OCAMPO et al vs.

OCAMPO et al
NOVEMBER 11, 2010 ~ VBDI AZ

OCAMPO et al vs. OCAMPO et al

G.R. No. 150707

April 14, 2004

FACTS: The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten

(10) children. 2 of them, Fidela, and Felicidad are respondents herein.

‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired

3parcels of land and, upon their death, left the following properties. Only one of them, lot a is the subject of this case, a parcel of

residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur

‘that the 3 parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses although the land denominated as

parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property

owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but defendants Fidela

Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to do so; that the same defendants have been receiving the fruits of

the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs ;and, that because of their relationship, they undertook earnest efforts to amicably

settle this controversy but because of defendants’ utterly unreasonable and unjustified actuations, the same failed.

‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the properties; ordering defendants Fidela

and Felicidad to release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances which they had caused to be annotated on the TCT;

requiring Fidela and Felicidad to refrain from further encumbering said properties; further ordering Fidela and Felicidad to

indemnify plaintiffs .

‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that in 1987, the

TCT in the name of defendant Fidela and covering the lot described as parcel (a) was cancelled and, in lieu thereof aTCT was

issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by

defendant Fidela in their favor.

That at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when a TCT was issued to defendant Belen

Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and

sisters, and that the donor Fidela was not the exclusive owner thereof.
The RTC holds and declares that defendant spouses are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the following properties. The CA

affirmed with modifications (for damages) the said ruling. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed property?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED

Petitioners’ chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership

executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of

documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by

respondents, such as:

1. On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and presented preponderant

proof of her claim. she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, referring to the subject property, executed

between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The document dated in 1948, was acknowledged before a notary

public. Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his “exclusive ownership” of the property, “having

been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for more

than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in [the] concept of owner without any claim of other

persons.”20

2. Respondent Belen proved that in 1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration;

and that Fidela had entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of

petitioners.

3. To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also presented a Real Estate Mortgage executed

by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in

this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and

recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.

4. Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed in 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act

shows the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property

5. In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration indicating that she, as owner, had been paying

real estate taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.

The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the

thing mortgaged. Co-ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a

co-owner may dispose only of one’s interest in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others. The

effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the

co-ownership. In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any acknowledgement of co-

ownership.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee.

Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What

they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution of the Acknowledgement — assuming that its authenticity and due

execution were proven — the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior

document, is clearly inconsistent with the document (Acknowledgement of Co-ownership) relied upon by petitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to prove their ownership. Having filed an action

involving property, they should have relied on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents’

claim.

Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact that some of the children of Spouses

Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly found that since the litigants in

this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could have been a good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow

petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership among the parties cannot be presumed.

It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling of the subject property — commencing in 1948 and

eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 1984 — it was only after 1984 that petitioners started asserting their claim of

co-ownership thereof

NOTES:

1. Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be considered as a declaration against interest. A statement

may be admissible as such a declaration if it complies with the following requisites:

1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;

3) at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her interest; and
4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true

The Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the declarant Fidela, since her right over the

property had already been extinguished by the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have

acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no more property against which she had an interest to declare.

2. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of another who accepts it.

Once perfected, a donation is final; its revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any legal ground therefor. A donation

may in fact comprehend the entire property of the donor. At any rate, the law provides that donors should reserve, in full

ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and that of all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance

of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by them.

3. To be sure, petitioners’ arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself. The law is clear that

when its terms have been reduced to writing, an agreement must be presumed to contain all the terms agreed upon; and there can

be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement

Related

PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a direct recourse from the Decision[1] dated June 3, 2014 and the Order[2] dated August 19, 2014, both
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, (RTC) in Special Proceeding (SP) No. B-10-11-39
dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition[3] for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of private respondent's
(respondent) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family
Code. He alleged that he and respondent were married on June 29, 1996 in
a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro Camotes, Cebu with Rev. Fr. Vicente Igot
as the solemnizing officer; that a son was born of their marriage; that their
marriage went well in the first few months but respondent later became an
extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to frequent quarrels and
petitioner being threatened and physically harmed; that she is a happy-go-
lucky and extravagant type of person and a gambler; that they eventually
separated in 2002; and, that respondent is now living with another man in
Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a clinical psychologist and respondent was
said to be suffering from "aggressive personality disorder as well as
histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.
Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons.
The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public
Prosecutor certified as to the absence of collusion between the
parties.[4] Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner and his witness
testifying.
On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is ORDERED
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.[5]
In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:
x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it can validly
[pass] upon the validity of church marriage in the light of the separation of
the Church and the State as enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987
Constitution. Withal, marriage is a sacrament according to the teaching of
the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the same is purely religious.
Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment in the
Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical tribunal
determining that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The
procedure is governed by the Church's Canon Law not by the civil law
observed by the State in nullity cases involving civil marriages. Ergo, the
principle of separation of Church and State finds application in this case. x
xx
xxxx
Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus,
resolving the validity of the church marriage is outside the province of its
authority. Although the Family Code did not categorize the marriage
subject of the petition for nullity or annulment, the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the State laid down the principle of separation, ergo, it
is beyond cavil that nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken out of the
church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of the State is bereft of any
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
As the second issue hinges on the affirmative resolution on the jurisdiction
of this Court, the same becomes moot due to the non-affirmance of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.[6]
Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an
Order dated August 19, 2014.
In denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC said:
Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church are [per se] governed
by its Canon Law. Although the Family Code provides for some regulations,
the same does not follow that the State is authorized to inquire to its
validity, The Constitution is supreme to the Family Code. Under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Constitution is written in all laws,
acts and transactions, hence, the same must be upheld.[7]
Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that:
The Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that
the validity of church marriage is outside of the province of its authority.[8]
Petitioner contends that the RTC had rendered judgment principally on the
ground that the validity of church marriage is outside the province of its
authority, however, it is the civil law, particularly the Family Code, which
principally governs the marriage of the contracting parties.
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment on the
petition for review arguing that the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the
validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code, and that
the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving contracts of
marriage and marital relations.
We find merit in this petition.
Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.
Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in
this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested.[9] Thus, the State is mandated to protect marriage, being the
foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the
nation.[10] The State has surrounded marriage with safeguards to maintain
its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the
State are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that
would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction.[11]
Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the
constitutional provision to protect the inviolability of marriage and the
family relations. In one of the whereas clauses of the Family Code, it is
stated:
Whereas, there is a need to implement policies embodied in the New
Constitution that strengthen marriage and the family as a basic social
institution and ensure equality between men and women.
Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may
fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely
subject to the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by
law. The Family Code provides for the essential[12] as well as
formal[13] requisites for the validity of marriage. The absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.[14] No prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however,
for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing
officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be
contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing
officer. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the
city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
except in marriages where no license is required.[15] The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official
has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[16]
The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage
may be solemnized, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
xxxx
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly
authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil
registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted
by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the
contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious
sect;
xxxx
Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or
in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.
Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the
requirements and formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner
and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in
a church was in accordance with the above-quoted provisions. Although,
marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it has civil and
legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner
correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage
contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the
Philippines; and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the
religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter.[17] Notably, the
proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms
of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still considered
married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of
separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.
As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve
at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds[18]for the
termination of marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a
petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court
exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;
Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner
filed before the RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction;
thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte
is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution of the case based on the
sufficiency of the evidence presented.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., certify that J. Leonen left his vote concurring with this
ponencia.

[1] Penned by Judge Carlos O. Arguelles; rollo, pp. 18A-22.

[2] Id. at 31.

[3] Id. at 14-18.
[4] Id. at 19.

[5] Id. at 22.

[6] Id. at 20-21.

[7] Id. at 31.

[8] Id. at 8.

[9] Mariategui v. Court of Appeals, 282 Phil. 348, 356 (1992).

[10] Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution, thus:

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote
its total development.
[11] Jimenez v. Cañizares, 109 Phil. 273, 276 (1960).

[12] Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are

present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a
female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
[13]Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
[14] Art. 4.
[15] Art. 9.

[16] See Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 569 (2008).

[17] Rollo, p. 9-A.

[18] Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the
consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform
marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the
identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the
beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for
reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up
to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted
child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed
that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless
after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming
to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease
found to be serious and appears to be incurable.