Santos vs Republic
Petitioner Santos spouses seek to adopt the 4-year uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for
old sickly brother of the wife. It was established that the
petitioners are both 32 years of age and have maintained a
conjugal home of their own. They do not have a child of their
own blood nor has any one of them been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Luis E. Santos, Jr., is a lawyer, with
business interests in a textile development enterprise and the
IBA electric plant, and is the general manager of Medry Inc.
and the secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His co-
petitioner-wife is a nurse by profession. The parents of the
child testified that they entrusted him to the petitioners who
reared and brought him up.
Issue: Can a sister adopt her own brother?
Held:
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those
persons who may not adopt, and it has been shown that
petitioners-appellants herein are not among those prohibited
from adopting. Article 339 of the same code names those who
cannot be adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is
under consideration, is not one of those excluded by the law.
Article 338, on the other hand, allows the adoption of a natural
child by the natural father or mother, of other illegitimate
children by their father or mother, and of a step-child by the
step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of course,
necessary to remove all doubts that adoption is not prohibited
even in these cases where there already exist a relationship of
parent and child between them by nature. To say that adoption
should not be allowed when the adopter and the adopted are
related to each other, except in these cases enumerated in
Article 338, is to preclude adoption among relatives no matter
how far removed or in whatever degree that relationship might
be, which in our opinion is not the policy of the law. The
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration.
Republic vs Court of Appeals
James Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United
States of America, married Lenita Mabunay, a Filipino Citizen,
who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country.
The spouses jointly filed a petition with the RTC to adopt the
minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with
the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as
well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption. The RTC
rendered a decision granting the petition.
Issue: Can the spouses adopt the minors?
Held:
While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted
to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in
paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can
qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). Lenita may not thus adopt
alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the
husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184. Art 185 provides: Art. 185. Husband
and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1)
When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
As amended by Executive Order 91,
Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for
both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an
alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality.
The Family Code has resolved any possible
joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances: (1)
When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the
other.
It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the
Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find
governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt
or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in
accordance with this Code.
Republic vs Toledano
Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who
are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph
Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially
capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor.
Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up
to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been
under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon
gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a
widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and
inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the
petition.
Issue: Can the spouses adopt Solomon?
Held:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the
Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly
barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209
expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to
adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen
who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who
seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse;
or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to
adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity
of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions
may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on
inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.
Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other
hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of
Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She
sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition
for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the
husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must
jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one
spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When
one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
Cang vs Court of Appeals
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who
were married, begot three children. During the early years of
their marriage, the Cang couple's relationship was undisturbed.
Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her
husband's alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie subsequently
filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They
had an agreement for support of the children and that Anna
Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent of
Herbert. Petitioner left for the US.
Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna
Marie filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon
learning of the adoption, Herbert went back to the Philippines
to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the
court.
Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the
written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter
has abandoned them?
Held:
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its
retroactivity "insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws." As amended by the Family Code, the statutory provision
on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The written
consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)
the parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality.
Based on the foregoing, it is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written
consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a
requisite for its validity.
As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of
law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable
for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the
requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the
parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane
or hopelessly intemperate."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's
conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his
children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount
to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss
in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for
his children. He maintained regular communication with his
wife and children through letters and telephone. He used to
send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Cervantes vs Fajardo
The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo
and Gina Carreon, who are common-law husband and wife.
Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's
sister and brother-in-law, the herein petitioners Zenaida
Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took
care and custody of the child when she was barely two (2)
weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child
by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina
Carreon.
The adoptive parents received a letter from the
respondents demanding to be paid the amount of
P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child.
Petitioners refused to accede to the demand. Subsequently,
the respondents took the child.
Issue: Can respondents take back their child?
Held:
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare is paramount. The
provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under
five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies
regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is
the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the resources and moral as well as social
standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion.
It is undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is
legally married to a woman other than respondent Gina
Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law
husband and wife relationship. His open cohabitation with co-
respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor that
desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an
upright and moral-minded person. Besides, respondent Gina
Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but
who eventually left her and vanished. Upon the other hand,
petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally,
physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and giving her a future better than what the natural
mother, whp is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit
relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by
petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents.
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of
dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the
adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse
of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both
spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and
custody of the adopted child and exercise parental authority
and responsibility over him.
Sayson vs Court of Appeals
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children,
namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,
1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later. Their properties
were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together
with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for
partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and
Isabel Sayson. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own
complaint, this time for the accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children.
Both cases were decided in favor Delia, et al on the
basis of practically the same evidence. The Judge declared in
his decision that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree
of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced
by her birth certificate. Consequently, the three children were
entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation.
Held:
In consequence of the above observations, we hold
that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children,
are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased
couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil
Code: Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants
succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction
as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different
marriages. An adopted child succeeds to the property of the
adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of
Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the
distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under
Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived, which
shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children.