Department of The Classics, Harvard University

Department of the Classics, Harvard University
Callicles' Quotation of Pindar in the Gorgias

Author(s): Marian Demos
Source: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 96 (1994), pp. 85-107
Published by: Department of the Classics, Harvard University
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CALLICLES'QUOTATIONOF PINDAR IN
THE GORGIAS
MARIANDEMOS
the most discussed

quotation from lyric poetry found
PERHAPS
in Plato is the reference by Callicles in the Gorgias to a Pindaric
poem concerned with the labors of Herakles (fr. 169a Snell-Maehler).
Although Callicles quotes only five lines from the poem, it is clear that
these lines, like the referenceto Simonides in the Protagoras, are famil-
iar to Plato's audience. As in the Protagoras, one of Socrates' inter-
locutors quotes lyric poetry in orderto defend or supporthis own views
on a particularsubject. It should be noted that it is not Socrates who
introduces lyric poetry into the separate discussions with Protagoras
and Gorgias; his interlocutorsare responsible for the initial references
to lyric poetry in these two dialogues. While Protagoras makes
Simonides' poem a controversialmatterinvolving literarycriticism on
the part of Socrates, Callicles' referenceto Pindarseems to be adduced
as support for his advocacy of "the survival of the fittest" as an
axiomatic truth.
What is problematicabout Callicles' quotationof Pindaris not only
the meaning of the lines as intended by Pindar and as interpretedby
Callicles, but also the curious fact that the manuscripttraditionof Plato
provides a variantreading which has puzzled generations of scholars.
An analysis of the quotation's context in Callicles' conversationwith
Socrates must be accompaniedby a look at the contents of the Pindaric
fragment which is mentioned (either by quotation, paraphrase,or a
combination of both) in other ancient sources, as well as elsewhere in
Plato, and which is partiallypreserved in P. Oxy. 2450, fr. 1. In addi-
tion, since it has been assumed that Polycrates' fictitious KazrnyopiaL
1CoKp'txoug, supposedly countered centuries later by Libanius' 'Anto-
X3oyla
C'Kpxdtoxg, referred to the same Pindaric passage, it has been
argued that the Gorgias and Polycrates' lost work were somehow
86 Marian Demos
related. The nature of their relationshipis anotherpoint of scholarly

contention.1The aim of this study is to understandthe Pindaricquota-
tion in the context of the dialogue and to determinewhich of the two
variantreadings is preferablein light of Callicles' stance in the Gor-
gias. Even though the genuine Pindaric text is attested in two other
sources,2 the reading found in the manuscriptsof the Gorgias should
not necessarily be emended. The possibility of Callicles' misquotation
of Pindaris worthconsidering.
Callicles' discussion with Socrates in the Gorgias begins at 481b
when he questions the latter'ssincerityduringthe earlierexchange with
Polus. Callicles finds it unbelievablethat Socrates could maintainthat
it is better to be the victim of injustice ratherthan its perpetrator(cf.
Socrates at 469c1-2: ei 6' XvayYcKax•ovei~' l Stl•t i~ 6StFKet(YOctt,
Xoilxvy vlvXxov cStKEicYOct f 9LStclKEv)
and that it is preferablefor
an evildoer v to be
punished rather than to escape punishment (474b:
K(xtov ... t6 pi 6t6iva t 8•iyv to 8t66vat). Socrates responds to
Callicles by encouraginghim to refute these tenets. If Callicles should
refuse to counter Socrates' views, then Callicles forever would be at
odds with himself (482b4-6).3 Socrates now must deal with this third
interlocutorwho, unlike Gorgias and Polus, presents a forceful chal-
lenge not only to Socrates' views but also to conventionalnotions of
justice.
Callicles blames Polus for acting like Gorgias. According to Calli-
cles, Polus was driven to self-contradictionby Socrates, who cleverly
alternateshis line of questioning; Socrates switches from questioning
on the basis of v6tog; to that of qcpntgand vice versa as partof his tech-
nique to force men into self-contradiction. At first, Callicles blames
Polus for having felt ashamedof his own sentiments and thereforenot
saying what he really thought because he was afraid to disagree with
Socrates' contentionthat it is more shamefulto commit injustice rather
1 See E. R. Dodds, Plato:
Gorgias (Oxford 1959) 28-29 for specific referencesto dis-
cussions of this topic.
2 Namely, the scholion on Pind. Nem. 9.35a and Ael. Aristid. 45 [vol. 2, 68 Din-
or.
dorf with correspondingscholion in vol. 3, 408 Dindorf].
3 Socrates uses musical terminology here, likening a man to a lyre, to describe the
state of being 'discordant'or 'out of tune' (482c2: &do~1<povog) with oneself. His accus-
ing Callicles of self-disagreementrecalls Protagoras'attackon Simonides. However,the
tone of Socrates' initial speech to Callicles is sarcastic. Note the mocking reference to
Callicles' love for Demos, son of Pyrilampes,and for the Atheniandemos as comparedto
Socrates' own loves, Alcibiades and philosophy(481d-e).
Callicles' Quotationof Pindar in the Gorgias 87
than be a victim of it.4 His metaphoricallanguage describing Socrates'

'gagging' and 'tying togetherPolus' hands and feet' (482e1-2: E7xEeto-
pCorl, ouYuotStoe?g) implies an attack on Socrates, not only on
Polus. This attackbecomes direct when Callicles chargesSocrateswith
pretending to be concerned with 'truth' (&driOecta) and deliberately
tricking his interlocutors (482e2-5, 483a2-7). Next, Callicles intro-
duces the familiar distinction between 'nature' (qpIYtg)and 'conven-
tion, custom' (v6otog)into his argumentationand claims that Socrates
has thoughtup a clever trick involving these two concepts wheneverhe
poses questions to someone (482e5-483a8). The antithesis between
and v6tog; appearsfrequentlyin the Greek literatureof the fifth
oplurtg
and fourth centuries.5Callicles is not saying anything revolutionaryat
this point; he is merely setting the stage for his subsequentinterpreta-
tion of what is sanctioned by The opposition between
p•ntg.
and v6tog; is also reflected in the p•pu;tg
discrepancybetween Polus' true sen-
timents and his reluctance to proclaim them.6 One infers that qnot;
somehow correspondsto Polus' view of reality while v6'tog, designat-
ing 'the general consensus', impedes his statingthis view.
Callicles' little regard for conventional attitudes has already
appearedin a preceding statementidentifying 'what is fine by conven-
tion, not by nature' (482e4-5: & XpUoYet 1v oX)Kotyv K•Cha,v6~cp (8)
with 'base and low argumentsaimed at the public' (482e3-4: cpoprtlK&
K'al These words show that Callicles considers his views
SrlJrlyopt•6d).
superiorto those of the oi ntoA2•hot.
His choice of words characterizes
him as someone who sets himself apart from society and its conven-
tions and foreshadows the Weltanschauunghe will espouse. He takes
pains to distinguishhimself from Socrates also, especially since the lat-
ter is 'misbehaving' (483a2-3: by sometimes asking ques-
tions on the basis of v6dog, atK•xKoXpyei;)
other times on the basis of q6Ttig,and
thereby ensnaring those responding to his questions in a trap of self-
contradiction. Whenever someone talks on the basis of 'convention',
4 Callicles follows Socrates' practice of using terms such as "worse" and "more
shameful"interchangeably.
5 For useful discussions of this topic, consult W. K. C. Guthrie,A History of Greek
Philosophy 3 (Cambridge1969) 55-134 [especially 101-107 and 131-134 treatingCalli-
cles' views and his quotationof Pindar],F Heinimann,Nomos und Physis (Basel 1945)
110-169 and G. B. Kerferd,The SophisticMovement(Cambridge1981) 111-130.
6 Note the repetitionof Evavxviaat 482e5 and 483al which implies that a parallelis to
be drawnbetween the two sets of antitheses.
88 MarianDemos
Socrates questions him on the basis of 'nature' and vice versa. Calli-
cles sees Socrates' exchange with Polus as an example of the use of this
sly technique which operates between two supposedly antithetical
spheres. Beginning at 483a7, Callicles unfolds his understandingof the
differencebetween qp(ytgand its opposite.
According to Callicles, 'sufferingwrong' (483a8: t6 t) is
worse and more shameful 'by nature' (qp~oet),whereas, 68tLKic••e(
conven-
'by
tion' (v6tco), 'doing wrong' (t6 lStKeiv) is the greaterevil.7 'Suffering
wrong' is experienced only by slaves who are unable to help them-
selves and others in their care when they are wronged and abused. He
thinks that weak men, the majorityof the populace, are the ones who
laid down the 'laws' since these laws are to their advantage
In order (v6•tot),
to
(483b4-7).8 frighten strongermen and prevent them from
'overreaching'(nXtov i~'etv), the weak men say that it is shameful and
unjustto 'overreach'and that 'doing wrong' consists in seeking to have
more than what others have: Xyouxnv 6;g Katl cStLov t6
aty•Xpyv
0tXovEKrtEiv, K(X'toit6 tiv t6 cl&KEirV,
9t6
t'Xov v 'Cov t1etiv
t&i
-xetv (483c3-5). The weaker segments of society, whom Callicles dis-
dainfully calls pauv,6tepot (483c6), thereforeare content to be on an
equal footing with the stronger.
Callicles' belief in the survival of the fittest is firmly rooted. He
argues that 'natureherself makes clear' that 'it is right for the superior
to have more than the inferior and for the strongerto have more than
the weaker' (483c8-d2).9 Not only is he stating what he considersto be
a fact but he is also advocatingthis state of affairs which 'natureher-
self' sanctions. 'Justice' (483d5: tb as exhibited by nature,
'is judged' to be the samei•catov),
for animals and for mankind.
(wKihptr•t)
Callicles' conception of naturaljustice is expandedto include the asser-
tion that it is right for the strongerto have sovereigntyover the weaker
(483d5); thus, "might is right."10His appeal to 'justice (according to
7 The views expressed here by Callicles are similar to those of Antiphonthe Sophist
regardingv6oiogversus cp)aot;(Diels-Kranz87 B 44).
8 Callicles here seems to be conflating the various meanings of v6itog. 'Law' and
'convention' are the same thing in this context insofar as 'laws' are formal encodings of
what is prescribedby 'convention'.
9 Note thatCallicles assumes that 'the better' are 'the stronger'.
10It should be emphasized that Callicles endorses this state of affairs according to
nature. Callicles is not merely stating what he sees: namely, that animals and humans
everywhere are subject to the power of qpnrtg;.He thinks that "the way things are
(accordingto nature)"is "theway things should be."
nature)' is importantbecause Callicles is unabashedly expressing the

view that "might is right" is a just principle. Callicles, unlike Gorgias
and Polus, has the courage to proclaimhis beliefs, even if they are con-
trary to popular opinion.11 By disregarding conventional notions of
morality,he has set himself up as the spokesman for qpoStg. Nature's
definition of justice, not the definition supplied by v6tog; (cf. 483c3-5
above), is valid for Callicles.
The bold reassertionof the credo that it is right for the strongerto
have more than the weaker continues with Callicles' mention of Xerxes
and his father Darius as examples of strong men who justified their
invadingthe territoryof othersby virtue of nature'sdefinitionof justice
(483d6-7: •n•i tnofq6 Xpdf*evog Eipprlg;iti tv 'EXXc8a~
ev 1 6 x8t••1ai a toI Fnix i•0KaOg;).The 'justification' or
FrptFxr na•ip
z Kicatov) employed by these two enemies of Greece is
'right' (t6
exactly the principle of nature which Callicles is advocating.12As his
subversive speech continues, his words, though highly rhetorical,have
a serious undertone. The juxtaposition of v6~gogand in the
qop•tg
phrase Kcro't ye v ti;g cploeco; (483e3) is striking and
v6•ov •
paradoxical.13Callicles unites v6gog and qpaQtg,which earlier were
described as antitheticalto one another(cf. 482e5-6), in a clever play
upon words.14He justifies the aggression of men like Xerxes, saying
that their actions are 'in accordancewith the natureof justice' (483e2:
z\ This is followed by the emphaticasser-
tionIpicnv
iS•tv
that vtoi
there is Strcxa•o)).
a v6oog; of naturewhich accounts for these actions.15
He is quick to point out that this v6tgo; is distinct from that established
by man. In short, the actions of a Xerxes are justifiable in terms of
II Compare Callicles' courage to express openly his beliefs to Protagoras'claim that
he alone admits to being a sophist and to have the ability to educate men (cf. Protagoras
317b3 and following).
12 The boldness of Callicles' view is reinforcedby his referenceto the greatenemies of
Greece. He implies that Darius and Xerxes had a justification of their imperialism:
13 Note the parallel phrases employed here: Ktar c ctIv eiJv toi~ )tKaliou / ratr
vo6iov ye tbv rfq;gp o;g(483e2-3). Callicles' wording implies that these phrases are
somehow interchangeable,since they refer to a single (i.e., Callicles') conception of
nature.
14 The expression v6ftog;rtigqp cEo; first appears here, although an allusion to this
concept can be found in Thuc. 5.105.2.
15 The exclamation vtxal ut Aiaxand the particle ye in 483e2-3 emphasize Callicles'
insistence on the validity of his view regardingthe contrastbetween the v6iog; of nature
and that laid down by man.
90 MarianDemos
nature'sv6'gogbut not necessarilyjustifiable by man's. Callicles' self-

conscious language here is importantbecause he is using the words
(pcytg, tob ~iatov and v6'ogo interchangeably; v6'gog and (pcyotq,in the
context of his argument,have now become fused and assimilated into
his conception of 'justice' (zt 81?Katov).If one argues that the notions
of 'law' (or 'convention'), 'nature' and 'justice' are related, as does
Callicles, then the normativestatementthat it is right for the strongerto
gain the advantageover the weaker can be viewed as a universaltruth.
Callicles strengthenshis argumentby appealingto "the law of nature"
and thus makes the refutationof his views more difficult.
The Nietzschean overtones of Callicles' speech are most evident in
his descriptionof the enslavementof the strongby the weak.16The best
and strongest members of society are compared to 'lions'17 (483e6:
Xiovtac): seized while still young, they are bewitched into slavery by
the majority who say that 'equality is a necessary state of affairs'
(484a1: t' ioov Xp~i q'etv).18 Consequently,this state of 'equality' is
defined as tbo'taXv Icai'tr 8&1iatov(484al-2) and is imposed by the
weakest members of society as a means of restrainingthe strongest.
Callicles, however,glorifies a differentscenario where he envisions the
existence of a man 'with sufficient naturalstrength' (qpiyotv19tiKcViv)
who 'shakes off' (cntocTEtod6gevog) all of society's fetters and 'tramples
on' all 'learning, tricks, spells, and unnaturalconven-
(Kc•a'tcr'tcioug)
tions' (ypgg~Caa Kai Kai ~incptxSg tcai v6goog Rnap&
CLayyavE•i5ga
(484a2-5). The descriptionof the rise of the strong man uses
IO.ctnv20)
imagery befitting an apotheosis;21the former slave now becomes soci-
ety's 'master' and 'thereinthe justice of natureshines forth'
(cornt6ntrlq)
c v tb
(484a6-bl: vrza60a apeXgW
tiq;,ig qcco0q 81catov).
16 See Dodds
(above, n. 1) 387-391 for evidence that Nietzsche was influencedby the
views attributedto Callicles by Plato.
17The image of the lion here
may have contributedto Nietzsche's depiction of die
blonde Bestie in Zur Genealogie der Moral 1.11 (Leipzig 1887).
18Note the sonorousquality of Callicles' words in 483e4-6. The onomatopoeicsound
of Callicles' own lines mimics the bewitching effect of those spells and incantations
which he says are used by the weak to enslave the strong. CompareMeno 80a2-3 for the
collocation of the verbs yoiI't-Eo('beguile') and ('subdue by enchantment').
19Like Ka7xert8o
qpuot;can have variousmeanings in Callicles' speech.
v6jtog, Callicles to
20I understand imply that there are vdo6ot which are 'natural' (Katx
P6cntv).
21Truejustice 'shines forth' (484b1: *2iage*v) just as the formerslave now 'reveals
himself' (484a6: &ve~p6&vi)as master.
Note the consistent use of the gnomic aorist which gives added
weight to Callicles' description of the revolt of the Obermensch. He
uses powerful words to characterizethe violent reactions of the 'strong
man' against his weaker oppressors. Also, the opposition between 'the
justice of nature' and society's conception of justice is reasserted. The
most striking statement(484a6-bl) is the one which precedes his Pin-
daric quotation. According to Callicles, the subjugationof the weak by
the strong is something to be exalted. His interpretationof 'justice
according to nature' is not merely a statement of the workings of
nature;it is an affirmationof the 'natural' state of affairs which sanc-
tions the rule of the strongest over the weakest. In other words, I
understandCallicles' position as follows: "It is only natural for the
strong to have more than those who are weak; this is the way things are
and this is the way they should be."
To support his point of view, Callicles quotes from a well-known
poem of Pindar. Below is the Oxford text of the much-discussed sec-
tion of the Gorgias in which Callicles claims that Pindarexpresses sen-
timents similarto his own:
~yi XFyo v6icv~uoOCCv

8o0CE8 got •Iai Hiv&apo CiRncp
'r otwcXeqt
vdgo06 Rdvr(ov
OvaztovZIE i &Oxav&rmov
o0rog8 6ri, prov, -
tVKato)v
ycet TO
P~atld1atov22
~WnepTtr O XEtp-
TeK•X•Lpogat
pyototv 'HpanXiog, 'nel--'npt&1ag
Xy&0 o rW w;--r6 y p qowgo o K 6'
F?_1CTragLat--XytC1Ur
o0rFesrpdlgevog oi 6're86v-ro;roI Fqpdvo XilXdcaZo rag Poig,
(bg;trolo) ovzog oSo 6tlKa(ou ( 1aCoeYt,
Kai po g al &XX aKtl-
_1~va~
av dva tperrvovog
Vv
zoo zhO
PshIiov6d re
o •'ai
e •cai frr6dvomv.
etpovv
(484bl-c3)
It is clear that Callicles assumes that his audience knows the Pindaric
poem from which he is quoting. There is no doubt that this was a
famous poem, since Herodotus, Pindar's contemporary,refers to it in
22 Although Burnet's OCT offers this

reading of the text (i.e., Aristides' version), the
best manuscripts (B, T, P, F) have PJta(ov t6
&icatdxatov.
92 MarianDemos
the Histories. The context of Herodotus' reference to Pindar'sgnome

regarding v6goog as 'king of all' is the recounting of the contrast
between the burialrites of the Greeks and the Indic Kallatiae(Histories
3.38). Herodotus is illustrating here his observation that every race
prefers its own 'customs' (v6goot)over those of others. Unlike the
Greeks who burnthe corpses of their fathers,the cannibalisticKallatiae
eat them. Both the Greeks and the Kallatiae expressed outrage at one
another's respective practices. Herodotus then concludes with the
remark:oitco giv vuVTaira vev6ogtci, , txai 6pOOggot 8oIiet Hiv-
&8pognotifr~itv6Ltovnivrov paxtctka p~ evoat (3.38).
"•oCg
Whether Herodotus' application of Pindar's gnome coincides with
what the poet actually intended it to mean is not altogether certain.
MartinOstwald,for example, believes that Herodotus'interpretationof
the Pindaricquote is correct, since vo'gog,in its original context and in
the Herodoteanpassage, refers to "a traditionalattitudewhich implies
certaindeep-seatedconvictions and beliefs."23A differentview is taken
by Marcello Gigante who sees v6googas meaning 'tradition,norm, cus-
tom' in Herodotus' applicationof the Pindaricphrase but Pindarhim-
self meant something very different by Pindar's meaning,
is not as "relativistic"as v6otog.
Gigante argues, Herodotus';v6goog,in its Pin-
daric context, should be understoodas "la legge che viene da Zeus, la
legge divina universale che regge la storia del mondo."24Although I
agree with Ostwald's definition of v6goog as used by Herodotus,25
Gigante's contention that Herodotus' quotationof Pindaris tailored to
suit the historian'sown views, expressed within the context of this sec-
tion of the Histories, is attractive. Socrates in the Protagoras, for
example, can offer an interpretationof Simonides' poem which will
promote his own system of beliefs in the face of Protagoras'sophistry.
Like Protagoras,Herodotusquotes poetry out of context. He cites Pin-
dar's gnome in orderto defend his generalizationregardingthe attitude
of men to their particularcustoms and rites. More importantly,even
though Pindar'spoem is fragmentary,one can ascertainfrom the other
extant lines provided by P. Oxy. 2450 that the poet uses v6googin a
sense differentfrom that of Herodotus.
23M. Ostwald,"Pindar,Nomos and Heracles,"HSCP 69 (1965) 124.
24M.
Gigante, NOMOXBAXIAEYX(Naples 1956) 111. Gigante's discussion of
Herodotus' reference to Pindar (pp. 109-112) emphasizes the "parzialithdell' interpre-
tazione erodotea"(109).
25Cf. M. Ostwald(above, n. 23) 124-125.
Callicles' Quotation of Pindar in the Gorgias 93
Before one can comment upon Callicles' use of the Pindar quota-
tion, one must determine the actual wording of Pindar and what he
meant by the gnomic statementthat v6googis 'king of all'. Ever since
EdgarLobel first published the Oxyrhynchuspapyrusin which the ini-
tial line seems to coincide with the last line of Callicles' quotationof
fragment 169a and with his referenceto Herakles' stealing of Geryon's
cattle (Gorgias 484b11),26various scholarshave offered differing inter-
pretations of the fragmentaryPindaricpoem as well as varied textual
readings.27 Scholars even disagree regarding its overall metrical
scheme.28Putting the controversialtechnical aspects of the fragment
aside, one can neverthelessgain some insight into Pindar'streatmentof
the labors of Herakles, especially with regardto the hero's attacks on
Geryon and Diomedes. The focus of my study of the Pindaricfragment
is on the concept of v6googwhich, in my view, has its meaning altered
by Callicles (or, more precisely, by Plato) in the context of his argu-
ment against Socrates. By Plato's time, the meaning of v6googhad
become destabilized.
It is generally assumed that v6gog 6 nvrcov
t paotxceg is the first
line of Pindar'spoem.29N6'gogis 'king' of all things, both human and
divine. Although some have comparedthis phrase to the Homeric for-
mula describing Zeus, ntaoilp'&v6pOvre OefOvre,30 the personification
of v6ogogas 'king' does not necessarily imply that Pindaris referringto
Zeus or to Zeus' v6ogoghere. The personificationof abstractconcepts
such as "time"or "love" is not uncommon in Greek poetry.31Pindar's
26See E. Lobel (ed.), "P. Oxy. 2450," The
OxyrhynchusPapyri XXVI (London 1961)
141ff. for the editio princeps of the papyrusbeginning from line 6 cc6a
(nttd •rppui6va
27 A full bibliography of pre-1956 treatments can be found throughout Gigante's
NOMOXBAXIAEYX(1956). Some of the most helpful detailed discussions of fr. 169a
are M. Ostwald (above, n. 23) 109-138; W. Theiler, "N6iog; 6
MuseumHelveticum 22 (1965) 69-80; M. Gigante, "Nuovi resti dell'ode tn&vov cpat•Eg,"
Pindarica,"Atti
del XI. Congresso Internazionaledi Papirologia (Milan 1966) 286-3 11; C. Pavese, "The
New Heracles Poem of Pindar,"HSCP 72 (1968) 47-88; and H. Lloyd-Jones,"Pindar,fr.
169,"HSCP 76 (1972) 45-56 (= GreekEpic, Lyric and Tragedy[Oxford 1990] 154-165).
The most recent text of fr. 169a in the 1989 Teubneredition of Pindaric fragments by
H. Maehleris the one upon which I base my study.
28 Like Lobel and
Lloyd-Jones,I think that the poem is probablya dithyramb.
29 Lloyd-Jones (above, n. 27) 48 cites the
beginning of the sixth Nemean ode ("Ev
&v8pCov,Jv OFv yFv vo;) as anotherexample of Pindar'splacing of a gnomic statementat
the very startof a poem.
30For example, Pavese (above, n.
27) 55-57 and Lloyd-Jones48.
31Pavese and Lloyd-Jonesthemselves
provideexamples of other personifications(e.g.,
94 MarianDemos
wording implies that Zeus himself, one of the immortals, is ruled by

v6oog. It is interestingto note that the sophist Hippias in the Protago-
ras, presumablyalluding to the same Pindaricpoem cited by Callicles,
describes v6gCogas a 'tyrant of mankind' (337d2: t6pavvo wvT(v
Hippias' negative portrayalof v6jxog takes place in the
c&vOp0ntov).
context of his brief reference to the v6oog-pi56t; antithesis, a favorite
topic of the sophists. Pindar's use of the term, however, is free from
any of its later connotations. Pindarregardsv6googas somethingpow-
erful and inevitable; it holds sway over everything. The main verb of
which v6googis the subject, lyet (line 3), presents some difficulties.
Firstly, what is its translation? Pavese thinks that "the verb is used
absolutely for leading by a divine agency" and "this use of Odyocorre-
sponds to that of the epic flyiogact."32However, merely to say that
v6ogo 'leads' causes the gnome's meaning to be too vague. Pindarhas
supplied us with an implied object from the surroundingcontext. Both
Dodds and Ostwald think that the object of the verb is t6'ptat6ratov.
I agree with Lloyd-Jones (who cites Nem. 11.42-3: oaxiOvacbv oi"tog
FiOvo;g &yet goipa) that the object of oyet can be supplied from the
immediatelypreceding Ovaxrv e cai d~avtormvand that t6 Pioat6ta-
tov is the object of the participle8ticotoJv.33As 'king', v6oog presum-
ably rules over 'all things, both human and divine'. Secondly, should
one interpretOvacr&v Kca~&Oavdmovin a narrowsense, referringto
•
'mortals and immortals' exclusively34and not to other entities?35This
is an importantquestion because its answer can lead to a better under-
standingof the meaningand prominenceof v6googin the fragment.
If it is assumedthat tlKctLOv t6 Ptoaiactccovis the correcttext of the
thirdline of fr. 169a,36problems of translationagain arise. Pavese, like
Heraclitus'personificationof nI6Xog; as 'fatherandking of all' in Diels-Kranz22 B 53).

32Pavese (above, n. 27) 57. Dodds (above, n. 1) 270
provides the tentativetranslation
'conducts (?)' for 'yEt; he later says that "488b3 suggests that Plato took to mean
'yTt
'plunders',as in the phrase yeTyv cKaiqpipev." Ostwald(above, n. 23) 117 translatesit as
'bringson'. All these translationsseem inadequate.
33Lloyd-Jones48.
34Ibid.
35Cf. Isth. 5.16 (Ovar('0varoiotnrpint) for the adjective 'mortal'appliedto things as
well as humanbeings.
36 This is the reading found in the scholion on Pindar'sNem. 9.35a (quoting fr. 169a
from v6jog; down to Xetp() and Ael. Aristid. or. 45 [vol. 2, 68 Dindorf] and the corre-
sponding scholion [vol. 3, 408 Dindorf]. It also appears in the margin of V (Parisinus
2110), a Byzantinemanuscript.
Lloyd-Jones,regardsthe verb 8tcatCOvas factitive;however,the former

translates it as 'bringing to justice' while the latter claims that the
verb's form implies the meaning 'makes just'.37 The meaning of this
participle is uncertainbecause 68tKca6ois not found elsewhere in lyric
poetry.38It is importantto take note of the verb's rarityin lyric poetry
because some have dismissed the variant reading Ptatcov (Ptaicov in
mss. of the Gorgias) on the groundsthat it is unattested. Although the
Pindaric poem is fragmentary,one can say with little hesitation that
suits the poem's context better than P•tatov rt6
8t••tov t6 itid6attcov
86ca(i6tatov. Herakles' strength(Pla) is a commonplace topic and it
is therefore natural to assume that Pindar is referring to the modus
operandi of Herakles, clearly a theme of the poem's subsequentlines
regardingGeryon and Diomedes, by means of the abstractsuperlative
t6 plaI6trtov. It would be difficult to argue from the poem's extant
contents that Pindar portrays Herakles' brutal 'pyca as examples or
proofs of 'what is most just' (t6 Since he mentions
ttrKactazov).39 for them
Herakles' seizing Geryon's cattle without having paid (Gor-
gias 484b9: &inptiUag;cf. P. Oxy. 2450, line 8) and the hero's grue-
some encounter with Diomedes' man-eating mares (lines 9ff. of the
papyrus), the poet seems to have focused upon the violence of these
"laborsof Herakles."40It is impossible to determinethe role of 8ir', if
indeed it had any role at all, in Pindar'spoem. If
8t-at••v t6 Pttixim-
tov is accepted as the true Pindarictext, then the poet absolves Hera-
kles from any wrongdoing because vropog,by making 8i"Kcmothat
which is most violent, 'guides' (&yit) the affairsof gods and men.
The dative phrase kncprCmqr yCXtpialso presents problems, since
37See the lengthy discussion by Pavese (above, n. 27) 57-60. Lloyd-Jones (p. 49)
rejects Pavese's interpretation,based on the fragmentarylines provided by the papyrus,
that Herakles is bringing Diomedes' violent deeds to justice. Diomedes' motivationfor
resisting Herakles (line 15 of P. Oxy. 2450 refers to Diomedes' source of action: &pEr)
seems to support Lloyd-Jones' argument which implies that Pindar does not blame
Diomedes for protectinghis property. Like Lloyd-Jones, Dodds (above, n. 1) 270 trans-
lates 6tuacitv as 'makingjust'.
38 See LSJ s.v. tKcta6oefor an ambiguous translation('to set right') of the verb in the
context of fr. 169a alone.
39Pindarcites some of Herakles' deeds as evidence (line 4: pog(t) in support
of his gnome regardingv6Log. PerhapsPindarregardsHerakles' rt•KquCL
actions as not necessar-
ily just in and by themselves but as partof the long-termprocess of justice (8micr).
40 Note the phrase P3(g
o;86v (P. Oxy. 2450, line 19) as a possible reference to Hera-
kles' labors.
96 MarianDemos
Aelius Aristides in his H-Epti p'ropt"iig, evidently citing the Pindar

fragment as quoted in the Gorgias, assumes that the 'highest hand'
belongs to Heraklesand not to v6iog;.41Aelius Aristides, writing in the
second centuryA.D.againstPlato's views on oratoryas expressed in the
Gorgias, already demonstrates that this quote from Pindar had
prompted possible misinterpretationthroughoutantiquity. Surely the
'supremehand' (line 4) is that of v6iog; (line 1); Aristides' paraphrase
therefore is misleading, unless he infers that the 'hand' of v6iog; is
Herakles' by implication, since the hero's violent deeds are sanctioned
by v6oiog. Perhapshe confuses the reference to Herakles in the poem
cited in the Gorgias with anothertakenfrom a differentpoem of Pindar.
This is a plausible explanation of Aristides' error because he quotes
from 'a certain dithyramb'of Pindar immediately after discussing the
other passage cited by Callicles.42While explaining why Pindarrefers
to the deeds of Herakles in the quotationfrom the Gorgias, Aristides
hypothesizes that the poet has anotherone of his works in mind. Quot-
ing some lines from a Pindaricdithyramb,he says:
ro *ot;, 9 "t
EqK~uipootat pyototv 'Hpacwko; abccrot' •Cai
nEPI acc'UTvEv 8t10p'U ( "k 89' 97%
k~poet CtE~tvq~vo; t• g1l
"rtv*,
i
nCCp' prj9ov, "iVwo gCFV FrjpiovrFj,t6 8Ek At (PiXcpov
&~tiv"
atYTCt dl:txLv.''43
(vol. 2, 70 Dindorf)
Pindar,whose poetry characteristicallybestows praise (axvo;) or blame

(y67yo), says in the lines cited by Aristides that he 'praises' (aiv(o)
Geryon in comparison to Herakles but he immediately interjects the
phrase 'May I be altogethersilent regardingthat which is not pleasing
(qpihXpov)to Zeus'.44
Although I hesitate to claim that Pindar expresses the exact same
41 Ael. Arist. 45.53 (vol. 2, 70 Dindorf:
d
tiy&p t<Oeat i
pltatciraov v6gov Evat
TOv&aoIvTaC aiC IrIv{ilJErp'T1Trv OcKpOCTv
Xeipa 4
'HpacKXoi;,0'E)r tir XEtpb'y rov
KCaifoviLgtXrjv, .'TIopiiaj] Toi;iFcntri;Xdyot7
accril[sc.
Ci ;XoIroXrcIat).
42The dithyramb to which Aristides refers was entitled the Cerberus [cf. U. von
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 344].
43 For the text of the Pindaric fragmentcited by Aristides, see fr. 81 (dith. 2) Snell-
Maehler.
44 Schol. Aristid. vol. 3, 409 Dindorf (a 8I, J[ 'Fpur6v, Enraotv~t cnap' aCzyrv rv
'HpaKX coiv
.. .) makes it clear that the Pindarictext should be n~pd instead of Tcap'
aXtiv.
sentiments towards Geryon in fr. 169a as he does in the dithyramb,I

think that Aristides' quote from the dithyramb is instructive to the
extent that here Pindar admits that Geryon is worthy of praise but the
poet feels that Zeus would be displeased if Geryon were praised. In
other words, there seems to be a dichotomy between Pindar's own
sense of praiseworthybehavior and 'what is pleasing to Zeus'. The
encomiastic poet defers to Zeus' authorityover the mattereven though
he may think that Zeus' son, Herakles, behaves in an unjust fashion
when he steals Geryon's cattle.45He quickly becomes silent for fear
that Zeus may be offended by his opinion.46It is not unusualfor Pindar
to cut shorthis treatmentof a subject which he thinks might be consid-
ered offensive.47 'Silence', says Pindarat one point, 'is often the wisest
counsel for a man' (Nem. 5.18:
•ai -6 oty&v nohhXX6ici;oi aoqpCxzx-
yA&v6pino voiosct). However, just as Pindar implies in the
tov
dithyrambthat Geryon is praiseworthybecause he tries to resist Hera-
kles' taking of the cattle by force (according to schol. Aristid. vol. 3,
409 Dindorf), a partialreconstructionof lines 15-17 of fr. 169a seems
to indicate that Diomedes, like Geryon, is tacitly praisedfor having put
up a struggle in defense of his property.48Diomedes acted out of
&pEZiJ, not out of K6po; (line 15: o Ko]p)
6 &dX1'&pE-r). In spite of
the fragmentarystate of the two Pindarpoems, one can conclude with
some certaintythat Pindartreatsthe theme of the labors of Herakles in
an ambivalent way. Herakles' foes, Geryon and Diomedes, are pre-
45The scholiast explains that Pindarpraises Geryon for defending his propertywhen
Heraklesunjustlytakes it away by force.
46 K. Crotty,in Song and Action: The VictoryOdes of Pindar (Baltimore 1982) 105,
aptly describes the situation:"Theencomiast's role, then, is a circumscribedone. It is his
duty to 'praise the praiseworthy,blame the blameworthy',and failure to do this is very
wrong. The imperative is not absolute, however, because it depends ultimately on
whetherthe gods are benevolent or hostile to the person, and the gods' disposition is not
subject to men's notions of right and wrong. The power to exalt or humble-even with-
out regardto a person's 'merits'-is a divine prerogative."
47 Cf. 01. 13.91 andNem. 5.17-18.
48 See Lloyd-Jones (above, n. 27) 51 for a discussion of these lines. Unlike Pavese
(above, n. 27) 67ff., he thinks that Diomedes resisted Herakles' violence ratherthan vice
versa. Pavese's view that Herakles resisted Diomedes contradicts what is said in the
marginal scholion as restoredand supplementedby Lobel in his 1961 publicationof the
papyrus fragment. Lobel's interpretationof the marginal scholion on the papyrus frag-
ment, which he supplements by Ael. Aristid. vol. 2, 70 Dindorf and its corresponding
scholion, is o6lo Enii ijpFt, &XX'&pTfzigj vF-,(. zT6y&p [T&
tTP1 npo]itaO(t
•Xroi'o
&xv~pFfou(Fo'aTv) [ I d)'X' olOX 8(F') 18[/]Jlt
aptTot[o?.'Hpa]x)•Sg [&q'(PFX]CtEvog.
98 Marian Demos
sented as worthy opponents who defend themselves against the vio-

lence of Zeus' son. Although Pindarthinks that it is right for these fig-
ures to try to resist Herakles' violent actions, he also simultaneously
considers the violence of Heraklesas somethingwhich can be justified.
The justification inherent in Pindar's poems may be that Herakles'
opponents are by nature monstrous and consequently unjust, even
though their reaction to Herakles is laudable. In addition, Herakles is
the son of Zeus and his actions may be justifiablefor this reason alone.
Pindarresorts to the concept of v6iio; in order to justify or 'make
just' that which is 'most violent' in both the humanand divine spheres.
I have hesitatedto provide a translationor a definitionof v6iog; as used
by Pindarin fr. 169a because I think that it has no direct English equiv-
alent. Some understandPindarto be referringto divine law. According
to Hugh Lloyd-Jones,for example, "law for him was identical with the
will of Zeus."49Marcello Gigante sharesthis opinion; however,he sees
Orphic and Pythagoreanovertones in Pindar's conception of v6tog;.50
However,Pindar'swords explicitly state that v6iog; is king of all, both
mortal and immortal (fr. 169a, lines 1-2). Zeus himself, therefore, is
subject to the power of v6og.;.51Other scholars prefer to translateit as
'custom' or 'usage'. MartinOstwald, for example, understandsPindar
to mean "the common acceptanceof a traditionalbelief as a valid and
binding conviction";the power of v6iog; is "absolute,unchallengeable,
and legitimate."52This definition is inadequatebecause it is applicable
only in the humansphere. The gods do not "accept"or "believe in" the
power of v6iio;; they are part of the process by which v6io; 'justifies
that which is most violent'. Since this word can have the two different
aforementionedmeanings, it is possible that Pindarhas a more general
conception of what he means by v6iog; than has been hithertoposited.
Perhaps a fusion of the two prominent interpretationsof the word
would better capture the sense which Pindar intends. Kevin Crotty's
49Lloyd-Jones(above, n. 27) 56. Cf. Dodds (above, n. 1) 270.
50 Cf. Gigante (above, n. 24) 75. He is just one of many scholars who have postulated
Orphicinfluences;see Ostwald(above, n. 23) 120ff. for a lengthy discussion of the schol-
arly literatureand a complicated argumentagainst the interpretationof v6jto; as 'divine
law'.
51 Although Guthrie (above, n. 5) 133 is right to point this out, his suggestion that
v6tog; be translatedas 'recognized custom (usage, tradition)' does not clarify Pindar's
meaning of the term in fr. 169a. Surely Pindarwould not think that the violent acts of
Heraklesare somehow 'customary';cf. Dodds (above, n. 1) 270.
52Ostwald(above, n. 23) 125-126.
insightfulremarksaboutthe word's meaning may assist the searchfor a

bettertranslation:
While nomos is divine therefore, it ought not to be severed from

connotationsof men's beliefs and values. Nomos, men's esteem or
hatredfor the heroes, is based not only on human notions of com-
mendable behavior but also on the gods' love for or hostility
towards the hero. Nomos refers to men's beliefs and evaluations,
but Pindar is showing how these beliefs and evaluations are
grounded in the gods' activity of exalting and humbling and may
even contradictmen's own notions of what is praiseworthy.53
This interpretationof the significance of v6iog; in Pindarfr. 169a takes

into account the inherentparadoxicalnatureof the term. The paradox
arises out of its applicability to both gods and men. I agree with
Crotty's view to the extent that I think that Pindarhimself finds v6iog;
an ambiguous notion, since it refers to both 'divine law' and 'social
usage'.54 If a common denominatorin the two proposed meanings of
v6iogois sought, then anotherinterpretationis possible.
The noun v6oog;is thought to be etymologically related to the verb
('to allot'). Pindarcould then be using v6iog; in its basic sense as
vFtg
'allotment' or 'apportionment'. I would suggest a somewhat more
intricate definition of v6oog; as suggested by the contents of fr. 169a;
v6ogo as 'king of all' is 'the way in which things are (apportioned)'or,
in perhapsmore general terms, 'the existing state of affairs'. This is an
overarchingprinciple which is greater than gods and men.55 Resem-
bling a king who directs his kingdom, v6io;g 'directs' (6yEt)everything
in its domain, namely, the universe. 'The way things are' is not a
derivativeconcept; in other words, one cannotprovide a rationalefor it.
Like Herakles,v6iog; acts 'with arm supreme' (i6ntEprt6'yCpXEt).56 If I
understandPindar'sintimationscorrectly,then the poet is claiming that
53Crotty(above, n. 46) 106.

54Crotty 104.
55The 'seventh' type of rule described by the Athenian at Laws 690c5-8 comes to
mind as an example of the kind of power which Pindar'sconception of v6tog; possesses.
The Athenianstates that the rule which is 'dear to the god and fortuitous' &-ye
F0ruxfi) is considered r6 6tcait6rarxovby men. Men's adherenceto the (0eopi•,i
outcome of
wice
the casting of lots is an example of this type of &pX7i.
56I employ Lloyd-Jones'stranslationhere (cf.
p. 49).
100 MarianDemos
one cannot understandwhy things happen the way they do but, never-
theless, he believes that their final outcome is somehow just. N6iog;
may then be viewed as the ultimateauthority;it acts as if it were a just
king. It empowersHeraklesto bring 'utmostviolence' (t6 3tat6mtzxov)
against Geryon and Diomedes, and althoughthe hero's actions may be
considered blameworthyby men, v6oog;has "the power to overthrow
normalhumannotions of right and wrong.""57 Herakles'violent encoun-
ters in fr. 169a are 'justified' insofar as they are part of 'the existing
state of affairs'understoodby gods and men.
Callicles uses his quotationof Pindar in the Gorgias to defend the
'law of nature' as he interpretsit. As has been suggested earlier, the
concept of v6io;g is a fluid one; by the fifth and fourthcenturies,it has
particularconnotationswhich may not have attendedPindar'soriginal
meaning of the term in fr. 169a.58Callicles' view that it is always 'just,
right' (81xatov) for the strongerto have the advantageover the weaker
is his definition of v6oiog, not Pindar's.59He cites the poet in order to
support a position which seems far from what Pindar implies; Pindar
tries to excuse Herakles' violent behavior by appealing to v6iog; in
order to justify it, whereas Callicles clearly expresses the opinion that
v6iog; itself is the right of the strongerin all cases. It appearsthat Pin-
dar's view of the term, which is more akin to 'the way things are', is
reinterpretedby Callicles to signify 'the way things should be'. Calli-
cles advocates 'nature'slaw'. Unlike Pindar,he actively supportsthe
belief that it is right for the strong to be in a position of dominance.
Therefore,one infers that Callicles does not think that behaviorsimilar
to Herakles' treatmentof Geryon and Diomedes would need justifica-
tion for the sheer reason that such treatmentis 'right' (81catov) in all
cases; Herakles' forceful taking of Geryon's cattle is in accordance
with 'the nature of justice' (484cl-3: 6;g roov u ivTog ;STo 8t-aoV
cpi5Eti, o
p -i povi ai t&ztpXXvx t cvzi toP•incEXTov6; tE
i KpEu(vovo; Tcx-ov wTIt6vt).
C1x cE Pindar, on the
Etp6vov ~C•ifilr06vov).60
57Crotty(above, n. 46) 105.
58The v6itog-pziat; debate, in which v6oto; is definedby humanbeings, is not relevant
to Pindar'suse of the term.
59 Cf. 483dl-e4 and note Callicles' phrase,Kacx& v6jtov ye r6v Trig in particu-
lar. c•e(o;g,
60Callicles' diction here is noteworthybecause he assumes that 'the strongerman' (6
'
,Kpeirtrwv) is automatically'the betterman' (6 Xeriov) and he thus implies that nature's
definitionof justice has a sound moralbacking.
other hand, seems to think it is necessary to make allowance for Hera-

kles' use of violence.
The clearest display of Callicles' championing the right of the
stronger is found in his exuberant generic description of the man of
'sufficient nature' (484a2: p'0otviKcavriv). 'Nature' (q~aiotv)is used
here as a synonym of 'strength'. Callicles' choice of words is notewor-
thy because it suggests that he is carefully selecting terms which make
his argumentcohesive; in his view, natureendorses the superiorityof
some men. Throughouthis speech, Callicles focuses upon 'justice' (t6
81iatov) as defined by nature.61The man of 'sufficient nature' disre-
gards unnaturallaws and conventions; Callicles implies that these are
man-made and imposed by weaker men upon the stronger. Therefore,
they are not 'natural' because they curb the stronger man's right to
claim more than the weaker does. It is importantto note Callicles'
emphasis on the "rightful" claim of the stronger, which can be
described as t6 81xatov, because Socrates' interlocutoris claiming that
nature'sfavoringthe stronger,a v6iiog;PpEco;g, is to be defended on the
groundsthat 'naturaljustice' is preferableto justice as defined by men.
Callicles' sequence of thought implies that it is not only naturalfor the
strongerto have more than the weaker; unlike 'having an equal share'
(484al): t' iYov icX'tv),which is society's definition of tb KahKXv
(484al-2), the v6oiog •xi
o6
8•~xatov opcaweo; defended by Callicles is that
which is 'good andjust'.
When Callicles cites Pindar,his purpose is to show that his view of
naturaljustice is not novel. Like Socrates who interpretsSimonides'
poem in the Protagoras, Callicles transformsthe meaning of Pindar's
poem to suit the particularphilosophical stance which he himself is
espousing in the Gorgias; specifically, the right of the stronger. Since
he has shifted Pindar'soriginalmeaning of the gnomic statementv6iog;
o6 t6t(owv 5; ... so that v6go; in the fragment is now inter-
as patXtY
preted signifying the 'law of nature' (as described in 483e and fol-
lowing), it is conceivable that Plato can have Callicles alter the original
text of the quotationin orderto defend his vehementstandpoint. A pur-
poseful misquotationof Pindar'swords on the part of Plato, attributed
to Callicles, would not only characterizeSocrates' interlocutoras one
of those men who dare to 'trample upon' society's (cf.
484a4) but it would also serve to reinforce Callicles' yp•tCtCaza
own view that
61483dl-e2 and 484al-bl.
102 MarianDemos
v6iog;, interpretedas the right of the strongerto have more than the
weaker, is itself iacxk6
oai 8-Kato; and that violent behavior on the
part of the strongerin order to rule and have more than the weaker is
'right' according to 'the law of nature'. In other words, if Callicles
were to misquote Pindar,Plato would be painting a clearer picture of
Callicles' personalityinstead of merely having Callicles cite Pindaras
an authoritativesource in defense of Callicles' views. If one believes
that Plato is capable of purposeful misquotation for the sake of an
insightful and ironicalglimpse into his portrayalof Callicles' character,
then it is plausible that the variantreading Ptaioov62 T')
found within the manuscriptsis not necessarily the result6•Ktal6CzTov
of a scribal
error involving spoonerism.63Although most editors of the Gorgias
emend the text so that it accords with Pindar's8t-cat(v t6 itatz6mtxov,
cited in schol. Nem. 9.35a and Ael. Arist. or. 45 (vol. 2, 68 Dinforf),64
some scholarsaccept the readingfound in the manuscriptsas the origi-
nal Platonictext.65In spite of the majorityopinion which arguesagainst
the possibility of Plato's purposelyhaving Callicles misquote Pindar,I
think that both sides of the issue should be studied, especially in light
of the quotation'scontext within the dialogue. This necessitates a brief
look at the complicated argumentationemployed by the two opposing
viewpoints.
The argumentwhich is most often used againstthe readingprovided
by the manuscripttraditionis that the verb Picat6o is unattested;conse-
quently, its meaning is unclear. (or the deponent Ptc'ogCat) is
Btoi6(
the attestedverb relatedto the substantive Pica. What would PiatzOv,if
its existence as a verb in Greek is allowed, mean in relation to its
object, t6 8tK-catzx6 ov?66 Wilamowitz, who believes that the corrupt
62 The correctaccentuationwould be ptcot(v.
63 Dodds (above, n. 1) 272 argues that the manuscriptreading is this type of textual
corruption;cf. Ostwald (above, n. 23) 132 n. 8, Pavese (above, n. 27) 57 n. 22 and Crotty
(above, n. 46) 155 n. 1.
64Cf. the OCT edition of Plato's dialogues by Burnet (vol. 3) and Dodds's edition of
the Gorgias (p. 123).
65E.g., E. Des Places, Pindare et Platon (Paris 1949) 171ff.; J. Irigoin, Histoire du
texte de Pindare (Paris 1952) 16-17; A. E. Taylor,Plato: The Man and his Work(London
1960) 117 n. 2 and P. Friedlander (trans. H. Meyerhoff), Plato 2 (Princeton 1964)
260-61. For a detailed discussion of the manuscripttraditionfor the Gorgias, see Dodds
(above, n. 1) 34-56.
66The false accent found in the manuscripts(itaocov) can be explained as a copyist's
error. Perhapsthe erroris somehow "learned,"since ptaiov is the genitive pluralof the
adjectivep[ato; and is found in legal terminology(e.g., 8ilcrl itt(aov) employed by ora-
Callicles'Quotationof Pindarin theGorgias 103
reading Patczovstems from Plato's accidental misquotationof Pindar

caused by a lapse of memory (ein Geddchtnisfehler),thinks that its
meaning would correspondto that of According to his
Pizxa61'Evo;.67
account, the Pindaricphrase as misquoted here by Plato is understood
by Libanius,who supposedlyparaphrasesthe Pindariclines as found in
his text of Plato, to mean 'violatingjustice'.68
Wilamowitz sees anotherinstance of this same accidentalmisquota-
tion of Pindar'spoem in the Laws (890a4-5: ... evat 8t661tKt6'rtCtov
ritTi;g v vtKiX It is uncertainthat Plato has the Pindar
itac6 0Evog).69
quotationin mind here, and the reference in Laws 690b7-c3 to the nat-
ural 'rule' (690c3: &pXi) of the wise over the ignorant,in which Wil-
amowitz sees another accidental misquotation of the same Pindaric
lines by Plato, is not necessarily an allusion to the gnome quoted by
Callicles in the Gorgias, even if the Athenian speakermentions Pindar
by name in this passage.70An explicit Platonic reference to Pindar's
poem in Laws 715al-2 i~qcxpuv nto KaCz& cptv cOv If•vcapov
(Kmcci
yetyv 8t•ato6vcza r Ptaicattzov, 0;og qpxvat) forces Wilamowitz to
conjecturethat the "correct"text of Pindarlater found its way into the
manuscript tradition, thus replacing Plato's original misquotation
here.71
The problems caused by the argumentationof Wilamowitz are
numerous,however. Firstly,he cannot adequatelyaccount for the "cor-
rect" allusion to Pindar'spoem in Laws 715a and for the Pindarictext
tors such as Lysias and Demosthenes (cf. LSJ

67Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,Platons.. Pfiatog).
2 (Berlin 1920) 97.
68 Wilamowitz
(98-99) regards Pt(Ezaot z6io Ko~tovin Libanius Apol. Socr: 87 as a
paraphraseof P•tat•v r' ov. Lloyd-Jones (above, n. 27) 48 also believes that
Libaniusadopts the text of6ictK•t6lra
the Pindariclines from a manuscriptof Plato.
69Although Dodds (above, n. 1) 271 argues "thereis nothing to prove that Plato had
the Pindarpassage in mind here,"the claim of Wilamowitzthat this passage in the Laws
alludes to Pindar'spoem may have been promptedby the words immediately preceding
the alleged reference; the Athenian speaker attributesthe attitudeexpressed in the sup-
posed paraphraseto poets as well as to other v6pFeg ocpo((cf. 890a4).
70 The Athenian's reference to Pindardeals with the poet's opinion regardingthe rule
of the wise. Consequently,he may be alluding to a nonextantpoem of Pindar. The opin-
ion expressed in Laws 690cl-3 seems to counter one which is attributedto Pindar:
J o K&v cloV ymye Pu(ai1vyi've-
Ka•Cottoitd6 ye, flyv68ape opkzzte, XE866v vKc R'napx In
GOat, arzX
atcotv &8, T•ilv 0toi v6douA1 6v'zo &pIJv o
0Piat'ov
v&XX' neq•u7cFuaiv.
addition, the Athenian mentions the 'rule of the stronger' immediately before turningto
the words of Pindarin 690b7-8 as supportfor his view.
71 Wilamowitz98.
104 MarianDemos
as quoted by Aristides who, since he is defending rhetoric against

Plato's criticism in the Gorgias, presumablyquotes from a manuscript
of the dialogue which has the reading 8tlcat^v tb P3tat6tzxovby the
second century A.D., two centuries earlier than that of Libanius who
supposedly is paraphrasing the Platonic misquotation P1iatv tob
8tKx6traxtov in his 'Antokoyfia Xwp6toug. If one follows Wilamowitz,
then it is difficultto explain why Aristides offers the "genuine"Pindaric
reading,which one assumes that he obtains from a manuscriptof Plato,
while Libanius, who one presumes is using a manuscriptof Plato two
centuries later, paraphrasesthe alternate reading or "misquotation."
The chronology of these two referencesto the Pindarquotationimplies
that textualcorruptionmay have occurredbetween the time of Aristides
and thatof Libanius. An alternativehypothesis involves postulatingthe
existence of competing manuscripttraditionsof Plato during antiquity,
one containing the "genuine"Pindaricreading and the other the "mis-
quotation."
Anotherpossible explanationinvolves the presence of an alternative
reading (either a learnedcopyist's correction[8t&atiovt I Ptait6~aov]
of a Platonic misquotation or a possible corruption resulting from
spoonerism [Itaot&v t r8tKaiatotov]) in the margin of a Plato
manuscript,which later intrudedinto the text and ultimately replaced
the genuine Platonicreading. What is certain,however,is that Libanius
had access to the two readings because he creates an imaginary sce-
nario in which Socrates is defending himself against Anytus who,
according to Libanius, purposely altered Pindaric poetry in order to
attackSocrates:
olJtou K1a
7onpi H-Itv8poU ta& yvrat 8E8otoK( al'ro•i rv
8t8 lv~CKC Ipo13O14Rkvo; t; t(OVV•(OVCKOXTCaC40;
•01
~
XPt PtdCXat t
'XX &Kcatov 09t &oCcj
X1oa; tiv v6tCov 'nrtptdxt,
0 to ap.
KaRtolJo olJuo; E1KOt(o Upop?tact 1(OKPtrIt;, (;) 0O(p(toXauO;
"Avvuro; t_ wp'xl t oiro notuyrouI v
g6hXgT bt t xap KOaCrtep
o1K ;ti
EK60at;g ta&eOyoRitvov K•a EGioR~tvot; &vO6poirotg,rtv
'AviTrou,Ti &8 1-Itv86pou. &XX& tcol),o KaXOg 9roitrjo
Rtv
KaoKoupy(ov.v IerO6aerival ztO"tor rtotlto) KCary'oprjKce
yv7p t'
tol htvd po KalKXv OXOKpdXCt1V F-tIveaeGV.
(Apol. Socr. 87 Foerster)
This difficult passage from Libanius' Apology, which presents a ficti-
tious account of the trial of Socrates, says that Anytus broughtup the
subjectof Pindar(nrEpt 1Itv68po 8tahxX••~rat)in his accusationagainst
Socrates. Libanius has Anytus fear Pindar's teaching (&t6acxiv),sup-
posedly spreadby Socrates, which would inspireyoung men to 'violate
justice' and disregardestablished laws. However, Anytus fails in his
indictment of Socrates because he 'dared to alter Pindar's words'
eTaFyp6~oa t %bto rTcotrlto3).Socrates 'sees beneath'
(F'64iXaoe
(-Icpopxrat)Anytus' ploy. By the act of changing Pindar's meaning,
Anytus manages unwittingly to help Socrates' cause and to speak
againstPindar.
The problempresentedby this passage is the paraphraseof Pindar's
'teaching': Xetpi t•ierat tb 8GKotov. Libanius does not
indicate whence he derives this episode involving Anytus' purposeful
Onrtptztx,
misquotation of Pindar employed as an indictment against Socrates.
An immense amount of scholarly conjecture regarding Libanius'
sources has resultedin the assumptionthat materialfrom the lost Karll-
yopia I(oKpiXrougof Polycrates, itself a fictitious account of Socrates'
prosecutionwritten sometime aroundthe first quarterof the fourthcen-
tury B.C.,is used by Libanius.72However,Libaniusneverrefers to Poly-
crates or his work even though he mentions the name of Xenophon
whose Apology he definitely uses as a source.73Since Libanius has
Anytus refer to the same Pindariclines as does Callicles, scholars have
extrapolatedthat there must be some type of relationshipbetween the
Gorgias and the lost work of Polycrates (assumed to be Libanius'
source). One must bear in mind, however, that Polycrates is not neces-
sarily Libanius' source for the reference to Anytus' citation of Pindar,
and the fact that Callicles and Anytus refer to the same well-known
Pindar poem does not imply, as Wilamowitz maintains in his clever
attempt to date the Gorgias, that the dialogue is Plato's response to
Polycrates' work.74Like Taylor, I think that it is unlikely that Poly-
72For a detailed discussion of the
scholarly literatureon this topic, see H. Markowski,
De Libanio Socratis defensore (Breslau 1910) 20-66. Cf. Libanii opera 5, ed. R. Foerster
(Leipzig 1909) 1-4 and Dodds's comments (above, n. 1) 28-29, 271-272.
73 I am gratefulto Albert Henrichsfor bringingthis to my attention.
74Wilamowitz (above, n. 67) 99ff. Most scholars (e.g., Markowski,Foerster,Dodds
and Wilamowitz) accept Libanius' use of Polycrates as a given, even though it can be
argued that Libanius obtains much of the material for his fictitious work from the dia-
logues of Plato and Xenophon'sApology. In addition,it is possible that Libaniushimself
creates the situation of Anytus' purposefulmisquotationof Pindar. I would like to think
that Libanius,using a Plato manuscriptwith a variantreadingof Pindaras quoted by Cal-
licles and juxtaposing it with the Pindartext as found in Aelius Aristides, is responsible
106 MarianDemos
crates "could have used a misquotationput by Plato into the mouth of

Callicles to damagethe reputationof Socrates."75
Since it is impossible to determinewhether or not there was a rela-
tionship between the Gorgias and Polycrates' lost pamphlet, it seems
fruitless to argue (as does Wilamowitz) that Polycrates had corrected
Plato's unintentionalmisquotationand that Anytus later chargedPoly-
crates with alteringPlato's text.76It is unnecessaryto postulate such a
complicated explanationfor Libanius' having access to the two differ-
ent versions of Callicles' quotation of Pindar. Libanius could have
been using a manuscriptof Plato which containedPtatuiv tb tcctoroa-
tov while simultaneouslyreading Aristides' speech in defense of ora-
tory which had the genuine "Pindaric"text.77Perhapsit was Libanius
who, when confrontedwith the variantreadings in Plato and Aristides,
contrived the imaginary scene in which Anytus misquotes, just as
another of Socrates' opponents, namely, Callicles, appears to have
done.
Although many scholars favor the alternativeexplanation for the
variant readings, textual corruption in the form of a "spoonerism"
which must have occurred between the time of Aristides and that of
Libanius,78their argumentdisregardsCallicles' words at 484b10 where
he explicitly states that he does not know what Pindar'spoem exactly
says: X9,yt oijron;S(o;-r y(xp ~ior?atgat. This comment
obicK
••oCahad
would appearsuperfluousif Callicles not misquoteda famous Pin-
daric passage. The suggestion that Plato intentionally has Callicles
misquote should be considered in light of the added irony of Callicles'
misquotation. While PtatOv t6 could mean 'violating
that which is most just', Callicles't&oatOicatov
words would have more effect if he
quotes Pindar as describing the power of v6gog;by the phrase 'enforc-
ing (i.e., effecting by force) that which is most just'.79 Interpreting
for attributingthe act of purposeful misquotationto Anytus who, like Callicles, is an

opponentof Socrates. Even if my conjectureis wrong, I do not think that one can be cer-
tain of the influenceof Polycrates'pamphleton the contents of the Libaniuspassage.
75Taylor(above, n. 65) 104. Cf. Dodds (above, n. 1) 271.
76Cf. Wilamowitz(above, n. 67) 99.
77See R. Pack, "Two Sophists and Two Emperors,"CP 42 (1947) 17-20 for Aristides'
influenceon Libanius.
78See n. 63 above.
79Those who believe that Plato puts a misquotationinto the mouth of Callicles trans-
late, for the most part,Ptaloxvas 'violating'; cf. Des Places (above, n. 65) 173 and Irigoin
(above, n. 65) 17. Callicles would be undermininghis own position if he were to say that
Pittuov in the latter sense would be more appropriatewith respect to

the immediate context of Callicles' quotation. Immediatelybefore his
reference to Pindar'spoem, Callicles takes pains to demonstratethatthe
v6ogo of nature, which sanctions the advantageof the strong over the
weak, establishes a state of affairs which is in itself right and just. In
other words, t6 8tcaotzracov could refer to the ideal scene describedin
483e-484a. Theognidea255 reads KXXthoov ri 8tiKo6traOov and, by
extension, it could be claimed that Callicles has describedwhat is
K•<c-
Xt(rov in his eyes: the rebellion of the powerful against the constraints
of society. If one allows for the possibility that Callicles misquotes
Pindar,then his incorrectciting of the poet's words aboutv6ogogis used
as a feeble supportfor his own viewpoint. In addition, it would seem
quite comical if Plato not only presented Callicles' perverse view but
also had Callicles attributesuch an opinion to Pindar.80
FLORIDA INTERNATIONALUNIVERSITY
v6gog 'violates' justice. Charles Segal has suggested to me that Ptat6domay be a facti-
tive verb like tcat6ao; therefore,the phrasePtatiFv ro 6t8at6aXrov would mean 'mak-
ing r6 into Pif.'
8tKat•6•aov
80 I wish to thank the readersof HSCP for their helpful suggestions. The researchfor
this article was supportedin partby a fellowship from the AmericanAssociation of Uni-
versity Women.

Department of The Classics, Harvard University

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Callicles' Quotation of Pindar in the Gorgias

the most discussed

related. The nature of their relationshipis anotherpoint of scholarly

than be a victim of it.4 His metaphoricallanguage describing Socrates'

nature)' is importantbecause Callicles is unabashedly expressing the

nature'sv6'gogbut not necessarilyjustifiable by man's. Callicles' self-

~yi XFyo v6icv~uoOCCv

22 Although Burnet's OCT offers this

the Histories. The context of Herodotus' reference to Pindar'sgnome

wording implies that Zeus himself, one of the immortals, is ruled by

Heraclitus'personificationof nI6Xog; as 'fatherandking of all' in Diels-Kranz22 B 53).

Lloyd-Jones,regardsthe verb 8tcatCOvas factitive;however,the former

Aelius Aristides in his H-Epti p'ropt"iig, evidently citing the Pindar

Pindar,whose poetry characteristicallybestows praise (axvo;) or blame

sentiments towards Geryon in fr. 169a as he does in the dithyramb,I

sented as worthy opponents who defend themselves against the vio-

insightfulremarksaboutthe word's meaning may assist the searchfor a

While nomos is divine therefore, it ought not to be severed from

This interpretationof the significance of v6iog; in Pindarfr. 169a takes

53Crotty(above, n. 46) 106.

other hand, seems to think it is necessary to make allowance for Hera-

reading Patczovstems from Plato's accidental misquotationof Pindar

tors such as Lysias and Demosthenes (cf. LSJ

as quoted by Aristides who, since he is defending rhetoric against

This difficult passage from Libanius' Apology, which presents a ficti-

crates "could have used a misquotationput by Plato into the mouth of

for attributingthe act of purposeful misquotationto Anytus who, like Callicles, is an

Pittuov in the latter sense would be more appropriatewith respect to

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