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    From the 1920s Afghanistan maintained a small air arm that depended heavily upon outside assistance. Starting in 2005, the United States led an air advisory campaign to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF). In 2007 a formal joint/combined entity, led by a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, began air advisor work with Afghan airmen. Between 2007 and 2011, these efforts made modest progress in terms of infrastructures, personnel and aircraft accessions, and various training courses. But by 2010, advisors increasingly viewed AAF command and control (C2) as a problem area that required significant improvement if a professional air force was to be built. In the spring of 2011, major institutional changes to AAF C2 procedures were being introduced when nine U.S. air advisors were killed. The attack was the worst single-incident loss of U.S. Air Force personnel in a deployed location since 1996 and the worst insider-attack since 2001. From the day of that tragic event, the cultural chasm between Afghanistan and the West became more apparent. This dilemma continues with no end in sight to an air advisory mission of uncertain long-term value.

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    From the 1920s Afghanistan maintained a small air arm that depended heavily upon outside assistance. Starting in 2005, the United States led an air advisory campaign to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF). In 2007 a formal joint/combined entity, led by a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, began air advisor work with Afghan airmen. Between 2007 and 2011, these efforts made modest progress in terms of infrastructures, personnel and aircraft accessions, and various training courses. But by 2010, advisors increasingly viewed AAF command and control (C2) as a problem area that required significant improvement if a professional air force was to be built. In the spring of 2011, major institutional changes to AAF C2 procedures were being introduced when nine U.S. air advisors were killed. The attack was the worst single-incident loss of U.S. Air Force personnel in a deployed location since 1996 and the worst insider-attack since 2001. From the day of that tragic event, the cultural chasm between Afghanistan and the West became more apparent. This dilemma continues with no end in sight to an air advisory mission of uncertain long-term value.

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    33 views1 page

    PRESS RELEASE: Flight Risk

    Uploaded by

    Naval Institute Press
    From the 1920s Afghanistan maintained a small air arm that depended heavily upon outside assistance. Starting in 2005, the United States led an air advisory campaign to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF). In 2007 a formal joint/combined entity, led by a U.S. Air Force brigadier general, began air advisor work with Afghan airmen. Between 2007 and 2011, these efforts made modest progress in terms of infrastructures, personnel and aircraft accessions, and various training courses. But by 2010, advisors increasingly viewed AAF command and control (C2) as a problem area that required significant improvement if a professional air force was to be built. In the spring of 2011, major institutional changes to AAF C2 procedures were being introduced when nine U.S. air advisors were killed. The attack was the worst single-incident loss of U.S. Air Force personnel in a deployed location since 1996 and the worst insider-attack since 2001. From the day of that tragic event, the cultural chasm between Afghanistan and the West became more apparent. This dilemma continues with no end in sight to an air advisory mission of uncertain long-term value.

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    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    Contact: Jacqline Barnes, (410) 295-1028, jbarnes@usni.org

    Flight Risk
    The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission
    in Afghanistan, 2005-2015
    “Flight Risk should be required reading for anyone interested in
    the mission of advising and assisting foreign military forces.”
    —Jon T. Hoffman, Chief Historian, U.S. Army and author of
    Chesty: The Story of LtGen Lewis B. Puller

    From the 1920s Afghanistan maintained a small air arm that


    depended heavily upon outside assistance. Starting in 2005, the
    United States led an air advisory campaign to rebuild the Afghan
    Air Force (AAF). In 2007 a formal joint/combined entity, led by a
    U.S. Air Force brigadier general, began air advisor work with
    Afghan airmen.

    Between 2007 and 2011, these efforts made modest progress in terms of infrastructures, personnel and
    aircraft accessions, and various training courses. But by 2010, advisors increasingly viewed AAF
    command and control (C2) as a problem area that required significant improvement if a professional air
    force was to be built. In the spring of 2011, major institutional changes to AAF C2 procedures were being
    introduced when nine U.S. air advisors were killed. The attack was the worst single-incident loss of U.S.
    Air Force personnel in a deployed location since 1996 and the worst insider-attack since 2001.

    From the day of that tragic event, the cultural chasm between Afghanistan and the West became more
    apparent. This dilemma continues with no end in sight to an air advisory mission of uncertain long-term
    value.

    Forrest L. Marion is a retired U.S. Air Force Reserve colonel and has a PhD in U.S. history from the
    University of Tennessee. He is an oral historian and staff historian at the Air Force Historical Research
    Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He deployed as joint task force historian to the southern
    Philippines (2002) and as air advisor wing historian to Afghanistan (2009, 2011).

    NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS


    Publication date: 15 October 2018
    Aviation | 376 pp.
    Hardcover & eBook: $39.95
    ISBN: 978-1-68247-336-8
    6 x 9 in
    www.usni.org

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