Samantha Post

ENGL 202B
November 19, 2018

Roots of Terrorism: Salafi-jihadism

Since September 11, 2001, the global awareness of terrorism, particularly of radical

Islamist terrorist groups, has grown rapidly. Terrorist attacks have occurred in Istanbul, Paris,

London, Baghdad, Bir al-Abed, Mosul, Tel Aviv, Kabul, and dozens of other cities all over

the world. Dialogue produced by Western media emphasizes radical Islam as the origin of

these violent attacks; however, little is understood about the true context in which the roots of

terrorism grew, nor what perpetuates its growth today.

Salafi-jihadism is known to the Western World as the “radical Islam” which

radicalizes individuals, recruits terrorists, and inspires terrorist organizations such as Al-

Qaeda and the Islamic State. By interpreting, appropriating, and spreading Salafi-jihadism,

religious scholars and political leaders have contributed to its transformation throughout

history, and influenced the modern, global phenomenon of terrorism.

This paper serves as an informative introduction to Salafi-Jihadism, focusing on main

pillars, historical scholars who reinterpreted and taught the ideology, and the language of

modern propagandists, particularly the Islamic States’ reinterpretation of Salafi-jihadism. As

the teaching, learning, and language of Salafi-jihadism play tremendous roles in the

transnational radicalization and recruitment of terrorists for the Islamic State, the roots of

Salafi-jihadist ideology are essential to the study of Islamic terrorist groups, conflict in the

Middle East, the “Global War on Terror”, and Western media dialogue.

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Salafi-Jihadism

Salafi-jihadism is an ideology, and a movement that builds upon principles of

Salafism and Jihad. Salafism emphasizes a return to the practices of Islam that existed during

its first three generations. Jihad has been interpreted differently throughout history, but can be

generalized as the “defense of territory, life, faith, and property” (Knapp 85). The frame of

Salafi-jihadism, therefore, is defending territory, life, religion, and property from

modernization.

Salafi-jihadism has five main pillars of belief: jihad, takfir, al-wala’ wal-bara’,

tawhid, and hakimiyya (Cook 511). Some of these principles are principles of Islam,

however, they are described below following Salafi-jihadist interpretations. The first

principle, jihad, justifies the use of violence in defense of territory, life, religion, and

property. Sometimes referred to as sacred warfare, jihad is an essential underlying pillar

which sets the stage for violence as it validates it in the name of Islam. Second, takfir

distinguishes Muslims from non-Muslims. According to this pillar, non-Muslims include

Muslims who do not adhere to Salafi-jihadist principles, and they should be shunned or

excommunicated along with all other non-Muslims. Al-wala’ wal-bara’ is an essential

component to Salafi-jihadism which accentuates devotion to Allah (God) and his believers,

and disassociation with non-believers. Similar to takfir, al-wala wal-bara suggests

disassociation with those who do not follow Salafi-jihadism. Next, tawhid is the concept of

absolute monotheism. Absolute monotheism in Islam says Allah is the one and only God, and

creator of the universe. Finally, hakimiyya builds upon tawhid and accentuates Allah as the

one and only lawgiver. The five pillars of Salafi-jihadism are essential components of the

radical ideas and radicalization propaganda spread by the Islamic state.

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 The Islamic State concisely combines the principles of Salafi-Jihadism and uses these

interpretations to radicalize and recruit members. In its propaganda and preaching, the

Islamic State emphasizes three main principles. Primarily, the principle of tawhid al-

hakimiyya combines the Salafi-jihadist principles of tawhid and hakimiyya to explain Allah as

the only lawgiver and Sharia (Islamic) law as the only law (Mills). To the Islamic State, this

principle means that state and international laws are not valid and therefore do not need to be

followed. Instead, the only law that should govern and be followed is Sharia law. Next, kufr

bi taught emphasizes the rejection of idols (Mills). Following the Islamic principle of

absolute monotheism, it is forbidden to worship any person or thing besides Allah. In

practice, this principle is demonstrated by rejection of politicians, judges, leaders, and anyone

that undermines Allah’s role as the lawgiver. Finally, as explained above, al-wala’ wal-bara’

means devotion and disassociation based on Islam. However, the Islamic State interprets this

principle further as rejection of everyone outside of the Jihadi movement, even other Muslims

(Mills). In combining all three pillars, the Islamic State’s interpretation can be understood as

the justification of violence in order to reject and destroy national and international laws,

idols, and those outside of the movement (including Muslims). By reinterpreting the already

radical Salafi-jihadist ideology, the Islamic State succeeded in constructing a narrative that

can be complicated to undermine.

Historical Scholars

Sayyid Qutb and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi are two scholars that, among others, are

considered to be spiritual fathers of Salafi-Jihadism. Sayyid Qutb was an Egyptian-born

educator, journalist, scholar, and activist whose ideas, notably the principle of hakimiyya,

were interpreted radically and incorporated into the Salafi-jihadist narrative (Musallam 84).

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Al-Maqdisi, a Saudi-Arabian born writer whose books are found in nearly every ISIS

headquarter, is considered responsible for the radical interpretations of takfir and al-wala’ wa

al-bara (Khaled al-Saud 736)

Sayyid Qutb was born in Egypt in 1906. He grew to criticize the Egyptian regime,

viewing the secularist government in Egypt along with other secularist Arab governments as

a product of westernization. Qutb believed that different forces of colonialism were acting to

westernize the Muslim world, but despite this, Islam provided strength for the Muslim world

to resist. To Qutb, the West (notably the United States of America and Europe) was the

Muslim worlds’ number-one enemy. One of Qutb’s most famous ideas was that of jahiliyya

states, or states that do not govern according to Sharia law (Musallam 64). This idea grew

from Qutb’s belief that all Muslim societies submitted to authorities other than Allah (e.g.,

governments, international treaties, etc.), which implicated their traditions, customs, laws and

values (Qutb). Qutb, who saw this as a violation of the principle of hakimiyya, believed that

jahiliyya states were not true Muslim societies.

As a writer and activist, Qutb published newspapers and books detailing his

revolutionary ideas. He went on to influence Islamists throughout Africa and the Middle East,

and groups such as the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Jihad Organization, and the Islamic

Resistance Movement (Musallam 86). His ideas continue to be discussed today by modern

theorist, and are also used in the Islamic State’s narrative to support tawhid al-hakimiyya and

kufr bi taught by encouraging the withdrawal and excommunication from their jahiliyya state.

Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi contributed more recently and more largely to the Salafi-

jihadist movement through reconstruction, reinterpretation and development of the ideas of

takfir and al-wala’ wa al-bara’. His disciples went on to found Al Qaeda and hold high

positions in the Islamic State, despite al-Maqdisi arguments against well-known terrorist

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tactics such as suicide bombings and the killing of Muslim civilians (Khaled al-Saud 737).

Contrary to the modern understanding of a five pillar Salafi-jihadism, al-Maqdisi asserted

that there were three main pillars: tawhid, al-wala’ wa al-bara’ and jihad (Khaled al-Saud

738). After al-Maqdisi:

The first duty upon al-muwahhid [the monotheist] is to disavow and disbelieve in the

scattered gods and the many names that are being worshiped other than God, which in the past

took the form of stones and primitive idols, and in our time are the rulers and legislators and

their manmade laws and legislations. While the tawhid, which we spoke of, entails al-bara’

(disavowal) and disbelief in these man-made laws and scattered idols, one of its most

trustworthy ties is the subject of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, which requires the disavowal of the

authors of these laws and regulations and the people who are applying them (Khaled al-Saud

738).

According to al-Maqdisi, tawhid is basis for al-wala’ wa al-bara’ and jihad. In other

words, the most honorable way of combatting states which violate the principle of absolute

monotheism is by renunciation of and disbelief in the idols and actors which write, apply and

enforce the laws, and sacred warfare. In addition, al-Maqdisi worked to transform the takfir

ideology of excommunication from one of submission to one of resistance (Khaled al-Saud

740). Al-Maqdisi’s ideas were catapulted partially due to his friendship with Abu Mus’ab al-

Zarqawi, who had more extremist views and went on to find Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Long before the establishment of terror groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State,

scholars and activists like Qutb and al-Maqdisi were reinterpreting, teaching and spreading

ideas of hakimiyya, takfir, and al-wala’ wa al-bara’. Though these beliefs may be considered

radical, they were originally not inherently violent. Qutb and al-Maqdisi did not intend to

provide an ideological framework for terrorist organizations involved with suicide bombings,

and murder of innocent civilians. However, due to their colleagues, published work, and

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followers, their ideas catapulted radical movements, and provided justification for terrorist

organizations.

Modern Propagandists

The Islamic State relies heavily on online propaganda to radicalize and recruit

members. Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was one of the greatest influencers on

jihadists in the twenty-first century. His propaganda on the internet, and involvement with the

Islamic State has impacted and continues to impact individuals all over the world who are

exploring Salafi-jihadist ideology. Awlaki was killed in Yemen by a United States drone

strike in 2011, making him the only American to be killed by his own government without

trial (Shane). Though Awlaki was killed, he was not silenced – his ideas continue to live on,

influencing terrorists and terrorist attacks all over the world including the Boston bombing

and shooting at Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France.

Awlaki, an American-Yemeni, was born in New Mexico in 1971, grew up in Yemen,

and returned to the United States to study at Colorado State University (Shane). He was first

active in the American-Muslim community as a national voice for Muslims in the United

States, preaching cohesion between the East and the West. After the 9/11 attacks, however,

the United States government began closely surveying and raiding Islamic institutions and the

homes of Muslim leaders (Shane). Awlaki ideas shifted quickly. Viewing this as a war

against Islam, he left the United States and became aggressive and violent. He publicly

praised terrorist attacks, preached against trusting non-Muslims, joined Al Qaeda in Yemen,

and publicized a “Call to Jihad” which encouraged people to engage in sacred violence to

defend Islam (Shane).

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 Awlaki’s lectures are available on CDs, DVDs, YouTube, and on other websites,

making them easily accessible learning tools for individuals grasping for knowledge on the

subjects. Awlaki’s American-Yemeni background allows his propaganda to appeal directly to

impressionable Muslims living in the West, emphasizing the western “war on Islam” and

justifying violence in its defense. In addition, Awlaki’s English propaganda is able to reach

Western audiences that are not literate in Arabic.

Awlaki’s videos have been found in the search history of the Tsarnaevs, brothers

responsible for the Boston Marathon Bombing, and of Mohammod Youssuf Abdulazeez, a

young man who killed five in an attack on Tennessee military installations. His DVDs were

found in the home of Shannon Conley, who left the USA to join ISIS in Syria. His name was

glorified by Cherif Kouachi after leading an attack on the Charlie Hebdo newspaper office,

and repeated by the group of men plotting a terrorist attack in New Jersey. These examples

emphasize the vast audience Awlaki continues to have the attention of, and the dangerous

impact of his parole. More generally, this demonstrates how online propaganda spreads

radical messages, and the large influence that the propagandists preaching these messages

have.

Conclusion and Discussion

Salafi-jihadism has been transformed over history, due to the different interpretations

of scholars, political leaders, and groups. Currently, it is being used by the Islamic State to

radicalize and recruit members for their terrorist organization, and is therefore essential to

understand when considering global terrorism. This is a basis for understanding how ideology

acts as a basis for terrorist groups, though other factors must be considered such as social

environments, culture, history, and psychology. However, understanding the way Salafi-

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jihadism has been interpreted, is learned, and is taught provides an alternative perspective and

deeper understanding of the “radical Islam” portrayed by Western media and government.

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 References

Cook, David. “Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea by Shiraz Maher (review).” The

Middle East Journal, vol. 71 no.3, 2017, pp. 511-513. Project MUSE.

Khaled al-Saud, Abdullah bin. “The Spiritual Teacher and His Truants: The Influence and

Relevance of Abu Mohammad Al-Maqdisi.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 41,

no. 9, June 2017, pp. 736–754., doi:10.1080/1057610x.2017.1338057.

Knapp, Michael G. "The Concept and Practice on Jihad in Islam." Parameters, vol. 33, no. 1,

2003, pp. 82-94. ProQuest, http://ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/login?url=https://search-

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recruitment.html.

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http://ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/13119

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Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, translated from Arabic by International Islamic Federation of

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