A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party

entitled to the
avails of the suit.

LIYAO VS. LIYAO

GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the
deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the
child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two
sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years
and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated
that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased.

HELD:

Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that
he was the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one
to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. Hence, it was then
settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and
within the period limited by law.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged
father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

The filiation of the legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1.The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgement; or

2.An admission of legitimate filiation in the public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1.The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2.Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws.

Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;

(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity
with the provisions of this Code on Support; and

(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.

Illegitimate Children

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)

PE LIM VS. CA

FACTS

In 1978, the petitioner Raymond Lim and respondent Maribel Cruz fist met in a club along Roxas Boulevard on the very first day
when the latter was just sixteen years old and working as an attendant in the said club. The petitioner showed interest to the
respondent and started courting her which he succeeded. They started cohabiting in different areas in Manila in which the
petitioner was the one paying for their rentals. In July 1981, Maribel already pregnant, left for Japan but returned in October of
the same year.

In January 1982, Maribel gave birth to their daughter and it was the petition who shouldered the hospitalization and even caused
the registration of the name Joanna Rose Pe Lim on the child’s birth certificate.

Towards the latter part of 1983, Maribel noticed that the petitioner’s feeling towards her started to wane. It resulted to the
petitioner’s abandonment of Maribel and their daughter. Respondent tried to support themselves that it was never enough so
that she sought for support from the petitioner who kept on promising but nothing had been made. Hence, a complaint was filed
against the petitioner for support. However, the petitioner contended that it was Maribel who insisted for them have that kind of
intimacy which he never deemed it as such. He even insinuated that he was not the father of the child considering the nature of
Maribel’s work as an entertainer. More so, the payment he made upon all expenses was just a gesture of generosity since he
wanted to help her out of that hard situation that she was in with the promise that she is going to pay him back. Nevertheless, the
RTC ruled in favor of Maribel and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s acts would stand as evidence to justify his paternity.

HELD:

Yes. Article 172 (2) states “An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parents.” In this case the tenor of the petitioner is that they are not just friends as claimed by the petitioner. It is
clear that the petitioner is the father of the child since he executed all responsibilities which undeniably showed concern of a
legitimate father such as payment of hospital bill, causing the registration of the child using his surname and lastly the lines in his
letters which much love and concern to Maribel and their daughter

QUESTION

The alleged father did not sign the birth certificate of his alleged child. However, his name was enter in the said document by the
registrar. Could it a valid and competent evidence of his paternity?

Answer:

No, it is an incompetent evidence of his paternity because it should be voluntarily and actually signed by the father himself.

RIVERO VS. CA

Facts: Benito DyChiao, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with Shirley Arevalo. They begot a son,
BenedickArevaloDyChiao. When Benito Sr. died, Benedick, through her natural mother and guardian ad litem, being a minor, filed
a complaint on his behalf, against the legitimate children of the deceased for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child and
that he be given his share in the estate left by the deceased. This was opposed by Mary Jane, daughter of the deceased, but later
on signed a compromise agreement with Benedick, recognizing the latter as illegitimate son of her father and giving him his share
in the estate. Attached to the agreement was a SPA appointing Mary Jane to represent her brothers who are confined in a mental
hospital. Such compromise agreement was approved by the court, thus requiring the compulsory recognition of Benedick.
Thereafter, the Dy-Chiao brothers, through their uncle, assailed such compromise agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the recognition of Benedick‘s illegitimacy by Mary Jane is valid based on the compromise agreement made.

Ruling: No. Article 2035(1) of the New Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the civil status of persons shall be valid. As
such, paternity and filiation, or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the court to
determine its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Further, such recognition is ineffectual
because under the law, the recognition must be made personally by the putative parent and not by any brother, sister or relative.

BERNABE VS. ALEJO

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe who was
born on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal wife) died, the sole surviving heir left was
Ernestina. Carolina, in behalf of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe and be given a share of his father’s estate.

Trial court’s ruling: Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of
the alleged parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.

CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed under Article 285 of the Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed
within 4 years after the child has attained the age of majority and that subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take
away his right.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son.

HELD:

The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is
given by the new code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate children” are usually begotten and raised in
secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.

Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious
children.

Hence, the petition was denied and assailed decision was affirmed.

Republic Act No. 9255

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE
176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."

MOSSESGELD VS. CA

Case Doctrines:

● Illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother , and this is rule regardless of whether or not the father admits
paternity.

● Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law
Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, one Eleazar Calasan (married), signed the birth
certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. Both Eleazar and
Marissa accomplished the dorsal side of the certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and
correct. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.

The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar
himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar
denied the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of
their mother.

Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to
register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Eleazar filed a
motion for reconsideration. Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the
child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue: Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the
alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity?

Held:

No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.”

This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to
register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s
consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of
adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname.

Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the
father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by
law. (Mossesgeld vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998)

REPUBLIC VS. VIVENCIO

Facts:
Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition for change of surname, from “Vicencio” to “Yu”. She alleged that she was born to Spouses Pablo
Vicencio and Fe Leabres. After a marital spat, Pablo left the conjugal abode and never returned. The marriage of her parents was
later dissolved and her mother dropped the surname Vicencio. Fe thereafter married Ernesto Yu. Since her childhood, she had not
known much less remembered her real father Pablo, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu. Despite of which, she
had been using the family name “Vicencio” in her school and other activities. In view of such situation, confusion arose as to her
parentage and she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her classmates and their
neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment. She consulted her step-father about the petition, and the latter consented to it.
The Solicitor General opposed but the trial court granted the petition. The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
held that it is for the best interest of Cynthia that her surname be changed.
The Solicitor General appealed, arguing that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant Cynthia’s change of
surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal complications due to the fact that her step-father has
two (2) children with her mother. In the event of her step-father’s death, it is possible that Cynthia may even claim inheritance
rights as a “legitimate” daughter. The Solicitor General opines that Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir
because the change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, but Ernesto has not opted for such a remedy.

Issue: May Cynthia be allowed to adopt the surname of his step-father?

Held:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.
The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule
on the use of surnames, specifically the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their
father.
Cynthia is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the
surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that achange of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same
unless weighty reasons are shown.
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion
with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not
legally adopted by him.
Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-fathers legitimate children, a plausible
reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as
his very own daughter, providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal constraints lead us to
reject private respondents desire to use her stepfathers surname. Further, there is no assurance the end result would not be even
more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger
much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage

Legitimated Children

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage
shall not affect the legitimation. (270a) chan robles virtual
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants. (274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced

ADOPTION

Art. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support
and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family.
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title.
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by
nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to be adopted. (27a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:
(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their
guardianship relation;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country
adoptions as may be provided by law. (28a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. (29a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority
shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. (29a, E. O. and PD 603)

Art. 187. The following may not be adopted:

(1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said
person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority.
(2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and
(3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded. (30a, E. O. 91 and PD
603)

Art. 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary:
(1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over,
(2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality;
(3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if
any; and
(5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. (31a, E. O. 91 and PD 603)

Art. 189. Adoption shall have the following effects:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if
the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
both spouses; and
(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives. (39(1)a, (3)a, PD 603)

Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in
accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall
divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire
estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the
adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire
estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third by
the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
(39(4)a, PD 603)

Art. 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of any
person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss
or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted is at least eighteen years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the
adoption on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant. (40a, PD 603)

Art. 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:
(1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or
(2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has
definitely repudiated the adoption. (41a, PD 603)

Art. 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the court
in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or
incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is
physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted
arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and
shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries

Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. – The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared available for adoption;
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy;
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter(s) as
his/her own child since minority;
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be initiated within six (6) months
from the time of death of said parent(s).

CANG VS. CLAVANIO

FACTS:
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved
the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor
children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert.
The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contest the adoption, but the
petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written
consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not
necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that
Herbert has abandoned them.

RULING:

Yes.
Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption
has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the
child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child.
Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the
parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate."
In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform
the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."

In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental
claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love,
care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with
his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims.

TAMARGO VS CA

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. Jennifer's natural parents filed civil
complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since
Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the
petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by Adelberto.

RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto was
still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, at the time the
shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive
affect may be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

6. EFFECTS OF ADOPTION:

a. Parental Authority
b. Right the Same as Legitimate
c. Surname of the adopted
d. Succession

MARIATEGUI VS. CA

FACTS:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa
Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupo’s second wife is
Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa
Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the
Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.

Lupo’s descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated
themselves Lot NO. 163 of the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration proceedings and a decree ordering
the registration of the lot was issued. The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.

HELD:

Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipa’s marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided
all requisites for its validity are present.

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a
man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born
in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence, Felipa’s children are legitimate and therefore have successional rights.
RECISION
DISINERITANCE, AVAILABLE TO ADOPTER, see Art 919

Disinheritance is an act by which an owner of an estate deprives a person who would otherwise be his heir, or the right to inherit
it. It can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause shall be specified. The cause must be one authorized or
enumerated by law. The burden of proving the truth of the cause of the disinheritance shall rest upon the heirs of the testator, if
the disinherited heir should deny it.

The grounds for disinheritance are expressly stated in this article:

Art. 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants,
or ascendants;
*There should be a final judgment of conviction by a court of justice of the guilt of the descendant which however, may come
before or after the execution of the will and the guilt must be established.
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
*The act of accusing as understood in this paragraph may include the institution of a criminal action, or even the mere statement
of the heir as a witness in a case against the testator, a statement where said heir affirms or corroborates the accusation. As a
matter of fact, if the heir-witness is in possession of facts which might result in the testator’s acquittal and the heir-witness
deliberately fails to reveal said facts, there is also an “accusation.”
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
*It is essential that there must be a final judgment of conviction either in the adultery caseor in the concubinage case before this
Article can be applied.
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change
one already made;
*No judicial demand is needed for the law does not require this. Note that when a judicial pronouncement is needed, the law says
so.
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;
*Note that maltreatment by an ascendant of a descendant does not constitute a ground for the descendant to disinherit the
ascendant, for while it may be an abuse, it is generally in the exercise of a power. The reverse is however repugnant to natural
law, and is therefore a ground for disinheritance.
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
*There need not be final judgment of conviction. The essence of the cause is that anything that brings dishonor or disgrace to the
family of the testator merits correction in the form of disinheritance. However, a single act is not ordinarily sufficient, for “leading
a life” implies continuity.
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. (756, 853,674a)

In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

FACTS:

Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie, and that Stephanie has been using her
mother’s middle and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname.

ISSUE: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

RULING:

YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and
the Family Code provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can assert her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

REPUBLIC VS. HERNANDEZ

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Change of Name)

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for
the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired
consequent to his adoption.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the
petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be
conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance
and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules.
Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform
with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably
satisfied.
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon
Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the
policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder
of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.

Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for
adoption.

Held: No.
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:
(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal
rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;
The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree
of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by
petitioner.
However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally
registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is
beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a
prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name
is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special
proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor
can be threshed out and accordingly determined.
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere
incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy
available under our remedial law system.

CHING LENG VS. GALANG, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political,
and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. It is not within the
province of our civil law to determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the adoption
of an alien child in order to forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws does not warrant, denial of the adoption of a Filipino
minor by qualified alien adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would be thereby subverted.

Republic Act No. 9225; Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of
the Philippines.

REYES VS. SOTERO

(Special Proceedings – Adoption)

Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena
Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties
were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband and
asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from the local
civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued
by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioner’s claim that she was
legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial
court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption
decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”

Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.

Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before
the trial court.
An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well
as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which
rendered the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of
petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until
contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the
adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

QUIMIGUING VS ICAO

Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
which dismissed her complaint for support and damages and request for amendment of complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already married Felix Icao succeeded in having sexual relations with her through force and
intimidation. As a result, she became pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao and had to stop studying. She then
claimed for monthly support, damages and attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to allege the fact that a child had been born in
her complaint. The lower court dismissed the case and subsequently denied further amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the original complaint to state a cause of action.

Issue: W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and an independent cause of action
for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40) recognizes the provisional personality of the unborn child, which includes its right to
support from its progenitors, even it is only “en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that, just as a conceived
child, it may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Readings of Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article
29 of the Spanish Code also further strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for damage caused” per Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision supported by
Article 2219, which provides moral damages for victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the decision; with costs against Icao.

LACSON VS LACSON

Facts:
On Feb 14, 1953, when they got married, Jan 9, 1963 is when Carmen (respondent) left home in Bacolod to go to Manila,
on March 12, 1963 Carmen filed a complaint for custody of children as well as support in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, Before it pushed through though they reached a settlement where the two eldest kids would go to
petitioner Alfonso and the youngest would stay with Carmen, This was affirmed by the CFI. and on May 7, 1963 respondent filed a
motion for the custody of all children be given to her in JDRC since, she said she only entered into agreement to gain custody of
her younger children and thus should be given custody of the older ones as well who are all below 7 years old. CA ruled that
compromise agreement as relating to custody of children should be declared null and void and as such the execution of said
judgment is void too.

ISSUE: Whether or Not support should be awarded to the wife

HELD:
Yes, should have but was filed out of time, Older children at that time were 5 and 6 so agreement should have been declared null
and void since no compelling reasons were stated otherwise, However the children are now 11 and 10 and thus The 11 year old
may choose which parent they want to live with and Court may also award custody to who they deem more fit through evidence

PATRICIO VS. DARIO

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons,
Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a
residential house and a pre-school building.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc
instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038
and raffled to Branch 78.

Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla
Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the
decedent.
ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing therein.

HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated
in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of
liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to
the next nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own
family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.