BENJAMIN T. LOONG, petitioner, Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No.
Sections 3 and 4 of Rep. Act No. 6734 (entitled, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NURSHUSSEIN UTUTALUM and ALIM BASHIR
EDRIS, respondents.
FACTS : On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the respondent Commission his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao
Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990 (15 January 1990
being the last day for filing said certificate); herein two (2) private respondents
(Ututalum and Edris) were also candidates for the same position.
On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the
respondent Commission (Second Division) a petition (docketed as SPA Case No. 90-
006) seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the
ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to
his age.
On 15 May 1990, the respondent Commission (Second Division) rendered the now
assailed Resolution 3 (with two (2) Commissioners — Yorac and Flores concurring,
and one Commissioner — Dimaampao dissenting), holding that:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections (Second
Division) holds that it has jurisdiction to try the instant petition and the respondent's
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is hereby denied.
Denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution, the
respondent Commission issued Resolution dated 3 July 1990, 7 stating among others
that —
While the Frivaldo case referred to the questioned of respondent's citizenship, we
hold that the principle applies to discovery of violation of requirements for eligibility,
such as for instance the fact that a candidate is a holder of a green card or other
certificates of permanent residence in another country, or, as in this case, that the
candidate does not possess the age qualification for the office.
On 3 July 1990, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Vice-Governor of the
Mindanao Autonomous Region. 8 Hence, this special civil action of certiorari filed by
petitioner on 9 July 1990 to annul the aforesaid resolutions of respondent
Commission dated 15 May 1990 and 3 July 1990, issued in SPA No. 90-006.
ISSUE : SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner
Loong) was filed within the period prescribed by law.
HELD : The undisputed facts are as follows: petitioner Loong filed his certificate of
candidacy on 15 January 1990 (The last day for filing the same), the election for
officials of the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region being on 17 February 1990; but
private respondent Ututalum filed the petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate
Loong only on 5 March 1990, or forty-nine (49) days from the date Loong's certificate
of candidacy was filed (i.e. 15 January 1990), and sixteen (16) days after the election
itself.
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao") requires that the age of a person
running for the office of Vice Governor for the autonomous region shall be at least
thirty-five (35) years on the day of the election
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code ("Code" for brevity) provides that the
certificate of candidacy of the person filing it shall state, among others, the date of
birth of said person. Section 78 of the same Code states that is case a person filing a
certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a petition to cancel the
certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within twenty-five (25) days from the
time the certificate was filed.
Clearly, SPA No. 90-006 was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code.
We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for
disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for
filing a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying
Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedures.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of
disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at nay time after
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may
be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6
applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in
Section 6 and 7 Rep. Act. No 6646 is mentioned made of the period within which
these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the
Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of
candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on
petitions for quo warranto.
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate fails
to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for
whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has
another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo
warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as
provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of
procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional,
provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10)days from the date
the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).

In sum, SPA No. 90-006 was filed by private respondent Ututalum beyond the 25-day
period (from the filing by petitioner Loong of the questioned certificate of candidacy)
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code. It follows that the dismissal of said petition for
disqualification is warranted. Further it would appear that we can not treat SPA NO.
90-006 as a petition for quo warranto (Section 253 of the Code) for when it was filed
with the respondent Commission, no proclamation of election results had as yet been
made, it was premature.
Ututalum v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335
Facts: Ututalum and Anni were candidates for the 2nd congressional district of Sulu.Utatalum filed with
the Provincial Board of Canvassers that the election returns appearedto be tampered with or falsified.
Petitioner claimed that there were excess number of voters in Siasi. It was dismissed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers on the ground thatit was filed out of time and that it should have been raised
before the votes for Siasi havebeen canvassed. Thereafter, he filed a written petition with the
COMELEC seeking toannul the elections in Siasi and to conduct another election. The board of
canvassersforwarded the appeal of petitioner with the COMELEC with a request to proclaim Annias the
winner. The COMELEC resolved that there was no failure of elections. Anni was
thereafter proclaimed the winner. While Ututalum’s petition was pending, the
governor
of Sulu sought to annul the list of voters of Siasi which was upheld by the SC. Ututalumwanted to have
the case applied to his petition even if he was not a party to the case filedby the governor
Issue: WON the petition should be granted on the ground of vote-padding.
Ruling: Such irregularities as fraud, vote-buying and terrorism are proper grounds in anelection contest
but may not as a rule be invoked to declare a failure of election and todisenfranchise the greater
number of the electorate through the misdeeds, precisely, of only a relative few. Otherwise, elections will
never be carried out with the resultantdisenfranchisement of the innocent voters, for the losers will
always cry fraud andterrorism
Penera vs. COMELEC GR 181613 September 11, 2009 & November 25, 2009
Premature Campaigning
FACTS:
Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta.
Monica during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the
Office of the Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for
Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor
and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging
in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of
the campaign period.
Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11
September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the
Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution
dated 24 July 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified
Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and
declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.
ISSUE:
Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning? May premature campaigning be
committed by a person who is not a candidate?
RULING:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may
already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. Thus, such person can
be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the
campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign period.
Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and
letter of the law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate
of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was
decided on the ground that one who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate
until the start of the campaign period.
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the
second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA
9369, Congress inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:
x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take
effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that
election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the
campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign period,
such election offenses cannot be so committed.
In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense
only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight
— any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law
cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is
liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the
campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the
law.
various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing
a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City
government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the
publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards,
streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5)
distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to
vote for him. Eusebio denied petitioners' allegations and branded the petition as a
harassment case. Eusebio further stated that petitioners' evidence are merely
fabricated.

The ruling of the regional director on May 2004, recommends that the instant petition
be granted, pursuant to section 68 (a) and (e) of the omnibus election code, the
respondent Vicente p. Eusebio is disqualified to run for the position of mayor, Pasig
city for violation of section 80 of the omnibus election code.

the COMELEC ruled and orders on 5 may 2004, five days before the elections, the
disqualification of respondent Vicente p. Eusebio from being a candidate for mayor of
Pasig city in the May 10, 2004 elections; the election officers of district i and district ii
of Pasig city to delete and cancel the name of respondent Vicente p. Eusebio from
the certified list of candidates for the city offices of Pasig city for the May 10, 2004
elections; the board of election inspectors of all the precincts comprising the city of
Pasig not to count the votes cast for respondent Vicente Eusebio, the same being
cast for a disqualified candidate and therefore must be considered stray; the city
board of canvassers of Pasig city not to canvass the votes erroneously cast for the
disqualified candidate respondent Vicente p. Eusebio, in the event that such votes
were recorded in the election returns; the regional director of NCR, and the election
officers of Pasig city to immediately implement the foregoing directives; the law
department through its director iv, atty. alioden Dalaig to file the necessary
information against Vicente p. Eusebio before the appropriate court.
HENRY P. LANOT, SUBSTITUTED BY MARIO S. RAYMUNDO,
ISSUES:
PETITIONER,CHARMIE Q. BENAVIDES, PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,
VS.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, RESPONDENTS.
Ø Whether Eusebio actually committed the acts subject of the petition for
FACTS: disqualification.
On 19 March 2004, Henry P. Lanot ("Lanot"), Vener Obispo ("Obispo"), Roberto
Peralta ("Peralta"), Reynaldo dela Paz ("dela Paz"), Edilberto Yamat ("Yamat"), and Ø What could be the effect if Eusebio will be disqualified from the election.
Ram Alan Cruz ("Cruz") (collectively, "petitioners"), filed a petition for
RULING:
disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against
Eusebio before the COMELEC. Lanot, Obispo, and Eusebio were candidates for
There is no basis to disqualify Eusebio. Director Ladra recommended the
Pasig City Mayor, while Peralta, dela Paz, Yamat, and Cruz were candidates for
disqualification of Eusebio "for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code."
Pasig City Councilor in the 10 May 2004 elections. The case was docketed as SPA
The COMELEC First Division approved Director Ladra's recommendation and
(NCR-RED) No. C04-008.
disqualified Eusebio

Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an election campaign in various forms on

Acts committed by Eusebio prior to his being a "candidate" on 23 March 2004, even if
constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are protected as part of
freedom of expression of a citizen before he becomes a candidate for elective public
office. Acts committed by Eusebio on or after 24 March 2004, or during the campaign
period, are not covered by Section 80 which punishes only acts outside the campaign
period.
The 14 February 2004 and 17 March 2004 speeches happened before the date
Eusebio is deemed to have filed his certificate of candidacy on 23 March 2004 for
purposes other than the printing of ballots. Eusebio, not being a candidate then, is not
liable for speeches on 14 February 2004 and 17 March 2004 asking the people to
vote for him.
number of votes, against whom a petition for disqualification was filed before the
election, are presumed to have been cast in the belief that he was qualified. For this
reason, the second placer cannot be declared elected.
The exception to this rule rests on two assumptions. First, the one who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified. Second, the voters are so fully aware in fact
and in law of a candidate's disqualification to bring such awareness within the realm
of notoriety but nonetheless the voters still cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. Lanot and Benavides failed to prove that the exception applies in the
present case. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that Eusebio is disqualified,
the rule on succession provides that the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Pasig City shall
succeed in Eusebio's place.

They also presented Certification issued by Mr. Diego Cagahastian, News Editor of
Manila Bulletin dated 10 March 2004 and Mr. Isaac G. Belmonte, Editor-in-Chief of
Philippine Star dated March 2, 2004 to the effect that the articles in question came
from the camp of [Eusebio].
Eusebio is not liable for this publication which was made before he became a
candidate on 23 March 2004.
The court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the 10 May
2004 Advisory of Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and in the 21 May 2004 Order of the
Commission on Elections En Banc. It has been set aside the 20 August 2004
Resolution of the Commission En Banc since respondent Vicente P. Eusebio did not
commit any act which would disqualify him as a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections.

Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election

Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying
the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division -
to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his
certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

By definition, the election offense in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot
be committed during the campaign period. On the other hand, under Eusebio's
theory, unlawful acts applicable to a candidate cannot be committed outside of the
campaign period. The net result is to make the election offense in Section 80
physically impossible to commit at any time. We shall leave this issue for some other
case in the future since the present case can be resolved without applying the proviso
in Section 11 of RA 8436.

As second placer, Lanot prayed that he be proclaimed as the rightful Pasig City
Mayor in the event of Eusebio's disqualification. As third placer, Benavides, on the
other hand, prays that she be proclaimed as the rightful Pasig City Mayor in the event
of Eusebio's disqualification and in view of Lanot's death. Even if we assume
Eusebio's disqualification as fact, we cannot grant either prayer.

The disqualification of the elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated because of
the disqualification. Votes cast in favor of a candidate who obtained the highest
 this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests —
despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:

1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;

3) The issue involves the protection of labor;

4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or

5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate
and speedy remedy available.

In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their
petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression

all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its

adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the
implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the
COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its
exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are confronted with the question as to
whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent
criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech.

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice
and letter on free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to
mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and allquestions that
arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections
should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.

DIOCESE VS. COMELEC The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of
the Constitution.This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over
- The Comelec has no power to regulate the free expression of private citizens, who petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded
are neither candidates nor members of political parties. jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.

Facts: COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the immediate removal Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave
of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from
petitioners COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.

Held: During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of
discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government
Procedural: branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is
this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people against government’s
infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate out weighs the
jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
Substantive:
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. 113 However, all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate
the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
candidate in this case.
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor
candidates. II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows:122
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the enumeration made on
actsthat may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects
candidates.
Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued by COMELEC.
This was followed bythe assailed letter regarding the "election propaganda material
posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list
groups. . . ."123
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign materials only
mentions "parties" and "candidates":
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political
parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not
more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the
like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election propaganda: Provided,
That the size ofthe poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its
equivalent. Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be
authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the
size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent. Candidates
may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the
owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and
impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations
implementing the Fair Election Act, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any
lawful campaign material in:
a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the
requirements and/or limitations set forth in the next following section; and
b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.
The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common
poster areas and those enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is
prohibited. Persons posting the same shall be liable together with the candidates and
other persons who caused the posting. It will be presumed that the candidates and
parties caused the posting of campaign materials outside the common poster areas if
they do not remove the same within three (3) days from notice which shall be issued
by the Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful election
propaganda are posted or displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election
Officeror other officials of the COMELEC shall apprehend the violators caught in the
act, and file the appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The
above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to
candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that
these are "allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral
parties or organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation on
authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . ." Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording. These provisions show that
election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with
candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and
political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that
these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses
limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party. 125 There was no
allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin
regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of
their advocacy against the RH Law. Respondents also cite National Press Club v.
COMELEC126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the Constitution, to some
extent, set a limit on the right to free speech during election period. 127
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates
for the 2013 national elections because of the COMELEC notice and letter. It was not
merelya regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for public office.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate,
political party, or party-list group.
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not
be considered acts of election campaigning or partisan politicalactivity unless
expressed by government officials in the Executive Department, the Legislative
Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and members of the Civil
Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and
parameters should be deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the facts and
issues in this case. It also appears that such wording in COMELEC Resolution No.
9615 does not similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the law it implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.

any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the
rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to interpret the
law insofar as the facts of this case requires, states:

4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter

broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain
the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or
graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a candidate or party,
and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or
oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a
public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots,
appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements,
teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the
scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not
limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for
consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.

Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:

SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:

1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act

designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a
public office, and shall include any of the following:

....
 written form within twenty four (24) hours from the time the verbal objections were
made as required in Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code. On September 6,
1990, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution affirming the Resolutions dated 23
March 1988 and 5 June 1989, containing rulings adversely against petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its en banc Resolution dated September 6, 1990.

Held: The Court thinks not. The date “21 January 1988” appearing in the Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division is plainly a typographical error. The correct date is 31
January 1988. This fact does it ipso facto annul a proclamation which may have been
already made. In this regard, petitioners’ reliance on Section 245 to support their
claim of nullity of the proclamation made by the BOARD for lack of authorization from
the COMELEC is misplaced. In which case, no proclamation can be made by the
Board of Canvassers without authorization of the COMELEC until after the latter has
ruled on the objections brought to it on appeal by the losing party.

In the case at bar, when the proclamation was made by the BOARD on 31 January
1988, there was no pending appeal filed by petitioners before the COMELEC from the
rulings made by the BOARD on their objections to election returns rendered on 29, 30
and 31, 1988. What was filed by petitioners on 30 January 1988, before the
proclamation, was a petition seeking merely to restrain the canvass and proclamation
or suspend the effects of any proclamation. This petition, however, is clearly not the
appeal referred to in Section 245 that will operate to bar the BOARD from making any
proclamation of the winning candidates without authority from the COMELEC after the
latter has ruled on the objections elevated to it on appeal. Consequently, there was
no legal impediment to the proclamation of private respondents by the BOARD on 31
January 1988.

SALACNIB F. BATERINA, et al., vs. COMELEC, et al.,

205 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner Salacnib F. Baterina was a candidate for Governor of Ilocos Sur in
the special local elections held on 25 January 1988. The other petitioners were
candidates for Vice Governor and Provincial Board Members, in the same local
elections. In the course of the canvass proceedings, verbal objections were raised by
petitioners to certain election returns based on the grounds mentioned in Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236, in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt and
custody of the election returns. The objections were aimed at excluding the election
returns from the canvass. Petitioners submitted to the BOARD their objections in
 on the result of canvass of votes, Olfato and the rest of the petitioners were
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor and Sanggunian members.

Lirio filed a supplemental petition praying for the annulment of petitioner Olfato’s
proclamation citing fake voters and massive disenfranchisement which affects the
very integrity of the election returns. He also filed an election protest against Olfato in
the CFI of Batangas citing fake voters, fake voter’s identification cards, flying voters,
substitute voters and massive disenfranchisement. Olfato assumed the office of
Mayor. The COMELEC issued a Resolution dismissing Lirio’s petition and reinstating
the proclamation made by the MBC of respondent Olfato and the entire ticket, without
prejudice to other legal remedies under the Election Code.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the pre-proclamation

Controversy filed by Lirio?

Held: The Supreme Court riled in the affirmative citing previous rulings of the Court.
The COMELEC has the power and authority to inquire into the allegation of fake
voters, with fake ID’s in a pre-proclamation controversy in order to determine the
authenticity or integrity of election returns or whether such election returns faithfully
record that only registered or genuine voters were allowed to vote. Under the election
Code, the COMELC is the sole judge of all proclamation controversies. The
COMELEC has vast powers under the Election Code in consonance with its
primordial task of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.

The Court dismissed the petition for review filed by Lirio and directed the COMELEC
to proceed with dispatch on the pre-proclamation controversy (petition for suspension
of canvass and proclamation of winning candidates). The court noted that the
COMELEC Resolution considered the proclamation made in favor of Olfato and his
ticket as temporary in nature as it was made subject to the final outcome of the pre-
proclamation case.
OLFATO vs. COMELEC
103 SCRA 741, 1981

Facts: During the January 30, 1980 local elections, petitioner Olfato and the other
petitioners were the official Nationalista Party (NP) candidates for Mayor and
Sanggunian Bayan, respectively, of Tanauan, Batangas. On the other hand, Lirio was
the official candidate of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) fo Mayor of said town.
Three (3) days after the elections, private respondent Lirio, together with the
candidates in his ticket, filed with COMELEC a petition for suspension of the canvass
and proclamation of winning candidates for the elective positions of Tanauan, alleging
disenfranchisement of voters, terrorism, fake ID’s of voters and flying voters. Based
 HELD: The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative stating that said returns were
obviously false or fabricated - prima facie.

LAGUMBAY V. COMELEC 16 SCRA 175

In each precinct the number of registered voters equaled the number of ballots and
the number of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the
Liberal Party, the party in power, whereas, all the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero.

All the reported votes were for the candidates of the Liberal Party, all whom were
credited with exactly the same number of votes in each precinct, whereas all the
candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts.

ISSUE: Was the election result in said precincts utterly improbable and clearly
incredible?
 Petitioner appealed to the COMELEC Second Division which excluded election
returns from 3 precincts and directed the MBC to reconvene and finish the canvass of
the remaining or uncontested returns and then, to proclaim the winning mayoralty
candidate. Private respondent Bernal moved for reconsideration of the decision of the
Second Division with the COMELEC en banc.

The MBC proclaim petitioner winner of the election. Private respondent Bernal filed
an urgent motion to declare void petitioner’s proclamation. The duly proclaimed Vice-
Mayor Betita, and private respondent Bernal filed n action for quo warranto against
petitioner before the RTC of Iloilo. Petitioner filed with COMELEC en banc a motion to
cancel Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion declare void petitioner’s
proclamation on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to have
abandoned said motion when he filed quo warranto action.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second Division, annulled the
petitioner Dumayas’ proclamation; and constituted a new MBC. Respondent Bernal
was proclaimed by the newly-constituted MBC as the duly-elected Mayor of the
Municipality.

Petitioner Dumayas asked the Supreme Court to set aside the COMELEC en banc
resolution.

Issue: Whether the COMELEC was correct in including in the canvass the election
returns of the contested precincts?

Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. The only evidence presented by the
petitioner to prove the alleged irregularities were the self-serving contracts of his
watchers and inspectors. Returns cannot be excluded on mere allegations that the
returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns on their face appear to be
regular and without any physical signs of tampering. The election irregularities cited
DUMAYAS vs. COMELEC by the petitioner would require the presentation of evidence which cannot be done in
G.R. Nos. 141952-53, April 20,2001 a pre-proclamation controversy which is summary in nature.

Facts: Petitioner Dumayas and respondent Bernal were rival candidates for the
position in Mayor of Carles, Iloilo in the May 1998 synchronized elections. During the
canvassing by the MBC, petitioner sought the exclusion of election returns for 3
precincts of Barangay Pantalan owing to alleged acts of terrorism, intimidation and
coercion committed in said precincts during the casting and counting of votes. The
MBC denied petitioner’s objections and proceeded with the canvass which showed
respondent Bernal garnering more votes than the petitioner.
 precinct had been overlooked in the computation of the totals. As matters stood,
therefore, the total number of votes cast for Demorito was 5,470, or 51 more than the
5,419 votes cast for petitioner. Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza, the Regional Election Director
advised Garin to request authority from the COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose
of correcting the error. A formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC on May 17,
1995. On May 23, 1995, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 95-2414, directing the
Municipal board of Canvassers of said municipality to reconvene to annul the
proclamation of Nicolas C. Castromayor for the number 8 place for councilor; and to
proclaim the winning number eight (8) councilor, and to submit compliance hereof
within five (5)days from receipt of notice. Petitioner protested the proposed action in a
letter dated June 5, 1995 to COMELEC Executive Director Resurreccion A. Borra,
questioning the legality of the actuations of Garin. Hence, this petition to annul
COMELEC Resolution No. 95-2414.

Issue: Whether or not the MBC has the power to reconvene to annul a proclamation
upon prior authorization from the COMELEC.

Held: Yes. It should be pointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a
simple problem of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In
making the correction in computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative
capacity, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. Hence any question
pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to the COMELEC en
banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions affecting
elections.

NICOLAS C. CASTROMAYOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

250 SCRA 298

Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member Sangguniang Bayan
of the municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held on May 8, 1995. On May 10,
1995, the winners were proclaimed on the basis of the results of the canvass which
showed that petitioner received 5,419 votes and took eighth place in the election for
members of the Sangguniang Bayan. However, when Alice M. Garin, Chairman of the
MBC, rechecked the totals in the Statement of Votes the following day, she
discovered that the number of votes cast for Nilda C. Demorito, as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, was 62 more than that credited to her. The returns from one
 election. Biliwag contends that the ground of terrorism cannot be invoked in pre-
proclamation controversy.

Issue: WON fraud and terrorism is considered a pre-proclamation controversy to

justify the resolution of declaring that there was a failure of election in San Fernando
Pampanga.

Held: Election is not complete until all the essential acts thereof are concluded. In this
case, election is not complete unless there is a proclaimed winner. The matter
involves a failure to elect based on the ground that the election was marred by
massive terrorism. The 1973 Constitution vests power to the COMELEC to be the
sole judge of all election contest and controversy and that it had the power to declare
a failure of election and call for a special election.

Sanchez v. COMELEC, 153 SCRA 67

Facts : In the mayoral contest in Pampanga, Biliwang was proclaimed

winner. Sanchez filed an action to annul the proclamation with the COMELEC and to
declare that there was a failure of election and to call for a special election. This was
based on the ground that massive terrorism was made by the incumbent mayor in
ordering armed men to hold at gunpoint teachers who were counting the ballots and
replacing the ballots with pre-prepared ones in favor of Baliwag. Baliwag denied the
allegations. The COMELEC issued a resolution declaring that there was failure of
elections in San Fernardo Pampanga and referred the same to the President and
Batasang Pambansa so that the necessary law would be passed for holding a special

Veloria Vs. Comelec
FACTS:The seven (7) petitioners, Ramon Veloria et.al, as well as the seven (7)
private respondents. Pedro Sales et.al were candidates for municipal mayor (Veloria
and Sales), vice-mayor (Espejo and Soriano)and members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Manaoag, Pangasinan, in the local elections of January18, 1988. After the
canvass of the election returns on January 31, 1988, the private respondents were
proclaimed duly elected to the positions they ran for. Dissatisfied, the petitioners filed
Election Protest. Several proceedings were had, and some issues were brought up to
the Court of Appeals and this Court for determination. Revision of Ballots was then
set of February 26, 1990. During the scheduled initial revision of the ballots in
Precinct No. 22, Barangay Licsi, the private respondents, as protestees, filed a
“Motion to Dismiss” on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the
election protest on account of the following:
(1) that the election protest involves the contestsover three (3) different Municipal
Offices joined together in one (1) single petition which is inviolation and clear
disregard of the specific and mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 35, Part VI of
the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, and/or Section 2, Rule II of Comelec
Resolution No. 1451.
(2) that the Election Protest was in violation of COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE,
and/or ComelecResolution No. 1451; and
(3) that there is no showing that the protestants paid the requisite filing fees and legal
research fees for each interest. The petitioners-protestants opposed the Motion to
Dismiss which was subsequently dismissed. Instead of perfecting an appeal within
five (5) days as provided by law, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on
March 20, 1990. The protestees opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, and
the petitioners filed a Rejoinder. In the meantime, Judge Romulo E. Abasolo, was
assigned to take charge of the cases. Abasolo then denied the MFR which prompted
the petitioners to file Notice of Appeal. Respondents filed a “Motion to Dismiss Notice
of Appeal” on the grounds, that it was filed out of time and that the resolution of the
trial court was already final and executory. Judge Abasolo then gave due course to
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. The private respondents (as protestees) sought
recourse in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order
(SPR No. 8-90) to annul Judge Abasolo’s order giving due course to the appeal. On
May 30, 1990, the Commission en banc issued a TRO enjoining Judge Abasolo from
implementing his Order of May 10, 1990. COMELEC then granted the petition for
certiorari. Hence, this special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N COMELEC acted “with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction.”
RULING: There is no merit in this petition for review for the COMELEC correctly
found that the petitioners’ appeal from the court’s order dismissing their election
protest was indeed tardy. It was tardy because their motion for reconsideration did not
suspend their period to appeal. The petitioners’ reliance on Section 4, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC RULE S OF PROCEDURE which provides:
“Sec. 4. Effect of motion for reconsideration on period to appeal. –
A motion to reconsider adecision, resolution, order, or ruling when not pro-forma,
suspends the running of the period toelevate the matter to the Supreme
Court.”The “motion for reconsideration” referred to above is a motion for grant this petition for certiorari for the COMELEC does not possess jurisdiction to
reconsideration filed in the grant the private respondents’ petition for certiorari.

COMELEC, not in the trial court where a motion for reconsideration is not entertained.
The rule applicable to decisions or orders of the court in election protests is Section
20, Rule 35 of the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE which provides:
“Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. –
The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice
must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.”
The above COMELEC rule implements Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code
quoted below:
“Sec. 256. Appeals. –
COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law, jurisdiction to issued
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus:
“In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has
always been expressly conferred, either by the Constitution or by law. As a matter of
fact, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, ‘w]hile the power to issue the writ of
certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory
provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are expressly
designated’
“Thus, our Courts exercise the power to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative enactments.

Appeals from any decision rendered by the regional trial court under Section251 and
paragraph two, Section 253 hereof with respect to quo-warranto petitions filed in
election contests affecting municipal officers, the aggrieved party may appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court [now Commission on Elections] within five days after
receipt of a copy of the decision. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained
by the Court. The appeal shall be decided within sixty days after the case has been
submitted for decision.”
“Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction.
The Constitution makes no mention of any power given the COMELEC to exercise
original jurisdiction over Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus unlike in
the case of the Supreme Court which was specifically conferred such authority.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

Petitioners admitted receipt of the resolution of the trial court dated March 7, 1990 on
March 15,1990 but they filed a notice of appeal on April 3, 1990 only, instead of on or
before March 20, 1990 (five days from receipt of the trial court’s decision), because
they filed a motion for reconsideration which, as previously stated, is prohibited by
Section 256 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section20, Rule 35 of the COMELEC
RULES OF PROCEDURE. The COMELEC, therefore, correctly ruled that the
motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners

in the trial court on March 20, 1990 did not suspend the period to appeal since a
“motion for reconsideration” is prohibited under Section 256 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and according to
procedures laid down by law and its timely perfection within the statutory period is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Judge Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when he
gave due course to the petitioners’ tardy appeal from his predecessor’s (Judge
Santiago Estrella’s) resolution of March 7, 1990 dismissing the petitioners’election
protest. Said resolution had become final and unappealable. Nevertheless, we must
 Blg. 881because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It
purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity
of Comelec Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. The
trial court granted private respondent’s motion to quash and dismissed the criminal
case.

Issue: Whether or not transfer is violative of section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881.Held:
Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government
officer or employee during the election period. If done to promote efficiency in the
government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333provides that the
Comelec has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or detail. Prescinding
from this predicate, two elements must be established to prove a violation of Section
261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz:(1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer
or employee within the election period as fixed by the Comelec;
and(2) The transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the Comelec in
accordance with its implementing rules and regulations. An officer cannot be held
liable for violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, before the
effectivity of Comelec Resolution No. 2333 promulgating the necessary implementing
rules.

PEOPLE vs. REYES ( 247 SCRA 328 )“Election Offense, A. Election

Offenses”Facts: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, Collec
tionDistrict II, Manila International Container Port (MICP) Customs Personnel Order a
ssigned Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy
Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. Ebio filed with the Comelec
a letter – complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment
violated Comelec Resolution No. 2333 and Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg.881, the
Omnibus Election Code, which prohibit the transfer of any employee in the civil
service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and
localelections. Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash theinfor
mation on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. He
contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not violate B.P.

Cordova –versus- Comelec, G.R. No. 176947, Feb. 12, 2009
Facts:Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office
because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and residency requirements.
Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. Cordora claimed that he is not a
natural-born Filipino, that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father.
Tambunting denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. He also took an
oath of allegiance pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003).Cordora claims that the number of years of residency stated in
Tambunting’s certificates of candidacy isfalse because he lost his residency because
of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency
requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Tambunting and the COMELEC En Banc affirmed
the findings and the resolution.
Issue: Did Tambunting fulfill the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by
law?
Held: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the
COMELEC En Banc. Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the
residency requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an American.
Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American.
Because of the circumstances of
his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization pro
cess to acquire Americancitizenship. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election
laws, includes the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the
intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon citizenship.
Cordora vs Comelec Carpio, J:
FACTS:Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against
Tambunting asserting that Gustavo Tambuntingmade false assertion in his certificate
of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born Filipino and resident before the election in
2001and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local
public office because Tambunting lacked therequired citizenship and residency
requirements.Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration which
stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival
in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on
17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting
acquired American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s claim that
Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth
certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American
father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen.
The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s
father petitioned him through INS Form I-130(Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an
American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting
also took an oath of allegiance on 18November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No.
9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.The
Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed
to substantiate the charges. TheCOMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the
resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was
convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by
sufficient and convincing evidence .Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate
opinion which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner
Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover,
Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his
certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office. Petitioner filed a
MRbut was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino.

HELD: Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process involved in INS
Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting
claims that because of his parents’ differing citizenships, he is both Filipino and
American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a
naturalized American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses

dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American
citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the
American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification showed
nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting
possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the
2001elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him
from running for public office.

Dual citizenship

is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the

different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person
with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and
swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.

Dual allegiance

, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual’s active participation in the
naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines.
The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized
citizen’s foreign citizenship.