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International Relations: The Long Road to Theory


Author(s): Stanley H. Hoffmann
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Apr., 1959), pp. 346-377
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The Long Road to Theory
By STANLEY H. HOFFMANN

IThas becomecustomaryto begina discussionof thenatureand


present stateofthedisciplineofinternationalrelationswitha number
of complaints. This articlewill notabandonthecustom;indeed,its
purposeis, in the firstplace,to statetheconviction thatmanyof the
problems we facein ourfieldcanbe solved only by farmoresystematic
theoreticalworkthanhas beendonein thepast-a conviction shared
bymostwriters. Secondly, however, I willtryto showthatrecentap-
proaches toa general theoryofinternational relationsareunsatisfactory,
becauseeachone is, in itsown fashion, a shortcutto knowledge-
sometimes evena shortcuttoa destination thatis anythingbutknowl-
edge.Thirdly,I will presentsomesuggestions fora less ambitious,
butperhapsmoresatisfactory, effort towardtheory. Muchof thedis-
cussioninvolves problems of method and purpose common to mostof
thesocialsciences.Preciselybecausethediscipline rela-
ofinternational
tionsis inpoorershapethanpractically anyoftheothersocialsciences,
theseproblems areparticularlyimportant here.

I
ofconsidering
It is thepossibility relations
international as a largely
autonomous the
field,within sprawling and loosescience of politics,
whichexplains theneedfortheory.
Arguments aboutthedegreeofautonomy ofinternationalrelations,
bothas an areaofhumanactivity discipline,
andas an intellectual can
go on forever.No onewillcontend thatthefieldcanbe isolatedeasily,
orthattheproblems setbypolitical scienceandpolitical philosophy in
generalarenotrelevant here,too.However, thethreefollowing points
shouldbe decisive. First,thefieldcan be sufficientlyisolatedforana-
lyticalpurposes. Internationalrelationstakeplacein a milieuwhich
has itsown "coherence and uniqueness," itsrulesof thegamewhich
differ sharplyfromtherulesofdomestic itsownperspective.'
politics,
Secondly, sincethisprerequisiteis met,thefieldshouldbe treated as an
1 FrederickS. Dunn, "The Scopeof International
Relations,"WorldPolitics,i, No. i
(OctoberI948), pp. I42-46; GeorgeLiska,International
Equilibrium,
Cambridge, Mass.,
I957, pp. i98ff.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 347

autonomous discipline.
To be sure,suchautonomy, insofaras it arbi-
trarily isolates
andelevates onesector ofsocialactivity,performs a kind
of vivisection.However, no socialscientistcan workwithout at least
an implicit modelofhisfieldin hismind.Ifwe lookatthetwosocial
sciences whosecontributions havebeenmostvitalforthedevelopment
of international relations:politicalscienceand sociology, we see that
thesedisciplines use as a modelthe imageof the integrated com-
munity. Now,whatever elsethenatureof international relationsmay
be, it is notan "integrated system."2 It wouldbe verydangerous, in
thelongrun,to continue to workin ourfieldwitha modelthatdoes
notfit.Manyofthemistakes of moderntheoretical attempts in inter-
nationalrelations and in international law comefromthesystematic
misapplication ofthemodeloftheintegrated Rechtstatto thedecen-
tralized milieu-either
international as a normforanalysis, oras a goal.
Thirdly, without wantingto soundlikean imperialist fora relatively
greenscience, I wouldarguethatthearchitectonic roleAristotle at-
tributed tothescienceofthePolismightwellbelongtodayto interna-
tionalrelations, whichhavebecometheverycondition of our daily
life.If we weretoputtheprimary emphasis in thestudyofpolitics on
worldaffairs, and to treatdomestic politicsin thelightof worldaf-
fairs,insteadof thereverse, we mightproducea Copernican revolu-
tionevenbiggerthanthechangethattransformed economics when
macro-analysis replacedmicro-analysis.3
As an autonomousdiscipline,international relationsis not in very
good shape.I am not worriedby disagreement on a definition of the
field.Debateswhichtryto determine the scopeof a socialscienceusu-
ally end withformulasevenmoreambiguousthanthe absenceof any
definition-likeattempts at defining The participants
aggression.4 argue
fortheirinterpretations as if therewere an immutableessenceof in-
ternationalpolitics,or sociology,etc. A nominalistapproachmakes
moresense:thebestdefinition is the statementwhich,withoutviolat-
ing common-sense notionsaboutthesubstanceand purposesof thedis-
cipline,leads to the most perceptiveinvestigations. How could one
2 See Sir AlfredZimmern's remarkson similarlines:The Studyof International Rela-
tions,Oxford,1934, p. 15.
3See the reflectionsof AlexanderRfistow,"WeshalbWissenschaft der Politik,"in
ZeitschriftfurPolitik,I, 1954, pp. 132-35.
4 See RichardC. Snyder,"Toward GreaterOrder in the Study of International
Politics,"WorldPolitics,VII, No. 3 (April 1955), pp. 461-78; AntonioTruyol,"La
Teoria de las RelacionesInternacionales como Sociologia,"Revistade EstudiosPoliticos,
xcvi (November-December 1957), pp. 293-336. George Schwarzenberger's definition
includesthe dangerousexpression"international society"(Power Politics,New York,
1951, p. 4).

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348 WORLD POLITICS

agreeonceandforall uponthedefinition ofa fieldwhosescopeis in


constant flux-indeed, a fieldwhosefluctuation is one of itsprincipal
?
characteristics
Farmoredisturbing istheconfusion thatconcerns theproper method
and purposes ofthediscipline. First,we finda multitude of contribu-
tionsfromotherfields, a conglomeration of partialapproaches.5 Most
fieldshavesomething tooffer. Buta fleamarket is nota discipline. We
musttrytomakethesecontributions relevantbyaskingtherightques-
tions.In otherwords, theremustbe a core,whichis missing at present.
One ofthefunctions oftheory in thesocialsciences is preciselyto pro-
videsucha core.'Collecting factsis notenough;it is nothelpfulto
gatheranswers whenno questions havebeenaskedfirst. Withoutthe-
ory,we willhavetotakewhatever otherdisciplines we seefitto dump
ontoourplate,and we willhaveindigestion fromsmorgasbord. With
adequate theory,we will help ourselvesmore selectively.
Secondly, however, whenwe look at theory in our discipline, and
examinethequestions thattheory asks,we finda bewildering array.
Theoriesof international relationsare like planesflying at different
altitudesandin different directions.There are, at the highest elevation,
numerous speculativeworksconcerned either withtheproperplaceof
idealsand moralstandards in worldaffairs, or withmasterkeyex-
planations, or with advice on statecraft-evidence of thedifficulty of
keepingapartthethreekindsoftheory thatcanbe distinguished ana-
lytically:normative (or"value")theory, empirical (or "causal")theory,
andpolicytheory (or recipesforaction).At a loweraltitude, we find
morerigorous analyses of limited and unconnected areas within the field:
theories of nationalism and imperialism, of international law and or-
ganization, systematic inquiriesintothedecision-making processes of
certain nations,orintothenature andvarietiesofwar. Here thewriters
havebeenconcerned mainlywithempirical knowledge. This survey
revealstwofacts.First,progress in ourdiscipline requires twoefforts.
We musttrytolinkandexpandthescattered studies ofthelatter type,
and we musttryto connectthoseearth-bound theories withthesky-
boundtheories of theformer type.Secondly, whatis particularly dis-
tressingin international relationsis thestateof systematic empirical
theory.I do notbelievethatitcanbe separated fromvaluetheory and
5As an example,see QuincyWright,The Study of International Relations, New
York, 1957.
6On the role of theory,see KennethW. Thompson,"Toward a Theoryof Inter-
nationalPolitics,"American Political Science Review, XLIX, No. 3 (Septemberi955),
Politics:A Surveyof Trendsand
pp. 733-46;and idem, "The Studyof International
Developments,"Reviewof Politics,xiv,No. 4 (October1952), pp. 433-67.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 349
frompolicytheory; buttheinevitable cocktailmadeof all threein-
cludesat present verylittleof thefirst.
I wouldsuggest thatthefirstconditionof improvement is a clear
recognition ofthescholar'spurpose.His dutyis toseekknowledge and
understanding fortheirownsake;and thisimpliesthatthemainpur-
pose of research shouldnotbe "policyscientism."7 The fighting of
crusades, thedesireto advisepolicy-makers,
thescholar'sdedicationto
nationalor international causescan,and perhapsevenshouldbe, the
occasion,8 buttheyshouldnotbe thepurposeof theoretical research.
Politicalsciencein thiscountry grewlargelyoutof a similarcurative
urgeand engineering itch,butit outgrewthem,too.We shouldnot
rushbackto the"policy"periphery of our discipline
untilwe know
moreaboutthetheoretical center,
whichcommands theperiphery.Im-
patience,theviceof reformers, is theworstenemyof systematic theory
in any field,and the worsttemptationof Americansocial scientists.
Policyscientism is one formof impatience.But,as we shall see below,
impatiencemars even thosegeneraltheoreticalefforts which,on the
surface,seemuntouchedby policydrives.Perhapsbecausethereis too
littleof it,generalempiricaltheorytoo oftenseemslike a hastyeffort
to accountforeverything at once.Consequently,insteadof a keyopen-
ing thedoorsof science,it is like a sledgehammerthatonlycrushesa
coupleof boltsand breaksapartin the process.

II
I will tryto discussonlythe main generaltheoreticaleffortsof pre-
dominantly empiricalorientation,and I will beginwithtwo attempts
at providingus with a broad explanationof world affairs.
The theory whichhas occupiedthecenterof thescenein thiscountry
duringthe last tenyearsis ProfessorMorgenthau's"realist"theoryof
powerpolitics.It triesto give us a reliablemap of the landscapeof
worldaffairs,9to catchtheessenceof worldpolitics.The masterkeyis
theconceptof interest definedin termsof power.The theorysucceeds
in focusingattentionon theprincipalactorsin worldaffairs:thestates,
and on the factorsthataccountforthe autonomyof international re-
lations: the differencesbetweendomesticand world politicswhich
thwarttheoperationin thelatterof ideas and institutionsthatflourish
7 On this point, see David Easton, The Political System,New York, 1953, pp. 78ff.;
Hans J. Morgenthau, "Reflectionson the State of Political Science," Review of Politics,
XVII, No. 4 (October 1955), pp. 43i-60.
8 See Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Political Theory," Political Science Quarterly,
LXVIII,No. 3 (September1953), pp. 321-37.
9 Morgenthau, op.cit., pp. 455ff.

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350 WORLD POLITICS

in theformer, thedrasticimperatives of survival,self-preservation,


and
self-help whichareboththecausesand theproductsof suchdifferences.
However,as a generaltheory, therealistanalysisfailsbecauseit sees
the world as a staticfieldin whichpower relationsreproducethem-
selvesin timelessmonotony. The map is inadequatefortwo main rea-
sons.First,the realistanalysisof power is a verydebatableone. The
decisionto equate politicsand the effects of man's "lust for power,"
and thetendency to equatepowerand evilor violence,mutilatereality.10
A "powermonism"does not accountforall politics,whenpoweris so
somberly defined.Furthermore, theextentto whichpoweras a carrier
of eviland violenceexpressesa basichumaninstinct is questionable,
for
muchof theinternational (or domestic)evil of poweris rootednot in
the sinfulness of man but in a context,a constellation, a situation,in
which even good men are forcedto act selfishly or immorally.The
discrimination betweentheinherent or instinctiveaspectsofthe"power
drive,"and the situationalor accidentalones, is an importanttask,
neglectedby thetheory.
Also,itis dangeroustoputin a keypositiona conceptwhichis merely
instrumental. Poweris a meanstowardanyof a largenumberof ends
(includingpoweritself): the qualityand quantityof powerused by
menaredetermined bymen'spurposes.Now, therealisttheoryneglects
all thefactorsthatinfluence or definepurposes.Why statesmen choose
at timesto act in a certainway ratherthan in anotheris not made
clear.The domesticconsiderations thatdefinenationalpowerareeither
leftout or brushedaside.So is therole of internationally sharedvalues
and purposes.We get a somewhatmechanisticview of international
affairsin whichthestatesmen's roleconsistsofadjustingnationalpower
to an almostimmutableset of external"givens."The realistworld is
a frozenuniverseof separateessences.1"
Even if the role of powerwere as determining as the theorypostu-
lates,thequestionariseswhetheranyschemecan putso muchmethodo-
logical weightupon one concept,even a crucialone; forit seemsto
me thatthe conceptof powercollapsesunderthe burden.Power is a
mostcomplexproductofothervariableswhichshouldbe allowedto see
the lightof the theoryinsteadof remaininghiddenin the shadowof
10 ScientificMan versusPower Politics, Chicago,I946, pp. 50-5I
Hans J.Morgenthau,
and i88-202.
11 On thesepoints,see JohnH. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, Chi-
cago, 195I, pp. 3-I5 and 63ff.; RobertW. Tucker,"Professor Morgenthau's Theoryof
Political'Realism,'" American Political Science Review, XLVI, No. i (March I952),
pp. 2I4-24; HerbertButterfield, "The Scientific
versusthe MoralisticApproach,"Inter-
national Aflairs, xxvii, No. 4 (OctoberI951), pp. 4II-22; Harold Sprout,"In Defense
of Diplomacy,"World Politics, i, No. 3 (April I949), pp. 404-I3.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 351
power.12 Otherwise, thetheory is boundeither tomeandifferent things
at differentstepsof theanalysis(or whendealingwithdifferent pe-
riods),or to endbyselecting foremphasis onlyone aspectofpower:
eithermilitary forceor economicstrength.'3 Thus,insteadof a map
whichsimplifies thelandscape so thatwe canunderstand it,we areleft
witha distortion.
Thereis a secondreasonfortheinadequacy ofthemap.The clumsi-
nessthatcomesfromthetimeless concept ofpoweris compounded by
theconfusing useofotherconcepts thataredatedin morewaysthan
one,and whichthetheory appliesto situations in whichtheydo not
fit.The modeloftherealists is a highly embellished ideal-typeofeight-
eenth-and nineteenth-century international relations.
This visionof
thegoldenage is takenas a norm,bothforempirical analysis,andfor
evaluation.A number of oddities of thetheory areexplained thereby.
First,thelackofan adequatediscussion ofends.Forwhenall theactors
havealmostthesamecredo,itbecomes easyto forget theeffectsofthe
commoncredoon theactors'behavior, and to omitfromamongthe
mainvariables ofthetheory a factor whoseroleseemsconstant." It is
nevertheless an opticalillusionto mistake a particularpattern forthe
normof a scientific system. Secondly, theconception of an objective
andeasilyrecognizable national interest is onewhichmakessenseonly
in a stableperiodin whichtheparticipants playforlimited ends,with
limitedmeans,and without domestic kibitzers to disrupt theplayers'
moves.In sucha period,thesurvival of themainplayers is rarelyat
stakein the game,and a hierarchy can rathereasilybe established
amongtheotherand farlessvitalinterests thatare at stake.Today,
survivalis almostalwaysin question, and themostdivergent courses
of actioncan be recommended as choicesforsurvival.'5 An attempt
atusingthetheory as a keytotheunderstanding ofcontemporary reali-
tiesputsoneintheposition ofa Tiresiaswhorecognizes interestswhich
theparties refuseto see,whodiagnoses permanence wheretheparties
12
It is impossibleto subsumeunderone word variablesas different as poweras a
conditionof policyand power as a criterionof policy;power as a sum of resources
and poweras a set of processes;poweras a potentialand powerin use.
13On thislast point,see,e.g.,A. F. K. Organski's"economicpowermonism"in his
WorldPolitics,New York, i958.
14Morgenthau's viewson therole of motivesand of ideologicalpreferencesare to be
foundin PoliticsAmongNations,New York,i955, pp. 6-7and 8off.Similarviewsare
expressedby KennethW. Thompsonin Roy Macridis,ed., ForeignPolicyin World
Politics,New York, i958, pp. 35I-55.
15See Thomas I. Cook and MalcolmMoos, "ForeignPolicy:The Realismof Ideal-
ism,"AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,XLVI, No. 2 (JuneI952), pp. 342-56; Raymond
Aron, "En qu'te d'une philosophicde la politiqueetrangere," Revue Franfaisede
SciencePolitique,iii, No. i (January-MarchI953), pp. 69-9i.

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352 WORLD POLITICS
findconfusing change,and whoseex postfactoomniscience is both
irritatingandirrelevant.
Thirdly, theidea thatthenationalinterest carriesitsown morality
is alsoone whichmakessenseonlyin a stableperiod(althoughit is
strangely phrased).Foritis in sucha periodthatan international con-
sensusassures at leastthepossibility
ofaccommodation ofnationalob-
jectives:theconflictsof interestswhichareinvolved arenotstruggles
between competing internationalmoralities.
The philosophical plural-
ismimplicit in therealisttheory (whichpurports tobe bothnormative
andempirical) is hardlytolerablein periodsof"nationalistic
universal-
ism,"anditisunnecessary inperiodsofstabilityandmoderation, which
bloomonlybecauseof a basicagreement on values.Fourth,theem-
phasison therationality offoreign policyandthedesiretobrushaside
theirrationalelements as intrusionsor pathologicaldeviations
areun-
derstandableonlyin terms ofcabinetdiplomacy, wheresuchdeviations
appear(especially withthebenefit of hindsight)to havebeenrare.
There,rationality seemedlikethesimpleadjustment ofmeanstostable
and generally recognized ends.Theseconcepts are farlessapplicable
to a periodin whichthepoliticalstruggles involveprimarily thede-
termination of ends.16 Thus,behindtheclaimto realism, we finda
reactionary
utopia.
The consequence of thisinadequacy of themapis thatthetheory's
usefulnessas a generaltheory forthedisciplineis limited.
In thefirst
place,fromthepointofviewofsystematic empirical thetheory
analysis,
stresses
theautonomy ofinternationalrelations
to thepointofleaving
beyonditspale theforceswhichworkforchangeand which,cutting
acrossthestates, affectthestates'behavior.17
We are presented both
witha singlekeyto theclosedroomof politicsamongnations, and
witha warning thattheroomis in a housewhosekeywe cannothave,
or whoseopeningmustbe leftto the"workman-like of
manipulation
perennialforces."18
We arenottoldwhattheyare,orhowtheyoperate.
We reachat thispointoneofthemostfundamental ofthe
ambiguities
theory.The postulate of thepermanence ofpowerpolitics amongna-
tionsas thecoreofinternational relations
tendstobecomea goal.The
static
qualitiesofthetheory leadtoconfusion between thephenomenon
16 These argumentsare developed by Henry A. Kissinger in A World Restored,Bos-

ton, I 957. The application of a rationalityof means to the selection of ends is, it seems
to me, one of the fallacies that mar the argument for limited nuclear war.
17 See Hans J. Morgenthau, "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the
United States," AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,XLVI, No. 4 (December I952), pp.
973-76; and a critique of this attitudein Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and
the Childrenof Darkness,New York, 1944, pp. I73ff.
18Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 9.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 353
of powerconflicts and the transitory formsand institutions in which
such conflicts have been takingplace in recentcenturies. Why should
the soundreminderthatpoweris hereto staymean thatthe present
system ofnation-states willcontinue, or changeonlythroughforcesthat
are of no concernto us? Such an attitudeis a double evasion:from
the empiricaldutyof accountingforchange,and fromthe normative
task of assessingwhetherthe presentsystemshouldindeed continue.
One cannothelpbutfeelthat,in spiteof Mr. Morgenthau's qualifying
statements, thereis behindhis theorytheold positionthatwhateverhas
been,mustcontinue.
This bringsus to a secondlimitation, whichconcernstheusefulness
of theschemeas a normative theory.It is something
of a successphilos-
ophy.The criterion of a good foreignpolicyis its rationality,but the
touchstone of rationalityis success.Unfortunatelythe standardsof suc-
cessand failureare not made clear.First,how will we distinguish be-
tween the folliesof straightutopianismand the fallaciesof wrong
realism-realismthatdid not work?"9Secondly,fromwhat viewpoint
shallwe decidewhethera statesman has succeededor failed?Shall we
turnto historyalone? But at whatstage?Metternich had succeededby
1825, failedbyi848, and writers disagreeas towhetherhe had succeeded
or failed by 1914.20 If we set our standardsoutside and above history,we
must avoid tryingto prove that historywill inevitablyrecompense
policiesthatmeetour standards.Otherwise, we becomesalesmenfora
philosophicalstand who traveltheroadsof history in searchof a clien-
teleofconfirmations, ratherthanscholarstestinga hypothesis or philos-
ophersinterested in an ideal whichhistorycannotpromiseto blessat
all times.
The former positionwe wishto avoid.It is particularly
uncomfortable
when one's basic postulateabout human natureis such that history
cannotbe anythingbut a tale fullof sound and fury,signifying noth-
ing.2'This viewmakesit impossibleto understandhow therecould be
a rationaltheoryof rationalhumanbehavior.This is not the last con-
tradiction:the realisttheorycombinesa Hobbesian image of naked
powerpoliticswithan attemptto show thatstatesare nevertheless not
condemnedto a lifethatis "nasty,brutish,and short."Realism thus
19 Aron, op.cit.; David Thomson in ContemporaryPolitical Science, Paris, UNESCO,
i950, pp. 588-89.
20
See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, London, i951, pp. 89-9i.
21
Reason, "far from following its own inherent impulses, is driven toward its goal
by the irrationalforcesthe ends of which it serves" (Morgenthau, ScientificMan versus
Power Politics, p. 154). See Alfred Grosser, "L'etude des relations internationales,
specialite americaine?" Revue Franfcaisede Science Politique, VI, No. 3 (July-September
i956), pp. 634-5I.

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354 WORLD POLITICS
puts its faithin voluntary restraints, moderation, and the underlying
assumptionof possible harmonyamong national interests-points
scarcelyadmittedby the originalpostulate.Finally,thereis a sharp
contrastbetweenthispostulate,whose logic is a permanentclash of
forcesof evil,and thenormof eighteenthand nineteenth-century in-
ternational relations-theperiodin which the world'sstateof nature
was mostLockian,and Morgenthau's view of humannaturemostun-
justified.
With such flawsand contradictions, the policyguidancewhichthe
realisttheoryis able to affordis limited.Realismallowsus to eliminate
thosepoliciesthatwould foolishlyforgetthe prerequisiteof power;
butit doesnotgo muchfurther. Too manyfactors are leftoutforrealist
adviceto avoid the dilemmaof homiliesand admonishments, or sug-
gestionsinappropriate for revolutionary periods.22The light that il-
luminatedthe landscapein the quiet obscurityof nineteenth-century
politicsis blownoutby today'stempest.
There are otherattemptsat providingus witha masterkey,and at
explainingas largean amountofdata as possible.I referto philosophies
of history,to which specialistsin international relationshave some-
timesturnedand are likelyto turn.23 Like Hegel and Marx,Spengler
and (especially)Toynbeeare beingadoptedby politicalscientists after
havingbeen repudiatedby historians. They fill manyof the gaps of
realism.Whereasrealismis too muchconcernedwithtimelessproposi-
tionsand permanentnecessities, the philosophersare rightlydealing
with problemsof time and change,and with the effectsof changes
withintheunitsoftheworldon therelationsamongtheseunits.Where-
as realismputsthestateat thecenterof itsanalysis,philosophiesof his-
toryremindus thatworldpoliticsis morethantheintersection of vari-
ous foreignpolicies,and thatthesepoliciesoftendepend on whether
thestatesaddressthemselves to othermembersof thesame civilization
or culture,or to completeoutsiders.These philosophiesare usefulalso
becauseof theirmethod:the comparisonof culturesor civilizationsas
if theywere contemporary carriesa lessonforinternational relations.
22 This is frequentlythecase withGeorgeKennan.See WilliamG. Carleton,"Brain-
trustersof AmericanForeignPolicy,"WorldPolitics,vii, No. 4 (JulyI955), pp. 627-
39. On the possibilityof justifyingin realisttermsa policythatcan also be advocated
on utopiangrounds,see WarnerR. Schilling,"The Clarification of Ends, or, Which
InterestIs theNational?"ibid.,viii,No. 4 (JulyI956), pp. 566-78.
23 See KennethW. Thompson,"Toynbeeet la politiquemondialecontemporaine,"
Diogene, xiii (JanuaryI956), pp. 60-go; idem, "Mr. Toynbeeand World Politics,"
WorldPolitics,Viii, No. 3 (April I956), pp. 374-9I; idem, "Toynbeeand the Theory
of International Politics,"PoliticalScience Quarterly,
LXXI, No. 3 (SeptemberI956),
pp. 365-86.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 355
Finally,philosophers of history havea disarming wayof makingex-
plicit,and evencentral, assumptions aboutman,society, and history
whichareoftenrepressed butnevertheless operating in all socialscien-
tists'schemes. Suchcandoris to be commended.
However, we areoncemorein thepresence of a shortcut.Here,a
teleological interpretation whichdiscourages further research andtwists
thefactsintoa predetermined pattern is substituted forcarefuland
systematic explanation. It is "a setof advance-judgements,"2" a flaw
we foundalready in realism. Hencemanysimilarities. First,thenetis
toowide-meshed to catchall themainfactors in worldaffairs and to
accountforthemainforcesat workin a givenperiod.Secondly, his-
toryis againransacked forconfirmation of a postulate, and factsthat
do notfitareleftoutorthrown together underheadings thataresome-
timestautological rather thanexplanatory; thedifference fromrealism
liesinthenature ofthepostulate: organic metaphors orspiritualrevela-
tionsreplacethepowerdrive.Thirdly, successor survival frequently
serves as a criterion offitness ofcivilizations or nations, forthisis the
onlywayoutoftheimpasseofa "normative pattern fortheevaluation
of lawsderivedempirically."25
Sincephilosophers ofhistory seein history theunfolding ofa design
ratherthanthemererepetition of a basicpattern, theworldis no
longerregarded as a field,butas a planin whichcertain forceswork
towardan endwantedbyGod,nature, or history itself.Consequently,
themainunitsofanalysis areentities lesslikelytoresist sucha scheme
thantheordinary unitsof historians or socialscientists. The philos-
ophersdeal withclasses,peoples,civilizations, cultures-units which
areeither veryusefulforusbutcannotbe ourexclusive analytical tools,
or altogether artificialcongeries whoseconstruction and use areopen
to challenge.26 Thuswe canpickoutoftheseschemes usefulinsights,
and thinkaboutsuggestive hypotheses. Butthisroadendsin thesky,
notin a theory ofinternational relations.

III
Thereis another
roadwhichis supposedto endin theory.
It is be-
ginning
tobe muchtraveled.
In a way,itseemslesspretentious.
Those
24 ErnestBarkerin M. F. AshleyMontagu,ed., Toynbeeand History,Boston,1956,
pp. 94-95. See also TalcottParsons,Essaysin SociologicalTheory,Pure and Applied,
Glencoe,Ill., 1949, pp. 23ff.
25 HenryA. Kissinger, "The Meaningof History,"unpublished
dissertation,
Harvard
UniversityLibrary,p. I43.
26PitirimSorokinin P. Geyl,A. Toynbee,and P. Sorokin,The Patternof the Past,
Boston,1949, pp. I I 1-12,

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356 WORLD POLITICS

whotakeit do notclaimto havea thesis, The


a generalexplanation.
over-all
theory is to be butthefinalsalaryforlongand hardlabor.
But,itis said,we shallearnoursalaryonlyifwe beginwitha broad
anddetailed conceptualframework,a scheme"within whichitmaybe
possibleto organizea theory"and "whichspecifies thevariableswhich
a theorywill employ."We startwitha centralconcept,or a setof cen-
tralrelatedconcepts, whichwill allow us to ask therightquestionsand
to analyzethe data systematically. We should end with a refinedset
of laws and propositions"capable of refutationor confirmation by
meansof controlledexperiment or systematic observation."27
There is much in theseideas thatis sound.But theirultimateuse-
fulnessdependson how theyare applied.Attemptsmade so farseem
to me both discouragingand dangerous.There have been two main
varieties:on the one hand, an attemptinspiredby "generalsystems
theory"(applied to international relations,
interpretedin termsof "sys-
temsof action") as a firststep towarda "systemof theory";on the
otherhand, attemptsat using as a conceptualschemeone particular
concept,supposedlystrategicenoughto allow the organizationof the
whole fieldaroundit. These two varietieswill be discussedseparately;
but theyhave commoncharacteristics, and many remarksabout the
firstgroupapplyat leastin partto the secondgroupas well.
Systemstheoryhas progressedmainlyin social sciencesotherthan
thoseconcernedwith politics.It is a spectaculardevelopmentof the
behavioralsciences.Its advocatein international relationsis primarily
MortonKaplan. To put it bluntly,I believethatsystemstheoryis a
huge misstepin the rightdirection-thedirectionof systematic em-
piricalanalysis.
It is an effortwhichraisesfundamental questionsabout the proper
purposeand methodsofthesocialsciencesin general,and international
relationsin particular.A writerhas recentlywonderedwhetherthe
purposeof scientismsuch as systemstheorywas to producesystems
ratherthanto achieveunderstanding of thesocialworld.28 "The actual
processis primarily one of splittingverbalhairswithan axe."29Such
efforts tend to investalmostall the scholars'energyin the building
27 Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Relations, New York,
I957, p. xi. Similarremarksare foundin TalcottParsonsand EdwardShils,Towarda
General Theory of Action, Cambridge, Mass., I95i, esp. pp. 50-56.
28N. Jacobson in RolandYoung, ed., Approaches to the Study of Politics, Chicago,
I958, pp. II5-24. See also StanleyHoffmann, "Tendancesde la sciencepolitiqueaux
Etats-Unis," Revue FranCaise de Science Politique, vii, No. 4 (October-December
I957),
PP- 9I3-32.
29 Barrington Moore,Jr.,"The New Scholasticism and theStudyof Politics,"World
Politics,VI,No. I (OctoberI953), p. I29. See also Morgenthau,
op.cit.,note7 above,p.
443-

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 357
of modelsand boxesand the discussionof method.As a consequence,
only thoseproblemsthatare relevantto the systemsare being con-
sidered,whatevertheirrelevanceto thefield.The complexity and bar-
rennessof theseattemptsremindme of the fabulouslycomplicated
machinebuilta fewyearsago by an Americanengineer.Its onlypoint
was thatit had no point.
Systemstheoristshave mistakenlyidentifiedthe methodsof the
physicalsciencesand thepurposesof the socialsciences,withthepara-
doxicalresultthatwhereasphysicalscientists shapetheirtoolsin order
to promotediscoveries and produceresults,manysocial scientists tend
to lose sightof theirsubjectand to do a Sisyphus-like job of methodo-
logical Byzantinism. Aristotle'swarninghas been forgotten:"Look
forprecisionin each class of thingsjust so far as the natureof the
subjectadmits."30 The scientific
purposesof the representatives of this
trend(admirablysummedup by Mr. Kaplan's effort)are: to discover
laws,recurrent patterns, regularities,
high-levelgeneralizations;to make
of predictabilitya testof science; to achieveas soon as possiblethe
ideal of a deductivescience,includinga "setof primitive terms,defini-
tions and axioms" from which "systematictheoriesare derived."3"
These objectives, it seemsto me, are the wrongones.
The searchforlaws is based on a misunderstanding, by social scien-
tists,of thenatureof laws in thephysicalsciences;theselaws are seen
as farmorestrictand absolutethantheyare. The bestwe can achieve
in our disciplineis the statement of trends.Because the experimental
methodsavailablein thesocialsciencesare "notcapableof demonstrat-
ing any causal laws," we can only eliminatecertainhypotheses(i.e.,
find "negativelaws"), and thus definelimits,withinwhich certain
trendscan be suggestedwith"some degreeof approximation" only.32
The reductionof ourfieldto a systemof laws,evenif it could be done,
would be an impoverishment. As Max Weberwarned,the knowledge
of social laws is not the knowledgeof social reality,but merelyan
aid forattainingthisend.33The mostgeneral"laws" of international
relationsare boundto be fairlytrivialgeneralizations, forin the social
30 Quoted by Carl J. Friedrich, Political Philosophy and the Science
of Politics,
Padua, I957, p. 8.
31 Kaplan,op.cit., p. xi. See also Hans Zetterberg
in Paul Lazarsfeldand MorrisRosen-
berg,eds., The Language of Social Research, Glencoe,Ill., I955, pp. 533-40.
32 M. Cohen and E. Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and ScientificMethod, New
York,I934, pp. 266-67. See also Karl Popper,The Povertyof Historicism, Boston,Mass.,
1957, pp. II5ff.; Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences, New York,I958,
pp. 175-76 and 237-
33 Edward Shilsand H. A. Finch,eds.,Max Weberon theMethodology of theSocial
Sciences, Glencoe,Ill., I949, pp. 73ff.and 77ff.

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358 WORLD POLITICS

sciences"regularities are foundonlyat thelevelof wholes,"which


mustbebroken up ifwe wanttounderstand reality.34The discovery of
platitudes is oftenan excellent pointofdeparture, alwaysan execrable
destination.
Predictability ispossible onlyinareas(suchas military action)where
thenumber ofvariables is limitedand knownin advance-twocon-
ditionswhicharerarely metin thesocialsciences, and neverpossible
at thelevelofa generaltheory. Here again,thebestwe can do is to
projectintothefuture a limitednumber of possibletrends, and rank
themconditionally ("otherthingsbeingequal" . . . ). Accuracy of
predictions shouldnot becomethe touchstone of adequatetheory.35
The idealofa deductive scienceraisestwosetsof seriousproblems.
On theonehand,evenifonerecognizes thatevery science rightlywants
to becomea closedsystem of hypotheses, thereal questionremains
whether manysocialscientists do notshowunduehastein trying to
beginwitha closedsystem, deprived of sufficient empirical referents.
The construction ofpurelyabstract hypotheses basedon a smallnum-
ber of axioms,fromwhicha numberof propositions are deduced,
eitheris a strange formofparlorgame,tooremote fromreality to be
"testable," or else restson postulates aboutthe behaviorof the in-
cludedvariables, whichare eithertoo arbitrary or too general;the
choiceis between perversion andplatitude.It is thepriceofhaste.36 A
purescience ofpolitics,divorced fromactualpolitics, is as objectionable
as a puretheory oflaw,divorced fromexisting law.
On theotherhand,ifwe shouldagreethatthescienceof interna-
tionalrelations cannotbe deductive attheoutset, we arestillfacedwith
a secondproblem: whatmethods shouldweusenow'intrying toreduce
themassoffactsto scientific analysis
and order?It seemsto me that
"systems scientism," evenin its moreconcrete or inductive aspects,
usestotally inappropriate techniques.Therearetwosortsofaberrations.
The first is a cocktailofmethods borrowed fromothersciences. Thus,
Mr.Kaplangrafts concepts tornfromsociology, economics, cybernetics,
biology,andastronomy ontoa verydifferent subject-astrange method
in
fora believer "systems." The previous question, whether thesecon-
ceptsfitourfield,has notbeenasked.Consequently, thisinterdisci-
plinaryarsenalserves a pointless invasionofourfieldbyuprooted for-
34RaymondAron,Introduction a la philosophic
de l'histoire,
Paris,1948,p. 227.
35 See JohnStuartMill, A Systemof Logic, London, I930, pp. 554 and 594; C. J.
Friedrich,Constitutional
Government and Democracy,Boston,I946, pp. 571-72; Mor-
genthau,op.cit.,note io above,pp. I50-5I.
36 See JessieBernard'scritiquein International SociologicalAssociation,
The Nature
of Conflict,
Paris,I957, pp. 64ff.Mill'sclassiccritiqueof theabstract
and concrete
deduc-
tivemethodsin the socialsciencesis of vitalimportance here.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 359
eignmethods, ratherthana guidedraidintoneighboring fieldsby a
rigorous method ofourown.
Anotheraberration is the mushrooming of mathematical models,
supposed toaccount forlargepartsofthefield.Now,either thescientist
includes in hismodelonlythevariables thatcan be measured; in this
case,heis likelytoleaveoutsomeofthemoredecisive ones,andtoput
insatellitefactors,whichmerely reflect,orresult
from, moreimportant
variables whichareleftoutbecausetheyarenotmeasurable. Hence,far
fromexplaining reality,manysuchmodelsseemonlyto givemathe-
maticalsubstance to shadows, andtodriveresearch intothechaseand
measurement of shadows.Or else,themodelbuilders tryto measure
all theimportant variables,butthisinvolves somefantastic assumptions,
suchas thepostulate thatinourdiscipline quantificationalwaysentails
a gainin precision rather thana possibleloss,or thatquantities meas-
uredindependently can be addedor combinedmeaningfully.37 The
resultis alwaysa timeless andclosedmathematical universe.
Notonlyarethepurposes andmethods ofsystems scientism opento
criticism.The results achieved so farin internationalrelationsarealso
questionable, on threecounts. First,themaptheseefforts producedoes
notallowus to recognize thelandscape. Preciselybecausetheyaimat
a highlevelofgenerality and use toolscomingfromotherdisciplines,
thesesystems do notcapture thestuff ofpolitics.
Theyarebuilton the
shakyfoundations of metaphors takentoo seriously.38 The political
patterns theystudyarealwaysreducedto something else.Bothin Mr.
Kaplan'sand in someof Karl Deutsch'searlierworks,menand so-
cietiesarereducedto communication systems,without muchconcern
forthesubstance ofthe"messages" thesenetworks carry. Maybecom-
munication theory willprovetobe thecommon framework forefforts
thatseektointerpret thebehavior ofall systems"fromatomicparticles
to galaxies,"fromviruses to planets.39Butthisis notwhatwe arein-
terestedin here.In addition to communication theory, Mr.Kaplanhas
transplanted intoaliensoilsomeproducts ofstructural-functionaltheory.
Eventhoughhe starts withone goodidea,and one soundwarning:
37See JeanRivero,"Introduction to a Studyof the Developmentof Federal Socie-
ties,"International
Social ScienceBulletin,iv, No. i (Spring1952), pp. 14-15; Robert
MacIver,Social Causation,Boston,1942, pp. 48ff.; GunnarHeckscher,The Studyof
ComparativeGovernment and Politics,London, 1957, pp. 20-21.
38 "We cannotthinkcreatively withoutmetaphors, but any metaphoris in danger
of becominga categoricalimperative"(David Riesmanin Leonard D. White,ed.,
The Stateof theSocial Sciences,Chicago,1956, p. 338). Contra,see HerbertA. Simon
and AllenNewell in ibid.,pp. 66-83.
39 JamesG. Millerin ibid.,pp. 29-65. See Karl Deutsch,"Mechanism, Organismand
Society:Some Models in Natural and Social Science,"Philosophyof Science,xviii,
No. 3 (July1951), pp. 230-33.

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360 WORLD POLITICS

theidea thattherearevarioustypesofinternational
systems,and the
warningthatthesetypesare not integrated socialsystems,he soon
forgets
thewarning andoverextendstheidea.He borrows hisvocabu-
whosemodelis theintegrated
laryfroma discipline andwhose
society,
concepts milieucharacterized
do not fitthe smallinternational by
"theextraordinarydiversity
ofnational Suchheterogeneity
situations."40
vitiatesan abstractdiscussionin termsof general "role functions":
fromthe viewpointof the "total system"the differences betweenthe
basic unitsare as importantas the similarities;the oppositeis true
when the sociologistlooks at the actorsin the social system.Mr. Kap-
lan's roles,systems,and processesare assumed but not examined.
Consequently, "sociologism"operateshere,too-in themostunlikely
field.International systemsare discussedas if theyhad a compulsive
will of theirown; the implicitGod, Society,who gave its stuffy op-
pressiveness to theuniverseof Comteand Durkheim,is again at work,
undertheincognitoof System.Each systemassignsrolesto actors;the
structure of thesystemsetsitsneeds,its needsdetermineits objectives,
and "theobjectivesof a systemare valuesforthe system."'"The only
processesdiscussedare processesof maintenance, integration, and dis-
integration;for the implied supremevalue is stability:mechanical
stability,sincepurposesand valuesotherthanpreservation of the sys-
temare leftout.It is theusual penaltyforthedoubleattemptto drive
the consideration of values out of the subjectmatter,and to presenta
value-free theory:thestatus quo becomesan empiricaland normative
pivot.42 However,international systemsare alwaysopen and moving
-at leastsufficiently to forceus to abandonthemodel and thevocabu-
laryof theclosedsystem.
Secondly,theinadequacyof theresultscan be shownby pointingto
theirinabilityto explain world politics.On the one hand, excessive
concernforOccam'srazor,and thetendencyto reducepoliticsto what
it is not,entaila loss of suchvitalelementsas institutions,
culture,and
the actionof individualsas autonomousvariablesratherthan social
atoms.As in therealisttheory, Mr. Kaplan's emphasison international
systems also involvesa neglectof thedomesticdeterminants of thena-
tionalactors,and his model of actionleaves out the forcesof change
40 Edwin Dickinson,Law and Peace, Philadelphia,i95i, p. 6; also Charles De
Visscher,Theoryand Realityin Public International
Law, Princeton,N.J.,I957, pp.
153-55-
in W. W. Rostow,"Toward
p. I49. See a critiqueof thistendency
41 Kaplan,op.cit.,
a GeneralTheoryof Action,"WorldPolitics,v, No. 4 (JulyI953), pp. 530-54; and
RaymondAron,GermanSociology,London, i957, pp. 69ff.and io8.
42 MorrisCohen,Reason and Nature,New York, I93I, pp. 343-44.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 361

operating withinoracrosstheactors.43 On theotherhand,thestriving


fortotalobjectivity, thedesireto retainmainlymeasurable elements,
andtheeffort tobuildsystems combine in theproduction ofmodelsin
whichmanyvariables areinterrelated,butwhereno hierarchy is estab-
lishedamongthevariables. The principle of "indeterminacy"44 is fol-
lowedwithrigorous scientism,as ifitwerecompatible withthegoalof
it doesnotallowus to determine
predictability; whatvariables willbe
submitted tothestandard methods
scientific andvalida-
ofverification
tionwhichdetermine whether thesevariables willbe included in orex-
cludedfrom ourscheme;nordoesitallowustodecidelaterwhether the
correlationswehavediscovered aremeaningful and or
relevant not. We
aretoldwhathappenswhenthevariables reacha certain position, but
neverwhytheyshouldreachit,or in whatway.We end withover-
stuffed orwithstatic
boxes, schemes or,atbest,withcomparative statics.
Thirdly,theinadequacy of theresults of systems theory is also re-
vealed,moreindirectly butnotlesseffectively, by thestrange under-
ground connection whichlinksthistheory toa mostobjectionable form
of policyscientism. A viewof thesocialuniverse as theinterplay of
impersonal forces, theprocedural andmechanical theimplied
analogies,
normofstability leadsthesocialscientist almostinevitably to a thera-
peuticand manipulative approach-tothebeliefthatthe controlof
thevariables he hasidentified wouldpushsociety in thedirection that
he (or social"elites")deemsdesirable. The connection betweenthe
coolanddetached objectivityofthetheorist and the"engagement" of
thepolicyscientist is oftenmadethrough anothersetof metaphors:
metaphors aboutthehealthandsickness ofsocietiesandsystems.45 This
wayofarguing canhardlyhaveanyclaimto scientific positivism, for
consistent
it is neither withthepretense ofvalue-freedom, nordoesit
makesenseanalytically so longas we do notknowthelawsofchange
fromonesystem toanother. Indeed,itis a coursewhichleadstohighly
unscientificresults. On theonehand,precisely becausetheschemes es-
tablishedby systems theoristsare staticand non-explanatory, when
thesewriters wantto suggest theytendto jumpfromtheex-
policies,
tremeofindeterminacy totheextreme of"single-trend" analysis. They
suddenly givecrucialimportance to one factor,without realizingthat
sucha decisionpostulates boththeexistence of a generallaw which
43 See the similarities
betweenMorgenthau's and MortonKaplan's conceptionof the
nationalinterest.Kaplan concludesthatit is "objective"(op.cit.,p. i65).
44 Harold Lasswell and AbrahamKaplan, Power and Society,New Haven, Conn.,
I950, p. xvii.
45 See M. Kaplan, opecit.,pp. 4 and 256ff. See also Harold Lasswell,WorldPolitics
and Personal Insecurity,New York, I935.

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362 WORLD POLITICS
states"what kind of changein human culturewill regularlyfollow
upon specificchanges"in the selectedfactor,"and the possibility of
isolatingthisfactor.On theotherhand,relianceon systemand method
is so greatthatthereis a tendency to assumethatthe"laws of equilibri-
um" of the systemor the methodsof scientific analysiswill by them-
selvessettheobjectives to be attained.47
The resultis boundto be either
verydubiousadvice,or a considerableamountof platitudes, all predi-
catedon thefancyconceptionof thesocialscientist as an all-knowing,
thoughdemocratic, brain-washer.
Attemptsat organizingthe disciplinearound a central,unifying
conceptare less ambitiousbut not much morepromising.First,as we
have seen before,the fieldis too huge foreven onlyits principalfea-
turesto be subsumedunder,or explainedby, one key concept.Sec-
ondly,thechoiceof one centralidea is inevitably based upon a postu-
late whichis too debatableto serveas the singlephilosophicalunder-
pinningof a theoreticalsystem.
There have been two such attemptsrecently.The firstis George
Liska's equilibriumtheory.Although,in contrastto the realisttheory,
the centralconceptis supposedlyused only as an analyticaltool,and
not as an explanation, the difference becomesalmostinvisiblein prac-
tice.For thebasic postulateis formulated in termscomparableto the
basic assumptionof realism:statesseek to securethe best attainable
positionofequilibrium(insteadof: statesseekto securethebestpower
position),and theyshouldseek such a positionas "a desirablepolicy
for safeguardinghumane values"48(a statementwhich echoes the
realistphilosophyof the moralnationalinterest).It seemsto me that
thisdouble analyticand evaluativenormis also based on the model
of theworldof cabinetdiplomacy,as the closestapproximation of the
norm.A "staticbias"" is imposedon the data,sinceit is assumedthat
international relationstend towardequilibriumand stability.As the
conceptpresents itselfalso as thenormof a desirablepolicy.thetheory
runsintothe objectionthatbecauseof the countlessvarietiesof "de-
sirable" equilibria,such a norm should be infinitely more refined
beforeit could be accepted.
46 Carl G.
Hempel,"The Functionof GeneralLaws in History,"Journalof Philos-
ophy,xxxix,No. 2 (JanuaryI942), pp. 35-47.An exampleof this tendencycan be
foundin Harold Lasswell'sstudy,"World Organizationand Society,"in D. Lerner
and H. Lasswell,eds., The PolicySciences,Stanford,Calif.,I95I, pp. I02ff. See the
critiqueby GeorgeLipsky,"The Theoryof International Relationsof Harold Lass-
well,"journal of Politics,xvii, No. i (FebruaryI955), pp. 43-58.
47 See MortonA. Kaplan, "An Introduction to the Strategyof Statecraft,"
World
Politics, iv, No. 4 (July I952), pp. 549-76.
48 Liska,International
Equilibrium,p. i6.
49 GunnarMyrdal,An AmericanDilemma,New York, 1949, p. 1052.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 363
Butherewe meetthemoretechnical defectsofthescheme.Again,
likepower,theconcept ofequilibrium is bothtoobroadand toonar-
rowto serveas a usefulcentraltool.Too broad:in orderto makeit
meaningful, one has to distinguish varioustypesof equilibrium; the
theorysoonbecomesas overcomplicated as thatof realismwas over-
and thereaderwondershow theequilibrium
simplified,50 amongall
thepartialequilibriais evergoingtobe assured. Too narrow:therisk
of puttingat thecoreofa system a mechanistic conceptis as greatas
thedangerofemphasizing an instrumental conceptlikepower;forit
entailsneglectof thepurposes of theactors, whoseobjectives largely
determine thenatureof thefinal"equilibrium." Again,mostof the
processesofchangeareleftoutof theanalysis, although theyusually
prevent internationalsystems fromattaining equilibrium. Thereis a
finalflawpeculiarto equilibrium analysis. This framework is largely
a productofmetaphoric thinking-this timeanimport fromeconomics.
The conceptof equilibrium makessensein a universe of measurable
in whichhumanbehavior
variables, canbe treated as a parameter, and
whoserulesaredetermined bythepolitical and socialuniverse which
includesit.Suchanalysis makeslittlesensein thepolitical universe, for
heretheestablishment oftheserulesis oneofthemainstakes, human
behavior mustbe treated as uncertain, mostvariables arenotmeasur-
able,and theempirical verificationof equilibrium is limitedto very
smallsectors ofbehavior.5" Attempts at treating politicalaffairs as an
equivalent of economics, at measuring poweras if it werewealth,
andatanalyzing politicalprocessesas iftheywerean exchange ofgoods
can only,likeotherborrowings, end in platitudes or in questionable
hypotheses basedon toosmalla selection ofvariablesor toodistorting
a setof assumptions.52
With the secondattempt, RichardSnyder'sdecision-making ap-
proach,53we moveback to a schemewhichis largelyinspiredby
moderntheoriesof organization and communication. We can no
50 See Liska's distinctions of variousequilibria(op.cit., pp. I3-I4, 52, 57, I32ff.).
51 See David Easton, "Limitsof the EquilibriumModel in Social Research,"Be-
havioral Science, I, No. 2 (April i956), pp. 96-104. For instance,the "balancebetween
the power of the principalGreatPowers and theirsense of responsibility and self-
restraint"(Liska, op.cit., p. i58) is hardlya measurablequantity.
52 See a critiqueof theseattempts by BrunoLeoni, "The Meaningof 'Political'in
Political Decisions," Political Studies, v, No. 3 (October 1957), pp. 225-39. Talcott Par-
sons has emphasizedthe fundamental differences
betweeneconomicsand politicsin
The Social System, Glencoe,Ill., I95I, pp. 55Iff.; his recentattemptto analyze the
"polity"as a "subsystem of society"parallelwiththe economy(in RolandYoung,ed.,
Approaches to the Study of Politics, Chicago,I958, pp. 298ff.) is not veryencouraging.
53 RichardC. Snyder, H. W. Bruck,and BurtonSapin,Decision-making as an Ap-
proach to the Study of InternationalPolitics, Princeton, N.J.,I954; also R. C. Snyder
in Young,ed., op.cit.,pp. 4ff.

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364 WORLD POLITICS

longeraccusetheauthorofleavingout toomanycrucialvariables, or
ofputting at theheartof his schemea conceptwhosevalueimplica-
tionsand empirical significanceinterfere witheachother.Indeed,the
framework suffersfromexactly theopposite defects. The boxbuiltby
Mr.Snyder is so fullofsmallerboxeswithinboxesthat,beforeit can
be used,muchhastobe thrown out.His approach obeystheprinciple
ofindeterminacy andfailsto suggest whichone of thenumerous ele-
mentsthatmakeup themanysidesof thebox are likelyto be most
One of theparadoxes
relevant.54 of thesearchforpure"interrelated-
ness"is thattheschemeendswitha mereenumeration offactors:we
arebeingshownthepearls,and we are toldthattheyare somehow
connected. In addition, thecombined disadvantage ofthis"value-free"
centralconcept andoftheloanfromorganization and communication
theoriesis proceduralism-the view,oncemore,of worldpoliticsas
a setofprocedures (easilyrepresented bycirclesand arrows)irrespec-
tiveofthesubstance ofthe"messages" carriedor decisions made.
As fortheassumption behindtheconcept, it is that"action"in in-
ternationalrelations canbe defined as a setofdecisions madebyrecog-
nizableunits.Thispostulate canbe attacked bothforwhatit includes
and forwhatit excludes.First,it impliesthatpoliticsis normally
madeup ofhighlyconscious movesandchoiceswhichcanbe analyzed
in termsofneatcategories. I am notsurethatthisis thewaythings
happen,thatactionscan easilybe isolatedin time,pinneddownlike
brokenup intodistinct
butterflies, elements, and comparedas if a
meansto measurealternatives and preferences in politicshad been
invented.Secondly, thepostulate leavesout of international relations
everything thatis notthemereaddition ofseparate decisionsmadeby
variousunits.Manypatterns and rulesofworldpolitics, suchas the
balanceofpowerorinternational law,areonlyinparta deliberate prod-
uctofstatesmen's will.In part,thebalanceofpoweris a broadauto-
maticdevice, andinternational lawtheaccretion ofcustoms whichcan-
notbe explained byMr. Snyder's "phenomenological" approach. The
theory'sfocusmightbe rightforforeign-policy analysis,
butit is too
weakfortherestof international relations.Generalizations basedon
comparative studiesofdecision-making willbe misleading iftheinter-
nationalcontext whichconditions thebehavior oftheunitsis notstud-
ied moreadequately. All thisdoesnotmeanthatdecision-making is
nota highly usefultoolofanalysis. In fact,Mr.Snyder's schemeis most
54 Compare Snyder's scheme with Bernard C. Cohen's simpler and convincing frame-

work in The Political Process and Foreign Policy, Princeton,N.J., 1957. See Herbert
McClosky, "Concerning Strategiesfor a Science of InternationalPolitics," World Poli-
tics, viii, No. 2 (January1956), pp. 281-95.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 365

as a detailedapproachto thestudyof
Butit is impressive
impressive.
notto thewholeof international
decision-making, relations.

IV
We havebeenengagedin a wrecking operation. Nevertheless, the
needforconceptualization and theoryremains. I wouldliketo offer
somesuggestions fora farmoremodestand slowwayof proceeding
towardtheory. Theyare basedon postulates whichare certainly as
debatableas thoseI havediscussed. Butthereis a difference: I do not
claimthatit is possibleto squeezethewholecamelof international
relations
through theeyeofone needle.
Indeed,myfirst assumption is oneofrelativism andpluralism. Each
one of theapproaches I havereviewed has something to contribute;
noneis theonlyrightwayofphrasing thequestion, or theonlyright
answer.In everysocialscience, and quiteobviously here,thefactswe
can gatherare too numerous, too opento conflicting interpretations,
too "unstructured,"to fitonlyone schemeof analysis.55 The broader
theareathesocialscientistwantstounderstand, themorehe is guided
byhisownvalues.The author's postulatesareshowneither bythekind
of hierarchyhe establishesamongvariables, or by his refusal,in the
name of "system," to establisha hierarchy. sometimes
Social scientists
act as if theinevitablesubjectivity
of theirminds-potentially as useful
as an entrepreneur'sinventiveness-were somesortofbiasto be ashamed
of.The onlyalternative to an open statement of valuesby socialscien-
tistsleads to "the characteristic suppressionof theseprob-
positivistic
lemsundera new disguise."56 Furthermore, we neverapproacha whole
fieldmerelywiththe desireto "understand"it. The analyticalmodels
we use areinfluenced bothbyeach age's viewof humannatureand by
the mostpressingcontemporary problems.The systemsof todayare
keyed to the problems of statecraftraisedby a bipolarworld and by
thespreadof nationalism. The new imageof man as one livingorgan-
ism amongmany,conditionedby environment, and to be bestunder-
stood in termsof adjustmentor maladjustment, underliesmuch of
modern social science,includinginternationalrelations.
Secondly,when one triesto understanda field,thereis no sounder
methodthan thatof drawingone's questionsand concepts,"as An-
5 Talcott Parsons, The Structureof Social Action,New York, I937, pp. 592ff., Ray-
mond Aron, La theorie de l'histoire dans l'Allemagne contemporaine, Paris, 1938,
pp. 255 and 266ff.
56 C. J. Friedrich in Robert Merton et al., Reader in Bureaucracy,Glencoe, Ill., 1952,
p. 33. See also Thomas I. Cook, review of Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society,
in Journalof Philosophy,XLVIII, No. 22 (October i95i), p. 698.

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366 WORLD POLITICS

taeus'strengthwasdrawn,fromcontact withtheearth."57 Thismeans


thatour toolsof analysisshouldbe borrowed fromotherdisciplines
onlyinsofar as theydealwithfactors orunitsrelevant to international
relations.
Furthermore, international like othersocialrela-
relations,
involve
tions, notmereimpersonal forces, butmen.It is through men's
valuesandinstitutions,throughthethoughts of
and acts theirleaders,
thatthebasicfactors of thematerial environment affect international
relations.
Therefore theconsideration ofmen'svalues,beliefs, andemo-
of
tions, theirpurposes and ideas,is indispensable.58 to
It is preferable
phraseandcheckone'shypotheses byreferring to commonly accepted
notions ofhumanbehavior, thantodo so byturning to theconduct of
gasesorpistons.
Thirdly, becauseoftheinevitable subjectivityand "problem-orienta-
tion"ofthesocialscientist,and becauseofthepresence ofhumanbe-
ingsinall theprocesseswe wanttostudy, thestrictdistinction between
"purelyscientific"and "normative"theoryshould be dropped.We
evaluateas we breathe,and ifwe don'tdo it in termsof ethicalnorms,
we do in termsof "integration," "eufunction," and "dysfunction." Poli-
ticsis a purposeful foreignpolicyinvolvesquestionsof rightor
activity;
wrong.To deal only with "objectivebehavior,"or to resortonly to
strictly scientific
investigations,
is like tryingto explainman afterwe
have merelyseenhim movehis handsand lips in a phonebooth.Fur-
thermore, "purescience"is a myth:sciencehas its own philosophical
postulates, and eventhemostapparently objectiveschemehas itsnorma-
tiveimplications. Sciencewhich refusesto pronounceon value prob-
lemsleadsto a policyscientism whichacceptsthevaluessetby thepol-
icy-makers-for pure empiricalsciencecannottell us what we should
do-and thenproceedsin thename of scienceto a taskof engineering
basedon truncated premises;foras Mill stated,good policyadvicepre-
supposesbothscienceand a teleology.Conversely, discussionsof value
problemsin worldaffairs, divorcedfroma consideration of thespecial
milieuand thespecialrulesofthegame,willproduceonlystalemoraliz-
ing.
On thebasisof theprecedingpostulates, I would like to suggesttwo
kindsof systematicresearch.The firstis turnedtowardthe past; it is
butfarfromexclusively,
predominantly, empirical.The secondis turned
57McClosky, op.cit.,p. 295. See also RichardPipes,"Max Weberand Russia,"World
Politics, viI, No. 3 (April 1955), pp. 371-401.
58See Edgar S. Furniss,Jr.,"The Contribution of Nicholas JohnSpykmanto the
Studyof International Politics,"WorldPolitics,iv, No. 3 (April 1952), pp. 38i-40i;
Jean Gottman,"Geographyand International Relations,"ibid., iII, No. 2 (January
1951), pp. 154-73; idem,La politiquedes e'tatset la geographie,Paris, 1952, pp. 48-
49, 144-45, i64ff., 205.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 367
towardthefuture, anditis morenormative. Bothareefforts toprovide
us witha reliablemap,simplifying thelandscapeso as to emphasize
itsmostimportant features.We shouldremember thatsomeschemati-
zationis inevitably we
involved; shouldavoid,however, the distor-
tionscriticized above;and we shouldkeepall thosefeatures rightly
and adequately represented on theprevious mapsthatI reviewed.
Thefirst attempt I wanttosuggest iswhatRaymond Aronhascalled
"historical
sociology."59Itisnota general theory. Atthisstage,therecan
be no moregeneraltheory herethanin,letus say,sociology. It is a
generalapproach basedon thefollowing ideas.The searchfortimeless
propositions and thedeductive methodare,at present, disappointing.
We mustproceedinductively and,beforewe reachany conclusions
abouttrends manifest throughout history, we shouldresort to system-
atichistoricalresearch, notin orderto turnour discipline intohis-
tory, butin orderto accomplish thetaskswhichI willnowtryto de-
scribein generalterms.
Our starting pointwouldbe an analysisof whatRaymondAron
calls"diplomatic constellations,"
or historicalsituations.
Bycomparing
theresultsofouranalysis ofvarioussituations separatedbyfairly even
timeintervals,we wouldbe ableto delimit and describe historicalsys-
temsofinternational relations
(in a waywhichI willdiscusslater);
we wouldtryto identify themainvariables of eachsuchsystem, and
to discoverthedynamics of changefromone system to another. This
stagewouldbe similar to thedescriptionof domestic politicalsystems.
A secondstagewouldbe thecomparison of historicalsystems; here,
oneaspectofourtaskwouldbe theequivalent ofMontesquieu's typol-
ogyofregimes orWeber'stypology ofeconomic actionorofauthority:
we shoulddefine types ofinternationalsystems, eachtypebeingcharac-
terizedbya feature or combination of features whichdetermines its
originality.60
Another sortofcomparison of systems wouldleadus,at
last,tosomemeaningful generalizationsaboutaspects common tomany
59In The Natureof Conflict, pp. 177ff. See also his article,"De l'analysedes con-
stellationsdiplomatiques,"Revue Fran.Caise de SciencePolitique,iv, No. 2 (April-June
1954), pp. 237-51. Cf. Crane Brinton, The Anatomyof Revolution,New York, 1952,
pp. 7ff.; RushtonCoulborn,ed., Feudalismin History,Princeton, N.J.,1956, pp. 389ff.
600ne typemightbe international systemsof revolutionary periods,when the old
rulesof the game are challengedand totallynew problemsappearthatthe processes
and institutionsavailableduringthe previousperiodare powerlessto handle.Ours is
not the firstsuchperiod.The problemwhichouterspace poses forus is comparable
to the problemsraisedby the great discoveriesin the sixteenth century(new rules
neededfortheacquisitionof territory, forthe sea, etc.). The onlyradicallynew prob-
lemsof todayare thoseraisedby nuclearweaponsand thoseof economicdevelopment
in a post-colonial phase.The rest-the break-upof empires,the clash of super-states,
ideologicalwarfare, etc.-are not at all unprecedented.

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368 WORLD POLITICS

systems: typesofrelations betweenthebasicunits(suchas thebalancing


processor relationsbetweenunitsof a different nature:an empireand
or a multi-national
a city-state, stateand a nation-state),
typesofforeign
policies,or the role of selectedfactors.61Finally,we could proceedto
comparisons ofdomesticpoliticalsystems and international ones,and of
typesofdomesticand international systems.For thereare manysimilar
problems:the organizationof and restraints on power,the balancing
ofinterests,thedevelopment of consensusand legitimacy, theavailabil-
ityofprocedures ofchange.I havementioned beforeboththeautonomy
of each "milieu"and the unityof politics.Since manywritersin our
fieldhave tendedeitherto assumea rigiddifference betweendomestic
and international formsof politicalorganization, or to treatthe latter
as if theywere deviationsfromthe former,such a comparativeeffort
would be interesting.
BehindtheprogramI suggest,thereis one assumption whichshould
be spelledout. An understanding of world politicsor of any aspect
thereofpresupposesan understanding of the characteristicsof the in-
ternational system.The behaviorof a given variabledependson the
kindsof situations or constellationsin whichit figures,and thesesitua-
tionsin turnarelargelya functionof theinternational systemin which
theyoccur.In particular, the basic units'freedomof actionis limited
and theirchoicesare conditionedby thenatureof the system.This as-
sumptioncarriesthreeimplications.The firstis that it is a mistake
to limitthestudyof international relationsto contemporary problems.
Our incurabletendencyto generalizeis particularly misleadingwhen
ourgeneralizations arebasedon a verysmallsegmentofthefield.Each
conceptwe use has a different meaningin different contextsof time
and space.We mustincludein our researchtheinternational relations
of non-Western and worldpoliticsof periodsotherthan
civilizations,
thoseof the cityor nation-state. The relationsbetweenempires,the
complexhierarchy withinempires,the relationsbetweenempiresand
peoples at theirbordersare worthstudy.Also, the studyof interna-
tionalrelations, farmorethan comparativegovernment, is a studyof
change:the lack of a supremestraitjacket comparableto the statein
domesticpoliticsturnsworldaffairsintothepure dynamicsof "open"
systems. This doesnotmeanthatthereare no regularities or cycles;but
it is fromhistory,and notthroughdeductionfromabstracthypotheses,
thattheorymighttryto obtain"laws" of thefield.Furthermore, a re-
61
On types of foreign policies, see, e.g., the foreign policy of nations in periods of
loss of influence;the foreign policy of "new nations." On selected factors,see Associa-
tion Franqaise de Science Politique, La politique etrangere et ses fondements,Paris,
'954.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 369

turnto historywould discourageus fromproducingexplanationsin


whicha determining roleis givento a specificvariablewhichhappens
to play sucha rolein thepresent, but did not do it to the same extent
at all times:forinstance,economicdevelopment.Lastly,an explora-
tionof history will allow us to discriminate betweenthenew problems
thrownup by contemporary eventsand the old and recurringones.
A secondimplicationis thatwe mustavoid boththe dangerof pre-
sentinga staticschemeof "interrelated" variableswithoutindicating
theirrelativeimportance, and the dangerof stressing exclusivecauses
or certaintrendsor variablesin isolation."Studieson thecausativein-
fluenceof a given set of circumstances cannotbe divorcedfroman
of
analysis thevariouscomponentsof the diplomaticcomplex."62 We
will avoid thisdouble peril if we begin with the analysisand com-
parisonof concretesituations. We will thusbe able to determine what
factorsand correlations were indeed relevant(and in what circum-
stances) and, furthermore, to testthe hypothesesderivedfromspe-
cializedstudies.These studiesare oftenbased on assumptions concern-
ing internationalrelationswhichcannotbe acceptedat theoutset,such
as thepostulateofsomepsychologists thatindividualand grouptensions
are similar.The approachI suggestmightbe a way out of the social
dilemma:a "social whole" such as a totalfieldcan neverbe
scientists'
graspedscientifically, and we can onlydeal withselectedaspects.But
if we do not startwith at least an approximation of the whole,and
concentrate eitheron singletrendsor on limitedempiricalresearch,
thosefragments of thewhole cannotbe assessedcorrectly. We should
notassumethatthenatureof theinternational systemfullydetermines
theconductofitscomponents, butneithershouldwe analyzethelatter
apartfromtheformer.
My thirdimplicationmay be more controversial. There are three
tasksat leastas necessary as the searchforregularities and generaliza-
tions.First,thereis a taskof classification:fordescription and categori-
zationmaybe as importantas, and are a prerequisite of,recurrences
and prediction.Each categorysuch as war, the balance of power,63
negotiation,federalism, or imperialismconcealsmore than it reveals
a numberof different situations.Secondly,thereis a need for a sys-
tematicanalysisof differences, not similarities,among patternsof in-
ternational for
relations, only in thisway will we be able to identify
thedominantvariablesoperatingat different timesand places,and to
62Aron, in The Nature of Conflict,p. i8o.
63
See Ernst B. Haas's excellent analysis, "The Balance of Power: Prescription,Con-
cept or Propaganda?" WorldPolitics,v, No. 4 (July 1953), pp. 442-77.

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370 WORLD POLITICS

distinguish types.A thirdandrelatedtaskis to determine theroleof


contingent as opposedtoregular
factors, ones-a rolewhich,in spiteof
Tocqueville's acidwarning, and socialscientists
political tendto brush
asidetoo easily,as if in particular theactsof individuals in history
couldalwaysbeeither eliminatedorreduced togeneral laws:thejargon
of"random variables"encourages sucha tendency.64 For all thesepur-
poses,andforthequestofregularities as well,thecomparative method
is indispensable.
Without it,we wouldgo fromtheextreme oftotally
uprooted abstractions to theextreme of individual eventsconsidered
without sufficientconceptualization.
The readermightobjectthatwhatI suggest is exactly
whatis being
donebothbytheorists andbytextbooks. However, mypointis thatwe
haveto proceedmethodically and gradually, and thattheweakness
ofmanytheories comesfromtheirattempt toskipseveralstages. As for
texts,theyare oftenunsystematic or limitedto thedescription of the
contemporary international system,witha sprinkling ofmemories from
nineteenth-century Europeandiplomacy.65
Thispointbrings mebacktothefirst stageofourprogram-the only
onewhich,at present, can and shouldbe plannedin detail.We must
remember that"theapplication ofthecomparative methodtohistorical
material is notpossibleif it is confined to a comparison of chainsof
events,sincetheseareessentially uniquein character." We need"vari-
ableswhicharecapableofgeneraltreatment""-a "box,"but,ifI may
sayso,a flexibleone,andonewhosemainroleis tobe puttouse.For
thesocialsciences arelittered withunusedboxesthathavetakenon a
morose, pointlesslifeoftheirown,likethefascinating bonesscattered
on theshorespaintedbyChirico.
The mostfruitful approachto buildingsucha box is, as Quincy
Wrighthas suggested, to considertheworldas a field,ratherthana
64Tocquevillecommentedon the tendencyof thosewho writein democraticages
to neglectthe role of individualaction,to stressthe inevitability of past events,and
to be moreconcernedwithgeneraltheoriesof actionthanwiththeactors(Democracy
in America, ii, ch. xx). See also thediscussion
byJohnR. Meyerand AlfredH. Conrad,
"EconomicTheory,Statistical Influenceand EconomicHistory,"Journal of Economic
History, xvii, No. 4 (DecemberI957), pp. 524-44; and P. Renouvin,Histoire des rela-
tions internationales,I, Paris,1953, introduction.
65 It is easy to see how the schemeI suggestwould differ fromMortonKaplan's,
even thoughwe are bothengagedin a quest forsystemsand processes.Only two of
his systems have empiricalreferents; I proposeto startfromhistory. He proceedsde-
ductively and thusproduceshypotheses whichare difficult
to test,forthereasonsI have
suggestedabove; I would proceedinductively. His systemsand processesare stated;
theirexistencein realityshouldbe demonstrated first.The level of generalizationat
which he operatescould not, in my scheme,be reacheduntil each of the various
stagesI describehas been passedin turn.
66 BertF. Hoselitz,"On Comparative History,"World Politics, ix, No. 2 (January
1957), p. 274.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 371

plan,an equilibrium, an organization, or a community.67 Withinthis


field,we muststudyin correlation foursetsof data,foreachinterna-
tionalsystem canbe defined in terms ofthesefourseries.
(i) The first
seriesconcerns theparticular structureoftheworldin
theperiodconsidered. Whatarethebasicunits(or actors),howmany
arethere, howis powerdistributed, and whatis thehierarchy among
them?Can one distinguish in theworldseparatediplomatic fields,
eachone corresponding, forinstance, to a civilization,
a continent,a
certainracialor culturalsolidarity? Sincewhenhavetheseunitsoper-
atedas independent actorswithinoneofthefields?Whatis the"rela-
tionshipofmajortension" ?68Thisseries is thebasisofanyinvestigation
-and it is onewhichis frequently neglected.
(2) The second seriesis composed ofall theforces whichcutacross,
or operatewithin, manyof theunits.Fromtheperspective of a his-
toricalsystemof international relations, theseforcesare factorsof
change.Butat anypointin time,fora decision-maker, theyrepresent
"givens":theycan be used,or fought, but cannotbe ignored.The
morenumerous theforces, themoretheunitsare,so to speak,caught
in a transnational
net:theymaystillpreserve a largemeasure offree-
dom,buttheforces arelikerailways whichdetermine thedirectionsin
whichtheactorsmaygo,andtheylimittheactors'capacity forunpre-
dictableaction.The number and natureoftheseforcesarethusan in-
dexoftheintensity ofinternational relations.Amongthem,thereare
"objective"factors suchas technology, military or economicdevelop-
ments(forinstance, theindustrial andthenuclearrevolutions). There
are also transnational movements, organized(the Internationals) or
not(internationally sharedvaluesor philosophies). Ideologicaldrives
and rulingconcepts of legitimacy shouldbe examined here.We must
tracetheorigins, thestrength, thescope,and thedirections of these
forces.
(3) Thethird series ofdataconcerns therelations betweenthedomes-
tic and theforeign policyof thebasicunits.These data have been
analyzedonlyfragmentarily bytherealisttheory, although theirim-
portance canhardlybe exaggerated. Threegroupsofproblems should
be studiedhere.First,whatarethe"objective factors"fortheunitcon-
sidered(geography, technological level,economic resources,
population,
militarypotential)? Secondly, howdoestheunit'spattern ofpoweraffect
67 Wright,The Studyof International Relations,pp. 489ff.
68Arnold Wolfers,"The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," WorldPoli-
tics,iv,No. i (OctoberI951), pp. 39-63.See also LeonardBinder'simportant
reminder
politicsis not totaland global: "The Middle East as a Subordinate
thatinternational
System,"ibid.,x, No. 3 (April I958), pp. 408-29.
International

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372 WORLD POLITICS

themakingof foreignpolicy?By "patternof power,"I mean the in-


ternalconstitution, in an Aristoteliansense: the politicalinstitutions,
but also the social and economicstructure(includingthe systemof
distribution of property),the channelsof information leading to the
government (a vitalcategory,forno executiveis betterthanits degree
of awarenessof domesticand foreignproblems),the amountof inde-
pendenceof the policy-makers fromthe restof society.Thirdly,how
does the unit'spoliticalcultureaffectthe makingof foreignpolicy?
Here I referbothto thejudgments,beliefs,and emotionstowardout-
sideunitsof thosedomesticgroupswhichtryto influence foreignpol-
icy, and to the origin,education,and ideas of the decision-makers
themselves:what are theirviews about the ends of theirpolicy,and
aboutthemeanstobe employed?69 Arethere"nationalstyles"offoreign
policy-a mixtureof traditions, impulses,and habitscreatedbyhistory,
by the systemof government, by manipulators of publicopinion,and
conditioning foreignpolicyto a large extent?
(4) The fourthseriesdealswiththeoutcomeoftheinterrelationships
amongthevariousseriesmentionedbefore:international relations,in
themorenarrowor precisemeaningof theterm.Here,someimportant
distinctions mustbe made.Manytheories(and texts)look at theserela-
tionsfromone angleonly:theforeignpoliciesoftheunits;theperspec-
tiveis frombelow (the units),lookingup. This is indispensable, butit
is not enough.The situationscreatedby the interaction of the units,
whethertheiroccurrence was expectedbytheunitsor not,have a logic
of theirown; the of
types power configurations thatresultnot only
fromtheconflict, or convergence, of foreignpolicies,but also fromthe
verystructure oftheworldandfromtheoperation oftransnational forces,
in turnreshape,condition,and oftencommandforeignpolicies.Thus
we also need anotherkindof perspective: fromthe top,lookingdown.
Excessiveemphasison one perspective producesopticalillusions.The
illusionproducedby theseconddistorts contemporary theoriesofinter-
nationallaw. The illusionproducedby thefirst, forinstance,leads the
realiststo exaggeratethe weaknessor voluntarycharacterof interna-
It is dangerousto studyinternational
tionalrestraints.70 organizations
69 On the pattern of powerand on politicalculture,see Samuel H. Beer and Adam
B. Ulam, eds.,Patterns of Government,New York, I958, pp. 3ff.See also the "box"
suggestedby HerbertC. Kelman,"Societal,Attitudinal and Structural Factorsin In-
ternationalRelations,"Journalof Social Issues, xi, No. i (1955), pp. 42-56.
70 See Fred A. Sondermann, "The Studyof International Relations:i956 Version,"
World Politics, x, No. i (OctoberI957), pp. I02-I2. This defectis visiblein Politics
Among Nations, in Mr. Organski'srecentbook,World Politics, and in thefinetextof
ErnstB. Haas and Allen S. Whiting,Dynamics of InternationalRelations, New York,
I956.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373

as iftheywereexclusively agencies ofworldorder;theyarealsoinstru-


mentsofforeign policies.It is equallydangerous to seein statesonly
forcesserving nationalinterests, fortheyarealsotheagentsofvarying
typesofinternational order.
A suitable approach to thestudyof thisseriesofdatamightbe the
following.Withineachinternational system, international relationscan
be defined as the combination of two kinds of activities.On theone
hand,theunitsintowhichtheworldis dividedtryto reachcertain
goals;wecanstart witha generalclassification oftheseends,as Arnold
Wolfers has suggested, and adopthisthreefold division:self-preserva-
self-abnegation.71
tion,self-extension, On theotherhand,fromtheper-
spectiveofthesystem as a whole,a numberof basictasksarebeing
performed bytheprocesses of international relations-tasks whichre-
sultfromthefragmented structure oftheworld, and from the uneven-
nessof political,economic, and military development,72 coupledwith
theunits'inability toremaincompletely isolated(conflict; politicalac-
commodation; politicaldiffusion; economic transformation). We must
of courseremember thatthereis no total"worldsociety" or "com-
munity" whichsetsitsowngoals,defines thesetasks, andallocates roles.
However, ifthepurposeofall sociological research is to discover"con-
stantthemesand multipleconcrete realizations,"and if the fieldof
politicscanbe seenas a codeofanswers to a smallnumber ofperma-
nentproblems,73 thenit mightbe interesting to startwiththeidentifi-
cationof theunitgoalsand worldtaskswhichcan be foundin any
system, andto continue witha systematic studyoftheirevolution, in-
teraction,and realization in each system. For whatdistinguishes the
international ofonesystem
relations fromthoseofanother istheanswer
to twoquestions. First,thequestionof scope:whatis,in thissystem,
therangeofthegoalswhichunitstrytoreach,andofthetaskswhich
arebeingperformed amongthem?The transformation ofthesubject-
matterofinternational relations is a crucial aspectof the field.
Secondly,
thereis thequestionof means:whatprocesses, techniques, or institu-
tionsare beingusedby theunitsin orderto achievetheirrespective
goalsandtoperform theircollective tasks, as wellas in themutualrela-
tionsthatdevelopfromtheunits'efforts to reachtheirgoalsand ac-
71
Op.cit.,note68 above.
72
The role of unevennessin development as one of the main dynamicsof interna-
tionalrelationshas not receivedsufficientattention.There are usefulindicationsin
Organski,op.cit.,withreference to economicunevenness;in JohnH. Herz, "Rise and
Demiseof theTerritorial State,"WorldPolitics,ix, No. 4 (JulyI957), pp. 473-93,with
referenceto military unevenness.
73RaymondAron,"Le developpement de la societeindustrielle,"mimeographed lec-
tures,Paris,I956, p. 48.

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374 WORLD POLITICS

complish theirtasks?Thisquestionis equallyimportant, sincethena-


tureofworldpolitics depends largely on thechoicesmadebytheactors
amongavailabletechniques ofwarornegotiation, conceivable typesof
law, groupings, and organizations, or possiblemethodsof economic
transformation.
Amongthematerials tobeusedforsuchresearch, nonehasbeenmore
neglected thanthewritings of philosophers, theorists,and statesmen.
We arestillableto gainas manyinsights intotheAmerican political
system, or intothepoliticsof liberalism, fromLockeor Rousseauor
Tocqueville as we getfromtheanalysis ofinstitutions andpoliticalbe-
havior.In thesameway,thewritings I refer towouldprovide us with
modelsofinternational politicsthatwouldhelpusunderstand theprob-
lemsI havetriedto list,bothby reference and by contrast. Modern
sociology of knowledge mayhaveexaggerated thedegreeof depend-
enceofideason thesocialenvironment; butno onecan denythecor-
relation,anditshouldbe studied inourdiscipline, too.Therehavebeen
somepath-breaking whichstudytheories
efforts, andwritings ofstates-
menas distorted mirrors oftheworldaroundthem.Muchmorecould
be done,if we usedsuchworksnotfornew chapters of
in histories
political
thought butas toolsfortheanalysis ofactualsystems andsitua-
tions.74
Ourpresent rather contemptuous approach to thebodyofthe-
oriesof international law-theoriesthatarefarlessnarrowthanone
oftenbelieves-isparticularly regrettable. Also,one ofthekeysources
of tensionand changein anypoliticalsystem is thecontrast between
thevaluesandbeliefs of someoftheleadersand theunderlying reali-
tiesofpolitics.Onlya studyoftheideasexpressed bytheleaders, and
bywriters whoarevoicingthegenerally acceptedassumptions which
inspiretheleaders, canallowus tolocateandanalyzeintelligently this
sourceoftension.
In addition to suchsystematic research, thereis a needto undertake
a different kindoftask.I havementioned earliersomeoftheperma-
nentreasonsfora political philosophy ofworldaffairs. Morecontem-
poraryreasonsareequallyimportant. WhatKantstressed almosttwo
centuries ago has becomeirrefutable in theworldof "total"interna-
tionalrelations or "international civilwar."The problems of peace
and of a worldorder command all the others. No citizen will enjoy
74See ArnoldWolfers'brilliantplea in his prefaceto Wolfersand L. W. Martin,
The Anglo-American Traditionin ForeignAffairs,New Haven, Conn., i956; also
FrederickS. Dunn, "The PresentCourseof International RelationsResearch,"World
Politics,II, No. I (OctoberI949), pp. 9off.Amongpastefforts, Frank
see in particular
Russell,Theoriesof International Relations,New York, I936; Walter Schiffer, The
Legal Community of Mankind,New York, I954.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 375

autonomy in a worldwhosefragmentation produces


imperatives
ofna-
tionalsurvivaland differentiation
fatalto suchautonomy.
The twotraditionaltasksofpoliticalphilosophy:
thesearchforthe
properrelationamongtheindividual, the communityin whichhe
lives,and theworld,on theone hand,and concernforthebestmethods
by whicha desirablerelationcould be realized,on the other,have not
been well performed in worldpolitics.There have been too manyas-
sumptions-conflicting ones,to be sure-which convergeon the con-
clusionthatsuch a searchand sucha concernare unnecessary in our
field.The beliefin the inefficacy of ethicalconsiderations in worldaf-
fairsor in the evil qualitiesof all politicalactions,the raisingof pru-
dence to the positionof a supremevalue,the tendencyto see in po-
an inevitableclashbetweennationalvaluesand interna-
liticalconflicts
tionalones,whichmusttherefore be prudently sacrificed
to thepreserva-
tionof theformer-thisis a counselof despair.75 The tendencyto ad-
vocateas a solutionforworldproblemstheoriesproposedforproblems
thathave arisenwithinnationsis a counselof laziness.76 For what is
assumedis thatsuchan extensionto theworldmeetsno biggerobstacle
thanthepresenceof "bad men,"obscurantists, reactionaries,ammuni-
tion-makers,corruptpoliticians,etc. . . . who block the way to the mil-
lennium;or thatthedivisionof the worldintojealouslyseparateunits
is an accidentaland temporary factor;or thatuniversalvaluescan be
promotedat littlecostto nationalvalues.The tendencyto turnaway
froman international scenemarkedby what seemssenselesschaos is
anothercounselofdespair.The preoccupation withtheachievement of
a singlevalue (such as peace), or with the establishment of a simple
institutional panacea (such as worldgovernment), is anotherplea for
laziness.
Thus,we cannotact as if "thebestvalues"had been determined for
us once and forall by traditionalpoliticalphilosophy.We cannotact
as if all we had to do was to cultivatethesevaluesin our domesticsys-
temsor to transposeintotheworldthe proceduresthatpromotethese
valuesat home.Our firstproblemis the clarification of the valueswe
would liketo see promotedin theworld-and, as I have suggested, we
in
cannotdo so if we do not startwitha viewof man as, at least part,
a community-building animal,makingmoraldecisionsamongalterna-
71 See especiallyMorgenthau, op.cit.,note I7 above.The emphasison "survival"as
an absoluteraisesa hostof troublesome such
questionswhichrealismrarelydiscusses,
as survivalof what (a specificpoliticalform,such as the nation-state?an ideology?
men?) and forwhat?
discussion:Swordsinto Plowshares,New York, i956,
76 See I. L. Claude's excellent
PP. 407ff.

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376 WORLD POLITICS

tivecourses ofactionwhichall involve thepresenceofsomevaluesand


thesacrifice of others.77Secondly, we mustrelatethesevaluesto the
worldas itis,farmorecloselythanwe usuallydo.Therearemanyad-
vocatesofcourses ofactionwhichobviously clashwiththecharacteristic
featuresofthepresent international system-either becausethecourse
belongsto a bygonesystem judgedmoresatisfactory bythewriter, or
becausethecoursewouldputon theroadto a newandmoreprogres-
sivesystem a worldobviously unableor unwilling untilnowto travel
sucha road.Theseadvocates shouldnotonlypleadforthedestination;
theyshouldtellus in detailhowwe can reachit.Purelyperfectionist
ethicsthatbrushasidetheproblem ofthedifficultand dirtymeansto
utopiaareas unhelpful as theiropposite: policyscientism thatplunges
intoroadstounexamined destinations orbelievesthatwhatoughttobe
emerges fromwhatis. The rangeof valueconflicts and thedegreeto
whichvaluesaresharedin worldpolitics are notnecessarily different
fromwhattheyarein domestic affairs;butthefundamental differences
in structure and institutions, justlyemphasized by realism, obligeus
tobe veryprecise aboutthewaysinwhichsuchconflicts canbereduced
andsuchsharing promoted, iftheseareourobjectives. For theburden
ofproving thatthepresent pattern ofpowerpolitics is compatible with
therealization ofan international morality remains on us,although-
orrather precisely because-wedo notaccepttheviewthatthedivorce
isinevitable.
I wouldtherefore liketosuggest a taskinwhichsystematic empirical
analysisand a philosophy of internationalrelationswould merge. We
musttryto buildrelevant utopias.By spellingout our viewson the
purposes,theprerequisites, thepossibilities,and theprocedures of an
idealinternational order,we wouldaccomplish a tripletask.We would
meettherequirement of clarifying our personalvaluepositions. We
would avoid the piecemeal engineering approach of policy scientism.
We wouldavoidthetwinescapisms ofrealism, whichgloomily assumes
theinevitability of thecustomary, and of idealism, whichpostulates
an easyroadtoworldprogress. In suchan effort,we shouldtakeinto
accountall theaspectsof worldpoliticswhichI havesuggested: see
whatobstacles or opportunities are providedby the lastingpolitical
stylesof nationsand of theirleaders,showwhatroleis and can be
Playedbytheforces thatcutacrossnations, andexamine whatkindsof
situationsare mostlikelyto favoror to hindertheobjectives we ad-
77 W. Y. Elliott,The PragmaticRevolt in Politics,New York, I928, pp. 470ff.;
ArnoldWolfers,Statesmanship and Moral Choice,"WorldPolitics,i, No. 2 (January
1949), pp. I75-95.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 377

vocate;discussto whatextentrelianceon existing and in-


processes
stitutions
is enough,towhatextent
thecreationofnewonesis required
and possiblefor bold politicalinnovation,or to what extentweight
should ratherbe put on materialand spiritualfactorswhich operate
withinthenationsand peoplesof theworld.78 It is not,and cannotbe,
our taskto guaranteethatutopiacan be reached.Nor shouldwe con-
fineourselvesto proposalswhich are timidenough to be uncontro-
versial.Our taskis to saywhatgoalswe wantfortheworld,to explain
what our "utopia"implies,to suggestmethodsforbuildingit, and to
showhow suchmethodsmightappearand workin theworldas it is.
Whetherthesegoals and methodsare adoptedor not does not depend
on us. That is thetaskof politics.But we shouldnot encourageby our
silence,or our scholasticism,thepoliticians'all-too-frequentinclination
to believethatthefutureis merelythe sum of habitsof the past and
survivalin thepresent.
task.I do not see how we can avoid it,if we believe
It is a difficult
that"themechanisms of nature,workingthroughtheself-seeking pro-
pensitiesof man (which of coursecounteract one anotherin theirex-
ternaleffects)maybe used by reasonas a meansof makingway for
the realisationof . . . the empire of right."79
"I See the argumentspresentedby PercyCorbettin Morals,Law and Power in In-
ternationalRelations,Los Angeles,i956; and by RichardF. Behrendt,"Der Beitrag
der Soziologiezum Verstandnis Probleme,"Schweizerische
Internationaler Zeitschrift
fur Volkwirtschaft xci, No. 2 (June i955), pp. I45-70.
und Statistik,
79Kant,EternalPeace. I hope to developand applymethodically I
the suggestions
have presented here.

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