Professional Documents
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RULE 72 jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was
included in the intestate proceedings; (4)there was absence of
Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same
family, in accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification of
VDA DE MANALO VS. CA (2001)
non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
Arcilla, Jay
CA dismissed; MR was denied. Hence, this petition for review.
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate
ISSUES:
in 1992. He was survived by his wife and his eleven children, who are all
W/N CA erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC
of legal age. He left several real properties located in Manila and in
which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the
Tarlac including a business- Manalo’s Machine Shop with offices at
petition for judicial settlement of estate ?
Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In November, the respondents, who
are eight of the surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for
RULING:
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for the
NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration,
appointment of their brother, Romeo, ias administrator thereof. The trial
Settlement and Distribution of Estate is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING and,
court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing
as such, it is a remedy whereby the respondents seek to establish a
the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
status, a right, or a particular fact..
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, and directing service
by registered mail of the order. The trial court issued an order declaring
In the determination of the nature of an action or
the whole world in default, except the government, and set the
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in
reception of evidence of the petitioners. the complaint shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of the petition belies
the claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
upon motion of the petitioners who were granted ten(10) days within petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such
which to file their opposition to the petition. as the fact of death and his residence which are foundation
facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
The trial court called resolved such issues in the following administration of the estate rest. It also contains an
manner: enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list
1. admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the merits 2. of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be
denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed
immaterial 3.declared that the court had jurisdiction 4.denied the motion for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention
for inhibition 5.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father.
appointment as regular administrator in the for hearing.
DISPOSITION:Petition is denied for lack of merit
The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition
forcertiorari, contending that:
Thereafter, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RULING:
RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
of administration in her favor. In January 2001, private respondent
submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband. In the intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts. of property in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of
Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
Subsequently, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."
intestate proceedings. petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that
the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims
of the required inventory of the decedent's estate. Petitioners also filed to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. These
other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and
part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule
assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, 87.
incomplete and inaccurate.
#2
Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides
proceedings. CA likewise dismissed the petition. for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
ISSUE: the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or
WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the
the right to participate in the settlement proceeding by way of Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
intervention under Rule 19 the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such
interests can be protected.
Preciosa B. Garcia, wife of deceased, and nn behalf of their child: Rule 79 Section 2, demands that the petition should show the
Agustina B. Garcia opposed, which was denied by CFI. Preciosa alleged existence of jurisdiction to make the appointmentsought, and should
that Fule was a creditor of the estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of allege all the necessary facts such as death, name, last residence,
thedeceased is not entitled to succeed from him. existence, situs of assets, intestacy, right of person who seeks
administration as next of kin, creditor or otherwise to be appointed.
The Court of Appeals reversed and annulled the appointment of
Fule. Preciosa became special administratrix upon a bond of P30, 000.00. Resides – ex vi termini “actual residence”-Elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
ISSUES: which it isemployed.-Same meaning as “inhabitant”.
a.)What is the distinction between venue and jurisdiction
CUENCO VS. CA
The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element Finally, venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon
of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of
otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. It would needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over
be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent of
be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix
law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its
effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court every time she orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court. and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had
and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court
In the case at bar, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the only to revert once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court
intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of
court to determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
leave a last will and testament upon which would depend the proper
venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS
Balanay, Rendel Bryan
Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of
jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly FACTS:
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City During his lifetime, Felicisimo T. San Luis contracted three
was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo
court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However,
provides: on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. Felicidad San Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.), then
(Rule 73) surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived
with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the decedent, possessed the ISSUE:
legal standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid. Whether venue was properly laid.
Mila, one of the children by first marriage, filed a motion for inhibition
against Judge Tensuan. The motion was granted and the case was RULING:
reraffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues were Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
raised at the second trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in
for letters of administration. It held that, at the the time of Felicisimo’s the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time
death, he was duly elected governor and a resident of Laguna. Hence, of his death." The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
the decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of and not domicile in the technical sense. The word "resides" should be
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be 1st marriage with Paz Lazo in 1942 whom he had a daughter named
passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal (respondent) 2nd marriage with Isabel
be ventilated in a separate action. However that general rule has de la Puerta in 1948, who gave birth to a boy named Jose Douglas
qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience. Portugal, Jr. (petitioners).
Although generally, probate court may not decide a question of title of By virtue of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights
ownership yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one executed by Portugal Sr. and his 4 siblings, over the estate of their father,
of collation or advancement or the parties consent to the assumption of a parcel of land n Caloocan was issued a TCT in the name of “Jose Q.
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo”.
impaired then the probate court is competent to decide the question of
ownership. Paz died in 1984, while Portugal Sr. died intestate in 1985.
We held that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
general rule. Here the probate court had already received evidence on Estate of Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel
the ownership of the 12 hectare land during the hearing of the motion for of land, and was subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila
its exclusion from the inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.”
who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against
As pointed out by the appellees they belong to the poor stratum of Leonila for cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in
society, they should not be forced to incur additional expenses by her name, alleging that Leonila is not related whatsoever to the deceased
bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the 12-hectare Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land,
land. The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new one be
heirs of Francisco to file in the intestate proceeding , Special Proceeding, issued in their (petitioner’s) name.
a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their
claim for the 12 hectare land in question stating the ultimate facts in A Pre-Trial Order was issued & after trial, the trial court dismissed the
support of their claim. case for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction without resolving
the issues as stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that petitioner’s
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., VS. probate court.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
Borlagdatan, April Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to CA, citing the case of Carino vs.
Carino. In this case, the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the
FACTS: validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even
6) That the spouse is working in London as an auxiliary nurse Respondent argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what
and ½of her salary forms part of the estate. properties form part of the estate and to appropriate for herself.
She also points out that this function is vested in the court in
• Petitioner filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss alleging
charge of the intestate proceedings.
that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration and if an estate exists, the letters of Petitioner asks this court to declare that the properties specified
administration be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse. do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her
bare allegations and handful documents. Since this court is the
• RTC appointed Rita administratrix of the estate of the deceased
trier of facts, the court cannot order unqualified and final
upon a bond posted by her in the amount of 1k. The Trial Court
exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
ordered her to take custody of the real and personal properties
estate.
and make an inventory thereof.
The resolution is better left to the probate court before which the
• Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision.
administration proceeding are pending. The trial court is in the
ISSUES: best position to receive evidence. The function of resolving
WON the property should be included in the inventory or list of
1) WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres for purposes properties is one clearly within the competence of the probate
of administration? court.
Sec.1 of Rule 74, does not preclude the heirs from instituting PADA-KILARIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
administration proceedings even if the estate has no debts or Cadavis, Albert
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an
FACTS:
ordinary action for partition. While Sec. 1 allows the heirs to
• Jacinto Pada had six children, namely, Marciano,
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta.
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does He died intestate.
not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an • His estate included a parcel land a residential and coconut land
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is in Leyte. It is the northern portion cadastral Lot which is the
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reason for not resorting to subject to the instant controversy.
an action for partition.
• During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, feliciano
When partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house on the
northern. Then feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living
should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
in the house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona
without good or compelling reasons. Pada hilario, one of Pastor/s children, has been living in that
house.
The court see no reason not to apply the doctrine to the case at
bar. There are 2 surviving heirs, and admitted that there are no • The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extrajudicial
debts. What is apparent is that these 2 are not in good terms. The partition of his estate. For this purpose, they executed
reason why private respondent seeks the appointment is her to a private document which they, however, never registered in
obtain possession for her own purposes, since these properties the office of the Registrar of Deed.
are presently in the hands of the petitioner who supposedly
disposed in fraudulently. • Both Ananias and Marciano, represented by his daughter,
Maria, that cadastral Lot as allocated during the said partition.
The court is of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason Then Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right
as co-owner of said property. Juanita Pada sold to engr. ernesto
which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of
Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner.
the deceased.
• Later on, Maria Pada sell the coownership right
The Court hold that, the Trial court which the administration
o f h i s f a t h e r , M a r c i a n o . P r i v a t e respondent, who is
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing the letters the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Sometime in 1908, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as the HELD:
administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate by reason of the fact that
Palanca failed and refused to render an account of the property and Judgment of the lower court disallowing the claim against Pio de la
funds of the said estate and even failed and refused to deliver such Guardia Barretto’s estate affirmed.
property and funds to his successor Jose McMicking who was Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety, would not
appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate in Palanca’s stead. have been liable himselfhad this action been commenced against him. If
Palanca retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be. The
the same, and never returned to the Philippines. Due to these basis of the liability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault or
circumstances McMicking instituted a claim against the estate of failure of the principal. If the latter incurs no liability, the former incurs
Mariano Ocampo who was a surety of Palanca. The court approved such none. The administrator who complies with the law incurs no liability
claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the administrator of Mariano to any person.
Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he had sufficient funds. No payment was made
to Margarita Jose’s estate. The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’s original
claim was made and to which Doroteo Velasco was appointed as
McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of Pio de la administrator was already partitioned at the time the claim was made.
Guardia Barretto who died in 1905. Pio was one of the sureties of
Doroteo Velasco when he was appointed as administrator of Mariano A partition of the property of a deceased person may be made under the
Ocampo’s estate. Pio left an estate to which the defendant Benito Sy provisions of sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Conbieng was appointed as administrator. The committee appointed by notwithstanding that an administrator with the will annexed has been
the court to appraise and hear claims against Pio’s estate disallowed appointed and the administration of the estate under said appointment
is in progress. Such provisions are applicable no matter what stage the
Whether or not the action of the petitioners to annul the extrajudicial Spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated
settlement executed by the respondents has prescribed. proceedings before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of
herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa. CFI granted the
petition. Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina
entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Miguels estate, adjudicating
HELD:
between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel. Private
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s dismissal of respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
the case on the ground that the action has prescribed. CFI of Ozamiz City. CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of
the adoption. Thereafter, the private respondents appealed said decision
Upon appeal, petitioners contended that since they and the respondents to the Court of Appeals. While said appeal was pending, the
were co-heirs of Marcelo, the action for partition does not prescribe. Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial settlement with respondent
Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
The SC held that although, as a general rule, an action for partition
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the
Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his brothers and sisters. Court of
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title.
Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the validity of the adoption of
The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases; from the moment
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to
the possessor of the property asserts such adverse title. When
claim their share of the properties from the Rodriguezes. The latter
respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement stating
refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
therein that they are the sole heirs of the deceased, and secured new
were not their blood relatives. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul
transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded
the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and consequently, set up the 1983 partition. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987
a title adverse to them. to include the allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise were
made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed. The
The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such affirmed the decision of the trial court.
discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed
with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in ISSUES:
the name of the respondents exclusively.
(1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition had already prescribed (2)
PEDROSA VS. COURT OF APPEALS whether or not said deed is valid
De guzman , Jabrielle
HELD:
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in
publication of extrajudicial settlement. It states: The fact of the question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, no extrajudicial
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity and
in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to
persons. The rule contemplates a notice which must be sent out or issued hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a years from its execution in 1941. To say that Maria Elena was
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the
extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina,
publication was done in the instant case. only represented her own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since
Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically vested to his
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes interests did
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A not include Miguels estate but only Pilars estate.
deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent Petition is GRANTED.
and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting
FACTS: Both Rosa Aldana and the Carreons moved for reconsideration,
contending that, inasmuch as Jose Francisco y Palumpon had
Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal
withdrawn, there was no authority to continue, for the matter became a
summarily to settle the estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco. Alleging
closed incident. Thereafter, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. de Francisco, as
that they had three minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the
guardian ad item of the three legitimate, submitted an "amended
deceased left a parcel of land with house thereon, and no creditors, she
motion" wherein she made practically the same allegations of her
asked for declaration that the persons entitled to share in his estate are
previous motion and prayed for identical remedies — except those
the said three minor children, with herself as usufructuary. She
touching the recognition of Jose Francisco y Palumpon. Overruling
requested for appointment as guardian ad item of her three minor
objections, the court admitted the amended motion, heard it granting the
children, and her request was granted in due course. Petition was
interested parties opportunity to present their evidence and arguments,
approved and was registered.
and rendered judgment holding the realty was private property of the
Rosa Aldana Francisco mortgaged her share of the realty to the sisters deceased Jose Francisco, who had acquired it four years before his
Fausta Carreon and Catalina Carreon and was duly registered. marriage to Rosa Aldana. Wherefore it held that the whole property
Afterwards, she conveyed by absolute deed of sale, to the aforesaid passed to the ownership of the three legitimate children of the deceased,
creditors, her interest and participation in the land. This sale was subject to usufructuary rights of the widow; it annulled the mortgage
likewise inscribed in the office of the Register of Deeds. and the sale executed by Rosa Aldana in favor of the Carreon sisters, and
then issued other appropriate instructions to the Register of Deeds.
However, in a motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda.de Francisco, mother of
the deceased Jose M. Francisco, allegedly in representation of the minor ISSUES:
Jose Francisco y Palumpon, averred that this minor was a recognized
WON the court erred: (1) in continuing to hear the motion for reopening,
natural son of the deceased, with legal right to participate in his estate,
even after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation and (2) in
that the previous proceedings were void because Rosa Aldana Francisco
taking cognizance of the annulment of the mortgage and sale, which it
had concealed such fact, and because she had interests in conflict with
could validly consider as a probate court.
those of her three sons, the truth being that the land was private
property of Jose M. Francisco of which she could not have been awarded HELD:
a portion in fee simple.
Supposing the original motion did not afford legal standing to the three
When the motion to annul or reopen was called for hearing, Macaria legitimate children, and that it could not be "amended", as contended by
Palumpon requested in open court the dismissal, without prejudice, of appellants, we perceive no reason to prevent the court below from
considering such amended motion as a new and independent petition in
Contrary to appellants' claim, relief for the minors cannot be directed From the foregoing, the conclusion follows that no prejudicial error was
against the bond which, according to appellants, should have been committed by the lower court, whose order is, consequently, affirmed
demanded under section 3, Rule 74, because that section applies where with costs.
RULING:
ISSUE:
US VS. CHIU GUIMCO
Dimaliwat, Dianne Whether the judge was acting within his power when he ordered
the commitment of Guimco to the provincial jail?
FACTS:
RULING:
Joaquin Cruz, a chinese merchant living for many years in the
municipality of Gingoog, Province of Misamis, died while visiting China. No. Section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 5 of
Before his departure from the Philippines he had executed a will before Rule 75), which allows imprisonment of a person who neglects to deliver
Anastacio Servillon, a notary public, in which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden a will after the death of the testator without reasonable cause, can only
were named as executors. Chiu Guimco is Joaquin Cruz’s brother. be applied when a court is acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
the administration of the estates of deceased persons. Where
Guimco, as attorney in fact and manager of the estate of his administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
deceased brother, entered into an agreement with his brother’s Filipina taking action under this section, should require that there be before it
wife, whereby she relinquished her claims to the estate for a some petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make
consideration. He also entered into an agreement with Uy Cuan, his action by the court under this section appropriate.
brother’s Chinese wife, for the distribution of the estate and for the
payment of rentals on her interest in the real estate. No payments have, The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is clearly a
however, been made by Guimco. totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section
628 (now section 4 of Rule 75). It is not permissible in a prosecution
Ramon Contreras, acting on behalf of Uy Cuan, wrote a letter to Guimco under Sec. 628 to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein
urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment prescribed under Sec.
lawful proceedings in accordance therewith. Guimco replied that the will 629.
in question had never been in his possession and that he had never seen
it. To enforce the production of the will by the accused at a trial under Sec.
628 would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere
A complaint was filed under section 628 of the Code of Civil production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had
Procedure charging Guimco with the failure to produce the will within possession of it as charged in the criminal complaint. This would
the time required by law. The court found the accused guilty and constitute an infringement of the provision of law which says that in a
imposed upon him a fine of P1800. Subsequently, the court, believing
RULING:
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will PEREZ VS. PEREZ
shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed. Katigbak , Paula Margareth
For this purpose, section 626 provides that the person who has the
custody of he will shall, within 4 days after he knows of the death of the FACTS:
testator, deliver the will to the court which has jurisdiction, or to the On May 25, 1973, the plaintiffs-appellants executed a deed of
executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629 proscribed coercive real estate mortgage in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines
means to compel a person having the custody of a will to deliver it to the over the property located in Bataan as security for an agricultural loan of
court which has jrisdiction. Petitioner alleged that the deceased P6,500.00. The mortgage contract was registered in the Registry of Deeds
designated nobody as custodian of his will but that he directed his of Bataan. The plaintiffs failed to pay their obligation which prompted
nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep one in DBP in extrajudicially foreclosing the property. the application was filed
his possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose And the necessary notice of Sheriffs sale was issued and posted by the
Azores, with instructions to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed to deputy sheriff at three (3) public places in Morong, Bataan, where the
present said will for probate, Manuel should take charge of presenting it mortgaged property is located and duly published for three (3)
to the court. +aking everything into account therefore, it is of the court's consecutive weeks in the Olongapo News. On December 19, 1978, the
vieww that Jose Azores, the son of the deceased, had the custody of the public auction sale was conducted at the municipal building in Morong,
will because the original thereof was turned over to him. For the sake of Bataan, wherein Democrito Perez emerged as the winning bidder for
argument, however, admitting that the testator had designated nobody P11,000.00. Certificate of sale in favor of Democrito Perez was issued and
as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied that his act of subsequentl$ registered in the Registry of Deeds. Since plaintiffs-appellants failed to
making a codicil and entrusting the custody thereof to his legitimate exercise their right to redeem the foreclosed property, original defendant
children, clearly modified his last will. In this sense, the custody of both Democrito Perez executed an affidavit of consolidation which resulted in
is entrusted to his legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to the issuance of a new TCT. On 1985, a civil case for Annulment of Public
petitioner. Hence, as the legitimate children of the deceased had custody Auction Sale with Damages coupled with Preliminary Injunction and
of the originals of the will and of the codicil, they alone could, had the Prayer for Restraining Order was filed by herein petitioners against the
right and where bound by law to apply for the probate of their father' respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Balanga, Bataan. The
last will. In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for case was dismissed. Petitioners filed an appeal alleging that the RTC
Held: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator of the estate of the
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes deceased Chung Liu.
final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.
Ngo The Hua, claiming to be the spouse of the deceased, filed a petition
to be appointed administratix of the estate of the aforementioned
However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the deceased. The petition was opposed by the children of the deceased
estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Further, in claiming that Ngo Hua is morally and physically unfit to execute the
Ramon vs. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party interested in a duties of the trust as administratix, and that the she and the deceased
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he procured an absolute divorce in Taiwan. The lower court found that
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or Ngo Hua and the deceased were validly divorced in Taipei. The court
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. issued an order appointing Chung Kiat Hua as administrator instead.
Issue:
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of
Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated Whether or not the lower court erred in passing upon the validity of the
by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA divorce obtained by Ngo Hua and the deceased and upon the filiation of
the oppositors?
Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988, must be upheld. Held:
No. It is well settled that the declaration of heirs shall only take place
RULE 78 after all the debts, expenses and taxes have been paid. A cursory reading
of the pertinent section discloses that what the court is enjoined from
Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to doing is the assignment or distribution of the residue of the deceased’s
Whom issued estate before the above-mentioned obligations chargeable to the estate
are first paid. Nowhere from the said section may it be inferred that the
NGO THE HUA VS. CHUNG KIAT HUA
Mercado, Trish court cannot make a declaration of heirs prior to the satisfaction of these
obligations. It is to be noted, however, that the court in making the
NGO THE HUA v. CHUNG KITA HUA
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS Whether the trial court erred in not appointing her
Pangilinan, Legis administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in
appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix without first
TORRES VS. JAVIER
Pangilinan, Legis setting the case for hearing.
FACTS:
RULE 79 During the discussion, Villegas informed Adela that the amount of
P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance,
Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary, Petition and was probably more than what she would get in the estate, because the
Contest for Letters of Administration estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Although Adela did not
want to accept the money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she
was made to sign the deed of assignment, Adela did not know the true
GUTIEREZ VS VILLEGAS value of the estate.
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine The administrator Villegas and Rizalina denied the allegations of
fraud, undue influence and the like.
FACTS: Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying that
In 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all
surviving spouse Jose Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a deceased copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it
brother, Rizalina and Adela Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving spouse appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without
filed with the Rizal CFI- Pasay, a petition for Letters of Administration , serving her copies thereof.
and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged
as intestate heirs, besides himself, the 2 nieces of his deceased wife. that the movant, although originally a party to the probate proceeding,
Under the unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having
accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
No. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge
of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or Ignacio Abuton died, testamentary, leaving two sets of children
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which by two different wives. First from DionisiaOlarte whom he had 12
RULING:
The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in
RULE 84 the administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary
General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the instant
case there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and
WILSON VS REAR ordinary course of business, the administrator should have wound up
Borja,Catherine and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment.
FACTS:
When he was appointed and qualified as administrator, the law imposed
July 14, 1925, Charles C. Rear was murdered by some Moros on
upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the
his plantation. The whole plantation consisted of public lands. J.J. Wilson
estate in a business-like manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate
qualified as special administrator of the estate on November 17, 1925.
without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay. He was not appointed
Later, the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800, of to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the
which the commissioners filed an inventory and report, which was also heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the estate for the
signed by Wilson. January 4, 1927, the commissioners made and filed a use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent business
report of claims against the estate, but by reason of the fact that it was man would handle his own personal business. When appointed, it is the
claimed and alleged that the administrator did not have any funds to legal duty of the administrator to administer, settle, and close the
pay, on March 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a administration in the ordinary course of business, without any
portion of the property. unnecessary delay. Neither does an administrator, in particular, without
RULING OF CA:
SAN DIEGO VS. NOMBRE -It reversed the trial court's decision explaining that even in the absence
Borlagdatan, April of such special powers, a contract or lease for more than 6 years is not
entirely invalid
FACTS:
-No such limitation on the power of a judicial administrator to grant a
-AdeloNombre as duly constituted judicial administrator leased lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the present
a fishpond to Pedro Escanlar (respondent) law
-Terms of the lease : 3yrs -In accordance with Article 1647, CC it is only when the lease is to be
recorded in the Registry of Property that it cannot be instituted without
-It is executed without previous authority or approval of the Court special authority
where the proceedings was pending
-However under Rule 85, Section 3, of the Rules of Court it authorizes a
-Nombre was removed as administrator by Order of the court and one judicial administrator, among other things, to administer the estate of the
SofronioCampillanos was appointed in his stead deceased not disposed of by will which includes leasing the property
-A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only the The heirs of the deceased are his surviving spouse, nine (9) children
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate. (among them the herein petitioner, Natividad V. A. Jaroda), and four (4)
grandsons, among them the herein respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan. After
-A judicial administrator before entering into his duties, is required to
Respondent Tan was appointed special administrator he petitioned for
file a bond.
the withdrawal of sums of P109,886.42 and P72,644.66 from the
-This is not applicable in case of agency wherein agent is only Philippine National Bank, which sums were not listed in his petition for
answerable to his principal. The protection which the law gives the administration as among the properties left by the deceased instead
principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the actually belong to and were held in trust for the co-owners of the Juna
fact that control by the principal can only be thru agreements, whereas Subdivision. Powers of attorney purportedly signed by the co-owners
the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of
authorizing the late Carlos Villa Abrille to sell the lots in the Juna
law and orders of the appointing court.
Subdivision and to deposit the proceeds thereof with the Philippine
National Bank were exhibited. The court granted the petition.
Tan executed, together with the other co-owners of the Juna Subdivision
a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell (or)
dispose the lots in the 99.546-hectare subdivision. Tan filed before the
court for the approval of the power of attorney executed authorizing
himself to sell the lots, which the court also granted.
JARODA VS. CUSI
Petitioner Natividad V. A. Jaroda moved to nullify the order that
Bueno, Jirene
allowed the withdrawal of the bank deposits, as well as the order which
FACTS: approved the power of attorney which was granted by the respondent
court. Jaroda appealed but it was also dismissed. Petitioner Jaroda filed
the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction alleging,
among other things, that appeal would not be speedy and adequate as
Antonio Tan filed for a Special Proceeding before the respondent court respondent Tan has sold and continues to sell the subdivision lots on the
strength of the respondent court's order, to her irreparable prejudice and
stating that the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate leaving
that of the other heirs which the Court gave due and issued an order
estates consisting of his conjugal share in real and personal properties
restraining the respondent from selling the share of the intestate estate.
The bank deposits were in the name of the deceased; they, therefore,
belong prima facie to his estate after his death. And until the contrary is
RULING: shown by proper evidence at the proper stage, when money claims may
be filed in the intestate proceedings, the special administrator is without
power to make the waiver or to hand over part of the estate, or what
appears to be a prima facie part of the estate, to other persons on the
Yes. We agree with petitioner that the order allowing the special
ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. If even to sell for
administrator to withdraw the bank deposits standing in the name of the
valuable consideration property of the estate requires prior written
decedent is in abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
notice of the application to the heirs, legatees, or devisees under Rule 89
the first place, said withdrawal is foreign to the powers and duties of a
of the Rules of Court, such notice is equally, if not more, indispensable
special administrator, which, as Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court
for disposing gratuitously of assets of the decedent in favor of strangers.
provides, are to —take possession and charge of the goods, chattels,
Admittedly, no such notice was given, and without it the court's
rights, credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same for the
authority is invalid and improper.
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose
may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only
such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special
administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless b) The order approving the power of attorney executed by administrator
so ordered by the court. Tan and appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell the subdivision lots
for a price at his discretion is, likewise, void for want of notice and for
approving an improper contract or transaction.
In the second place, the order was issued without notice to, and hearing
of, the heirs of the deceased. The withdrawal of the bank deposits may
be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the As provided under Section 4 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court , power of
estate, and apparently within the powers and duties of a special attorney for the sale of the pro-indiviso share of the estate requires
administrator; but actually, said withdrawal is a waiver by the special "written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees who are interested in
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the intestate estate to the the estate to be sold" and admittedly, administrator Tan did not furnish
bank deposits in favor of the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision, who such notice.
A concrete example would be for administrator Tan to authorize agent Jaroda's interest in the estate demands that she be heard by the court in
Tan to sell a lot for P50, with the condition that if he can sell it for more all matters affecting the disposal of her share, and that the administrator
he could keep the difference; agent Tan sells the lot for P150.00; he should primarily protect the interest of the estate in which she is a
retains P100.00 and deposits in the bank P50.00 "in the name of Antonio participant rather than those of the decedent's co-owner. The partial
V. A. Tan, in trust for Juna Subdivision" (as worded in the power of partition approved by the court has no effect, one way or the other, upon
attorney. Annex "F-1"); thus, administrator Tan's accounting to the estate the orders contested in the present case because it is not definite whether
for the sale of the lot for P50 would be in order, but the estate would the lots described in the 57 pages of the partition agreement correspond
have been actually cheated of the sum of P100, which went to agent Tan to those of the Juna Subdivision as described in the power of attorney.
in his individual capacity.
85
documents executed on the same date wherein they manifested that they
RULE are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the judicial
proceeding and administration.
Accountability and Compensation of Executors and
Administrators
Without said accounts having been heard or approved, the
administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and
JOSON VS. JOSON
Castillo, Shain Ann terminated and to relieve him of his duties as such. Heir Eduardo Joson
filed an opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the court issued an
FACTS: order declaring the proceedings terminated and relieving the
Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Nueva Ecija leaving behind administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts
heirs and properties. He married three times and was survived by nine notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said accounts.
(9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by his first wife Eufemia de
la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his second wife Pomposa Miguel and his The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
third wife and surviving widow Dominga M. Joson.
86
Eventually, the RTC granted the second Motion for Payment;
however, it reduced the sums to be paid. LCN, then filed a motion for RULE
reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC. Recourse was then
Claims against Estate
resorted to the Court of Appeals. On May 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. While the
AFAN VS DE GUZMAN
Court of Appeals conceded that Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law
Espino, Carla
Office, as the administrators of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere,
were entitled toadministrator's fees and litigation expenses, they could FACTS:
not claim the same from the funds of the estate.
On July 12 1957, De Guzman filed a claim in the special proceeding for
ISSUE:
the settlement of intestate estate of ArsenioAfan. The claim was allegedly
Whether or not Quasha Law Office is entitled to payment of the
expenses incurred as executor or administrator of the estate of Triviere. due from Afan, with interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16,
1949, as set forth in a promissory note then issued by Afan. On July 22,
HELD: 1957, theadministratix objected to the consideration of the claim upon
No. Section 7, Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court, which the ground, among others, that it had been filed long after the expiration
reads: Section 7. What expenses and fees allowed executor or of the period for the presentation of claim against said estate. The lower
administrator. Not to charge for services as attorney. Compensation
court issued the order refusing to entertain the aforementioned claim. De
provided by will controls unless renounced. When the executor or
Guzman invokes, in support of his appeal, section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules
administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any
professional fees for legal services rendered by him. of Court. He maintains that his claim was filed prior to the distribution
of the estate of the deceased. Further, he now alleges, for the first time, a
The afore-quoted provision is clear and unequivocal and needs "cause" why the lower court should allegedly have considered his claim.
no statutory construction. Here, in attempting to exempt itself from the He says, in his brief that he had no actual knowledge of the fact that the
coverage of said rule, the Quasha Law Office presents conflicting estate of the deceased was then already in the process of settlement.
arguments to justify its claim for attorney's fees against the estate. At one
point, it alleges that the award of attorney's fees was payment for its ISSUE:
administration of the estate of the late Raymond Triviere; yet, it would
later renounce that it was an administrator. Whether or not the claim of De Guzman should be granted
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
MBTC VS. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORP The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
Mercado, Trish should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. ABSOLUTE claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
G.R. No. 170498. January 9, 2013 claims,including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply
suppletorily.
FACTS:
On October 5, 2000, Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. SANTOS VS. MANARANG
(SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute Mansul, Nabral
Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to ESTATE OF OLAVE VS. REYES
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80. SHCI alleged in its complaint that it Pangilinan , Legis
made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of 27,000 pieces of
plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by SALONGA-HERNANDEZ VS. PASCUAL
Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507, 140768530, 140768531, Rabanal Michelle
140768532, 140768533 and 140768534. These checks were all crossed, and
were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s
General Manager, in 1998. Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding
for the settlement of his estate was commenced before the RTC of Pasay
City. This proceeding was pending at the time AMC
RULE 87
Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators
filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI
made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly undelivered HEIRS OF GREGOIRE VS. BAKER
items worth P8,331,700.00. According to AMC, these transactions could Rivera, Hiezll Wynn
not be found in its records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in
HELD: When there is a deficiency of assets in the hands of an executor or Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause
administrator to pay debts and expenses, and when the deceased person of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of another
action. RTC: granted the motion on the ground that the action should
made in his life-time such fraudulent conveyance of such real or
have been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by
personal estate or of a right or interest therein, as is stated in the the deceased, and directed the plaintiff to amend his complaint. Plaintiff
preceding section, any creditor of the estate may, by license of the court,
No. The rules on whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is
extinguished together with his criminal liability, has long been clarified
and settled in the case of People v. Bayotas:
ABS-CBN VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction
Tuason, Jannelle
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
FACTS: based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
Petitioners executed separate complaint-affidavits charging private terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
respondents of several violation of penal laws when they went to the liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
premises of ABS CBN and informed the employees thereof regarding the committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in sensostrictiore."
forced closure of the premises of the station and stoppage of its
ISSUE
89
judicial control and could not be disposed of without judicial authority,
RULE and that the court has never authorized the sale mentioned in the
Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of decedent complaint filed herein; and that the defendants Jose, Guillermo, and
Facts: (2) Whether or not the CFI Order approving the power of
attorney is valid.
The Special Proceeding was commenced by Antonio Tan
(Tan) allegingin the petition that Carlos Villa Abrille died Ruling:
intestate and that his heirsare his surviving spouse, 9 children
(among them is petitioner NatividadJaroda) and 4 grandsons,
among them respondent Tan. On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled in the
affirmative. Said withdrawal is foreign to the powers
Tan was appointed special administrator. and duties of a specialadministrator. (Rule 80.2)
IMPERIAL VS. MONOZ -Luis contended that he should get the properties partitioned
Borlagdatan, April while oppositor-petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial, the only child
(adopted), should get only the remaining of the estate.
FACTS:
ISSUES:
-On 1957, Luis Santos surviving spouse of the deceased Fermina
Bello Santos, who died intestate filed Special Proceeding No. 1049, WON:
entitled "Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello Santos", in CFI Bulacan
(1) An order of a probate court in testate or intestate proceedings
-Luis was appointed regular Administrator on 1958, as there was approving a project of partition which clearly fixed the distributive share
no opposition filed by the only other heir, herein petitioner Purificacion to which each heir is entitled is merely interlocutory in nature so that the
Santos Imperial probate court can correct and set aside the same anytime; or is final and,
therefore, appealable within the 30 day period for appeal; and
-Later on petitioner Purificacion Santos Imperial entered her
appearance in the abovementioned intestate proceedings as Oppositor, (2) A court can order the correction of an erroneous final decision after it
and filed a motion to require the regular administrator to render an had become final and executory.
accounting
RULING:
-The questioned orders having become final and, therefore, executory Yes. Concepcion Lopez is an acknowledged daughter of the deceased
because of the failure of the herein respondent Luis U. Santos to appeal and is the only heiress.
on time by allowing the period for appeal to lapse before filing his
Contrary to appellants’ contention it is a well-settled rule that a person
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 100
Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her ISSUES: 1. Whether private respondents should be dismissed for failure
minor daughters. to comply w/ the rules on certification of non-forum shopping?
• Petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents 2. whether the release and waiver of claim precludes private
claim have been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise respondents from claiming their successional rights?
extinguished by reason of Remedios Release and waiver of
3. whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational
proving their filiation?
assistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor
children discharge the estate of SimaWei from any and all RULING:
liabilities.
1. Rule 7, sec.5 of the ROC provides that the certification on non-forum
• RTC-denied the motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
motion to dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and waiver of Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of
claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that the case. However, liberal application of the rules is proper where the
she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin vs CA, we ruled
No renunciation of right occurred. Trial court also rejected that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-
petitioner’s objections on the certification against forum forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
shopping. procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.
So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the
• Petitioner mover for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be
petition for certiorari before CA which affirmed the RTC orders.
considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the
CA denied the MFR. Hence this petition.
rules.
• Petitioner argues that the CA disregarded existing rules on
2. As regards Remedios release and waiver of claim, the same does not
certification against forum shopping; that the release and waiver
bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid
of claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy
and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
family and estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities; and
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
that private respondents do not have the legal personality to
benefit which legally pertains to him. In this case, we find that there was
institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed
no waiver of hereditary rights. The release and waiver of claim does not
to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.
state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
remedies received 300k and an educational plan for her minor daughters
• Private respondents contended that their counsels certification
by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims
can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on
of whatsoever nature and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
certification of non-forum shopping.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 101
Susim. Considering that the document did not specifically mention We ruled in Bernabe vs Alejo, that illegitimate children who were still
private respondents hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot minors at the time of the Family code took effect and whose putative
be construed as a waiver of successional rights. parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition
for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age.
Even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of
private respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Under Under the family code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is
article 1044 of CC, parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. Not having judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.
their rights as heirs of the deceased. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the
their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as alleged parent.
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
3. Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, we agree with the CA depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents
that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private in proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine
respondents have yet to present evidence. Before the family code took the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. This
effect, the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the
children was article 285 of the Civil code, to wit: RTC.
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
ff.cases:
Xxxx
RULE 91
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years from the Escheats
finding of the document.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 102
INRE ESTATE OF LAO SAYCO not accompanied by any certified copy of the investigatory of the real
Castillo, Shainn and personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a
statement of the places where the realty is located.Moreover, the notice
FACTS: summoning the persons who believed they were entitled to his property
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of should have been published for at least six consecutive weeks, and not
the estate of the decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, aliasSaya, and for three.Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by
guardian of the minor Lay Chuyting from the judgment rendered in a the decedent at death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his
special proceeding. identity and rights.
The municipal council of Mambajao appeared in the said
proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan died in that In the present case, counsel for the municipality of Mambajao
pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor,the real and merely prayed for an order of reversion and for the adjudication in
personal property left by the said decedent within the district of the behalf of the municipality of the property aforementioned; he did not
property left by the said decedent within the district of the comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the required proofs
aforementioned municipality be awarded to the latter. The administrator in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the
also prayede that his administration be closed, and, as the guardian of subject of an investigation.
the Chiaman Lay Chuyting, requested that the property referred to be REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
delivered to the latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan. Castillo, Rochelle Jane
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 103
1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to
miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose
question." Since it was established that there were no known heirs and the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio de San Jose, Inc.
persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the
escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the
Philippines. exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be
the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former
ISSUE: (underscoring supplied). (d) A judgment in escheat proceedings when
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all
Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the
persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are
same escheated in favor of the state.
not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown,"a judgment
RULING: (A)We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement
that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its to all persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any
sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure
who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been
property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self- observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private
service by the first comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
sovereignty, the state may, and usually does, prescribe the conditions "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify
and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. the escheat judgment which has long attained finality.
The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which
such action must be brought. (b) In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an RULE 109
escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the Appeals in Special Proceedings
date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to
TESTATE ESTATE OF VDA.DE BIASCAN VS. BIASCAN
the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him
Dela Cruz, Kyzeth
for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be
barred forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured REPUBLIC VS. NISHINA
by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly De guzman, Jabrielle
prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in
FACTS:
asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her
judgment. (c) In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and
mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe, filed before the RTC of Malolos,
751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 104
surname. In her petition, respondent alleged the following: She was born the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from
on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in special
and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who were married. Her father later proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First
died. Her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As they Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order
could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the
respondents mother caused the late registration of her birth under the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate
surname of her mothers second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and to which such person is entitled; (c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in
Hakamada eventually divorced. Her mother married another Japanese, part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree issued by the presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles
Tokyo Family Court. It was filed and recorded in the civil registry of the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e)
Manila. It surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera Nishina,hence, deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing,
certificate bearing the surname Hakamada, issued through late except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
registration be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case,
surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe. and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an
After hearing the petition, RTC, granted respondents petition and order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.
directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the
record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada and to change it from NISAIDA pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the
SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE. Before the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the
Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to
alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said
file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 court and held to be final. In the present case, the filing of a record on
(appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard
appellate court dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order
respondents petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change
petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal of surname in the civil registry. WHEREFORE, the petition is
within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting GRANTED.
respondents petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner
never perfected its appeal
RULES 99-100
ISSUE: Adoption and Custody of Minors
WON the CA erred in dismissing the appeal.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BOBILES
Dorado, Czaybeeh
RULING:
SECTION 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
REPUBLIC VS. TOLEDANO AND SPOUSES CLOUSE
specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be
Espino, Carla
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 105
Aliens, not included in the foregoing exceptions, may adopt Filipino
FACTS: children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may
be provided by law.
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen
and Evelyn Clouse, a former Filipino who became a naturalized US There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not
citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a minor who is Evelyn's qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional
youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former
the Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America.
court erred in granting the petition for the spouses are not qualified to In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by
adopt under Philippine Law. consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place,
when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to
ISSUE:
adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
RULING: 1988.
Under Articles 184 and 185 of The Family Code of the Philippines, Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to
private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184. She was a former
Solomon Joseph Alcala. Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately,
the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without
Article 184, paragraph (3) expressly enumerates the persons who are not
violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband
qualified to adopt, viz.:
and wife. It reads:
(3) An alien, except:
Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by following cases:
consanguinity;
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
spouse; or
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly
condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 106
Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence,
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of
authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child to be the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the
enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
created after the right has vested. As long as the petition for adoption
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
between the spouses. governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
REPUBLIC VS. MILLER criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent
Hipolito, Nina Anthonette happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. Therefore, an
FACTS:
alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family
On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed
code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code,
with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno
may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the
Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the
Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed
interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They
affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD
are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for
society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless
adoption. On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective,
couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them
prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their
General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.
natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
ISSUE:
objectives of the law.
Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child
when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the IN RE MICHELLE LIM
Family Code prohibiting the same. Katigbak, Paola Margareth
RULING: FACTS:
Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, Monina Lim (petitioner) is an optometrist by profession. On
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent 1974, she married Primo Lim. Being childless, they registered the minor
enactment of a new law disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family children entrusted to them by certain Ayuban as their own----named
Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 107
When Primo died, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
citizen. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee
amnesty given under RA 8552 to those individuals who simulated the is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child.
birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael. At the time of the filing of the These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.
while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
RTC dismissed the petitions on the ground that since the petitioner had necessary since the children have been emancipated having reached the
remarried, she should have filed the petition jointly with her new age of majority. This is untenable. It is true that when the child reaches
husband. Motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied. Mere the age of emancipation that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
consent of the husbend was insufficient because the law gives additional years of age emancipation terminates parental authority over the person
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification, and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and responsible for
which the husbandmust comply. As to the argument that the adoptees all acts of civil life. However, parental authority is merely just one of the
are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint effects of legal adoption. Other effects were enumerated in Article V of
exercise of parental authority, the trial court ruled that even an RA 8552.
emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes
certain obligations and responsibilities. Petitioner further insist that joint adoption was possible since Olario
already filed a case for dissolution of marriage, the court ruled that until
Hence, the present petition. and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the
ISSUE: case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required.
Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 108
The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change
Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.
change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement
the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his RULING:
adoption.
No.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the
Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of
same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for
adoption:
adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding,
arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a
separate proceedings. legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are
surname of the adopters;
different from and are not related to each other, being respectively
governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear
that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is
a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which
consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and
change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if
involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of not prayed for by petitioner.
name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the
substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied. However, the given or proper name, also known as
the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive
adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the
Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change
avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the
protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an
prohibition in the Rules against the joinderof adoption and change of adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively
name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be
single petition. granted.
ISSUE:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 109
The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil
register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is ISSUE:
desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,
use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
HELD:
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and YES.
accordingly determined.
RATIO:
A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict An adopted child is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an to bear the surname of her father and her mother. Being a legitimate
independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination
by its own set of rules. Afortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any
of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of mother.
another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and
significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law Since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her
system. natural father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, the Court
finds no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
IN RE STEPHANIE GARCIA
Mercado, Trish
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 110
In his answer, Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except
awarded to him instead. Petitioner maintained that Mercedes was unfit from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
to take custody of the minors. He adduced the following reasons: firstly, The Court likewise affirms the award of P50,000.00 as support for the
respondent abandoned her family in 1992; secondly, she is mentally minor children. As found by both courts, petitioner’s representations
unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children. regarding his family’s wealth and his capability to provide for his family
more than provided a fair indication of his financial standing even
ISSUES: though he proved to be less than forthright on the matter. In any event,
1. Whether or not the custody of the minor children be given this award of support is merely provisional as the amount may be
to the mother. modified or altered in accordance with the increased or decreased needs
2. Whether or not the father is obligated to provide financial of the needy party and with the means of the giver.
support to the minor children not in his custody.
RULING:
1. Yes. Section 213 of the Family Code states that:
“In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take
RULE 103
Change of Name
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child
over seven years of age, unless the parent is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS (May 21, 1992)
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
Rodriguez, Maria Lorraine
otherwise.”
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and
FACTS:
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral
Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of
welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina. When he was but 2 and a half years
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper
Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were, with the consent of their natural
person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive
parents and by order of the court, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now
of a mother’s love and devotion for which there is no
deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a
substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother
high school teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they
cannot be replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender
remained childless after 15 years of marriage. Upon reaching the age of
years than all other things combined.
22, private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering
student, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was
2. Yes.
averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him
Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give
from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry
support is demandable from the time the person who has a right to
when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 111
nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, opportunity to improve his personality and to provide his best interest.In
thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother granting or denying the petition for change of name, the question of
does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. proper and reasonable cause is left to the discretion of the court. The
evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the
RTC: resolved in favor of private respondent, decreeing that, the
best evidence available is required.In the present case, the court had
jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with.
exercised its discretion judiciously when it granted the petition.
Republic through the Solicitor General appealed. The Solicitor General Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his
contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot injury to the interest of the State or other persons .Nothing whatsoever is
justify the petition for change of name. He claims that for private shown in the record of this case that such prejudice or injury to the
respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass
interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of
ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who
is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. petitioner's name.
Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which not only some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will
requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter. be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the
CA: Affirmed. grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
ISSUE:
Whether the reasons given by private respondent in his petition legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having
for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
granting of said petition. unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
RULING: YES. The assertion of the Solicitor General was unacceptable. prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment
The testimony of private respondent in the lower court bears out the and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
existence of valid cause in his bid for change of name: that he observed fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
that “Wong” as a surname embarrassed him to his friends and when he interest.
goes with Chinese friends he cannot talk Chinese; that private In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the
respondent was living in Campo Muslim, a Muslim community but no question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of
one can believe that he is a Muslim; that he has a little business of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court
Furniture but has little customer because no one believes that he is and not all the best evidence available. Summarizing, in special
Muslim. Hence, the SC upheldthe decision of respondent appellate court. proceedings for change of name, what is involved is not a mere matter of
allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of
The purpose of the law an allowing of change of name as contemplated
the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications advanced in support
by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 112
thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant and Nationalist China, she gave birth to a daughter, May Sia alias Manman
with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in Huang on January 28, 1958 in the City of Manila; that on January 12,
the courts. 1959, she caused her daughter to be registered as an alien under the
While it is true that under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the
name of Mary Pang, i.e., using the maternal surname, because the child's
effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it
father had abandoned them; that her daughter has always used the name
must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings.0 Mary Pang at home and in the Baguio Chinese Patriotic School where
The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More she studies; that on August 16, 1966, petitioner Pang Cha Quen married
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are Alfredo De la Cruz; that as her daughter has grown to love and
recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. recognize her stepfather, Alfredo De la Cruz, as her own father, she
It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another desires to adopt and use his surname "De la Cruz" in addition to her
as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and
name "Mary Pang" so that her full name shall be Mary Pang De la Cruz;
privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to effect
this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive that Alfredo De la Cruz gave his conformity to the petition by signing at
parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption the bottom of the pleading; that the petition was not made for the
being more an incident than the object of the proceeding. 31 The welfare purpose of concealing a crime as her ten-year old daughter has not
of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an committed any, nor to evade the execution of a judgment as she has
application for adoption. never been sued in court, and the petition is not intended to cause
damage or prejudice to any third person. She prayed that her daughter
be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to
SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC
Salayog, Benny Rico Mary Pang De la Cruz.
PEOPLE VS. CAGANDAHAN On April 4, 1968, respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of
Sumaway, Dylan the petition on September 16, 1968 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning and
inviting all interested persons to appear and show cause, if any, why the
REPUBLIC VS. AQUINO petition should not be granted. The order also directed that it be
Tomarong, Marian
published at the expense of the petitioner in the Baguio and Midland
REPUBLIC VS. MARCOS Courier, a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain
Tresvalles, Kris Province, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, the first
publication to be made as soon as possible. The order also commanded
FACTS: On March 30, 1968, a verified petition was filed by private that the Solicitor General and the City Attorney of Baguio be furnished
respondent Pang Cha Quen alleging that she is a citizen of Nationalist copies of the order and petition.
China, married to Alfredo De la Cruz, a Filipino citizen; that she had
resided in Baguio City since her birth on January 29, 1930; that by a On September 16, 1968, when the petition was called for hearing, nobody
previous marriage to Sia Bian alias Huang Tzeh Lik, a citizen of opposed it. Upon motion of petitioner's counsel, respondent Judge
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 113
authorized the Clerk of Court or his deputy to receive the evidence of the IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF THE MINOR MAY SIA
petitioner, Pang Cha Quen. ALIAS MANMAN HUANG TO MARY PANG DE LA CRUZ, PANG
CHA QUEN, Petitioner. (P. 15, Rollo.)
Then, respondent Judge issued an order on February 12, 1969
authorizing the name of the minor, May Sia alias Manman Huang, also The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the
known as Mary Pang, to be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz. court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication.
In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the subject of the proceedings, i.e., the various names and aliases of the
Supreme Court on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law petitioner which she wished to change to "Mary Pang De la Cruz."
HELD: The Government's contention is well-taken. (1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
1. We accordingly hold that for a publication of a petition for a change of
name to be valid, the title thereof should include, first, his real name, and (2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
second, his aliases, if any. this Court explained the reason for the rule
requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other (3) when the change will avoid confusion (Haw Liong vs. Republic, L-
names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the 21194, April 29,1966; Chill Hap Chin vs. Republic, L-20018, April 30,
caption of the published order. It is that the ordinary reader only glances 1966; Republic vs. Tanada, et al., L-31563, November 29, 1971; Alfon vs.
fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition Republic, I,51201, May 29, 1980);
in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the
(4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a
title strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to
Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage (Josefina Ang Chay vs.
him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The probability is
Republic, L-28507, July 31, 1980); or
great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if
they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. (5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody (Uy vs. Republic,
In the case at bar, the caption of both the verified petition dated March
L-22712, November 29, 1965).
30,1968, and the published order of the trial court dated April 4, 1968
read, thus: As may be gleaned from the petition filed in the lower court, the reasons
offered for changing the name of petitioner's daughter are: (1) that "her
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 114
daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la each other. When his parents subsequently got married, they executed a
Cruz as her own father. (2) to afford her daughter a feeling of security deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed
and (3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
his conformity at the foot of this pleading" The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in
Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together
Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. The general with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
rule is that a change of name should not be permitted if it will give a Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother
false impression of family relationship to another where none actually are not carried in a person’s name, they anticipate that Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
exists. we specifically held that our laws do not authorize legitimate
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might
children to adopt the surname of a person not their father, for to allow also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have
them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their different surnames. Hence, they filed a petition for change of name
father, can result in confusion of their paternity. and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have
Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it his registered name changedto Julian Lin Wang.RTC denied the petition
was not filed by the proper party. because the reasons for the change of name were not within the grounds
recognized by law. Appeal made thereon was subsequently denied.
Clearly, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person
ISSUE:
desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified
Whether or not the denial to grant the change of name was proper.
by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition
was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia.Hence, only May Sia herself, RULING:
alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be
age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. The decision to ‘proper and reasonable cause’ for which the change is sought. To justify
change her name, the reason for the change, and the choice of a new a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced
name and surname shall be hers alone to make. It must be her personal
by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change
decision. of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
IN RE: PETITION OF JULIAN WANG
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
Tuason, Jannelle
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
FACTS: signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.16
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 115
The present petition seeks to drop the middle name altogether. Decided father so that the son would be Jorge Batbatan and the daughter would
cases in this jurisdiction involving petitions for change of name usually be Delia Batbatab. The petition was denied by the trial court on the
deal with requests for change of surname. There are only a handful of grounds that the records show that it was the petitioner who supplied
cases involving requests for change of the given name and none on
the information in the birth certificate of her son, and that entries in the
requests for changing or dropping of the middle name. Does the law
records of birth are correctable only if the effect would not change status,
allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name? We have
to answer in the negative because middle names serve as to identify the citizenship, or any substantial alterations. Such changes must be decided
maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish in the appropriate proceeding.
him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he
has. ISSUE:
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the Whether or not the name change could be allowed
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change
of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and RULING:
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his
middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute The Court ruled in the affirmative. The changes sought by
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete petitioner would not affect the status of the children because they are
name.
illegitimate in the first place. The law requires that illegitimate children
should carry the surname of their mothers and that is precisely what the
REPUBLIC VS. CAPOTE
petitioner was trying to achieve here. A clerical error implies mistakes by
Umbalin, Norissa
the clerk in copying or writing, the making of wrong entries in the public
records contrary to existing facts. It is not a clerical error if it would bring
RA 9048 & 10172 about a substantial change.
Clerical Error Law
FACTS:
LEE VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner Eligia Batbatan is the mother of two minor children,
G.R. NO. 118387, 367 SCRA 110
Jorge Batbatan Ang and Delia Batbatan Luy. The surnames were taken OCTOBER 11, 2001
from then name and alias of their father, Ang Kiu Chuy, alias Sioma Luy. Meiki , Merlin
Petitioner and Sioma Luy were never married, and Sioma Luy is married
to another woman. Petitioner filed the petition to remove the name of the FACTS:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 116
The private respondents are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who took care of the
lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng. The petitioners are children of Lee petitioners. They all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng
Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan. and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore,
before private respondents’ discovery of the dishonesty and fraud
Private Respondents—Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names
Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee, filed two (2) separate of all his children, including those of petitioners’, be included in the
petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records obituary notice of the former’s death that was to be published in the
of birth of the petitioners—Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano newspapers.
Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio Lee, and Emma
Lee. The private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an
investigation. After investigation, the NBI prepared a report that the
A case was filed against all petitioners, except Emma Lee, before RTC false entries in the records of birth of petitioners made it appear that
Manila assigned to respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. A the latter were legitimate children of Kek Shiok Cheng.
similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of
Kalookan and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the
Hamoy. petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners’
records of birth with the lower courts.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous
entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions on the grounds
and/or canceling therein the name of “Keh Shiok Cheng” as their that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is
mother, and by substituting the same with the name “Tiu Chuan”, to assail the legitimacy and filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition,
who is allegedly the petitioners’ true birth mother. which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
prematurely; and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions that they are the
legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng Respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss for failure
who were legally married in China. of the petitioners to appear at the hearing of the said motion.
Tiu Chuan was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order stating
new housemaid but immediately became his mistress. As a result of that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional
their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners. requirements for the Court to take cognizance of this case.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Petitioners’ attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-
Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their father, falsified mentioned orders failed and they appealed to the CA. The CA,
the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making it appear however, found no merit in their arguments and dismissed their
that petitioners’ mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. petition.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 117
ISSUES: “Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
1. Whether or not resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
is proper opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
2. Whether or not the private respondent’s suits amounted to a opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
collateral attack against petitioner’s legitimacy in the guise of a Rule weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is ‘appropriate.’
108 proceeding
The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 118
“If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition requisite parties, notices and publications could very well be regarded
for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even as that proper suit or appropriate action. (Underscoring supplied.)
if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court
can no longer be described as “summary”. There can be no doubt that The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings
when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar adversarial does not give trial courts the license to go beyond the
or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated
be cancelled and/or corrected and the opposition is actively by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.” harmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point to the case of
(Underscoring supplied.) Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic, which is of a later date than Republic vs.
Valencia, where this Courtreverted to the doctrine laid down in earlier
According to the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both cases, starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic, prohibiting the
petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of extension of the application of Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless
birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs.
proceedings. Civil Registrar, allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would
render the said rule unconstitutional as the same would have the effect
We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals: of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-
entries of birth was filed by private respondents and pursuant to the Rowe vs. Republic, the reason we declared null and void the portion of
order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order the lower court’s order directing the change of Labayo-Rowe’s civil
setting the case for hearing was ordered published once a week for status and the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in latter’s record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was inappropriate to
the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowe’s petition before the
of the order setting the case for hearing in “Media Update” once a lower court failed to implead all indispensable parties to the case.
week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the
orders were ordered served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Far from petitioners’ theory, this Court’s ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs.
Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners herein. Republic[ does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the
and the other respondents in the case below to file their oppositions to civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule
the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished
herein petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and from a summary proceeding. Thus:
Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the RTC-Manila,
and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan. “If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may,
respondents in the courts below by way of a special proceeding for under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 119
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of 412 to clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register.
the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or
citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving
issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:
by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to
prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary ‘On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of
admitted. x x x.” (Underscoring supplied.) any entry regarding “marriages” in the civil registry for any reason by
the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is
It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be
may be dispensed with, and the remedy granted upon mere canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical
application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a
statute expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious
summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake
Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or
proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires publication of the petition three some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction of name that
(3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).’
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec.
3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to ‘Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil
file their opposition, if any, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the status of petitioner and her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.’
Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting
the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss ‘Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108,
the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7). and for that matter under Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used
by Mauricio to change his and Virginia’s civil status from married to
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x’
Valencia, that Rule 108, when all the procedural requirements
thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to “Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil will change the status of a person from “legitimate” to “illegitimate,”
register. It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs. as in Sarah Zita’s case, the same cannot be granted in summary
Valenciathere continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of proceedings.”
whether or not substantial corrections in entries of the civil register
may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by
New Civil Code. The more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of pronouncements seemingly in conflict with each other, and perhaps,
Appealsand Republic vs. Labradordo seem to signal a reversion to the in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same
substantial issue.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 120
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
to substantial corrections is unconstitutional is embodied in the early corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated the extent or understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
scope of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court ruled in this or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
case that: unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New
“x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what Civil Code.”[43] (Underscoring supplied).
was contemplated therein are mere corrections of mistakes that are We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a
clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the wrong premise, that is, the interpretation that Article 412 pertains only
nationality or citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively
the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue an order excluding from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule,
in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial changes that may affect nationality, status, filiation and the
substantial change, which affects the status or citizenship of a party, like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong
the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon Tin does not satisfactorily answer this question except to opine that
the nature of the issue involved. Such action can be found at random the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and
in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation of which cannot, therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues.
will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
arise affecting the interested parties. This opinion is predicated upon without, however, shedding light on the matter.
the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary
in nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.” The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412
contemplates a summary procedure.
This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:
vs. Republicwhere the Court said that: “No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a
judicial order.”
“From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed
until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of Court on January 1, except to say that the corrections or changes must be effected by
1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the
secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous procedure contemplated for obtaining such judicial order is summary
rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 in nature.
of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now
provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of “corrected” and “changed”. In its ordinary sense, to correct means “to
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other make or set right”;“to remove the faults or errors from” while to
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme change means “to replace something with something else of the same
Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. kind or with something that serves as a substitute”. The provision
VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such rules of court ‘shall neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor
not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights.’ If Rule 108 does it distinguish on the basis of the effect that the correction or
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 121
change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has
civil register may be changed or corrected under Article 412. What are prospective application. Hence, the necessity for the preceding
the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than Articles treatise.
407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 122
certificates of Carlito’s children, he prayed that the date of his and his implead the minors’ mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
wife’s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the
the date appearing in their marriage certificate. questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings’ parents, and
the latter’s citizenship.
On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition3 in which it
was additionally prayed that Carlito’s second name of "John" be CA Ruling;
deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of
Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s) marriage certificate be corrected from By the assailed Decision of October 27, 2005, the CA denied
"John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese," respectively. petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to The essential requisite for allowing substantial corrections of entries
the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an
entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 123
appropriate adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Section 3, was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which states: the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as parties to the
Section 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the proceeding.
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that Marivel was unaware
parties to the proceeding. of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth
certificates, especially since the notices, orders and decision of the trial
xxxx court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of children.
Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as
any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando It is also well to remember that the role of the court in hearing a
would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. x x x. petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the
truth about the facts recorded therein.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their
with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication x x x. certificate of marriage25 shows that indeed they were married on
January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito
xxxx declared that the date "April 27, 1989" was supplied by his helper,
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole adding that he was not married to Marivel at the time his sons were
world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the born because his previous marriage was annulled only in 1999.Given
decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded the evidence presented by respondents, the CA observed that the
under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. x x x minors were illegitimate at birth, hence, the correction would bring
about no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
xxxx
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting that she declared at
thing and not against a person. The decision on the petition binds not the witness stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in
only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is 1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely The documentary evidence supporting the deletion from Carlito’s and
all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the his siblings’ birth certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the date
right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that of marriage of their parents, moreover, consisted of a certification
brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court issued on November 24, 1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and Epifania had been living
together as common law couple since 1935 but have never contracted
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to rule on whether marriage legally.
Marivel or respondents’ parents should have been impleaded as
parties to the proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention, however, A certification from the office of the city registrar, which was
that during the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who appended to respondents’ Amended Petition, likewise stated that it
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 124
has no record of marriage between Juan Kho and Epifania. Under the Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlito’s
circumstances, the deletion of the word "Married" opposite the "date of siblings uniformly stated the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To
marriage of parents" is warranted. disallow the correction in Carlito’s birth record of his mother’s
citizenship would perpetuate an inconsistency in the natal
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth certificate of his name circumstances of the siblings who are unquestionably born of the
from "Carlito John" to "Carlito," the same was properly granted under same mother and father.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the
cancellation or correction of entries involving changes of name falls Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the
under letter "o" of the following provision of Section 2 of Rule 108: correction of the name of Carlito’s wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel."
The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.— Upon good visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal Carlito and his wife is "Marivel."
separation; (e) judgments of annulment of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) Apropos is Yu v. Republic which held that changing the appellant’s
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; Christian name of "Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the righting
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) of a clerical error. The change of name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere innocuous
minor; and (o)changes of name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) alteration, which can be granted through a summary proceeding. The
same ruling holds true with respect to the correction in Carlito’s
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which marriage certificate of his father’s name from "John Kho" to "Juan
governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with, Kho." Except in said marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the uniformly entered in the birth certificates of Carlito and of his
correction sought for. siblings.
More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of record from the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Urious College in Butuan City, certificate of eligibility from the Civil Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Service Commission, and voter registration record satisfactorily show
that he has been known by his first name only. No prejudice is thus
likely to arise from the dropping of the second name.
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 125
."Sec. 2 of Art. IV defines "natural-born citizens as those who are
FACTS: citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Citizenship."
On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of
the Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of Petitioners maintain that even if it were granted that eleven years after
respondent Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respondent Ong’s birth his father was finally granted Filipino
to fill up the vacancy created by the retirement on April 28, 2007 of citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. The appointment was reported respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
the following day, May 17, 2007, by the major daily publications.
Petitioners thereupon pray that a writ of certiorari be issued annulling
On May 18, 2007, the major daily publications reported that the the appointment issued to respondent Ong as Associate Justice of this
appointment was "recalled" or "held in abeyance" by Malacañang in Court.
view of the question relating to the citizenship of respondent Gregory
S. Ong. There is no indication whatever that the appointment has been Subsequently, on May 24, 2007, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for
cancelled by the Office of the President. the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), praying that a
TRO be issued, in accordance with the Rules of Court, to prevent and
On May 19, 2007, the major daily publications reported that restrain respondent Executive Secretary from releasing the
respondent Executive Secretary stated that the appointment is "still appointment of respondent Ong, and to prevent and restrain
there except that the validation of the issue is being done by the respondent Ong from assuming the office and discharging the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)." functions of Associate Justice of this Court.
Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong Executive Secretary’s Comment:
through respondent Executive Secretary is patently unconstitutional,
arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse of discretion Respondent Executive Secretary accordingly filed his Comment,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. essentially stating that the appointment of respondent Ong as
Associate Justice of this Court on May 16, 2007 was made by the
Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this President pursuant to the powers vested in her by Article VIII, Section
fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate 9 of the Constitution, thus:
indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners attached a copy of said
birth certificate as Annex "H" to the petition. The birth certificate, SEC. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and Judges of lower courts
petitioners add, reveals that at the time of respondent Ong’s birth on shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
May 25, 1953, his father was Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
Petitioners invoke the Constitution:
Respondent Executive Secretary added that the President appointed
Section 7 (1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "No respondent Ong from among the list of nominees who were duly
person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower screened by and bore the imprimatur of the JBC created under Article
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution. Said respondent further stated:
Atty. Gerald Chan I Special Proceedings-I LLB4301 &LLB4302 I AY 2015-2016 Page 126
"The appointment, however, was not released, but instead, referred to Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato,9 on the ground that the case is
the JBC for validation of respondent Ong’s citizenship." one of transcendental importance. They claim that the President’s
appointment of respondent Ong as Supreme Court Justice violates the
Ong’s Comment: Constitution and is, therefore, attended with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Finally, they reiterate that
Respondent Ong submitted his Comment with Opposition, respondent Ong’s birth certificate, unless corrected by judicial order
maintaining that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen; that petitioners in non-summary proceedings for the purpose, is binding on all and is
have no standing to file the present suit; and that the issue raised prima facie evidence of what it states, namely, that respondent Ong is
ought to be addressed to the JBC as the Constitutional body mandated a Chinese citizen. The alleged naturalization of his father when he was
to review the qualifications of those it recommends to judicial posts. a minor would not make him a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Furthermore, the petitioners in his view failed to include the President
who is an indispensable party as the one who extended the
appointment. ISSUE:
As to his citizenship, respondent Ong traces his ancestral lines to one Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen. NO
Maria Santos of Malolos, Bulacan, born on November 25, 1881, who
was allegedly a Filipino citizen5 who married Chan Kin, a Chinese
citizen; that these two had a son, Juan Santos; that in 1906 Chan Kin HELD:
died in China, as a result of which Maria Santos reverted to her
Filipino citizenship; that at that time Juan Santos was a minor; that He is still required to submit evidentiary documents.
Juan Santos thereby also became a Filipino citizen;6 that respondent
Ong’s mother, Dy Guiok Santos, is the daughter of the spouses Juan In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, docketed as B.E.
Santos and Sy Siok Hian, a Chinese citizen, who were married in 1927; No. 1398-N filed on September 14, 1979, under O.R. No. 8131205 of that
that, therefore, respondent’s mother was a Filipino citizen at birth; that date, respondent Ong alleged that he is qualified to be admitted to the
Dy Guiok Santos later married a Chinese citizen, Eugenio Ong Han Philippine bar because, among others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that
Seng, thereby becoming a Chinese citizen; that when respondent Ong he is a Filipino citizen because his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a
was eleven years old his father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964 when he, respondent Ong,
naturalized, and as a result he, his brothers and sisters, and his mother was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too, thereby became a
were included in the naturalization. Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his petition, be
submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of his
Respondent Ong subsequently obtained from the Bureau of father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth
Immigration and the DOJ a certification and an identification that he and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his
is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV, Sections 1 and 2 of father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino citizen when he was
born. It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
Petitioners, in turn, filed a Consolidated Reply, in which they asserted evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to
their standing to file this suit on the strength of previous decisions of take the oath as a lawyer.
this Court, e.g., Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona8 and
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It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent
Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
that respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father.
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