)

People vs ROMEO PADICA y LORICA, LESLIE GANS y MELENDRES, FLORENTINO FABRIGAS, ROMEO
PRADEZ, LEONARDO MARAJAS, LEOPOLDO MARAJAS and LEON MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, ** accused. LEON
MARAJAS, JR. y RAMOS, accused-appellant. , 221 SCRA 362

Facts:
(Note: Accused Romeo Padica y Lorica (who was later discharged to be a state witness) and Romeo Pradez are
one and the same person (Original Record, 546). The other accused have remained at large, hence the lone
appellant in this case is Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos.)

The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans, Florentino Fabrigas, Romeo
Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas were originally charged in the latter part of 1978 with
kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal possession of firearms.
Padica and herein both pleaded not guilty.

Prosecution's narration of facts:

"On or about 9:00 o clock in the morning of February 8, 1978, appellant and his brother, Leopoldo
Marajas, using a car driven by Leopoldo, visited Romeo Padica in his house in Metro Manila. Leopoldo
requested Padica to drive for Eddie Boy Marajas, a brother of Leopoldo and appellant, and his classmates,
giving Padica P100.00 for the purpose. Upon receiving the amount, Padica, pursuant to the instructions of
Leopoldo, drove the car, with Leopoldo and appellant on board, and proceeded to Pasay City, arriving there
at about 10:00 A.M. Leopoldo left the vehicle and, upon coming back after a while, he told Padica that they
were going to Sukat, Parañaque.

"Thereafter, with Padica still driving the car, they proceeded to the Superville Subdivision, also in
Sukat, where they arrived at about 11:30 A.M. of the same date. Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga(
THE VICTIM), both fourteen (14) years of age, more or less, were in said subdivision. Leopoldo alighted from
the car and talked to them. Subsequently, Leopoldo together with Francis and Eddie Boy, boarded the car.
All of them proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with Padica still driving the vehicle. Seated beside Padica was
Leopoldo Marajas, while appellant and Eddie Boy occupied the back seat, with Francis Banaga between
them.
"Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00 noon of the same date, Leopoldo Marajas told Padica, to drive the
car into the sugarcane plantation at the side of the road. Once inside the plantation, Padica stopped the car
when told to do so by Leopoldo, who then alighted from the vehicle and told Francis Banaga to alight.
However, Francis refused to get down from the car. Notwithstanding his resistance, he was forced out
of the car by Leopoldo Marajas, Eddie Boy and appellant, who pulled him out of the vehicle.
Thereafter, the three brought Francis Banaga to a place inside the sugarcane plantation, more or less
ten (10) meters away from the car, while Padica remained in the vehicle. Leopoldo Marajas then
delivered several stabbing blows at Banaga after which appellant shot Banaga with a handgun. Banaga
fell on the ground. Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and appellant returned to the car. Leopoldo took the wheel from
Padica and drove the car to Muntinlupa, where Padica alighted and was left behind with Leopoldo warning
Padica, 'Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka lang.'

On or about 5:00 P.M. of the same day, Tomas Banaga, father of Francis, became alarmed when his
son failed to come home. A few minutes after 6:00 P.M. of (the) same date, someone called up by phone,
telling Tomas not to look for his son as he was in good condition, and demanding P500,000.00 for his
(Francis') release. Tomas reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary authorities in Camp Crame.

February 9, 1978, Tomas received a second phone call in the course of which the caller
reduced the amount demanded to P200,000.00. On February 10, 1978, there was another phone call
with (the) caller lowering the amount to P23,000.00 and giving instructions that the money be
wrapped in a newspaper, placed in a paper bag, and delivered by a girl wearing a T-shirt to Luneta, in front
of the National Library, under a true with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978.

"Norma Camello, sister-in-law of Tomas Banaga, volunteered to deliver the money as the maid of
(the) Banaga family who was supposed to do it was scared. She went to the National Library at Luneta and
positioned herself under a tree with red flowers, pursuant to the instructions of the caller. A few minutes
later, a taxicab arrived. Appellant alighted from the vehicle, approached Camello and got the money from her
which was in a paper bag, saying: 'Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang bata mamaya sa bahay. When appellant
returned to the waiting taxicab and was about to board it, Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of those sent to
Luneta to entrap the person who would receive the ransom money, apprehended and arrested
appellant

Pursuant to the information given by appellant during the investigation, a Philippine Constabulary
team led by Lt. Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by appellant, went to Calamba, Laguna search for
the body of Francis Banaga. Appellant led the team to the place where the cadaver was dumped,
which was inside a sugarcane plantation about 75 meters away from the road. The team recovered the
body of Francis Banaga and brought it to the Municipal Health Officer of Calamba for autopsy.
According to the necropsy report ,Francis Banaga sustained two (2) entry gunshot wounds, one
on the head and the other on the chest, with two (2) exit gunshot wounds and several lacerated
wounds. The death of Francis was caused by 'intra-thoracic brain hemorrhage due to gunshot wounds.'
After three (3) years in hiding out of fear for his life, Romeo Padica finally revealed to Lt. Cruz
(sic) of Regional Security Unit Intelligence Division, Lucena City that he (Padica) witnessed the killing of
Francis Banaga. Padica had met Lt. Cruz (sic) near the Lucena City Market and after making the
disclosure, surrendered to the authorities.

Appellant predictably presented a different narration of the events that led to his arrest. He
insists that he was the victim of an elaborate frame-up by the military authorities assigned to
investigate the case. Appellant claims that on February 8, 1978, the day that the victim disappeared, he
was in Batangas province, where he was a resident. In the early morning of February 10, 1978, he
decided to go to Manila, with Sto. Tomas, Batangas as his point of departure, in order to thresh out
some financial matters in connection with his business of buy and sell.

He arrived in Manila at around 9:00 A.M. and proceeded to the office of Mrs. Aquilina Marquez-
Marajas, his sister-in-law, at Mabini Street in Malate to talk to his brother, Leonardo. Not finding Leonardo
there, he then went to the house of his sister, Nelly Marajas, a neighbor of the Banaga family, at Gatchalian
Subdivision in Parañaque. He was about to board a tricycle at the main gate of the subdivision at around
9:30 A.M. when he was suddenly accosted by two Metrocom officers in civilian clothes who forcibly took him
to a car. Appellant was later brought at about 12:00 noon to the Siesta Court Hotel, also in Malate,
where he was repeatedly beaten and subjected to torture by his abductors who tried in vain to extract
information about the disappearance of Francis Banaga.

In the evening of the same day, he was taken out of the hotel and was taken by the men to an
unspecified safehouse where, once again, his ordeal at their hands was resumed. Unable to bear the
maltreatment any further, appellant then tried to fool them by admitting that the missing Francis Banaga
could be found in Paete, Laguna. He then led a group of his captors to the said place but they found no trace
of the missing boy. Incensed at the deception, the men took him back to the safehouse.
Later, appellant was again taken out of the safehouse and, together with another captive whom he
identified only as "Florentino," he was brought to an isolated sugarcane plantation. There Florentino led the
military team to the cadaver of Francis Banaga. Appellant and Florentino were later brought back to the
safehouse. The former claims that he was kept there for about two months, during which time he helped in
the maintenance and care of the safehouse and its surroundings. He also met at the safehouse .

RTC ruling:

After more than eight years of trial, the trial court rendered its assailed decision pronouncing the
guilt of appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua

Issue: Is the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom with murder?
Ruling: NO. We do not adopt as correct the nature or categorization of the offense for which he must
do penance.

At the outset, from the evidence on record, we are not convinced that the crime of kidnapping for
ransom was committed as charged in both the original and amended informations. Rather the crime
committed was murder, attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of
superior strength, and not the complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder as found by the
trial court without objection by either the prosecution or defense. The essential element in the crime
of kidnapping that the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his liberty, or that he was
transported away against his will with the primary or original intent to effect that restraint, is absent
in this case. The malefactors evidently had only murder in their hearts when they invited the trusting
Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna, and not to confine or detain him for any length of time or
for any other purpose.

We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic
purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but for purposes
thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the evident purpose of taking the
victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it cannot be inferred that the latter's
purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of their liberty, the subsequent killing of the
victims constitute the crime of murder, hence the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be
considered as a component felony to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder.

That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to kill
the victim can readily be deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-bloodedly snuffed
out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore,
there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from which it can be inferred that from the outset the
killers of the victim intended to exchange his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand
for ransom appears to have arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the
victim's family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and deliberation
among the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.

It will be observed that under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance that the
kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of ransom raises the imposable penalty to death. It is essential,
however, that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty of the victim be present. The fact
alone that ransom money is demanded would not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of
movement of the victim into the crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or
deprived of his liberty for some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic
intent of the accused. Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of
freedom of movement would at most constitute coercion.
In addition, Francis Banaga, then already fourteen years of age and a fourth year high school
student, was neither forced nor coerced unlawfully into going along with his killers. He voluntarily
boarded the car and went with the Marajas brothers to Laguna. The victim had every reason to trust
them as they were his neighbors in Gatchalian Subdivision. In fact, one of the brothers, accused Leonardo
Marajas alias "Eddie Boy," was his schoolmate and a playmate.
There was treachery since, under the aforestated circumstances, the victim was lured by his
killers into going with them to Laguna without the slightest inkling of their nefarious design, coupled
with the sudden and unexpected assault by the malefactors on the hapless victim in the isolated
sugarcane plantation in Calamba, which thereby divested him of an opportunity either to effectively
resist or to escape. Abuse of superior strength was likewise present, for the accused deliberately
resorted to their collective strength for the purpose of overpowering whatever feeble defense the poor
Francis Banaga could offer.
Superior strength should not be appreciated distinctly but should be considered as being absorbed
in and by treachery, and the same is true with regard to the allegation of craft. Hence, abuse of superior
strength may not be taken into account separately in this case, either as a qualifying or as an aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, although the trial court and both parties herein have again passed sub
silentio thereon, it is evident that the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was present since
appellant and his co-accused obviously and deliberately chose the desolation and isolation of the
sugarcane plantation to perpetrate the crime far from the gaze of potential eye-witnesses. This
circumstance is underscored by the fact that they committed the crime at about 12:00 noon, a time of
day when any passersby or assistance could hardly be expected in the vicinity of the locus criminis.
Appellant's defense that he was in another place at the time of Francis Banaga's
disappearance and killing must necessarily fail. Indeed, trite as our innumerable reiterations have already
made this statement of rejection, we must perforce again reprobate appellant's alibi as an inherently weak
defense decidedly easy of concoction.
Appellant's further denial that he was entrapped on the night of February 10, 1978 by the
authorities after receiving ransom money from Norma Camello must likewise be rejected. Both Norma
Camello and Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the police operatives, positively and without hesitation identified
appellant as the person who was collared at Luneta Park.
Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have given credence to the testimony of Romeo
Padica as it is incredible and inconsistent with the other evidence on record.
There is no merit in all the foregoing submissions and pretensions of appellant. It is true that the
testimony of a particeps criminis is to be invariably viewed with much caution, coming as it does from a
polluted source. However, in the case at bar and after a careful evaluation, we find no plausible reason
to depart from the favorable appreciation by the trial court of Padica's testimony which the said court
characterized as reasonable and probable, given in a clear, straightforward and convincing manner
thereby leaving no doubt in the mind of said court that he was telling the truth.
There is certainly nothing strange in the matter of the Marajas brothers requesting Padica to drive
for them. As testified to by the latter, he was then a close friend of one of the brothers, Leopoldo, who was
the one who requested him to drive, and the latter presumably had full confidence in him as he was at the
time a professional driver of taxicabs.
The fact that appellant and his co-accused carried out the murder of Francis Banaga in broad
daylight is hardly surprising. As pointedly noted by the Solicitor General, "it is not difficult to believe that
appellant and his co-accused committed the crime in broad daylight because there were no other persons at
the scene of the incident," as the same was inside a desolate sugarcane plantation in the outskirts of
Calamba, Laguna and the crime was perpetrated at noon of that day, as we have earlier explained.
Appellant has also clearly lost sight of the rule that the discharge of an accused to be a state
witness, lies within the sound discretion of the court before whom it is sought and in the exercise of
that discretion, it is not required that the court be absolutely certain that all the requirements for
the proper discharge of a co-accused be present. In the case under consideration, the prosecution
presented enough evidence to support its motion for the discharge of Padica. The trial court's reliance
thereon and its consequent finding on the basis thereof that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty
must be respected as it was in better position to evaluate such evidence.
As for the several hematomas and contusions that were discovered on the body of Francis
Banaga, it is entirely possible that the same were inflicted when the victim put up a furious struggle
for his life against his assailants. According to Padica, the Marajas brothers forcefully pulled out
Banaga from the car when they stopped by the roadside. They continued to inflict physical harm on
the boy while prodding him to proceed inside the sugarcane plantation until they reached a clearing
where, after Leopoldo Marajas delivered stabbing blows on the victim which may not have inflicted
knife wounds but contusions from the assailant's clenched fists, Leon Marajas, Jr. then fired away
with the fatal shots. All the while and just before he was shot to death, Padica narrated that the victim
desperately exerted all efforts to ward off the assault on his person.
Appellant also raises as an issue the questionable manner in which Padica surrendered, after nearly
three years of hiding.
We find his explanation satisfactory and credible, he had desired all along to surrender as he
had grown tired of constantly fearing for his life and of his difficult plight as a fugitive from justice.
He was obviously always on the lookout for persons in authority whom he could trust during his stay of two
to three months in Lucena City where he had in the meantime found work as a porter in the public market.
In the course of his stay there, he had heard about the "kind-hearted" Lt. Perez, a ranking officer of the local
constabulary.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of the crime of murder and
IMPOSING upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People V. Merano

Merano knew Marquez in the Beauty parlor where she was working and had grown to trust her. One
September 6, after a trip to a beach in Laguna, Marquez allegedly borrowed Merano’s then three-month old
daughter Justine to buy her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because Marquez would
sometimes bring things for Justine.However, Marquez failed to return the child. Merano was searching for
her child but to no avail. On November 11, 1998 she received a call from the accused who told her that she
will return Justine the following day and that she cannot do so now because her own son is confined in the
hospital. The accused also asked her to pay 50,000 for the expenses in taking care of Justine. However, the
accused did not return the child. As such Merano went to the house of the accused only to find out from the
maid that the accused was not there and that Justine only stayed in the house for a couple of days.

Merano went to see then Mayor Alfredo Lim to ask for his help, who in turn referred her to Inspector Eleazar
of San Pedro, Laguna, who assigned two police officers to accompany her to Marquez’s house. However, the
accused was not there.

Later onMerano gave her sworn statement to the police and filed a complaint against Marquez. On February
11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her daughter at Castillo’s house in
Tiaong, Quezon. The following day, Merano, accompanied by two policemen, went to the house of Castillo in
Quezon. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that Marquez sold Justine to him and his wife and that they
gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) supposedly for Merano who was asking for money. Castillo
even gave Merano a photocopy of the handwritten "Kasunduan" dated May 17, 1998, wherein Merano
purportedly gave Justine to the Castillo spouses.The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had
grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her because
the police advised her to go through the proper process as the Castillos might fight for their right to retain
custody of Justine. Merano then learned from Castillo that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the
Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the Reception and Study Center for Children of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.

Arguments of the defense:

1. She claims that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the elements of
the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is not present in the case
2. Marquez alleged that Merano offered Justine to her for adoption. Marquez told Merano that
she was not interested but she could refer her to her friend Modesto Castillo (Castillo).
3. SPO2 Fernandez, one of the police officers who accompanied Merano to Castillo’s house in
February 1999, was presented by the defense to prove that he was a witness to the execution of a
document wherein Merano gave up her right to Justine to the Castillo spouses.
4. It is illogical for her to give the whereabouts of Justine if she was guilty

Ruling:

The appeal is without merit

1. The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention falls under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, viz:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained,
or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.

She was not charged for illegal detention but for deliberate failure to return the minor to her parent after
being entrusted with the child’s custody. The Revised Penal Code considers it a crime when a person who
has been entrusted with the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to return said minor to his parent
or guardian. This may be found in Article 270, which reads:

Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore
the latter to his parents or guardians.25
This crime has two essential elements:

1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and( from both versions of the parties in the
case, it was established that marquez was entrusted with the custody of Justine. Marquez agreed to the
arrangement to temporarily take care of the child. For the first element to be present, it does not matter how
long the custody lasted.

2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians. (Marquez’s deliberate
failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to do so by the latter’s mother, shows that
the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.)

This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the essential elements of
this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being punished
is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his parents or
guardians.27 As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the Court further explained what "deliberate" as
used in Article 270 means:

Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply something more
than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously
wrong

2. Marquez’s insistence on Merano’s alleged desire and intention to have Justine adopted
cannot exonerate her because it has no bearing on her deliberate failure to return Justine to
Merano. If it were true that Marquez merely facilitated Justine’s adoption, then there was no more
need for Merano to contact Marquez and vice-versa, since Merano, as Marquez claimed, had direct
access to Castillo. The evidence shows, however, that Merano desperately searched for a way to
communicate with Marquez. Finally, even if it were true that Merano subsequently agreed to have
Castillo adopt Justine, as evidenced by the "KasunduansaPagtalikodsaKarapatan at Pagpapa-
amponsaIsangAnak," this would still not affect Marquez’s liability as the crime of kidnapping and
failure to return the minor had been fully consummated upon her deliberate failure to return Justine
to Merano.
3. Anent Marquez’s claim that SPO2 Fernandez’s testimony corroborated hers, a perusal of the
transcript of SPO2 Fernandez’s testimony will reveal that its focus was mainly on how the agreement
on Justine’s adoption came to be. The fact that SPO2 Fernandez may have corroborated Marquez’s
defense of adoption by testifying that he witnessed how Merano gave up her child for adoption to
Castillo is irrelevant. As we have discussed above, the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a
minor had been fully consummated way before the execution of the agreement in February 1999, the
validity of which is not in issue before us now. Moreover, even if Merano had indeed given up Justine
to Castillo on February 12, 1999, Merano’s consent to have Justine adopted in 1999 has no impact
on her demand to regain custody of Justine in 1998.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR. HC No. 00467
finding Aida Marquez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO
RETURN A MINOR under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED. No Costs.

G.R. No. 93475 June 5, 1991

ANTONIO A. LAMERA, petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March 1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an
owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly "hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries to Ernesto Reyes and PaulinoGonzal.

Two informations were filed against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with multiple physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) an
Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's
victim. The information reads as follows:

That on or about the 14th day of March, 1985, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, being the
driver of an owner-type jeep with Plate No. NCC-313 UV Pil. '85 which hit and bumped a motorized
tricycle with Plate No. NA-6575-MC '85 driven by Ernesto Reyes and as a consequence of which
PaulinoGonzal and Ernesto Reyes sustained physical injuries and lost consciousness, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously abandoned (sic) them and failed (sic) to help or render
assistance to them, without justifiable reason.

On 29 June 1987 the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig rendered its decision in Criminal Case No. 2793
finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner appealed.

Subsequently, petitioner filed this instant petition and he raises this sole issue: could there be a valid charge
for alleged abandonment under Article 275, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as basis for
prosecution. "2. Anyone who shall fail to help another whom he has accidentallywounded or injured" when, he
was previously charged with "reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries" under Article 265 (sic) of the Revised Penal Code?

He maintains the negative view and supports it with the argument that "[f]or the same act, that is, the
vehicular collision, one could not be indicted in two separate informations at the same time based on
"accident" and "recklessness', for there is a world of difference between "reckless imprudence" and
"accidentally'."

Issue: whether or not prosecution for negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the same Code.

The Supreme Court holds in the negative because said Articles penalize different and distinct
offenses. The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply
pursuant to existing jurisprudence.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the petitioner is actually invoking his right against double
jeopardy.1âwphi1 He, however, failed to directly and categorically state it in his petition or deliberately
obscured it behind a suggestion of possible resultant absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems
obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the three courts below. In any case, to do so would have
been a futile exercise. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in
Criminal Case No. 2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. 64294 before the Regional Trial
Court. As stated above, the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered on 29 June 1987, while his
arraignment in the latter took place only on 27 April 1989.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused.

He is charged for two separate offenses under the Revised Penal Code.

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or
identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same
facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.

The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly for separate offenses.1âwphi1 The first,
Criminal Case No. 64294, for reckless imprudence (Article 365), falls under the sole chapter (Criminal
Negligence) of Title Fourteen (Quasi Offenses) of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. The second,
Criminal Case No. 2793, for Abandonment of one's victim (par. 2, Art. 275), falls under Chapter Two
(Crimes Against Security) of Title Nine (Crimes Against Personal Liberty and Security) of Book Two of
the same Code.

Undoubtedly then, no constitutional, statutory or procedural obstacle barred the filing of the two
informations against petitioner.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PROCOPIO REYES, POLICARPIO NACANA, FLORENTINO CLEMENTE, HERMOGENES MALLARI,
MARCELINO MALLARI, CASTOR ALIPIO, and RUFINO MATIAS, defendants-appellants.

(60 Phil 369, G.R. No. L-40577 August 23, 1934)

FACTS:

While the pabasa was going on the evening of April 10, 1933, between 11 and 12 o'clock, the defendants
arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars, and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front of the
chapel. Alfonso Castillo, who was chairman of the committee in charge of the pabasa, tried to persuade them
to refrain from carrying out their plan, by reminding them of the fact that it was Holy Week and that it was
highly improper to construct a fence at that time of the evening. A verbal altercation ensued.

When the people attending the pabasa in the chapel and those who were eating in the yard thereof noticed
what was happening, they became excited and left the place hurriedly and in such confusion that dishes and
saucers were broken and benches toppled over. The pabasa was discontinued and it was not resumed until
after an investigation conducted by the chief of police on the following morning, which investigation led to
the filing of the complaint.

Many years ago the Clemente family by informal donation gave the land on which the old chapel was erected.
When it was destroyed, the present chapel was erected, and there is now a dispute as to whether the new
chapel is not now impinging on the land that belongs to the Clemente family. The appellants are partisans of
he Clemente family.

The appellants were then convicted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac of a violation of article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code or Offending the religious feelings.

ISSUE: Whether the defendants are guilty of Article 133 or unjust vexation.

HELD:

The defendants are not guilty of Article 133 but of unjust vexation. It is to be noted that article 133 of the
punishes acts "notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful." The construction of a fence, even though
irritating and vexatious under the circumstances to those present, is not such an act as can be designated
as "notoriously offensive to the faithful", as normally such an act would be a matter of complete indifference
to those not present, no matter how religious a turn of mind they might be.

The Court ruled that the act of building a fence was innocent and was simply to protect private property
rights. The fact that this argument is a pretense only is clearly shown by the circumstances under which the
fence was constructed, namely, late at night and in such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had
gathered to celebrate the pabasa and is further shown by the fact that many of the appellants saw fit to
introduce as their defense a false alibi.

Appellants are therefore acquitted of a violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code but found guilty of a
violation of article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.

CALUAG vs PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171511March 4, 2009

FACTS:
Around 4:00 in the afternoon, Nestor, one of the witnesses presented, learned that two of his guests from an
earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and Sentillas were drinking. When Nestor inquired
from several people including his own son Raymond what happened, Caluag butted in and
replied, Bakitkasamakabaroon?, and immediately boxed him without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband. Although she tried to
pacify them, they did not listen to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed
him. At around 6:00 p.m., Nestor told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.

At around 7:30 in the evening, when Julia and her son Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she
encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun,
poked it at her forehead, and said Saankapupunta, gusto moito? Despite this fearful encounter, she was still
able to proceed to the barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.

For the defense, Caluag stated that Nestor was drunk and unruly and blocked his way. He also stated that it
was Nestor who boxed on the face which caused him to fall down. Nestor pursued him and punched him
again. Thereafter, an unidentified man from the crowd armed with a knife went towards Nestor but Sentillas
timely interceded and pacified the man. Sentillas never boxed Nestor. Caluag also denied poking a gun at
Julia.

MeTC: found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of grave threats.

RTC & CA: Affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC.

Contention the petitioner:Petitioner argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime
committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is guilty of grace threats?

HELD:
Yes, the Court sustained the conviction of the petitioner.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a
condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always accompanied by
a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no
condition.

The acts committed by the accused constituted grave threats where there was a threat to kill or
shoot someone, which amounts to a crime, and the threat to kill was not subject to a condition.
The records show that at around 7:30 in the evening, Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall
to report the mauling of her husband which she witnessed earlier at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
On her way there, petitioner confronted her and pointed a gun to her forehead, while at the same time saying
“Saankapupunta, gusto moito?” Considering what transpired earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband,
petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious
physical injury on her person. Actions speak louder than words. Taken in the context of the surrounding
circumstances, the uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury evinced by
petitioner’s accompanying act. Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under
Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the
threat to kill was not subject to a condition.

The threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor
between grave threats on one hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, “shall threaten another
with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel,” since it presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong
will not constitute a crime.

People v. Ty

FACTS:

Vicente Ty AND Carmen Ty were charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an
information filed by 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owners, proprietors, managers and
administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such said accused had the custody of Arabella Somblong, a minor,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another and with deliberate intent to deprive the parents of
the child of her custody, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the custody of
said Arabella Sombong to her parents by giving said custody of subject minor to another person without the
knowledge and consent of her parents.
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then only seven
(7) months old, for treatment to the Sir John Medical and Maternity Clinic located at No. 121 First Avenue,
Grace Park, Kalookan City which was owned and operated by the accused-appellants. Arabella was
diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the child at the
clinic for speedy recovery. About three (3) days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be discharged but
complainant was not around to take her home. A week later, complainant came back but did not have
enough money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise confided to accused-
appellant Dr. Carmen Ty that no one would take care of the child at home as she was working. She then
inquired about the rate of the nursery and upon being told that the same was P50.00 per day, she decided to
leave her child to the care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was transferred from the ward to the
nursery. Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and accumulate. It was at this time that accused-
appellant Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she hire a yaya for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery
fee of P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a yaya was hired. Arabella was then again transferred from the
nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as residence for the hospital staff.

From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant. She neither visited her child nor called to inquire
about her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to
get in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful as she left no address or telephone number where she
can be reached. This development prompted Dr. Ty to notify the barangay captain of the childs
abandonment.[6] Eventually, the hospital staff took turns in taking care of Arabella.[7]

Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at
the clinic, suggested during a hospital staff conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian who could
give the child the love and affection, personal attention and caring she badly needed as she was thin and
sickly. The suggestion was favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the child to her aunt, Lilibeth
Neri.[8]

In 1992, complainant came back to claim the daughter she abandoned some five (5) years back.

When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed a petition for habeas corpus against accused-appellants
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Said petition was however denied due course and was
summarily dismissed without prejudice on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having
been perpetrated in Kalookan City.

Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against accused-appellants.

Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for dishonorable conduct against accused-appellant Dr.
Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of the Professional Regulation Commission. This case was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, this time against the alleged guardians of her
daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and Lilibeth Neri. On January 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision granting the petition and ordering the guardians to immediately deliver the person of Cristina Grace
Neri to the complainant, the court having found Cristina to be the complainants child. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, however, said decision was reversed on the ground that the guardians were not unlawfully
withholding from the complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after finding that Cristina and
complainants daughter are not one and the same person.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of kidnapping and failure to return a minor.

HELD:

Accused-appellants are not guilty of the crime charged.

This Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial
courts ruling that complainant has rightful custody over the child, Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being
identical with complainants daughter, Arabella. The Court discoursed, thusly:

Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed
before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown to be petitioners daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina.

In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate
existence of petitioners child, Arabella, from that of private respondents foster child, Cristina.

We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is petitioners own witness, testified in court that, together with
Arabella, there were several babies left in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it was Arabella
or some their baby that was given to private respondents. Petitioners own evidence shows that, after the
confinement of Arabella in the clinic in 1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when she visited the
clinic. This corroborates the testimony of petitioners own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was physically
confined in the clinic from November, 1987 to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion in her
counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was in the custody of the hospital until April, 1989. All this, when
juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of private respondents that they obtained custody of Cristina in
April, 1988 and had her baptized at the Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to the conclusions
that Cristina is not Arabella.

Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, herself a mother and the ponente of the herein assailed
decision, set the case for hearing on August 30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing petitioners
demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She made the following personal but relevant manifestation:

The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four children, wanted to see how petitioner as an alleged
mother of a missing child supposedly in the person of Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost
child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled hearing of this case late, and she walked inside the
courtroom looking for a seat without even stopping at her alleged daughters seat; without even casting a
glance on said child, and without even that tearful embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving
mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed no signs
of endearment and affection expected of a mother who had been deprived of the embrace of her little child for
many years. The conclusion or finding of undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that petitioner-appellee
is not the mother of Cristina Neri has been given support by aforestated observation.

Since we hold that petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor
Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the
validity of the mode by which private respondents acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.

Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the evidence adduced in this case accused-appellants
must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged, there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to
return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not conclusively shown and established to be complainants daugther,
Arabella.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong as one
and the same person, still, the instant criminal case against the accused-appellants must fall.

Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code
can be had, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody of the
minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential
element herein is that the offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually
punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor, as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather the
deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
Said failure or refusal, however, must not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as to oblige the
parents or the guardians of the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody.

Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article must imply something more than mere negligence; it
must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong, foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.

In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accused-
appellants to restore the custody of the complainants child to her. When the accused-appellant learned that
complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent wanton neglect, they tried their
best to help herein complainant find the child as the latter was no longer under the clinics care. Accused-
appellant Dr. Ty did not have the address of Arabellas guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe
Mallonga who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians residence and informed
them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back.

The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the
finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on their part to restore the child to her mother. Evidence
is simply wanting in this regard.

It is worthy to note that accused-appellants conduct from the moment the child was left in the clinics care
up to the time the child was given up for guardianship was motivated by nothing more than an earnest
desire to help the child and a high regard for her welfare and well-being.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


vs.
CARMEN LIM @ "MAMENG LIM"

Facts:
Aida Villanueva, 10 years old, and her sister, Avelyn, 7 years old were sent by their father Charito to buy
rice. They went to the pier, to meet their mother left when she did not arrive. They went to Helen Theatre to
see a picture. In front of the theatre was the store and residence of accused Carmen Lim. Carmen called
them "Come here Nene" and asked them to get inside her house by passing through the front door.

They conversed and Lim gave Aida and Avelyn rice and kangkong for lunch. Afterwards, Aida was told by the
accused to take a bath and Lim gave her a dress to wear.

The prosecution alleged that from July 1, 1986 to July 15, 1986, Aida Villanueva was detained in the house
of the accused doing household chores. Avelyn was brought by Lim's sister in Cebu on the same day they
arrived in the house of the accused.

On July 15, 1986, the father, Charito found Aida in the house of Lim. He asked the Lim to let Aida go home
with him, but she refused. So, he left and came back the following day accompanied by Sgt. Antonio Ariate
who had with him an armalite. Sgt. Ariate identified himself to the accused and told her that he was taking
Aida with him. Lim let Aida go.

According to accused Lim, she saw Aida and Avelyn in front of her store and inquired from them about their
parents. The sisters claimed that they were driven away by their father and were not given any food to eat.
Lim took pity on them and gave them food and allowed them to take a bath. Concerned for their safety, she
offered to shelter the sisters. As Lim’s younger sister was visiting at that time, appellant proposed to Aida to
let Avelyn accompany appellant's sister to the latter's home. Aida agreed, on condition that she and Avelyn
could meet every week. Aida stayed in appellant's residence for about two weeks. To help in the house, Aida
would go to the market to buy bread, fish and salt for appellant's household. She also helped watch over
appellant's store from time to time.

Lim said that on the morning of 15 July 1986, Charito Villanueva, arrived at her store and introduced
himself to Lim as the father of the two sisters. He said that he was going to bring the children home but Aida
refused to go with her father. When asked by appellant why she refused, Aida replied that she was afraid
that her father would beat her up. Charito returned to Lim's store the next day accompanied by Sgt. Antonio
Ariate, Jr. Charito again talked to Aida to convince her to go home with him which this time, Aida agreed.

Issue: W/N the trial court erred in convicting appellant

Held: Yes.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction.

There is no kidnapping in this case. The two minors voluntarily entered the appellant's residence through
the front entrance. The fact of detention which is an essential element in the crime charged, was not clearly
established. There was no showing that there was actual confinement or restriction of the person of the
offended party. Lim's residence has a store fronting the street where many customers presumably come and
go. The place is busy with a movie house in front. There is no indication that Aida was locked up, physically
restrained of her liberty or unable to communicate with anyone.

There are other circumstances which create grave doubts in Aida's version of her two week detention. In her
testimony, Aida claimed that she attempted to escape three times but she was not able to do so but it was
not explained clearly how and why she did not succeed. When Aida saw her father for the first time, she
inexplicably did not shout for help or run to him but just observed him and the appellant talk for half an
hour. The actuations of both Aida and her father are highly incredible and are not the natural reactions of a
ten-year old child who has been detained against her will for two weeks and who has tried unsuccessfully to
escape three times.

The fact that her father was already there was the perfect opportunity for Aida to try and get away from the
appellant. Aida also did not go with her father because the appellant allegedly told her not to go. For
someone who had been detained against her will, as between her father and her detainor, Aida would have
disregarded the appellant's order and would have run to her father. Neither is it believable that a father who
has been desperately looking for his two minor daughters for two weeks would just calmly accept the
appellant's refusal to let go of his daughter.

It is apparent that Aida had free access going in and out of the appellant's residence. In fact, Aida could have
escaped at that particular period of time. She was three feet away from the appellant when Sgt. Ariate saw
her so she could have made a run for it if she really wanted to go.

The unbelievable and conflicting evidence of the prosecution strengthens the version of the appellant that
she took pity on the two runaway children and decided to give them food and shelter. Whether or not she
treated them like unpaid servants is not in issue. What is apparent from the records is the absence of proof
showing kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Another circumstance that belies the kidnapping charge is the unexplained delay in the lodging of the
complaint against the appellant. An entire week passed before the complaint was lodged on July 23, 1986.
Also, there is no motive whatsoever for Lim to kidnap the two children. She is a woman of sufficient means.
Had she wanted to hire an additional maid, she could certainly afford to hire another one without going to
the extent of committing a crime as serious as kidnapping. No motive was ever propounded by the
prosecution. Thus, we apply the precept that though proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction, yet a
void in the evidence in this respect discloses a weakness in the case for the prosecution.

Finally, the execution of the affidavit of desistance by Charito Villanueva, stating that his daughters were not
detained after all by the appellant taken together with the circumstances abovementioned has the effect of
exculpating the appellant from the charge of kidnapping. The instant case falls under the exception where an
affidavit of desistance is given due consideration. Significantly, the father of the two girls testified in open
court on November 24, 1987 that he was withdrawing the case and that his children were not detained. The
prosecution had every opportunity to cross-examine or tear apart the retraction and prove that the facts
were as earlier alleged but it failed to do so.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABDILA SILONGAN, ET. AL. (G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003)

Penalties Modified

FACTS: On March 16, 1996, businessman Alexander Saldaña went to Sultan Kudarat with with Americo
Rejuso Jr., Ervin Tormis, and Victor Cinco to meet a certain Macapagal Silongan alias Commander
Lambada. The four victims were taken to the mountain hideout in Maguindanao. The kidnappers demanded
P15 million pesos
from Alexander’s wife for his release,
it was later reduced to twelve million pesos after negotiations. The release was made in effect of the exchange
for a relative of the kidnappers who was caught delivering a ransom note to Alexander's family. Only eight of
the accused were brought to trial, namely, Abdila, Macapagal, and Teddy, all surnamed Silongan, Akmad
Awal, Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon Pasawilan. After trial, the RTC rendered
judgment and named the seven (7) accused Abdila, and Macapagal, all surnamed Silongan, Akmad Awal,
Rolly Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap, and Ramon Pasawilan as guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
was charged with Kidnapping for Ransom and sentenced Death Penalty. Teddy Silongan was acquitted.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THEIR VERDICT OF IMPOSING THE DEATH
PENALTY TO THE ACCUSED WITH INDEMNIFICATION DAMAGES AND MORAL DAMAGES.

RULING:

NO. Considering that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the abduction of Alexander Saldaña,
Americo Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis, and Victor Cinco were for the purpose of extorting ransom, the trial court
correctly imposed the death penalty. As already stated, the trial court ordered the appellants to pay, jointly
and severally, Alexander Saldaña and Americo Rejuso, Jr., indemnification damages of P50,000 each and
moral damages of P100,000 and P50,000, respectively. The court affirmed the award of P100,000 to
Alexander and P50,000 to Americo as moral damages. The amount of moral anxiety suffered by the two
victims is in no wise the same. Undoubtedly, Alexander's family had undergone greater distress in the
uncertainty of seeing Alexander again. Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659
is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar

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