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Mind, New Series, Vol. 82, No. 327. (Jul., 1973), pp. 321-330.
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Fri Jun 22 07:33:21 2007
VOL. LXXXII NO. 3271 [July, 1973
MIND
A QUARTERLY REVIEW
PSYCHOLOGY A N D PHILOSOPHY
T O DO OTHERWISE
BY WINSTONNESBITTand STEWARTCANDLISH
WE shall call the following argument, " argument A " :
Premiss 1
If a man could not have done otherwise than he in fact did,
then he is not responsible for his action. (That is, ' He could
not have done otherwise ' is a recognised excuse.)
Premiss 2
If determinism is true, it is true of every action that the
agent could not have done otherwise.
Conclusion
If determinism is true, no one is ever responsible for his
actions.
Argument A sets out, in broad outline, the reasoning by
which those who think that determinism rules out the possibility
of moral responsibility have often arrived a t their view. The
attempted proof contains no obvious fallacy. We shall try to
show that it does, however, fail to establish its conclusion;
but also that this failure is not for the reasons usually presented by
critics of the argument.
The first premiss seems difficult to deny, and it has even been
suggested that it states a logical truth.l At any rate, philo-
sophers who wish to avoid the conclusion of argument A usually
accept the first premiss and concentrate their attacks on the
By Roderick Chisholm, in his contribution to Determinism and Free-
dom, ed. Sidney Hook (Collier Books, 1961), p. 157.
11 321
322 WINSTON NESBITT AND STEWART CANDLISH :
J. L. Austin, ' Ifs and Cans ', Philosophical Papers (Oxford University
The title of Ayers' book msy seem to cast doubt on our clsim that he
doubt is illusion, caused by his use of the word ' determinism ' (see his
" did " was not an action1; and the question of his responsibility,
in any sense stronger than that of mere causal instrumentality, for
what got done, can arise only on the mistaken assumption that it
was a result of his action. It is, of course, true that if one is
literally incapable of doing other than one does, then one cannot
be morally responsible for what gets done; but all this amounts
merely to the fact that a man is directly responsible only for
his actions as opposed to mere movements of his body.
In trying to show that determinism is compatible with our
having the power to do otherwise than we do, then, Ayers and
Nowell-Smith do not show that it is compatible with the ful-
filment of the condition of moral responsibility which is im-
plicitly stated in the first premiss of argument A. However, it
might be objected, why should they be criticised for failing to
show that determinism is consistent with the fulfilment of this
condition? They do show that it is consistent with the ful-
filment of a condition of moral responsibility, namely an agent's
capacity to do otherwise than he in fact did; and presumably this
is all that they were trying to do. Two points can be made in
reply to this objection.
In the first place, Nowell-Smith and Ayers do not distinguish
clearly, as we have tried to do, between these two conditions.
While discussing the analysis of uses of ' could have ' in ' moral
contexts ' . 2 Nowell-Smith considers ' excuses ' ranging
u u
from
physical compulsion to a bad upbringing, apparently assuming
1 There are many intermediate cases which might seem t o cast doubt
upon this contention. For example, if I stop running because of a bad
stitch, I have performed a n action, but one may want to say that I lack
the power to go on running. Whether I do or not, in fact, is unclear, but
what is clear is that if I undeniably lack the capacity to go on (e.q. I collapse
from exhaustion), my not going on is not a n action of mine in the sense,
e.q., elucidated by Charles Taylor on p. 29 of The Explanation of Behaviour
(Routledge, 1964), where ' it is not only necessary that it end in the result
or meet the criterion by which actions of this kind are characterized, but
it must also be the case that the agent's intention or purpose was to achieve
this result or criterion.' The addition of a further necessary condition
for action, namely that the intention be productive of the result (i.e. it is
not action if the intended result is accidentally achieved), makes the
point even clearer.
Nowell-Smith, op. cit., ch. 20. His implicit conflation of ' He could
not have acted otherwise ' with ' He lacked the c a ~ a c i"t vto do otherwise '
&
there is ' a clear and common sense in which, for example, a man
who has been decapitated necessarily dies, or c a n not go on
living '.
0
We have argued so far that the defence ' He could not have
done otherwise ' is to be interpreted neither as ' He was in-
capable of doing otherwise ', nor as ' His action was causally
necessary '. Won-, then, is it to be interpreted? The question
has been partially answered in part I, but a further example will
clarify the issue.
Suppose that we are defending the action of a bank teller
who has handed money over to a bandit a t gunpoint, and we say
' He couldn't have done anything else; he had a gun pointed a t
him '. The person to whom we say this replies, ' K h a t do you
mean, couldn't have done anything else? He was quite capable
of hanging on to the money, wasn't he?' Assuming that this is
not intended as a joke in poor taste, a natural reply would be
' We don't mean that he \\-as i9zcapable of doing anything else.
What we're getting a t is that it would have been unreasonable to
have expected him to do anything else.' If we were then pressed
to explain why it would have been unreasonable to have expected
the teller to do anything else. we n~ouldprobably point out that
the presence of the gun provided him with overwhelming reasons
against doing anything else, that is, for doing what he did.
And this, we suggest, is what must be the case for the " excuqing
Taylor, op. cit., p. 225.
328 WINSTON NESBITT AND STEWART CANDLISH :
expression ", ' He couldn't have done otherwise ' to be approp-
riate: there must have been circumstances which provided the
agent with overwhelming, or very good, reasons for doing what
he did. For first, in all cases in which such an expression is an
appropriate defence, the factor which makes it a defence is in
fact such as to provide the agent with good or overwhelming
reasons for doing what he did. I t is difficult to imagine how this
contention might be proved; we have tried to show that it is
plausible, and can only ask anyone who thinks differently to
produce counter-examples. Secondly, to say ' He had over-
whelming (or good) reasons for doing what he did ' is itself a
sound defence, and it would be implausible to claim that although
this defence is a h a v s available whenever ' He could have done
otherwise ' is appropriate, some other defence is in fact invoked.
It may be thought that we have already had occasion to
mention some cases which constitute counter-examnles to what
has just been said. It will be remembered that ~ y & makes s his
remark, that the " excusing expressions " ' He could not help it '
and ' He could not have done otherwise ' are used even when it is
not meant that the agent was literallv inca~ableof doingw other-
w