The Challenge of Populism

for Representative
Democracy
Laura Bartley - 2016

2256 Words

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Introduction

“On one side, then, we face the problem of peoples who do not aspire to
democratic freedom, and on the other, of democracies we do not
want–“free” peoples who bring to power theocracies, empires, terror or
hate-filled regimes of ethnic cleansing, gated communities, citizenship
stratified by ethnicity or immigration status, aggressively neoliberal
postnational constellations, or technocracies promising to fix social ills by
circumventing democratic processes and institutions.”

The above quote from Brown (2010, para. 24) highlights the current so-called “crisis of
representative democracy” that has swept across Europe, for instance the success and
widespread resonance of the ‘No/Leave’ Campaign and UKIP during the 2016 Brexit
referendum; and the post-accession democratic backsliding in Hungary under Orbán.
Additionally, populist parties are now in power in several EU member states, either as
majority governments or in coalition governments, with populist parliamentarians accounting
for a quarter of the European Parliament (Grabbe and Lehne 2016)). Therefore the purpose of
this essay is to analyse the significance of increased populism on the system of representative
democracy throughout Europe and furthermore, to identify whether the rise of populist
parties and political leaders strengthens, or rather weakens democracies in this region.
The widespread disappointment increasingly associated with representative
democracy - alongside the perceived failures of traditional political parties in delivering their
pre-election democratic and economic promises - has, as this paper will argue, resulted in the
decline of the political legitimacy and popular support of these systems.
From the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, the emergence of populist movements
occurred regularly across European democracies with many scholars referring to the current
phenomenon as a ‘populist zeitgeist’ (Mudde 2004). Therefore with specific reference to the
current European context, this essay will argue that populism’s (re)emergence and recent
success is connected to the crisis of the democratic system (and in particular the
representative aspect of democracy). Moreover, populist movements can be seen to promote
more direct forms of democracy, as whilst often heavily influenced by nationalist and
anti-immigration rhetoric they provide an alternative for citizens disillusioned with the no
longer representative “‘Eurocrats’ and the opportunistic mainstream national governments

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across Europe” (Georgiev 2014, p. 119). As such firstly, the essay will begin by discussing
and defining the concepts of representative democracy and populism in their current
European context. The essay will then proceed to a more indepth discussion of the failures of
representative democracy in order to show the growing appeal of European populism as a
legitimate political and democratic alternative for citizens. Finally, the essay will conclude by
looking at the level of threat which populism may pose for the continuation and consolidation
of representative democracy across Europe.

The Contested Concepts of Representative Democracy and Populism

Much confusion tends to arise in debates concerning the issue of ‘populism’ due to the high
levels of ambivalence and abstruseness surrounding the term. Indeed the array of definitions
highlights the elusiveness of populism as described succinctly by Taggart “populism has an
essential chameleonic quality that means it always takes on a hue of the environment in
which it occurs” (2002, p. 6). However the widely used and accepted definition provided by
Mudde (2004, p. 544) emphasises the importance presence of the divide between the ‘elite’
and the ‘people’, as populism is viewed:
“as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the
corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
volonte [will] of the people.”

Under this thin form of ideology, populism can thus emerge in several forms, but it is
important to recognise the essential illiberal nature of this belief as it rejects fundamental
liberal checks and balances, and has a rigid understanding of the ‘will of the people’ that does
not tolerate the existence of pluralism or compromise (Krastev 2007; Zakaria 1997). This
lack of openness to negotiate is what Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, p. 4) describe as
populists’ self-perception as ‘true democrats’ who voice the ignored opinions of the general
public and unmask the societal inequalities which the established authorities persistently
overlook and ignore. However the importance of this is that populism is still seen as being
within ​the realms of the representative democratic system - despite being an
anti-establishment or anti-elite movement. Carothers (2016) claims that populism is set to be

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a challenge for established democracies due to the deep-seated nature the factors enabling
populist growth in Western democracies, for example the continued economic
decline/stagnation; lack of support for established political parties; insecurity and fear due to
increased migration; and advancements in communication technology.
It follows that in order to understand how populism strengthens or weakens
representative democracy in Europe to understand the concept of democracy as it has
occurred across the region. Firstly, much like populism and in spite of the vast amount of
literature within the field of democratisation and democracy studies, it is still hard to exactly
pin down the concept of democracy, let alone account for the factors causing its apparent
decay/decline. Indeed the heralding of a ‘democratic rollback’ (Diamond 2008) followed a
decade of severe global challenges such as the 2008 economic crisis in Western democracies,
the decline in power of the US and European Union coupled with the growth of China and
Russia. In many ways it is the rapid globalisation of the world which poses a challenge to the
understanding of democracy, as its meaning of ​rule by the demos (or people) loses
significance in a world that no longer consists of geographically contained sovereign entities.
Furthermore as Tormey (2015) has highlighted, the old collective identities on which
traditional representational democracy was created and founded no longer exist in the modern
era.

The Failures of Representative Democracies

Lack of Representation and Political Legitimacy

One of the main reasons attributed to the rise of populist (far-right and left parties) in
Europe is due to this ‘crisis of representative democracy’ and how this feeling of not being
represented results in an undermining of the legitimacy of the entire system (Georgiev 2014,
p. 116) . In light of recent political events such as Brexit and the election of Donald Trump
in the United States, it is clear that a considerable proportion of European citizens view state
institutions and parties as illegitimate. Thus we can say that one of the failures of
representative democracies in Europe today is their increasing lack of political legitimacy in
the eyes of the electorate. Some point to the fact that this is due to the distancing of the
political elite from the general population - the growth of ‘the rule by the elites’ concept. This

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language of anti-establishment and ‘rule by the elite’ is extremely present in the political
rhetoric of populist parties within Europe at the moment. For example following the election
of Donald Trump, Frauke Petry, the Alternative for Deutschland party leader commented
how Trump’s success “is a triumph of the American people, a victory of ​ordinary people over
the political ​establishment.​ It’s a victory over the politically correct ​globalist elites ​who show
little interest in the well-being of the people,” (cited in (Aisch and Ashkenas 2016, emphasis
added). This language was repeated by other far-right leaders such as Le Front National’s
Marine Le Pen (ibid, emphasis added) commending Trump's election as “a sign of hope for
those who cannot bear wild globalization, who cannot bear the political life led by the ​elites​.”
Therefore it is clear that this deep-rooted mistrust of the ‘establishment’ has moved from
formerly fringe-group political parties like the FN or UKIP, and now entered the mainstream
garnering much popular support. Yet in spite of this the tension between the political elites
and the disenfranchised citizens is only growing with:
‘the European elite remains deeply committed to the project (i.e. the
European Union)... the cost of this elite cohesion is a growing distance
between governments and the governed. By closing ranks, the elite has in
effect ensured that there is no moderate voices dissenting from policy
orthodoxy...And the European elite’s habit of disguising ideology as
expertise, of pretending that what it wants to do is what must be done, has
created a deficit of legitimacy (Krugman 2014, cited in Georgiev 2014 p.
118).

Disconnect between political parties & citizens

Another failure of representative democracy is linked to rigidity of traditional political
parties, the inability for citizens to identify with these parties, and the incapability of these
organisation to adapt in the modern, globalised world. As argued by Tormey (2015, p. 84)
“politics is undergoing a transformation in terms of citizens’ ability and willingness to be
represented by others, and particularly by ‘politicians.’” The result of Brexit saw the wrath of
the public against being told ‘what must be done’ by experts and this was again repeated in
the election of a non-politician in Donald Trump. The fact that fewer people are turning out
to vote in elections or choosing to joining political parties signals the disinterest and lack of
interest by citizens in the current political system (Tormey 2015).

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Populism and European Democracy - the threats and challenges?

“The question is not whether populism is here to stay but whether democracy is about to go.”
(Lagodinsky 2016)

The pressing issue in terms of the future of representative democracy is does the rise
in populism threaten the persistence of democratic rule in Europe, or on the contrary does the
arrival of a dissenting movement against a bureaucratic, non-representative system actually
strengthen democracy in the region? Following the claims put forth by Tormey 2015, I argue
that populism can mean the reinvigoration of democratic politics from the bottom-up with the
arrival of a “politics of the street, of the squares, of micro-parties, pop-up parties, and
demonstrations,” which may bring about changes in how representative democracy is viewed
but nonetheless could result in increased political engagement and radical change. This is
why is it so important to echo the argument put forth by Georgiev (2014, p. 116) that mere
political representation in a democracy via means of election is meaningless once the subjects
​ herefore populism is the perfect
no longer feel represented but rather feel ​subjected. T
mechanism of attacking the system from within, “using and playing by the rules of the
game...legitimising itself through the system.”
In this vein, populism also has the potential in its most ugly and extreme form, to be
hugely challenging for representative democracy as it denies limitations or restrictions on the
expression of ‘the will of the public’, thus undermining the concept of protecting minorities
or separation of political institutions. This results in populist parties having the tendency to be
greatly influenced by public opinion and attitudes, and thus as described by Decker (2003)
this can lead to populist governments choosing to make prompt and decisive policy actions
based on public response as opposed to more protracted negotiations and ultimately leads to a
lower quality of decision making.
That said, the below graph illustrates the diversity and complexity of the political
parties we refer to as ‘populist’ across Europe, and whilst it is clear that all are
anti-establishment, there is also significant differences between left (e.g.Podemos) and right
(e.g. UKIP) leaning political parties.

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Table 1: Populist Parties in Europe. Adapted from Aisch and Ashkenas, 2016.

Whilst the illiberal democracies we see take hold in Hungary and Poland challenge the
consolidation of representative democracy as previously seen in Europe, it is crucial to
recognise that many across Europe still believe in liberal, progressive values. So that in the
post-truth society that has unfolded the quality of political discussion has in many regards
nose-dived and a majority of voters appear to have abandoned their trust in their political
parties or leaders in favour of implementing aspects of a more direct democracy. The
dominance of populism should be seen as an opportunity for representative democracy to
evolve under its current globalised context and be made more transparent, participatory, and
responsive to the needs of the citizens. Additionally, whilst politicians need to reject the
xenophobia and anti-immigration rhetoric that often appears in populist speech, there is also a
need for public representative to become more accessible and accountable, and further efforts
made to ensure that civil society is actively and consistently part of the decision making
process. If representative democracy is to survive the challenges posed by populism it must
overcome its failings which enabled the rise of the populist parties.

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Conclusion

This essay has explored the significance of increased populism on the system of
representative democracy throughout Europe and has sought to ascertain whether the rise of
populist parties and political leaders strengthens, or on the other hand, weakens democracies
in this region. It is clear that the rise of populism has followed the growing inability of
representative democracy to fulfill the pre-elections promises made or the desires of the
citizens. Moreover it is clear that though antagonistic towards the existing representative
democratic institutions and players, populist movements can also be seen to promote more
direct forms of democracy providing an alternative mechanism of political engagement for
citizens who would otherwise remain disillusioned and disengaged with the entire system.
Therefore in conclusion, by analysing the impact of the increasing presence of populist
political parties and leaders in representative democracies, we can conclude that the
challenges which populism may pose for the continuation and consolidation of representative
democracy across Europe have emerged in response to the failings of this system in meeting
the needs of its citizens and thus provides the opportunity to reform and rejuvenate a
decaying system.

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