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CONFLICTS OF LAWS CASES

GROUP 1: PERSONAL STATUS

GROUP 2: DOMICILE AND NATIONALITY

1. CARABALLO VS REPUBLIC
4 SCRA 1055 (1962)
Facts:
Ricardo Caraballo, an American citizen enlisted in the US Air Force as staff sergeant and
detailed in Clark Air Base, lived in Angeles, Pampanga together with his wife, Graciela. He alleged
that he and his wife had no legitimate acknowledged natural children, natural children by legal fiction
or any other descendant, and so he and his wife desired to adopt as their child, Norma Lee Caber, a
5-day old natural daughter of one Mercedes Caber begotten by an unknown father. Caraballo filed a
petition for adoption of the child but it was dismissed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga on the
ground that the petitioner, being a non-resident alien, was not qualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the
Civil Code.

Issue:
Whether or not Caraballo, a non-resident alien is qualified to adopt a child in the Philippines

Ruling:
Ricardo Caraballo, the petitioner, an American citizen who now lives in Clark Air Field in
Angeles, Pampanga, Philippines, because of assignment in the US Air Force as staff sergeant, his
stay here in the Philippines then being temporary, is non-resident of the alien who, pursuant Article
335 of the Civil Code, is disqualified to adopt a child in the Philippines. It cannot be gainsaid that an
adopted minor may be removed from the country by the adopter, who is not a resident of the
Philippines, and placed beyond the reach and protection of the country of his birth.

2. DE LA VINA V. VILLAREAL AND GEOPANO


41 PHIL. 13 (1920)
Facts:
In 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the CFI of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña,
alleging: That she was a resident of Iloilo, and that the defendant was a resident of Oriental Negros;
that she was the legitimate wife of the defendant, having been married to him in Negros Oriental, in
the year 1888; that since the year 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, the defendant had been
committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as
his concubine, with public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff; that because of said illicit relations,
the defendant ejected the plaintiff from the conjugal home, for which reason she had established her
habitual residence. Upon said allegations she prayed for a decree of divorce.
The petitioner contends that the CFI of Iloilo had no jurisdiction because the defendant therein
was a resident of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of the defendant, must also be
considered a resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of the husband
is also the domicile of the wife.

Issue:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is tenable
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the general principle of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of
the husband. But in modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the said rule can be obtained.
The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where the theoretical
unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by institution of divorce proceedings; or where the
husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of parties by agreement, or a
permanent separation due to the desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to a cruel
treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of
the husband’s domicile. The case of Narcisa Geopano comes under one of the many exceptions
abovementioned. Therefore, a married woman may acquire another and separate domicile from that
of her husband, during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for divorce.

3. ROMUALDEZ- MARCOS VS COMELEC


248 SCRA 300
FACTS
Imelda Romualdez- Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of Leyte. Private Respondent Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for
disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. Petitioner then filed an amended certificate of candidacy,
changing the entry in item 8 from 7 months to since childhood. However, the amended certificate was
not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban
City as her domicile and residence.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage

RULING Tacloban became petitioner’s domicile origin by operation of law when her father brought
the family to Leyte. Domicile is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one. When she married,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home not a domicilium necessarium.

4. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 87193 June 23, 1989

FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in
due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial
Law era.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that
by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under
the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.

5. LABO v. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 86564 August 1, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He
was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to
Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.

Issue:
Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:
The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia
because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other
allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship.

GROUP 3: FAMILY RELATIONS

1. WONG WOO YU v. VIVO 13 SCRA 552

FACTS:

In the proceedings held before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) in June 1961, petitioner Wong Yu
declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 to join her Filipino husband Perfecto Blas, to whom
she was married in Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929 in a ceremony celebrated by Chua Tio, a
village leader.

On the basis of such declaration, the BSI rendered a decision finding Wong Yu to be legally
married to Blas, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. This decision was
affirmed by the Board of Commissioners. However, on June 28, 1962, the same Board of
Commissioners, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 and
ordering petitioner to be excluded from the country.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is recognized in Philippine courts

HELD:

No. The only basis in support of the claim that she is the wife of Perfecto Blas is a mass of oral and
documentary evidence bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.

Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to support the alleged marriage of petitioner to
Perfecto Blas but the record is punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to
doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929. This claim cannot also be
entertained under our law on family relations. Thus, Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that
laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the
Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme
Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered
in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume, therefore, that
the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not
one of those authorized in our country.

2. DJUMANTAN v. HON. DOMINGO

G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995

FACTS:

Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a contract worker. He then
embraced and was converted to Islam.

He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then returned to the Philippines.
Petitioner and her two children with Banez arrived in Manila as the “guests” of Banez. The latter made
it appear that she was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely repaying the hospitability
extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez executed an “Affidavit of Guaranty and Support,”
for his “guests.” As “guests,” petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner
and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael discovered the
true relationship of her husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for “concubinage”, however,
subsequently dismissed for lack of merit.
Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident.
Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. Banez’ eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter
complaint subsequently referred to CID. Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a
Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent Djumantan
irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. They revoked the visa previously
granted to her.

ISSUE: Effect of marriage on the wife’s right to stay in the Philippines

HELD:

The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in the country,
is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it. There is no law guaranteeing aliens
married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the
Philippines. The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of
the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to
a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her
failure to depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.

3. PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ V. VICENTE F. ESCANO,

GR. NO. L-19671, NOVEMBER 29,1965

FACTS:

In 1948, Pastor Tenchavez and Vicente Escaño were married before a Catholic priest in the
Philippines. On October 22, 1950, Vicente obtained an absolute divorce from her husband from the
State of Nevada, U.S.A. She then married in America with an American. Both presently reside in
California, the girl having acquired American Citizenship in 1958. On July 30, 1955, however,
Tenchavez had already initiated legal separation proceedings in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Will the legal separation proceedings and relief for damages prosper?

RULING:

Yes, because the girl technically has committed adultery, her divorce not being recognized here in the
Philippines. Pastor, aside from being relieved of his duty to support her, can obtain damages from her
– in view of her refusal to perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and her desertion of her
husband.

4. PEOPLE VS SCHNECKENBURGER 73 PHIL. 413

Facts:

A husband, who was an alien consul in Manila, and his wife entered into a mutual agreement
whereby each could carnally live with others, without interference from either. Pursuant to the
immoral agreement, the husband lived with another woman, and in the prosecution for concubinage
he presented in defense the prior agreement or consent. Is he guilty?

Ruling:

No, he is not guilty for after all the wife had previously given her consent. The Court also said:

1. The agreement is still null and void because it is contrary to the law and morals. But precisely
because the girl had previously given her consent, she is now underserving of our sympathy. She
deserves less consideration than a woman who condones.
2. It is alleged that when the law speaks of consent, what is meant is condonation. This is not so
because condonation comes after while consent is prior to the act.

5. PEOPLE V. JUDGE TOLENTINO GR NO. 94147, JUNE 8, 1994

Facts:

Alvin, natural born US citizen, and his wife Evelyn, a natural born Filipina who in 1988 became
naturalized US citizens, jointly filed in 1990 a petition for adoption of Solomon, Evelyn’s 12-year old
brother.

Issue:

Are Alvin and Evelyn qualified to adopt Solomon?

Ruling:

No. An alien who may adopt a Filipino is one who is a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt a
relative by consanguinity, or one seeking to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, or
one who is married to a Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse.

When the petition was filed, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino citizen. While she may appear qualified,
adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone because the law mandates joint adoption by husband
and wife.

GROUP 4: WILLS AND SUCCESSION

1. Philippine Trust Co. v Bohanan, al.

FACTS: Testator was a citizen of Nevada, with properties in the Philippines , who gave nothing in his
will to his Filipino wife ,and very little to his children. Under the Nevada law, however, which was duly
proved, the wife and the children are NOT compulsory heirs, and are, therefore, not entitled to any
legitime.

ISSUE: Can the wife and the children justifiably complain?

HELD: No, because under Art 16 , par. 2 of the Civil Code, the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of the will provisions shall be governed by the national
law of the deceased.

2. VDA. De Perez v. Tolete

FACTS:

Physicians Jose and Evelyn Cunanan lived in New York with their three children and established a
successful practice there. In 1979, he executed his last will bequeathing to his wife “ all the
remainders of his real and personal property” wherever situated”. If he survived his wife, his
properties would go to his children and grandchildren, with his brother Rafael as trustee. 4 days later,
Evelyn executed her will containing the same provision also found in Jose’s will that should there be
insufficient evidence to determine who died first, Jose shall be presumed to predeceased Evelyn.

In 1982, Jose and his entire family perished in a fire. Rafael filed a separate proceeding in New York.
They were admitted to probate.

In 1983, Salud Perez, mother of Evelyn petition to reprobate in the Philippines and asked that she be
appointed as administratrix.

ISSUE:
Can the will previously probated abroad may be reprobated in the Philippines?

HELD:

YES. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of the wills are the following:

1) The due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign law because we cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws;

2) The testator had his domicile in the foreign country where the will was probated;

3) The will had been admitted to probate in said country;

4) The foreign tribunal is a probate court;

5.) The laws of the foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills were followed

Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. While the
probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax the rules of evidence, the goal is
to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or
denied probate.

3. Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Inc.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins died leaving among others, two stock certificate covering 33,002 shares of the
defendant , a Philippine corporation. The certificates were in the possession of Country trust
Company of New York which was the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the deceased.
Meanwhile, ancillary administration proceedings in the CFI of Manila were instituted and the Court
appointed Lazaro Marquez as ancillary administrator, who was substituted by Renato Tayag.

ISSUE:

Whether the domiciliary administrator is entitled to the possession of stock certificate.

HELD: The domiciliary administrator of the estate of a deceased American citizen in the U.S. has no
power over and is not entitled to the possession of the stock certificates of shares of stock owned by
the deceased in a Philippine corporation, which certificates must be delivered to the ancillary
administrator of the deceased's estate in the Philippines, Lazaro Marquez, to be administered by the
latter in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his debts or to be distributed among his heirs.

GROUP 5: PROPERTY

GROUP 6: OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

1. Germann & Co. Vs Donaldson, Sim & Co. ;

Gr No. L-439 November 11, 1901

FACTS:

Germann & Co. is a German company with office at Berlin. Max Leonard Tornow is the sole
owner of this business with operations in Germany and Manila. On 5 February 1900, Tornow
executed an instrument conferring several powers of attorney in favor of Fernando Kammarzell.
Fernando Kammerzel was appointed manager of a business concern under a power of attorney
which confers the authority “to exact payment” of sums of money “by legal means”.
On 27 October 1900, Tornow executed a general power for suits to substitute for the first
instrument conferring power to Kammarzell. Under this instrument, Kammarzell sued Donaldson, Sim
& Co. for recovery of a sum of money. Donaldson, Sim & Co claimed that the original power cannot
be construed as conferring to Kammarzell the authority to institute a suit since under Art 1713 of the
Civil Code an agency stated in general terms only includes acts of administration and that in order to
alienate, mortgage or execute any other act of strict ownership an express commission is required.

ISSUE:

Does the authority include the power to file actions in court for the purpose of recovering a sum of
money?

HELD:

Yes. Kamerzell, through the instrument executed in Berlin by himself and Tornow, has the authority to
institute suits for the recovery of sums of money.

The clause referring to the “exact the payment” of sums of money “by legal means” also means the
power to exact the payment of debts through the institution of suits for their recovery. If there could be
any doubt as to the meaning of this language taken by itself, it would be removed by a consideration
of the general scope and purpose of the instrument in which it occurs. (See Civil Code, art. 1286.)
The main object of the instrument is clearly to make Kammerzell the manager of the Manila branch of
the plaintiff’s business, with the same general authority with reference to its conduct which his
principal would himself possess if he were personally directing it. It can not be reasonably supposed,
in the absence of very clear language to that effect, that it was the intention of the principal to
withhold from his agent a power so essential to the efficient management of the business entrusted to
his control as that to sue for the collection of debts.

2. Molina v. De la Riva (6 phil. 12)

FACTS:

An American Corporation delivered in America to a German corporation a consignment of


agricultural machinery to be carried on the German steamer “Bulgaria”. The place of destination was
Vladivostok, Russia. In the BILL OF LADING, it was stipulated that in case of disputes under the
contract, the question would be at the carrier’s option, decided exclusively by German courts applying
German law. During the voyage, war broke out between Germany and Russia, and the ship had to go
in the meantime to Manila. While in Manila, the shipper asked either for a transshipment of the goods
to Russia, or their surrender by the carrier. When the carrier refused, the shipper started suit in
Manila. The carrier raised the issue of jurisdiction, alleging that under the terms of the bill of lading,
Philippine courts had no jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Philippine court have jurisdiction

HELD:

The court held that Philippine courts have jurisdiction for a contractual stipulation cannot operate to
oust our courts of their jurisdiction under the law.

3. Companie de Commerce, etc, v. Hamburg-Amerika, etch

(36 Phil. 590)

FACTS:
A French shipper of goods aboard a German vessel felt prejudiced when the ship had to take
refuge in Manila due to the outbreak of World War I, and so, he brought suit in our country for
damages. Under the charter party, there was a clause providing for the settlement of disputes by first
referring them to a Board of Arbitrators in London, England. The Defendant asserted that our courts
were without jurisdiction over the subject matter in view of the contractual stipulation referred to.

HELD:

It was held that Philippine courts had jurisdiction because it only objected to it on appeal. In the
court below defendant not only appeared and answered without objecting to the court's jurisdiction,
but sought affirmative relief; and it is very clear that defendant cannot be permitted to submit the
issues raised by the pleadings for adjudication, without objection, and then, when unsuccessful,
assail the court's jurisdiction in reliance upon a stipulation in the charter party which the parties were
at entire liberty to waive if they so desired.

4. Government v. Frank (13 phil. 236)

FACTS:

Mr. Frank, an American citizen from Illinois, U.S.A., entered into a contract with the Philippine
government to serve as a stenographer for a period of two years. He served for only six months, and,
thereafter, the government sued for damages. Frank presented minority as a defense. The contract
was entered into in Illinois, where in such state, Frank was considered an adult. Under Philippine law,
Frank was still a minor.

ISSUE:

Which law should apply as to Frank’s capacity to enter into a contract

HELD:

At the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, Frank was an adult under the
law of said state and had full authority to contract. It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is
admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full
capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the
execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the
contract is made.

5. Philippine Banking Corporation vs Lui She

Gr no. L-17587, September 12, 1967

FACTS:

Justina Santos, an aged Filipino woman, leased to Wong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land on Rizal
Avenue, Manila, for a period of 50 years, and also gave to the latter an option to purchase the same,
payable in 10 years, on the conditions that Wong would become Filipino. Justina died. Wong also
died without having become a Filipino. Justina’s administrator, the Philippine Banking Corporation
now sues Wong’s estate and surviving spouse as administratrix, for the recovery of the land. It was
alleged that no recovery should be allowed – firstsly, because the contract was validly entered into,
and secondly, assuming the nullity of the same, Justina’s administrator should not be allowed to
recover on the theory that Justina herself was a party to the transaction.

ISSUE:

Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid

HELD:
No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they
reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be
sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to
buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship.

But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue
of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years,
then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it—
rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban
against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.

GROUP 7: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

GROUP 8: TORTS AND CRIMES

GROUP 9: FOREIGN CORPORATIONS

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