Music Analysis and Music Perception

Author(s): Ian Cross

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Music Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Mar., 1998), pp. 3-20
Published by: Wiley-Blackwell
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/854368 .
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IAN CROSS

MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION

Introduction
In his articleon analysisin TheNew Grove,Ian Bent assertsthat'Underlyingall
aspectsof analysisas an activityis the fundamentalpoint of contact between
mind and musicalsound, namely,musicalperception'(Bent 1980, p. 341). If
this assertionis accepted (and it does seem fairlyplausible),it appearsthat
considerationof the natureof musicalperceptionshouldbe of centralconcern
to the music-analyticcommunity.However,it seems that only a smallnumber
of analystshave devotedmuch attentionto perceptualissues, most analytical
and theoreticalliteratureyieldingonly infrequentand ratherdiversereferences
to such topics. Nevertheless,the referencesthat do exist enable somethingto
be inferredabout the notion of musicalperceptionas it may appearfrom the
standpointof the majorityof analysts.
A common set of assumptionsor beliefs seems to run throughstatements
such as:
[i] Onlythe recognitionof an a prioridecisionto hearcertainpatternsin a piece
can accountfor the sense of directednessand culminationwhen those pat-
terns areactuallyheard.(Smith1981, p. 157)
[ii] Weshouldtry to heara twelve-tonepiece, then, not only in itselfbllt also in
referenceto its basic set and to the operationsof the twelve-tonesystem.
(Hyde 1993, p. 63)
[iii] The whole questionof deciding'whatone hears'is problematical. ARerall,I
can 'hear'the most preposterousanalyticalrelationshipsif I choose to; it is a
questionof decidingwhatI wantto hear.(Cook 1987a, p. 57)
The commonality here is the idea of musical perception as something that
is essentially conscious and volitional, indeed, more or less untrammelled by
anything other than acts of individual will guided by analytical insight.
Referring back to the quotation that opens this article, I should now admit
that it was presented in incomplete form. In full, it reads:
Underlyingall aspectsof analysisas an activityis the fundamentalpoint of
contactbetweenmind and musicalsound,namely,musicalpercepiion(see
PSYCHOLOGY OFMUSIC).
In other words, the implication is that to provide an adequate account of musi-
cal perception, reference must necessarily be made to the empirical and scien-

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4 IAN CROSS

tific findingsof the psychologyof music.This immediatelyposes the question

of whetherperceptionas I haveconstruedit to be conceivedby manyanalysts
squareswith perceptionas characterisedwithinthe psychologyof music.The
simple answeris that the two accounts are fundamentallyincompatible;far
fromperceptionbeing consciousand volitional,the findingsof the psychology
of music appearto indicatethat perceptionof aspects of music can be, and
often is, more or less involuntaryor 'reflexive',and that it necessarilyinvolves
non-consciousprocesses.
What can account for this mismatch?It could be (as Cook (1994) argues)
that perceptionas studiedwithinmusicpsychologyis in fact musicological per-
ception- that the empiricalstudyof the psychologyof music is predicatedon
simple music-theoreticnotions to an extent that underminesits capacityto
explainmusicalperception.There are at least two reasonsfor disputingthis
view.While Cook'scriticismof 'theorism'(an a priorirelianceon music-theo-
reticconceptsas constitutingor correspondingdirectlyto cognitivecategories
and concepts)maybe levelledat specificstudiesof music cognition,it is not a
chargethat can be levelledagainstall studiesof music cognitionde natura.At
the very least,in providinga frameworkfor discourseabout musicalphenom-
ena, musictheoryhas an instrumentalutilityfor studiesof music cognitionin
that it may serve as a basis for initialhypothesesabout categoriesof musical
experiencethat are themselvesopen to empiricalevaluation.Moreover,it can
scarcelybe arguedthatthose manyexperimentalstudiesthatemploymusically
untrainedlistenersas subjects,and requirethem to makejudgmentsthat do
not relyon anyovertuse by them of music-theoreticconceptsor labelsin their
responses,fall into the errorthat Cook condemns.One can instancestudies,
such as those by Slobodaand Parker(1985) and by Ouraand Hatano(1988),
which examinedthe natureof recallmemoryfor short pieces of music simply
by requiringboth musicallyexperiencedand inexperiencedsubjectswho had
heardthe piece to sing or hum it; in addition,a numberof recentstudies,such
as that by Deliege, Melen, Stammersand Cross (1996), have examinedthe
capacitiesand strategiesused by both musicallyexperiencedand inexperienced
subjectsin musicalconstructiontasksemployingpurelyauditorymaterials.

A 'folk psychology' of music

One mightseekto sidestepthis issueby questioningwhetherthe music-analytic
idea of perceptionharmoniseswithperceptionas understoodwithinthe broad-
er domainof cognitivepsychology.But againthe mismatchpersists:the idea of
perceptionas involvinginvoluntaryand non-consciousprocessesis common
to virtuallyall psychologicaldomains.Nevertheless,the music-analyticaccount
of perceptionfails to squarewith the cognitive-scientificaccountin a waythat
is at least definablefrom the perspectiveof cognitivescience.The 'analytical

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 MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION 5

idea'of perceptioncan be thoughtof as a partial'folkpsychology'of music, or

of music analysis,by analogywith the distinctionbetweencognitive-scientific
accountsof quotidianbehaviourand common-senseaccountsof everydaylife.
A 'folkpsychology'is, in JeromeBruner'swords (1990, p. 35), 'a set of more-
or-lessnormativedescriptionsabouthow humanbeings "tick",what our own
and otherminds are like, what one can expect situatedactionto be like, what
are possible modes of life, how one commits oneself to them'. In this 'folk
psychology'of music analysis,the act of perceptionis subject to purposive
volitionalintervention,and categoriesof experience- qualia - mayin the light
of the analyst'senquiriesbe consciouslyshapedand re-made(for the analyst,
at least).
But if this is a folk psychology,it is being employedwithina very restricted
domain, very far away from that of everydaylife. Accordingto Bruner,we
'learnsuch a folkpsychologyearly,learnit as we learnto use the verylanguage
we acquire,and as we learnto conductthe interpersonaltransactionsrequired
in communallife'.The music analysts'folk psychology,however,is being used
to articulateand imparthighlyparticularinsightswithin a communityof ex-
perts.There are a numberof possiblegroundsfor objectingto such a usage.
The apparentlyunexaminednatureof such a vernacularaccount of the pro-
cesses of perception sits ill with the detailed and deeply contextualised
specificitythat characterisesthe act of music analysis.Moreover,while the
employmentof an analytical'folk psychology'in discussingthe experienceof
complex musical phenomenamay well adequatelycharacterisethe analyst's
listeningprocesses,the fact that these complex musicalphenomenaare un-
likely to be present in the consciousnessesof ordinarylisteners- who may
neverthelessenjoy music - makes it difficultto relate the findings of music
analysisto the musicalexperiencesof the 'averagelyeducated'but musically
untrainedlistener(exceptthat one mightsimplyassertthat the perceptionsof
music analystsand the perceptionsof such untrainedlistenerswill be differ-
ent). Furtherto this last point, some of the empiricalfindings of cognitive
science in respectof musicalperceptionseem to indicatethat little qualitative
difference may exist between the perceptionsof musically untrained,and
highlymusicallyeducated,listeners(see, for example,Bigand'sstudy (1993),
in which musicallytrainedand untrainedlistenersare shown to exhibit re-
markablysimilarsensitivitiesto globaltonal-harmonicstructurein the course
of listeningto melodies).
So, if this 'folk psychology'of musical perceptionis partial,unexamined,
and potentiallyin conflictwith the findingsof'scientific'psychology,perhaps
Bent's suggestionshould be heeded, and the psychologyof music should be
employed to underpin the structuresand methods of analysis.Perhaps,as
Erickson(1982) appearsto suggest, music analysismight even come to be
recognisedas a sub-domainof the studyof musicalcognition.

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6 IAN CROSS

I wouldimaginethat such a view,involvingwhat Cook (1987a, p. 223) calls

'the deletion of the listeneras a free agent', would find little favourwithin
the music-analyticcommunity.Moreover,the hermeneuticand criticaldimen-
sions to music analysisthat Cook and otherssuch asTreitler(1980),Tomlin-
son (1984) and Kerman (1985) have insisted upon, would seem to render
it immune from contaminationby 'postivistic'or 'reductionist'cognitive-
scientific explicationby locating music analysisfirmly in the 'mythopoeic'
culturaldomain.But such a defenceappearsuntenablein the light of contem-
poraryviews of scientificenquiry,which stressthat it cannotbe definedsolely
in termsof the 'positivism'previouslyheld to differentiateit fromothermodes
of investigation,and are disposed to view its conduct as the result of the
'situated-ness'of that positivismwithin more generalframeworksof thought
and behaviour(see Brown 1977). Feyerabend(1981, p. 7) suggeststhat the
distinction between hermeneutic methods of explication (which he terms
'historical traditions') and scientific accounts (which he terms 'abstract
traditions')is, in fact, illusory;he proposesthat
abstract [i.e. scientific] traditions are not alternatives of historical traditions;
they are special parts of them. The structures they contain, the abstract no-
tions that enter these structures, can be learned, understood, adapted to new
cases only because they form parts of an underlying historical medium that
supports them, gives them meaning and shows how they can be applied.

Even those such as Lakatos(see, for example,Lakatos 1970) who have no

truckwith the 'conventionalist'notion of science seeminglyimplicitin Feyer-
abend'sstatement,would still accordscientificactivitya historicaldimension
thatties it to the time and culturewithinwhichit is conducted.
Thus the 'culturallysituatedness'of music analysisprovides no defence
againstscientificimperialism,and suppliesno compellingreasonsthat would
preventsciencefromplayingsome rolein music-analyticendeavour.Whileit is
difficultto sustainan argumentfor the subsumptionof music analysisinto the
study of music cognition,it does seem plausibleto arguethat music analysis
should at least be underpinnedby scientificaccountsof perception,replacing
analytical 'folk psychological'views of perception with theories that are
grounded in cognitive science if these can be shown to be more accurate,
more generalisable,and more fruitful.Indeed,the term 'folkpsychology'was
broughtinto common currencyby cognitivescientistssuch as Stich (1983)
and Churchland(1984) who wishedto characterisethe 'everydayconceptual
schemes for accountingfor our own actions in terms of beliefs, desires,etc.'
(Greenwood,1991, p.7), whichwouldbe explainedawayand replacedby the
findingsof cognitivescience. In order to test the propositionthat analytical
'folkpsychology'shouldbe replaced by cognitivescience,it seems appropriate
to reviewthe two most highlydevelopedanalyticalmethodsthatpurportto be

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 MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION 7

based on cognitivepremises,namelythose of Lerdahland Jackendoff,and of

Narmour.These methodswill be discussedin the context of brief analysesof
the firstfourbarsof the second movementof Mozart'sPiano SonataK. 31 1.

Lers1ahl and Jackendoff- a generative theory

At first sight, Lerdahland Jackendoff'stheory (1983), which is intended to
'accountfor the musicalintuitionsof a listenerexperiencedin a given idiom',
appearsto be an amalgamationof psycholinguisticand Schenkeriantheory.
It seeks to elucidatea numberof perceptualcharacteristicsof tonal music -
segmentation,periodicity,differentialdegreesof importancebeing accorded
to the componentsof a musicalpassageor work,the ebb and flow of tension
and relaxationas a work unfolds - by employingfour more or less distinct
analyticallevels,eachwith its own moreor less formalanalyticalprinciples,or
productionrules.These productionrules, or Well-Formednessrules, specify
which analyticalstructuresmay be formed in each of the four analytical
domains- which analyticalstructuresare possible- on the basis of a given
musicalscore. Each domain also has a set of PreferenceRules, which select
betweenthe possibleanalyticalstructuresso as to achievea single 'preferred'
analysiswithineach domain.
The four domains- Metrical,Grouping,Time-Spanand Prolongational-
are conceivedas partiallyinterdependentand at the same time as modelling
differentaspects of a listener'smusicalintuitions.Thus structurewithin the
domainof Groupingis largelypredicatedon eventsat the level of the musical
surface,the Metricaldomainis basedon principlesof binaryandternaryhier-
archy (though strictly limited in terms of the levels to which the hierarchy
mightextend),theTime-Spandomainis predicatedpartiallyon the Grouping
and Metrical structuresbut also partiallyon principles of tonal-harmonic
referentiality,while the Prolongationaldomainis based largelyon the dynam-
ics of tonal-harmonicrelations and partiallyon the Time-Span structure.
Hence the Groupingand Metricaldomainsare largelyderivedfromthe musi-
cal surface,theirWell-Formednessrules ostensiblymodellingthe principles
that mightapplyin the 'raw'perceptionof immediaterelationsbetweenmusi-
cal events, while the Time-Span and Prolongationaldomains,though taking
the productsof the othertwo domainsinto account,aremodellingthe applica-
tion of stylistic and 'musico-semantic'knowledgethat occurs as part of the
perceptualcycle.
The applicationof theirtheoryto the firstfourbarsof the second movement
of Mozart'sK. 311 seems uncomplicated.The Metricalanalysis,shownin the
dots below the piece in Fig. 1(a), appearsself-evident,derivingfrom Well-
FormednessRules such as those statingthat 'Everyattackpoint must be asso-
ciated with a beat at the smallestmetricallevel present at that point in the

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8 CROSS
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Fig.1 Mozart, Piano Sonata K. 311, second movement,bars 1-4: analysisafter

the manner of Lerdahland Jackendoff(1983)
(a) Metrical analysis,GroupingstructureandTime-Span analysis

+#i5

* -
* * *

* -

(b) Prolongationalanalysis

Strong
prolongations
Weak o<

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 MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION 9

piece' (although the lowest, semiquaver,level is not shown in the figure),

'At each metricallevel,strongbeatsarespacedeithertwo or threebeats apart',
etc. These Well-Formednessrules are supplementedby Preferencerules that
suggest preferenceshould be given to, for example, 'metricalstructuresin
which the strongestbeat in a group appearsrelativelyearly in the group',
'metricalstructuresin whichstrongbeatscoincidewith pitch events',etc.
The Grouping structure,shown in the bracketsabove the score in Fig.
l(a), appearssimilarlyself-evident,being based on seeminglytruisticWell-
Formednessrules such as 'A piece constitutesa group','If a groupcontainsa
smallergroupit must containall of thatsmallergroup'(thusensuringa strictly
nestedhierarchy),etc. Preferencerulesherespecifysuchmattersas the criteria
for determininggroupboundaries(whichshouldoccurat pointsof disjunction
in the domains of pitch and time), conditionsfor inferringrepetitionin the
Groupingstructure,etc.Thus a groupboundaryis formedbetweenthe end of
bar2 andthe beginningof bar3 both in orderto ensurethe symmetricalsubdi-
visionof the firstfourbars(themselvesspecifiableas a groupin partbecauseof
the repetitionof the openingof bar 1 in bar 5) and becausethe pitch disjunc-
tion occurringbetween the G and the C is the largestpitch intervalthat has
occurredin the uppervoice of the piece up to that moment.Perhapsthe only
point of interestin the Groupinganalysisis the boundarybetween the third
quaverof bar 3 and the last semiquaverof thatbar,broughtaboutby the tem-
poralintervalbetweenthe two events (again,the largestsuch intervalthat has
occurredin the piece up to that moment). Here, the Groupingstructureand
the Metricalstructureare not congruent,pointingup a moment of tension at
the level of the musical surfacethat is only resolvedby the start of the next
groupat bar 5.
The Time-Span analysis,shown as a tree-structureabovethe score in Fig.
1(a), is intendedto depict the relativesalienceor importanceof eventswithin
and across groups.The Groupingstructureserves as the substratefor the
Time-Span analysis,the Well-Formednessrules in this domainbeing largely
concernedwith formalisingthe relationsbetween Groups and Time-Spans.
The Preferencerules suggest that metricallyand harmonicallystable events
shouldbe selected as the 'heads'of Time-Spans,employmentof these criteria
resulting in the straightforwardstructureshown in the figure.This shows
clearlythe shiftin metricalpositionof the most significanteventin each Group
orTime-Span,from downbeatin bar 1 to upbeatcrotchetin bars 2 and 3 to
upbeatquaverin bar 4.
A similarstructureis evidentin the Prolongationalanalysis,shown in Fig.
1(b), which illustratesthe building-upand releaseof tension as a tonal piece
unfolds. The Prolongationalanalysis derives in part from the Time-Span
analysis,but is primarilypredicatedon harmonicrelations,which the Well-
Formedness and Preferencerules specify as either prolongations(tension-

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10 IAN CROSS

producingor maintaining)or progressions(tension-releasing). The Prolong-

ational analysis that results for this passage appears to emphasise those
featuresand structuresthat might result from a Schenkeriananalysisof the
passage (see, for example,that by Salzer, 1962), betrayingperhapssome of
the parentageof the theory.
Lerdahland Jackendoff'stheoryis a competencetheoryin the strongsense
of the word, that is, a theory that is intendedto make explicitthe rules and
processesthat underliea listener'sexperienceof tonal musicalworks.As such
the theoryexhibitsseverallacunae,some of whichthe authorsthemselvesac-
knowledgewhile othershavebeen identifiedby reviewersof theirwork,nota-
bly by Peel and Slawson(1984), Rosner(1984) and Clarke(1986). Amongthe
lacunaethatLerdahlandJackendoffhavethemselvesidentifiedand addressed
(separately)in subsequentworkare those concernedwith the theory'slack of
a detailed,formal account of tonal-harmonicrelationsand its neglect of the
temporalityof musicalexperience.Lerdahl(1988) outlinesa theoryof tonal-
harmonicpitch relationswhichhas muchin commonwith the harmony-space
proposedby Krumhansl(1990) - itself relatedto Schoenberg's'chartsof key
regions'(1954/1969) - and developsthis furtherin the context of an analysis
of the beginningof Mozart'sSonataK.282 (Lerdahl1996).
Jackendoffhas been more concernedwith describingthe natureof ongoing
musicalexperience.In Jackendoff(1987) he examinesthe natureof musical
experiencein time, in the contextof the developmentof a theoryof conscious-
ness that privilegeswhathe callsthe 'phonological'level (thatlevelof cognitive
representationthatis directlytied to the 'surface'of stimuli),with only indirect
linksto schematicrepresentationsof more complexstructures(such as tonal-
harmonicrelations,semantic networks,etc.). In Jackendoff(1991) he pro-
poses a parallel, multiple-analysismodel of musical parsing which relies
stronglyon multiplenon-consciouslyaccessibleparsingmechanismsof which
only the selectiveand integratedoutput is availablein the form of conscious
experience.Jackendoffdoes no more than sketch out his parallelmultiple-
analysisparsingmodel;it constitutesan untestedand preliminarydescription
of the experienceof music in time. Moreover,neitherLerdahlnor Jackendoff
havesoughtto extendtheirtheoriesso as to providean accountof the experi-
ence of truly contrapuntalmusicaltextures.Nevertheless,until recently,their
theory constitutedthe only comprehensiveattemptto relate currentunder-
standingsof musicperceptionto musicanalysis.

Narmour- cognidon and snalysis

EugeneNarmour(1990, 1992) has now providedan even more comprehen-
sive theorythat takesas its premisethe need to accountfor the experienceof
musicin time and does so by focusingspecificallyon the perceptionof melodic

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 MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION ll

line. Narmour'stheory appearsto be more formaland explicitthan Lerdahl

and Jackendoff's;he differentiatesfar more sharplythan they do, however,
between the analyticalconsequencesof style-dependentfactors and those of
the operationof 'cognitiveprimitives',and the formalnature(if not the explic-
itness) of his theoryis mostly to be found in the latterdomain.He conceives
of these cognitiveprimitives- which are intendedto reflectthe operationof
biologically'hard-wired,innate'cognitiveprinciples(afterFodor 1983), and
whoseoperationis largelyderivedfromGestaltthinking- as the maindetermi-
nantsof musicalstructurein cognition.His theorystartsby close examination
of note-to-note relations,which he typologises accordingto the degree to
whichthese relationsare similaror different,and hence anticipatableor unex-
pected.The structuresthat his theorydescribesare thus intendedto map the
unfolding of the musical surface in the course of the listening experience.
Narmour is much more overtlyawareof the difficultyof characterisingthe
listener than Lerdahland Jackendoffappearto be; althoughhis theory can
againbe describedas a competencetheory,it is constructedmodularlyso as to
be ostensiblycapableof mirroringthe differencesbetweenlistenerswith differ-
ent degreesof stylisticknowledge.He nonethelessconceivesof the primitives
of his theoryas functioningevenin the absenceof anysuch knowledge.
Whileit is impossibleto give even a sketchyaccountof Narmour'scomplex
theoryhere, I shall try to provideat least a flavourof it. Veryapproximately,
relationswithinpairsof consecutiveintervalscan be classifiedas exemplifying
eitherProcess(if they aresimilar)or Reversal(if they aredifferent),with small
intervalsgivingrise to implicationsof continuation,or process,and largeinter-
vals givingrise to implicationsof reversal,or differentiation.Similarityor dif-
ferencecan be found both in the domainof intervalsize and in the domainof
registraldirection(ascentversus descent).Questionsof similarityor difference
are determinedby the applicationof quantitativemeasures(Narmour's'syn-
tactic scales'), so that, for example,two consecutiveintervalsthat differby a
majorthirdor greaterare adjudgeddifferent,althoughthe definitionof differ-
ence that Narmouremploysis sensitiveto context (e.g., when registraldirec-
tion is reversedin a pair of consecutiveintervals,they are adjudgeddifferent
when they differby a minor thirdor greater).
These basic termsprovidemeansof classifyinggroupsof consecutivenotes,
so an ascendingpassagesuch as c'-d'-e'-f' would constitutea Process (sym-
bolisedas P), an ascending-descendingfragmentgoingfroma largeintervalto
a small one such as c'-g'-f' would constitutea Reversal(R), a figuresuch as
c'-e'-c' would constitutean IntervallicDuplication(ID), etc. More complex
typesof classificationarisewhenthe implicationsof the initialintervalarecon-
trovertedby its successor:an ascending-descendingfragmentsuch as c'-d'-b
would constitute an IntervallicProcess (IP), while an ascending-descending
figuresuch as b-f,"'-gwould constitutea RegistralReversal(VR), etc.

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12

be broughtto bearon
Rhythmic,metrical,harmonicand stylisticfactorscan
so as to suppresseither
theseclassificationsof consecutiveintervalstructures qualitiesthat
the'non-closural'(implicative)orthe 'closural'(non-implicative) musicalsurface
patterns may bear,thus leadingto patternsat the level of the
being sepa-
combining or chainingwith their predecessorsand successorsor are
or combined patterns
rated fromthem.Theterminalelementsof individual theory
Narmour's
deemedto functionat a higherhierarchicallevel, enablingbasisto constructa
that
todepictrelationsbetweennon-adjacentnotes and on
representation of musical ongoingness. It shouldbe noted that
multi-levelled
Narmour'stheory;it is
theconstrualof patternis not alwaysprospectivein the identityof a pat-
possiblefor local contextualambiguityto operateso that
analyticalnotation by
ternemerges only retrospectively(representedin his
patterns).
placingin parenthesesthe symbolsfor such retrospective (slightlyadapted
Bearingall this in mind, let us turn to Narmour's analysis
of K. 311. Letters
here,Fig. 2) of the firstfour bars of the second movement involved,while
patterns
(IP,P, etc.) withinthe 'grouping'bracketsidentifythe the influenceof
above the top system indicate
the(b)'s and (d)'s in parentheses arethe separate
metreand durationrespectively.Most notableat first,perhaps, that scale-step
voice, and the fact
andindependentanalysesprovidedfor each
regardedas a variable
functionis not privilegedwithin the analysis (being 'transformation'of
stylisticfactor).The three systems show the progressive that the steps in-
noted
pitchesto higherhierarchicallevels, and it shouldbe
neatly nested hierarchy of the sort that Lerdahland
volveddo not producea
arise from the fact that
Jackendoff'stheory provides.This could be said to of factors that
Narmour's'single-domain'analysis conflates the operation
Jackendoff'stheory.
wouldfunctionin independentdomainsin Lerdahland
analyses is Narmour'somis-
A majorpoint of divergencebetween the two
the highest level.The
sion of any event within the last beat of bar two from - are subsumedinto
melodicsemiquaversB and G- both possiblecandidates Reversal'chain,
Registral
the 'IntervallicDuplication-Process-Retrospective
pattern element and henceboth remainingat
neitherfunctioningas a terminal
one tiny addition:I have
the lowestlevel.Narmour'sanalysishas here suffered B of bar two to
added the letters 'fm' in parenthesesabove the semiquaver but not actually
indicate something permitted within Narmour's theory that a note may act
present in his analysisof this passage- the possibility portenda trans-
that is, may
'formationally'as opposedto 'transformationally', this.
achieve
formationto a higherhierarchicallevelbut not in fact
Narmour'sanalysisthus construes the passage not as a progressionfrom
has it) but as a I-IV-V
tonic to dominant (as the analysisby Salzer (1962) takesto be archetyp-
structure.As he states:'Salzer'sanalysis[whichNarmour and confirmation
allySchenkerian]showsthe phrase as one more instantiation
of tonality,whereasthe implication-realization model shows it as an example

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 MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION 13

Fig. 2 Mozart,PianoSonataK. 311, secondmovement,bars1-4: analysisafter

the mannerof Narmour(1990, 1992)
¢ 1992 by The Universityof Chicago.Reprintedfrom Example10.5 of EugeneNarmour, TheAnalysis
and CognitionofMelodicComplexity(1992) by permissionof the Universityof ChicagoPress.

(b) (d) (d) (b) (b)

r EP* | p | IDP(VR) | (VR)n
rlP7Pn r271PTIDn
(fm)

1 Pl j *4Pn p¢45 l

"r Lr lLrr LF F r :

I IP | 3 1 IRyR) I
yR) * I (h, m)

(xs) ID

4 la b* ai
31 P " | 5 1

3 | P ! 2 1
R :
5 1 .
ID * n

wheremelodic, metric and durationalweakeningof prolongationof the tonic

occurs' (Narmour1992, p. 221). In point of fact, the terminallevel of Nar-
mour'sanalysisis not so differentfrom the Prolongationalstructurederived
fromthe applicationof LerdahlandJackendoff'stheory(withthe exceptionof
theirtheory'spostulationof a weaktonic prolongationin bartwo).

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14 IAN CROSS

FoLkpsychology versus sciendfic psychology

Havingbrieflyreviewedthe operationof these two theories,we are in a better
positionto judgewhetherthe ostensiblereplacementof a music-analytic'folk
psychology'by specificand scientificaccountsof perceptionhas conferredany
advantages.Consideredfromthe analyticalperspective,the resultis debatable.
Both theories are explicit about the bases for their analyticaldecisions, and
can account for aspects of structurethat do not seem quite so coherently
articulablewithin more 'conventional'approaches.Againstthis, both theories
may appear crude in the accounts that they provide of tonal-harmonic
relationsor of the complexitiesof musical texture, in part because of that
very explicitness;even Lerdahl'sdevelopmentof a sophisticatedand formal
theory of tonal-harmonicrelationscan be criticisedon the groundsthat its
'ahistorical'account of harmonyrendersit unsuitablefor sensitiveanalytical
application(a criticismthat Cook (1987b) makes of the very similarmodel
proposed by Krumhansl).Moreover,the whole approachto analysis that
these theoriesexemplifyis itself likelyto seem unacceptableto manyanalysts.
As Cumming(1992) suggestsin her reviewof Narmour'ssecond book, cog-
nitivelybased approachesappearto replacethe 'listeningI' with the 'cognising
brain',almost'factoringout' the analystas an agentin the act of analysis.A1-
thoughNarmour,in particular,is explicitaboutleavingspacefor the exercise
of analyticaljudgment,it can seem that such cognitivelybased theories offer
whatNagel (1986) calls'viewsfromnowhere'.
Fromthe analyticalperspectivethe verdicton the successof these two theo-
ries seems at best 'not proven'.Perhapsthatperspectiveis not the most appro-
priatefromwhichto judgethe meritsor otherwiseof thesetheories;it mightbe
more relevantto considerthem as instances of the applicationof cognitive
science to music that are intendedto explainthe listeningexperiencerather
than as analyticalmethods first and foremost.However,even from this per-
spectivethe achievementsof both theoriescan be disputedon the groundsthat
what they arebased on arenot 'veridical'accountsof the experienceof listen-
ing to music, but more or less formaltheoriesabout that experiencethat are
themselvespredicatedon contestableviewsaboutthe natureof perceptionand
need to be empiricallytested (as Clarke (1989) has suggested in respect
of Lerdahland Jackendoff).Their explicitnessis perhapsthe most positive
feature of the theories from the viewpoint of cognitive science. What they
provideare not so much fully-formedsystemsthat facilitatethe processesof
analysisby groundingthese in accurateaccountsof perception,but arraysof
questions- fairlyexplicithypothesesaboutthe elementsof musicalperception
andhow these mightimpingeon the processesof analysis- thatlaythemselves
open to experimentalinvestigationand perhapsrefutation.Indeed,Narmour's
theory has been extensivelyempiricallytested by Schellenberg(1996), who

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 ANDMUSICPERCEPTION
MUSICANALYSIS 15

finds that a simplifiedversionof Narmour'stheoryprovidesa betterfit to his

results.
While the judgmentfrom cognitivescience is more positive,it too appears
inconclusive.Clues as to why this mightbe the case can be derivedfrom as-
pects of both theorieswhich,whilenot overtlyevidentin the analysesthatthey
propose, neverthelessstronglyinfluence featuresof those analyses.In Nar-
mour'stheory, a strict differentiationis drawnbetween those aspects of the
listeningprocess that are governedby 'inescapable',biologicallyhard-wired,
innateperceptualprocesses,and those that are subjectto culturalfactors- to
knowledgeof, or simpleexposureto, particularstyles.Thebasisfor this differ-
entiationwould seem to be a sort of'biological determinism',wherebythe
'facts'of perceptioncan be explainedin terms of, and reducedto, an account
of the facts of neurophysiology.On this reading,only the workingsof hard-
wiredand innateperceptualprocesseswouldbe amenableto scientificinvesti-
gation,thatmode of enquirybeingunableto accountfor culturallydetermined
characteristicsof perception.Whilethe samebiologicaldeterminismis not evi-
dent in LerdahlandJackendoff'stheory,theirtheoryin manyplacesaspiresto
a levelof generality- for instance,in postulatingthatthe majorityof theirWell-
Formednessand Preferenceruleshaveuniversalapplicability-that is difficult
to reconcilewith the idea of science- particularlycognitivescience- as cultur-
ally situated (see also Clarke1986). Both of these positionsare at odds with
the rationaleadducedabovefor science havingsome explanatorypowerin re-
spect of hermeneuticactivities,the idea that science is itself a 'specialpart'of
the historicaltraditionthat enfoldsand derivesfromculture.
This contradictioncan be resolvedby jettisoningthe biologicaldetermin-
ism, and the claims to universalapplicability,in the light of the idea that
the functioningand structureof cognitionare determinedat least as much by
culture as by biology, and, acceptingthat postulate,that any claims for the
universalityof cognitive-scientifictheories of music must be circumscribed.
Whilemanywritershavesoughtto accountfor mind in terms of neurobiology
- or rather,in termsof computationaltheoriesof neuralstructureand function
(see, for example, Churchland1986) - some recent theories have proposed
that while biology is an evident constraint,the primarydeterminantof the
natureof cognitionis culture.Bruner(1990, p. 20) states that 'the biological
substrate... is not a cause of action but, at most, a constraintupon it or a
conditionfor it', and goes on to suggestthat:
It is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, that
gives meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an
interpretive system. It does this by imposing the patterns inherent in the
culture's symbolic systems - its language and discourse modes, the forms of
logical and narrative explication, and patterns of mutually dependent com-
munal life. (Bruner 1990, p. 34)

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 IAN CROSS
16

In the domainof music and of musicalperception,the

culturalforces is borne out by those few cross-culturaldeterminantpowerof
studiesthat havebeen
conducted (for example,Castellano,Bharuchaand
1991;Stobartand Cross 1994).These indicatethatthe Krumhansl 1984; Arom
the experienceof musicwithina given culturearelikely nature of music and of
to be determinedpri-
marilyby factorsspecificto the dynamicsof that culture
while remainingcon-
strainedby generalcognitiveprinciples.
Thus the uniformitarianprinciplethat would enable
theoriesof musicalperceptionto be postulatedcannot universallyapplicable
that postulate of uniformitarianism confidentlybe upheld,
- that past events can only be
in terms of presentlyacting and observablecauses - explained
most fundamentaltenets of science and perhapsthe constituting one of the
one that confers most
explanatorypower.And if Bruneris evenhalf-waycorrect,and
mind is formed
primarilyin the matrixof culture,neitherwill biological
provideus with generalisableand immutabletheoriesof determinism sufficeto
So the issue of whethera scientificaccountof music musical perception.
theanalyticalfolkpsychologyof musicperception perceptioncan replace
remainsunresolved,though
nowopen to question.It is perhapsmore relevantto
enquirewhethera scien-
tificaccountof musicalperceptionshould replacea folkpsychologicalaccount.
Whenthe questionis redirectedin thisway,the answer
it should not; just as there are no compellingreasons wouldappearto be that
for
rolein the elucidationof hermeneuticactivity,it seems science not to play a
that thereare no com-
pellingreasonsto expectcognitivescientificaccountsas
toreplace elementsof analyticalor hermeneutic currentlyunderstood
accounts.It seems more feasi-
bleto expect that the cognitivescience of music
should seek to
analytical 'folkpsychology'of musicalperceptionratherthanto explain the
After all, the analysts''folk psychology'might accurately replace it.
reflect their own
perceptionsand intuitions;alternatively,its use might simply
mostappropriatestrategyfor an analystto adopt in constitute the
order'empathically'
confrontthe objectof the analysisor even the act of analysis. to
a'folk psychology'of musical perceptionbelongs It could be that
in the same category as
theother interpretativetools that the analystchooses
to
withthe music.This is not to suggestthat the entire employin engaging
arrayof tools is fictive,
butsimplythat theirefficacycannotnecessarilybe
assessedby the same crite-
riaas might be used to assess the adequacyof a
scientificmethod; despite
thesituatednessof science within culture, its focus
on general causes and
generalisable proceduresis aimedat providinga level of replicabilityand
dictivepower that differentiatesits proceduresfrom those pre-
of the individual
analyticalact.
Nothing in the foregoingis intendedas an argumentagainst
science in respectof music perception.Indeed,there areefficacyof
any
cognitive
music perceptionthatappearimperviousto all but cognitive-scientific aspects of
method
¢BlackwellPublishers Ltd. 1998
MusicAnalysis,
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 MUSICANALYSISANDMUSIC PERCEPTION 17

and theory. In particular,the perceptionsof those listeners for whom the

analysts''folkpsychological'accountof perceptionseems inapplicable- those
who are musicallyuntrained- requireexploration,and the methodsof cogni-
tive science,which are directedtowardsmakingexplicitthe factorsthat medi-
ate between our experiencesand the frameworksof action, discourse and
interactionin terms of which those experiencesachievemeaning,would seem
to providethe most appropriatemode of inquiry.Moreover,the capacityof
cognitivescience to articulatethe unintuitablemeans that it is likely to have
some capacityto be explanatoryin respectof the perceptionseven of music
analysts,in that cognitive-scientificmethod, if appropriatelyapplied,can be
capableof unveilingthose aspectsof the perceptualprocessthat are not ame-
nableto consciousintrospection.
The cognitivescienceof music,then, shouldnot be directedtowardsreplac-
ing the folk psychologiesthat might be used in pursuitof the articulationof
analyticalinsight.If it has anyvalueforunderstandingmusic,it shouldlie in its
capacityto bridgethe gap betweenwhat music feels like- its experientialtex-
ture - and the languagethat is used to describeit and to teach it. To be more
specific,the applicationof cognitivescience to music should help to traverse
the disjunctionthat exists betweenthe waysthat music is experiencedby lis-
teners and by practisingmusiciansand the rationalframeworksof discourse
thatareconventionallyused to describeand to definemusicand musicalexpe-
rience.Its 'researchprogramme'(see Lakatos1970) shouldproceedby seeking
to provideaccounts of musical experiencethat are consonantwith the con-
straintsand particularitiesof embodimentand the conceptsof computational
logic (see Johnson-Laird1983) and with empiricallyderivedevidence about
musicalperception,performanceand creation.At the same time, its practice
must be informed by an intimate awarenessof the culturalcontext within
which it is conducted, of the meaningsthat can be borne by its materials,
methodsand data.

Conclusions
In this articleI havepostulatedthe existenceof a music-analytic'folkpsychol-
ogy' of musical perception.I have proposed that such a 'folk psychology'
shouldbe replacedby a scientificpsychology,a cognitive-scientificaccountof
perception.I havereviewedtwo recenttheoriesof musicanalysisthatappearto
be intended to carry out just such a project.I have concluded that neither
systemcan be saidto fulfilcomprehensivelythe projectof replacingthe music-
analytic'folk psychology'of musicalperceptionwith a scientificallyfounded
one, and suggestedthatsuch a projectmightbe misconceived- one taskof the
cognitivescience of music being not to replace folk-psychologicalaccountsof
musicalperceptionbut to explain them.

Music A nalysis, 17/i ( 19 9 8 ) c Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1998

18 IAN CROSS

In conclusion, it has to be said that it appears to be up to the individual

analyst to choose to employ either a folk-psychological theory of musical per-
ception or a cognitive-scientific one. The only inference that seems clear from
the issues considered in this article is that the analyst should be aware of which
type of theory is being used. For folk psychologies are not immutable; even
though cognitive science may not aim to replace them, they are subject to
change, and elements of cognitive science may come to infiltrate into our fu-
ture folk psychologies.
I fear that these inconclusive conclusions may seem highly expedient in that
they wriggle out of any obligation to provide answers, and throw the onus of
considering the issues raised in these pages back on to music analysts. How-
ever, from a scientific perspective, this seems a wholly acceptable outcome;
after all, as one scientist put it (quoted in Feyerabend 1981, p. 83):
The externalconditionswhich are set for [the scientist] ... do not permit
him to let himselfbe too much restricted,in the constructionof his concep-
tual world, by the adherenceto an epistemologicalsystem. He therefore
must appearto the systematicepistemologistas a type of unscrupulousop-
portunist. . .
That scientist was Albert Einstein.

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