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110
become just" (EN 1105al7-18). Again, using praxis in this morally qualified
sense, Aristotlesays in the EudemianEthics that only rationalbeings, and not
children or animals, are capable of "acting" (EE 1224a28-30; cf. EN
1139a20).
In a second sense, however, praxis refers to an event without moral
qualifications. As Joachim again explains: "The mere praxis-the external
movements resulting in a man's death-is morally colourless, the material
equally, for example, of legitimate self-defense, heroic patriotism, or
murder."4 In the ethical writings, of course, the way in which an action is
performedby an agent is the primaryconsiderationin any assessment of the
moral qualities of the action. In most cases, the moral qualities of an action
are determinedby the way in which it was done by an agent. Thus, when
Aristotle says that "By doing just acts we become just, " he goes on to explain
that the acts we do to become just are not just in the same, full sense of the
word as applied to acts done by someone who is alreadyjust. They are only
"such as a just person might do" (EN 1105b5-7). To be just in the full sense,
he writes, an act must be done by an agent with knowledge, choosing
(proairoumenos)the act, choosing it for its own sake, and having a stable
hexis, disposition (EN 2.1105a28-33). The exceptions prove the rule. For
even when Aristotle allows that an act can have moralqualitiesapartfrom the
agent's doing of it, the focus is still on the agent ratherthanthe act. InEN 5.8,
for example, he allows that an act can be just or unjust apart from any
assessment of the agent. But he is also careful to distinguish between acts
done justly and acts done justly only "accidentally"(Kar' (TUE'8 o K'KO).
An agent, he writes, cannotbe praisedor blamed for doing an action•that is in
fact just or unjust if he acts out of ignorance, under compulsion, or in some
other "accidental"way.5
Praxis, then, in the ethical works, can mean either:(1) the subjectof moral
predicates, or (2) an event that is not the subjectof moral predicates.In both
cases, the agent is the primaryconsideration.
In the Poetics, however, Aristotle's focus is on the action and not on the
agent: tragedy is imitationof action and not of humanbeings (50a16-17).6 A
poet must imitate an action, if he can be said to write a tragedyat all. But he
need not always give us enough informationabout how this action is done to
allow us to determine whether the agent deserves praise, blame or neither.
4Joachim, 91.
51Itis difficult to be more precise about Aristotle'sdistinctionbetween mere actions and actions
done in a certainway.J. L. Ackrill, in "Aristotleon Action," Mind 87 (1978) 595-601, discusses
some of the problemsinvolved. On the relevanceof EN 5.8 to the questionof Oedipus'hamartia
see R. Sorabji,Necessity, Cause, and Blame (Ithaca 1980) 295ff., and below, note 21.
6This difference in focus of the ethical works and of the Poetics is corrrectlynoted by R.
Dupont-Roc and J. Lallot, Aristote. La Poetique (Paris 1980) 196: the Poetics, they write,
"renversela perspectivede l'ethique. Ce qui est au premierplan ici, c'est non plus l'agent, mais
l'action. ... " However, they fail to realize that the theoreticalbasis of both the Poetics and the
ethical works is the same. They continue: "et, parce que cette action doit ^etrequalificeen termes
ethiques, les actantsdoivent 1 etre egalement .. "
Hence, praxis in the Poetics does not mean "a morally qualified action." I
argue below that several considerationssupportthis view: (1) the distinction
in the Poetics between praxis and ethos, (2) a survey of the occurrencesof
praxis and cognates in the Poetics, (3) Greek usage of praxis and cognates,
and (4) examples of dramaticaction.
1. Praxis and Ethos
Aristotle's distinctionbetweenpraxis and ethos is strongevidence in favor
of the view thatpraxis does not mean "a morally qualified action" in the
Poetics. Whatethos means, in this work and elsewhere, is of course a major
problem in itself.7 For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to
recognize that when and if moralqualitiesenter into the drama,they do so by
means of ethos (and/ordianoia), and not by means of praxis alone. I do not
mean to imply that ethos is always, or even usually, associated with moral
qualities. That it can have some moralaspects, however, is clear from the two
definitionsof ethos (ethe) given in the Poetics.
1. 50a4-6: "I mean by ethe thataccordingto which we say thatthose acting
are qualified" (Xhyw yap ... Tra 8 r, Ka 0' TroLoYUrtvaq E~vat
Prov 7ip&arrovraq).
4aLVE
2. 50b8-9: "Ethosis thatwhichindicateschoice"(o'Vrw8~\1o / Eiv 7rb
'
70otoWov 8Xrl4ott'v iTpoatpEo-wv).8
It wouldbe a mistaketo assumethatthe qualitiesof the firstdefinitionare
exclusivelymoral,orthatproairesisshouldbe translated"moralpurpose," as
Butchertranslatesit.9 On the otherhand,thereis no evidenceto justifythe
conclusionthatmoralqualitiesand choicesare meantto be excludedfrom
ethos in the Poetics. Aristotleseems to be sayingthatethos can indicate
(moral)choice and confer (moral)qualities.And he never suggeststhat
anythingelse (exceptdianoia),whichis also to be connectedwiththe agent
ratherthanwiththe action,10does this.
Aristotlestates, then, that these propertiesdefine ethos, but he never
suggeststhattheycanenterintoanaccountofpraxisalone.Further, he insists
thatpraxisis distinctfromethosandthatpraxis,butnotethos, is essentialto
tragedy:praxisdoesnotimplyethos.Wemayreasonablyconclude,then,that
praxisdoes nothavethepropertiesthatdefineethos, thatit does not indicate
choiceor serveto qualifythe agent.
7Among the recent works on this controversialtopic are: E. Sch'iutrumpf, Die Bedeutungdes
Wortesithos in der Poetikdes Aristoteles (Munich 1970);J. Pollitt, TheAncient Viewof GreekArt
(New Haven 1974), 184-89; E. Keuls, Plato on Greek Painting (Leiden 1978) 95-109. Keuls'
view thatethos in the Poetics means "dramaticpassage indicativeof character"(97) is surely the
correctone, though I cannot agree with her thatethos lacks a moral factor (97, note 28).
81 follow the text of R. Kassel's OCT (1965) unless otherwise noted. All translationsare my
own.
9Butcheruses this translationof proairesis at 50b9 and at 54a17-18. The term does not have a
narrowlymoralsense even at EN 3.2 (111lb4-1112a17),where it is used in a technicalsense which
we are not justified in importinginto the Poetics.
'0Poetics49b36-50a3 states thatdianoia, as well as ethos, serves to qualify those acting and
(in a passage bracketedby Kassel) that it is a cause of action.
Tables
1. Uses irrelevantto imitation:48bl, 50b35, 51a10
Total: 3
2. "Technical"uses
2a. 7rp&ytLa:51b22, 54a14, 54b6, 55a17, 56a20
Total: 5
2b. Tp&aKTKOV : 60al
Total: 1
2c. rrpa&tq: 47a28, 51b29, 51b33, 52a13, 52a37, 52bll
Total: 6
2d. Trp&rrEtv : 48a23, 49b31, 52a36, 52a36, 55a25, 59a15, 59b24,
60a14
Total: 8
2e. 7rpolTErTpay/
vaa : 55b30
Total: 1
Total2a-e: 21
3. Associated with aVayKIq: *51a28, 51b9, 51bl11,52a22, 52a29,
54a35, *56b2 E•KO'.,
Total: 8
4. Associated with "one," "whole," or "complete:"*49b24, 50b24, 51a18,
51a19, *51a28, 51a31, 51a33, *52a2, 52a14, 59a19, 59a22, 59bl, 62b8,
62bll
Total: 14
5. Associated with pity and fear: *52a2, 52bl, 53b2, 53b5, 53b13, *53b16,
*56b2
Total:7
6. Associated with KaX0q or
or7TovU8daio: 48al, 48a27, 48b25, *49b24,
*61a5, *61a6, *61a7
Total:7
7. Passages particularlyrelevantto Aristotle's theory of praxis:
7a. Poetics 14: kinds of praxeis: *53b16, 53b27, 53b30, 53b30, 53b36,
53b38, 54a2, 54a3, 54a3
Total: 9
7b. Praxis most importantaspect of tragedy:50a15, 50a22, 50a32, 50a37,
50b22
Total: 5
7c. 49b36-50a6: 49b36, 49b36, 49b37, 50al, [50a2], 50a4, 50a5, 50a6
Total: 8
7d. 50a16-22: 50a16, [50a18], [50a18], [50a20], 50a21, 50a22
Total: 6
7e. Other:50a24, 50b3, 50b4, 54a18, *61a5, *61a6, *61a7
Total:7
Total7a-e: 35
Total1-7 (cross-listings counted only once): 87
Discussion
#1. 48bl says that prattein is the Attic for poiein; in the other two
occurrencespragma means "thing."
#2. In the passages in which these instancesoccur, tragedyis called mime-
sis praxeos, the plot is called the systasis pragmaton, or some similar
reference is made to action as the sphere of drama, and nothing relevantto
ethics is said.
#3. The rule of probabilityor necessity is a formalrequirement,havingno
bearingon ethical questions.
#4. The rule that a praxis should be one, whole and complete is closely
connected with the "norm of length" within which the tragic change is
comprised(51al2-15). I argueabove, in the discussion of 50a16-20, that this
change should not be thoughtof in ethical terms.
#5. Pity and fear are primarilya response to the plot (53bl-7) and we will
see below, in the discussion of #7a, that the actions which make up plots are
described in non-ethical terms. Aristotle does say that pity is felt for the
and fear for the i4lows~(53a5-6), but a&vrao6 and 6/owgo do not
&v&eo•
have narrowlyethical senses27and in any case they describethe agent, not the
action. What Aristotle means is that a persona without these qualities will
interferewith the audience's tragic response to the plot.28
#6. In seven instancespraxis is associated with spoudaios or kalos. At
48al and 48a27 spoudaios describespeople who happento be acting, and not
the actions themselves. And, as we have seen, 61a4-9, where three other
instances occur, states that we cannot tell whether or not an action is
spoudaion orphaulon without consideringthe agent.
At 48b25-27 Aristotle states that when poetry originated,the bettersort of
poets imitated 7Ya' . .. 7Tpa0EL' Ka't 7 oV roo'rWoV,writing
KaXh• •r'
hymns and encomia, while the inferior sort imitated ratq [Trp&a6Et] i70V
hov, writing invectives (ftf6yot).Since encomia are writtento praise, as
a•ai
invectives are written to blame, kalas must attributean ethical quality to
praxeis, in this one instance. However, Aristotle is now discussing a stage of
poetry that precedes and differs from that of epic, tragedy and comedy.29
Comedy, Aristotle tells us, only appears when the earlier invectives are
replacedby "the laughable"(48b37), which is "some defect or ugliness that
is painless and not destructive"such as the comic mask (49a34-37). That is,
while the objects of invective are blameworthy,and hence morally qualified,
those of comedy are merely laughable. The developmentof epic and tragedy
30Foran argumentalong these lines see Golden (above, note 15) 283-89.
310n the connection between the spoudaion and the probable or necessary see M. Weitz,
"Tragedy," in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, P. Edwards, ed. (New York1967) 8.155 and the
excellent remarksof H. D. E Kitto, "Catharsis,"in The Classical Tradition,L. Wallace, ed.
(Ithaca 1966) 144.
32Else, 77. See also Lucas, 63-64, on the social connotationsof spoudaios.
33J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy(Oxford 1962) 48-49, rightly argues against a
tendencyto read psychological implicationsintoPoetics 14 when he tells us thatmellei, at 53b21,
for example, should not be translated"intends"(Butcher)but "on the point of."
34Compare53b4-6, where thepragmata are identifiedwith symbainonta:&(TE TOViKOU ra
T srpaypLara Kat 4pPiTTELKaCL •b
•EXEEV K 7•V oTvUpawvrtVOV .
yw6o•LEva
35 "Das irpajrTet ruhrtnirgends an diese Frage nach Gut und B'ose";B. Snell, "Aischylos
und das Handelnim Drama,"Philologus suppl. 20 (1928) 14. (Snell, however, fails to apply his
findings correctly to the Poetics, p. 16.) Those who cite Snell's article do not mention this
importantconclusion, concentratingsolely on what Snell says aboutprattein's connection with
completion:Else, 241, note 73; J. Redfield,Natureand Culturein the Iliad (Chicago 1975) 64-65
and note 49, 236: and J. H. Schmidt, Synonymikder griechischen Sprache (Leipzig 1876, rpt.
Amsterdam1967) 1.#23: who is wrong when he states that a
"Ap&valrpaccEwv,r,ropoViELVw,"
praxis is always the activity of a person (399). A good counterexampleis Aristotle, De Caelo
292bl-3: 86e voA/t4EV KaL T7*V OarTppov Trp4wPvaL'aLTOLairrVVOa 7TEp7 TdV T XWV Ka.L
(This passage is noted by7•TV
D. S. Margoliouth,ThePoetics of Aristotle [London 1911]40).
4•vr&v.
A while later, the brotherof the priestess happenedto arrive. That the
god orderedhim to go there and for what purposehe came is outside the
plot (rb86 E(TtL 7VEL XEV0'&%
1EWMb EEL KEL
Ka•L f'6"
0 r E CET70o
He arrived, was seized, and when on the point of being
pinOov).42he made himself known, either as
sacrificed, Euripidesor as Polyidus
wrote it, saying, as he was likely to do, that not only his sister but
himself also had to be sacrificed, and because of this he was saved
(Poetics 17.55b3-12).
This plot outline explicitly excludes any indication of proairesis: "Thatthe
god ordered him to go there and for what purpose he came is outside the
plot." Also excluded are not only the names of the characters,but also any of
their individual qualities. Without this ethos, the bare action has no moral
qualities of its own.
Aristotle's outline of the Odyssey plot also excludes ethos:
A certainman is away from home for many years, carefully watched by
Poseidonand alone. Moreover,things at home are in such a state thathis
possessions are wasted by the suitors and his son is plotted against. He
himself arrives, storm-tossed,and making himself recognized by some,
attacksand is himself saved while he destroys his enemies. This is what
is properto the plot; the rest is episode (Poetics 17.55b17-23).
In this example also, ethos, anything indicative of choice or descriptive of
individual qualities, is excluded.43 Aristotle avoids using ethically loaded
words, such as KXho'Tr, avvpo•Ovita4 to describe the actions,
oLtOLXELa,
thoughhe could well have used them all. Gomperzremarksperceptivelyabout
Aristotle's two plot outlines: "Forour philosopher,the daughterof Agamem-
non, the most powerful among the Greek princes, is thus merely a 'maiden';
Ulysses is not a hero and a mighty warrior before Troy, but simply a
'man.' "45
An excellent way of illustratingand testing our interpretationof Aristotle's
concept of praxis is to apply it to three plays with the same basic plot:
Aeschylus' Libation Bearers, Sophocles' Electra and Euripides'Electra. If
we base a plot outline of all threeplays on Aristotle'sexamples of the Odyssey
and the Iphigeneia in Taurisplots, we will get somethinglike this:
A woman has killed her husband, a king, and now rules in his stead,
along with her lover, who helped in the killing. She has, by her dead
husband, a son, living in exile, and a virgin daughter.The son returns
42Thetext reads thus with the deletion of the words bracketedby Kassel. The textualquestions
have no bearingon my point.
43Theimportanceof these two plot outlines for understandingAristotle'sview thattherecan be
tragedy withoutethos is noted by C. Lord, "TragedyWithoutCharacter:Poetics VI. 1450a24,"
Journalof Aestheticsand Art Criticism 28 (1969-70) 55-62.
44EN1107a9ff. lists these as names for actions that include baseness;cf. Rhetoric 1374a11-15.
45T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (Griechische Denker, Leipzig 1896), trans. G. G. Berry
(London 1912)4.414.
from exile, makes himself known to his sister by means of tokens, gains
access to his motherand her lover by means of craft and kills them.
This plot, common to each of the plays, tells us absolutely nothing about
the ethical qualityof the act of Orestesin killing his mother.In fact, the plot is
such that we cannot in principle determine this ethical quality from the act
alone. As a general rule, it is right to avenge one's father. And, again, as a
generalrule it is wrong to kill one's mother.But what may be said of avenging
one's fatherby killing one's mother?Each play solves this ethical dilemmain
a differentway, by attributingdifferentmotives and qualitiesto the agent;that
is, by the use of ethos.46
In the Libation Bearers, Orestes is made to give his reasons for the
matricideearly in the play.They are:the oracle, grief for his father,and loss of
his patrimony,which, he says, entails the servitude of the very men who
sacked Troy (297-305). Of these, all noble motives, the oracle is by far the
most important. When about to act, Orestes hesitates and asks Pylades,
"What shall I do?" (rt 6p&oro;).47 Pylades answers, "Whatof the oracle?
Count all men enemies except the god." Orestes answers, "Youare right,"
and does the deed (899-904). These passages have ethos, for they indicate
why something is chosen. And they clearly show that the choice is a noble
one. Orestes is never given any unworthymotives at other times; he is never
given a reason to distrustthe god, and he is never shown to be the sort of
person who would take advantage of a divine oracle for selfish purposes.
Orestes, therefore, is shown by the poet's use of ethos to be morallyjustified
and is vindicatedby the gods in the Eumenides.
The motives of Orestes in Sophocles' Electra are very different. He also
gives them in a speech early in the play: (1) desire to win fame, (2) desire to
destroy his enemies, and (3) to regain his patrimony(59-72). He does not
give as reasons the oracle, love of his father, desire to free the land from
tyranny. We conclude, and other speeches in the play bear this out, that
Orestes' motives in the Sophocles play do not justify a matricide.Here, ethos
shows that Orestes is blameworthy.
In Euripides'Electra, Orestes'motives are shown not by speech so much as
by the circumstancesattendinghis action: anotherform of ethos. Oresteskills
Aigisthus duringa sacrifice, and he kills Clytemnestrawhile she is preparing
for a sacrifice.48 He brings Aigisthus' corpse to Electra and asks her to
maltreatit as she wishes (896 ff.). He doubts the oracle (971) but does the
46There is some indicationthat Aristotle would have looked at the three plays in this way. In
Poetics 14.53b20-26, he includes a matricide in his list of plots and mentions the murderof
Clytemnestraby Orestes as one of the received legends the poet cannot change (Tobiqp ev oiVV
pJiOovi XV•EL oi'K TLwv) but should handleskillfully. This passage makes no
trape*X-Tlqpj•vov
that the bare plot
suggestion representsan action of any specific ethical quality. On the other
hand, when Aristotlementionstwo actualtreatmentsof the matricide,he does condemnthe son's
action:Rhet. 2.1401a35-b3 (Theodectes'Orestes) andEN 3.1110a26-29 (Euripides'Alcmaeon).
47This and Eur.El. 1244 (page 00, below) are good examples of the typical Greek preference
for dran overprattein when ethically qualifiedactions are in question. See above, section 3.
48An interestingparallelto this kind of ethos is providedby an example given by Pollitt(above,
deed anyway. All this shows a lack of concern for the gods, and for human
standardsof decency. Such a man can have no motive for matricidethat can
justify this act. This is in fact what the Dioscuri tell Orestes: "She has
receivedjustice, but you did not act justly " (8WKataux
EV VV, 8o'EXEL,T) 86'
obi'v86p&, 1244).
These three plays, then, do seem to have a bare plot that imitates an action
without moral qualifications. The agent is, in each case, given a different
quality by ethos.
We have found, then, that in Aristotle's dramatictheory, action, a mere
event, is primary and that ethos, that which indicates choice and confers
quality,is of secondaryimportanceand is not a necessarypartof all tragedies.
Plot is the "firstprincipleand soul of tragedy"(50a38-39), while psychology
and ethics are of much less importance.49 We have also found that Aristotle's
concept of praxis can be appliedfruitfullyto the Greekplays themselves. The
playwright, if our examples are typical, begins with a bare action that is a
given and "colors"it, as an artistpaints a statue, with readily distinguishable
and identifiable ethos. It would require a much more detailed study to
determinewhetherthe Greekplays also justify Aristotle'sview thatthe action
is a greatdeal more importantthanthe ethos. If he is right, however, many of
our questions about the characterizationand motivation of the personae of
these plays may be irrelevantas well as unanswerable.50
ELIZABETHBELFIORE
Universityof Minnesota
note 7) of ethos in painting. A paintingof Polygnotuswas said to depict Ajax swearingat an altar
while Cassandrasat holding the image of Athena to which she clung as a suppliantwhen Ajax
draggedher away(188). Here also, attendantcircumstances,the altarand the image, clearly show
the quality of Ajax' act of sacrilege.
49See P. Turner, "The Reverse of Vahlen," CR 9 (1959) 214, for a good criticism of our
tendency to interpretAristotle in the light of our modern interest in psychology, a subject with
which the Poetics has little concern.
50Anearlier versionof this paperwas read at the annualmeeting of the AmericanPhilological
Association, San Francisco, Dec. 1981. I wish to thankProfs. George Sheets and KathleenWilkes
for their helpful criticisms of an earlier draftof this paper.