PHILJUST

LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales
Bar Review Lecturer

Public Officers
01. Are the following persons considered public officers under the law and therefore can be
charged for violation of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the
Sandiganbayan: (1) Chairman of the National Centennial Commission (2) University of
the Philippines Student Regent (3) Employees and officials of the Philippine National
Construction Corporation
ANSWERS: (1) YES. The characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions, its
creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office. The NCC was precisely created to ensure a more coordinated and
synchronized celebrations of the Philippine Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-
government or private organizations and to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries and
to carry them out into effect. Thus, the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore concerns the implementation
of the policies as set forth by law. (Laurel vs. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48)
(2) YES. Although she is not a public officer with salary grade 27 and a mere regular tuition fee-paying
student, it is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in PD 1606, including presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Compensation is not an essential element of public office. Delegation of sovereign
functions to be exercised by her for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. The administration of
the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. (Serena vs. Sandiganbayan, 542
SCRA 224)
(3) NO. Employees and officials of the PNCC are not public officers within the coverage of RA 3019, as
amended, inasmuch as PNCC has no original charter as it was incorporated under the general law on
corporations and the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them. (Macalino vs. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA
452)
02. Who is an accountable public officer? Are municipal mayors accountable public officers?
ANSWER: Under the government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is a public
officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property. Section 340 of the Local
government Code expanded this definition by including “any officer of the local government unit whose duty
permits or requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible
for the safekeeping thereof x x x. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of their duties,
may likewise be similarly held accountable through their participation in the use or application thereof.” Thus,
local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the nature of their functions
or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds.
Section 102(1) of the Government Auditing Code provides that “The head of any agency of the
government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to his
agency.” Since municipal mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities, they are accountable
public officers. And as such, they are obliged to liquidate and settle disallowed cash advances within the
allowable period, without prejudice to their right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with them.
Failing to return the disallowed cash advances, the funds were deemed illegally or improperly used or applied
and they may be held liable for violation of Article 218 of the Revised penal Code. (Frias, Sr. vs. People, GR
No. 171437,October 4, 2007)
03. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned and controlled corporations organized and incorporated
under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act?
ANSWER: YES. The fact that the legislature, in mandating the inclusion of “presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned and controlled corporations” within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has
consistently refrained from making distinctions with respect to the manner of their creation clearly reveals its
intention to include such officials of GOCC’s with original charters and those organized and incorporated under
the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and
corruption. (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 452 SCRA 413).
(1)
De Facto Officer
04. Distinguish a de facto officer from a de jure officer; a de facto from a usurper.
ANSWER: A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colourable authority to
appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one
who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant
authority derived from an appointment, however, irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere
volunteer . (Funa v Agra, GR No. 191644, February 19, 2013)
vA de facto officer is one who assumed office under the color of a known appointment or election but
which appointment is void for reasons that the officer is not eligible, while a de jure officer is one who is in all
respects legally appointed or elected and qualified to exercise the office. A de facto officer has possession and
performs the duties under a colorable title without being technically qualified in all points of law to act while a
de jure officer has a lawful or legal title to the office. A de facto officer holding of office rests on reputation while
a de jure officer holding of office rests on right. A de facto officer may be ousted in a direct proceeding (quo
warranto) against him but a de jure officer cannot be removed through a direct proceeding .
A de facto officer has color of right or title to office while a usurper has neither color of right or title to
office. The acts of a de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure, insofar as the public
or third persons who are interested therein are concerned while the acts of a usurper are absolutely void. A de
facto officer may be entitled to compensation for actual services rendered while a usurper is not entitled at all
to compensation.
05. Are the acts of a de facto officer valid? Is he entitled to compensation?
ANSWER: The acts of a de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, insofar as
the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. (Funa. Agra, GR No. 191644, February
19, 2013) The lawful acts, insofar as the rights of third persons are concerned are, if done within the scope and
by the apparent authority of the office, considered valid and binding. However, the de facto officer cannot
benefit from his own status because public policy demands that unlawful assumption of public office be
discouraged. A de facto officer is entitled to emoluments for actual service rendered, and he cannot be made to
reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are valid as those of a de jure officer.
Appointments
06. Is the constitutional prohibition on the so-called Presidential “midnight appointments”
applicable to appointments made by a local chief executive?
ANSWER: NO. The constitutional prohibition on the so-called “midnight appointments,” specifically those made
within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting
President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials for making appointments during the last days of
their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by irregularities or anomalies
which breach laws and regulations governing appointment. (De Rama vs. CA, 353 SCRA 650)
However, Memorandum Circular No. 9 s. 2003 issued by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
CSC Resolution No. 030918 dated August 28, 2003, states that all appointments of whatever nature or status
issued within 45 days before any national or local elections shall be disapproved, subject to the exception
pursuant to Section 262 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The CSC MC further states that all appointments
issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved except if the appointee
is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as
shown in the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting.
07. Marco was appointed as Cooperative Development Specialist II simultaneous with 25 other
applicants in various positions, five (5) days before the end of Governor Ong’s term. Before the
election ban on appointment, he has undergone regular screening process conducted by the
Personnel Selection Board which found him qualified for the position. The incoming administration
questioned the validity of his appointment as violative of the CSC rule imposing a prohibition on
midnight appointment. Decide.
ANSWER: Although Marco’s appointment was made five days before the end of Governor Ong’s term, he was
fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening process conducted by the Personnel
Selection Board. Moreover, although issued in bulk, the 26 appointments can hardly be classified as “mass
appointment”, and this per se does not invalidate the appointment. Considering that Marco has already
accepted his appointment by the time the Province prevented him from assuming his office, his appointment
remains effective up to the present. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission correctly ordered the Province
to reinstate Marco to his position and to pay him back salaries from July 2004 when the Province prevented
him from reporting for work up to his actual reinstatement. (Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco GR No.
202331, April 22, 2015)
Nepotism
08. Who can be held liable for nepotism? What are the exceptions thereto?
ANSWER: The following can be held liable for nepotism: 1) appointing authority 2) recommending authority
3) head of office and immediate supervisor. These persons must be related to the appointee within the third
(2)
degree (national positions) or fourth degree (local positions) of consanguinity or affinity. By way of exception,
the following shall not be covered by the prohibition on nepotism: (1) persons employed in a confidential
capacity (2) teachers (3) physicians, and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. Hence, respondent’s Cortes’
appointment as Information Officer V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a member,
is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari’s abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic
character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere
presence during the deliberation for the appointment of Information Officer V created an impression of
influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. (Civil Service
Commission v. Cortes, GR No. 200103, April 23, 2014)
09. Does having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority constitute
nepotism?
ANSWER: NO. Having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority, does not nepotism
make. Besides, the law does not absolutely prohibit persons from being appointed to an office the appointing
authority of which is a relative so long as such relation, by consanguinity or affinity, is not within the prohibited
third degree. (Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 115)

10. Can the President still make appointment to the judiciary during the so-called midnight
appointment ban period?
ANSWER: The President can make appointments to the Supreme Court two months before a
presidential election until the end of his term but not to the rest of the Judiciary like the Court of
Appeals. Under Section4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be
filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, vacancies in the lower courts shall be filled within ninety (90) days from submission of
the list of nominees. These appointments are screened by the Judicial and Bar Council, and the
process necessarily precludes or prevents the President from making purely political appointments to
the courts, which is what is sought to be prevented by the prohibition. (De Castro v. Judicial and Bar
Council, GR No. 191002, April 20, 2010, 615 SCRA 666)
Security of Tenure in Career Executive Service
11. How is security of tenure acquired in the Career Executive Service?
ANSWER: The guarantee of security of tenure is a concept which is applicable only to first and second-level
employees in the civil service. For members of the Career Executive Service, security of tenure does not
extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed but to the rank to which they are appointed
by the President. (Osea vs. Malaya, GR No. 139821, January 30, 2002; Dimayuga vs. Benedicto, GR No.
144154, January 30, 2002 and Ignacio vs. CSC, 464 SCRA 220)

Appointments, assignments, reassignments and transfer in the Career Executive Service are based
on rank. Security of tenure in the Career Executive Service is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to
position. Mobility and flexibility in the assignment of personnel, to better cope with the exigencies of public
service, is the distinguishing feature of the Career Executive Service. (Secretary of Justice vs. Bacal, GR No.
139382, December 6, 2000)
Grounds for disciplinary action
12. Does dishonesty, as ground of disciplinary action against a public officer, need to be
committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged?
ANSWER: NO. The rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course
of the performance of duty by the person charged. If a government officer or employee is
dishonest or is guilty of oppression or misconduct, even if said defects of character are not
connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The principle is that when
an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of such officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public faith
and confidence in the government. (Remolana vs. CA, 362 SCRA 304)
13. Can employees in the public service engage in strike, mass leaves or walkouts?
ANSWER: NO. Employees in the public service may not engage in strike, mass leaves, walkouts and other
forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of
government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to strike. (Gisete vs. CA, 444 SCRA 51)
14. Can a government official or employee who is on AWOL be dismissed from service?
ANSWER: YES. Section 63 of CSC Res. No. 983142 already allows the dismissal of a government official or
employee who is on AWOL without prior notice. But the government official or employee who is on AWOL shall
be informed of his separation from the service not later than 5 days from its effectivity. (Petilla vs. CA, 424
SCRA, 254)
 (3)

15. Is summary dismissal allowed by law?

ANSWER: The provision on summary dismissal of public officers (when the charge is serious and evidence of
guilt is strong; when a respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged, and there is reasonable
ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and when respondent is notoriously undesirable) has
been repealed as the same violates the fundamental right of due process. However, summary dismissal
remains in the police and military service as these personnel carry the badge of the law.
15. Who has the power to dismiss Philippine National Police members? What are the grounds
for summary dismissal of PNP members?
ANSWER: The power to dismiss PNP members is not only the prerogative of the Peoples’ Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB) but concurrently exercised by the PNP Chief and Regional Directors. Once a complaint is filed
with any of the disciplinary authorities under RA 6975, the latter shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over
the case although other disciplinary authority has concurrent jurisdiction over the case. The grounds for
summary dismissal of PNP members are serious charges including charges for commission of heinous crimes
and those committed by organized/syndicated crime groups wherein the PNP members are involved,
gunrunning, illegal logging, robbery, kidnapping for ransom, white slave trade; illegal recruitment, carnapping,
smuggling, piracy, drug trafficking, falsification of land title and other government forms, large scale swindling,
film piracy, counterfeiting and bank fraud.(Quiambao vs. CA, 454 SCRA 17)
16. Give the effects of the following:
(1) Withdrawal of an administrative/civil complaint upon the case;
(2) Dismissal of the criminal action, upon the administrative case; and
(3) Cessation from office of respondent judge due to death, upon the administrative complaint.
ANSWERS:
(1) The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from
administrative disciplinary action. (Aranes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402 and Araza vs. Sheriffs Garcia and
Tonga, A.M. No. P-00-1363, February 8, 2000) An affidavit of desistance will not automatically result to the
dismissal of an administrative case or the exoneration of the respondent. (Jacobs vs. Tambo, 369 SCRA 148)
A complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or employee cannot
just be withdrawn at anytime by the complainant. This is because there is a need to maintain faith and
confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and instrumentalities. (Tecson vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 123045, November, 1999) Proceedings in such case should not be made to
depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are in a real sense, the only witness therein .
(Florendo vs. Enrile, 239 SCRA 22).
(2) Considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, the procedure to be followed and the sanctions
imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily
be binding on the other. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 114683, January 18, 2000).
(3) Cessation from office of respondent judge due to death does not per se warrant the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service. Since the instant administrative
complaint was filed before respondent’s death, the Court retains authority to pursue the administrative
complaint against him. The judge was ordered to pay a fine of PhP5,000.00 to be taken from his retirement
benefit in view of his demise. (Cabanero vs. Canon, 365 SCRA 425)
17. May a public officer be validly be found guilty of another offense other than the designated
offense or offenses with which he is charged in an administrative case?
ANSWER: YES. The designation of the offense or offenses with which a person is charged in an administrative
case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of another offense, where the substance of the allegations
and evidence presented sufficiently proves guilt. (Avenido vs. CSC, GR No.177666 April 30, 2008)
18. What procedure should be followed in administrative investigations involving a public
school teacher conducted by the Department of Education?
ANSWER: RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public school teachers, expressly provides that the committee to hear
public school teachers’ administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division
as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a
supervisor of the division. Where the various committees formed by the DepEd to hear administrative charges
against respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization as required by law, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis
for the suspension or dismissal of respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teacher’s organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have
given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective
teachers’ organization does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organization. The
teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DepEd
in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their underlings. (Fabella vs. CA 282 SCRA256)
(4)
While the ruling in the Fabella applies to public school teachers charged with violations of civil service
laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the DepEd Secretary, the same does not
apply where the charges against the public school teachers are for violations of RA 6713, known as the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employee, where the acts or omissions complained
of relate to respondents’ conduct as public official and employee, if not outright graft and corruption.
(Ombudsman vs. Masing, 542 SCRA 253)

Right to Formal Investigation

19. The Provincial Vice Governor and the Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan filed an
administrative complaint against the Provincial Governor with the Office of the President for grave
misconduct and abuse of authority because he allegedly tried to intimidate them to approve a bank
loan. The respondent Governor was ordered to file an answer and not a motion to dismiss. After
filing three (3) motions for extension of time to file an answer, his counsel filed a motion to dismiss
which was denied and the parties were required to submit their position papers. Respondent
Governor filed his answer but it was considered instead as his position paper. He then filed a
motion for formal investigation which was also denied. On the basis of their position papers a
decision was rendered finding the governor guilty. Is the denial of the motion for formal
investigation proper?
ANSWER: NO. The denial of the motion of the Governor for formal investigation is erroneous. His right to
formal investigation is spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23. He has the right to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses and the right to compulsory attendance of
witness and the production of documentary evidence. The right of the Governor to formal investigation was not
satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279)

20. An administrative complaint was filed against MDA before the Office of the Ombudsman.
She requested for a formal investigation as provided for in the Administrative Code but it was
denied. She now claims she was deprived of her right to due process. Is her contention legally
tenable?
ANSWER: NO. The provision in the Administrative Code cited by the petitioner in support of her theory that she
is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. The
administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a
different rules of procedure govern. Administrative Order No. 7, as amended by AO 17, particularly governs
the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The denial of petitioner’s
request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. Petitioner was
required to file a counter-affidavit and position paper and later on, was given a chance to file two motions for
reconsideration of the decision of the deputy ombudsman. (Medina vs. COA, 543 SCRA 684)
21. Who is vested with the power to remove or dismiss erring local elective officials? What is
the effect of the imposition of the penalty of dismissal in an administrative case?
ANSWER: The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code. (Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55) Likewise, in Pablico vs. Villapando, 385
SCRA 601, it was held that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the rules and regulations implementing the
Local Government Code insofar as it vests power on the “disciplining authority” to remove from office erring
elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government.
Such grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the
authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the rules and regulations. No such regulation may alter,
amend or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code.
The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied,
and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good
faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the
exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or
partisanship of the disciplining authority. When the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and
not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.
(Ibid.) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative investigation shall be considered a bar
to the candidacy of the respondent for any elective position. (Section 66 c, LGC)
22. May a Deputy Ombudsman be subjected to the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the
President?
ANSWER: NO. The framers of the Constitution intended that independent bodies be insulated from political
pressure to the extent that the absence of independence would result in the impairment of their core functions.,
Hence, RA No. 6770 vesting authority in the President over the Deputy Ombudsman violates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and thus unconstitutional. (Gonzales III. Office of the President
of the Philippines, GR No. 196231, January 28, 2014)
(5)
Preventive Suspension vs. Suspension as a Penalty
23. Distinguish preventive suspension from suspension as a penalty. Can service of the former
be credited as service for the latter?
ANSWERS: Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in administrative
investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the
powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital
in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person
investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. Unlike in criminal law in case of preventive imprisonment, the period within
which one is under preventive suspension, not being a penalty, is not considered of the actual penalty of
suspension – service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of the penalty. (Quimbo vs.
Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277)
24. What are the periods of preventive suspension?
ANSWER: For administrative cases: a) under CS Law, 90 days b) under the LGC, 60 or 90 days for elective
officials, and 90 days for appointive officials c) under Ombudsman Act, 6 months. For criminal
cases, under RA 3019, 90 days by analogy.

25. Differentiate preventive suspension pending investigation from preventive suspension

pending appeal.
ANSWER: PSPI is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplinary authority an unhampered
investigation while PSPA is punitive is character. In PSPI, the officer shall be automatically
reinstated after the lapse of the period of preventive suspension while in PSPA, if officer is
exonerated, he shall be reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension. In PSPI, the
officer is not entitled to payment of salaries during such period of suspension even if
subsequently exonerated, except local elective officials, while in PSPA, his penalty of
suspension shall be treated as PSPA upon appeal but if exonerated or the penalty is
reprimand, he is entitled to back salary corresponding to the period of suspension.
Preventive suspension and Backwages
26. Should a civil servant is preventively suspended and subsequently reinstated, is the
payment of backwages proper during the period of his preventive suspension?
ANSWER: YES. The payment of backwages during the period of preventive suspension of a civil servant who
is subsequently reinstated is proper if: (1) he is found innocent of the charges, and (2) the suspension is
unjustified. Where the two circumstances are absent, the payment of backwages is improper. (Brugada vs.
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 450 SCRA 225)
Appeals from Administrative Decisions
27. Can a complainant appeal a decision exonerating or absolving a civil service employee?
ANSWER: NO. The Civil Service Law does not allow a complainant to appeal a decision exonerating or
absolving a civil service employee. This doctrine, however, may have been modified to allow the Civil Service
Commission, as a party adversely affected by the decision, to appeal decisions exonerating an employee.
Nonetheless, excepting the privilege of appeal granted to the CSC, the law does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers and employees from administrative charges. (CSC vs. Dacoycoy, 306 SCRA
425 and Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551)
In National Appellate Board of the NAPOLCOM vs. Mamauag, 466 SCRA 624, it was also held that a
private complainant is not one of “either party” who can appeal under Section 43 and 45 of RA 6975 – she has
no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against members of the PNP. The government party
that can appeal is not the disciplinary authority or tribunal which previously held the case and imposed the
penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service – it must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case.
In Civil Service Commission v. Clave, GR No. 194645 and 194665, 667 SCRA 556, both the GSIS
and the CSC were given standing to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals. In GSIS v. Chua, GR No.
202914, 682 SCRA 118, the GSIS was then allowed to bring an appeal of the modification of the penalty with
this Court. Thus, we now hold that the parties adversely affected by a decision in an administrative case who
may appeal shall include the disciplining authority whose decision dismissing the employee was either
overturned or modified by the Civil Service Commission. (LRTA v. Salvana , GR No. 192074, June 10, 2014)
Impeachable Officers
28. Who are the impeachable officers? Can they be prosecuted for criminal offenses?
ANSWER: As enumerated in Section 2 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, only the following are
impeachable officers: the President, the Vice President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be
criminally prosecuted for the same offense which constitutes grounds for impeachment presupposes his
continuance in office. Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.
(6)
Initiation of Impeachment
29. When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution?
ANSWER: Initiation of impeachment proceedings takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. Considering that the first impeachment
complaint was filed by former President Estrada against the Chief Justice, along with seven other justices of
the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003, and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Reps. Teodoro and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003, violates the constitutional prohibition against initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period. (Francisco vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol, GR No.
160261, November 10, 2003)
30. Before the 15 th Congress opened its first session, Ombudsman MMG faced an
impeachment complaint filed by RHB. A day after the opening of the 15 th Congress, the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to the House
Speaker who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the order of Business. On the
same day, RR filed another
impeachment complaint against Ombudsman MMG. On even date the House of representatives
provisionally adopted the Rules of procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14 th Congress.
The Secretary General RR’s complaint to the Speaker who also directed the Committee on Rules to
include it in the Order of Business. During the plenary session, the House of Representatives
simultaneously referred both complaints to the Committee. After hearing, the Committee, by
Resolution, found the two complaints sufficient in form. By a second Resolution, the Committee
found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, sufficient in substance. Ombudsman MMG avers that 1) she was denied of due process
when the impeachment rules were published only after the Committee has ruled on the sufficiency
of form of the complaints and 2) two impeachment proceedings were initiated against her when two
impeachment complaints were filed against her in the same year. Decide.
ANSWERS:
1) Unlike the rules of procedures on inquiries in aid of legislation, the Constitution did not intend to have the
Impeachment Rules published. In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, the
Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Congress relative
thereto. Under the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the
legislature.
2) The one year bar rule under the Constitution was not violated. The term “initiate” means to file the
complaint and take initial action on it. The initial action taken by the House of Representatives on the
complaint is referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Contrary to Ombudsman MMG
emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings.
(Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011)
31. A verified impeachment complaint was filed by 208 members of the House of
Representatives against Chief Justice Crown. The complaint was immediately transmitted
to the Senate for trial. Chief Justice Crown challenges such immediate transmittal to the
Senate because the verified complaint was 1) not included in the order of business of the
House, 2) was not referred to the House Committee on Justice for hearing and
consideration for sufficiency in form and substance, and 3) was not submitted to the House
Plenary for consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2), Section 3, Article XI of the
Philippine Constitution. Decide with reasons whether the initiation of impeachment is valid.
ANSWER: Since the verified complaint was filed by 208 Members of the House of Representatives and they
constituted at least one-third of its Members, it need not undergo the procedure in Paragraph 2,
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution. The verified complaint constitutes the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate should proceed forthwith. (Section 3(4), Article 11 of the
Constitution.)
Command Responsibility
32. Can a public officer be dismissed from service on administrative charge for gross neglect of
duty without substantial evidence to support the findings of gross neglect of duty because
the duty to monitor and inspect the project was not vested in the public officer?
ANSWER: NO. Administrative liability could not be based on the fact that a public officer was the one who
signed and approved the Environmental Compliance Certificate, without proof of actual act or omission
constituting neglect of duty. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross neglect of the public officer,
administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command responsibility. The negligence of a
public officer’s subordinates is not tantamount to his own negligence. It was not within the mandated
responsibility of the public officer to conduct actual monitoring of projects. The principle governing public
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officers under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 clearly provides that a head of a department or a
superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence or misfeasance of
his subordinates unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained
of. (Principe vs. Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, office of the Ombudsman, 374 SCRA 460).
33. Does the Doctrine of Command Responsibility apply to high ranking officers of the central
monetary authority?
ANSWER: NO. The principle of command responsibility itself which is an accepted notion in military or police
structural dynamics or its counter part respondeat superior in the law on quasi-delicts is not relevant to a case
involving the actual performance in the office of petitioner public officials and given the fact that they are high
ranking officers of the country’s central monetary authority. Petitioners in this case owing to their high ranks
cannot be expected to monitor the activities of their subalterns and to acquaint themselves which such minutae
as the flow of files and documents which leave their desks. Myriad details such as those, by office practice, left
to subalterns and minor employees. Delegation of function is part of sound management practice. (Reyes vs.
Rural Bank of San Miguel, 424 SCRA135)
34. Can the doctrine of command responsibility be used in amparo and habeas cases data?
Can the President, as commander-in-chief of the military be held responsible for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances?
ANSWERS: YES. The development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the
application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus,
command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ
of amparo to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address a person’s abduction in order to
enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.
YES. The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control
over the military that qualifies him as superior within the purview of the command responsibility. On the issue of
knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply strict standard of knowledge, i.e.,
actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a
more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. Under EO 226, a
government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he
has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his
subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take
preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. As to the issue of
failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the
President has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military. (in the Matter of petition for
the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in Favor of Noriel Rodriguez v. GM Arroyo, et al. GR No. 191805 and
193160, November 15, 2011)
Ombudsman
35. What is the scope and limitations of the power of the Ombudsman?
ANSWER: Scope of power: The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Ombudsman over acts of public
officers related or not related to official duty. (Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, GR No. 116801, April 6, 1995) The
power to investigate and prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified – it pertains
to any act or omission of any public officer or employee, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. (Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, 354 SCRA 651) It has the power to prosecute not only
graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. (Office
of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc, 374 SCRA 691)
The Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official, other than impeachable officials, and members of Congress and the Judiciary. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. CA, GR No. 168079, July 17, 2007) RA 6770 expressly grants the power to preventively
suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges to the Ombudsman and his deputies.
(Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, 491 SCRA 92) Section 25 of RA 6770 gave the Office of the Ombudsman
the power to impose penalties in administrative cases.
Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies including members of the cabinet, local governments, government - owned and controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except those who may be removed only by impeachment. On the other
hand, RA 7160, the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan have
disciplinary authority over elective barangay official. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with the local government units over administrative cases against elective local officials. (Laxina vs.
Office of the Ombudsman, 471 SCRA 542)
Power to Impose Preventive Suspension. RA 6770 empowers the Ombudsman to impose a
preventive suspension of a longer period of not more than six (6) months.
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Limitations. The office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to investigate employees of government-
owned or controlled corporations organized under the Corporation Code. (Khan vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
495 SCRA 452).The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against a judge of the
Regional Trial Court relative to his handling cases before the court. The determination of whether a judge has
maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is exclusively a judicial function. (De Vera vs. Hon. Pelayo, GR
No. 137354, July 6, 2000) The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action. (Judge Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman - Mindanao, GR No. 124295, October 23, 2001)
Effectivity and Finality of Decisions, Appeal
36. What decisions of the Ombudsman are considered final and unappeallable?
ANSWER: Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman was further amended which
provides that decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately executory even pending appeal and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins the appeal, he shall be considered as having been
under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive
by reason of the suspension or removal, which provision is similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. Section 7 now reads:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. – Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of Decision or
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Decisions Considered Final and Unappeallable. There are two instances where a decision, resolution
or order of the Ombudsman arising from an administrative case becomes final and unappealable: (1) where
the respondent is absolved of the charge, and (2) in case of conviction, where the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary.
(Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 184083, November 19, 2013)
All appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to
the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Where the decisions of certain
administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the
Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature; their actions are logically beyond the control of the RTC, a
co-equal body. A such, the RTC has no jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain the execution of the
Ombudsman’s decisions in disciplinary cases. (DILG v. Gatuz, GR No. 191176, October 14, 2015)
37. Are the decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code final and
executory?
ANSWER: YES. The decision of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are immediately
executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions are rendered
mandated them to be so. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of
the decision. Thus the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution. (Calingin vs.
CA, 434 SCRA 173)
38. What is the three-fold responsibility of a public officer?
ANSWER: It is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-
fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public
officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or
wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the
injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally,
such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This
administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities. (Apolinario vs. Flores, GR
No.152780, January 22, 2007)
Preventive Suspension by the Sandiganbayan
39. Can the Sandiganbayan impose preventive suspension upon members of Congress facing
charges for violation of RA 3019 –the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, without violating
the doctrine of separation of powers?
ANSWER: YES. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from RA 3019 nor from its sanctions. The question in the case at bar does not
pertain to an affair internal to either Congress or the Executive where the Court substituted its own judgment
over that of any other two branches of government, and therefore there is no infringement of any specific
Constitutional proscription, no impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision
that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law does not
exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension. (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 636)
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41. How may a public office be created and abolished? Distinguish abolition of an office and
its related positions from removal of an incumbent from office. Explain the test of good faith in the
abolition of a public office.
ANSWER: A public office is created by the Constitution or by law or by an officer or tribunal to which the power
to create has been delegated by the legislature. The power to create an office carries with it the power to
abolish. Abolition and removal are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant
in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of tenure
does not arise in the abolition of office. On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related
positions subsist and the occupants are merely separated from their positions. A valid order of abolition must
not only come from a legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith
when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does not circumvent the constitutional security
of tenure of civil service employees. Abolition of office may be brought about by reasons of economy, or
remove redundancy of functions, or a clear explicit constitutional mandate for such termination of employment.
Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition if a
legal nullity. The overlap in the functions of the abolished Energy regulatory Board (ERB) and of the Energy
Regulatory Commission (ERC) does not mean that there is no valid abolition because the latter has new and
expanded functions which are intended to meet specific needs of a deregulated power industry. (Kapisanan ng
mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory Board vs. Barin, 526 SCRA 1)
42. The Executive Secretary issued a Memorandum directing all non-career officials to vacate
their positions. Pursuant to the Memorandum, ANDOK resigned from the DOF. More than a year
later he was charged before the Ombudsman due to the illegal transfer of Tax Credit Certificates.
Can the Ombudsman still institute an administrative case after a public official’s resignation from
office.
ANSWER: NO. While resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of administrative liability to
which he or she is still answerable if the purpose is either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or
to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. ANDOK’s resignation was neither his choice nor his own doing; he was
forced to resign. His forced resignation negates that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.
Although the Ombudsman Law does not preclude the Ombudsman from conducting the investigation, the
Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case against ANDOK because the latter was not a public
officer at the time the case was filed. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, GR No. 164679, July 27, 2011)
Multiple Positions, Additional Compensation
43. Are the following public officers allowed to hold multiple positions? If so, are they entitled to
double compensation? 1) Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as ex-officio Member of the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS 2) Secretary of Finance as ex-officio Member of the Monetary
Board
ANSWERS: 1) NO. It is a clear violation of the special provision of Section 2 of Article IX-A of the Constitution,
which strictly provides that he shall,, during his tenure, not hold any other office or employment. Such provision
foes not make any distinction among the offices he may not hold, or as to whether or not the functions attached
to said offices would be primarily related to his duties as Chairman of the CSC and therefore may be held in an
ex-officio capacity. His designation as ex-officio member also impairs the independence of the CSC since the
President exercises control over all government offices in the Executive branch. Since he is not allowed to hold
any other position in the government service even in an ex-officio capacity, it follows that he is not entitled to
receive any form of additional compensation. (Funa v. Chairman, CSC, GR No.191672,, November 25, 2014)
2) YES. The prohibition against the holding of multiple positions by Cabinet Members in Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to positions occupied in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of their office. However, he
cannot receive any additional compensation for his service in that position are already paid
for by the compensation attached to his principal office. (Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317)
44. What is the principle of hold-over? Who among the elective officials may hold-over?
ANSWER: In the absence of any express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, the public officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor shall have been
duly chosen and shall have qualified. The purpose of hold-over principle is to prevent hiatus
in public service. The hold-over principle may apply to barangay officials as their term is fixed by a
statute, RA 9164. An amendatory law may be passed by Congress for this purpose. All other
elective officials are not covered by the principle because their terms are fixed by the Constitution.
Likewise, constitutional officers whose terms are fixed by the Constitution have no right to hold-over
their positions.
45. What are the requisites for the effective operation of the “Rotational Scheme” for
Constitutional Commissions?
ANSWER: The first Commissioner should start on a common date and any vacancy before the
expiration of tem should be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term.

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46. What are the rights of illegally dismissed civil service employees?
ANSWER: An employee of the civil service has the right to be protected min the possession and exercise of his
or her office. He or she cannot be removed from his or her employment save for causes allowed by law. A
necessary consequence of the importance given to security of tenure is the rule that an employee invalidly
dismissed from service is entitled to reinstatement. An employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated
is also entitled to the full payment of his or her backwages during the entire period of the time that he or she
was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his or her position and from enjoying its benefits. This
is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never left the office. The right to receive
backwages means exactly this – that it corresponds to his salary at the time of his dismissal until
reinstatement. Any income he may have obtained during the litigation of the case shall not be deducted from
this amount. This is consistent with our ruling that an employee illegally dismissed has the right to live and to
find employment elsewhere during the pendency of the case. (Campol v. Balao-as, GR No. 197634, November
28, 2016, 810 SCRA 501)
Three consecutive terms limit
46. What are the two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three
consecutive terms limit for local elective officials?
ANSWERS: (1) The two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three
consecutive terms limit are: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC,
311 SCRA 602; Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574; Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 and Abundo vs.
COMELEC, GR No.201716, January 8, 2013))
47. ONG was declared by the Board of Canvassers as winner for a mayoralty position in the
1992 elections. He assumed office but was ordered unseated six months later by virtue of a
successful election protest filed by ALEGRE. He ran again in 1995 and 1998 for the same position
and won and served his terms. (1) Is he eligible to run again for mayor in the 2001 elections?
(2) Would your answer be the same if during the 1992 elections, the order unseating him was
issued after the expiration of his term?
(1) YES. Though proclaimed as winner by the Board of Canvassers, he is not considered duly elected
for that particular term because he was unseated. Voluntary renunciation of a term of office does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from the office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
(Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602)
(2) NO. In Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the Supreme Court held that Ong’s assumption as mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes “service of full term” and should
be counted as full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the Constitution. While
Ong’s opponent “won” in an election protest in the 1998 mayoralty race, and therefore was the legally elected
mayor, that disposition was without practical and legal use and values, having been promulgated after the
term of the contested office has expired. Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998
mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled
by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from the start to finish of the
term, should be legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
In Rivera vs. COMELEC, GR 167591ans GR 170577, May 9, 2007, since respondent Morales was
elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, and assumed the position and served as mayor until June
30 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that he was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him as mayor. Such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the
powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely.”
48. CONDE was elected Mayor of the Municipality of La Trinidad in the elections of 1995, 1998
and 2001. He fully served his first two terms, and during his third term, the municipality was
converted into a component City if La Trinidad. The city charter provided for a hold-over
and so without interregnum CONDE went on the serve as the Mayor of the City of La
Trinidad. Is CONDE eligible again to run for City Mayor in the 2004 elections?
ANSWER: NO. While a new component city which was converted from a municipality acquires a new
corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean however, that for the
purpose of applying the constitutional provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. Where a person has been
elected for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-year
term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until
the end of the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city
mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the term. Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred
from running for city mayor under the three-term limit rule. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574)
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This prohibition also applies to the office of a punong barangay of a municipality merged with another
municipality to create a city as a new political unit. The territorial jurisdiction of such barangay is the same as
before conversion and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. The voters who voted for the punong
barangay are the same group of voters. The prohibition applies to prevent him from running as punong
barangay for the fourth time, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. (Laceda vs. Limena, GR No.
182867. November25, 2008)
49. Distinguish voluntary renunciation from office from involuntary severance from office.
ANSWER: No severance From Office. Where an elective official was elected for 3-consecutive terms but was
the subject of a preventive suspension by the Ombudsman for several months during one of his terms, such
suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his
office during this period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009)
Voluntary Renunciation From Office. A Punong Barangay who had already completed two consecutive
terms of office and ran for a third term in the Barangay elections of 2002, and while serving his third term as
Punong Barangay, he subsequently ran and won and assumed the position of a Sangguniang Bayan member,
has effectively abandoned the position of a Punong Barangay and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment,
like resignation, is voluntary. When he voluntarily relinquished his office as a Punong Barangay, there is
voluntary renunciation of said office. (Bolos vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184082, March 17, 2009))
Involuntary Severance From Office. SFP was elected and served three consecutive term as municipal
councilor. During his second term, he succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement of the incumbent vice-
mayor. His assumption as vice-mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his office as municipal
councilor resulting an interruption in his second term of service. It was held that it could not be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law, hence qualified to run again as
municipal councillor. (Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50)

50. EDWARD was elected City Mayor of Puerto Princesa in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, where he fully served all the three consecutive terms. In the 2001 elections he ran
for governor of Palawan but he lost in such electoral race. A year after, a recall election for
City Mayor of Puerto Princesa was called by the COMELEC. Is EDWARD eligible to run for
City Mayor without violating the constitutional provision on term limit?
ANSWER: YES. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of
the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service. (Socrates vs. COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457)
51. What is the effect of interruption of service on the three-term limit rule?
ANSWER: In Abundo v. COMELEC, GR No. 291716, January 8, 2013, the Court held that the two-year period
during which Abundo’s opponent was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. Pending the favorable resolution
of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. For two years, Abundo was a
private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. An elected official who was
belatedly declared as winner and assumed office for only a short period of term is declared eligible by the
Court, because he was deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents and that an injustice may
be committed against the people of Viga by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders.
--ooOoo—

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