Cases 11-27-2018

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994
EVELIO B. JAVIER, RIZAL G. PAGTANAC, JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., SILVESTRE E.

UNTARAN, JR. and ALFONSO V. COMBONG, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMIANO SENTINA, JUANITO BULAC, FRED PALLON,
AMADO YANGSON, ANGEL MARTINEZ, DIONISIO NOMBREHERMOSO, MANUEL RIVERO,
JR., FEDERICO RUIZ, JR., MELQUIADES GALIDO, AGUSTIN ALMOROS, GENEROSO
BARSUBIA, FELOMINO CABREJAS, FORTUNATO CADIAO, FERNANDO CONDES,
MARCELINO DE LA CRUZ, PELAGIO JUADA, FRANCISCO JUBILAN, RODOLFO SIASOL, EPE
MACABANTI, ERNESTO GRASPARIL, EUSTAQUIO MENA, DIONISIO JAVIER, PETRONILO
BERGANTINOS, FRANCISCO ABANTO, FELIMON ABLE, CORAZON HABLADO, JOSE ADUG,
SILVESTRE ELLO, ESTEBAN MANINGO, ELEUTERIO PLAMERAS, FELIPE DE LOS REYES,
GONZALO VELASCO, TEODULFO NARANJO, ALFREDO BACAWAG, JOSE CEPE, ENRIQUE
JOSILVA, PEDRO QUANICO, PELAGIO ESPARAR, CRISANTO GELLA, RODULFO GUMANAO
and CRISANTO MEJUGE, respondents, ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, intervenor.
Silvestre E. Untaran for himself and for petitioners.
Alfonso V. Combong, Jr. for petitioners.
Florentini M. Pesayco for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The issues raised in this petition for review on certiorari revolve around the validity of Resolution No.
206 of the Provincial Board of Antique abolishing the Office of the Provincial Engineer.
On 19 April 1974, Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and forty (40) officials and employees of
the Office of the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire
Provincial Board of Antique. The petition was anchored on the hypothesis that the abolition of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of
tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial
Board’s candidacy in the 08th November 1971 elections.
Respondents, denying petitioners’ ascriptions, insisted that the abolition of the Office of the
Provincial Engineer was motivated instead by a provision of Presidential Decree No. 17, which
lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from 50% to
17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries and operating expenses of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer. Respondents averred that the power of the provincial board to
create an office carried with it the power to abolish it; that administrative remedies had not been
exhausted by petitioners; and that mandamus was an improper remedy inasmuch as the power to
appropriate funds for the Office was not ministerial but within the sound judgment of respondents.
In due course, the lower court 1 rendered a decision. Finding for respondents, the court held that the
"drastic decrease in the amount available for appropriation" was the principal consideration that
impelled the Provincial Board to abolish the Office. The court a quo also took note of the resolutions
of several municipal councils in Antique calling the attention of the Provincial Board to the neglect in
the maintenance of provincial roads. The lower court decreed:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds and so holds that Resolution No. 206,
Series of 1973, was validly enacted by the herein respondents, composing the
Provincial Board of Antique, and consequently dismisses the herein petition.
Likewise, the counterclaim is dismissed. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the lower court having been denied, petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 15 February 1977, the appellate court, reversing the court a quo, held that "the passage of
Resolution No. 206 was prompted in the main by reasons other than those stated therein," and that
the evidence on record "adequately justifie(d) the charge that personal and political animosities on
the part of petitioner Sentina, on (the) one hand, and respondents, on the other, (had) caused the
respondent Provincial Board to enact said resolution." 2 The appellate court rendered
judgment, 3 thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. In lieu
thereof, another one is rendered (a) declaring Resolution No. 206, Series of 1973 of
the Provincial Board of Antique, to be null and void; (b) granting the writ
of mandamus, and ordering the respondents, or their successors as members of the
Provincial Board of Antique, to reinstate the petitioners to the positions they held in
the Office of the Provincial Engineer as of June 30, 1973; and to appropriate the
necessary amounts for the maintenance of said office and the payment of the back
salaries of the petitioners from July 1, 1973 until the date of their reinstatement,
minus the sums any of the petitioners may have received from other employments in
the meantime; (c) ordering the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay each of the
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00, P2,000.00 and P500.00 for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, respectively; (d) ordering the lower court to
conduct further proceedings to determine the amount allowable as back salaries to
each of the petitioners in accordance with the guidelines stated above; and (e)
ordering the respondents-appellees to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On 14 September 1978, the Court of Appeals denied, for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration.
The Provincial Board thereupon instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On 18 August 1982, during the pendency of this appeal, Enrique A. Zaldivar, then incumbent
governor of Antique, filed a motion for leave to intervene, 4 which the Court granted. 5 Governor
Zaldivar contended, in his memorandum in intervention, that should the displaced officials and
employees of the Office be reinstated and paid their back salaries from 01 July 1973, it would be to
the great sacrifice of Antique’s development programs. 6
Critical in the instant petition are two basic questions: whether or not the provincial board had the
authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned resolution, and, in the affirmative,
whether or not that authority was legitimately exercised.
Private respondents claim that the abolition of the Office of the Provincial Engineer is not only
constitutionally infirm but also violative of General Order No. 3 issued shortly after the proclamation
of martial law in 1972. Private respondents explain that Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973
Constitution —
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the
incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by
this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. —
has been so framed as to allow the policy and purpose behind General Order No. 3 to continue, i.e.,
to consolidate in the hands of the President, the power to appoint, dismiss and control all officials of
the government, both national and local, in line with the nature and spirit of martial
law. 7 Respondents quote a portion of the Journal of the Constitutional Convention during its 287th
plenary session of 25 November 1972, where their counsel, Arturo Pacificador, a constitutional
convention delegate, stated on the floor during the discussions on Section 9, Article XVII, of the
1973 Constitution, that ". . . the local government unit who may believe that an office they (have)
created is no longer necessary may petition the President to issue a decree abolishing the same, but
it will be beyond their power to abolish by themselves said office in view of the clear mandate of the
provision of the Constitution." 8
Undoubtedly, Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government, 9 recalling to mind General Order
No. 3 issued on 22 September 1972, but this general provision could not have meant or envisioned
an absolute proscription on local governments, if and when minded, from themselves creating or
abolishing positions, an authority that they theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such
law was Section 18 of Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which
empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial
engineer. While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that
office, absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by
implication from the power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact, expressed that an "implied
power of a province . . . (should) be liberally construed in its favor" and "(a)ny fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of local government and it
(should) be presumed to exist."
We must rule then that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist
at the time.
The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial
board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act is
done in good faith.
We have scrutinized closely the records, most especially in this case, in view of the disagreement
between the trial court and the appellate court on their factual findings; the result of our examination
is that there, indeed, appears to be evidence to support their own respective findings. On the one
hand, valid reasons have been shown that tend to substantiate the need at the time for the abolition
of the office in question by the Provincial Board. Upon the other hand, it cannot be discounted that
personal and political motives did contribute in no small measure in that final decision of the board.
In sum, we see a situation where the abolition of the office could have well been justified except for
the convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process that clearly appear to have greatly
influenced the final action taken by the board. We are not prepared, however, to conclude a clear
case of bad faith on the part of respondents.
Given the peculiar factual settings heretofore expressed, we would have, under ordinary
circumstances, simply issued an order of reinstatement. The Court cannot, however, close its eyes
to the multifarious and significant events that have since taken place on, among other things, the
national and local government structures, as well as their offices and incumbents; the law itself, both
constitutional and statutory; as well as the personal and other circumstances of concerned parties,
including no less than petitioners and private respondents themselves. It is our considered view that
in lieu of an order for reinstatement of private respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to
five (5) years without qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents.
The above holding is not without precedent. The Court had an opportunity to adjudicate similarly
in Rubio, et al., vs. People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation, et al. 10 There, the petitioners, who
were issued original and permanent appointments by the PHHC in the Multi-Storey Tenement
Projects, occupying regular and permanent positions, were improperly separated from service in
1966 due to an alleged abolition of positions. In awarding back salaries, in lieu of reinstatement, this
Court, speaking through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, said:
The Court therefore also declares that the Trial Court was correct in directing
reinstatement of the petitioners-employees to their former positions, and the payment
to them of back salaries and other benefits they would otherwise have earned.
This is however no longer an easy matter. In the first place, it is doubtful if

reinstatement as a remedy would be feasible in view of the fact that more than
twenty-three (23) years have already elapsed since the petitioners-employees’
positions were abolished. Many of them will have found employment elsewhere.
Some may have passed away. Many others will have reached retirement age or will
no longer be employable on account of age or inadequacy of qualifications, by this
time. In the second place, as the PHHC and the other respondents allege, it would
be unfair to "permit a dismissed laborer to earn back wages for all time, or for a very
long period of time," without allowing the employer to prove the salaries the laborer
had earned during the period of his separation, or what efforts he had exerted to find
gainful employment; . . .
In Antiporda vs. Ticao (160 SCRA 4C), the Court, citing previous cases, held that since the
reinstatement of an employee unjustly terminated was no longer feasible, the latter should instead
be awarded "backwages equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, JUDGMENT is
hereby rendered ORDERING petitioners, or their incumbent successors in the Provincial
Government of Antique, to cause to be paid to private respondents back salaries, computed as of
the date of their removal, equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Presided by Judge Celso L. Magsino.
2 Rollo, p. 94.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez and concurred in by Associate

Justices Delfin Fl. Batacan and Jose B. Jimenez.
4 Rollo, p. 433.
5 Resolution of September 29, 1982; Rollo, p. 437.
6 Rollo, p. 442.
7 Private Respondents’ Comment on the Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 258.
8 Rollo, pp. 262-263. The existence of this portion of the Journal of the Constitutional
Convention was belied by petitioners’ counsel, former Associate Justice of this Court,
Calixto O. Zaldivar, who appended to petitioners’ reply brief, the letter of 1971
Constitutional Convention President Diosdado Macapagal stating that the 287th
plenary session of the Convention was held on November 26, 1972, not on
November 25, 1972, that the purported interpellation or speech of Arturo Pacificador
during said plenary session did not occur at all and that there were indeed reports
about fabricated speeches inserted in the Constitutional Convention Journal (Rollo,
p. 343).
9 National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service

Commission, 221 SCRA 145.
10 185 SCRA 656, 22 May 1990.

EN BANC
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597

Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
Respondents.
x------------------------x
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May
2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part
of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative

districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists
of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,
Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos
first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted
against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao.MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan,
Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated
from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent
province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the
appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of
the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall

continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or
where they are residents:Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces
becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for
appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed
by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they
shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval
of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided,
furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a

plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City
in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province
under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407
on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-
0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7] provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to

adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of
the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo
with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC

promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first
legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of
MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification
of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes
cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is
entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in
Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that
in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create
or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly
availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because
the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-
judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597
became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen
(respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from

questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent
Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it
did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the
legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first
legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC
could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City
its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies
exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the
minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
for the creation of a legislative district within a city.[13]
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents

Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R.
No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their
compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a)
the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation
of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No.
7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the
creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment
of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its
earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and
joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the

following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA
9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative
districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative
district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as
the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in
Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such
new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in

G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral
arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional

(a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces
under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous
regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region
and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that,
if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated
in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.[18] Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed as
prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not
comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054

is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was
not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those
mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent
Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its
Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10
and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces
was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of

RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and
respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in
their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed
it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section
19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the
oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008,
the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The
petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC
acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters
of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its
Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG,
maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure
pending the enactment by Congress of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to
test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No.
177597.
(B) On the merits

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of
Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by
any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On
the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of
its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically
enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast
in Cotabato City for representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify
the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed
for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as
proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as

winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This case
does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into
the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of
MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of
this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast
in Cotabato City for representative of the district
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in the
canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not
to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in
these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other
succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a
local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of
Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM

Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of
the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative
bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of
provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it

will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with
a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district
because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes
entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create
a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must
also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The
threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power

to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these
powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional
or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be
created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded
as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or

reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress
can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies
to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress.
An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to
create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM
Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions
of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous

regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for
Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM

Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x
x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the
ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to
national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative
district, the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from
the effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is
a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is
a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like
the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is
maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national
funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local
or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow

its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This
violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan,

recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion
legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative

district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis
supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because

the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one
representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a
legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose

population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of
the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in
paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created
or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall
be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment
shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
(Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on
29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of
Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance,
petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is created by statute,
the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority
of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces,
was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment
provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number
of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least
one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment
within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the
House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members
as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected
by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each
representative district shall comprise as far as practicable,
contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a)
indirectly, through the creation of a province for each province shall have at
least one member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of
several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning
the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to
the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those
incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible,
not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the
fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act
of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other
conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the
consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts
prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under
consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into
other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts,
without complying with the aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts indirectly through a special law enacted by
Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will
not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under
the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the
new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here,
the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress

does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but
also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a
legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is
created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that
each province shall have at least one representative in the House of
Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the
power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely
prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces
because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have
the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger
the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only
Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district

to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000,
it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the
surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution which requires that [E]ach city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of

the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the
ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with
or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum
annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square
kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34] The following scenarios thus
become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the
membership of a superior legislative body, the House
of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House

of Representatives based on one representative for at least every
250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional
Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii)
of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at
least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the

majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional
Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the
ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No.
177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s]
and pack Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]

Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x
provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new
representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing
to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new
provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000)
[population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to
Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are
saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one
thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives
without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in

Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned
or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch
system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or
reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts,

not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which
states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a province created
by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a
province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an
increase that only Congress can decide.Incidentally, in the present 14 th Congress,
there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House
of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total
membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in
every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves
only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district
representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the
allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new
provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that
the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the
Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates
that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that
necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does
not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities
and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the
resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to

the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for
being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of
provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power
only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover,
the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the
office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the
ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as
provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act
201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the

geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.

9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and
cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.Consequently, we rule that COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- RENATO C. CORONA

MARTINEZ Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
In G.R. No. 177597, for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; in G.R. No. 178628, for declaratory
relief and for the writs of prohibition and mandamus.
[2]
The petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, Bai Sandra S. A. Sema (Sema), further seeks to compel the COMELEC to
exclude from the canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the legislative district in question in
the 14 May 2007 elections. On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 178628, Perfecto Marquez, prays that the
Court order the COMELEC to conduct a special election for representative of the First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City.
[3]
Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, and Upi. The second legislative
district is composed of 19 municipalities (Talitay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu
Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan,
Datu Paglas, Gen, S.K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan and Paglat).
[4]
The enactment of the organic acts for the autonomous regions of the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao is mandated
under Sections 18 and 19, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
[5]
The provision reads:
SECTION 19. Creation, Division or Abolition of Provinces, Cities,

Municipalities or Barangay. The Regional Assembly may create, divide, merge,
abolish, or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or
barangay in accordance with the criteria laid down by Republic Act No. 7160, the
Local Government Code of 1991, subject to the approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Regional Assembly
may prescribe standards lower than those mandated by Republic Act No. 7160,
the Local Government Code of 1991, in the creation, division, merger, abolition,
or alteration of the boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay.
Provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay created, divided, merged, or whose
boundaries are altered without observing the standards prescribed by Republic Act
No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall not be entitled to any share of
the taxes that are allotted to the local governments units under the provisions of the
Code.
The financial requirements of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or
barangay so created, divided, or merged shall be provided by the Regional Assembly
out of the general funds of the Regional Government.
The holding of a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the voters
of the areas affected by the creation, division, merger, or whose boundaries are being
altered as required by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991,
shall, however, be observed.
The Regional Assembly may also change the names of local government
units, public places and institutions, and declare regional holidays. (Emphasis
supplied)
Before the enactment of RA 9054, the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays was
vested in Congress (for provinces, cities and municipalities) and in the sangguniang
panlalawigan and sangguniang panlungsod (for barangays). (See Sections 384, 448, and 460 of Republic
Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.)
[6]
Sultan Mastura (created from Sultan Kudarat), Northern Kabuntulan (created from Kabuntulan) and Datu Blah
Sinsuat (created from Upi).
[7]
The Memorandum reads in pertinent parts:
The record shows the former province of Maguindanao was divided into two new provinces (Shariff
Kabunsuan and Maguindanao), in view of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act (MMAA) No. 201,
which authority was conferred to under Section 17, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 giving the
ARMM, thru its Regional Legislative Assembly, the power to legislate laws including the enactment
of the Local Government Code of ARMM.
The newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprises the municipalities of Barira, Buldon,
Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi and Datu
Blah, including Cotabato City [which] belongs to the first district of Maguindanao province.
It must be emphasized that Cotabato City is not included as part of ARMM although geographically
located within the first district of the former Maguindanao province. Cotabato City is not voting for
provincial officials. This is the reason why Cotabato City was not specifically mentioned as part of
the newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Geographically speaking since [sic] Cotabato City is located within the newly created province of
Shariff Kabunsuan having been bounded by municipalities of Sultan Kudarat, Datu Odin Sinsuat
and Kabuntalan as its nearest neighbors. Following the rule in establishing legislative district, it
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
However, legally speaking, it may arise question of legality [sic] if Cotabato City will be appended
as part of the newly created Shariff Kabunsuan province. Under our Constitution [it is] only
Congress that shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided
for under Section 5(1) of Article VI.
xxxx
In order to avoid controversy on the matter, pending the enactment of appropriate law by Congress,
it would be prudent and logically feasible to maintain status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
[8]
Resolution No. 7845 pertinently provides:
WHEREAS, the Province of Maguindanao consists of two legislative districts, with

Cotabato City as part of the first legislative district.
WHEREAS, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 provided for the creation of the
new Province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprising the municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu
Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura and Upi, all
of the first legislative district of the mother Province of Maguindanao, except Cotabato
City which is not part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; while the
remaining municipalities of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu
Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah
Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan,
Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat, all of the second legislative district of the mother
Province of Maguindanao, shall remain with said province;
WHEREAS, the last paragraph of Section 5 of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy (MMA) Act
No. 201 provides that (e)xcept as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative
district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain.;
WHEREAS, by reason of said provision of MMA Act No. 201, the first legislative
district of the Province of Maguindanao is now made up of Cotabato City only, and
its second legislative district, the municipalities of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan,
Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South
Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun,
Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
In the earlier Resolution No. 7801, dated 11 January 2007, the COMELEC allocated one legislative seat each
for the provinces of Maguindanao and Shariff Kabunsuan for the 14 May 2007 elections.
[9]
Resolution No. 7902 reads in full:
This pertains to the amendment of Minute Resolution No. 07-0407 dated March 6, 2007, entitled,
IN THE MATTER OF THE MEMORANDUM OF ATTY. WYNNE B. ASDALA, ACTING
DIRECTOR III, LAW DEPARTMENT, RELATIVE TO THE STUDY/RECOMMENDATION
OF SAID DEPARTMENT RE: CONVERSION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF
MAGUINDANAO INTO A REGULAR PROVINCE PER MINUTE RESOLUTION NO. 07-0297
DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2007. The dispositive portion of which reads:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending
the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First District of Maguindanao.
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to amend the pertinent portion of Minute
Resolution No. 07-0407 to now read, as follows[:]
[]Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, that the district shall be known as Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).
Let the Executive Director advise the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato City accordingly.
(Emphasis in the original)
[10]
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
[11]
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two
hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such
number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population
has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections
but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
[12]
Consistent with her claim that Cotabato City is not part of Shariff Kabunsuans legislative district, petitioner filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of respondent Dilangalen as candidate for
representative of that province (docketed as SPA No. A07-0).
[13]
Respondent Dilangalen asserts, and petitioner does not dispute, that as of 2000, Cotabato City had a population of
163,849, falling short of the minimum population requirement in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides: Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
[14]
124 Phil. 1226 (1966).
[15]
As provided in the Resolution of 16 October 2007.
[16]
The Court also required Sema to submit with her Memorandum the certifications from the Department of Finance,
the Lands Management Bureau, the National Statistics Office, and the Department of Interior and Local
Government that at the time of the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan on 28 August 2006 it met the requisites for
the creation of a province under Section 461 of RA 7160.
[17]
SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province,
city or municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
[18]
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.
[19]
Rollo, p. 229.
[20]
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which
shall be automatically released to them.
[21]
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[22]
Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[23]
See, however, Macabago v. Commission on Elections (440 Phil. 683 [2002]) where the Court held that a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 will lie to question the constitutionality of an election regulation if the
COMELEC has acted capriciously or whimsically, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
[24]
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571 (2001); Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
L-32717, 26 November 1970, 36 SCRA 228.
[25]
Sections 385 and 386, RA 7160.
[26]
Sections 441, 449 and 460, RA 7160.
[27]
Section 20, Article X, Constitution.
[28]
See Section 2, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution and Section 5, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
[29]
312 Phil. 492, 501 (1995).
[30]
Section 48 of Republic Act No. 8507 (Charter of Paraaque City) provides:
Section 48. Legislative District. As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Paraaque

shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national election after the passage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 7839 (Charter of City of Pasig) provides:
Section 50. Legislative District. As highly urbanized, the City of Pasig shall have
its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national
elections after the passage of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 58 of Republic Act No. RA 9230 provides:
Section 58. Representative District. The City of San Jose del Monte shall have its
own representative district to commence in the next national election after the effectivity
of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9355 provides:
Section 7. Legislative District. The Province of Dinagat Islands shall constitute one,
separate legislative district to commence in the next national election after the effectivity
of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
[31]
In his Concurring Opinion in Paras v. Commission on Elections (332 Phil. 56, 66 [1996]), then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. stated:
The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of elective local
officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The elective
national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and Congressmen. The
elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and
Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities
and municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the
elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the
only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
[32]
Supra note 13 at 1235-1236.
[33]
See note 3.
[34]
Section 461 provides: Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income,
as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust
funds, transfers and non-recurring income.
[35]
Atty. Edgardo Carlos B. Vistan II, counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 177597.
[36]
TSN (27 November 2007), pp. 64-69.
[37]
Unlike the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution mandates, in Section 15, Article X, the creation
of autonomous regions in the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao to foster political autonomy. See Cordillera
Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 495.
[38]
Website of House of Representatives as of 12 May 2008.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736
of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer
the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio
A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his
district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the
unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative
districts.1
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara,
Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga,
Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang,
Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No.
2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.7
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised
therein."
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-
province of Biliran became a regular province. It provides:
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces

upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with
the national elections following the effectivity of this code. The new
legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall
continue to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected
representatives of the original districts out of which said new
provinces or districts were created until their own representatives
shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections
and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the
Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to
five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The
composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the
Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the composition of the five (5)
legislative districts appeared as follows:
First District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679

2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
———— ————
TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Second District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
———— ————
TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Third District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649

2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
———— ————
TOTAL 214,499 125,763
Fourth District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140

2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474
———— ————
TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682

2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247
———— ————
TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC,
among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second
Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District
has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference,
he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the
First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved
the least disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied
with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
equality of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that
respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his
Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition
on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2)
assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent
COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional
power of the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another
legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer
and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of
the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the
Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative
Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of

the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided
by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor

adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang
Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a
distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to
resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of Representatives
would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.14Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law;
(2) empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the
power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the
options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote
the debates in extenso, viz.:16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment by
substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the
chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote first
by the Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and cities on
the one hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So I propose this simple
formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the proposed
amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment is
concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would also provide for a
mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will in
effect embody what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within three
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all
the proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the Commission

will allow this. We will just delete the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the
capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what would be left would
only be the following: "Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating

specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW,
THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED
FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES,
CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to the
provinces and to the cities, without indicating the municipalities comprising each of
the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to make the
actual apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for and allocated
to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to COMELEC
to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful practices of cutting
up areas or spheres of influence; in other words, gerrymandering. This Commission,
being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible situation
under the circumstances to undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in
expertise and in time because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has
prepared the report on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino in this
respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces and cities for the purpose of
redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in the legislative power.
And I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it
is one of the constitutional offices created under this Constitution. We have the
assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the
Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in the life of this
Commission, there is no reason why we cannot complete the work of
reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has
already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the Constitutional
Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I
think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the most workable approach that is
available to this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment itself
or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial
question for the body to decide. I would propose that the Commission should now
decide what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or
should it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative will act
accordingly on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe the
Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this matter and they are ready
with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole country into
various districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready
with the list and if this body would wish to apportion the whole country by district
itself, then I believe we have the time to do it because the Committee on the
Legislative is ready with that particular report which need only to be appended to the
Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work of the Committee on the
Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to give that information so
that the people here would be guided accordingly when they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he so

desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to the
first election after the enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election; on
the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution — the reapportionment

based on the COMELEC study and between the approval of the Constitution and the
first election — the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment and

considering the fact that there will be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would
there be instances representation of under non-representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission that
there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will come out to be one for every
350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by Commissioner
Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was also almost the
same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had some kind of meeting
of minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial question, an
amendment to the amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead
of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall make the redistricting. So
may I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into
a motion so we can vote on that first as an amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the apportionment of

the legislative districts instead of the proposal that COMELEC be given the mandate
to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the
proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment
which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be

followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not really appear as a
paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution where
we mandate a Commission that will become functus officio to have the authority. As
a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that authority until after the ratification of the new
Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the
approval of this proposed amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt that
motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment

legislative districts.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner

Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento,
therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him to move that the
COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the Commission

that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC "to make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the
phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the
Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments on the
apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of amendments
a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an
intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one
district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be
possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district and call it
a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there
should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we
have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned
district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both
the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of
municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the
COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data
regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality
and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district
area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that,
if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that
in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not
also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is
to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about
an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the
province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this
time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves
a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion,
thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." In Macias
v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But
while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the
transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of
Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Ordinance Appended to the Constitution.
2 Represented by Congressman Cirilo Roy G. Montejo.
3 Represented by Congressman Sergio A.F. Apostol.
4 Represented by Congressman Alberto S. Veloso.
5 Represented by Congressman Carmelo J. Locsin.
6 Represented by Congressman Eriberto V. Loreto.
7 Section 9, Article XVIII of the Constitution provides:
"A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular
province or until its component municipalities are reverted to the mother province."
8 376 US 1. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
US 633, Maryland Commission For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 US 656, etc.
9 The power of the respondent COMELEC to redistrict does not appear to have been
disputed by the parties in the proceedings below.
10 Promulgated March 26, 1986 and otherwise known as Freedom Constitution.
11 See Article I, Section 3 of Proclamation No. 3.
12 See Section 1, Article II of Provisional Constitution.

13 He was the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative. The other co-sponsors
of the Ordinance, introduced in the Commission as Resolution No. 551, were
Commissioners Azcuna, Sumulong, Calderon, Alonto, Jamir, Lerum, Guingona,
Abubakar, Rodrigo, Aquino, Concepcion, de los Reyes, Jr., Garcia and Treñas.
14 Record of Constitutional Commission, October 9, 1986 session, p. 686.
15 Ibid, p. 687.
16 Ibid, pp. 692-694, 700.
17 Records of Constitution Commission, Session of October 13, 1986, pp. 950-951.
18 No. L-18684, September 14, 1961, 3 SCRA 1.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203974 April 22, 2014
AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-07971 and Minute
Resolution No. 12-09252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both
promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for
Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel public respondent to implement the
same.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city
of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte,
and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were
allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should
be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the
conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city,
the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU)
directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause
material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of
the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of
Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to
conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC,
Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite.
Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a
municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the
plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012,3 the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012,
in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-24 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the
assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-
memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
component city into highly-urbanized city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City
to participate in said plebiscite.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on
substantially the same arguments earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other
hand, public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and
that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this
instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU,
and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and
prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of
an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which
adopted a calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1,
2012. Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan
prayed that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree
that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite, and that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent from implementing the
questioned resolution. On October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-0989 suspended the
preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the
plebiscite was once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM
regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.
After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court
for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to
schedule the plebiscite either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the
TRO issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite
has become mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the delay in holding the
plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days
form the date of the President’s declaration.
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position by arguing that
mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts
surrounding the case, it cannot be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautista’s
entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus
Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the locality
during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling
the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in
G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan City’s conversion. Given
the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on
March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the qualified registered
voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus
moot and academic for ultimately, the public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The
only variation will be as regards its participants.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for
determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10,
Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses
not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in
the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan
City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City
of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the
registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining
towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions, it is but proper that
we ascertain first the relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the
LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the
Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy" in times of war and other
national emergency under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in
nature.5 The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the
approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the
case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC
provisions detailing the requirements for the creation of barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and
provinces9. Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also
been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected."
(emphasis supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception
to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted
earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or
not the requirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it
ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices
under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the
President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of
conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city
proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for
the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the delegation of
power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code
is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation,
division, merge, abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said
constitutional provision.
This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Court’s pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by analogy.
While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent
component city into a component city, its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in
ascertaining the proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city comes within the purview of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and its application to cases
of conversion were discussed thusly:
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of
our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of
the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the
people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries
of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people’s
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units.12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial
that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the
enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching
ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the
constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 852813 was declared
unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela without
submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial
alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a
change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase
"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines
between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the
other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGC’s Implementing Rules and Regulations, which reads:
Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City. –
xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion – The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make
it independent of the province where it is geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will
come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of
independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of
Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance
from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq.
km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s
conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take
place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and
more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs
and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision should be interpreted
with the other relevant provisions in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC
which is undeniably the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision
itself, "Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. On the other hand, Sec.
453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a
city as highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the declaration after the city
has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application and ratification in a
plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus,
the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite
requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act
beyond the Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond
what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:14
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection. x x x
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
Constitution.15 In a long line of cases, the cardinal principle of construction established is that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or
more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted,
even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language used.17
Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should
be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning
of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of
the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political
units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view
of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an
HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their
interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly
requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the conversion of Puerto
Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered
voters in said cities alone. It is clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said
plebiscites was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on who will
vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that
the Court is asked to resolve the question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities
have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said cities
prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the
operative fact doctrine―that “the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.”18
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly

affected by Cabanatuan City’s conversion
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and
Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly
affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.
a. "Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly
affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are
worth revisiting.
We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose
economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted
from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.21
xxxx
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will
be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the
separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy
of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected
and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (emphasis added)
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X, we affirmed our ruling
in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain
the earlier finding that what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the
Constitutional Commission:23
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are
actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words.
Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part
of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the
plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155––the
predecessor of the LGC––thus:
Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume that a province has
municipalities and there is a merger of two municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the
plebiscite will be conducted within the two merged municipalities and not in the eight other
municipalities?
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and that is the reason we
probably have to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two municipalities which are being
merged, but the entire province will now have to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire municipality have to vote? There
are two barangays being merged, say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to
participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected directly by the merger of
two of its barangay.
Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged, abolished, whatever, would
the rest of the municipality not participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to
one municipality?
Senator Guingona. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51 barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two municipalities, let us say, in a
province with 10 municipalities – the entire province – will the other municipalities although not
affected also have to participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the territorial boundaries of
the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman
mentioned.24
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not
only changes in economic but also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an
LGU shall be considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be
participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from
an independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby
necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner
Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan City’s conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija
to justify the province’s participation in the plebiscite to be conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija
will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285
of the LGC. The law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the
internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the following manner:
(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on
the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory
of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt,
suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city
will cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter’s population.
Taking this decrease in territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded
that Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers’ values. As
assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for Region
III:25
Basis for IRA Province of Cabanatuan Province of

Computation Nueva Ecija City Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City
No. of Population 1,843,853 259,267 259,267
CY 2007 Census
Land Area 5,751.33 282.75 5,468.58
(sq. km.)
IRA Share of Actual IRA Estimated IRA Reduction

Nueva Ecija Share share excluding
Cabanatuan
City
Based on ₱800,772,618.45 ₱688,174,751.66 ₱112,597,866.79
Population
Based on Land ₱263,470,472.62 ₱250,517,594.56 P 12,952,878.06
Area
Total ₱125,550,744.85
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in
IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City’s
conversion, petitioner Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also
adverse, deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City
is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may
levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided,
however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions
of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys
the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry
resources,26 professional taxes,27 and amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be
argued that this is not a derogation of the province’s taxing power because it is in no way deprived of
its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory, the conversion will still reduce the
province’s taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in
shares in local tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a material
and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting its participation in the
plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC
is in order, viz:
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty
Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city
treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province is a threat
to the latter’s economic viability. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be
converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province’s
operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead
costs. Moreover, the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in the province’s economic
performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its most progressive city of
Cabanatuan attains independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its
residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative
supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12,
Art. X of the Constitution read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall
not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is
converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province
and be under the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight
because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater
economic activity require greater autonomy.29 The provincial government stands to lose the power to
ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve
resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.31 The province will also be divested of
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the
appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be
modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for
and be voted upon as provincial officials.33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will
be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit.
Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects
queued by the provincial government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not
scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial
jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1âwphi1
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its
residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered
voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Respondents’ apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set a
dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces
will always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain the city’s dependence is
speculative at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the
conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed
to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable
how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter that
is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights of its constituents. To
limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is
as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they
demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is
hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public
respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally,
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City
into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a
within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join Dissent of J. Leonen

MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Took no part. I join the Dissent of J. Leonen

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
I join the dissent of J. Leonen

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

I dissent. See Separate Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

ENRIQUE ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
OCC-En Banc
Supreme Court
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 113-115.
2
Id. at 64-65.
3
Id. at 143-146.
4
COMELEC Chairperson Sixto Brillantes and Commissioner Armando Velasco cast the
dissenting votes.
5
Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).
6
RA 7160, Sec. 385-386
7
Id., Sec. 441-442
8
Id., Sec. 449-450
9
Id., Sec. 460-461
10
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at
least Fifty Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component
cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is
located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be
considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.
(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for
elective provincial officials.
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of

independent component cities shall be governed by their respective charters, as
amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections.
Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials
prior to the classification of said cities as highly-urbanized after the ratification of the
Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such
right.
11
G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999, 314 SCRA 603.
12
Id. at 610.
13
An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered 7720 – An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to Be Known as the City of
Santiago.
14
No. L-21114, November 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095, 1106.
15
Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 111230, September 30, 1994, 237 SCRA 279, 291
16
Mutuc v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32717, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228.
17
Garcia v. COMELEC, supra note 15.
18
Fernandez v. Cuerva, supra note 14.
19
No. L-73155, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 727.
20
G.R. No. 103328, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 735.
21
Tan v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 742-743.
22
Id. at 745-746.
23
III RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 486.
Senate Bill No. 155, II RECORDS OF THE SENATE 121, 4th Regular Session (July 26,
24
1990).
25
Rollo, p. 89.
26
RA 7160, Sec. 138.
27
Id., Sec. 139.
28
Id., Sec. 140.
De Leon, Hector S. & De Leon, Hector Jr., TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE

29
CONSTITUTION (2011).
30
LGC, Section 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. - The
province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality
within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions.
Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the
province.
Id., Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and
Compensation.
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the provincial governor shall:
xxxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and
the exercise of the appropriate corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of
this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and
activities of the province and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:
(i) Ensure that the acts of the component cities and municipalities of the province and
of its officials and employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers, duties
and functions.
31
Id., Section 30. Review of Executive Orders. -
(a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes, the
governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or
municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall review all
executive orders promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies
of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal mayor, as
the case may be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of review,
the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are
within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or municipal
ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders
within thirty (30) days after their submission, the same shall be deemed consistent
with law and therefore valid.
xxxx
Id., Section 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation.
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
city mayor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services,
and activities of the city government. and in this connection, shall:
xxxx
(xii) Furnish copies of executive orders issued by him, to the provincial governor in
the case of component city mayors, to the Office of the President in the case of
highly-urbanized city mayors and to their respective metropolitan council chairmen in
the case of mayors of cities in the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, within seventy-two (72) hours after their issuances;
xxxx
(xx) Submit to the provincial governor, in case of component cities; to the Office of
the President, in the case of highly-urbanized cities; to their respective metropolitan
authority council chairmen and to the Office of the President, in case of cities of the
Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the following
reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertinent to the
management, administration and development of the city and all information and
data relative to its political, social and economic conditions; and supplemental reports
when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the year, particularly
when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare of the
city, province, region or country.
32
Id., Section 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may, within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang

panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
33
Id., Secs. 451-452(c).
34
Tan v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 747, Concurring Opinion, Teehankee, C.J.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]
BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE

BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and
BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In the late 1940s, John Walson, an appliance dealer in Pennsylvania, suffered a

decline in the sale of television (tv) sets because of poor reception of signals in his
community. Troubled, he built an antenna on top of a nearby mountain. Using coaxial
cable lines, he distributed the tv signals from the antenna to the homes of his customers.
Walsons innovative idea improved his sales and at the same time gave birth to a new
telecommunication system -- the Community Antenna Television (CATV) or Cable
Television.[1]
This technological breakthrough found its way in our shores and, like in its country of
origin, it spawned legal controversies, especially in the field of regulation. The case at bar
is just another occasion to clarify a shady area. Here, we are tasked to resolve the inquiry
-- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Batangas CATV, Inc. (petitioner
herein) against the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Mayor of Batangas City
(respondents herein) assailing the Court of Appeals (1) Decision[2] dated February 12,
1999 and (2) Resolution[3] dated May 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 52361.[4] The Appellate
Court reversed and set aside the Judgment[5] dated October 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City in Civil Case No. 4254,[6] holding that neither of the
respondents has the power to fix the subscriber rates of CATV operators, such being
outside the scope of the LGUs power.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No.
210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in
[7]
Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge
its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, provided, however, that any increase
of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.[8]
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00
to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter[9] threatening
to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction
docketed as Civil Case No. 4254. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang
Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators
because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.
On October 29, 1995, the trial court decided in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the defendants, their representatives, agents, deputies

or other persons acting on their behalf or under their instructions, are hereby
enjoined from canceling plaintiffs permit to operate a Cable Antenna Television
(CATV) system in the City of Batangas or its environs or in any manner, from
interfering with the authority and power of the National Telecommunications
Commission to grant franchises to operate CATV systems to qualified
applicants, and the right of plaintiff in fixing its service rates which needs no
prior approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Batangas City.
The counterclaim of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. [10]
The trial court held that the enactment of Resolution No. 210 by respondent violates
the States deregulation policy as set forth by then NTC Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz
in his Memorandum dated August 25, 1989. Also, it pointed out that the sole agency of
the government which can regulate CATV operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot
exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate legislation.
Unsatisfied, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 52361.
On February 12, 1999, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the trial courts
Decision, ratiocinating as follows:
Although the Certificate of Authority to operate a Cable Antenna Television

(CATV) System is granted by the National Telecommunications Commission
pursuant to Executive Order No. 205, this does not preclude the Sangguniang
Panlungsod from regulating the operation of the CATV in their locality under
the powers vested upon it by Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1983. Section 177 (now Section 457 paragraph 3
(ii) of Republic Act 7160) provides:
Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:

a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to
provide for health and safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve the morals, and promote the prosperity and general welfare of the community
and the inhabitants thereof, and the protection of property therein;
xxx
d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being
carried on and exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the city, except
travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe
restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under
the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall
exercise such authority without infringement on the taxing and regulatory
powers of the city government;
Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, Local
Government Units can perform just about any power that will benefit their
constituencies. Thus, local government units can exercise powers that
are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly
granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance; and (4)essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their
inhabitants. (Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, p. 46)
Verily, the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided in the

Local Government Code. The fixing of service rates is lawful under the General
Welfare Clause.
Resolution No. 210 granting appellee a permit to construct, install and operate a
community antenna television (CATV) system in Batangas City as quoted earlier in
this decision, authorized the grantee to impose charges which cannot be increased
except upon approval of the Sangguniang Bayan. It further provided that in case of
violation by the grantee of the terms and conditions/requirements specifically
provided therein, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise.
Appellee increased the service rates from EIGHTY EIGHT PESOS (P88.00) to ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY PESOS (P180.00) (Records, p. 25) without the approval of
appellant. Such act breached Resolution No. 210 which gives appellant the right
to withdraw the permit granted to appellee. [11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.[12]

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following
assignments of error:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GENERAL

WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
AUTHORIZES RESPONDENT SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD TO
EXERCISE THE REGULATORY FUNCTION SOLELY LODGED WITH
THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 205, INCLUDING THE AUTHORITY TO FIX
AND/OR APPROVE THE SERVICE RATES OF CATV OPERATORS; AND
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION

APPEALED FROM AND DISMISSING PETITIONERS COMPLAINT. [13]
Petitioner contends that while Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of
1991, extends to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their
constituents, nonetheless, it does not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation.
Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the authority to regulate the CATV operation,
including the fixing of subscriber rates.
Respondents counter that the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error in
rendering the assailed Decision. First, Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to
Section 177(c) and (d) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, the Local Government Code of
1983, which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses. The term businesses necessarily
includes the CATV industry. And second, Resolution No. 210 is in the nature of a contract
between petitioner and respondents, it being a grant to the former of a franchise to
operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of contracts.[14]
The petition is impressed with merit.
Earlier, we posed the question -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? A review of
pertinent laws and jurisprudence yields a negative answer.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the first one to place the CATV industry under
the regulatory power of the national government.[15] On June 11, 1978, he
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1512[16] establishing a monopoly of the industry by
granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive franchise to operate CATV system in any
place within the Philippines. Accordingly, it terminated all franchises, permits or
certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local
governments or by any instrumentality or agency of the national
government.[17] Likewise, it prescribed the subscriber rates to be charged by Sining
Makulay, Inc. to its customers.[18]
On July 21, 1979, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
894 vesting upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over
the operations of Sining Makulay, Inc. Three days after, he issued E.O. No.
546[19] integrating the Board of Communications[20] and the Telecommunications Control
Bureau[21] to form a single entity to be known as the National Telecommunications
Commission. Two of its assigned functions are:
a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications

utilities and services, radio communications systems, wire or wireless telephone or
telegraph systems, radio and television broadcasting system and other similar
public utilities;
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of

public service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates
pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in
cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of
which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the
Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
Although Sining Makulay Inc.s exclusive franchise had a life term of 25 years, it was
cut short by the advent of the 1986 Revolution. Upon President Corazon C. Aquinos
assumption of power, she issued E.O. No. 205[22] opening the CATV industry to all citizens
of the Philippines. It mandated the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV
operators and to issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
On September 9, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos issued E.O. No. 436[23] prescribing
policy guidelines to govern CATV operation in the Philippines. Cast in more definitive
terms, it restated the NTCs regulatory powers over CATV operations, thus:
SECTION 2. The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in the
Philippines shall remain vested solely with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC).
SECTION 3. Only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or

cooperatives, granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the
Commission may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render
cable television service within a service area.
Clearly, it has been more than two decades now since our national government,
through the NTC, assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Changes in the
political arena did not alter the trend. Instead, subsequent presidential issuances further
reinforced the NTCs power. Significantly, President Marcos and President Aquino, in the
exercise of their legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512, E.O. No. 546 and E.O. No. 205.
Hence, they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress.[24] That the
regulatory power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436
mandating that the regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested
solely in the NTC. Blacks Law Dictionary defines sole as without another or others.[25] The
logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the
NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other
bodies.
But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs
of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the
Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the
regulatory power shall be vested solely in the NTC, it pertains to the regulatory power
over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence, such as,
the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of certificates of authority, (3) establishment
of areas of operation, (4)examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial
qualifications of applicant operators, (5) granting of permits for the use of
frequencies, (6) regulation of ownership and operation, (7) adjudication of issues arising
from its functions, and (8) other similar matters.[26] Within these areas, the NTC reigns
supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -- a power comprising varied
acts, such as to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode;
to direct by rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws. [27]
Coincidentally, respondents justify their exercise of regulatory power over petitioners
CATV operation under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1983.
The Court of Appeals sustained their stance.
There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local
legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions
under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983.
That it continues to posses such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the
Local Government Code of 1991). Section 16 thereof provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among others, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant, scientific and technological capabilities,
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the same Code specifically mandates:
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang
Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, x x x:
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police
power of the State to LGUs.[28] Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect
the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld enactments
providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling,[29] the occupation of rig drivers,[30] the
installation and operation of pinball machines,[31] the maintenance and operation of
cockpits,[32] the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, [33] and the
operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses[34] as valid exercises by local legislatures
of the police power under the general welfare clause.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach
subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public
streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large
regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. [35] This is
the same regulation that it exercises over all private enterprises within its territory.
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well
recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the
mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV
industry.
I.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national
legislature. Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test
its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. [36]
Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan,[37] Justice
Moreland said: An ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid,
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the
Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive,
partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. In De la Cruz vs. Paraz,[38] we laid
the general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and
E.O. No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power
exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators. As earlier discussed, the fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the
matters within the NTCs exclusive domain.
In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made
provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject
matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general
powers, cannot regulate the same conduct.[39] In Keller vs. State,[40] it was held that: Where
there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt
ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general
statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which
is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered
invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has
appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout
the State. A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the
powers granted to the municipal corporation.[41]
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations
shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution
in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general
character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. [42] The principle is
frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant
of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to
the general policy of the state.[43] In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality,
there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general
law.[44] In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce
Properties Corp., Inc.,[45] ruled that:
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as
the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly
from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot
exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a
single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at
will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to
create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power
to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution,
like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy
its will or modify or violate it.
Respondents have an ingenious retort against the above disquisition. Their theory is
that the regulatory power of the LGUs is granted by R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government
Code of 1991), a handiwork of the national lawmaking authority. They contend that R.A.
No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205 (issued by President Aquino). Respondents argument
espouses a bad precedent. To say that LGUs exercise the same regulatory power over
matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence is to promote a scenario of
LGUs and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate regulatory measure on
the same subject matter. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning
CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
At any rate, we find no basis to conclude that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205,
either expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 7160 repealing clause, which
painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not
include E.O. No. 205, thus:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code." Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order
No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are
hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital
fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special
Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos.
559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436,
464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and
effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-
funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52,
53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended;
and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Neither is there an indication that E.O. No. 205 was impliedly repealed by R.A. No.
7160. It is a settled rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing of such intentions. In Mecano vs. Commission on
Audit,[46] we ruled:
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there
must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the
new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the
two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.
As previously stated, E.O. No. 436 (issued by President Ramos) vests upon the NTC
the power to regulate the CATV operation in this country. So also Memorandum Circular
No. 8-9-95, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7925 (the Public
Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines). This shows that the NTCs regulatory
power over CATV operation is continuously recognized.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another
in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of coordinate
branches of the government.[47] On the assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and
R.A. No. 7160, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect
to both by harmonizing them if possible. This recourse finds application here. Thus, we
hold that the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting
CATV operation, including specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein
precludes LGUs from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of their constituents. In effect, both laws become equally effective and
mutually complementary.
The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easily understandable. CATV system is
not a mere local concern. The complexities that characterize this new technology demand
that it be regulated by a specialized agency. This is particularly true in the area of rate-
fixing. Rate fixing involves a series of technical operations.[48] Consequently, on the hands
of the regulatory body lies the ample discretion in the choice of such rational processes
as might be appropriate to the solution of its highly complicated and technical problems.
Considering that the CATV industry is so technical a field, we believe that the NTC, a
specialized agency, is in a better position than the LGU, to regulate it. Notably, in United
States vs. Southwestern Cable Co.,[49] the US Supreme Court affirmed the Federal
Communications Commissions (FCCs) jurisdiction over CATV operation. The Court held
that the FCCs authority over cable systems assures the preservation of the local
broadcast service and an equitable distribution of broadcast services among the various
regions of the country.
II.
Resolution No. 210 violated the States deregulation policy.
Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer
markets and competition.[50] Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries
out a policy of deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In
the field of telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are
still unserved or underserved. Thus, to encourage private sectors to venture in this field
and be partners of the government in stimulating the growth and development of
telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation.
In the United States, the country where CATV originated, the Congress observed,
when it adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996, that there was a need to provide a
pro-competitive, deregulatory national policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly
private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies
and services to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition.
The FCC has adopted regulations to implement the requirements of the 1996 Act and the
intent of the Congress.
Our country follows the same policy. The fifth Whereas Clause of E.O. No. 436 states:
WHEREAS, professionalism and self-regulation among existing operators, through a

nationally recognized cable television operators association, have enhanced the
growth of the cable television industry and must therefore be maintained along
with minimal reasonable government regulations;
This policy reaffirms the NTCs mandate set forth in the Memorandum dated August
25, 1989 of Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz, to wit:
In line with the purpose and objective of MC 4-08-88, Cable Television System or
Community Antenna Television (CATV) is made part of the broadcast media to
promote the orderly growth of the Cable Television Industry it being in its developing
stage. Being part of the Broadcast Media, the service rates of CATV are likewise
considered deregulated in accordance with MC 06-2-81 dated 25 February 1981,
the implementing guidelines for the authorization and operation of Radio and
Television Broadcasting stations/systems.
Further, the Commission will issue Provisional Authority to existing CATV operators
to authorize their operations for a period of ninety (90) days until such time that the
Commission can issue the regular Certificate of Authority.
When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To
rule otherwise is to render the States policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State,
LGUs cannot defeat national policies through enactments of contrary measures. Verily,
in the case at bar, petitioner may increase its subscriber rates without respondents
approval.
At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that municipal corporations are bodies politic
and corporate, created not only as local units of local self-government, but as
governmental agencies of the state.[51] The legislature, by establishing a municipal
corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself from its right
and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power
over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted. [52]
Respondents likewise argue that E.O. No. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition
against impairment of contracts, Resolution No. 210 of Batangas City Sangguniang
Panlungsod being a grant of franchise to petitioner.
We are not convinced.
There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV
system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when
President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or
certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local
governments. Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional
Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a
cable television system or render cable television service within a service area. It
is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities
have no power to grant franchises.[53] Consequently, the protection of the constitutional
provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges,
franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.[54]
One last word. The devolution of powers to the LGUs, pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate of ensuring their autonomy, has bred jurisdictional tension between said LGUs
and the State. LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole. Thus,
when the Drafters of the 1987 Constitution enunciated the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of local governments,[55] it was never their intention to create an imperium in
imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single
sovereign state.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 52461, are hereby REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254
is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., on leave.
[1]
Mary Alice Mayer, John Walson: An Oral History, August 1987 (USA).
[2]
Rollo at 51-56. Per Associate Justice Buenaventura O. Guerrero (retired) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Teodoro P. Regino (retired).
[3]
Rollo at 58.
[4]
Entitled Batangas CATV, Inc. versus The Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod and Batangas City
Mayor.
[5]
Rollo at 86-90.
[6]
Entitled Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. The Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Batangas City
Mayor.
[7]
Rollo at 70-73.
[8]
Id. at 72.
[9]
Id. at 84, dated April 26, 1994.
[10]
Rollo at 89-90.
[11]
Id. at 56.
[12]
Id. at 58.
[13]
Id. at 19.
[14]
Section 10. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that: No law impairing the obligation of contracts
shall be passed.
[15]
The fourth Whereas Clause of P.D. 1512 reads:
WHEREAS, because of technological advances in equipment and facilities, CATV systems have acquired
a more significant role in the socio-political life of the nation, requiring the exercise of regulatory
power by the national government.
[16]
Decree Creating an Exclusive Franchise to Construct, Operate and Maintain a Community Antenna
Television System in the Philippines in favor of Sining Makulay, Incorporated.
[17]
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1512.
[18]
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1512.
[19]
Creating a Ministry of Public Works and a Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
[20]
Created under Article III, Chapter I, Part X of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, as amended.
[21]
Created under Article IX, id.
[22]
Dated June 30, 1987.
[23]
Prescribing Policy Guidelines to Govern the Operations of Cable Television in the Philippines.
[24]
Miners Association of the Philippines vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 98332, January 16, 1995, 240 SCRA 100.
[25]
Sixth Edition at 1391.
[26]
See National Telecommunications Commission Practices & Procedures Manual, April 27,1992; PLDT vs.
National Telecommunication Commission, G.R. No. 94374, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 486.
[27]
Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at 1286.
[28]
US vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918).
[29]
Id.
[30]
People vs. Felisarta, G.R. No. 15346, June 29, 1962, 5 SCRA 389.
[31]
Miranda vs. City of Manila, G.R. Nos. L-17252 & L-17276, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 613.
[32]
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary vs. Sabungan Bagong Silang, Inc., G.R. No. L-22609, February 28,
1966, 16 SCRA 336; Chief of P.C. vs. Judge of CFI of Rizal, G.R. Nos. L-22308 & L-22343-4,
March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 607.
[33]
Viray vs. City of Caloocan, G.R. No. L-23118, July 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 791.
[34]
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila G.R. No. L-24693,
July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.
[35]
See New York State Commission on Cable Television vs. Federal Communication Commission.
[36]
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and
consistent with public policy. The Solicitor General vs. The Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No.
102782, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837.
Though designated as resolution, Resolution No. 210 is actually an ordinance as it concerns a subject that
is inherently legislative in character, 37 Am. Jur. p. 667. Dillon comments, thus: "A resolution
concerning a subject which is inherently legislative in its character and for which an ordinance is
required, will, if adopted with all the formalities required in the case of an ordinance, be regarded
as an ordinance and given effect accordingly. The substance, and not the form, of the corporate
act is what governs. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 594-897.
[37]
24 Phil 165 (1913).
[38]
G.R. No. L-41053, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 556.
[39]
56 Sm Jur 2d 375 citing Birmingham vs. Allen, 251 Ala 198, 36 So 2d 297; Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal
636, 192 P442, 21 ALR 1172; Thrower vs. Atlanta, 124 Ga 1, 52 SE 76.
[40]
46 Ariz 106, 47 P2d 442.
[41]
56 Sm Jur 2d 375 citing Savannah vs. Hussey, 21 Ga 80; Corvallis vs. Carlile, 10 Or 139; Judy vs.
Lashley, 50 W Va 628, 41 SE 197.
[42]
56 Am Jur 2d 374 citing West Chicago Street R.Co. vs. Illinois, 201 US 506, 50 L Ed 845, 26 S Ct 518; Ex
parte Byrd, 84 Ala 17,4 So 397; Mclaughlin vs. Retherford, 207 Ark 1094, 184 SW2d 461.
[43]
56 Am Jur 2d 374 citing Sims vs. Alabama Water Co., 205 Ala 378, 87 So 688, 28 ALR 461; Abbot vs.
Los Angeles, 53 Cal 2d 674, 3 Cal Rptr 158, 349 P2d 974, 82 ALR 2d 385; Phillips vs. Denver, 19
Colo 179, 34 P 902; Miami Beach vs. Texas Co., 141 Fla 616, 194 So 368, 128 ALR 350.
[44]
Johnson vs. Philadelphia, 94 Miss 34, 47 So 526, see also Kraus vs. Cleveland, 135 Ohio St 43, 13 Ohio
Ops 323, 19 NE2d 159.
[45]
G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 255.
[46]
G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 500.
[47]
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, Corp. Inc., supra.
[48]
Republic vs. Medina, L-32068, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 643.
[49]
392 U.S. 157 (1968).
[50]
Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. at 443.
[51]
Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 NC 52, 74 SE2d 310; Othello vs.
Harder, 46 Wash 2d 747, 284 P2d 1099.
[52]
Laramie County vs. Albany County, 92 US 307, 23 Led 552; People ex rel. Raymond Community High
School Dist. vs. Bartlett, 304 Ill 283, 136 NE 654.
[53]
36 Am Jur 2d 11.
[54]
36 Am Jur 2d 7 citing Grand Trunk W.R. Co. vs. South Bend, 227 US 544, 57 L ed 633, 33 S Ct.
303; Murray vs. Pocatello, 226 US 318, 57 Led 239, 33 S Ct 107; Home Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Los
Angeles, 211 US 265, 53 L ed 176, 29 S Ct 50; Birmingham & P.M. Street R. Co. vs. Birmingham
Street R. Co. 79 Ala 465; Westminster Water Co. vs. Westminster, 98 Md 551, 56 A 990; Elizabeth
City vs. Bank, 150 NC 407, 64 SE 189; State ex rel. Webster vs. Superior, Ct.67 Wash 37, 120 P
861.
[55]
Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
SECOND DIVISION
March 23, 2015
G.R. No. 197115
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, Petitioner,

vs.
FEDERICO DACLAN, JOSEFINA COLLADO and her husband FEDERICO DACLAN, TEODORO
DACLAN and MINVILUZ DACLAN as surviving heirs of deceased JOSE
DACLAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197267
FEDERICO DACLAN, JOSEFINA COLLADO, TEODORO DACLAN and MINVILUZ DACLAN as

surviving heirs of deceased JOSE DACLAN, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and
PROVINCE OF LA UNION, represented by its PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 assailing 1) the January 25, 2011
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90014 which set aside the July 31, 2007
Decision3 of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, as well as 2) the CA’s
May 30, 2011 Resolution4 denying the parties’ respective Motions for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station (or "breeding station") was established by the
Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Region I, for the purpose of
breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood
program of the national government. In support of the said project, plaintiffs6 executed four (4)
documents denominated as Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines (or
"Republic") donating to the latter four (4) parcels of land, more particularly described in the following
Tax Declarations (TD):
1.TD No. 23769 registered in the name of Federico Daclan covering a [parcel of] land
with an area of 15,170 square meters, more or less;
2.TD No. 38240 registered in the name of Josefina Collado covering a [parcel of]
land with an area of 3,440 square meters, more or less;
3.TD No. 27220 registered in the name of Teodoro Daclan covering a [parcel of] land
with an area of 2,464 square meters, more or less;
4.TD No. 1875 registered in the name of Jose Daclan (deceased father of plaintiff
Minviluz Daclan) covering a [parcel of] land with an area of 1,769 square meters,
more or less.
These parcels of land are located at Barrio Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. The donation was subject to
the conditions that these parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding
station, and 2) shall not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the
donors or their heirs.
Sometime in 1991, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of the
Department of Agriculture (DA), were devolved to the local government units pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code". Thus, defendant Province of La
Union (or "Province") assumed the powers and functions of the DA, in the operation of the breeding
station.7
In particular, the deeds of donation8 stipulated –
a.That the land herein mentioned shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall
not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the DONOR or his heirs;
xxxx
c.That in case of non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the DONOR and all permanent
improvements existing thereon shall become the property of the DONOR; x x x9
All in all, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197267 – Federico Daclan, Josefina Collado, Teodoro Daclan,
Jose Daclan (the Daclans) – and several others donated around 13 hectares of land to the Republic.
The uniform deeds of donation covering these parcels of land contained the same conditions,
including the above stipulations relative to exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion.10
Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on
a 1.5-hectare portion of the 13-hectare donated property.11
In a September 4, 2003 Letter12 to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, the Daclans and
other donors demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding station has
ceased operations and that the land has been abandoned.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On March 28, 2005, the Daclans filed Civil Case No. A-2363 for specific performance against the
Republic and the Province of La Union. The case was assigned to Branch 32 of the RTC of Agoo, La
Union (Agoo RTC). The Daclans essentially claimed in their Amended Complaint13 that pursuant to
the automatic reversion clause in the deeds of donation, they are entitled to a return of their donated
parcels of land after the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) ceased operating the breeding station, but
that the Republic and the Province failed to honor the said clause and refused to return their land.
They thus prayed that the defendants be ordered to return to them the donated land, with all
improvements existing thereon.
In its Answer,14 the Province alleged that the Daclans have no cause of action since the breeding
station was still existing – although this time it is being operated by the Province, pursuant to the
devolution program under the Local Government Code of 1991, and that the Daclans violated the
deeds of donation because they have occupied the donated land and have begun fencing the same.
It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the grant of injunctive relief.
In a subsequent Manifestation,15 the Republic opted to adopt the above Answer filed by the Province.
In their Reply,16 the Daclans claimed that the donated land cannot be assigned by the Republic to the
Province as the deeds of donation did not include the Republic’s successors or assigns as intended
beneficiaries; that contrary to the Province’s claim, the breeding station is not operational and has
been abandoned, and the existing heads of cattle found therein do not belong to the government but
to former officials of the BAI; and that with the automatic reversion clause, they are granted the
immediate right to occupy the subject land, and no injunctive relief should issue against them.
Upon motion of the parties, an ocular inspection of the premises was conducted, and a
Commissioner’s Report17was prepared and issued thereafter. The report indicated in part that –
From information gathered from Ms. Cresencia Isibido, a caretaker of the Agoo Breeding Station, the
land had an original area of thirteen (13) hectares. At present though, only eleven point five (11.5)
hectares is [sic] being occupied by the Agoo Breeding Station as 1.5 hectares was [sic] occupied by
the La Union Medical Center.
At a distance of about 200 meters from the main entrance of the breeding station, an office is located
at the south of said lot. Beside the office is a shed where six (6) young goats (kids) are housed.
Another shed where goats are housed is located at the northern side of the lot, fronting a water
pump station.
It was likewise gathered that at present, the breeding station has a total number of fifty (50) goats.
Also, there are six (6) cows roaming in the pasture land. Four (4) of these cows are pregnant. It was
clarified that these cows belong to the Cross Australian Bi-Bhraman [sic] breed.
There are four (4) caretakers in the breeding station, all of whom are employed by the provincial
government of La Union. They receive salary from the provincial government and they likewise
submit monthly reports to the Provincial Veterinarian. These four caretakers are Cresencia Isibido,
Manuel Daclan, Ruben Daclan (son of plaintiff Federico Daclan), and Tita Fortes.
The group left the breeding station at around 3:30pm.
Agoo, La Union, this 14th day of December, 2006.18
During trial, the witnesses testified as follows:

To substantiate their claim, the plaintiffs presented the following witnesses whose testimonies are
summarized, thus:
REINERIO BELARMINO[,] JR., is 46 years old, married, a resident of Namnama, San Fernando, La
Union, and Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture, Region 1.
Dir. Belarmino testified that by virtue of a subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum, he
brought to Court a photocopy of a letter he issued to Atty. Benjamin Tabios, Legal Consultant of the
Department of Agriculture dated October 14, 2003.
Dir. Belarmino said that while he confirmed and affirmed the contents of the letter, he nevertheless
could not agree on [sic] one sentence written therein. This pertains to the entry that the artificial
breeding station is no longer operational. He explained that although he signed the letter, it was his
legal officer who prepared the same.
Further, he said that he had been calling his legal officer since it was the latter who drafted said
letter. He clarified that upon personal verification, he found out that it was not the artificial breeding
station that was not [operational]. Rather, it was the breeding station that was not operational.
He likewise mentioned that as early as 1993, the Department of Agriculture, particularly the Bureau
of Animal Industry, gave up the breeding station because of the devolution. In particular, the
operation of the breeding station was transferred to the Province of La Union. However, he affirmed
that in the deed of donation, there is no mention of the Province of La Union. Likewise, there is no
mention of any successor.
He clarified though that no breeding activity was done by the Department of Agriculture through the
Bureau of Animal Industry since 1993 because ownership of the breeding station was transferred to
the Province of La Union. The transfer was made without the consent of the donors since the
transfer was between two government entities.
On the ocular inspection which was conducted, Dir. Belarmino affirmed that at present, there are six
cows and fifty (50) goats in the breeding station. However, he clarified that said 50 goats are not the
same goats that were turned over to the province of La Union as a result of the devolution.
TEODORO DACLAN, 84 years old, married, retired government employee and a resident of
Nazareno, Agoo, La Union, testified that he is one of the plaintiffs in this case.
He said that he executed a Deed of Donation in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, then
represented by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. He clarified that as embodied in their
complaint, they seek to enforce the common provision that in case of non-use, abandonment or
cessation of activities of the Bureau of Animal Industry, possession and ownership of the lots subject
of donation shall revert x x x to the donors.
In this respect, he said that the Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of Animal Industry,
has no on-going breeding activity in the above- mentioned lots. He maintained that he came to know
of such non-operation of the breeding station as early as thirteen (13) years ago.
He likewise testified that he was never informed of any devolution which transferred the operations
of the breeding station from the Bureau of Animal Industry to the Province of La Union. Moreover,
his permission was never sought for the use of the donated lots by the Province of La Union.
FEDERICO DACLAN, 83 years old, married, retired employee of the Bureau of Animal Industry and
a resident of Brgy. Nazareno, Agoo, La Union, also testified.
He said that he is one of the plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiff Teodoro Daclan is his brother while
plaintiff Minviluz Daclan is his niece. His spouse, Josefina Collado, is likewise a co-plaintiff.
He added that he donated a parcel of land with an area of 15,170 square meters located at
Nazareno, Agoo, La Union in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through the Secretary of
Agriculture.
Further, he reiterated that as embodied in the deed of donation, one of the conditions therein is that
the land shall be used as a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, except with
the previous consent of the donor or his heirs.
He maintained that since 1993 up to the present, the lot is no longer being used as a breeding
station nor has the defendant province of La Union sought his permission for the use of said lot for
any other purpose.
JOSEFINA COLLADO, 72 years old, married, housewife and a resident of Nazareno, Agoo, La
Union testified that she and her husband donated a parcel of land situated at Nazareno, Agoo, La
Union in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through the Secretary of Agriculture.
She said that at present, there is no breeding activity being conducted on said lot. She added that
there has been no breeding activity for a long time now. Further, she clarified that she and the other
plaintiffs were never notified of a devolution so much so that the operation of the breeding station
was transferred to defendant Province of La Union. Also, the defendant Province of La Union never
secured their consent for the use of the lot for any other purpose other than a breeding station.
MINVILUZ DACLAN, 75 years old, single, retired teacher and resident of San Pedro, Agoo, La Union
testified that she is the [daughter] of the late Jose Daclan. She said that during the lifetime of her
father, she was aware of a Deed of Donation executed by her father in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the then Secretary of Agriculture.
She said that the lot subject of the donation is situated in Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. Likewise, she
testified that the donation was premised on the condition that a breeding station is to be established
in said property. However, she maintained that there is no such breeding station.
Further, she was not aware if her father gave his consent for the use of the property for any other
purpose other than for a breeding station. She emphasized that her father gave his consent only for
the use of a breeding station. Likewise, she has not been consulted nor her permission sought for if
the land can be used for any other purpose other than for breeding.
The defendant Province of La Union presented the following witnesses whose testimonies are
summarized, thus:
CRESENCIA ISIBIDO, 58 years old, single, government employee and a resident of San Pedro,
Agoo, La Union testified that she is employed at the Office of the Veterinarian, particularly at the
Agoo Breeding Station at Nazareno, Agoo, La Union.
Particularly, she has been employed thereat since August 28, 1974, initially as Farm Worker and
now, as Farm Foreman. As foreman, she exercises supervision over her co-employees and over all
animals in the breeding station. She clarified that in 1989, there were six (6) personnel assigned at
the breeding station. She likewise clarified that from 1974 until 1989, she received her salary from
the Bureau of Animal Industry.
During the devolution of 1993, she started receiving her salary from the provincial government of La
Union. She added though that even after devolution took place, the operation of the Agoo Breeding
Station continued.
Likewise, she testified that from the time she was promoted as farm foreman, goats, cattle and swine
were being maintained at the breeding station. She recalled that there were about twenty (20) cattle,
seventy (70) goats and eight (8) swine.
When the devolution took place, she specified that the activities in the breeding station included
production of animals, forage and artificial insemination. She said that the cattles in the breeding
station were either subjected to natural insemination or artificial insemination. Upon the other hand,
goats are subjected to natural insemination. Aside from artificial or natural insemination, greasing is
also being conducted in the breeding station.
DR. NIDA GAPUZ, 47 years old, married, Provincial Veterinarian and a resident of Bauang, La
Union testified that she is the provincial veterinarian of the province of La Union since October,
2006. Prior to her appointment as provincial veterinarian, she was the Supervisor Agriculturist of the
Provincial Veterinarian’s Office. Again, prior to her appointment as supervisor agriculturist, she was
Agricultural Center Chief II of the same office.
She recalled that in 1983, their office was under the Department of Agriculture Regional Office.
Thereafter, they were transferred to the Provincial Office of the Department of Agriculture. She said
that at that time, the Agoo Breeding Station was already existing.
Thereafter, with the advent of devolution, the Office of the Provincial Veterinarian was created and
eventually, they were separated from the Department of Agriculture.
Further, she testified that in her capacity as Agricultural Center Chief II, she handled the facilities for
the Agoo Breeding Station and the La Union Breeding Station, both of which are under the office of
the provincial veterinarian.
She mentioned that she used to visit the Agoo Breeding Station at least two (2) times a month. She
added that natural as well as artificial insemination activities were conducted in said breeding
station. As such, she explained that one of the purpose[s] of the breeding station is to reproduce and
disperse animals.
At present, she said that the breeding station engages in goat dispersal and cattle production. There
are no swine since swine production was phased out because of the establishment of the La Union
Medical Center within the vicinity of the breeding station.
Likewise, she said that at present, there are seven (7) heads of cattle being raised in the breeding
station. Of these, two (2) are pregnant. There are also forty-six (46) heads of goats.
ATTY. MAURO CABADING, 53 years old, married, Provincial Assessor and a resident of San
Fernando City, La Union testified that he is familiar with the Agoo Breeding Station because he took
photographs thereof sometime last year.
He explained that he was directed by the governor and the provincial administrator to take
photographs of the breeding station to determine whether the allegations contained in the complaint
filed by herein plaintiffs [are] true or not. He then proceeded to the Agoo Breeding Station
accompanied by his driver and a personnel from the Provincial Veterinarian’s Office.
He maintained that he can recognize the photographs taken at the breeding station since it was his
camera that was used in taking pictures. He then started identifying the photographs, making
mention of those which depicted cows, goats and houses for cows and goats. Also, he said that the
[owner] of the goats and cows seen at the photographs he took is the provincial government of La
Union.19
On July 31, 2007, the Agoo RTC rendered its Decision20 in Civil Case No. A-2363, which decreed
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING this
instant case for specific performance.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court held that although the functions and powers of the BAI were transferred to the
Province by virtue of devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991, the Province continued
to operate the breeding station. It added that the Daclans’ consent to the transfer of functions and
powers was not necessary as to affect the validity of the donations of their lands; devolution of
power took effect by operation of law. It held further that contrary to the Daclans’ claims, the
preponderance of evidence suggested that the operations of the breeding station never ceased; and
there are farm animals, buildings, structures, and offices being supervised by four caretakers whose
salaries were being paid by the Province, and these personnel submit monthly reports of operations
to the provincial veterinarian.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Daclans took the Agoo RTC’s July 31, 2007 Decision to the CA via appeal. On January 25,
2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed July 31, 2007 decision of Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union is hereby SET ASIDE. The donation insofar as the 1.5
hectare portion of the donated parcels of land that is now being used by the La Union Medical
Center for its medical facility, hence no longer being used for the purpose for which the donation was
constituted, is hereby declared revoked. Accordingly, possession and ownership of that particular
portion of the donated parcels of land shall revert to the donor/s or their heir/s.
SO ORDERED.22
In essence, the CA agreed with the findings of fact of the Agoo RTC, except that it held that the
Province violated the exclusive use stipulations in the deeds of donation when it allowed the
construction of the LUMC within a portion of the donated lands, as the operation of a human medical
facility has no relation to the operation of an animal breeding station, and it has not been shown that
the consent of the donors was obtained prior to the construction of the LUMC. Thus, with respect to
the portion occupied by the LUMC, the automatic reversion clauses in the deeds of donation apply.
The appellate court held further that even the Office of the Solicitor General conceded that if any
violation of the deeds of donation occurred, it could only affect that portion which is no longer used
as a breeding station. Finally, it upheld the validity of the automatic reversion clauses in the subject
deeds of donation, which it found to be consistent with law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy.
Both the Daclans and the Republic moved for reconsideration, but on May 30, 2011, the CA issued
the second assailed disposition sustaining its judgment.
The present Petitions were thus filed.
In an October 3, 2011 Resolution23 of the Court, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Issues
The following issues are raised:
By the Republic in G.R. No. 197115
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED THE

PROVISIONS OF THE DEEDS OF DONATION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO RETURN

PORTION/S OF THE PARCEL/S OF LAND DONATED BY RESPONDENTS AND/OR THEIR
FOREBEARS BASED ON AN UNESTABLISHED INFERENCE.24
By the Daclans in G.R. No. 197267
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE THE MAIN ISSUES RAISED BY THE
PETITIONERS IN THE TRIAL COURT AND BEFORE IT.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A

WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.25
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
G.R. No. 197115. For the Republic, the lone point of contention is that the CA could not validly order
the return to the Daclans of the donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is situated because it
has not been proved that such portion formed part of lands originally donated by the Daclans. The
Republic contends that the Daclans donated only an aggregate of 2.2843 hectares, while the
breeding station sits on 13 hectares of donated land; the Daclans did not prove during trial that the
1.5-hectare land where the LUMC is erected sits within the 2.2843 hectares donated by them. It
maintains that if reversion must occur, the Daclans must first clearly identify the land on which the
LUMC is erected as theirs. Thus, it prays that the July 31, 2007 Decision of the Agoo RTC be
reinstated.
For their part, the Daclans adopt their Petition in G.R. No. 197267 as their Comment to the
Republic’s Petition. In turn, the Republic manifested that it was adopting its Comment26 to the
Daclans’ Petition in G.R. No. 197267 as its Reply.
G.R. No. 197267. The Daclans in their Petition insist that the deeds of donation they executed are
"personal and exclusively limited to the parties, the donor and the donee. (They do) not extend to or
inure to the benefit of their successors and assigns;"27 the rights and obligations of the parties to the
donations are not transmissible by their nature or stipulation. Thus, the unauthorized turnover of the
breeding station to the Province by the BAI – the sole beneficiary under the deeds of donation –
constitutes a violation of the terms of the deeds of donation, thus giving ground for reversion; and
with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the BAI ceased to exist and was
abolished. Thus, the donated lands automatically revert to their original owners. They add that the
evidence clearly indicates that the donated lands are no longer being used as a breeding station, but
merely grazing land for a few animals whose ownership is even in doubt. Finally, the Daclans decry
the failure of the Province to provide "agricultural extension and on-site research services and
facilities" as required under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which thus constitutes a violation of the stipulation contained in the deeds of donation to
develop and improve the livestock industry of the country. Thus, they pray that the assailed CA
dispositions be set aside completely and all their donated lands be reverted to them.
Notably, the Daclans admit in their Petition that the 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is
constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to the government, but belongs to "other
donors who are not parties to the case."28
In its Comment29 with a prayer for the denial of the Daclans’ Petition and reinstatement of the July 31,
2007 Decision of the Agoo RTC, the Republic argues that the question of whether the breeding
station is still in operation is one of fact which should not be disturbed at this stage of the
proceedings; that the Daclans’ admission in their Petition that the 1.5-hectare portion where the
LUMC is constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to the government contradicts its
argument that the CA committed serious error in ordering the reversion of the said portion to them;
that it is not merely the BAI which acted as the donee, but the Republic itself – represented by the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture – which is the recipient of the Daclans’ donated lands
under the deeds; and that the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 did not result in the
cessation of operations of the Agoo breeding station.
In an August 28, 2013 Manifestation,30 the Province adopted the Republic’s Comment to the Petition
as its own.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Republic’s Petition in G.R. No. 197115 and denies that of the Daclans’ in G.R.
No. 197267.
The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that the breeding station remained operational
even after its transfer from the Republic to the Province. The activities of the BAI did not cease even
after it was dissolved after the government adopted the policy of devolution under the Local
Government Code of 1991; these activities were merely transferred to the Province. Thus, the
witnesses for the Daclans and the Republic uniformly declared that the breeding station remained
operational even after the Local Government Code of 1991 was put into effect. Particularly, Regional
Director Reinerio Belarmino, Jr. of the Department of Agriculture, Region 1 declared that after the
breeding station was transferred to the Province, he saw upon ocular inspection that there remained
six cows and fifty goats on the premises. Cresencia Isibido testified that as Farm Foreman, she
exercised supervision over her co-employees in the breeding station; that in 1989, there were six
personnel assigned at the breeding station; that from 1974 until 1989, she received her salary from
the BAI; that after devolution, she started receiving her salary from the Province; and that even after
devolution, the operation of the Agoo Breeding Station continued, and goats, cattle and swine were
being maintained thereat. Dr. Nida Gapuz, La Union Provincial Veterinarian, said that natural as well
as artificial insemination activities were being conducted at the breeding station, as well as goat
dispersal and cattle production. Atty. Mauro Cabading, La Union Provincial Assessor, testified that
he was directed by the Governor and the Provincial Administrator to take photographs of the
breeding station in order to verify the complaint filed by the Daclans; that he then proceeded to the
Agoo Breeding Station; that he took photographs of the animals – cows and goats – therein; and that
the Province owned said animals at the breeding station.
As against the bare assertions of the Daclans that the breeding station was abandoned and became
non-operational, the testimonies of the above public officers are credible. "In the absence of any
1avvphi1
controverting evidence, the testimonies of public officers are given full faith and credence, as they
are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their official duties."31
Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As
defined, "devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority
upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities."32 It
includes "the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and
responsibilities."33 While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province of La Union
by the Department of Agriculture as a consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and
continued to function as a breeding station; and the purpose for which the donations were made
remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of donation did not specifically prohibit the
subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic. The Daclans should bear in mind
that "contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation
or by provision of law."34 Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are
transmissible.
The Daclans lament the supposed failure of the Province to provide "agricultural extension and on-
site research services and facilities" as required under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which failure they believe, constituted a violation of the
stipulation contained in the deeds of donation to develop and improve the livestock industry of the
country. Yet this cannot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands; on the contrary, to
allow such an argument would condone undue interference by private individuals in the operations of
government. The deeds of donation merely stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the
establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, and that in case of
non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BAI, possession or ownership shall
automatically revert to the Daclans. It was never stipulated that they may interfere in the
management and operation of the breeding station. Even then, they could not directly participate in
the operations of the breeding station.
Thus, even if the BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, its activities continued when its
functions were devolved to the local government units such as the Province of La Union. It cannot be
said that the deeds of donation may be nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct; its
functions continued in the government offices/local government units to which said functions were
devolved.
Lastly, the CA cannot validly order the return to the Daclans of the donated 1.5-hectare portion
where the LUMC is situated, because such portion was not donated by them. They admitted that the
1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to
the government, but belonged to other donors who are not parties to the instant case. As far as the
Daclans are concerned, whatever they donated remains part of the breeding station and so long as it
remains so, no right of reversion accrues to them. Only the original owner-donor of the 1.5-hectare
portion where the LUMC is constructed is entitled to its return.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:
1. The January 25, 2011 Decision and May 30, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R CV No. 90014 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
2.The Petition in G.R. No. 197115 is GRANTED. The July 31, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32 dismissing Civil Case No. A-2363 is REINSTATED;
and
3.The Petition in G.R. No. 197267 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE**

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Per Special Order No. 1955 dated March 23, 2015.
**
Per Special Order No. 1956 dated March 23, 2015.
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 12-36; G.R. No. 197267, pp. 8-42.
2
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 38-48; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
3
Id. at 72-87; penned by Judge Clifton U. Ganay.
4
Id. at 50.
5
CA rollo, pp. 174-192.
6
Petitioners in G.R. No. 197267.
7
Rollo, G.R. No. 197267, pp. 184-185.
8
Records, pp. 7-10.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 11; Rollo, G.R. No. 197267, p. 189.
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 27, 29, 44; G.R. No. 197267, p. 189; Records, pp. 227-228,
11
343.
12
Records, p. 11.
13
Id. at 63-69.
14
Id. at 84-87.
15
Id. at 102-103.
16
Id. at 88-91.
17
Id. at 227-228; prepared and signed by Commissioner Dante R. Evangelista.
18
Id. at 228.
19
Id. at 344-351.
20
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 72-87.
21
Id. at 87.
22
Id. at 47.
23
Id. at 136.
24
Id. at 18-19.
25
Id., G.R. No. 197267, p. 18.
26
Id. at 235-251.
27
Id. at 19.
28
Id. at 32-33.
29
Id. at 235-251.
30
Id. at 263-265.
31
Peligrino v. People, 415 Phil. 94, 121-122 (2001).
32
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991, Section 17(e).
33
Id., Section 17(i).
34
CIVIL CODE, Article 1311.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership,
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes
presiding, which dismissed its complaint in Civil Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and Trust Company, defendant," for lack of merit.
The following facts — a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are based on a
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas,
Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation
duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real
estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as
vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known
as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On
July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor
of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment)
and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively
for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones
or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed
at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b)
provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to
an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters
from its boundary lines. 2
The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez.3
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092
issued in its name, respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated
therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and
encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills
through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills
likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic Flour
Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in
the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719,
101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the
beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed
estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or
established. 8
Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a
commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and transferred to
third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area ...
had been declared a commercial and industrial zone ... 11
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which
defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes.
The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the
construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the
demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning permit applications with the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and planning permits to
proceed with the construction.12
On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for
decision. The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction
... restraining and enjoining defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf
from continuing or completing the construction of a commercial bank building in the premises ...
involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building
restrictions annotated in the defendant's transfer certificate of title."
In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as
part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions
imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued.
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject
restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on
the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow
down to general interest and welfare. " In short, it upheld the classification by the Municipal Council
of the area along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that
the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant-
appellee.14 The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid,
considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and
void. 15
On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which
motion was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.17 It averred, among others, in the
motion for reconsideration that defendant- appellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of
the contract of sale in its favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of
Title issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It also invited the trial court's attention to its claim that the
Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant
corporation." 18
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. 19
On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the
complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration, its record on
appeal, and a cash appeal bond." 20On April 14, the appeal was given due course 21 and the records
of the case were elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised. 22
Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred —
I. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of
the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its
police power; and
II. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to
nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not
make a finding that the building was erected along the property line, when it should
have been erected two meters away from said property line. 23
The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already

had occasion to hold in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies
a purely defensive position, and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error, "
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise of police power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an
exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was
never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in
the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and
are within the issues framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties to present all
questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to
enable the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine
whether or not such ruling was erroneous. The requirement is in furtherance of justice in that the
other party may not be taken by surprise. 26 The rule against the practice of blowing "hot and cold" by
assuming one position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent
deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or properly litigated 29 or
pleaded 30 in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation
of facts below. when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated
by the trial court was whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which
declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in
question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-
appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of
the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is
unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a
matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its interpretation
likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor"
and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in
favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates
that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the
people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out
of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in
which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly,
do not apply in the case at bar.
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale
and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should
be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. 35 Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, 37 the exercise
of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long
Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39 police power "is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when We declared: "We
do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made
to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone,
was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of
traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal
'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking
thru Justice Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al., 41 Thus-
As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed.
169), 'the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business
lawful today may in the future, because of changed situation, the growth of
population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and
be required to yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was
observed that 'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of
the state today things which were not thought of as being with in such power
yesterday. The development of civilization), the rapidly increasing population, the
growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of
the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state,
have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly
were not so considered. 42 (Emphasis, supplied.)
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state 43 and to this
fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. 44
The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of
police power may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking
for the Court, resolved the conflict "between one welfare and another, between particular and
general, thus —
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial
a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation What is
critical or urgent changes with the times. 46
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a "
legitimate response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now
Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to
succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." 48
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General49 that laws and
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the
parties. Thus —
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between
the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile – a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society.
Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded
therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the
Philippines v. Reparations Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief
Justice, restates the rule.
One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and
authorities 52 to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede
the agreement of the parties embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced.
In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling
in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention
of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the
context of other local legislation related thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al., 55 two Of the
cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that
the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual undertaking between the
parties. Dolan v. Brown, states that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of
property by injunction where the property has so changed in character and environment as to make
it unfit or unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the
complainant to whatever remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy of
injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in
his deed conditions or restrictions which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the
beneficial enjoyment of the estate. 57 Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We
can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5
and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants- appellees should be permitted, on the strength of
the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running
with the land are binding on all subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the zoning
ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not
intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other agreement
between parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution.
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-
appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail
over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police
power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5
and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is hereby
AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee * and Aquino,JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in question is commercial. It would be worse if
the same were to be left as residential and all around are already commercial.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by Justice Guillermo S. Santos commends
itself for approval. I feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence, The observation, however,
in the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to my mind, for
further reflection as to the respect to which they are entitled whenever police power legislation,
whether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doing so, however, it may not be amiss to
consider further the effect of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.
1. Reference was made in the opinion of the Court to Philippine American Life Insurance Company
v. Auditor General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice Sanchez. A concurrence came from me. It
contained this qualification: "It cannot be said, without rendering nugatory the constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both the equal protection and due process clauses
which equally serve to protect property rights, that at the mere invocation of the police power, the
objection on non-impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in other cases where
governmental authority may trench upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment or
harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three leading United States Supreme Court decisions,
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 3 Nebbia v. New York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Co., 5 I stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an enactment of a
police power measure does not per se call for the overruling of objections based on either due
process or non-impairment based on either due process or non-impairment grounds. There must be
that balancing, or adjustment, or harmonization of the conflicting claims posed by an exercise of
state regulatory power on the one hand and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural or of
juridical persons, on the other. 'That is the only way by which the constitutional guarantees may
serve the high ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus effectively preclude ally
abusive exercise of governmental authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence stop there: "In the opinion of
the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief Justice Hughes, there was this understandable stress
on balancing or harmonizing, which is called for in litigations of this character: 'The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with
the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this
Court.' Also to the same effect: 'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot
be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the
reserved power in its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in harmony with each other. This
principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation
of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow
that conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with
the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the
reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community.' Further on, Chief Justice
Hughes likewise stated: 'It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a
growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding paragraph of my
concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. case: "If emphasis be therefore laid, as
this concurring opinion does, on the pressing and inescapable need for such an approach whenever
a possible collision between state authority and an assertion of constitutional right to property may
exist, it is not to depart from what sound constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then, perhaps much more so than in other disputes,
where there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary cannot escape what Holmes fitly
referred to as the sovereign prerogative of choice, the exercise of which might possibly be impugned
if there be no attempt, however slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the respective
claims of state regulatory power and constitutionally protected rights." 8
I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a departure therefrom in the able and
scholarly opinion of Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is a fundamental postulate
of our Constitution. The only point I would wish to add is that in the process of such balancing and
adjustment, the present Constitution, the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. decision having
been promulgated under the 1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that the claim to property rights based
on the non-impairment clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our present
fundamental law: "The State shall promote social Justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property,
and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9
2. Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by Hart and Sacks under the category of
"private directive arrangements. " 10 Through them people are enable to agree on how to order their
affairs. They could be utilized to govern their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their future
conduct. It is a well-known fact that the common law relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such covenants are an
important means of ordering one aspect of property relationships. Through them, there could be
delimitation of land use rights. It is quite understandable why the law should ordinarily accord them
deference, It does so, it has been said, both on grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there
are limits to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the extent that they ignore technological or
economic progress, they are not automatically entitled to judicial protection. Clearly, they must
"speak from one point of time to another." 11 The parties, like all mortal, do not have the power of
predicting the future with unfailing certainty. In cases therefore where societal welfare calls for police
power legislation, the parties adversely affected should realize that arrangements dealing with
property rights are not impressed with sanctity. That approach, in my view, was the guiding principle
of the opinion of the Court. f fence my full and entire concurrence.
ABAD SANTOS, J:, dissenting:
Although Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, is valid
until otherwise declared, I do not believe that its enactment was by virtue of the police power of that
municipality. I do not here dispute the concept of police power as stated in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80
Phil. 77 (1948) for as a matter of fact I accept it. And I agree also that it is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in PLDT vs. City of Davao, L-23080, Oct. 26,
1965, 15 SCRA 244. But Resolution No. 27, cannot be described as promotive of the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the
contrary, its effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quite of a residential section would by
the resolution be replaced by the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry. Where there
would be no industrial and noise pollution these bane of so-called progress would now pervade and
suffocate the environment to the detriment of the ecology. To characterize the ordinance as an
exercise of police power would be retrogressive. It will set back all the efforts of the Ministry of
Human Settlements to improve the quality of life especially in Metro Manila. It will make Metro
Manila, not the city of man as envisioned by its Governor but a city of commerce and industry.
Considering, therefore, that Resolution No, 2-1 was not enacted in the legitimate exercise of police
power, it cannot impair the restrictive covenants which go with the lands that were sold by the
plaintiff-appellant. I vote for the reversal of the appealed decision.
# Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in question is commercial. It would be worse if
the same were to be left as residential and all around are already commercial.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by Justice Guillermo S. Santos commends
itself for approval. I feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence, The observation, however,
in the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to my mind, for
further reflection as to the respect to which they are entitled whenever police power legislation,
whether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doing so, however, it may not be amiss to
consider further the effect of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.
1. Reference was made in the opinion of the Court to Philippine American Life Insurance Company
v. Auditor General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice Sanchez. A concurrence came from me. It
contained this qualification: "It cannot be said, without rendering nugatory the constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both the equal protection and due process clauses
which equally serve to protect property rights, that at the mere invocation of the police power, the
objection on non-impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in other cases where
governmental authority may trench upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment or
harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three leading United States Supreme Court decisions,
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 3 Nebbia v. New York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Co., 5 I stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an enactment of a
police power measure does not per se call for the overruling of objections based on either due
process or non-impairment based on either due process or non-impairment grounds. There must be
that balancing, or adjustment, or harmonization of the conflicting claims posed by an exercise of
state regulatory power on the one hand and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural or of
juridical persons, on the other. 'That is the only way by which the constitutional guarantees may
serve the high ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus effectively preclude ally
abusive exercise of governmental authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence stop there: "In the opinion of
the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief Justice Hughes, there was this understandable stress
on balancing or harmonizing, which is called for in litigations of this character: 'The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with
the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this
Court.' Also to the same effect: 'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot
be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the
reserved power in its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in harmony with each other. This
principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation
of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow
that conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with
the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the
reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community.' Further on, Chief Justice
Hughes likewise stated: 'It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a
growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding paragraph of my
concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. case: "If emphasis be therefore laid, as
this concurring opinion does, on the pressing and inescapable need for such an approach whenever
a possible collision between state authority and an assertion of constitutional right to property may
exist, it is not to depart from what sound constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then, perhaps much more so than in other disputes,
where there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary cannot escape what Holmes fitly
referred to as the sovereign prerogative of choice, the exercise of which might possibly be impugned
if there be no attempt, however slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the respective
claims of state regulatory power and constitutionally protected rights." 8
I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a departure therefrom in the able and
scholarly opinion of Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is a fundamental postulate
of our Constitution. The only point I would wish to add is that in the process of such balancing and
adjustment, the present Constitution, the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. decision having
been promulgated under the 1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that the claim to property rights based
on the non-impairment clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our present
fundamental law: "The State shall promote social Justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property,
and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9
2. Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by Hart and Sacks under the category of
"private directive arrangements. " 10 Through them people are enable to agree on how to order their
affairs. They could be utilized to govern their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their future
conduct. It is a well-known fact that the common law relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such covenants are an
important means of ordering one aspect of property relationships. Through them, there could be
delimitation of land use rights. It is quite understandable why the law should ordinarily accord them
deference, It does so, it has been said, both on grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there
are limits to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the extent that they ignore technological or
economic progress, they are not automatically entitled to judicial protection. Clearly, they must
"speak from one point of time to another." 11 The parties, like all mortal, do not have the power of
predicting the future with unfailing certainty. In cases therefore where societal welfare calls for police
power legislation, the parties adversely affected should realize that arrangements dealing with
property rights are not impressed with sanctity. That approach, in my view, was the guiding principle
of the opinion of the Court. f fence my full and entire concurrence.
ABAD SANTOS, J:, dissenting:
Although Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, is valid
until otherwise declared, I do not believe that its enactment was by virtue of the police power of that
municipality. I do not here dispute the concept of police power as stated in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80
Phil. 77 (1948) for as a matter of fact I accept it. And I agree also that it is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in PLDT vs. City of Davao, L-23080, Oct. 26,
1965, 15 SCRA 244. But Resolution No. 27, cannot be described as promotive of the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the
contrary, its effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quite of a residential section would by
the resolution be replaced by the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry. Where there
would be no industrial and noise pollution these bane of so-called progress would now pervade and
suffocate the environment to the detriment of the ecology. To characterize the ordinance as an
exercise of police power would be retrogressive. It will set back all the efforts of the Ministry of
Human Settlements to improve the quality of life especially in Metro Manila. It will make Metro
Manila, not the city of man as envisioned by its Governor but a city of commerce and industry.
Considering, therefore, that Resolution No, 2-1 was not enacted in the legitimate exercise of police
power, it cannot impair the restrictive covenants which go with the lands that were sold by the
plaintiff-appellant. I vote for the reversal of the appealed decision.
#Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, p. 110.
2 Id., pp. 4-5. Emphasis supplied.
3 Id pp. 111-112.
4 Id., p. 112.
5 Id., p. 80.
6 Id., p. 86.
7 Id., p. 94.
8 Id., pp. 11 2-113.
9 Id., pp. 60 and 113.
10 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, p. 2.

11 Id, p. 3.
12 Record on Appeal, pp. 113-114.
13 Id., p. 114.
14 Id., pp. 114-115.
15 Id., p. 114.
16 Id., p. 116.
17 Id., p.118.
18 Id., p. 117.
19 Id., p. 127.
20 Id., pp. 127-129.
21 Id., p. 130.
22 Ibid.
23 See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, pp. 30-31.
24 76 Phil. 563, 567 (1946).
25 Sec. 18, Rule 46, Revised Rules of Court; Tan Machan v. De la Trinidad 3 Phil.
684, (1946).
26 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 111, 1968 Ed., p. 648, citing Jones v.
Seymour, 95 Art. 593, 597, 130 S.W. 560.
27 Id., pp.638-649, cit Elliot on Appellate Procedure, 416-417.
28 Sumerariz, et al. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, et al., L-23764, Dec.
26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1374: San Miguel Brewery, et al. vs. Vda. de Joves. et al., L-
24258, June 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 1093, 1097. See also Tuason vs. Hon. Arca, et al.,
L- 24346, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1308, 1312.
29 Plaridel Surety and Ins. Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-21520, Dec.
11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1187.
30 Manila Port Service, et al vs, Court of Appeals, et al., L21890, March 29. 1968, 22
SCRA 1364.
31 Record on Appeal, p. 114.
32 Sec. 3 reads:
Sec. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and
municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils.
xxx xxx xxx
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in
municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the
City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may,
however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning. (Emphasis supplied).
33 Emphasis supplied.
34 The full text of Section 12 follows:
SEC. 12. Rules for the Interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act. —
1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be liberally

construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted infavor of the local
government and it shall be presumed to exist.
2. The general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of local

governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare and
material progress of the people in the community.
3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this arising

out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand
and third party on the other, should be governed by the original terms
and provisions of the same, and in no case would this act infringe
existing right.
35 Primicias vs. Fugoso 80 Phil, 77 (1948).
36 Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919), citing earlier authorities, Justice
Malcolm ponente.
37 Edu v. Ericta, L-3206, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 487, Justice Fernando, now Chief
Justice, speaking for the court.
38 See Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849, Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice,
also wrote the decision for the Court.
39 L-23080, Oct. 20, 1965, 15 SCRA 244, 247-248.
40 L-25035, Feb. 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 792, 797.
41 70 Phil. 726 (1940).

42 Id., P. 734; Emphasis supplied.
43 Id., p. 733, citing U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 (1915).
44 Id., p. 733.
45 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
46 Emphasis supplied.
47 Edu v. Ericta, supra, p. 489.
48 Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed., p. 558.
49 L-19255, January 18, 1968, 22 SCRA 135, citing Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisedell, 78 L. ed., 413, 428.
50 L-25389-90, June 27, 1968, 28 SCRA 1115, citing Manresa, Comm. Vol. 8, part 2
(5th Ed.) p. 535.
51 L-29203, July 26, 1971, 40 SCRA 75.
52 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 9-17.
53 Proctor & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of

Customs, L-24173, May 23, 1968, 23 SCRA 691.
54 170 NE 425, 428 Illinois (1930).
55 243 NW 356, 358-359 Iowa (1932).
56 Op. Cit at p. 427.
57 Id., Id.
58 Op. Cit. at p. 358.
1 L-19244, January 18, 1968, 22 SCRA 135.
2 Ibid, 148.
3 290 US 398 (1934).
* Justice Teehankee was co-counsel for defendant-appellee.
4 291 US 502 (1934).
5 294 US 240 (1935).
6 Ibid, 151-152.
7 Ibid., 152-153.
8 Ibid., 155.
9 Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution.
10 H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process, 124.
11 Ibid, 125.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs. DANTE O. GARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate
and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer,
who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for
parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following
statements were printed on the TVR:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC

OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM
DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION
THEREON. CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM
LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS.
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE

OF APPREHENSION.[1]
Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent addressed a
letter[2] to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers
license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint[3] with application for
preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on
12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and
regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the
validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.
The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and
impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he
suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation
of his license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the
TVR and the confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed
out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing,
collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which powers are
legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity
of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does
not preclude admixture of the three powers of government in administrative agencies. [4]
The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the
governing board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the
implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the courts attention to
MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin,
however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he
claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September
1995, extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license for twenty more
days. A preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the
MMDA was directed to return the respondents drivers license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision [5] in favor of the
herein respondent and held that:
a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council
held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an
opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without
DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction,
cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made

permanent; th(e) MMDA is directed to return to plaintiff his drivers license; th(e)
MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating drivers license without first
giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.
In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court
below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a
property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power
in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that
revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without due process
as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the
judiciary retains the power to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or
revocation of the license, the petitioner points out that under the terms of the confiscation,
the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication
Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly
passed in the presence of a quorum, and that the lower courts finding that it had not was
based on a misapprehension of facts, which the petitioner would have us review.
Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the
basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and
that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing
regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for
the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring
motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic
enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in cases of
traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the
date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or
vehicle plates.[7]
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin
the petitioner from confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent events have
overtaken the Courts need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and
academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail
confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioners
future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the
exercise of its police power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a
property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked
by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our
rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal[8] on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v.
Director of Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements,
and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao[11] on a legislative franchise to
operate an electric plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex.
Rel. Sullivan,[12] which states in part that, the legislative power to regulate travel over the
highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be
exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians.
Since motor vehicles are instruments of potential danger, their registration and the
licensing of their operators have been required almost from their first appearance. The
right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public
safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke
such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Funk,[13] to the effect that: Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use
of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways.
Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated
by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The
Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but
must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways.
One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as
here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles.
Such a general law is manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well
within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the
exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by
whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[14] we
categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power,
let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had the
authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued that there was
no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded
that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no
power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an
ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police
power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in
the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National
Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards
as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units
(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of
1991.[15] A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. [16] Local government units
are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units.
With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a
"special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide"
basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as
the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare"
of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
"development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector
for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative

functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority
over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without
diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning
purely local matters.
.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the
MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules
and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court
and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized
exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner
shall install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or
nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the
enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No.
4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the contrary notwithstanding, and that (f)or this purpose,
the Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local
government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental
organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and
requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or
those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in
this case), the petitioner is not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.[20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the
private sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a
statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,[21] and
is supported by the criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.[22]
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact
that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by
the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management,[23] and
we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-
snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the MMDAs
enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts
in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from
a legitimate source.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 10.

[2] Id., p. 11.
[3] Id., p. 1.
[4] Memorandum for Defendants, Records, pp. 178 -185.
[5] Id., pp. 187-190, penned by Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
[6] Records, pp. 197-225.
[7] Sec. 7, Mem. Circ. No. 04, Series of 2004.
[8] 56 Phil 123 (1931).
[9] G.R. No. L-24548, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 302.
[10] G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
[11] G.R. No. L-22766, 30 August 1968, 24 SCRA 898.
[12] 63 P. 2d 653, 108 ALR 1156, 1159.
[13] 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (108 ALR 1161).
[14] G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 836, penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.
[15] Sec. 16 of Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:
General Welfare.-Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the
development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
[16] Supra, Note 18, p. 844, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 95-
98 [1996], citing UP Law Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, Improvement of
Local Government Administration for Development Purpose, Journal of Local Administration
Overseas 135 [July 1962].
[17] Ibid., pp. 849-860.
[18] Entitled An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a Land
Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes, approved on 20 June 1964. Sec. 29 thereof
states:
Confiscation of drivers license.- Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by
the Commissioner shall, in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations
issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations, confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission therefore which shall
authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from
the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended,
and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from
the date of apprehension will cause suspension and revocation of his license. (emphasis supplied)
[19] Entitled Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Certain Powers Related to Traffic Management
and Control in Metropolitan Manila, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes, dated 21
November 1978.
SEC. 5.- In case of traffic violations, the drivers license shall not be confiscated but the
erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan
Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the
violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the
violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their
branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. (emphasis supplied)
[20] Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 7924.
[21] Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. dela Serna, (G.R. No. 82805, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA
524) we upheld the grant of concurrent jurisdiction between the Secretary of Labor or its Regional
Directors and the Labor Arbiters to pass upon money claims, among other cases, the provisions of
Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, as enunciated in Executive Order No. 111.
Holding that E.O. 111 was a curative law intended to widen workers access to the Government for
redress of grievances, we held,the Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction, [t]he
provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, it would have rendered such
a proviso - and the amendment itself - useless to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the
self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental that a statute is to be
read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. (See also Philtread Workers
Union v. Confessor, G.R. No. 117169, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 393.)
[22] In Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, (G.R. No. 60549, 26 October 1983, 125 SCRA 221) we upheld the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism
Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain municipalities in the province of Cebu as
tourist zones. The law granted the Philippine Tourism authority the right to expropriate 282 hectares
of land to establish a resort complex notwithstanding the claim that certificates of land transfer and
emancipation patents had already been issued to them thereby making the lands expropriated
within the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2, and that the agrarian
reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those
relating to the health and physical well-being of the people, and that property already taken for
public use may not be taken for another public use. We held that, (t)he petitioners have failed to
overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree whose avowed purpose
is the legislative perception of the public good. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.
All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will
not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56). And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to rebut the presumption of validity, the
presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v. Mutuc,
22 SCRA 424).
In the same manner, we upheld in Dumlao v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January
1980, 95 SCRA 392) the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that
any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement
benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected is disqualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. Invoking the need for the emergence of younger blood in local politics, we affirmed that
the constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class. (See also Tropical Homes, Inc, v. National Housing Authority, G.R.
No. L-48672, 31 July 1987 152 SCRA 540; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47791, 11 March
1978, 82 SCRA 55; People v. Vera, GR No. 45685, 65 Phil 56 [1937].)
[23] Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 7924.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994

EVELIO B. JAVIER, RIZAL G. PAGTANAC, JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., SILVESTRE E.

Silvestre E. Untaran for himself and for petitioners.

Alfonso V. Combong, Jr. for petitioners.

Florentini M. Pesayco for private respondents.

This is however no longer an easy matter. In the first place, it is doubtful if

1 Presided by Judge Celso L. Magsino.

3 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez and concurred in by Associate

5 Resolution of September 29, 1982; Rollo, p. 437.

7 Private Respondents’ Comment on the Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 258.

9 National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service

10 185 SCRA 656, 22 May 1990.

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597

PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative

On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a

Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to

However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC

In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents

(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the

In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in

(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional

(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054

On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of

The petitions raise the following issues:

I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(B) On the merits

The Ruling of the Court

On the Preliminary Matters

The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation

There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as

On the Main Issues

Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it

Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power

SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or

Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous

On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM

To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow

The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan,

Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative

However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,

and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose

The contention has no merit.

The Constitution ordains:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress

Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district

Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of

(2) The proportional representation in the House