Last Updated: Mon Jan 27 11:18:09 UTC 2014

JDAM Matures
Parts 1 and 2
Australian Aviation, December 2002 - January 2003
Updated August, 2008.
by Dr Carlo Kopp

The JDAM will greatly expand the capabilities of theatre deep strike fighters such as the F-15E and F-111C, by
providing near precision or precision strike capabilities through an overcast. Laser guided bombs such as the
baseline GBU-10/12 and GBU-22/24 are unusable under conditions where the laser illumination is impaired,
conditions which are of no consequence to a JDAM tracking L-band microwave emissions from low orbiting
satellites. The use of platform referenced and wide area differential GPS techniques push the accuracy of the
JDAM into the domain traditionally occupied by laser guided bombs. This Boeing F-15E is pickling off no less than
five 2,000 lb GBU-31 JDAMs, each of which can autonomously fly to its preprogrammed target (Boeing).

T he U S Joint Direct Attack Munition (J DAM) family of inertial/G P S guided bombs

became a household word with the extensive use of these weapons during the
Enduring Freedom air campaign in Afghanistan. T his was not the first use of the J DAM,
delivered by the B-2A during the Allied Force campaign in 1999, the J DAM is credited
with providing a critical all weather strike capability during periods of dense cloud cover,
when the primary laser guided weapons used by the NAT O force proved ineffective.
The JDA M has proven to be a highly effective weapon, offering new capabilities and very
significant long term growth potential, but it is not without its critics. This two part feature
will explore the current status of the JDA M and a number of related growth programs
currently under way.

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Inertial/GPS Guided Bombs
The origins of modern GP S guided bombs such as the JDA Ms lie not in the domain of GP S
satellite navigation, but in inertially guided bomb experiments performed during the 1980s.
U ntil that period, the dominant guided bomb technology was the laser guided weapon, first
introduced like television guided weapons during the Vietnam war period. That conflict saw a
long running and sustained war of attrition conducted by the U S Air Force and U S Navy
against North Vietnam. W hile average loss rates of U S aircraft to Russian supplied A A A and
SA Ms were fairly low, the cumulative effect over a decade long war was telling. This
produced significant pressure for precision weapons, and the early GB U -2 laser guided
bombs and GB U -8 H O B O S television guided bombs evolved primarily to reduce the number
of aircraft exposed to defensive fire. The GB U -8 and the GB U -2 had significant limitations
but were nevertheless highly successful compared to dumb bombs.
The guidance packages in these weapons were trivially simple by contemporary standards,
reflecting the low density of period electronics. The cheaper and simpler laser guided
weapons rapidly displaced the more complex television guided bombs, despite the higher
accuracy of the latter.
The standard low cost GB U -10/12/16 series Paveway I I laser guided bomb kit is a case
study in simplicity. The quadrant seeker is fitted under a thick lens, and embedded in an
aerodynamically aligned seeker head. Electronics in the guidance package sense the angular
error between the bomb's velocity vector and the laser spot, illuminated by an aircraft of
ground based laser designator. The angular error is then used to control solenoid valves
which vent gas from piston / cylinder actuator assemblies, pressurised by a burning gas
cartridge. The canard controls are either fully deflected or neutral in position, providing the
simplest possible bang bang or non-proportional guidance.
The relatively dumb guidance technique in such weapons results in aggregate guidance
errors of the order of several metres, generally irrelevant for a 2,000 lb bomb lethal radius.
Laser guided weapons have some very important limitations. Perhaps the most important of
these is their dependency upon continuous laser illumination of the target aimpoint. If the
laser is shut down, or the target is obscured by rain, water vapour (cloud/fog), dust or
smoke, the bomb seeker is blind and the weapon is apt to follow a ballistic trajectory like a
very ordinary dumb bomb.
This limitation was less important in the latter portion of the Cold W ar since low altitude
delivery was considered an acceptable risk in a central European battle with the Soviets.
Therefore fighters and bombers delivering these weapons would typically attack from short
distances, well below cloud cover in most situations.
W ith the end of the Cold W ar tactics shifted. Loss of aircraft and aircrew became politically
unacceptable, and bombing campaigns were mostly prosecuted from medium altitudes, well
above the reach of AAA and shoulder fired SAMs. The latter accounted for the largest number
of coalition aircraft losses in the 1991 Desert Storm campaign.
Medium altitude delivery presented serious issues for laser guided bombs. Loss of the
sightline to the target would cause the weapon to go ballistic and frequently impact
hundreds of metres from the intended aimpoint. In urban areas this would result in serious
collateral damage, and politically damaging loss of civilian lives.
Another issue was the robustness of a simple non-redundant laser guidance system.
W hether the guidance signal was lost through hardware failure, or loss of illumination, the
weapon was almost guaranteed to go astray.
Adverse weather conditions and embarrassing collateral damage incidents in Desert Storm
created the impetus for a production all weather inertial/GPS guided bomb kit.
Inertially guided bomb technology was the subject of intense U S Air Force interest during
the 1980s. Such a weapon would be initialised over a digital umbilical with target and
aircraft coordinates before release, and then it would autonomously fly to impact using
flightpath position and velocity information produced by its onboard Inertial Measurement
U nit. Microprocessor and Kalman filter technology permitted these weapons to use very
refined guidance and autopilot algorithms. The weapon's trajectory could be optimised for
range, impact velocity or impact angle. Since the inertial system was self contained, the
weapon could not be jammed.
An inertially guided bomb presented the prospect of a robust, digitally programmable, highly
reproducable weapon which was jam proof and wholly oblivious to ambient weather
conditions. The perfect precision guided bomb?

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No inertially guided bomb ever entered production, since the cost of inertial units with the
required accuracy proved to be prohibitive. The perfect yet unaffordable guided bomb.
The great enabler for inertially guided bombs was the U S Air Force Navstar GP S satellite
navigation system. By using a GP S receiver to bound the cumulative error produced by the
inertial unit, an inertial bomb with GP S could achieve equal or better accuracy at very low
cost, compared to a purely inertially guided bomb.
The first GP S aided inertially guided bomb to be built and deployed was the U S Air Force's
Northrop GB U -36/B GA M84 (GP S Aided Munition) 2,000 lb weapon, deployed on the B-2A as
a gapfiller prior to production of the then embryonic JDA M. W hile the GA M was a relatively
expensive weapon at cca U SD 40k / round, engineered for early deployment rather than
minimal mass production cost, it did prove the concept convincingly. More over, it also
proved an important refinement for improving the accuracy of such weapons. This refinement
was the use of platform referenced differential GP S, or GATS (GP S Aided Targeting System).
W hen the B-2 programmed its GA Ms before release, it included a list of which GP S satellites
it was tracking. The bomb would track only these satellites, ignoring all others, and thus
would see identical GP S position errors to the bomber. A GP S aided bomb without
differential techniques would have a circular error probable of the order of 7 to 12 metres,
using differential techniques the B-2A/GA M combo repeatedly demonstrated 6 metres or
less, making it directly competitive against the established precision GBU-10 Paveway II.

The Joint Direct Attack Munition

The JDA M was the result of a hotly contested flyoff between McDonnell-Douglas (Boeing)
and Martin-Marietta (Lockheed-Martin), bidding the GB U -31/32 and GB U -29/30 respectively.
Boeing won what is likely to prove in time to be one of the most lucrative contracts for
decades.
The baseline JDA M was to be an accurate rather than precision weapon, with a planned CEP
without enhancements of 12 to 13 metres, corresponding to the systemic GP S P -code error
and some guidance loop error. The initial plan was to enhance this basic weapon with future
seeker technology to provide genuine precision capability.
The heart of the JDA M is a Honeywell H G1700 Ring Laser Gyro (RLG) inertial unit, which
measures position, velocities and accelerations in all three axes. The brain of the JDA M is in
its Guidance and Control U nit (GCU ), which contains an embedded microprocessor running a
Kalman filter, which accepts position measurements from the GCU 's H G1700 and a Rockwell
GEM-I I I low cost military GP S receiver. The Kalman filter continuously computes a best
estimate of the bomb's position in space. This information, and the preprogrammed target
GP S coordinates, are then used to feed a flight control algorithm. H R Textron actuators are
used to drive three of the four tail surfaces. Power is provided by a thermal battery in the
JDA M tailkit. Most JDA M variants employ a set of strap on aerodynamic strakes, intended to
increase body lift and also reduce the weapon's stability to improve its pitch and yaw rates,
and thus manoeuvrability.
The flight control algorithm can be configured before launch for vertical or horizontal (ie
shallow dive) terminal trajectories, selected by the user for a specific type of target. A
weapon intended for the basement of a tall building could be programmed to enter at
ground floor level, wheres a weapon intended to enter a bunker shaft could be programmed
for a vertical trajectory.
The use of Kalman filter technology allows for refined midcourse flight algorithms, which can
manage the weapon's kinetic energy and maximise glide range. Compared to the primitive
analogue guidance in a baseline Paveway I I, the JDA M achieves close to twice the glide
range under similar launch conditions.
The JDA M employs the U S standard Mil-Std-1760 umbilical interface, incorporating the Mil-
Std-1553B digital multiplex bus. Before launch the JDAM's embedded software communicates
with the launch aircraft's stores management processor, no differently than a computer
peripheral. P rior to release the JDA M is powered up using an umbilical feed from the launch
aircraft. The JDA M executes an internal self test, warms up and aligns the H G1700 inertial
unit. O nce the JDA M is ready, it communicates status information to the launch aircraft,
which then downloads GP S timing, GP S Almanac (ie nav message), GP S Ephemeris
(constellation) and the GP S P P S crypto key. This information is used to initialise the GEM-I I I
receiver.
O nce the inertial unit is aligned and the GP S receiver initialised, the launch aircraft can
download into the bomb the target GP S coordinates, fuse settings and impact parameters,
all of which can be reloaded at any time before release. P rior to release the aircraft's
position and velocities are downloaded.
After the weapon is released, the thermal battery is initiated, the GP S receiver acquires a

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satellite constellation, and the weapon autonomously flies itself to impact, using pre-
programmed parameters, penetrating cloud with no loss in accuracy. Should the GP S signal
be impaired, lost or jammed, the weapon can rely on its inertial unit and will suffer some
modest loss in accuracy, dependent upon how late in the flight the signal was lost, and also
depending on the tolerance errors in the H G1700 (some units may be slightly more accurate
than others).
The autonomous capability in the JDA M is without precedent and a key advantage of this
weapon against laser guided bombs. The latter are dependent upon laser illumination, as a
result of which the aircraft can engage only one target at a time. W hile a good operator can
pickle off bombs several seconds apart for a level medium altitude strike, and move the
laser spot from aimpoint to aimpoint during an attack, in practical terms this permits strikes
only on clusters of targets and depends critically on operator proficiency. The JDA M has no
such limitation.
The JDA M can fly a boresight trajectory similar to a ballistic drop, but can also fly off axis
trajectories, to engage targets to either side of the flight path, with some loss in range.
Therefore, an aircraft can pickle off multiple JDA Ms almost simultaneously, each
independently targeted, with the sole limitation that the targets must be within the
kinematic footprint of the weapon. The weapon can be released from altitudes as high as 50
kft, at speeds up to Mach 1.3, with medium altitude drops yielding standoff ranges of
several nautical miles. A supersonic high altitude drop (F/A-22A) almost doubles range
performance due to the much higher initial energy of the bomb.
A heavy bomber carrying dozens of JDA Ms can obliterate dozens of targets within a given
footprint, in a single large drop, as each bomb can be independently preprogrammed before
release. The catchcry for the laser guided bomb was one aircraft, one bomb, one target - in
the JDAM era this becomes one aircraft, many JDAMs, many targets.
Integration of the JDA M is relatively simple, the principal prerequisite being that the launch
aircraft is equipped with a Mil-Std-1760 digital weapon station interface. W ith this
capability, software changes are the only modification to the launch vehicle. Clearance
testing is required since the JDA M is aerodynamically different to the Mk-84/83/82 series
slick bombs.
The JDA M GCU module was sized from the outset to fit the internal volume of a Mk.84,
Mk.83, Mk.82, B L U -109/B and B L U -110/B tailcone. At this time production of the JDA M
encompasses the GB U -31 (Mk.84/B L U -109), GB U -32 (Mk.83), GB U -35 (B L U -110) models,
with the GBU-38 (Mk.82) in development with a planned 2004 IOC.
The GB U -31 has been most widely used, primarily as a replacement for the GB U -10 in
strategic strike (Serbia/Afghanistan), battlefield interdiction and close air support roles
(Afghanistan). The U S Navy has used the GB U -32 and GB U -35 widely during the Afghan
campaign. It is expected that the GB U -38 will become a preferred weapon for battlefield
interdiction, close air support and especially urban combat - in these roles low collateral
damage is more important than lethal blast effect. Directly interchangable with the Mk.82
slick, the GB U -38 will provide aircraft like the B-52H, B-1B, B-2A, F-111C and F-15E with
formidable firepower.
To date the JDA M has been used only in its basic configuration, without additional seekers
installed. Even with this limitation, the weapon has proven to be a robust replacement for
the Paveway II.
The capability of the JDA M to punch through a solid cloudbase has revolutionised close air
support and battlefield work, since historically such combat required either very low level
strikes using dumb bombs, or medium to low altitude strikes using laser guided bombs.
Inclement weather offered cover to a clever opponent. The JDA M has closed this strategic
loophole forever.

JDAM Accuracy and Jam Resistance

The accuracy of the JDA M is frequently criticised, the bomb being often described as much
less accurate than the widely used GB U -10/12 Paveway I I weapons. This argument is lame
and not representative of more recent developments in technique and technology.
The baseline accuracy of the weapon cited in mid 1990s glossy brochures is a very
pessimistic number, based on worst case GP S accuracy for the period. Since the 1999 Allied
Force campaign, the US Air Force has generated predictions of GPS accuracy variations over a
24 hour cycle for targets of interest, or areas of interest. These computer models analyse an
effect termed Geometrical Dilution O f P recision (GDO P ), which arises as a result of the
relative positions of satellites in the constellation a reciever can see at a given point in time
and space. As the orbital positions of the satellites in time, the GDO P error increases or
decreases. W here and when an unusually favourable constellation is seen, the GDO P error

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can be very low, and GP S errors resulting can be a fraction of the textbook figure. The
practice followed by the U S Air Force since 1999 is to plan non-time critical strikes to fall
into time periods of minimal GDO P for the target of interest, to achieve defacto precision
accuracy.
The U S Air Force planned in the late 1990s a series of P roduct Improvement P rogram (P I P )
incremental block upgrades to the JDA M guidance package, but no details have been
disclosed more recently as to which have been implemented to date.
O ne candidate is the use of platform referenced differential GP S, which is relatively
undemanding to implement since it involves only software changes to the aircraft and bomb
embedded code (O FP ), and GP S receiver operating code. These force the bomb to acquire
only a programmed constellation of satellites. The principal errors in bomb delivery are then
dominated by the accuracy of the synthetic aperture radar or thermal imager/laser
rangefinder used to produce target coordinates, and the guidance loop error in the bomb.
Experience with the B-2A suggest this technique results in 6 metre or better CEP s, with the
GDOP error dominating the GPS error under most circumstances.
Another more potent candidate is the use of W ide Area Differential GP S (W A DGP S)
techniques, pioneered in the U S Air Force EDGE and W A GE trials. This family of techniques
involves the deployment of a network of precisely calibrated GP S receiver ground stations
surrounding the theatre of operations, which continuously measure the error in the recieved
GP S signal against the precisely surveyed location. Data from these ground stations is fed
over low data rate landlines or satellite links to a central ground station, which runs a
complex computer model incorporating parameters such as solid earth tide (bulge) and wet /
dry tropospheric delay. The system continously computes a set of correction parameters for
use in an enhanced Kalman filter, these are encrypted and broadcast via a radio link (EDGE)
or unused encrypted GP S Almanac page (W A GE). The compensated GP S errors achieved
using this technique are as low as several inches in all three axes.
An aircraft and JDA M configured to use W A DGP S techniques can achieve true precision
accuracy, 100% of the time, without the cost penalty of a seeker package.
Experience from Afghanistan suggests that the most frequent cause of JDA Ms going astray
were either bent fins resulting from mishandling, or more frequently the fat finger factor to
use the colourful americanism. Human errors in entering aimpoint coordinates on keypads,
entry of other than the intended coordinates, and in one instance possibly a ground forward
air controller mistakenly transmitting over the radio his own coordinates rather than those of
the enemy!
Like the alleged inaccuracy of the JDA M, its vulnerability to jamming is very frequently
overstated by its critics. To date there is no published evidence of successful use of
jamming to defeat a JDAM, or indeed any GPS aided weapon.
The baseline GEM-I I I receiver has built in provisions to resist GP S jamming. Regardless of
these, successful jamming of a GP S guided bomb is not as simple as JDA M critics like to
suggest. For a jamming effort to work properly, the jamming signal must be coupled into the
mainlobe of the bomb's antenna, preferably from the very instant the bomb is released, or
even earlier. This is easier said than done, since the GP S antenna on the JDA M is mounted
on the tail, and therefore if the jammer is colocated with the target, the antenna mainlobe
is always pointing away from the jammer. The only jamming signal which can couple in is
what little attaches to the skin of the bomb and tailkit as a creeping wave. Creeping waves
tend to be weak in magnitude, and are easily suppressed with coatings.
Even should GP S jamming increase in popularity (U S reports suggest more recent A GM-88
H A RM versions will have provisions for homing on GP S jammers), the installation of
improved GP S antennas and receivers would defeat most techniques. Neither represent
unusual integration challenges for a modular design such as the JDAM.
O ne issue JDA M critics seem to universally overlook is the reality that it takes very little
effort in any inertial/GP S system to incorporate code which monitors the difference between
the GP S and inertially predicted bomb positions. Should the GP S position read from the
receiver suddenly change by a large amount, the software can simply reject the GP S
measurement and continue to fly the bomb using inertial data until impact, or until the GP S
signal behaves as it ought to. U nless the jammer is unusually effective, odds are that gaps
in jamming will occur and the bomb guidance can use these to grab valid GP S
measurements. W ith a flight time of mere minutes or tens of seconds, the cumulative
inertial system error seen since the last valid GPS measurement could be very small indeed.
It is worth noting that a JDA M is potentially more robust than an analogue laser guided
bomb in the event of a guidance component failure. For instance a hardware failure in a GP S
receiver or inertial unit could be handled by rejecting its output and flying to impact on the
remaining source of position and velocity data. Boeing have not disclosed whether this

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technique is used.
In summary, most of the criticisms directed at the JDA M (and very popular in some Canberra
circles) are very lame and assume a very clever technological peer competitor opponent.
W hatever limitations the JDA M might have, these are generally of less significance than the
enormous gains in capability and firepower offered by this weapon. At unit costs under U SD
20M, the JDAM is one of the best bang for buck choices in the market today.

JDAM Cutaway. The JDAM is a GPS aided inertially guided bomb. The Guidance and Control Unit containing a
HG1700 RLG, GEM-III GPS receiver and computer package is installed inside the bomb tailkit. The GCU was
designed from the outset for tailkit volumes compatible with the Mk.84, Mk.83 and Mk.82 low drag bombs, and
has been adapted to the tungsten tipped bunker busting BLU-109/B and BLU-110/B warheads (Boeing).

Without doubt the most important near term application of the JDAM has been its use as a near precision
conventional weapon for US Air Force heavy bombers, previously limited to dumb bombs. The 2,000 lb GBU-31
fitted to the Mk.84 or BLU-109/B warheads was the first to see widescale combat use. The JDAM was blooded in
1999 when the B-2A bombed Belgrade with the weapon. In 2001, the decisive blows to the combined Taliban/Al
Qaeda ground forces in Afghanistan were inflicted by B-52H and B-1B bombers delivering GBU-31s against a wide
range of battlefield targets (Boeing/USAF).

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The US Navy's primary JDAM variants are the GBU-32 and GBU-35, designed for the 1,000 lb Mk.83 and BLU-110/B
warheads standard for this service. The Boeing F/A-18C/D/E/F will be the primary near term delivery platform for
naval JDAMs. Loadouts are likely to be identical to the existing Mk.83, but using smart Mil-Std-1760 racks with Mil-
Std-1553B bussing to the bomb umbilical connectors. The baseline JDAM can be retargeted up to the point where
it is released (Boeing).

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The smallest member of the JDAM family is the new GBU-38 500 lb weapon, designed for the Mk.82 warhead. This
weapon is easily identified by the absence of the large cruciform strakes used on the 2,000 lb and 1,000 lb
variants, with small nose mounted vanes substituted. The 500 lb JDAM will become a mainstay of close air
support, battlefield interdiction, airfield attack and urban bombardment roles, as it offers good lethality against
soft targets yet a much smaller collateral damage footprint than its larger siblings. A B-52H carrying 48 rounds,
or an F-111C carrying 24 rounds, each independently targeted, offers a dramatic increase in deliverable precision
firepower on a single pass. It is not unreasonable to argue that this weapon will revolutionise bombing technique
(Boeing). Part 2
T he Joint Direct Attack Munition family of G P S aided inertially guided bombs represents
perhaps the most important single development in bombing technique over the last two
decades, and will in time supplant the established laser guided bomb as the most widely
used low cost guided munition. P roviding aircraft with the ability to attack multiple
aimpoints in a single pass, J DAM provides a force multiplying effect unseen in scale since
the laser guided bomb displaced the dumb bomb during the latter part of the Vietnam
conflict. In this month's final part, growth derivatives of the JDAM will be explored.

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Imaging seekers are one technique which will provide the JDAM with genuine precision capability. A typical design
for such a seeker will see the JDAM seeker take a snapshot of the target surroundings, which is then compared
with a preprogrammed image to fix the bomb's position. Once the error is found, the target aimpoint is corrected
and the bomb dives into the target. MilliMetric Wave Imaging techniques were demonstrated in the Orca
program, while DAMASK demonstrated an IIR seeker. Both techniques have growth potential for attacks on
moving targets such as vehicles or shipping (Author/USAF).

JDAM Precision Seekers

From the very outset of the JDA M program, the intention of the U S Air Force was to equip
the basic weapon with a range of precision terminal homing seekers. The basic idea was to
provide an accurate basic weapon, with the terminal seeker providing the remaining
precision capability.

To that effect, the JDA M Guidance Control U nit (GCU ) was designed with additional growth
capacity in empty slots for more cards, but also with unused spare interfaces to permit
additional hardware to be integrated with minimal effort. In this fashion, specific software
could be written for seeker equipped variants and loaded into the standard low cost mass
production GCU. A unique seeker would then be plugged into the unused GCU interfaces via
an umbilical routed from the nose of the bomb.
This highly flexible model was devised to accommodate as many different options in seeker
technology as the user might ever want. By dividing the system into discrete modules,
where the mass produced baseline hardware is kept unchanged, it is possible to achieve the
large economies of scale which are characteristic of very large, uniform and mature mass
production builds.
Cost has traditionally been the greatest impediment to the large scale use of precision

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munitions. W hile a well guided GB U -10/12 Paveway I I laser guided bomb can be very
accurate, and is cheap due to its primitive seeker design, the weapon is also in many
respects fragile since the seeker's simplicity denies redundancy to protect against hardware
failures, and the guidance technique is vulnerable to the loss of laser illumination. O pting
for more sophisticated proportional navigation style laser semiactive homing, with an
inertial capability, as used in the later GBU-22/24 Paveway III bombs drives up the cost.
Television guided bombs have also proven expensive. The GB U -8 H O B O S, which evolved into
the cruciform wing GB U -15 family of weapons, proved to be amongst the most expensive
guided bomb kits ever mass produced. The requirement to provide a stabilised platform for
the bomb's seeker, and robust radio datalinks, resulted in a cost structure which effectively
compromised these capable weapons in large scale use. The key difficulty with the GB U -15
series was its uniqueness - the airframe components were unusable for other purposes and
this drove up the unit cost.
The advent of the JDA M as a platform for range of precision seekers or guidance packages
changes the basic economic equation. The unique portion of the precision weapons kit is the
seeker hardware/software alone, with the remainder of the weapon being essentially
standard low cost mass production hardware. Therefore nearly all of the investment in
developing and producing the precision weapon is concentrated into the seeker alone.
To date no precision seekers have been deployed operationally, or at least not announced in
the public domain. In part this is because the basic JDA M has proven generally more
accurate than originally expected. O perational use of techniques such as strike planning in
optimal GDO P windows, deployment of improved later generation GP S satellite vehicles have
clearly driven accuracy close to the GB U -10 class, and with the eventual use of wide area
differential GP S (eg W A GE) and B-2 derived platform referenced differential GP S, there will
be little pressure for precision seekers. W hy add U S$10k to 20k to the cost of each bomb if
you can get 80% of its accuracy via cheaper techniques?
However, this does not by any measure mean that seekers are dead. O n the contrary, many
situtations will demand seekers. Moving targets in a jamming environment will almost
certainly require seeker technology to retain precision accuracy if the GPS channel is lost.

JDAM Radar Seekers

The U S Air Force ran two technology demonstrations during the late 1990s. The classified
Raytheon/Sandia Hammerhead program demonstrated the use of Synthetic Aperture Radar
(SA R) active seeker for the JDA M, with a 3 m CEP. W hile details have not been released as
yet, it is reasonable to speculate that the design uses a scene matching area correlation
technique to fit a SAR map against a preprogrammed target area map.
At that time the U S Air Force also sponsored the classified O rca program, to demonstrate a
millimetric wave (MMW ) radar seeker with a 3 metre or better CEP. MMW seekers have been
used for instance on radar guided anti-tank mortar rounds, and the technology is central to
the latest variants of the Hellfire missile carried by the A H-64D Longbow Apache. No details
have been released on O rca to date. Given the potential of the technology, an MMW seeker
could be used for attacking moving targets like shipping or armour, and using scene
matching area correlation techniques in the manner of the Pershing I I I RB M, it could also be
used for precision strikes on fixed targets.

Clearly there is considerable potential in radar seeker technology for the JDA M, and many
possibilities exist.

JDAM Electro-Optical Seekers

At this time there are very few electro-optically (EO ) guided bombs in operational service.
The U S Air Force retains residual stocks of the GB U -15, which have been since upgraded to
EGB U -15 configuration by the additional of a GP S receiver and I MU to provide JDA M-like
midcourse guidance. The Israelis have a range of weapons, but stocks and configurations
remain largely undisclosed.
A key obstacle to the use of autonomous and datalink supported EO guidance techniques
has been cost. To achieve a respectable acquisition range of several miles, the seeker optics
must be stabilised down to tens of microradians or better jitter performance. Typically
multiple fields of view are required. The result was an expensive to produce gimballed
optical package with the additional encumbrance of cryogenic cooling if infrared day/night
capability was needed. If the weapon was to be remotely guided from a cockpit, then the
weapon would also require an expensive jam resistant wideband video datalink to carry the
seeker image to the launch aircraft. W hile autonomous target recognition techniques have
matured in recent years, one to two decades ago they were both expensive and unreliable.

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Much has changed since in basic technology. In daylight imaging, high resolution CCDs and
CMO S imagers are now much cheaper and immeasurably better than the vidicon tubes of the
1970s. In infrared imaging, bolometric uncooled and cryogenically cooled Indium Antimonide,
Mercury Cadmium Telluride, P latinum Silicide and Aluminium Gallium Arsenide Q uantum W ell
Imaging P hotodetector (Q W I P ) focal plane or staring arrays are now available. O f particular
interest is the Q W I P technology since it permits high resolution imaging chips operating in
the MW I R (midwave or 4-5 micron band) and LW I R (longwave or 8-12 micron band), but also
allows a single imaging chip of the proper architecture to concurrently image in both the
MW I R and LW I R bands - effectively two band specific thermal imagers in one slab of
Aluminium Gallium Arsenide semiconductor producing two video signals at the same time.
Not surprisingly, the leading wave of Q W I P imagers is in the high volume commercial
medical/industrial markets rather than low volume military market.
No less important is the uncooled bolometric thermal imaging technology, which is much
less sensitive than cooled semiconductor imaging chips, but also much cheaper, and not
requiring the dollar hit of a refrigeration package. It's principal market lies in automotive
thermal imagers, popular in top tier US limousines.
Electro-O ptical guidance, be it autonomous or datalink aided, is potentially valuable to the
JDA M family of weapons. W hile it cannot penetrate cloud, it is compact and extremely
precise. W ith the weather immune GP S/I MU guidance, an EO seeker equipped JDA M can fly
under the cloudbase to acquire its target. W idely available EO targeting pods, especially on
U S aircraft, provide a source of good quality infrared imagery which can be downloaded to a
seeker equipped JDA M before release. W ith satellite and UAV generated high resolution
imagery, and datalinks to combat aircraft, there are few obstacles to target imagery being
tranmsitted in seconds from a source to a bomber, and through the Mil-Std-1760 umbilical,
to a seeker equipped JDAM before release.
The first EO seeker demonstrated on a JDA M was the DA MASK (Direct Attack Munitions
Affordable Seeker), sponsored by the O ffice of Naval Research (O N R) under a U SD 15M
contract. The aim of the DA MASK project was to demonstrate a very cheap yet highly
accurate low cost EO seeker, with no moving parts.

The DAMASK program demonstrated the viability of an uncooled autonomous thermal imaging seeker on the
baseline GBU-31 JDAM. The DAMASK would take a snapshot of the target scene, and pattern match the image
against a stored image of the target area to refine its position estimate. The result is accuracy of the order of
several feet, and trials drops as good as 2 ft from the intended aimpoint. The HART program will see this
technology incorporated into a production weapon (US Navy).

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The DA MASK design was innovative in many respects. The low cost seeker was designed
around an uncooled imaging-infrared focal plane array (U I I FPA) device, using low cost optics
and a molded composite casing. The imaging array is based on the same technology used in
the Cadillac Seville 2000 head up FLIR, to achieve exceptionally low unit costs. A commercial
signal processing module was adapted to support the seeker, and installed in the unused
tailkit volume. The U S Navy estimated the unit cost of a DA MASK kit at U S$12.7k in mass
production.
The DA MASK employs scene matching techniques well proven in systems such as the
Tomahawk. Before the bomb is released, the launch aircraft downloads an image of the
target, produced by satellite, the aircraft's SA R or FL I R. W hen the bomb is released is flies
over the target and then noses over to point down at a very steep angle. In this terminal
flight phase it images the area surrounding the target, and then performs the correlation
operation to determine the bomb's actual position against its intended position. The system
was to calculate weapon alignment to 100 microradians accuracy, for a 2.6 metre error at
impact.
O nce the JDA M's position is updated from the target scene, the weapon will correct its
donwward trajectory, pulling multiple Gs if required as it is travelling down very quickly at
several thousand feet of altitude at this point. O nce the trajectory adjustment is completed,
the weapon continues on inertial/GPS guidance to impact.
The DA MASK demonstration presented some interesting problems. The issue of seeker
alignment was demanding, especially since the minute flexure in the bomb body was enough
to introduce potentially problematic errors. Image roll alignment proved to be an issue, as
did motion induced image blurring and image distortion resulting from lens behaviour. Image
processing speed also presented challenges, since the time window for processing the
acquired image was very short.
DA MASK proved to be a resounding success, with trial weapon drops including simulations of
GP S jamming by disabling the bomb's GP S receiver. The first drop saw the weapon impact
within 2 ft of the intended aimpoint.
The DA MASK program was essentially a technology demonstration to prove that the concept
of a simple EO seeker worked effectively.
The current U S Navy H A RT (Hornet Autonomous Real-Time Targeting for F/A-18C/D/E/F)
program builds on the DA MASK effort. H A RT is aimed at providing a production EO seeker for
the JDA M, which incorporates the capability to download the image from the aircraft's
FL I R/EO targeting pod (A AS-38 or ASQ -228 AT FL I R/Terminator) providing the ability to
precisely target pop-up and relocatable targets. The formal FB O statement for the program
specifies Boeing as the sole source. W hether the H A RT seeker package will incorporate the
Autonomous Target Recognition (AT R) algorithms devised by Boeing for the A GM-84E SL A M
family of missiles is unclear from published materials. HART will run until 2007.
W hether the U S Air Force adopt the H A RT seeker, or indeed it becomes available to export
clients, remains to be seen. The nature of the design lends itself to integration on any

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FL I R/EO pod equipped Mil-Std-1760 capable aircraft, which both the RA A F's F-111C Block C-
4/5 and F/A-18A HUG will become in the timelines of interest.

The DARPA AMSTE program recently demonstrated a successful strike against a moving target using a JTIDS
datalink aided JDAM. The target was tracked by two separate airborne GMTI radars, providing a continuous
stream of target coordinates which were fused and then tranmitted over a JTIDS channel to the JDAM in flight.
The weapon is reported to have impacted within the lethal radius of the target (Author).

Datalink Guided JDAMs

The limitation of the baseline JDA M guidance package is that it was designed to engage
fixed targets, the original intent being to fit precision seekers for attacking moving targets.
More recent developments in the U S suggest that a radical change may be afoot in this
area.
The Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (A MST E) technology demonstration
program is a complex effort which is intended to develop and prove techniques for the
engagement of moving ground targets, using cheap munitions and standoff radar targeting
techniques. In particular, A MST E is exploring Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMT I) radar
techniques, target position refinement using information from multiple radars on multiple
aircraft, and the use of datalinks to guided weapons.
Perhaps the most dramatic outcome of the A MST E effort was the August 22, 2002
demonstration, in which a JDA M modified with a JT I DS datalink receiver successfully
engaged a moving vehicle in a column, using target coordinates produced by a distant E-8
JSTARS and a second radar on an airborne testbed.
The inert JDA M was dropped by an F-16C at 20,000 ft, the target was part of a vehicular
column travelling at 30 km/h. O nce released, the JDA M acquired the JT I DS signal and
continuously updated its aimpoint position as it flew toward the target. DA RPA have not
disclosed the frequency of updates, but it is likely that a whole JT I DS net was reserved for
this purpose.

The A MST E demonstration is important since it proves the feasibility of continuosly

datalinking a moving target's position to a JDA M in flight. The position information could be
produced a GMT I radar on a distant aircraft, be it a fighter with a larger radar, an I SR
platform or a UAV, or it could be produced by a FL I R/EO /laser targeting system on a fighter
or an endurance UAV such as a P redator or a Global Hawk. O nce the targeting sensor is
measuring the location of the target vehicle, it takes little effort to pump this information

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out on a datalink radio channel to a bomb in flight.
Handling the target coordinates at the bomb end is perhaps the most challenging aspect of
such systems. The guidance software will have to incorporate a Kalman filter which
estimates the position of the target vehicle based upon a track history of continuously
transmitted coordinates. A prediction of the target's position based on this data is then
used to adjust the bomb's aimpoint. Since the JDA M is flying blind toward its target, the
quality of the prediction algorithms is critical to success.
Another important aspect of seekerless JDA M engagement of moving targets is the accuracy
of the transmitted coordinates, since these are added to the JDA M's guidance error. W hile
many radars support GMT I techniques, very few support the more accurate multi segment
Differential P hase Centre Antenna (DP CA) techniques, as these require specific adaptations
to the radar antenna design, and feed designs. As a result, the range and bearing accuracy
of GMT I radars usually does not match that achieved in SA Rs. The A MST E program works
around this limitation by fusing GMT I tracks from multiple airborne radars, to yield a best
estimate of target position. The target bearing error can be modest, and triangulation of the
target using bearings from two or more radars separated by several miles evidently makes
the difference.
W hen the A MST E derived technique does eventually become operational, it will permit the
concurrent engagement of multiple ground vehicles in all weather day/night conditions.
W hilst it may not match the accuracy of seeker equipped JDA Ms, it makes up for that
limitation in much lower weapon costs.
Combining a datalink midcourse system with a cheap autonomous short range seeker, such
as a device derived from an anti-armour submunition, of course yields the best of both
worlds.
W hat is clearly evident is that the sanctuary of motion will not last long for evaders of the
JDAM.

The HdH JDAM-ER is being designed for very low mass production unit cost, which is reflected in a number of
design features. The most evident is the revival of the DSTO GTV untapered wing planform, which sacrifices a
little range performance but is significantly easier to manufacture. The baseline GBU-31/32/35/38 tailkit is used,
with software alterations to support the changed aerodynamics and wing deployment functions (HdH).

Additional HdH JDAM-ER line drawings here [1], [2], [3] (HdH).

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Australia's Winged JDAM-ER
The notion of a GP S aided inertially guided glide bomb is nothing new, but fielding one has
proven to be a time consuming task. Australia is in a unique position insofar as the DSTO
GTV/Kerkanya demonstration put it in the forefront of glide bomb kit research - until recently
this innovative DSTO effort sat in limbo.
The first attempts to convert the GT V/Kerkanya concept into viable production weapons
never got off the ground, in both senses of the phrase. During the 1990s Hawker de
Havilland pursued the Icarus I and I I concepts, the former using a B Ae A L A RM anti-radiation
seeker, the latter using a JDA M-like GP S/inertially guided tailkit. A lack of funding saw both
efforts confined largely to paper studies. AW A DI also pursued the idea of a production
GT V/Kerkanya derivative, but aimed from the outset at a GP S/inertially guided tailkit
solution under the Agile Gliding W eapon (AGW ) designation. W ith the entry of the JDAM into
full scale production, the idea of fusing the A GW wing kit with the JDA M tailkit was explored
as a joint effort between AW A DI and Boeing. The AW A DI effort collapsed after the company
was acquired by B AeA. Thus, it appeared, the effort to revive the GT V/Kerkanya as a
production effort was doomed to failure.
Last year Hawker de Havilland (now Boeing owned) at Fisherman's Bend were awarded RA A F
funding to pursue a Concept Technology Demonstration of a GT V/Kerkanya derived wing kit
for the GB U -38 500 lb JDA M. HdH licenced the DSTO intellectual property in the
GT V/Kerkanya and acquired all archived DSTO design data, reports, and remaining
demonstrator hardware components to support this effort. HdH have received great support
from DSTO, RAAF Capability Development, the DoD CTD program office and DMO.
O ver the last 2 years, the HdH development team at Fisherman's Bend have been working in
earnest to convert the GT V/Kerkanya research findings into a viable design for mass
production. This effort has involved analysing the basic design issues for the wing from the
ground up, and re-evaluating nearly all basic design assumptions.
The current intent is to perform a critical design review at the end of 2002, resulting in a
qualified design by mid 2003 and flight trials in late 2003. Should no unforseen difficulties
arise, the HdH Range Extension Kit for the GB U -38 JDA M (JDA M-ER for Extended Range)
could enter Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) some time in 2004.
The basic JDA M tailkit is well suited to such an adaptation since the Guidance and Control
U nit (GCU ) has available internal growth capacity, and spare unused interfaces to permit the
control of additional hardware. The wing kit would thus be connected to the GCU via an
umbilical, and additional code added to the baseline JDA M to provide for release of the
wing, and provide a unique autopilot for the winged variant. In the simplest of terms, the
JDA M tailkit hardware would remain unchanged, but software would be added to adapt the
tailkit to the glide wing.
The HdH design uses an untapered wing planform like the GT V demonstrator, but differing
from the later tapered wing planform on the Kerkanya. This reversion loses a few percent in
aerodynamic efficiency, but improves the radar scattering behaviour of the wing, and is much
easier to mass produce at low cost. U nlike the DSTO demonstrators which used differential
pressure sensing ports and a pitot tube to achieve optimal gliding performance, the baseline
HdH design will derive its velocity from GP S/inertial outputs. W hile this does not extract the
full glide range potential from the design, it does reduce cost and complexity considerably,
and improves the reliability of the wing kit.

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Key design objectives for the HdH product are lowest possible mass production cost, zero
hardware changes to the existing GB U -31/32/35/38 tailkits, best possible performance,
modularity, ease of maintenance and especially shortest possible assembly time in the field.
The latter will be critical to user acceptance of the kit, the less time expended and the fewer
errors in assembly when deployed in the middle of nowhere, the more popular the kit will be
with its users. The design philosophy is centred on producing a flexible product which can
further grow as customers request additions. Should a customer pursue a high wing
configuration, improved glide range, or a different wing sweep angle, the basic design is
aimed at accommodating such changes at the lowest incremental cost.
HdH intend to offer scaled variants of the kit for the Mk.82, Mk.83, Mk.84, B L U -109/B, B L U -
110/B, BLU-118/B warheads, and any future warheads in this weight class.
At the time of writing the external design was frozen with detail design currently
progressing to design review. Available illustrations reflect the current configuration, but are
likely to change in detail areas to reflect future customer requirements.
The importance of the HdH effort cannot be understated. In strategic terms, a JDA M-ER with
30 to 50 N MI of standoff range for a high altitude release provides a very cheap mass
production standoff weapon which defeats all but the largest and most capable area defence
SA Ms in service. As the range of the weapon is well matched to typical combat aircraft radar
SA R modes, it provides a genuine standoff all weather capability. Should the JDA M in the
future acquire a standard datalink, this capability would be expanded to encompass moving
targets.
The JDA M-ER is not a substitute for the A GM-142 SO W, as the latter is a supersonic weapon
with a pinpoint precision imaging seeker and remote datalink control. W hen dealing with
well defended very high value targets, such as radar installations, mobile command posts,
command bunkers or communications nodes, or targets of opportunity, the A GM-142 permits
positive operator control of the weapon to impact with a fairly short flight time. This
contrasts with the less precise, much slower but also much cheaper JDA M-ER. The low cost
of the JDA M-ER permits its use against much lower value targets, even if these are well
defended. In practice the RAAF would use the AGM-142 to engage air defence and command-
control-communications targets, while concurrently using the JDA M-ER to engage the fixed
targets being defended by those same assets.

The HdH JDAM-ER effort builds on the DTSO GTV/Kerkanya glidebomb effort, using the standard JDAM tailkit with
suitable software alterations. With a standoff range likely to be well in excess of 50 NMI, the JDAM-ER will
revolutionise much of the bombing game. The weapon will be suitable for medium/high altitude drops, and low

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level toss deliveries, placing the bomber outside the range of most air defence weapons (Author).

Like all other variants of the JDA M, the JDA M-ER will permit massed attacks against
prebriefed targets. A fighter could pickle off an arbitary number of these weapons, and turn
tail while the bombs each autonomously fly to their targets. Even with a 50 N MI glide range,
the footprint the fighter can hold at risk encompasses roughly a 100 N MI circle. A key issue
for the RA A F will be achieving a mature Mil-Std-1760 capability on its F-111C/G and F/A-18A
fleets before the weapon becomes available.
Exploiting the full potential of the JDA M-ER, especially the 500 lb GB U -38 varianant, will
require smart bomb rack technology, with a Mil-Std-1760 capability on each ejector. For the
F/A-18A this would require a dual or triple rack, for the F-111C/G a modified B RU -3/A six
hardpoint rack. The GB U -38/JDA M-ER would be especially well suited to the F-111C/G as
with four 6 hardpoint smart racks it has to potential to engage 20-24 aimpoints on a single
pass, subject to clearances. Autonomous targeting of the JDA M-ER will require either a good
Synthetic Aperture Radar or a high resolution thermal imager with exceptional jitter
performance. The latter makes a good case for some technology insertion into the Pave
Tack, since no existing thermal imaging pods come near the required performance (doubters
might consider looking up the jitter specifications of such if they choose not to believe this
author).

Most observers consider the introduction of the JDA M into the RA A F inventory as a forgone
conclusion, under the A I R 5409 Bomb Improvement P rogram, although the JDA M has had its
fair share of doubters and critics in Russell over recent years. O ne hopes that repeated 6
o'clock news observation of B B C and CN N T V footage from Afghanistan will have dispelled
their fears or indeed dislike of the weapon! W hether one likes the JDAM or not, it has proven
its effectiveness very convincingly.

Notes (2008):
Since this article w as produced there have been numerous developments in Australia and
the U nited States. T he JDA M-ER A CT D progressed and trial drops of the w eapon w ere
performed in August, 2006. Also initial JDA M integration w ork w as performed on the F-111C,
funded from internal Boeing Australia budgets [Click for more ...]. T he baseline JDA M is
being integrated on the F/A-18A/B H U G Hornet. I n late 2006 then Defence Minister Nelson
sold to Federal Cabinet the idea of replacing front line F-111s w ith F/A-18F Super Hornets,
the latter more suited as advanced trainers given the regional environment [Click for more

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...]. T he JDA M H A RT /DA MA SK achieved I O C in 2007, w ith claims that the U S Navy w ould
acquire up to 6,000 seeker kits. T he A MST E system w as trialled in 2004 as an alternative
maritime strike capability CO N O P S, during the Resultant Fury Sinkex[Click for more ...]. T he
GB U -39/B Small Diameter Bomb achieved I O C and is being flight tested on the F-22A Raptor
[Click for more ...].

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