Evidence Rules Apply in Administrative Cases

1. Samalio v.
Court of Appeals
454 SCRA 462
Topic: Applicability of Rules of Evidence
Facts: Weng Sai Qin, a Chinese with Uruguayan

passport, was taken to Augusto R. Samalio,
Intelligence Officer of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID), because her passport was
suspected to be fake. Qin paid Samalio $500 in
exchange of her passport but Samalio returned
Qin’s passport without an immigration arrival
stamp. Thereafter, a criminal case for robbery
and violation of the Immigration Law was filed
against Samalio in the Sandiganbayan, as well as
an administrative case for dishonesty, oppression
and misconduct. Samalio was found guilty of the
charges in both proceedings and was ordered
dismissed from service by the BID Commissioner,
and such decision was affirmed by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), the Secretary of
Justice and the Court of Appeals. The CSC and the
Secretary of Justice took cognizance of the
testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the Sandiganbayan
case, applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Rules on Evidence

applies in the administrative case.
Ruling: Yes. The CSC and the Secretary of

Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the
“rule on former testimony,” in deciding
Case Digests on Evidence

petitioner’s administrative case. The provisions of
the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to
the rules of procedure of administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise
provided by law or the rules of procedure of the
administrative agency concerned. The Rules of
Court, which are meant to secure to every litigant
the adjective phase of due process of law, may
be applied to proceedings before an
administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in
the absence of different and valid statutory or
administrative provisions prescribing the ground
rules for the investigation, hearing and
adjudication of cases before it. For Section 47,
Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to
testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, between the same parties or
those representing the same interests; (c) the
former case involved the same subject as that in
the present case, although on different causes of
action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in
the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case and (e) the adverse party had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case. In this case, Weng Sai Qin was
unable to testify in the administrative
proceedings before the BID because she left the
country even before the administrative complaint
against petitioner was instituted. Petitioner does
not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin was
given in Sandiganbayan case, the very basis for
filing the administrative complaint. Hence, the
issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in such case

was the same issue in the administrative case,
that is, whether petitioner extorted money from
Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity
to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai
Qin, and to defend and vindicate his cause before
the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, all the requisites for
the proper application of the rule on former
testimony were satisfied. Furthermore, the proper
foundation was laid because in the early stages
of the proceedings before the Board of Discipline
of the BID, Weng Sai Qin’s departure from the
country and consequent inability to testify in the
proceedings had already been disclosed to the
parties.
2. Ong Chia v. Republic
328 SCRA 749
Facts: Ong Chia was born in China but he came

to the country when he was a boy and stayed
here since then. When he was 66 years old, he
filed a petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen.
He testified as to his qualifications and presented
witnesses to corroborate the facts which will
admit him Filipino citizenship and the trial court
granted such petition. However, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court’s
decision when the State appealed to it,
annexing in its appellant's brief the pertinen t
documents for naturalization which contends
that petitioner failed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Ong Chia now contends that the appellate

court erred in considering the documents
which had merely been annexed by the State
to its appellant's brief and that such
documents, not having been presented and
formally offered as evidence, are mere scraps of
paper.
Issue: Whether or not the documents annexed to

the State’s appellant briefs should be considered
as evidence even if they were not formally
introduced as evidence.
Ruling: Yes. The documents should be

considered as evidence. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the rule on formal offer
of evidence (Rule 132, Section 34 of the Rules of
Court) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. Rule 143
of the Rules of Court states, “These rules
shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and
election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not therein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
convenient .” The only instance when said
rules may be applied by analogy or
suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." In the case at bar,
petitioner claims that as a result of the
failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the

trial court, he was denied the right to object
against their authenticity, effectively depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process. However, the Supreme Court is not
persuaded, ruling that the reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence which
has not been formally offered is to afford the
opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was
deprived of the right to object to the authenticity
of the documents submitted to the appellate
court by the State. He could have included his
objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals.
3. Bantolino v. Coca Cola Bottlers, Inc.

403 SCRA 699
Facts: Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero et

al., who are former employees of Coca Cola, filed
a case against the latter for illegal dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees, and
ordered their reinstatement and the payment of

backwages. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
despite the negative declarations of Coca Cola as
to its relationship with the complainants, the
complainants’ testimonies are more credible to
prove the existence of employer-employee
relationship. The NLRC affirmed such decision but
the Court of Appeals modified such ruling
because the complainants’ affidavits should not
be given probative value since they were not
subjected to cross- examination, they were not
affirmed and therefore, they are hearsay
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not administrative bodies like

the NLRC should be strictly bound by the rules of
evidence.
Ruling: No. The argument that the affidavit is

hearsay because the affiants were not presented
for cross examination is not persuasive because
the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC, where decisions may be reached on the
basis of position papers only. It is not necessary
for the affiants to appear and testify and be
cross-examined by counsel of the adverse party.
To require otherwise would be to negate the
rationale and purpose of the summary nature of
the proceedings in the NLRC. The rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control
proceedings before the labor arbiter and the

NLRC. They are authorized to adopt reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case
speedily and objectively without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in the
interest of due process.
4. People v. Galleno
291 SCRA 761
Topic: Expert Testimony as Evidence; Evidence in

Criminal Cases

Facts: Joeral Galleno was charged with statutory
rape committed against Evelyn Obligar, a five
year old girl. The prosecution presented three
expert witnesses namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr.
Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and Dr. Machael Toledo,
whose testimonies convinced the trial court that
rape was committed against Obligar. Galleno
contended that he should be acquitted since the
expert testimonies were not impeccable
considering that the doctors found that there was
no presence of spermatozoa, and that they were
not sure as to what caused the laceration in the
victim's vagina.
Issue: Whether or not the lacking testimonies of

the expert witnesses as to the occurrence of
carnal knowledge should result to the acquittal of
the accused.
Ruling: As a general rule, witnesses must state

facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It
is the court's duty to draw conclusions from the
evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusions and opinions of
witnesses are received in many cases, and are
not confined to expert testimony, based on the
principle that either because of the special skill or
expert knowledge of the witness, or because of
the nature of the subject matter under
observation, or for other reasons, the testimony
will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its

conclusions not only with the aid of the expert

testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as
to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony of the other prosecution
witness, especially the victim herself. In other
words, the trial court did not rely solely on the
testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert
testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the
fact that the experts enumerated various possible
causes of the victim's laceration does not mean
the trial court's interference is wrong. The
absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina
does not negate the conclusion that it was his
penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina.
In rape, the important consideration is not the
emission of semen but the penetration of the
female genitalia by the male organ.

5. People v. Calumpang
454 SCRA 719
Topic: Alibi
Facts: Rico Calumpang and Jovenal Omatang

were charged with two counts of murder,
committed against the spouses Alicia Catipay and
Santiago Catipay. The trial court dismissed the
defense of alibi interposed by the defendants
because it was weak and then convicted the
defendants, relying on the testimony of Magno
Gomez who allegedly eye witnessed the killing of
the two victims. The defendants appealed,
contending that the testimony of Magno is
unreliable and inconsistent, and that the trial
court erred in dismissing their defense of alibi.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of alibi is

sufficient to cast doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.
Ruling: Yes. Appellants’ defense of alibi was

indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated
only by their relatives and friends, and it was not
shown that it was impossible for them to be at
the place of the incident. However, the rule that
an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was
never intended to change or shift the burden of
proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the
prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot draw strength from the

weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution
overturns the constitutional presumption of
innocence of an accused by competent and
credible evidence proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the presumption remains.
There being no sufficient evidence beyond
reasonable doubt pointing to appellants as the
perpetrators of the crime, appellants’ presumed
innocence stands.
The Supreme Court found that the testimony of

the lone witness Magno is full of inconsistencies.
While Magno claimed to have witnessed the
gruesome killings, the records show that serious
discrepancies attended Magno’s testimony in
court and his sworn statement executed during
the preliminary examination. Well settled is the
rule that evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself—such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances
stand. Magno’s testimony failed to satisfy such
rule, hence, the presumed innocence of the
accused must be upheld.

6. Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa G.R.
No. 152807
Topic: Admissibility of Evidence
Facts: The heirs of Lourdes Sabanpan filed a

complaint for unlawful detainer with damages
against respondents Alberto Comorposa, et al.
The MTC ruled in favor of the heirs, but the RTC
reversed such decision. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC judgment, ruling that
respondents had the better right to possess the
subject land; and it disregarded the affidavits of
the petitioners’ witnesses for being self-serving.
Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court, contending
that the Rules on Summary Procedure authorizes
the use of affidavits and that the failure of
respondents to file their position papers and
counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an
admission by silence.
Issue: Whether or not the affidavits in issue

should have been considered by the Court of
Appeals.
Ruling: No. The admissibility of evidence should

not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether
certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at

all, while probative value refers to the question of
whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are

admissible as the witnesses' respective
testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to
reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set
forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear
the burden of proving their cause of action,
because they are the ones asserting an
affirmative relief.

7. People v. Negosa
G.R. No. 142856-57
Topic: Testimonial Evidence
Facts: Roberto Negosa was charged with two

counts of rape, committed against Gretchen
Castaño. As to the second count of rape,
Gretchen testified on direct examination that the
penis of the appellant was able to penetrate her
vagina. However, on cross examination, she
testified that she and the appellant were wearing
short pants and underwear, hence, it was
physically impossible for his penis to penetrate
her vagina. The RTC convicted Negosa for
statutory rape and for acts of lasciviousness in
lieu of the second count for rape. Negosa
appealed, contending that the trial court should
have not believed the inconsistent testimony of
the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the inconsistent testimony

of the victim is sufficient to acquit the accused.
Ruling: No. The trial court disbelieved Gretchen’s

testimony on the second count of rape that the
appellant managed to insert a small portion of his
penis through the side of his short pants and the
side of the victim’s loose short pants and
convicted the appellant only of acts of

lasciviousness. This, however, does not impair
Gretchen’s credibility and the probative weight of
her testimony that she was raped by the
appellant. In People vs. Lucena, we ruled that the
testimony of a witness may be partly believed or
disbelieved, depending on the corroborative
evidence and intent on the part of the witness to
pervert the truth. The principle falsus in uno
falsus in omnibus is not strictly applied in this
jurisdiction. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus deals only with the weight of evidence
and is not a positive rule of law; the rule is not an
inflexible one of universal application. Modern
trend in jurisprudence favors more flexibility
when the testimony of a witness may be partly
believed and partly disbelieved depending on the
corroborative evidence presented at the trial.
Thus, where the challenged testimony is
sufficiently corroborated in its material points, or
where the mistakes arise from innocent lapses
and not from an apparent desire to pervert the
truth, the rule may be relaxed. It is a rule that is
neither absolute nor mandatory and binding upon
the court, which may accept or reject portions of
the witness’ testimony based on its inherent
credibility or on the corroborative evidence in the
case.

8. People v. Matito
G.R. No. 144405
Topic: Circumstantial Evidence
Facts: Ferdinand Matito was charged with

murder, committed against Mariano Raymundo,
Jr. The prosecution presented the following during
the trial: (1) testimony of the widow that her
husband, prior to his death, declared that it was
appellant who had gunned him down; (2) the
presence of nitrate powder on the cast taken
from the right hand of appellant; (3) the bitter
quarrel that ensued between Matito and the
victim after the latter had cut off the former’s
water supply; (4) the denial by Matito of the
request of his neighbors (including the victim) to
widen the right of way along the premises of his
house; and (5) hours before the victim was killed,
the threatening remarks of appellant to the
former’s daughter. The Regional Trial Court
convicted Matito.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence of the
prosecution is sufficient to convict the accused.
Ruling: Yes. Circumstantial evidence, when

demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may
be the sole basis of a criminal conviction. It
cannot be overturned by bare denials or
hackneyed alibis.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that

evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws
from the evidence established. Resort thereto is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would
result in setting a felon free." It is not a weaker
form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence. Cases
have recognized that in its effect upon the courts,
the former may surpass the latter in weight and
probative force. To warrant a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
totality of the evidence must constitute an
unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
On the strength of the circumstantial evidence

proven in the current case, we hold that the court
a quo did not err in convicting appellant of the
crime charged. The combination of the
circumstances comprising such evidence forms

an unbroken chain that points to appellant, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator of the
crime.

9. People v. Sevilleno
G.R. No. 152954
Topic: Circumstantial Evidence
Facts: Appellant Paulino Sevilleno was charged

for rape with homicide, committed against
Virginia Bakia. The RTC convicted appellant based
on the following circumstances presented by the
prosecution: (1) appellant invited the victim to
watch a "beta-show"; (2) victim and the appellant
proceed to a sugarcane field in Hacienda San
Antonio, the place where the corpse of the victim
was found; (3) the appellant emerge from the
sugarcane field alone and without the victim, with
fresh scratches on his face, neck and both arms;
(4) the multiple scratches suffered by the
appellant on the right side of his face and ears
were all caused by human fingernails; and (5) the
victim suffered hymenal laceration, contusions,
abrasions and hematoma on different parts of her
body and was strangled resulting to her death
which indicated that there was a struggle and the
victim vigorously put up a fight against her
attacker. Sevilleno appealed, contending that the
scratches on his face do not prove that they were
inflicted by Virginia, much less that he committed
the crime.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution evidence

is sufficient to convict the accused.
Ruling: Yes. The rules on evidence and

precedents to sustain the conviction of an

accused through circumstantial evidence require
the presence of the following requisites: (1) there
are more than one circumstance; (2) the
inference must be based on proven facts; and (3)
the combination of all circumstances produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt
of the accused. To justify a conviction upon
circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be such as to leave no
reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal
liability of the appellant. Jurisprudence requires
that the circumstances must be established to
form an unbroken chain of events leading to one
fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the
appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
author of the crime. The prosecution were able to
establish all of these.
While it is established that nothing less than

proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not
preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when
direct evidence is not available. Direct evidence
is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt
of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in
the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution
may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence
to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually
committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence
is insisted on under all circumstances, the
prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous
crimes in secret or secluded places will be hard, if
not impossible, to prove.

10. People v. Darilay
421 SCRA 45
Topic: Direct Evidence, Circumstantial Evidence
Facts: Appellant Noel Darilay, who was then 15

years old, was found guilty for the rape and
murder of minor Marilyn Arganda, and the
attempted murder of Ailyn Arganda. Ailyn
testified that she and Marilyn were on their way
home when they met appellant who suddenly
struck them with a piece of wood which left them
unconscious. Appellant left Ailyn under such state
but he carried Marilyn to a grassy place where he
repeatedly raped and eventually killed her. The
appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
prove that he raped and killed the victim because
only Ailyn’s testimony was relied upon and there
was no direct evidence presented.
Issue: Whether or not the absence of direct

evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
warrants his acquittal thereof.
Ruling: No. The Court agrees with the appellant
that the prosecution failed to adduce direct
evidence to prove that he raped and killed
Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the said
crime. However, direct evidence is not
indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused
for the crime charged; it may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. Based on the evidence
on record and as declared by the trial court in its

decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial
evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the
appellant who raped and killed Marilyn on the
occasion or by reason of the rape. Hence, he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide, a special complex crime.
First. The appellant alone waylaid Ailyn and
Marilyn while the two were walking home after
buying tinapa. The appellant hit Ailyn twice with
a piece of wood on her back and boxed the left
side of her face, rendering her unconscious. The
appellant also struck Marilyn with a piece of wood
on the back. After dragging Ailyn to a grassy
area, he left her there. Second. When Ailyn
regained consciousness, Marilyn and the
appellant were nowhere to be found. Third. The
torn dress, the pair of panties, and a slipper were
found about 15 meters away from where the two
young girls were waylaid by the appellant.
Fourth. The appellant testified that he himself
accompanied the policemen and pointed to the
place where Marilyn’s body was dumped,
completely naked, with blood oozing from her
nose and vagina. Considering all of these, the
court is convinced that the appellant raped
Marilyn about 15 meters from where he had
earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn
across the river where he killed her to prevent
her from revealing to the authorities that she was
raped. The appellant hid her body under the
bushes and trees to prevent police authorities
from discovering that he killed Marilyn.

11. Ayala de Roxas v. Case
8 Phil. 197
Topic: Vested Right in a Rule of Evidence
Facts: Appellant Edwin Case filed a petition

claiming a right of way through a passage along
the westerly side of the property of Carmen Ayala
de Roxas. Case owns the two adjoining properties
lying in the rear of appellee’s premises, and
being the dominant tenement, he claims the
benefit of easement. Appellant claims that the
right of way exists not by necessity but simply
that it arises by prescription, founded not on any
written instrument but on immemorial use alone.
The appellant makes the additional point that
since the passage of the Code of Civil Procedure,
an immemorial prescription does not call for the
same proof as under the Spanish procedure. The
third Partida says that discontinuous servitudes
have no fixed periods, but must be proved by
usage or a term so long that men cannot
remember its commencement.

Issue: Whether or not immemorial use or vested
right over a servitude can be established by mere
evidence like the testimony of witnesses over 60
years of age who were acquainted with the
servitude during their lives and who also had
heard it spoken of in the same way by their
elders, as required under the Spanish Code.
Ruling: No. The Court held that there is no

vested right in a mere rule of evidence. (Aldeguer
vs. Hoskyn, 2 Phil. Rep., 500) But the point would
be whether this requirement of the Spanish law is
not substantive rather than evidential in its
nature, so as to survive the repeal. If substantive,
then the appellant has failed to comply with it; if
not substantive, but merely a matter of
procedure, then it must be taken to be replaced
by the corresponding provisions of our new code.
We find therein no equivalent provision, other
than subsection 11 of section 334, establishing as
a disputable presumption “that a person is the
owner of property from exercising acts of
ownership over it or from common reputation of
his ownership.” The use of the passage proved in
this case cannot be held to constitute acts of
ownership for the reason that it is quite
consistent with a mere license to pass, informal in
its origin and revocable in its nature. It seems,
however, that under the clause quoted, common
reputation of ownership of the right of way was
open to proof and on this theory of the case such
testimony, if available, should have been offered.
The Court is of the opinion that in order to
establish a right or prescription something more
is required than the memory of living witnesses.

Whether this something should be the declaration
of persons long dead, repeated by those who
testify, as executed by the Spanish law, or should
be the common reputation of ownership
recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is
unnecessary for the court to decide.
12. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo 453

SCRA 283
Topic: Burden of Proof

Facts: Marcelino Dailo, Jr. obtained a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and executed a
mortgage as security. Marcelino eventually died
and was survived by his wife Miguela. Upon
maturity, the loan remained outstanding and as a
result, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage and a
certificate of sale was issued in its favor as the
highest bidder in the extrajudicial sale. After the
lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership
thereof by executing an affidavit and a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Miguela claimed that she had no
knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the
subject property, which was conjugal in nature,

so she instituted a case to nullify the real estate
mortgage and the certificate of sale. Petitioner
claims however that the property mortgaged is
Marcelino’s exclusive property.
Issue: Who has the burden of proving that the
property mortgaged is conjugal property?
Ruling: The burden of proof that the debt was

contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. He who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove. Petitioner’s sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate
proof, does not persuade the Court. Other than
petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from
the records of the case to compel a finding that,
indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of his family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be
held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case

reveals that during the trial, petitioner vigorously
asserted that the subject property was the
exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court
was it alleged that the proceeds of the loan

redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on
appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family
benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below,
he will not be permitted to change his theory on
appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only
be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice
and due process. A party may change his legal
theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any
further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the
new theory.
13. Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Aying G.R.

No. 144773
Facts: Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the

issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over

said parcel of land. After her death in 1930, the
Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing the
issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta
Maloloy-on’s eight children. The certificate of title
was, however, lost during the war. All the heirs of
the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale conveying the subject parcel of land to
herein petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Company.
Aznar, claiming to be the rightful owner of the
subject property, sent out notices to vacate,
addressed to persons occupying the property.
Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for
ejectment against the occupants before the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
Issue: Who has the burden of proof?
Ruling: The only evidence on record as to when

such prescriptive period commenced as to each
of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinog’s
(heir of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three
years after 1964, they already learned of the
existence of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale; and Laurencio
Aying’s (heir of Emiliano Aying) admission that he
found out about the sale of the land in dispute a
long time ago and can only estimate that it must
be after martial law. Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon
Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever as to when
the children of Simeon Aying actually learned of

the existence of the document of sale. On the
other hand, petitioner did not present any other
evidence to prove the date when respondents
were notified of the execution of the subject
document.
In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of

when the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon
Aying discovered the existence of the document
of sale, it must be determined which party had
the burden of proof to establish such fact. The
test for determining where the burden of proof
lies is to ask which party to an action or suit will
fail if he offers no evidence competent to show
the facts averred as the basis for the relief he
seeks to obtain. Moreover, one alleging a fact
that is denied has the burden of proving it and
unless the party asserting the affirmative of an
issue sustains the burden of proof of that issue by
a preponderance of the evidence, his cause will
not succeed. Thus, the defendant bears the
burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses
which he sets up in answer to the plaintiff’s claim
or cause of action; he being the party who
asserts the truth of the matter he has alleged,
the burden is upon him to establish the facts on
which that matter is predicated and if he fails to
do so, the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or
decision in his favor.

14. Bautista v. Sarmiento
138 SCRA 587
Topic: Quantum of Proof in Criminal Cases
Facts: Complainant Dr. Leticia C. Yap filed a case

of estafa against Dr. Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus
and Teresita Vergere. The case was heard before
the sala of Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento. The
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence against them but it
was denied. They were later found guilty for said
crime.
Issue: Whether or not conviction can be had in a

criminal case only upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt and not on a mere prima facie case.
Ruling: There is no denying that in a criminal

case, unless the guilt of the accused is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
he is entitled to an acquittal. But when the trial
court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss by
way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that
the prosecution had established a prima facie
case against them, they assumed a definite
burden. It became incumbent upon petitioners to
adduce evidence to meet and nullify, if not
overthrow, the prima facie case against them.

This is due to the shift in the burden of evidence,
and not of the burden of proof as petitioners
would seem to believe.
When a prima facie case is established by the

prosecution in a criminal case, as in the case at
bar, the burden of proof does not shift to the
defense. It remains throughout the trial with the
party upon whom it is imposed—the prosecution.
It is the burden of evidence which shifts from
party to party depending upon the exigencies of
the case in the course of the trial. This burden of
going forward with the evidence is met by
evidence which balances that introduced by the
prosecution. Then the burden shifts back.
A prima facie case need not be countered by a

preponderance of evidence or by evidence of
greater weight. Defendant's evidence which
equalizes the weight of plaintiff's evidence or
puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a
result, plaintiff will have to go forward with the
proof. Should it happen that at the trial the
weight of evidence is equally balanced or at
equilibrium and presumptions operate against
plaintiff who has the burden of proof, he cannot
prevail.

15. Rivera v. Court of Appeals
284 SCRA 673
Facts: Esmundo Rivera filed an ejectment case

against Peregrino and Merlinda Mirambel alleging
that they constructed their house in his land as
indicated by a private survey. He presented the
following evidence: private survey commissioned
by Rivera which was not properly authenticated
by the Bureau of Lands, a letter of the district
land officer to Rivera informing him that his
application cannot be given due course because
of a prior application. MTC ruled in favor of Rivera
because he was able to establish his cause of
action through preponderance of evidence. The
RTC reversed MTC’s decision because the houses
of the Mirambels were built outside the land of
Rivera and located in a public land. Rivera
appealed to the CA saying that RTC's findings lack
evidentiary support. The CA found that both
decisions are not supported by substantial
evidence. According to the CA, there should be a
field survey directed by the court or ocular
inspection of the subject premises, and not just
the sole survey conducted by Rivera which is self-
serving if without thorough verification.

Issue: Whether or not Rivera was able to prove
the fact that Mirambels are within his property.
Ruling: No. Basic is the rule in civil cases that

“the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.” Preponderance of evidence simply
means evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it. In the present ejectment case,
petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving
that the houses of private respondents were
located within his titled land. To justify a
judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore
establish a preponderance of evidence on this
essential fact.
The extant records of this case support the

finding of the Court of Appeals that the aggregate
of evidence submitted by both parties was
insufficient to determine with certainty whether
the private respondents’ houses were inside the
petitioner’s titled property. As noted by
Respondent Court, private respondents’ claim
that their houses were built on public land is not
convincing because petitioner has a transfer
certificate of title over the same parcel of land.
Likewise unconvincing is the private survey
commissioned by the petitioner himself to prove
that the houses of private respondents
encroached on his property. The reliability of the
survey would have been indubitable had it been
properly authenticated by the Bureau of Lands or
by officials thereof.

“Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in
equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof fails upon that issue.” Therefore,
as neither party was able to make out a case,
neither side could establish its cause of action
and prevail with the evidence it had. They are
thus no better off than before they proceeded to
litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the
courts can only leave them as they are. In such
cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the
complaints/petitions.
16. Benares v. Pancho

457 SCRA 652
Topic: Quantum of Proof/Evidence, Probative

Value
Facts: Complainants Jaime Pancho, Rodolfo

Pancho Jr., et al. worked at Hacienda Maasin II, a
sugar cane plantation owned and managed by
Josefina Benares. Complainants alleged to have
been terminated without being paid termination
benefits by Benares in retaliation to what they
have done in reporting to the Department of
Labor and Employment their working conditions.
The complainants filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with money claims before the labor
arbiter. The labor arbiter dismissed the case for
failure of the complainants to discuss the facts

and circumstances surrounding their dismissal
and to prove their entitlement of monetary
awards. The NLRC reversed such decision, ruling
that complainants were illegally dismissed for
failure of Benares to prove that there was just or
authorized cause in their dismissal. On appeal,
Benares questioned NLRC's general statement to
the effect that the payroll she submitted is not
convincing, she asserts that she submitted 235
sets of payroll, not just one, and that the NLRC
did not even bother to explain why it found the
payroll unconvincing. She also said that NLRC
should have remanded the case to the labor
arbiter since there are gray areas in the facts.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave

abuse of discretion in not considering the
petitioner’s evidence.
Ruling: No. The probative value of petitioner’s

evidence has been passed upon by the labor
arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
Although the labor arbiter dismissed respondents’
complaint because their “position paper is
completely devoid of any discussion about their
alleged dismissal, much less of the probative
facts thereof,” the ground for the dismissal of the
complaint implies a finding that respondents are
regular employees. According to petitioner,
however, the NLRC’s conclusion is highly suspect
considering its own admission that there are
“gray areas which require clarification.” She
alleges that despite these gray areas, the NLRC
“chose not to remand the case to the Labor
Arbiter as this would unduly prolong the agony of

the complainants in particular.” Petitioner
perhaps wittingly omitted mention that the NLRC
“opted to appreciate the merits of the instant
case based on available documents/pleadings.”
That the NLRC chose not to remand the case to
the labor arbiter for clarificatory proceedings and
instead decided the case on the basis of the
evidence then available to it is a judgment call
this Court shall not interfere with in the absence
of any showing that the NLRC abused its
discretion in so doing. It is well to note at this
point that in quasi-judicial proceedings, the
quantum of evidence required to support the
findings of the NLRC is only substantial evidence
or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
17. Duduaco v. Laquindanum A.M.

MTJ-05-1601
Topic: Quantum of Proof
Facts: Mercedes Duduaco charged Judge Lily

Laquindanum with grave misconduct, abuse of

discretion, and gross ignorance of the law.
Mercedes is the manager of Toyota Service
Center where respondent brought her vehicle for
repairs and replacement of parts due to a
vehicular mishap. The service advisor told
respondent that her vehicle will be released upon
payment of deductible franchise, respondent
refused saying that it should be paid by the
insurance company. She asked to speak with the
manager Mercedes but the latter was in a
meeting. It was explained to respondent that the
payment of the deductible franchise was upon
instruction of the insurance company but the
respondent got angry. Upon being told that
Mercedes was in a meeting, respondent said that
she was a judge and she should have a
preferential treatment. She was referred to
Saragoza and Yñez but when no agreement was
reached, she suggested that they put in writing
the demand for the deductible franchise before
she would pay. Upon presentation, she paid the
amount under protest but refused to sign a blank
form which is release of claim with subrogation.
They told her that she cannot get the car unless
she signs the form. She did not sign it so she left
without her car. She filed a case for replevin,
damages, and atty. fees against the service
center. The Investigating Justice of CA
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for
lack of merit insufficiency of evidence and
reasonable doubt. OCA adopted such decision.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner must prove

beyond reasonable doubt her case against
defendant.

Ruling: No. In administrative proceedings,
complainants have the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in their
complaints. Administrative proceedings against
judges are by nature, highly penal in character
and are to be governed by the rules applicable to
criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to
support the administrative charges should thus
be more substantial and they must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. However, petitioner
also failed to present substantial evidence. To
constitute gross ignorance of the law, the acts
complained of must not only be contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty and
corruption. On the other hand, misconduct is any
unlawful conduct on the part of a person
concerned in the administration of justice
prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right
determination of the cause. In this case,
respondent’s refusal to pay the deductible
franchise was justified. Her insistence that the
demand to pay be in writing, together with her
refusal to affix her signature in the blank form,
did not amount to grave misconduct, abuse of
judicial office or gross ignorance of the law. She
was only exercising her legal right. Had
respondent signed the blank form, she would be
deemed to have waived her earlier protest and
would have lost the right to claim for refund.

18. State Prosecutors v. Muro
236 SCRA 505
Topic: Judicial Notice
Facts: The case at bar involves the prosecution

of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in
violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange
Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. Judge
Manuel Muro dismissed all 11 cases solely on the
basis of the report published on 2 newspapers,
which the judge believes to be reputable and of
national circulation, that the Pres. of the
Philippines lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The respondent’s decision was founded on his
belief that the reported announcement of the
Executive Department in the newspaper in effect
repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the
court of its jurisdiction to further hear the
pending case. He further contends that the
announcement of the President as published in
the newspaper has made such fact a public
knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take
judicial notice which is discretionary on his part.
Issue: Whether or not the judge may take judicial

notice of a statute before it becomes effective.

Ruling: No. Matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be
well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.
Judicial notice is not equivalent to judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court,
and he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before
it becomes effective. A law not yet in force and
hence still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of unquestionable
demonstration.

19. Fule v. Court of Appeals
162 SCRA 446
Topic: Stipulation of Facts as Evidence
Facts: Petitioner Manolo Fule was convicted of

violation of B.P. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law, on
the basis of a stipulation of facts entered into
between the prosecution and the defense during
pre-trial which was not signed by the petitioner or
by his counsel. On appeal, the respondent
appellate court upheld the stipulation of facts and
affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Issue: Whether the conviction, based solely on a

stipulation of facts which was not signed by
either the petitioner or his counsel, was proper.
Ruling: No. The omission of the signature of the

accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required
by the Rules, renders the stipulation of facts
inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer
of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed
the stipulation of facts does not cure the defect
because Rule 118 requires the signature of both
the accused and his counsel. What the

prosecution should have done, upon discovering
the lack of the required signatures, was to submit
evidence to establish the elements of the crime,
instead of relying solely on the supposed
admission of the accused. Without said evidence
independent of the admission, the guilt of the
accused cannot be deemed established beyond
reasonable doubt.

20. Service Wide Specialists, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 117728
Topic: Admission of Liability
Facts: Servicewide filed a complaint for replevin

and/or sum of money with damages against
spouses Eduardo and Felisa Tolosa, alleging that
the spouses failed to pay the installments due on
the purchase price of a jeepney despite several
demands. Later on, Servicewide amended its
complaint and included Eduardo Garcia as
defendant alleging that the Tolosa spouses,
without Servicewide's knowledge and consent,
executed and delivered to Garcia a "Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage" over the jeepney
sought to be recovered. Lourdes Bartina filed a
complaint-in-intervention claiming that the
vehicle subject of the complaint was sold to her
by Binan Motors owned by Garcia and that the
vehicle was in her possession when it was seized
by the sheriff and thereafter turned over to
Servicewide. Later, Bartina and Garcia and Binan
Motors, with the assistance of their respective
counsels, moved to dismiss the complaint-in-
intervention. They alleged that they had arrived

at an amicable settlement of their claims. The
decision was rendered by the trial court and
included Garcia in the payment of liability to
Servicewide.
Issue: Whether or not an offer to compromise is

considered an admission of liability in civil cases.
Ruling: No. The compromise between Bartina

and Garcia and Binan Motors cannot be taken as
an admission of Garcia's liability. In civil cases, an
offer of compromise is not an admission of any
liability. With more reason, a compromise
agreement should not be treated as an admission
of liability on the part of the parties vis-a-vis a
third person. The compromise settlement of a
claim or cause of action is not an admission that
the claim is valid, but merely admits that there is
a dispute, and that an amount is paid to be rid of
the controversy, nor is a compromise with one
person an admission of any liability to someone
else. The policy of the law should be, and is, to
encourage compromises. When they are made,
the rights of third parties are not in any way
affected thereby.

21. Dalandan v. Julio
10 SCRA 400
Topic: Admission
Facts: Clemente Dalandan filed a civil case

against Victoria Julio alleging in their complaint
that what transpired between the former and
Victorina Dalandan is not a facto de retro sale but
an equitable sale. Victoria Julio filed a motion to
dismiss which was granted by the court.
Clemente Dalandan went to the SC saying that
upon filing of the motion to dismiss of the other
party it is deemed that they admitted that the
transaction was really an equitable sale.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of motion to

dismiss was in effect admitting the allegation that
it was an equitable sale.
Ruling: No. As the trial court correctly pointed

out, "such allegation of 'equitable mortgage' in
the complaint is a mere conclusion of plaintiffs
(appellants) and not a material allegation, so that

the same cannot be deemed admitted by
defendants (appellees) who filed the motion to
dismiss". As a rule, the complaint should contain
allegation of ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action. Neither is it proper to
allege in a pleading inferences of fact from facts
not stated, or incorrect inferences from facts
stated, for they are not the ultimate facts
required by law to be pleaded. Legal conclusions
need not be pleaded, because so far as they are
correct they are useless, and when erroneous,
worse than useless. And to determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint and no other should be
considered. The allegation of nullity of a
judgment in a complaint, being a conclusion and
not a material allegation, is not deemed admitted
by the party who files a motion to dismiss.

22. Northwest Orient Airlines v. Court of Appeals
241 SCRA 192
Topic: Foreign Judgment as Evidence
Facts: Plaintiff Northwest Orient Airlines

authorized defendant C.F. Sharp & Co. through its
Japan branch, to sell the former's airlines tickets.
Sharp failed to remit the proceeds of the ticket
sales it made on behalf of Northwest which led
the latter to sue in Tokyo for collection of the
unremitted amount with claim for damages. The
Tokyo District Court of Japan rendered judgment
ordering Sharp to pay Northwest and Sharp failed
to appeal making the judgment final. However,
Northwest failed to execute the decision in Japan,
hence, it filed a suit for enforcement of the
judgment before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Sharp filed its answer averring that the
judgment of the Japanese court is null and void
and unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been
rendered without due and proper notice to Sharp.
The trial court granted the demurrer to evidence
motion of Sharp, holding that the foreign
judgment in the Japanese court sought to be

enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
Issue: Whether or not foreign judgment in the

Japanese court need to be proved as evidence in
the Philippine courts.
Ruling: A foreign judgment is presumed to be

valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also
proper to presume the regularity of the
proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a
judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal
of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors-
in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under
Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the
Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful exercise of
jurisdiction and has regularly performed its
official duty. Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming
the presumption of its validity. Being the party
challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, Sharp had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In
an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends
that the extraterritorial service of summons
effected as its home office in the Philippines was
not only ineffectual but also void, and the

Japanese Court did not, therefore, acquire
jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure

such as those relating to the service of process
upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or
the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the
procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on Sharp. As to
what this law is a question of fact, not of law. It
may not be taken judicial notice of and must be
pleaded and proved like any other fact. It was
then incumbent upon Sharp to present evidence
as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to
show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial
service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the
presumption of validity and regularity of the
service of summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
23. City of Manila v. Garcia

19 SCRA 413
Facts: The City of Manila owns parcels of land

occupied by illegal settlers, who were later
ordered to vacate the area for the expansion of
the Epifanio delos Santos Elementary School. The
defendants Gerardo Garcia et al., however,
refused; hence the suit for recovery of
possession. At the trial, the City presented the
certification of the Chairman of the Committee on

Appropriations of the Municipal Board, stating
that the amount of Php 100,000.00 had been set
aside in an Ordinance for the construction of an
additional building of the said school. The court
ruled out the admissibility of said document. But
then, the trial judge reversed his views, and ruled
in favor of the City by citing such evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court may alter its

ruling as to evidence presented in a case.
Ruling: Yes. A court of justice may alter its

ruling while the case is within its power, to make
it conformable to law and justice. Defendants'
remedy was to bring to the attention of the court
its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this
Court will not reopen the case solely for this
purpose.
Elimination of the certification as evidence would

not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand,
the trial judge could well have taken, because he
was duty bound to take, judicial notice of the
Ordinance appropriating an amount for the
school. This is because the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial
notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal
board of Manila. And the ordinance itself confirms
the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of
Php 100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

24. Gallego v. People
8 SCRA 813
Facts: Florentino Gallego, in view of holding a

religious meeting at the public market without
the required permit, was convicted of slight
disobedience of an agent of a person in authority.
He however assailed the decision of the court by
contending that there is no proof of the existence
of an ordinance in force requiring a permit for the
holding of a meeting; and claims that it is error
for the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of

Ordinance No. 2, series of 1957 of Lambunao,
Iloilo when the trial court itself allegedly did not
take cognizance of the ordinance.
Issue: Whether or not the Court may be

prohibited in taking judicial notice of an
ordinance.
Ruling: No. There is nothing in the law that

prohibits a court from taking cognizance of a
municipal ordinance. On the contrary, Section 5
of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court enjoins courts to
take judicial notice of matters which are capable
of unquestionable demonstration. This is exactly
what the Court of Appeals did in this case in
holding that "contrary to petitioner's contention,
there was an existing municipal ordinance at the
time (Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957) providing
for a previous permit for the holding of religious
meeting in public places."
Besides, it is not true, that the trial court did not

take notice of the ordinance in question. For the
lower court mentioned petitioner's "failure to
secure the necessary permit" with obvious
reference to Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1957.” In
People vs. Gebune, 87 Phil. 727, it was held that
courts of first instance should take judicial notice
of municipal ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions. It must be in compliance with this
ruling that the trial court took notice of said
Ordinance.c

25. Republic v. Court of Appeals
277 SCRA 633
Facts: The Regional Trial Court, after hearing,

adjudicated a parcel of land in favor of Josefa
Gacot. The Solicitor General appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), contending that the land
was previously declared to be the property of the
Republic in a decision rendered by Judge Lorenzo
Garlitos following an order of general default. A
rehearing of the case was conducted. However,
the Government failed to present the said order
of Judge Garlitos in evidence. Thus, the CA ruled

in favor of Gacot because the order of Judge
Garlitos not having been offered as evidence, it
cannot take judicial notice of such.
Issue: Whether or not the CA should take judicial

notice of the order of Judge Garlitos.
Ruling: Yes. Firstly, that the rules of procedure

and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of
evidentiary value in ordinary trials of evidence
which is not formally offered, and secondly, that
adjective law is not to be taken lightly for without
it, the enforcement of substantive law may not
remain assured. The Court must add,
nevertheless, that technical rules of procedure
are not ends in themselves but primarily devised
and designed to help in the proper and expedient
dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases,
therefore, the rules may have to be so construed
liberally as to meet and advance the cause of
substantial justice.
A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and

records in the same case facts established in
prior proceedings in the same case of the
authenticity of its own records of another case
between the same parties, of the files of related
cases in the same court, and of public records on
file in the same court. In addition judicial notice
will be taken of the record, pleadings or judgment
of a case in another court between the same
parties or involving one of the same parties, as
well as of the record of another case between

different parties in the same court. Judicial notice
will also be taken of court personnel.
26. Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

196 SCRA 650
Topic: Formal Offer of Evidence
Facts: Juan Peralta Jr., the half-brother of

petitioner Jose Tabuena, sold a parcel of land to
Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the
United States. Tabernilla returned to the
Philippines and upon his request, the subject land

was conveyed to him by Damasa, Peralta’s
mother. The latter, however, requested that she
be allowed to stay in said property to which
Tabernilla agreed on the condition that she will
pay all realty taxes. Damasa remained on the
said land until her death, following which the
petitioner, her son, took possession thereof. The
complaint was filed upon Tabuena to surrender
the property and the trial court ruled against
petitioner. The petitioner faults the decision of
the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent
court, for lack of basis because the lower courts
should not have taken into account evidence not
submitted by the private respondent in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Petitioner
claimed that the court, in arriving at its factual
findings, took cognizance of pieces of evidence
which had been marked by the plaintiff but never
formally submitted in evidence.
Issue: Whether or not decisions/factual findings

may be drawn from evidences which are not
formally offered.
Ruling: No. It is the policy of this Court to accord

proper deference to the factual findings of the
courts below and even to regard them as
conclusive where there is no showing that they
have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is
where such findings do not conform to the
evidence on record and appear indeed to have no
valid basis to sustain their correctness, as in this
case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based
mainly on exhibits of evidence, which had not
been formally offered as evidence and therefore
should have been totally disregarded,
conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court
also erred when it relied on the evidence
submitted in another civil case and took judicial
notice thereof without the consent or knowledge
of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine.
Thus vitiated, the factual findings here
challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting
sands and should not have been sustained by the
respondent court.
The Supreme Court found that the private

respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed
to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed
property with evidence properly cognizable under
our adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is
substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's
contrary contentions that should have persuaded
the trial judge to rule in his favor and dismiss the
complaint.

27. Estrada v. Desierto
356 SCRA 108
Topic: Hearsay Evidence
Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada denies

he resigned as President or that he suffered from
a permanent disability and contends that the
Office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her
oath as president. To overturn his claim, the
prosecution presented the Angara Diary which
contains direct statements of petitioner: his
proposal for a snap presidential election where he
would not be a candidate; his statement that he
only wanted the five-day period promised by
Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that
he would leave by Monday if the second envelope
would be opened by Monday; and his statement
that he is very tired and he just wants to clear his
name then he will go.
Issue: Whether or not the Angara diary relied

upon is violative of the hearsay evidence rule.
Ruling: No. The Angara Diary is not an out of

court statement. It is part of the pleadings in the
case at bar. Petitioner cannot complain that he
was not furnished a copy of the diary since the
same was frequently referred to by the parties
and three parts thereof were published in the

Philippine Daily Inquirer. In fact, petitioner even
cited in his Supplemental Reply Memorandum
both the 2nd and 3rd parts of the diary. Thus,
petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the
use of the diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming that it was an out of court
statement, still its use is not covered by the
Hearsay Rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its
probative face depends, in whole or in part, on
the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to
produce it. There are three reasons for excluding
it: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence
of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the
oath. Not all hearsay evidence, however, is
inadmissible as evidence. Section 26 of Rule 130
provides that "the act, declaration or omission of
a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him." It has long been settled
that these admissions are admissible even if they
are hearsay. In the case at bar, the diary contains
direct statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party.

28. Ortiz v. De Guzman
A.M. No. P-03-1708
Topic: Implied Admission
Facts: Atty. Jose Ortiz's initial investigation

revealed that on various dates, respondent Larry
de Guzman demanded and received cash bond
deposits in violation of standing regulations of
this Court. After issuing either fake receipts or
unauthorized provisional receipts, he then
ordered jail officers to release the accused in
different cases. According to Atty. Ortiz, the
falsifications committed were apparent after
comparing the fake receipts with the original
receipts duly issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). De Guzman was also caught
extorting money from a winning party litigant for
the implementation of a certain court decision in
an entrapment operation of the National Bureau
of Investigation. De Guzman was ordered to make
a comment on the allegations against him but
none was heard nor received from him during the
formal investigation.
Issue: Whether or not respondent's silence may

be considered as an implied admission of guilt.

Ruling: Yes. Throughout the entire process, and
despite the many opportunities given to
respondent, he refused to comment and present
his side. The gravity of the charges and the
weight of the evidence against him would have
prompted an innocent man to come out and clear
his name. However, he opted to maintain his
silence. The respondent's refusal to face the
charges against him head-on is contrary to the
principle in criminal law that the first impulse of
an innocent man, when accused of wrongdoing, is
to express his innocence at the first opportune
time, for his silence and inaction can easily be
misinterpreted as a defiance to the directives
issued, or worse, an admission of guilt. Therefore,
the Supreme Court was inclined to believe that
the respondent is guilty of all the charges against
him.

29. People v. Serrano
G.R. No. L-17937
Topic: Testimony of Co-conspirators
Facts: Eulogio Serrano, Cenon Serrano,

Anastacio Reyes et al. were charged for killing
Pablo Navarro in conspiracy with each other. The
accused denied all allegations and presented
different alibis. During the trial of the case before
the lower courts, Anastacio Reyes was discharged
to testify as a witness for the prosecution. Reyes
narrated before the court the events that took
place from the time he and his co-conspirators
plotted the killing up until the body of the victim
was hid.
Issue: Whether or not the lone testimony of

Anastacio Reyes is sufficient to prove the
conspiracy between the parties.
Ruling: Yes. The appellants contend that in order

that the testimony of a conspirator may be
admissible in evidence against his co-conspirator,
it must appear and be shown by evidence other
than the admission itself that the conspiracy

actually existed and that the person who is to be
bound by the admission was a privy to the
conspiracy; and as there is nothing but the lone
testimony of prosecution witness Anastacio
Reyes, a co-conspirator, the trial court erred in
finding that conspiracy has been established and
in convicting the appellants based upon the lone
testimony of their co-conspirator. The contention
does not merit serious consideration because the
rule that "The act or declaration of a conspirator
relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the
co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration,"
applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration,
but not to testimony given on the stand at the
trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant. And while the
testimony of accomplices or confederates in
crime is always subject to grave suspicion,
"coming as it does from a polluted source," and
should be received with great caution and
doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless
admissible and competent.

30. People v. Bulos
G.R. No. 123542
Topic: Admission
Facts: Both Nancy Cordero and Rogelio Bulos are

stay-in-workers for spouses Mario and Delia
Fariolan. Nancy was the cook and general
househelp while Rogelio worked as a truck helper
for the business of Mario. One day when the
spouses were away, Rogelio raped Nancy. During
his trial, Rogelio and the combined testimonies of
Mario and Conrado Perido, sought to establish
that Rogelio was not at the Fariolans' house on
the afternoon in question but was vacationing in
Cotabato where he stayed at Perido's house. On
rebuttal, Merson Cordero, Nancy’s brother who
also worked as helper at the rice mill of the
Fariolans, testified that Rogelio in fact left the
Fariolans’ house after he had already raped his
sister. Cordero also said that the accused in fact
offered marriage to Nancy, that the Fariolan

spouses actively persuaded Nancy to accept the
offer of marriage, and that Nancy refused.
Issue: Whether or not the offer of marriage in

rape cases is an admission of guilt.
Ruling: Yes. The Court takes into consideration

the flight of Rogelio the day after the rape, and
his offer of marriage to the victim after the
incident had been reported to the authorities. As
a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage to the
offended party is an admission of guilt. In this
case, it was proved that Rogelio did indeed offer
marriage to the victim. Thus, he is found guilty of
the crime of rape.

31. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hantex Trading
Co., Inc.
454 SCRA 301
Topic: Best Evidence Rule
Facts: Hantex Trading Co. is a corporation

engaged in the sale of plastic products. Lt.
Vicente Amoto, Acting Chief of Counter-
Intelligence Division of the Economic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received
confidential information that Hantex had
imported synthetic resin amounting to
P115,599,018.00 but only declared
P45,538,694.57. An investigation was conducted
and the following were presented against Hantex:
certified copies of Hantex’s Profit and Loss
Statement on file with the SEC; machine copies of
the Consumption Entries submitted by the
informer; and excerpts from the entries certified
by the investigators. Administrative hearings and
Hantex wrote the BIR Commissioner, questioning

the assessment because of the failure to present
the original, or authenticated, or duly certified
copies of the Consumption and Import Entry
Accounts, or excerpts thereof if the original
copies were not readily available.
Issue: Whether or not the final assessment of

the petitioner against the respondent is based on
competent evidence.
Ruling: Yes. The best evidence envisaged in

Section 16 of the 1977 NIRC, as amended,
includes the corporate and accounting records of
the taxpayer who is the subject of the
assessment process, the accounting records of
other taxpayers engaged in the same line of
business, including their gross profit and net
profit sales. Such evidence also includes data,
record, paper, document or any evidence
gathered by internal revenue officers from other
taxpayers who had personal transactions or from
whom the subject taxpayer received any income;
and record, data, document and information
secured from government offices or agencies,
such as the SEC, the Central Bank of the
Philippines, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff
and Customs Commission.
The law allows the BIR access to all relevant or

material records and data in the person of the
taxpayer. It places no limit or condition on the

type or form of the medium by which the record
subject to the order of the BIR is kept. The
purpose of the law is to enable the BIR to get at
the taxpayer's records in whatever form they
may be kept. Such records include computer
tapes of the said records prepared by the
taxpayer in the course of business. In this era of
developing information-storage technology, there
is no valid reason to immunize companies with
computer-based, record-keeping capabilities from
BIR scrutiny. The standard is not the form of the
record but where it might shed light on the
accuracy of the taxpayer's return.
32. Sy v. Court of Appeals

330 SCRA 550
Topic: Original Document
Facts: Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy are married

and blessed with 2 children. Fernando left his
family later and never returned. Filipina filed a
petition for legal separation but later amended it
to a petition for separation of property, which was
granted by the court. She then later filed a
petition for legal separation on the grounds of
abandonment and physical violence against her

husband, which was granted by the Court. Filipina
then filed a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground
of psychological incapacity citing habitual
alcoholism, refusal to live with her without just
cause, and refusal to have sex with her. The trial
court denied her petition since her grounds do
not constitute psychological incapacity. This was
uphold by the appellate court. On appeal to the
Supreme Court, she alleged lack of marriage
license as her new ground, attaching therein
mere photocopies of a marriage license and
marriage certificate.
Issue: Whether or not a mere photocopy of a

document is admissible in evidence.
Ruling: A marriage license is a formal

requirement and its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. It is clear on the evidence
presented that the issuance of marriage license
and marriage certificate was on September 17,
1974 but the celebration of their marriage was on
November 15, 1973 which also what was written
on the birth certificates of their 2 children. Since
the documents presented were just photocopies
of the original, the Court ruled that although the
marriage certificate and other pieces of
documentary evidence were only photocopies,
the fact that these have been examined and
admitted by the trial court, with no objections

having been made as to their authenticity and
due execution, means that these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained
therein. Likewise, no objection was interposed to
petitioner’s testimony in open court when she
affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of
their marriage was on November 15, 1973.
Therefore, having been admitted in evidence,
with the adverse party failing to timely object
thereto, these documents are deemed sufficient
proof of the facts contained therein.
33. Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals G.R.

No. 117384
Topic: Original Document
Facts: Felomino and Gregorio Madrid allegedly

sold 3 parcels of land to Teodoro dela and
allegedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the
latter. Dela Cruz and his heirs took possession of

the land but they found out that a Torrens Title in
the name of the Madrid brothers were issued on
the subject lands, so they filed a petition for
reconveyance. The Madrid brothers denied
having executed the Deed of Sale and alleged it
to be falsified. The original copy of the Deed of
Sale was said to be lost, thus only a photocopy
was presented during trial. To prove due
execution of the Deed of Sale, the Notary Public’s
testimony that his signature in the Deed of Sale
was genuine was offered. The Madrids did not
object to the admissibility of the photocopy.
Despite this, the trial court ruled that the
photocopy was inadmissible because no proof
was presented as to the loss or destruction of the
retained copy by the Notary public or the
duplicate copy held by the Madrids. It was then
held that there was no valid sale and the case
was dismissed. On appeal to the CA, the
photocopy was held admissible but has no
probative value, so still the trial court’s decision
was upheld. The CA held that despite the Notary
Public’s testimony, the Deed of Sale is not
trustworthy since the alleged surviving witness
was not presented to corroborate the Notary
Public’s testimony.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopy of the Deed

of Sale is inadmissible as evidence and if it has
probative value.

Ruling: Yes. The photocopy of the Deed of Sale
is admissible as evidence but has no probative
value. Nonetheless, the petitioners’ appeal was
granted because their possession was never
questioned by the Madrids. Not even a written
demand to vacate was issued. Despite being
owners of land covered by TCT’s the Madrids
were adjudged guilty of laches. All original copies
must be accounted for before secondary
evidence may be introduced. The Notary Public
who signed in the Deed of Sale testified that
there were five copies made. None among the
five were presented. Although the Dela Cruzs
claim that the National Archives does not have
among its copies these documents, this claim
was not supported by any certification from the
same office. However, despite the original not
having been presented, the respondents failed to
object as to its admissibility. The Notary Public
was not even cross-examined. Thus, the
photocopy has become primary evidence.
However, despite its admissibility, it holds no
probative value regarding the sale it was
intended to prove. The photocopy which was
alleged to be have been copied from one of the
Deed’s carbon copies, was unsigned by the
parties and was not even dated. The Notary
Public failed to verify the Deed from his own
records. Taken together, these casts serious
doubt on the due execution of the Deed of Sale.

34. Dela Rama v. Ledesma
G.R. No. 28608
Topic: Parol Evidence Rule
Facts: Salvador Dela Rama is one of Inocentes

Dela Rama Inc.’s incorporators and Rafael
Ledesma is his nephew. The corporation claimed
from the Philippine War Commission war
damages and it was paid in two installments.
After the first installment was paid, Dela Rama
sold 140 shares that he owns to Ledesma. There
was an alleged understanding that De la Rama
reserved to himself his proportionate equity in
the war damage benefits due on his 140 shares
which Ledesma promised to deliver to him upon
payment by the Foreign Claim Settlement
Commission of the United States. Subsequently,
new certificates of stocks were issued in
Ledesma’s name. When the 2 nd installment was
paid to the corporation, Dela Rama demanded
the return of his shares. Ledesma refused so Dela
Rama filed a collection case against the former.
On his answer, Ledesma denied the existence of
the agreement accompanying the sale of shares
of stocks. Ledesma raised as defenses that the
indorsement by De la Rama of the Stock
Certificate in question without qualification or
condition constituted the sole and exclusive

contract between the parties and to allow De la
Rama to prove any alleged simultaneous oral
agreement would run counter to the Parol
Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds. In reply,
Dela Rama alleged that the agreement does not
express the true intent of the parties, does the
Parol Evidence Rule does not apply. The trial court
did not allow Dela Rama to introduce parol
evidence to prove the existence of the agreement
upon which, the sale of his shares of stocks was
conditioned upon.
Issue: Whether Parol Evidence is admissible to

prove the existence of an alleged agreement that
accompanies a sale but not put into writing.
Ruling: No. Dela Rama is not allowed to

introduce Parol Evidence to prove the alleged
agreement accompanying the sale of his shares
of stocks to Ledesma. It is a well-accepted
principle of law that evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally
not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument.
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of

ways to explain the meaning of written contracts,
it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into
the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in
the instant case, there being no intrinsic
ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express
the true agreement of the parties. If indeed the
alleged reservation had been intended,
businessmen like the parties would have placed
in writing such an important reservation.
35. Canuto v. Mariano

37 Phil. 840
Facts: Espiridiona Canuto executed a Deed of

Sale of land in favor of Juan Mariano reserving the
right to repurchase within one year from the date
of sale. One year lapsed and Canuto failed to
exercise the right to repurchase. When Mariano
claimed absolute ownership over the land subject
of the sale, Canuto alleged that she be given an
extension to repurchase. Canuto claims that
Mariano agreed but the latter failed to appear at
the place and time agreed upon to receive the
money for the repurchase and for executing the
necessary Deed of Repurchase. Canuto then filed
a case to compel Mariano to receive the purchase
money and execute the necessary documents. To

prove the alleged oral extension of the period to
repurchase, one witness who was alleged to be
present when Mariano agreed to extend the time
was presented. The trial court ruled that Canuto
may exercise her right to repurchase. Mariano
appealed asking that parol evidence may not be
introduced to prove the alleged extension of
time.
Issue: Whether parol evidence may be

introduced to prove the alleged extension of
time.
Ruling: Yes, considering the circumstances.

Refusal by the vendee of a valid tender or offer of
purchase price in the exercise of the vendor’s
right to repurchase preserves the vendor’s right
to repurchase. The defendant having extended
the time within which the plaintiff could
repurchase the land on condition that she would
find the money and make repurchase within the
extended period, it is clear that he cannot be
permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing
that the plaintiff stood ready to make the
payment within the extended period, and was
only prevented from doing so by the conduct of
the defendant himself.
The SC citing the cases of Rosales vs. Reyes and

Ordoveza (25 Phil. Rep., 495), ruled that that a
bona fide offer or tender of the price agreed upon

for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the
rights of the party making it, without the
necessity of making judicial deposit, if the offer or
tender is refused. The case of and in the case of
Fructo vs. Fuentes (15 Phil. Rep., 362) was further
cited holding that in such cases when diligent
effort is made by the vendor of the land to
exercise the right to repurchase reserved by him
in his deed of sale "and fails by reason of
circumstances over which he has no control, we
are of the opinion and so hold that he does not
lose his right to repurchase on the day of
maturity."
36. Lechugas v. Court of Appeals

143 SCRA 335
Facts: Petitioner Victoria Lechugas filed an

unlawful entry case against private respondents
Marina Loza, Salvador Loza et al. Another case
was filed for recovery and possession of the same
property and both cases was tried jointly.

Petitioner testified that she bought the land from
Leoncia Lasangue in 1950. Private respondents
contended that the same land in question was
bought by their father from the father of
petitioner in 1941. Lasangue testified for the
Lozas stating that she sold the south part of the
land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff
claims.
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in

considering parol evidence over the objection of
petitioner.
Ruling: The appellate court acted correctly in

upholding the trial court’s action in admitting the
testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot
5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia,
who was never presented as witness in any
proceeding in the lower court. The parol evidence
rule does not apply and may not properly be
involved by either party to litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit
is not a party or a privy of a party to a written
instrument in the question and does not base a
claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
The rule is not applicable where the controversy

is between one of the parties to the document
and third persons. Through the testimony of

Leoncia, it was shown that what she really
intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to
read and write and fully relying on the good faith
of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her
thumb mark on a piece of paper.
37. People v. Francisco

78 Phil. 694
Topic: Marital Disqualification Rule

Facts: Juan Francisco, who had been previously
arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as
detention prisoner. He was charged with the
crime of parricide. On a visit to his family,
Francisco allegedly wounded his wife and caused
the death of their child. Francisco’s wife testified
against him, which he later questioned.
Issue: Whether or not testimony of the wife is

admissible.
Ruling: Yes. The law states that neither a

husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness
against the other except in a criminal prosecution
for a crime committed by one against the other
have been. However, as all other general rules,
this one has its own exceptions, both in civil
actions between the spouses and in criminal
cases for offenses committed by one against the
other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are
backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted
cases, outweigh those in support of the general
rule. For instance, where the marital and
domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility of interests disappears and the
consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private
life which the law aims at protecting will be

nothing but ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
As well-settled as this rule of marital

incompetency itself is the other that it may be
waived. Objections to the competency of a
husband or wife to testify in a criminal
prosecution against the other may be waived as
in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus,
the accused waives his or her privilege by calling
the other spouse as a witness for him or her,
thereby making the spouse subject to cross-
examination in the usual manner. It is well-
established that where an accused introduces his
wife as a witness in his behalf, the state is
entitled to question her as to all matters germane
and pertinent to her testimony on direct
examination. It is also true that objection to the
spouse’s competency must be made when he or
she is first offered as witness, and that the
incompetency may be waived by the failure of
the accused to make timely objection to the
admission of the spouse’s testimony, although
knowing of such incompetency, and the
testimony admitted, especially if the accused has
assented to the admission, either expressly or
impliedly. Other courts have held that the
witness’s testimony is not admissible even with
the other spouse’s consent. Clearly, if the statute
provides that a spouse shall in no case testify
against the other except in a prosecution for an

offense against the other, the failure of the
accused to object does not enable the state to
use the spouse as a witness.
38. Ordono v. Daquigan

2 SCRA 270
Topic: Marital Disqualification Rule
Facts: Avelino Ordoño was charged with rape

having raped his daughter, Leonora. In support of
that complaint, Catalina Balanon Ordoño, the
mother of Leonora, executed a sworn statement
wherein she disclosed that on that same date,
Leonora had apprised her of the outrage but no
denunciation was filed because Avelino Ordoño
threatened to kill Leonora and Catalina if they
reported the crime to the police. Catalina Ordoño
in her sworn statement further revealed that her
husband had also raped their other daughter,
Rosa. Avelino Ordoño, invoked the marital
disqualification rule found in Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. Counsel claimed that Avelino
Ordoño had not consented expressly or impliedly
to his wife's testifying against him. The trial court
overruled the objection.

Issue: Whether or not the marital disqualification
applies.
Ruling: No. Should the phrase "in a criminal case

for a crime committed by one against the other"
be restricted to crimes committed by one spouse
against the other, such as physical injuries,
bigamy, adultery or concubinage, or should it be
given a latitudinarian interpretation as referring
to any offense causing marital discord?
There is a dictum that "where the marital and

domestic relations are so strained that there is no
more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason
based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case identity of interests disappears and
the consequent danger of perjury based on that
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private
life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. That
the rape of the daughter by the father, an
undeniably abominable and revolting crime with
incestuous implications, positively undermines
the connubial relationship, is a proposition too
obvious to require much elucidation.

39. Tan v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125861
Facts: Tan Kiat averred that he bought a parcel

of land from Mr. Tan Keh where he built his house,
but was unable to effect immediate transfer of
title in his favor in view of his foreign nationality
at the time of the sale. Nonetheless, as an
assurance in good faith of the sales agreement,
Mr. Tan Keh turned over to Tan Kiat the owner’s
duplicate copy of the TCT and executed a lease
contract in favor of private respondent for 40
years. However, Mr. Tan Keh sold the subject
properties to Remigio Tan, his brother and father
of petitioners, with the understanding that the
subject properties are to be held in trust by
Remigio for the benefit of Tan Kiat and that
Remigio would execute the proper documents of

transfer in favor of Tan Kiat should the latter at
anytime demand recovery of the subject
properties. Another contract of lease was
executed by Mr. Tan Keh and Remigio in favor of
private respondent to further safeguard the
latter’s interest on the subject properties, but
private respondent never paid any rental and no
demand whatsoever for the payment thereof had
been made on him. Remigio was killed. At his
wake, petitioners were reminded of Tan Kiat’s
ownership of the subject properties and they
promised to transfer the subject properties to Tan
Kiat who by then had already acquired Filipino
citizenship by naturalization. Petitioners,
however, never made good their promise to
convey the subject properties despite repeated
demands by Tan Kiat. In fact, petitioners had the
subject properties fraudulently transferred to
their names.
Issue: Whether evidence is admissible.
Ruling: Inadmissible. Petitioners are in

possession of a TCT which evidences their
ownership of the subject properties. On the other
hand, Tan Kiat relies simply on the allegation that
he is entitled to the properties by virtue of a sale
between him and Alejandro Tan Keh who is now
dead. Obviously, private respondent will rely on
parol evidence which, under the circumstances
obtaining, cannot be allowed without violating

the “Dead Man’s Statute” found in Section 23,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
The object and purpose of the rule is to guard

against the temptation to give false testimony in
regard of the transaction in question on the part
of the surviving party, and further to put the two
parties to a suit upon terms of equality in regard
to the opportunity to giving testimony. If one
party to the alleged transaction is precluded from
testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the
undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.
40. Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 17740
Topic: Best Evidence Rule
Facts: Petitioners Carolina, Dolores and Cesar

Gonzales sought the settlement of the intestate
estate of their brother Ricardo Abad. They
claimed that they were the only heirs of the
deceased as the latter allegedly died a bachelor,

leaving no legitimate o illegitimate descendants
or ascendants. As such, Cesar was then
appointed as the administrator of the estate.
Sometime later, private respondents Honoraria,
Cecilia and Marian Empaynado filed a motion to
set aside the special proceeding. In their motion,
they alleged that Honoraria, the widow of Jose
Libunao, had been the common-law wife of
Ricardo for 27 years and that during the said
period their union had produced 2 children:
Cecilia and Marian. Petitioners, in contesting
Cecilia and Marian’s filiation, presented the joint
affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos
stating that to their knowledge Libunao had died
in 1971 and had been interred at the Loyola
Memorial Park. With this, petitioners claimed that
Cecilia and Marian Abad, who were born in 1948
and 1954 respectively, are not then the
illegitimate children of Ricardo, but rather the
legitimate children of the spouses Libunao and
Empaynado. They likewise submitted the affidavit
of Dr. Pedro Arenas, Ricardo's physician, declaring
that in 1935, he had examined Ricardo and found
him to be infected with gonorrhea, and that the
latter had become sterile as a consequence
thereof thereby rendering him to incapable of
fathering a child.
Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence

presented and submitted by the petitioners are
admissible.

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that the joint
affidavit as to the supposed death of Libunao was
not competent evidence to prove the latter's
death at that time, being merely secondary
evidence thereof. Libunao's death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when
the latter died. The Court ruled further that as to
Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was inadmissible
and the same remains inadmissible in evidence,
notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad as
being privileged communication under Section 24
(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The rule on
confidential communications between physician
and patient requires that: a) the action in which
the advice or treatment given or any information
is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
physician and patient existed between the person
claiming the privilege or his legal representative
and the physician; c) the advice or treatment
given by him or any information was acquired by
the physician while professionally attending the
patient; d) the information was necessary for the
performance of his professional duty; and e) the
disclosure of the information would tend to
blacken the reputation of the patient. On the fifth
requisite, Ricardo Abad's "sterility" arose when
the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact which
most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact,
given that society holds virility at a premium,
sterility alone, without the attendant

embarrassment of contracting a sexually-
transmitted disease, would be sufficient to
blacken the reputation of any patient.
41. People v. Brioso

37 SCRA 336
Topic: Contradicting Evidence

Facts: Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza were found
guilty for the murder Silvino Daria. The motive for
the killing appears to have been the disapproval
by the spouses Silvino and Susana Daria of
Mariano Taeza's courtship of their daughter,
Angelita. Angelita was even sent to Manila for her
to avoid Mariano Taeza. The courtship is admitted
by Mariano Taeza. The two accused appealed the
conviction alledging that the lower court erred in
relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory
testimony and statement of the prosecution
witness Cecilia Bernal on the physical identity of
the accused.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence is admissible.
Ruling: Yes. There is no discrepancy in the
testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material
points. She stated that she did not see Mariano
Taeza carry a gun when both the accused passed
by. But this brief observation does not necessarily
mean that he was not actually armed or carrying
a gun on his person. The fact that he did was
proved when both the said accused were seen
pointing their respective gun at the victim and
each subsequently fired once at him, Taeza using
a short weapon that could have been carried
concealed in his person. Cecilia Bernal had no

motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of
murder against the above-said accused,
considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of
the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan
Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason
why she should testify against him. Hence, her
statement that she came to court only to tell the
truth should be believed. The witness also stated
that she was hard of hearing and could not
understand some of the questions; thus, the
alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not
detract from the "positive and straightforward"
identification of the accused as the ones who
were seen at the scene of the crime and who
actually shot Silvino Daria. Moreover, the
testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in
the declaration of the victim, who told his wife
that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who
shot him. This statement does satisfy the
requirements of an ante mortem statement.
Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds,
Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness
of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that
he made the same under the consciousness of
impending death, considering that he died only
one hour after being shot.

42. People v. De Gracia
18 SCRA 197
Topic: Dying Declarations
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Norte

charged Alfredo Salva, Narciso de Gracia, and
Raymundo Sorima with the crime of murder for
the killing of Ernesto Flores. After being stabbed
by respondents, Flores rushed away in the
direction of his father's house, shouting for help.
Kauswagan Vice-Mayor Nemesio Agawin, who
was then reading a newspaper in his house, was
attracted by these shouts. He immediately got his
rifle, went down and followed Flores, finally
overtaking him in the back stairs of his father's
house, sitting by the stairs but supported by his
two brothers, and with his intestines protruding
out of his abdomen. Upon Agawin's inquiry as to
what happened, Flores spontaneously declared
that Alfredo Salva stabbed him while "Naring" (de
Gracia) and "Mundo" Sorima were holding his
arms. Flores died afterwards. Agawin testified in
court.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence is admissible.

Ruling: Yes. Accused contends that the
testimony of Vice-Mayor Nemesio Agawin
regarding Ernesto Flores' dying declaration had
not satisfied the requirements of an ante mortem
statement since the declarant had not made it
under the consciousness of an impending death,
nor had the statement fulfilled the requirements
of res gestae, because said declaration was
neither natural nor spontaneous, or unreflective
and instinctive, but rather it was made in reply to
a question asked from the declarant; and the
prosecution not having specified the purpose for
which Agawin's testimony was offered, the same
is inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay. The
trial court in admitting the testimony of Vice-
Mayor Agawin regarding Flores' dying declaration,
wherein he identified accused as his assailants. It
is believed that the circumstances under which
the victim made such identification have fulfilled
the requirements of either an ante mortem
statement or as part of the res gestae. Judged by
the nature and extent of the injury inflicted (deep
stab wound on the abdomen, causing his
intestines to protrude), Flores could not ignore
the seriousness of his condition, and it is safe to
infer that the deceased made the declaration
under the consciousness of impending death. The
same identification may also be considered as
part of the res gestae, since it was made

immediately after the stabbing incident and
appears to be natural and spontaneous, and
made before the deceased, who had no enmity
toward appellants, could contrive or devise a plan
to incriminate them. There was no necessity for
the prosecution to specify the purpose for which
it offered Agawin's testimony, for said purpose
was self-evident. Besides, the defense failed to
object on time to its presentation in the trial
court. Hence, the trial court correctly admitted
said testimony.
43. People v. Lara

54 Phil. 96
Facts: The deceased, Juan Advincula, was a

resident of the barrio of Salitran, in the
municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite.
Crispo Lara was charged with his murder. Lara
shot Advincula, who sought help in the house of a
neighbor, Felix Ramirez. Advincula found the
family of Ramirez sitting at the table eating their
evening meal; and he told them that he had been
shot by the Lara at the same time exhibiting the
bloody stain on his left side. Ramirez at once

called the barrio lieutenant, one Ciriaco Reyes;
and upon the arrival of the latter, Advincula
repeated his account of the occurrence, adding
that he was weak from the pain resulting from his
wound and that he would not survive. The next
day the justice of the peace of the municipality,
one Restituto Paman, took Advincula's affidavit, in
which the declarant reiterated what he had told
the lieutenant, but upon this occasion he said he
felt better and he indicated to the justice of the
peace that he thought he would not die of the
wound. On the next day Advincula was taken to
the Philippine General Hospital in the City of
Manila where he remained for three weeks, at the
end of which time he was discharged. In a few
days, however, the bullet, which had never been
extracted from the shoulder, begun to make
trouble again, and Advincula was taken back to
the hospital, where blood poisoning from the
internal wound soon developed and later on,
Advincula died.
Issue: Whether or not the statements of

Advincula regarding Lara as the one who shot
him can be admitted as dying declarations.
Ruling: The statement made to Ciriaco Reyes in

the house of Felix Ramirez, was in our opinion
admissible as a dying declaration because when
this declaration was made the deceased was
weak, complained of the pain which he was

suffering from the wound and stated that he
would not survive. It is true that the deceased
lived for nearly six weeks after that statement
was made, and in this interval recovered, to
external appearances, almost completely from
the wound. Nevertheless it appears that in the
end the deceased died from the same wound;
and the admissibility of the first declaration
depends upon the state of mind of the deceased
when the declaration was made, and not upon
the length of time that elapsed between the
infliction of the wound and the declarant's death.
This statement supplies ample proof that the
accused was the author of Advincula's death. It
was not a dying declaration with regard to the
affidavit given to the justice of the peace by the
deceased on the day after the fatal injury was
inflicted, for the reason that when that
declaration was made the deceased indicated
that he was under the impression that the injury
would not be fatal.
44. U.S. v. Dela Cruz

12 Phil. 87

Facts: Timoteo Dizon, together with a band, had
just committed robbery in two houses when they
were surprised by Constabulary forces which
attacked them, resulting to the wounding of a
member and in the death of Dizon. The accused
appellants were convicted of the crime of robbery
in an armed band. The accused appellants were
convicted based on the ante-mortem statements
of Dizon, for the purpose of identifying the
appellants as members of the band. The ante-
mortem statements admitted by the trial court
were an alleged extra-judicial declaration made
by Dizon a few hours before his death, wherein
he confessed his guilt of the robbery and stated
that the appellants were members of the band.
The evidence further discloses that this
confession was made to the provincial fiscal and
an officer of the Constabulary, and that, although
the appellants were there present, under arrest,
charged with the commission of the crime, and
heard the dying man charge them with being
members of the band, they kept silent and did
not attempt to deny the charge.
Issue: Whether or not the dying declarations of

Dizon is admissible to prove membership of the
accused in the band which committed the
robberies.
Ruling: No. The grounds for the admission of

evidence of co-conspirators clearly require that

such acts or declarations must have been made
during the progress of the conspiracy and in
pursuance of the ends for which it had been
formed, and not after the transaction had ended;
and further, before such evidence can be
admitted it must appear by competent evidence
that the conspiracy actually existed and that the
accused were members of the conspiracy. The
declaration under consideration was made after
the transaction to which it referred was at an end,
was not made in pursuance of the conspiracy,
and was clearly inadmissible for the purpose of
proving that the defendants were co-conspirators
with the defendant. It is suggested, however, that
while the statements in question were
inadmissible as proof of the truth of their
contents, they might have been received for the
purpose of showing that, when they were made
in the presence of the defendants, they made no
attempt to deny them, and by their silence
admitted their truth. Though silence may
sometimes mean admission of guilt, there must
be a proper opportunity to reply and the
surroundings were not such as to render a denial
expedient and proper; and the right of a
defendant in all criminal prosecutions "to be
exempt from testifying against himself" clearly
prohibits any inference of guilt from the silence of
an accused person who has been arrested and
charged with crime. The statements in question

were made after defendants had been arrested,
and in the course of an official investigation
which was being conducted by the provincial
fiscal, and under these circumstances, proof of
the fact that the statements were made in the
presence and hearing of the defendants, and that
they kept silence and failed there and then to
deny their truth, could in no event support the
inference that by thus keeping silence they
implicity admitted the truth of the facts alleged
by the declarant.
45. U.S. v. Antipolo

37 Phil. 726
Topic: Dying Declarations, Marital

Disqualification Rule
Facts: Dalmaceo Antipolo was charged with

the murder of Fortunato Dinal. The trial court
convicted him of homicide and from that decision
he has appealed. One of the errors assigned is
based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit
Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of Dinal, to testify as
a witness on behalf of the defense concerning
certain alleged dying declarations. The witness
was called to the stand and having stated that
she is the widow of Fortunato Dinal was asked:
"On what occasion did your husband die?" To this
question the fiscal objected upon the following
ground that she is not competent to testify under

the rules of procedure in either civil or criminal
cases, unless it be with the consent of her
husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that
permission, it follows that this witness is
disqualified from testifying in this case in which
her husband is the injured party. Counsel for
defendant insisted that the witness was
competent, arguing that the disqualification
which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates
only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of
the parties to a proceeding is called to testify;
that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal
case are the Government and the accused; that,
furthermore, the marriage of Dinal to the witness
having been dissolved by the death of her
husband, she is no longer his wife, and therefore
not subject to any disqualification arising from
the status of marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the marital

disqualification applies to a dying declarations
made by either spouse.
HELD: No. On grounds of public policy the

wife cannot testify against her husband as to
what came to her from him confidentially or by
reason of the marriage relation, but this rule does
not apply to a dying communication made by the
husband to the wife on the trial of the one who
killed him. The declaration of the deceased made
in extremes in such cases is a thing to be proven,

and this proof may be made by any competent
witness who heard the statement. The wife may
testify for the state in cases of this character as
to any other fact known to her. It cannot be
contended that the dying declaration testified to
by the witness was a confidential communication
made to her; on the contrary, it was evidently
made in the furtherance of justice for the express
purpose that it should be testified to in the
prosecution of the defendant.
The Supreme Court found that the trial court

erred in excluding the testimony of the witness
Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such
exclusion, the accused was deprived of one of his
essential rights. That being the case, a new trial
must be granted.
46. Macasiray v. People

291 SCRA 154
Topic: Waiver to Admissibility of Evidence
Facts: Petitioners Melecio Macasiray,

Virgilio Gonzales and Benedicto Gonzales were
charged with murder for the death of Johnny

Villanueve. In the course of the trial, the
prosecution introduced in evidence the
extrajudicial confession executed by appellant
Benedicto Gonzales and the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation wherein he affirmed the contents of
his confession. The defense objected thereto on
the ground of inadmissibility for having been
executed without assistance of counsel. The trial
court sustained the objection of the defense
which, nonetheless, presented appellant
Gonzales for the sole purpose of denying the
contents of the confession and the transcript of
stenographic notes. It did not mark the
confession as one of its exhibits. Aggrieved by
the ruling of the trial court, the prosecution
elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the trial court. It ruled that failure of the
defense to move for the exclusion of the
documents constitutes a waiver of their
objection.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the

defense to move for the exclusion of the
documents constitutes a waiver of their
objection.
Ruling: There is no waiver to admissibility of the

documents where objections were made during
the stage of formal offer; that objection to the
document during their identification and marking
is not equivalent to objection during their formal
offer; and that there is no need to impeach
appellant where his extrajudicial confession and

the transcript of stenographic notes wherein he
admitted liability had been excluded in evidence.
47. Lopez v. Valdez

32 Phil. 644
Topic: Objection to Admissibility of Evidence

Facts: This is an action begun by Benito Lopez,
the administrator of the estate of Marcela
Emradura, deceased, against Tomas Valdez for
the recovery of possession of the land. The Court
of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
Defendant went to the Supreme Court assigning
as error the procedure adopted by the court when
objections were interposed by counsel for
defendant to questions designed to adduce
evidence of the contents of written documents
when the destruction or the loss of the
documents had not been properly established. It
appears from the record that Lopez relied on
certain written contracts entered into between
Valdez and Marcela Emradura during her lifetime
to prove the cause of action set out in the
complaint. The documents themselves were not
produced and when counsel for appellee sought
to prove by certain witnesses the contents of
these documents, without presenting facts
justifying secondary evidence with reference
thereto, counsel for appellant made the objection
that the evidence was incompetent and improper
as the documents themselves were the best
evidence. A decision on these objections was thus
left in abeyance and the trial terminated without
a resolution of the questions presented. In spite
of that the trial court in its final decision took into
consideration the secondary evidence thus
introduced and based its decision thereon.

ISSUE: Was the procedure valid?
RULING: No. A party who offers an objection to a

question propounded to a witness testifying on
the trial of a civil action is entitled to a ruling at
the time the objection is made, or as soon
thereafter as may be possible; in any event
during the trial and as such time as will afford the
party against whom the ruling is made a
reasonable opportunity to meet the situation
created by the ruling. It is error for a court to
reserve decision on such a question until after the
trial is closed and the case submitted; and if such
error is prejudicial, the judgment will be vacated
and the cause returned for a new trial.
48. People v. Singh

45 Phil. 676

Topic: Confession
Facts: Santa Singh, an East Indian, was found

dead on the sidewalk in front of his tienda in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. There were three knife
wounds on the body, one of them necessarily
mortal. Sometime the accused Buda Singh
confessed to a friend of his, Ram Singh that he
had killed Santa Singh and related the details of
the crime, implicating five other East Indians in
its commission. On a subsequent occasion Ram
Singh thought that Buda Singh looked at him with
“malos ojos.” Suspecting that Buda Singh
regretted having made the confession and
contemplated killing him, Ram Singh reported the
matter to the authorities and the present action
was instituted against Buda Singh and his five
alleged companions. On motion of the fiscal the
case was dismissed against all of the defendants
except Buda Singh. Upon trial, the court below
found Buda Singh guilty of homicide. The counsel
of Buda moved that the confession made by Ram
Singh be stricken from the record on the ground
that it had not been shown affirmatively by direct
evidence that the confession had been made
freely and voluntarily.
Issue: Whether or not the confession made by

Buda Singh to Ram Singh is admissible.

Ruling: Yes. There is no merit in this contention.
The evidence was clearly admissible. Act No. 619,
upon which the argument of counsel is evidently
based, has been repealed by the Administrative
Code and evidence of a confession may now be
received without direct affirmative evidence that
the confession was freely and voluntarily made.
(U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308.)
The fact that the court, in its decision, takes the

confession into consideration must be regarded
as a denial of the motion to strike it from the
record and if the defendant desired to introduce
further evidence in rebuttal, the matter should
have been brought to the attention of that court
through the appropriate motion.

Evidence Rules Apply in Administrative Cases

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