Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
1.) Sovereignty
- Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State
is governed.
- Two kinds of Sovereignty: Legal and Political. Legal Sovereignty is the authority which has
the power to issue final commands. Political Sovereignty is the power behind legal
sovereign.
- Internal or External. Internal refers to the power of the State to control its domestic affairs.
External, which is the power of the State to direct its relations with other States, is also
known as independence.
In Laurel v. Misa the court held that Absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or
sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or government de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, as held in the case of Co Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh.
In Peralta v. Director of Prisons, the court held that if there is a change of sovereignty
the political laws are not suspended but rather abrogated.
In Tiamco v. Diaz,
In People v. Perfecto, the accused had written an editorial against the Philippine Senate
and was prosecuted under a provision of the Spanish Penal Code punishing insults to
ministers of the crown. The Supreme Court acquitted him, holding that particular article
of the said code had been automatically abrogated, being political in nature, upon
advent of American Sovereignty.
2.) Government
a.) Government in General
- Is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed
and realized.
In Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February20,2001, it was held that
the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), created under R.A. 7227,
performs functions which are basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of
economic and social development of Central Luzon, in particular, and the country’s goal
for enhancement, in general, do not make BCDA equivalent to Government. Other
corporations, such as SSS, GSIS, NIA, although performing functions aimed at promoting
public interest and public welfare, are not invested with government attributes. [Thus,
with the transfer to BCDA of Camp Wallace, the government no longer had a right or
interest to protect; the real party in interest to recover the property is, thus, the BCDA,
not the Republic of the Philippines.]
In PHHC v. CIR, the court held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over labor
disputes involving GOCC but not the performing governmental functions. Since the
National Housing Association was created, the Philippine government has carried mass
housing and resettlement program to meet the needs of Filipinos. The PHHC is
governmental institution performing governmental functions. Thus, the Court grant the
petition and set aside the assailed resolution of the Court of CIR.
In Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon city, the court rule that
1.) Basis
Article XVI, Section 3
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right
depends [Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83], However, it may be sued if it gives consent,
whether express or implied.
In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the court said, First of all, the
mantle of the State's immunity from suit did not extend to the NHA despite its being a
government-owned and -controlled corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential
Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA
was not immune from the suit of Roxas.
In Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, the Supreme Court said that the Bureau of Customs,
being an unincorporated agency without a separate juridical personality, enjoys
immunity from suit. It is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely the
power of taxation; it performs governmental functions.
In Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Morales, THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY
DOES NOT APPLY TO GOVERNMENT OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS. - This
doctrine has been reaffirmed in the recent case of Malong v. Philippine National
Railways [G.R. No. L-49930, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 63], where it was held that the
Philippine National Railways, although owned and operated by the government, was not
immune from suit as it does not exercise sovereign but purely proprietary and business
functions. Accordingly, as the CAA was created to undertake the management of airport
operations, which primarily involve proprietary functions, it cannot avail of the
immunity from suit accorded to government agencies performing strictly governmental
functions.
In Department of Health v. Philippine Pharmawealth, As a general rule, a state may not
be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it be the subject of a
suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the
other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a
contract, it does not automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State
“will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a
contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its
sovereign or governmental capacity[,] xx x no such waiver may be implied. ”Statutory
provisions waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of
immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”
In Sanders v. Veridiano, the Supreme Court spoke of a number of well-recognized
exceptions when a public officer may be sued without the prior consent of the State, viz:
(1) to compel him to do an act required by law; (2) to restrain him from enforcing an act
claimed to be unconstitutional; (3) to compel the payment of damages from an already
appropriated assurance fund or to refund tax over-payments from a fund already
available for the purpose; (4) to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may
satisfy by himself without the State having to do a positive act to assist him; and (5)
where the government itself has violated its own laws, because the doctrine of state
immunity “cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice”.
5.) Forms of Consent
- In order that suit may lie against the state, there must be consent, either express or implied.
Where no consent is shown, state immunity from suit may be invoked as a defense by the
courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings, because waiver of immunity, being in
derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly and must be construed in strictissimi
juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or counterclaim) against the State must allege the
existence of such consent (and where the same is found), otherwise, the complaint may be
dismissed.
In Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, supra., while consent to be sued was
granted through a special law, the government was held not liable for damages, because
under the attendant circumstances the government was not acting through a special
agent.
In Republic v. Purisima, Express consent of the State may be manifested through general
or special law. Solicitor General cannot validly waive immunity from suit. Only the
Congress can.
In Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, an action for the recovery of the value of the
property taken by the government and converted into a public street without payment
of just compensation was allowed, despite the failure of the property owner to file his
claim with the Auditor General. Invoking Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, the
Supreme Court said that suit may lie because the doctrine of State immunity cannot be
used to perpetrate an injustice.
In De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11, where it was held that
the “public respondents’ belief that the property is public, even if buttressed by
statements of other public officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioner’s
property”; after all, the TCT was in the name of the petitioner.
In Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, the Supreme Court held that the government
impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the
purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the recovery of
the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue
private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different
forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action
against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to
the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain limits, the
right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.
In Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, 227 shares in Negros Occidental Golf and Country
Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) owned and registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto
were sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents. In a suit for payment of dues of
the sequestered shares, PCGG raised, among others, the defense of immunity from suit.
The Supreme Court held that by entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto,
the Republic stripped itself of its immunity and placed itself in the same level as its
adversary. When the State enters into a contract through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative
authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accruse and rights and obligations
arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely
because by entering into a contract, the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen.
6.) Suability v. Liability
- A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the
consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The
circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand,
it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
In Republic vs. Villasor, Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of
judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of
the court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such disbursement is
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
In Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency v. UP, The Supreme Court finds that the
CA correctly applied the case of NEA. Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like
NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or levy.
However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the judgment award
must first be filed with the COA.
In UP v. Dizon, the court held that the funds of the UP are government funds that are
public in character. They include the income accruing from the use of real property
ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of the
RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered against the UP
in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its
liability.
In Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206, it was held that where the
municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final
money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds to
satisfy the money judgment.
c.) Renunciation of war and adoption of generally accepted principles of international law
- Renunciation of war. The historical development of the policy condemning or outlawing war in
the international scene:
a) Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided conditions for the right to go to
war;
b) Kelloqq-Briand Pact of 1928. also known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation
of War, ratified by 62 States, which forbade war as “an instrument of national policy”.
c) Charter of the United Nations. Art. 2 of which prohibits the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.
Article XVIII, Section 25
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
CASE: In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association v. Health Secretary, The Supreme Court clarified
that under the 1987 Constitution, international can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation
pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, which provides that no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate. Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can apply to domestic conflicts.
CASE: The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals or local courts are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that the municipal courts should uphold municipal law. In Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115,
the reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the
police power, which cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
d.) Civilian Supremacy over the Military
- Civilian Supremacy Sec. 3. Art. II: “Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the
military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its
goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory".
e.) Government as protector of the people, and people as defenders of the state
RA 9163, Sections 2,4,5, and 6
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby affirmed the prime duty of the government
to serve and protect its citizens. In turn, it shall be the responsibility of all citizens to
defend the security of the State and in fulfillment thereof, the government may require
each citizen to render personal, military or civil service. Recognizing the youth's vital
role in nation-building, the State shall promote civic consciousness among the youth and
shall develop their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism, nationalism, and advance their involvement in public
and civic affairs. In pursuit of these goals, the youth, the most valuable resource of the
nation, shall be motivated, trained, organized and mobilized in military training, literacy,
civic welfare and other similar endeavors in the service of the nation.
Section 4. Establishment of the National Service Training Program. - There is hereby
established a National Service Training Program, which shall form part of the curricula of
all baccalaureate degree courses and of at least two (2)-year technical vocational
courses and is a requisite for graduation, consisting of the following service
components:
(1) The Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), which is hereby made option and
voluntary upon the effectivity of this Act; (2) The Literacy Training Service; and (3) The
Civic Welfare Training Service
The ROTC under the NSTP shall instill patriotism, moral virtues, respect for rights of
civilians, and adherence to the Constitution, among others. Citizenship training shall be
given emphasis in all three (3) program components.
The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) and Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), in consultation with the Department of National
Defense (DND), Philippine Association of State Universities and Colleges (PASUC),
Coordinating Council of Private Educational Associations of the Philippines (COCOPEA)
and other concerned government agencies, may design and implement such other
program components as may be necessary in consonance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 5. Coverage - Students, male and female, of any baccalaureate degree course or
at least two (2)-year technical vocational courses in public and private educational
institutions shall be required to complete one (1) of the NSTP components as requisite
for graduation.
Section 6. Duration and Equivalent Course Unit - Each of the aforementioned NSTP
program components shall be undertaken for an academic period of two (2) semesters.
In lieu of the two (2) semester program for any of the components of the NSTP, a one
(1)-summer program may be designed, formulated and adopted by the DND, CHED, and
TESDA.
f.) Separation of Church and State
Principles of separation: Article III, Section 5; Article IX (C), Section 3 (3), Section 4 (2)
ARTICLE III, SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Exceptions: Article VI, Section 28 (3), Section 29 (2); Article XIV, Section 3 (3), Section 4
(2)
ARTICLE VI, SEC 28 (3) charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
ARTICLE, SEC 29 (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
ARTICLE, SEC 3 (3) At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians,
religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and
high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the
religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without
additional cost to the Government.
ARTICLE, SEC 4 (2) Educational institutions, other than those established by religious
groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation
in all educational institutions.
In Bayan v. Zamora, The ratification by the president of the VFA and the
concurrence of the senate should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of
our nation’s consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to
uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied therein. It becomes obligatory
and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law to be bound by
the terms of agreement (Article 2, section 2). As a member of the family of nations,
the country agrees to be bound by the generally accepted rules for the conduct of
its international relations. We cannot readily plead the constitution as a convenient
excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties and responsibilities under
international law.
In Province of North Cotabato v. Govt of the PH Peace panel on ancestral domain,
the supreme with regards to International law, The Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land. In international
law, the right to self-determination has long been recognized which states that
people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external self-
determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the external which
takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of
self-determination is viewed with respect accorded to the territorial integrity of
existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases
when there is an actual block in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-
determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and
exceptional cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt
for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine
the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
Writ of Amparo
Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
d.) Sanctity of Family Life, Life of the mother, Life of the Unborn
In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Article II section 12 of the Constitution states: “The
State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.” The court also recognized that
life begins during fertilization. Thus, partially banning contraceptives that only kill or
destroy a fertilized ovum.
e.) Equality between men and women
RA 9262,
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004
RA 7192,
Women in Development and Nation Building Act.
RA 6725
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
WITH RESPECT TO TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE ARTICLE ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.
f.) Balanced and Healthful Ecology
In Oposa v. Factoran, Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and
harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as the future generations.
Writ of Kalikasan
A Writ of Kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law that provides protection
of one's Constitutional right to a healthy environment, as outlined in Section 16,
Article II of the Philippine Constitution, which says the "state shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with
the rhythm and harmony of nature."
In Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association Inc., The acts of
the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents
and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate
powers vested in the local government unit. Advancing the interest of the residents
who are vulnerable to the alleged health risk due to their exposure to pesticide drift
justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. However, the
occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the
conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual praying or truck-
mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment. The banning does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
achieve The principle of precaution appearing in the rules of procedure for
environmental cases involves matters of evident in cases where there is lack of
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect. But it is not applicable if there is no indication of threat of
environmental harm, of if the threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. In the
case at bar, there has been to scientific study involving the effects of aerial spraying.
There has been no reported outbreak connected to the pesticide applied for the
past 4 decades.
g.) Priority to Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports
h.) Protection to Labor
i.) Self-Reliant and Independent Economy
Article XII Sec 10 (2), in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
j.) Indispensable Role of Private Sector
k.) Comprehensive Rural Development and Agrarian Reform
l.) Indigenous Cultural Communities
m.) Autonomy of Local Governments
n.) Full Public Disclosure
In Valmonte v. Belmonte, The Supreme Court ruled that the right to information is
an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure and honestly in the public services. It is meant to enhance the widening
role of citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse in the
government. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of public
concern” which is the first requisite. The states policy of full public disclosure is
limited to transactions involving public interest and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law.
In Akbayan v. Aquino, the Supreme Court held that To be covered by the right to
information, the information sought must meet the threshold requirement that it
be a matter of public concern x From the nature of the JPEPA as an international
trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern. This,
respondents do not dispute. They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the
right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Apportionment
Shall be made in accordance with the number of respective inhabitants, on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio.
i.) Each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled for at least one
representative.
ii.) Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, entitled to at least one
representative.
Reapportionment
Reapportionment of Legislative Districts may be made through a special law.
Sectoral Party – refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the following
sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers and professionals, whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Number
The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of the members of the
HOR including those under the part-list.
- In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure must be
observed:
i.) The parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during elections
ii.) The parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; provided, that those garnering
more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes;
iii.) Provided, finally, that each party, organization or coalitions, shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
CASE: In Veterans Federation Party v COMELEC, the SC reversed its ruling that the 38 respondent
parties, organizations, coalitions were each entitled to a party-list seat despite their failure to obtain at
least 2% each of the national vote in the 1998 party-list election.
The Court said that the Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters:
a.) The 20% allocation – the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of
the total membership of the HOR.
b.) The 2% threshold – only those parties garnering a minimum of the 2% of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House.
c.) The 3-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats (one qualifying and 2 additional)
d.) Proportional representation – the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed “in proportion to their total number of votes”.
CASE: In Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC the Supreme Court said even Major Political
parties allowed by the Constitution to participate in the Party-list system, they must however comply
with the guidelines in order that a political party registered under the party-list system may be entitled
to a seat in the HOR.
QUALIFICATIONS
TERM
Residence is acquired by living in a place, whereas domicile can exist without actually living in a place.
The important thing in domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there should
be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
Domicile can be lost only (1) when there is actual removal or change of domicile, (2) when there is a
bonafide intention to abandon the residence and establish a new one and there are acts which
correspond with the purpose. This domicile of origin continues if there is no clear and positive proof of
the concurrence of the above.
CASE: In Macalintal v. COMELEC, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad
because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to
return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine
domicile shall remain.
b.) Term vs. Tenure
Term – means the period of time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes
the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another
Tenure – represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is
not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons or beyond the
power of incumbent.
CASE: In Gaminde v. COA, The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993.
Expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02,
2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered.
Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments,
including that of her co-terminus staff.
c.) Election
- Elections for Congress of the Philippines were held on the Second Monday of May, 1987.
CASE: Special: To fill a vacancy, but elected member shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the
term [Sec. 9, Art. VI]
CASE:
3.) Salaries
- Art VI, Sec 10: The salaries of Senators and Members of Representatives shall be determined by
law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
- Art XVIII, Sec. 17: Until the Congress provides otherwise, the President shall receive an annual
salary of three hundred thousand pesos; the Vice-President, the Senate President, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two hundred forty
thousand pesos each; the Senator, the Members of the House of Representatives, the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions, two hundred
four thousand pesos each; and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, one hundred
eighty thousand pesos each.
In all offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment, a Senator or a member of the
House of Representatives “shall be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.”
CASE: In Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel, . In this case, petitioner Antonio Trillanes sought from the Makati
RTC leave to attend Senate sessions and to convene his staff, resource persons and guests and to attend
to his official functions as Senator. He anchored his motion on his right to be presumed innocent, and
claims that the Jalosjos ruling should not be applied to him, because he is a mere detention prisoner and
is not charged with a crime involving moral turpitude. The Makati RTC denied the motion. Elevating the
matter, the Supreme Court denied Trillanes’ petition on the ground that Sec. 13, Art. Ill of the
Constitution, explicitly provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua are nonbailable. The Court
further said that the presumption of innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full enjoyment of
civil and political rights.
CASE: In People v. Jalosjos, the Supreme Court denied the motion of Congressman Jalosjos that he be
allowed to fully discharged the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee hearings despite his having been convicted by the trial court of a non-bailable offense. The
denial was premised on the following: [i] membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons; [ii] one rationale behind confinement,
whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is the injury to the public,
not the injury to the complainant, which state action in criminal law seeks to redress; [iii] it would
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune from arrest during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same; and [iv] accused-appellant is provided with an
office at the House of Representatives with a full complement of staff, as well as an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his constituents; he has, therefore,
been discharging his mandate as member of the House of Representatives, and being a detainee, he
should not even be allowed by the prison authorities to perform these acts.
It is a privilege or immunity of a member of Congress from being questioned or held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. There are two
requirements that must concur: (1) The remarks must be made while the legislature or the legislative
committee is functioning, or in session. (2) Must be made in connection with the discharge of official
duties. (Coffin v. Coffin)
CASE: In Osmena v. Pendatun, the president of the Philippines himself who had been vilified by the
petitioner could not file any civil or criminal action against him because of this immunity. Nonetheless,
the majority of the members of the House of Representatives in which the questioned speech was
delivered were not precluded from demonstrating their loyalty to the chief executive by declaring
Osmena guilty of disorderly behavior and suspending him in the exercise of disciplinary power.
CASE: In Jimenez v. Cabangbang, the Supreme Court declared that the privilege could not be invoked by
a legislator who had allegedly maligned the plaintiff in an open letter to the President of the Philippines
coursed through and published in the newspapers. The finding was that he had written the letter at a
time when the Congress was in recess and in his private capacity only.
CASE: In Pobre v. Sen Santiago, Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word
on the matter. The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the
Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from
doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this
kind of disposition.
Section 12 – All Members of the State and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption of
office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the House
concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of
which they are authors. Commented [AQ4]: Reason: to prevent them from using
the influence of their position and to reduce, if not
Section 13 – No Senators or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or eliminate, the propagation of their personal and business
employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including interest, especially those which are contrary to and adverse
to public interest.
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting
his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Commented [AQ5]: They cannot hold incompatible
offices. They cannot be appointed to any office which may
Section 14 – No Senators or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative during the term for which they were elected.
Exception: Except if it is shown that said other office or
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any employment is an extension of the legislative position or is
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled in aid of legislative duties.
corporations, or its subsidiary, during his terms of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act an of his
office. Commented [AQ6]: Disqualification Lawyer-Legislator to
practice his profession absolute?
No. When it pertains to appearance during a trial, or a
hearing before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, the same
6.) Sessions (ART VI, Sec 15.) may be made not by him but any of the associates of his law
Sec 15. – The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its firm.
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for Commented [AQ7]: Are all contracts or transactions of
such number of days as it may determined until thirty days before the opening of its next the GOVT barred?
What is barred are only those contracts from which a
regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a legislator is expected to derive gain or profit at the expense
special session at any time. of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities.
a.) Regular Sessions (Secs 15 and 16[5])
The congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session,
unless a different date is fixed by law.
b.) Special Sessions
A special session may be called by the President at any time.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.
c.) Joint sessions
Instances when both houses meet in joint session but they vote separately:
1.) When they choose the President of the Philippines under Sec. 4, Art. VII;
2.) When they determine the disability of the President under Sec. 11, Art. VII;
3.) When they confirm the nomination of the Vice-President under Sec. 9, Art. VII;
4.) When they propose constitutional amendments under Sec. 1, Art. XVII;
5.) 2/3 votes of both Houses in joint session assemble, voting separately, is needed to declare
the existence of a state of war.
Instances when both houses meet in joint session and vote jointly:
1.) When they revoke or extend the proclamation of martial law or a proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Sec. 18, Art VII;
2.) Both Houses cannot, during sessions, adjourn for more than three days, or transfer to a
place other than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting without the consent of the
other.
Section 16. (1). The Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives, its Speaker, by a
majority vote of all its respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under
such penalties, as such House may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each
House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn
for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
CASE: In Avelino v. Cuenco, The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter. 1. The Court found it
injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. 2. At any session hereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion
here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a
doubt.
CASE: In Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,
CASE: In Arroyo vs. De Venecia, Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character.
They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not
have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular
measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
CASE: In Abas Kida v. Senate of the PH,
10.) Discipline
- House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 2/3 of all
its members, suspend (for not more than sixty days) or expel a member.
CASE: Osmena v. Pendatun, where the supreme court said the determination of the acts which
constitute disorderly behavior is within the full discretionary authority of the House concerned, and the
Court will not review such determination, the same being a political question.
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An enrolled bill is one duly introduced and finally passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper
officers of each, and approved by the President. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. Court is bound
under the doctrine of separation of powers by the contents of a duly authenticated measure of the
legislature [Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1; Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997], If
a mistake was made in the printing of the bill before it was certified by Congress and approved by the
President, the remedy is amendment or corrective legislation, not a judicial decree [Casco (Phil)
Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347].
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CASE: U.S. v. Pons – The supreme court refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative journals,
which it held to be conclusive on the courts. “To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature” it rules, “when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere
with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.” But except only where the matters are
required to be entered in the journals, like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill or on any
question at the request of one-fifth of the members present, the contents of the enrolled bill shall
prevail over those of the journal in case of conflict.
Section 26. (2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three
days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment
to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
the Journal.
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal
and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it
shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
Section 16. (4) (4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on
any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal. Each
House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
Enrolled bill prevails, except as to matters which, under the Constitution, must be entered in the
Journal. See Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714; Morales v. Subido, 26 SCRA 150.
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1.) During the sessions of the Congress, neither House shall adjourn for more than three (3) days
without the consent of the other.
2.) During the sessions of Congress, neither House shall adjourn to any other place than that in
which the two Houses shall be sitting.
CASE:
CASE: In Tanada vs. Cuenco, held that the right to nominate to the legislative seats in the Electoral
Tribunals belonged to the majority and minority parties in the chamber, not to the chamber itself or
to the majority party therein if the minority did not make its own nomination.
CASE: Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal. On the disqualification of the senator-members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, because an election contest is filed against them, see Abbas v. Senate
Electoral Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651, where the Supreme Court held that it cannot order the
disqualification of the Senators-members of the Electoral Tribunal simply because they were
themselves respondents in the electoral protest, considering the specific mandate of the
Constitution and inasmuch as all the elected Senators were actually named as respondents.
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63 Phil 139; Morrero v. Bocar, 66 Phil 429], and its decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court [Pena v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal G R No 123037, March 21, 1997].
CASE: Composition: The Senate President, as ex officio Chairman, 12 Senatorsand 12 Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman shall not vote
except in case of a tie. See Daza v. Singzon, 180 SCRA 496; Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377; Cunanan v.
Tan, 5 SCRA 1.
CASE: In Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789, the Supreme Court heldthat a political party must have at
least two elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments. Thus, where there are
two or more political parties represented in the Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator
in the Senate cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission on Appointments. It is not
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission; what the Constitution requires is that there must be
at least a majority of the entire membership.
TOPIC VIII. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT: POWERS
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Section 28 - Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President
to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government. (3) Charitable
institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (4) No law
granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as
provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
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Section 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form,
content and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and
shall
be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be
raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for
public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines
as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the
preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-enacted and shall remain in force and effect
until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
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Article VI, Sec 28
Section 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation. (2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of
the Government. (3) Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents
appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. (4) No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority
of all the Members of the Congress
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(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
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e.) Effectivity of Laws
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EO 200, June 18, 1987
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No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of the service for the full term for which he was elected. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of
May. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed
to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of
the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two
or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
b.) Call Special Election for President and Vice-President (Art. VII, Sec. 10)
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the
vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days
nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall
be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations for the
special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No
special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date
of the next presidential election.
c.) Revoke/ extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus, declaration of martial law
(Art. VII, Sec. 18)
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation
or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
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Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
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(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment
thereof.
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h.) Judge President’s fitness (Article VII, Sec. 11, par. 4)
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote
of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.