Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Middle Eastern Studies

The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy towards Tribal and Religious Opposition
Author(s): Madawi Al-Rasheed and Loulouwa Al-Rasheed

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Jan., 1996), pp. 96-119
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy
towards Tribal and Religious Opposition
MADAWI AL-RASHEED
and LOULOUWA AL-RASHEED
This article examines the Saudi state through its strategies towards two
types of political opposition. Both Shammar tribal opposition at the
beginning of the formation of the state early this century and Shiite
religious opposition in the last two decades challenged the legitimacy of
the Saudi state at different historical periods.' The analysis of such
strategies throws light on the characteristics of the state. We, however,
exclude other opposition such as that of the Arab Nationalists, Nasserites,
and the Free Princes in the 1960s; all have been dealt with in various
publications.2 Nor do we consider the recent religious dissident movement
within the Wahhabi establishment that started with the seizure of the
Mecca Mosque in 1979 and gathered momentum after the recent Gulf
War in 1991.
The end of colonialism this century and the abrupt emergence of states
which did not exhibit fully the characteristics of the 'Western capitalist
state' led some political scientists to reconsider their initial models, or
simply adapt them and expand their parameters to account for this
proliferation of political entities. Some call such relatively recent political
entities 'states' whereas others qualify the term state with adjectives like
'early states', 'archaic states' or 'inchoate states'.4 The emergence of the
Saudi state in 1932 is one such development which has so far attracted the
attention of scholars from various disciplines. As Saudi Arabia has
special, some would say unique characteristics relating to the cultural,
economic, religious, geographical and historical specificity of the country,
already established Weberian or Marxist state paradigms seem to be
inadequate frameworks for understanding its political processes. Among
such characteristics are the country's total reliance on wealth produced
from oil, a combination of monarchic rule and Wahhabi religious dogma,
a small population concentrated in urban centres (cities, towns and oases)
separated from each other by vast desert areas, strong tribal loyalties and
identities, a tradition of pastoral nomadism and finally regional variations
manifested in three cultural zones, the Hijaz in the west, Najd in the
centre, and al-Hasa in the east. The amalgamation of these three zones in
one political entity is a recent development resulting from the expansion
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.32, No.1, January 1996, pp.96-119

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
SAUDI POLICY TOWARDS TRIBAL AND RELIGIOUS OPPOSITION 97
of the central Najdi zone over the adjacent territories in the east and west.
In the twentieth century this expansion, orchestrated by the Al Saud
rulers of Riyadh, started with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
following the First World War. It was assisted by two factors: first, a
revival of Wahhabism in Arabia and its adoption by the Al Saud; and
second, an alliance with Britain paved the way for the consolidation of the
state and the elimination of various opposition groups through regular
subsidies both in cash and arms, allowing for the encapsulation of
resistant groups.
These characteristics led to the invention of a number of qualifying
adjectives attached to the word 'state' when reference to the political
entity created by Ibn Saud in the 1930s is made. Leaving definitions based
on misguided negative stereotypes aside (such as patriarchal desert state
or Bedouin state), Saudi Arabia has often been labelled as a theocratic
state, thus emphasizing the Wahhabi religious ideology which inspired
the unification of the country early this century and continues to do so
until the present. The country is described as 'a theocracy with an
absolute monarch at the top who is not only the head of the royal family
and the chief of the state and its commander-in-chief, but is also the
leader of all tribal chiefs and the supreme religious leader'.5 Such a
description focuses on a single attribute of the state, that is the historical
alliance between the Saudis and the Wahhabi ulema. It highlights the
interconnection between government and Islam, which has underlined
foundation of the country's political system. While not underestimating
the importance of Wahhabism in providing religious legitimacy and
endowing the regime with a spiritual-ideological foundation, a definition
of the state in such terms does ignore other crucial distinguishing charac-
teristics that mark the peculiarity of the Saudi state. The fact that many
other political entities in the Middle East have been at different historical
periods founded on the basis of an alliance between political power and
religious authority makes the theocratic nature of politics in the region a
shared characteristic rather than a unique attribute of Saudi Arabia.
Examples of this regional trait include among others the present Moroccan
state, the Sanusi rule in Libya, and the Yemeni Imamates.
Even when considered as a theocracy, some political scientists and
historians regard the Saudi state as a 'strange phenomenon and an
anachronism in political terms in the twentieth century'.6 Its alleged
'strange nature' led Kostiner to argue that in its early phase, i.e. at the
time when the Al Saud were consolidating their power in Arabia in the
first three decades of the twentieth century, the Saudi state resembled
a chieftaincy, similar to previous tribal confederacies in the Arabian
Peninsula. Ibn Saud's early rule did not mark a departure from the
98 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
chieftaincy pattern. Greater political sophistication was shown only in

handling foreign relations with Britain. Kostiner concludes that the Saudi
state was a renewed version of an established political pattern.7
Those who accept the marriage between politics and Islam as one
factor among others in marking the distinctive nature of the country and
its present political apparatus prefer to draw attention to the economic
foundation of the state, which Saudi Arabia shares with other oil pro-
ducing countries in the Middle East. The fact that Saudi Arabia's wealth
is not generated by the development of the country's internal forces of
production, but from the sale abroad of a raw material generates special
political features. Income from oil is paid directly to the regime from
abroad, thus forming a direct economic base for the political status quo.8
The political entity is, therefore, described as a redistributive, rentier
state.9 This is an economic-based model of the state whose governing
body resembles a landlord dependent entirely on rents from private
property and land, rather than living on the returns of a diversity of
productive investment. The state, now empowered by the revenues,
operates a complex system of subsidies and welfare benefits which in most
cases function as bribes to guarantee loyalty to the ruler. In the Middle
East, this model has been developed in the 1970s to account for the
Iranian state, but is now generalized to other single-resource countries
such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
Inspired by this perception of the oil-producing countries, the work of
anthropologist J. Davis develops further the idea of the rentier state and
adapts it to the political tribal realities of countries such as Libya. A
number of characteristics mark such states. First, their rulers get revenue
by taxing third parties, usually 90 per cent of their wealth comes from
petroleum production. This pattern, according to Davis, has important
economic and political consequences. The first are well-known and relate
to vulnerability resulting from dependency on a single commodity whose
price is subject to fluctuation. The less-noted political consequences,
however, relate to lack of constraints on the ruler. The ruler (Davis uses
the word prince) does not need consensus among his citizens. Therefore,
the prince may 'conceal the extent of his revenues; may fail to distinguish
Treasury from Pocket; may reward a restricted and exclusive coterie, a
family, a descent group, without any public accounting' ") Consequently,
rulers in such hydrocarbon societies, to use Davis' terminology, do not
need to set up formal procedures for gaining advice and consent; indeed,
they may consider it prudent and efficient to refrain from making explicit
rules about the division of spoils among interested groups. The fact that
the hydrocarbon prince can rule without consensus, conceal his income,
and get away with setting up formal channels for consultation and advice,
and draw no boundaries between his wealth and that of the state mark the
state in these societies as a distinct category.
Inspired by his anthropological orientation, Davis demonstrates how
the Libyan rentier state operates vis-a-vis the tribal components of
society. This dimension has been overlooked by the proponents of the
'rentier state model', who work within the field of political science. The
latter make no explicit reference to how the distributive, rentier state,
reduced to the persona of the ruler in these societes deal with political
opposition and demands for participation. Political processes in such
societies are explained by reference to a single element, oil wealth.
A recent enactment of this interpretation is Gause's book whose title, Oil
Monarchies, is an indication of a reductionist and monolithic approach.
Gause rejects 'Islam' and 'tribalism' as relevant factors in understanding
politics in the 1990s in the Gulf region including Saudi Arabia. He forcibly
argues that, 'the key to understanding the domestic political processes of
these countries is the enormous amount of wealth that oil revenues have
placed in the hands of the state since the oil boom of the 1970s'. "
It is assumed that the problem of representation or political participa-
tion does not arise in the rentier state since the constituency is not taxed,
oil revenues being a substitute for taxation. Governors may rule without
consensus, but both overt and covert opposition demanding greater
involvement in decision-making is an intrinsic characteristic of such a
political apparatus. It accompanies government without consensus. The
reasons are obvious. It is coincidental that historically countries such as
Libya and Saudi Arabia had no tradition of centralized state structures.
Both countries experienced diffuse political organization rooted in the
economic, ecological and social conditions of pastoral nomadism, inter-
cepted by small-scale urban and agricultural settlements. In the Saudi
countryside, the political microcosms revolved around tribal groups
whose legitimacy rested on descent. In sedentary areas, small-scale
centralised emirates emerged. They derived their legitimacy either from a
local sedentary tribal elite such as the Unayzah Emirate in the Qasim in
central Arabia 12 or from a religous source such as the first and second
Saudi Wahhabi dynasties in Deraiyya (1744-1818) and Riyadh (1824-91)'3
or from a tribal elite resident in an oasis but with a tribal depth in the
desert such as the Rashidi dynasty in Hail. 4 The present Saudi state and
its 'hydrocarbon prince(s)' coexist with various types of opposition. In
this article, we propose to look at how the emerging state dealt with tribal
opposition when it encountered the refusal of the Shammar to be incor-
porated in the Saudi realm in the 1920s. Later we examine how the
mature, fully developed state over the past two decades managed to
encapsulate the Shia opposition in the eastern province (al-Hasa). By
looking at two examples, located at different historical periods, we aim

to discover continuities and divergences in state praxis. We also aim
to examine whether there are certain specific strategies to deal with
opposition that become a characteristic of the way a 'hydrocarbon prince'
or 'state' deal with objections to their government.
This article does not explore in great detail physical violence as a
mechanism for crippling political opposition in Saudi Arabia. Suffice it
here to say that the oil wealth of the country which.-has become available
to its successive rulers since the 1950s has enabled the state to curb the
influence of opposition through investment in the means of coercion.
While a considerable proportion of this revenue is regularly invested in
the purchase of heavy military equipment, thus reflecting the country's
obsession with its e.ternal security, it remains unclear how much the state
regularly spends on its internal secret police and intelligence equipment,
obviously under the budget of the Ministry of Interior. A good indication
of the state's commitment to the modernisation of this area most important
for the security of both the regime and its personnel was the investment of
?24 million pounds sterling in the creation of a national network of
computerised intelligence. The project called for twin computer centres
in Riyadh and Jeddah to be connected over scrambled radio links to
twenty seven branch offices of the General Intelligence Department.
However, the events o f 1979 such as the seizure of the Mecca Mosque
and the Shiite riots in the eastern province exposed the inefficiency of
the country's intelligence services and eventually led to the decision to
establish a 12,000 man special anti-terrorist unit equipped with helicopters
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. I
Secret intelligence is one method employed by the regime to deal with
the problem of internal security. Actual physical violence is another.
Saudi Arabia's policies in this area seem to be in line with other state
practices in the region, the most exposed are those countries which have
military dictatorships and one party rule such as Syria, Iraq and Libya.
Thanks to its alliance with the West and its commitment to its interests,
the regime's violent practices against it own citizens have not yet been
fully exposed by the Western media. Before the Gulf crisis of 1990, the
press in Britain for example did not concern itself with regular reporting
on such practices partly becasue of the embarrassment this would cause
Western governments and partly because of Saudi Arabia's ongoing con-
tracts with companies selling military equipment and other technologies.
Exposure of excessive violence may automatically lead to severance of
diplomatic relations or freezing of commercial government contracts,
both unacceptable during times of economic recession or general hardship
in the West.
However, since the Gulf War, the Western media generally and some
newspapers in particular have been gradually trying to expose the practices
of the Saudi regime. A number of television programmes relating to
the work of exiled Saudi authors such as Abdul Rahman Munif and the
London-based Shia opposition group have recently been shown on British
television. These have accompanied occasional reports relating to the
abuse of human rights and the status of political prisoners in the countr
From these scattered reports and fragmented information, it seems
that the use of force cannot be ruled out as an effective strategy in dealing
with opposition inside the country. In spite of the fact that Saudi Arabia
does not invoke images of torture and excessive violence comparable to
the popular images of Iraq, sustained by some academic literature and
media reports, the Saudi state through its heavy investment in technology
of violence can inflict on its opposition similar misfortunes.'" However,
while this violence has not eliminated the opposition inside the country
altogether, it resulted in the flight of many political groups which sought
exile in north America, Europe and other Arab countries. Among the
latter, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq have been, at different historical
periods pending on their relations with Saudi Arabia, lands of refuge for
the Saudi opposition. Violence remains a readily available option which is
combined with overall policies regarding how to limit the prospects of
viable opposition. The following accounts will show how this has been
exercised on the ground in conjunction with other strategies at two
different periods in the history of the evolution of the state.
The early attempts of the Saudi state to subjugate central Arabia under
the umbrella of the Al Saud was met by persistent opposition especially
from the Shammar tribe and their Hail-based Al Rashid leadership. This
case is analysed in detail here because the Shammar and their leadership
represented real challenges to the Al Saud. This is because the Shammar
had an alternative model of government which had been well established
in northern Najd. Unlike other tribal groups, the Shammar had already
been involved in a political system which combined political centralisation,
tribal loyalties, and a multi-resource economy consisting of pastoral
nomadism, small-scale agriculture and trade. A sedentarised tribal elite
resided at the top of this political microcosm. 19
Since the 1830s, the Al Rashid had been resident in Hail from where
they spread their influence over adjacent territories, oases and towns in
central Arabia. Their expansion was aided by an elaborate system of
military recruitment consisting at different times of Shammar men, oases
dwellers, other nomadic tribes, and slaves and mercenaries. This expansion
led at the end of the last century to the expulsion of the Al Saud from
Riyadh and the termination of their influence in Arabia as they fled to
Kuwait. Consequently, when Ibn Saud recaptured Riyadh from the

Rashidis in 1902, he returned with a determination to eliminate their
influence completely. Ibn Saud regarded the Shammar and their Rashidi
leadership as representing the only serious threat to his expansion over
the whole of central Arabia.
There were reasons behind Ibn Saud's determination to shake Rashidi
rule in Hail. The Shammar and the Al Rashid were the only internal force
that destabilized the second Saudi state in 1891. Weak Saudi leadership
at the time failed to maintain its control over its territories. The state's
strong Wahhabi ideology also seemed to stumble as a result of Rashidi
expansion. When Ibn Saud returned to Riyadh early this century, he reali-
sed the extent of Rashidi threat to his growing realm. As he endeavoured
to build a state which was increasingly being empowered by growing
British intervention in Arabia as the First World War became imminent,
Shammar threat more than at any other time seemed very real. This is
because, unlike the opposition of other tribes who refused to be encapsu-
lated by him, the Shammar had a political structure well-established in an
oasis whose wealth at the time exceeded that of Riyadh, and was in contact
with foreign powers, mainly the Ottomans. The Shammar had a leadership
which claimed legitimacy on the basis of tribal descent. While Ibn Saud's
leadership was armed with the power of a religious ideology, that of the
Rashidis rested on the power of kinship and alliance with the Shammar
tribe, hence Ibn Saud's fears of the Shammar threat to his infant state.
While Ibn Saud adopted ad hoc measures to deal with various modes of
resistance to Saudi rule in the first two decades of the twentieth century,
he needed a consistent policy, perseverance, and continuous appeals to
the British for weapons and subsidies to deal with the Shammar. These
appeals exaggerated the threat of the Shammar and portrayed their
Rashidi leadership as a stubborn obstacle to the expansion of the Saudi
state to the north. After consultation with British officials in the Gulf, Ibn
Saud succeeded in convincing Colonel Hamilton in 1917 of the Shammar
threat. The Colonel wrote to his government about the difficulty that Ibn
Saud would face if he moved in the direction of Hail:20
Bin Saud said it was an impossible task because Ibn Rashid was a
sheikh of a single, powerful tribe, which would unite at once for self-
defence in case of Hail being attacked. Ibn Saud also explained that
the composition of his forces consisted of an amalgamation of
different tribes such as the Mutair, the Dawasir, the Subai, Ataiba,
Hajar and Dhafir, all of them would gather and would be a large
mob difficult to control or to keep concentrated for more than Hail
with such levies was not to be thought of.2"
It was only in 1921 that Ibn Saud's attacks on the Shammar and Hail
became fruitful. Hail was besieged for almost six months before the oasis
gates were opened for Ibn Saud. The oasis was cut off from all lines of
supplies as caravans carrying food were not allowed to enter it.22 Ibn Saud
immediately wanted members of the Al Rashid lineage to accompany him
to Riyadh where they were expected to live under strict supervision. A
governor of Hail was to be appointed by Ibn Saud who chose a loyal
cousin of his to be the Saudi representative in the oasis. These measures
ended Rashidi rule not only in Jabal Shammar and Hail, their traditional
tribal territory, but also in central Arabia as a whole, thus removing one
of the major threats to the newly emerging Saudi state.
This, however, did not eliminate Saudi fears altogether. There
remained a number of issues which had to be dealt with immediately after
the fall of Hail. Some Shammar sections refused to acknowledge Ibn
Saud's imminent success during the siege of the oasis; those sections that
anticipated the termination of Rashidi leadership migrated northward to
Iraq which was in the process of becoming a British mandated territory
under the kingship of Faisal, the son of the Sherif of Mecca. Now relieved
that some Shammar opposition was further away from his realm, Ibn
Saud wanted guarantees from the British to the effect of preventing the
Shammar from returning or being used as a weapon against him by the
Hashemites who equally opposed his rule. British representatives in Iraq
expressed their anxiety over the flux of some Shammar groups:
The Iraq government is being placed in great difficulty by the influx

of the Shammar into Iraq. It is exceedingly difficult to keep them
out and we are using all our endeavour to send them to join the
Shammar Jarba in northern Jazira.23
After the collapse of the Hail dynasty, how the"state was to deal with
both the tribe and its leadership became an urgent question requiring
a consistent policy capable of containing Shammar opposition or resur-
gence. The encapsulation of the tribe and that of its traditional leadership
was meant to prevent the Shammar from reuniting with their Rashidi
leaders.
Since 1921 the state pursued a policy of marginalization towards the
Rashidi rulers of Hail. This was a precondition for limiting their contact
with the Shammar tribe and curbing their influence among their traditional
constituency. This marginalization followed both a direct confrontational
and oppressive line and a more subdued course. In pursuing the first line,
Ibn Saud's triumph over his -historical enemies ended up in enforcing
house arrest on his rivals who were brought to Riyadh where they could
be placed under strict surveillance. A special 50-men force was set up
specifically for watching the movement of the last Rashidi leader and his
entourage.24 Its most important task was to prevent meetings, visits or
simply communication between the Rashidi leadership and other
Shammar members or their section sheikhs. Furthermore, there were
restrictions relating to travel within Saudi Arabia and abroad. Obviously,
any trip to Hail was not to be thought of at that time. It is interesting to
note that even now, almost sixty years after the collapse of Hail, the
descendants of the last Rashidi rulers have never set foot in their ancestor's
capital. Although now there is no ban on such visits, it is still regarded by
the government politically inappropriate and provocative.
The state confrontational strategy towards this traditional leadership
was sometimes relaxed, such as in 1950 when the house arrest and the ban
on travel overseas were lifted. The last deposed Rashidi ruler was allowed
to travel to other Arab countries and to Europe. This was encouraged by
the predominance of a generally stable period towards the end of Ibn
Saud's rule which coincided with the increasing flow of wealth from oil
revenues. However, at times of insecurity such as after the assassination
of King Faisal in 1975, the state reverted back to its oppressive strategies.
Some members of the Rashidi lineage were arrested and kept in prison
without charge or trial. When they were released a year later they
preferred to lead a life in exile outside the country, thus contributing
further to their own marginalization.
This direct confrontation was simultaneously accompanied by a more
subdued strategy. The Saudi state used economic dependency as a mech-
anism to limit the ability of the Rashidi leadership first to act independently
and second to maintain the loyalty of their followers. Deprived of their
confiscated wealth in Hail, the last Rashidi rulers were accommodated in
homes in Riyadh. They received monthly food rations and provisions
from Ibn Saud's treasury through his minister of finance. The general rule
was that these rations would cover the needs of each household without
allowing for lavish entertainment and excessive socializing comparable to
what had been experienced in Hail. Ibn Saud's policy was to limit the
deposed rulers' ability to entertain large crowds who would be attracted
by an overt display of generosity, a method most appropriate for building
a leader's reputation in the cultural and political context of Arabia. These
rations were stopped and replaced by monthly salaries which are distri-
buted among members of the lineage. Again, the salaries are meant to
cover basic needs and cannot be in any way compared with either those of
the Saudi ruling group or with those of other tribal leaders whose loyalty
to the government was undisputed. This economic dependency created
the conditions of marginalization in a society like Saudi Arabia in the
1990s. This highlights the principles according to which hydrocarbon
societies are governed; the prince who has at his disposal what seems to be
unlimited wealth can reward loyalty by gift-giving. In the language of
modern political discourse, this can easily be translated into favouritism,
commissions, and generous government financial contracts. Deprived of
access to such economic opportunities, the Rashidis some of whom are
already in exile, seem to be increasingly marginalized as a viable tribal
leadership due to the fact that they cannot reward loyalty and compete
with what the state and its hydrocarbon prince(s) can offer.
Overt confrontation and covert dependency have proceeded hand in
hand with a subtle policy of encapsulation. This is in line with state
practices vis-a-vis other groups and ex-power holders in the country. As
the state is aware of the dangers of excessive alienation inflicted on groups
which had previously enjoyed deference and mass support from their tribal
base, it tries to moderate its oppression. It has always been recognized
that pressure on tribal groups may cause unnecessary and unjustified
trouble given the importance of tribal loyalty in the country. Conse-
quently, recognition of the previous status of the Rashidis has been a state
priority. This takes the form of public display of respect in the majlis
(royal council) and the use of special rhetoric that portrays and maintains
their position as one of the status groups. As a result, this restores their
dignity and confirms their previous prestige among the country's nobility.
Linking the Rashidis to the Al Saud through marriage was also a state
policy. Like many other tribal women, some Rashidis were chosen by
Ibn Saud and his descendants as wives, thus fostering the development
of kinship ties with the ruling group and releasing some tension in the
relationship with previous power holders in the country. While these
marriages can be regarded as economically advantageous from the point
of view of the wife givers, they were asymmetrical, i.e. the Saudis never
reciprocated by themselves becoming wife givers. The fact that the
powerful party in the exchange system abstained from giving its females
in marriage to conquered groups exposes the inherent inequality in Ibn
Saud's marriage strategy. This strategy did not only expose the gender
inequality in Saudi society; it confirmed the low status of women as well as
their official and formal objectification by the Saudi political system. This
strategy also revealed the state's use of such inequality as a political
weapon against its opposing groups. Marriages were orchestrated in such
a way as to foster the dependency, marginalization, and above all the
breaking of the internal cohesion of the tribes. It is worth noting that,
unlike marriages with other groups, marriages with Rashidi women
proved disastrous to both the state and to the individual females con-
cerned. A Rashidi woman who was married to one of Ibn Saud's sons lost
two of her sons. One of them was killed by the secret police in the 1960s
after some clashes with his paternal uncles over the modernization of
Saudi Arabia. Her other son was killed following his assassination of his
paternal uncle, King Faisal, in 1975 in an attempt to take revenge for the
killing of his own brother.
While Saudi policy towards the Rashidi leadership oscillated between
direct oppression and subtle economic dependency, the policy towards
the tribe was to undermine its most feared characteristic. Tribal asabiyya
(solidarity and cohesion) which result from belief in descent from a
common ancestor is one of the most celebrated attributes of tribes in the
Middle East. The fact that tribes such as the Shammar, the Rwala and the
Murrah expressed in their discourse the importance of kinship links that
bind them together have enforced the image of these groups as cohesive
units ready to resist external threat and fragmentation by joint action.
Arab writers such as Ibn, Khaldun, Western travellers, and recently
anthropologists have over-emphasized the rhetoric of tribal solidarity. It
is only very recently, that some anthropologists and poltical scientists
have reconsidered this in the light of recent ethnographic data and
historical records.25
However, regardless of the plausibility of the argument about tribal
cohesion and solidarity, since their consolidation in 1950s and 1960s,
states in the region, especially those whose territories have been the
homeland of powerful tribal groups, have continued to believe in the
potential unity of tribes. This unity is portrayed as a threat to the integrity
of the state and its ability to extract allegiance from its citizens. Such
states assumed that their citizens have divided loyalties: as tribesmen they'
cannot possibly swear allegiance simultaneously to a king or leader as well
as to their tribe and its sheikh. The divisive nature of 'tribalism' has
always been inseparable from other economic aspects related to some
tribes: nomadism which is an ecologicaltand economic adaptation. It was
believed that sedentary tribes did not impose the same threat as nomadic
tribes. It is the combination of tribalism, a mode of social and political
organisation and nomadism, an economic adaptation that is believed to
be dangerous for the integrity of states. Therefore, states in the Middle
East, including Saudi Arabia tried ever since their foundation to encounter
this potentially dangerous situation by acting on both aspects of it, i.e. the
ideological and economic.
Unfortunately, in addition to their nomadism and tribalism, the
Shammar had a history of enmity, competition and rivalry with the Saudi
state. They were one of three most resistant groups (the other two being
the Hashemite in the Hijaz, a'nd the Idsrissis in Asir) who openly and
systematically challenged the authority of the Saudis during the time
when Ibn Saud was spreading his domination over the Arabian Peninsula.
Therefore, while the state generally tackled the problem of tribes by

pursuing a fearless policy of detribalization and sedentarization, it seems
that the Shammar needed a special treatment because of their past
opposition and resistance. Also, the Shammar were not confined to the
boundaries of Saudi Arabia, but some sections had already been in Iraq,
Syria and Jordan, thus representing a danger which cannot be controlled
within Saudi territory. Saudi policy regarding the encapsulation of the
Shammmar revolved around creating religious division within the group
by turning some sections into Wahhabi ikhwan.
Historical records show that the Shammar were very reluctant in the
first decade of this century to join Ibn Saud's ikhwan and settle in the
hujar, the special village settlements created for the purpose of accom-
modating those who accepted to become Wahhabi ikhwan and join Ibn
Saud's fighting force.26 However, as Ibn Saud, through his British allies in
Kuwait and other Ports in the Gulf region, continued to exert economic
pressures on the Shammar by imposing a ban on access to markets under
his control, some Shammar sections responded by accepting Wahhabism
and the compulsory sedentarization scheme. Ibn Saud's most faithful
British adviser reported in 1918: 'Ibn Saud sent out fifteen letters to
chiefly Shammar sheikhs communicating to them and offering them
alternatives of friendship on condition of taking up residence within his
effective borders or war if found elsewhere.'27
The sedentarization of the Shammar who turned into ikhwan was very
much a prerequisite for releasing some of the economic pressures on
them. Ibn Saud wanted those sections to settle in southern Najd where it
would be difficult for them to switch allegiance and join their tribal
brothers in the north28 The religious division was automatically translated
into political fragmentation and enmity between the various sections
which constituted the tribe. Moreover, while sections of the tribe were
left in remote hujar, the sheiks were 'invited' to Riyadh as guests of Ibn
Saud who bestowed on them various gifts and subsidies to bribe them into
accepting his domination, thus alienating them from the rest of their
sections. This was later combined with further encapsulation through
economic measures.
In the absence of extensive literature and micro-studies assessing the
economic-political pressures on the Shammar during the past fifty years,
we rely on the work of the only anthropologists who had conducted
research among them, under the auspices of the Saudi government and its
Ministry of Development. The conditions surrounding their work are
important in assessing the information they provide.29
Shammar nomadism was an economic adaptation to the aridity and
environmental instability in their potential tribal territory. Above all, it
was regarded by the state to be potentially threatening as it is associated

with mobility and lack of control. Therefore, the first policy to be enacted
against the Shammar was their sedentarization, believed to be the means
for their detribalization. Saudi policy towards them exploited the insta-
bility and occasional deficiences of the nomadic pastoral economy to
serve its general plan to have more control of their movement.' Sedentari-
zation was however, resisted by some sections, thus creating an economic
division between those who accepted to sedentarise in Hail and its
environs and those who remained nomadic in the Nafud Desert. While
historically the Shammar had always had a multi-resource economy,
which combined nomadism with trade and agriculture (at least ownership
of palm groves in the oases), their sedentarization by the Saudis was far
from spontanteous. It was guided by the Saudi government detribalization
policies. These were directed towards strengthening the centralized state,
and at the same time widening economic differentiation within the group.
Fabietti argues that the Saudi state altered the nature of the available
resources and the modes of access to them, thus creating the possibility of
wider inequalities within the tribe.3'
In 1925 Ibn Saud abolished the exclusive rights of the tribes in their
own diras (territory). This was a form of expropriation carried out by the
state of rights formerly held by the nomadic communities. Fabietti stresses
that this must not be taken to mean a transfer of ownership of grazing
lands from tribes to state, but rather, as a non-recognition on the part of
the state of the traditional power of control exercised over the resources
of the territory by the Bedouin communities.32 The state asserted its right
to intervene in a field which until then had been the domain of tribal
politics. The result was that the Shammar tribe began to lose its function
of protecting its members and managing their communal resources as
those have been appropriated by the state and redistributed among them
according to the degree of their loyalty.
The land redistribution process started with the 1968 Land Redistribu-
tion Law. In theory, all citizens can apply for a piece of land, but in
reality, land distribution was based on tribal membership and favouritism
by the state. The example of the Khota project demonstrates this very
clearly. Al-Khota was in the Shammar traditional territory. Those who
had access to land in the project were only able to do so as a result of
entering the patronage network of the local Saudi amir (governor of Hail)
or of having influential friends within the emirate bureaucracy. The
outcome of this policy was marked by the increasing internal economic
differentiation of the group and their political fragmentation, thus ensuring
that joint action on behalf of the Shammar became a remote possibility.
The fragmentation of the Shammar and their economic dependence on
the state were combined with direct policies of exclusion from certain
opportunities. For example, unlike the Murrah tribe,33 the Shammar were
not recipients of regular salaries from the National Guard, a para-military
body created by the state and consisting of members of the bedouin
groups. Shammar loyalty has never been taken for granted and remains
so until the present day. Consequently, a National Guard Unit has not
been established in their area.:
In summary, the containment of the Shammar and their leadership has
been achieved through the implementation of various measures, all
aiming, since the establishment of the state, to restrain opposition and to
destroy potential future resistance. The outstanding features of this
process were the use of violence, the creation of religious divisions, politi-
cal fragmentation, and economic dependency. In the following section,
we examine how the state after its maturity and greater sophistication of
the 1990s has been dealing with the Shia religious opposition.
Saudi Arabia has been regarded as one of the most homogenous
countries in the Middle East. This homogeneity is believed to be mani-
fested at the religious level. The majority of its population are Sunni
Muslims, who subscribe to the Whahhabi interpretation of Islam. How-
ever, this vision of the country obscures local cultural, tribal and religious
variations. Above all, it conceals the presence of a substantial Shia
community whose members had been agricultural farmers settled in the
oases of the Eastern province (al-Hasa), and are now urban dwellers in
the main cities such as Qatif, Hufuf, Dhahran. and Damam.
It is hard to arrive at an accurate estimate of the size of the Shia
community since their sheer presence represents one of the controversial
issues that the government prefers to conceal. Therefore, one stumbles
across figures ranging from the most reserved, 275,000, to 400,000,36 to
the most optimistic 500,000.37 In the absence of accurate statistics, perhaps
a figure of 400,000 can be realistic, thus representing 8 per cent of the total
population. The community is geographically concentated in the strategic
Eastern province, the oil zone of the country. The oil reserves in Qatif
and Ghawar are in places where almost 90 per cent of the population are
Shiites, hence the importance of any opposition that originates in this
area.
The Saudi state endorses the principles of Wahhabism summarized in
the belief in tawhid (the oneness of God) and the mission of the Prophet
Muhammad. This interpretation came into conflict with a whole range of
other Islamic interpretations. The confrontation was however severe
especially with the Shia version of Islam. Since its foundation in the
eighteenth century, Wahhabism under the banner of the Al Saud rejected
Shia beliefs and labelled them as bida' (innovations). The Shia hereditary
principles of succession were unequivocally opposed as the Wahhabis

emphasized the termination of the prophecy with the death of the Prophet.
Theological differences between the two versions of Islam were exaggera-
ted, thus creating from the very beginning an insurmountable barrier in
the way of any coexistence, let alone any reconciliation. In fact since the
eighteenth century the relationship between the two opposed camps has
been characterized by the intolerance of the Sunni majority of this Shia
enclave in Arabia. Religious intolerance was often translated into overt
violence, persecution, ostracism and hostility. Examples of direct attacks
on the Shia pilgrims both lcoal and foreign from Iraq and Persia, who
came to Arabia's holy cities to perform the pilgrimage are recorded by
historians and travellers. Wahhabi fanatics continued to raid their caravans
and plunder their possessions in the name of God. Their property and
even their lives were regarded as halal targets like those of the kafirs
(infidels). In 1802 Saudi Wahhabi forces attacked Karbala, the Shia holy
city in Iraq.38 After the incident, some pilgrims avoided travelling through
Saudi-Wahhabi territory and preferred to follow the caravan routes
which passed through northern Najd, a territory under the control of the
Rashidis, often described in the literature as a lenient and religiously
tolerant authority.39 This confrontation continued after the incorporation
of Al-Hasa in Ibn Saud's realm in 1913 and remained during the consoli-
dation of the present Saudi State.
In 1927, an ulema meeting took place in Riyadh under the auspices of
Ibn Saud to discuss a policy towards the Shia of the country. The meeting
came to the conclusion that they should be converted to the 'right path of
Islam', meaning Wahhabism. The use of force to achieve this end was not
ruled out.0 Furthermore, even after the fatwa of Al-Azhar University in
1959 which recognized Shiism to be the fifth school of Islamic jurisdiction,
the Wahhabis continued to regard them as heretics. The final official
religious policy in the chain of intolerance vis-a-vis the community came
in 1991 when Ibn Baz, head of the religious ulema in Saudi Arabia declared
that the Shia represent a Khariji sect.
While various fatwas against the community continued to be issued, on
the ground a number of measures were implemented with the objective of
'Islamising the Shia'. Ibn Jiluwi, the first Saudi governor of the eastern
province after 1913 regarded it to be his mission to enforce the 'Islamiza-
tion' of the Shia who came under his authority. The practice of taqiyya
(concealing the faith) became widely acceptable in the face of these restric-
tive measures.4" Systematic physical and symbolic violence over a long
period of time contributed to the alienation of the community and its
ghettoization. This was also accompanied by an attempt to abolish the
region's cultural, social and historical specifity which stemmed from its
geographical position on the Persian Gulf and its long lasting contacts
with the outside world through trade.42
In the 1980s subtle discrimination manifested itself in the absence of
state eonomic investment in the region and its marginalization socially,
culturally and economically. Apart from its involvement in the flourishing
oil industry, the government showed no serious commitment to develop-
ing the area's infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and other amenities
which benefit the local population. Furthermore, while some Shia
members of the community found employment at the bottom of the
employment scale in the oil company ARAMCO as manual labourers,
the majority were excluded from government posts and other professional
areas such as teaching, medicine, and the army. Consequently, the Shia
felt in the words of their spokesman in exile, Hamza al Hassan, as 'second
class citizens, confined to a ghetto and ostracised and estranged from the
dominant Sunni Muslim population'.4
The history of oppression and exclusion from mainstream Najdi religio-
cultural tradition, represented by Wahhabism and adopted by the Saudis,
contributed to the development of a tendency among the Shia to look
beyond the boundaries of the country for religious, ideological and
cultural inspiration. Hence, the region and its population were receptive
to political ideas that flourished in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s.
For example, it is this region where industrial strikes by the Shia working
in oil fields under the authority of ARAMCO took place in 1953 and 1956.
They demanded the amelioration of working conditions, higher salaries
and the right of industrial representation. Moreover, in the 1960s, embit-
tered by their marginalized minority status in the country, members of the
Shia community responded to Nasser's version of Arab nationalism,
which seemd at the time to provide a promise of equality with the majority
on the basis of communal Arab cultural bonds, thus overlooking their
Shiism. Similarly, the Ba'thist version of Arab nationalism had its grip on
the imagination of the region's population as it appealed to unity on non-
religious or sectarian grounds. Consequently, as such political ideologies
were rejected by the state, their proponents in the country were continu-
ously subjected to a fierce campaign of arrest, torture, and exile especially
during the reign of King Faisal in the 1960s and 1970s.
However, the greatest confrontation between the Shia community and
the Saudi state took place after the success of the Islamic revolution in
Iran. In 1980 the Saudi Shi organized a demonstration and a series of
strikes to celebrate the return of Imam Khomeini to Iran. This obviously
was dealt with repressively by the Saudi authorities and the National
Guard, leading to a number of deaths in the region. The Shia remember
the events as 'intifadat al-mantaqa al-sharqiyya' (the uprising of the
Eastern province), a symbol of the repression to which the community

had historically been subjected. Munadhamat al-thawrta al-islamiyya
(The Organization of Islamic Revolution), a clandestine Shia organization
representing the community in the Eastern province began to take shape
as the political outlet for the group following the spontaneous events of
1979-80. Membership in the organization was drawn from students and
ARAMCO workers." The Organization started broadcasting from
Iranian Radio stations in an attempt to reach the community in Saudi
Arabia. Also an information office was opened in Tehran to co-ordinate
political activities. Although the organization denies the patronage of
Iran, it is however proud of the fact that it has become a focal point for
other Shia in the Gulf, mainly in Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab
Emirates.
The monthly magazine al-jazira al-arabiyya (The Arabian Peninsula)
is perhaps one of the most consistent publications containing the discourse
of the Organization of the Islamic Revolution, which became known
since 1992 as al-haraka al-islahiyya (The Reform Movement)." While the
magazine systematically exposes the physical and symbolic violence of
the Saudi state against members of the Shia community by reproducing
the reports of international human right agencies, its exiled London-
based editorial board tries to combine their direct attacks on the regime
with quasi academic discourse. In its search for credibility, the magazine
contains articles and literary reports by distinguished Saudi writers, poets
and scholars. One interesting line of analysis developed by the editorial
board, founders and active members of the Reform Movement, was
related to a restatement of Ibn Khaldun's argument which caricatured the
segmentary nature of tribal and nomadic politics, the cyclical pattern of
dynastic rise and fall, and ridiculed the alleged 'blind Bedouin asabiyya'.
The magazine criticized the regime for promoting tribal asabiyya rather
than detribalisation, and also for promoting regionalism and sectarianism
at the expense of developing a unifying national and religious identity
in the country. Above all, al-haraka al-islahiyya through the magazine
emphasized the cultural, political and religious domination of Najd and
its Saudi-Wahhabi minority over the rest of the Arabian Peninsula,
including the Eastern province, the Hijaz and Asir.
Some of the articles in al-jazira al-arabiyya directly criticized the
Wahhabi religious establishment, in particular Ibn Baz, head of the
religious ulema. The criticism revolved around the rigid interpretations of
Wahhabism, its refusal to adapt to modern technological and social
change and its resistance to new ijtihad (interpretations). As the Shia
clergy and their specific version of Islam represent an area totally rejected
by Wahhabism, the magazine endeavoured also to refute stereotype
images of the community which the Saudi-Wahhabi establishment had

been promoting to discredit Shiism. The picure of the 'Blind Shaikh', has
become the caricature to represent Ibn Baz, the spokesman of official
Islam, on the pages of the magazine.
It is worth noting that both the magazine and the editorial board
behind it have been trying to build bridges with another Islamic move-
ment in the country, that which criticizes the regime from within the
Wahhabi establishment. The salafiyyun, a dissident group of young
Wahhabi ulema and university students have been since the Gulf War
very active in reaching the Saudi public through faxes, petitions, cassettes
and Friday sermons. Their main criticism of the government originated
with its use of foreign troops to defend the 'land of Islam'. Their demands
revolve around reform and return to the principal doctrines of Wahhabism
and the rejection of the corruption of the ruling group. However, although
some of the demands of the Wahhabi salafiyyun correspond to those of
the Shia community and its representatives, a wide gulf still separates the
two opposition groups. The Shia community is still considered to be
kafir (infidels) and mubdi'un (innovators) by both the official Wahhabi
establishment and the dissident group within it. The history of propaganda
against Shiism and the theological differences that exist between the two
branches are difficult to overcome. This makes any serious cooperation
between members of the t(wo religious opposition almost impossible to
think of at the present.
Since the Gulf War of 1991, the Shia opposition has been trying to
distance itself from religious extremism. The image that it wants to
project now is one of moderation. It searches for a place within the liberal
camp that includes among others the educated Hijazi elite. Its discourse
shifted from an insistence on the un-Islamic nature of the regime to one
which increasingly stresses the need for democratization and the enforce-
ment of civil society. According to a Shia spokesman, this means 'a
redistribution of economic and political power among the different
regions which make up the country'. The exiled Shia leadership moved
from total rejection of the regime during the time when the movement
was 'revolutionary' to a call for dialogue with the state. In the nineties,
this leadership calls for gradual changes rather than revolution. The man
who has been initiating this dialogue is the present Saudi ambassador to
London, Ghazi A. Algosaibi. Since his appointment in London, he has
been trying to build channels of communciation with the exiled Shia
opposition.
The Shia opposition has started calling for democracy and pluralism,
having abandoned its previous discourse on Islamic revolution, militant
action and extremism. Today, rather than focus on the tyrannical aspects
of the Saudi regime, the opposition leadership invokes the discourse of

human rights and the respect of religious and cultural diversity in the
country. This has been accompanied by a revival of al-asala al-shi'iyya
(Shia authenticity). This authenticity builds on the ancient Islamic
character of the Eastern province, and its Arab roots. Hamza al-Hassan,
one of the Shia spokesmen, stresses the Arab identity of the region, a
counter claim to Saudi propaganda which portrays the Shia community as
a Persian satellite in the Arabian Peninsula.4 Furthermore, other Shia
leaders have stressed the authenticity of their community in its adherence
to Islam by invoking the badu-hadar divide (sedentary-nomdic). While
the religiosity of the nomads has always been 'doubted' by the authorities,
the Shia claim a history of sedentary existence and agricultural labour,
both suitable conditions for practising Islam and observing its obligations
and rituals.
The change in Shia opposition discourse has been welcomed by the
state. The latter responded by inviting the exiled opposition leadership to
come back to the country. This invitation was accompanied by promises
for economic investment in the region, creation of new economic opportu-
nities and a general relaxation of the rules governing their presence in the
country, such as the ban on building Shia Mosques and husayniyyas, and
the celebration and excessive mourning during special Shia religious
festivals and rituals. The invitation was also dependent on the leadership's
commitment to terminating the publication of their magazine, al-jazira al-
arabiyya. At the time of writing this article,47 the London-based Shia
opposition has accepted the invitation and sent a representative to Saudi
Arabia to continue the process of negotiation with the regime. Other
members remain in exile because of the mistrust which has been nourished
over the years between the opposition and the state. From the point of
view of the opposition, the reconciliation is interpreted as a success; now
the state is forced to open channels of communication with them.
However, from the state's point of view, this was the first move in the
direction of encapsulating yet another opposition. Although the opposi-
tion leadership declined to discuss the 'price' paid for this reconciliation,
it was obvious that the old strategy of the regime which revolves around
bribery has been consistently used again. The opposition also continues
to propagate the idea that the publication of their magazine is 'suspended'
rather than permanently terminated.
Examining how the Saudi state has dealt with two types of opposition
situation, that of the Shammar and their tribal leadership, and the Shia
community and its religious opposition, we conclude that state practices
in the two caes have been different. While recognizing the relevance of
Islam and oil wealth, we argue here that the Saudi state cannot divorce
itself completely from its 'political culture', the sum total of the values,
norms and rules which underlie, enable and constrain political behaviour
in the country. By political culture we do not mean only 'tribalism' and
'Islam', transformed by the ruling group into an ideology capable of
endowing the regime with legitimacy, an interpretation propagated by
recent publications.48 This political culture defines what is acceptable in
politics and what is objectionable; it is the shared arena, the common
ground between society and the state. Furthermore, it is not a tool
imposed on society always from above as some authors imply in their
discussion of domestic politics in Saudi Arabia.49 Above all, this political
culture functions as both an enabling ideology, but above all as a constrain-
ing force. This is often not given enough attention by academics working
in the field of political science, international relations and political
economy. When its significance in the political process is acknowledged,
its role is often reduced to that of an ideology, upon which the ruling
group builds its legitimacy.
The enactment of this political culture is most obvious in the state's
treatment of tribal opposition. We argued that the state used a combina-
tion of overt confrontation and covert economic dependency in encapsu-
lating Shammar opposition. These two strategies were supplemented by
drawing the Rashidi leadership into marriage alliances with the Al Saud,
a policy in line with the way the state has dealt and continues to deal with
other tribal groups after the discovery of oil. Although violence was not
ruled out as a means of curbing the influence of the Rashidis, the state has
been relatively restrained. An explanation can be offered by reference to
the tribal values of the society in question. Direct and excessive oppression
of ex-tribal leaders and men of influence among huge tribal confederations
would have provoked unnecessary resentment and could have been
potentially explosive in a country which still values tribal identity and
affiliation. In dealing with tribal opposition, the state is not armed with a
legitimating ideology. Tribes such as the Shammar cannot be confronted
on religious grounds as they belong to mainstream Sunni Islam. They may
not show the same degree of zeal as historically expressed by the ikhwan,
but they remain Sunni Muslims, hence the lack of a religious pretext for
their utter suppression and humiliation. Their political opposition was
therefore, discussed with the aim of showing how the state established
a balance between direct confrontation, marriage ties, and more subtle
methods of subjugation.
The need for this balance seems to disappear in the way the state has
treated the Shia opposition. The Shia tribal identity is not an issue although
their communities recognize the bonds of kinship and tribal affiliation.

Their religious identity, however, is overemphasized by themselves and
the state. Consequently, they are opposed because of their interpretation
of Islam. Moreover, Shia resentment of their economic deprivation is
expresssed through the medium of religion. They perceive their sub-
ordination in terms of their minority status as subscribers to a different
interpretation of Islam. The confrontation, in spite of its being rooted in
politics, the struggle for power, and economic deprivation, is translated
into a religious opposition on both sides, i.e. the state and the community.
As the language of religion is employed by both groups, the state seems to
justify its use of excessive violence when dealing with Shia riots. Torture,
imprisonment, and even assassination are regularly practised. The state
seems to think that public opinion in this case is on its side whereas in the
first situation (tribal opposition), this is absent.
To understand this differential treatment, the concept of honour can
be useful here. While the violation of tribal honour by humiliating tribal
leadership is unacceptable, the same is done without hesitation in the
name of Islam. Curbing the Shia opposition is covered with religious
discourse inspired by the rhetoric of 'purifying' the country and its return
to the 'right path of Islam'. Ibn Baz's fatwas are crucial in justifying
violence and direct confrontation with the Shia. Similar fatwas cannot be
invoked when tribal opposition is at stake, hence the more subtle
approach towards the Shammar and the Rashidi leadership.
How does state policy towards the two types of opposition throw light
on the nature of political processes in the country? First, it is stressed that
the state functions within the predominant political culture society in
spite of the enormous oil wealth at its disposal, which allows the deploy-
ment of parallel strategies of oppression, diplomacy and bribery. The
use of violence by those in position of power is done within a specific
cultural framework. State policies towards the opposition are not solely
determined by its capcity to purchase the means of coercion (although
this capacity is extremely relevant), or by its ability to buy loyalty
(although this has often been practised), but by the predominant political
culture, which guides the selection of one strategy rather than the other.
This cultural interpretation explains the differences in state policy towards
its opposition groups in a more satisfactory manner. In the absence of
modern means for political participation and the expression of political
opposition, the Saudi state is constrained by its political culture. This
political culture defines the parameters of state actions. The parameters
cannot be regularly violated without serious consequences for the stability
of the political order.
NOTES
1. Research on the Shammar and their Hail dynasty was conducted by M. Al-Rasheed.
The Shia opposition was researched by L. Al-Rasheed in 1993. In both studies, a variety
of sources and research techniques were employed. These included archival research,
library and secondary sources, fieldwork and interviewing members of the opposition
groups, especially those in exile.
2. Opposition in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states during the 1960s has been the subject
of many publications. See for example F. Halliday, Arabia without Sultans (London,
1974).
3. The post-Gulf War Wahhabi religious opposition in Saudi Arabia is the subject of
another research project. A summary of results will appear in a forthcoming article by
M. Al-Rasheed, entitled, 'The Crown and the Turban: the Saudi state re-negotiating its
legitimacy in the post Gulf War period' (Paris, 1996).
4. The study of political centralization in various societies where anthropologists have
traditionally worked produced models to account for the evolution of these political
systems. The work of American anthropologists have been influential. See for example
E. Service, The Origins of State and Civilisations (New York, 1975) and M. Fried, The
Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York, 1967).
More recent studies of politics and states in primitive societies are found in H. Claessen
and P. Skalnik (eds.), The Early State (the Hague, 1978) and The Study of the State (the
Hague, 1981). The evolution of the state in nomadic societies is well documented in
A. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World (Cambridge, 1984).
5. D. Hiro, Inside the Middle East (London, 1982).
6. H. Lackner, A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (London,
1978).
7. J. Kostiner, The Making of SaudiArabia 1916-1936 (London, 1993).
8. H. Lackner, A House Built on Sand.
9. On the rentier state within political science discourse, see H. Beblawi and G. Luciani
(eds.) The Rentier State (London, 1987); G. Luiciani (ed.) The Arab State (Berkeley,
1990) and G. Salame, 'Political power and the Saudi State', MERIP Report, No.91
(October 1980). For an adaptation of the theory by anthropologists, see J. Davis, Libyan
Politics: Tribe and Revolution (London, 1987) and R. Fernea, 'Technological Innova-
tion and Class Development among the Bedouin of Hail', in B. Cannon (ed.), Terroirs
et Societes au Maghreb et Moyen Orient (Paris, 1987).
10. J. Davis, Libyan Politics, pp.18-19.
11. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab
Gulf States (New York, 1994), p.4.
12. S. Altorki and D. Cole Arabian Oasis City: the Transformaton of Unayzah (Texas,
1989.
13. R. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1965).
14. M. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis: the Rashidi Tribal Dynasty (London,
1991) and 'The Rhasidi Dynasty: Political Centralisation among the Shammar of North
Arabia', in R. Bidwell, G. Smith and J. Serjeant (eds.) New Arabian Studies, Vol.2,
pp. 140-52, (1994).
15. N. Safran, SaudiArabia: Ceaseless Questfor Security (Harvard, 1985).
16. Ibid., p.439.
17. The Independent, 3 March 1992.
18. For example on Iraq see S. Al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq
(London, 1989).
19. M. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis.
20. The documentation of this period is derived from reading of archival sources in India
Office Library (IOR) and other locations. For further details, see M. Al-Rasheed,
Politics in an Arabian Oasis, pp.283-4.
21. IOR, R/15/5/104, Reply to Hamilton on a recent Journey to Nejd 1917-1919.
22. M. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, p.231.
23. IOR/15/5/28, from High commissioner Baghdad to Political Agent Kuwait 1921, p. 16.
24. M. Al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis, p.248.
25. The segmentary politics of the tribes and their solidarity have been reconsidered in a
number of anthropological studies. For an overview see D. Eickelman, The Middle
East: An Anthropological Approach (Texas, 1981), pp.85-104. In political science, the
debate on the relevance of tribalism to modern politics in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf
states is discussed in F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies Domestic and Security
Challenges in the Arab Gulf States (New York, 1994).
26. J. Habib, Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan and Their Role in The Creation of
The Saudi Kingdom 1910-1930 (Leiden, 1978).
27. IOR/15/5/101, from Philby to Political Agents Baghdad 1918.
28. M. Al-Rasheed 'Durable and Non-Durable Dynasties: the Rashidis and Saudis in
Central Arabia', British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.19, No.2 (1992),
pp. 144-58.
29. Saudi Arabia is perhaps one of the least accessible countries for anthropological field-
ork. This is reflected in the scarcity of anthropological monographs. Anthropologists
Fabietti and Fernea were able to do research in the country because at the time of their
respective studies, they worked in the field of development under strict supervision by
the government.
30. U. Fabietti, 'Control and alienation of Territory among the Bedouin of Saudi Arabia',
Nomadic Peole (1986), p.39.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p.35.
33. D. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads: The al-Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter (USA,
1975).
34. R. Fernea'Technological Innovation'.
35. D. Holden and R. Johns, The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful
Dynasty in the Arab World (New York, 1981).
36. J. Buchan, 'Secular and Religious Opposition in Saudi Arabia, in T. Niblock (ed.),
State, Society and Economy in SaudiArabia (London, 1982).
37. Interviews with Hamza al Hassan, Shia opposition spokesman, London January 1994.
Other Shia discourse is found in A. Al-Shaykh, S. Al Dakhil and A. Al-Zayr, Intifadat
al minteqa al sharqiyya (The Intifada in the Eastern Province) (London, 1981).
38. L. Champenois, 'Le Royaume d'Arabie Sauudite', in P. Bonnefant (ed.), la Peninsule
ArabiqueAujourd'hui, Vol.2, (Paris, 1982).
39. The Wahhabi atrocities against the Shia communities of the Arabian Peninsula are
well documented in historical literature and travellers monographs. For a representative
work, see C. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2 volumes (London, 1979).
40. A. Al Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of SaudiArabia, (Boulder, 1985).
41. The principle of taqiyya (concealing the faith) has always been practised by religious
minority groups in the Middle East especially those who experienced violence on the
basis of their faith. Such communities confined their religious practice and rituals to the
safe private spheres of their homes while concealing their faith in public.
42. G. Grandguillaume 'Valorisation et Ddvalorisation lides aux contacts de cultures en
Arabie Saoudite', in Bonnenfant (ed.) La PeninsuleArabique.
43. Interview with Hamza al Hassan, see note 37.
44. J. Goldberg, 'The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia', in J. Cole and N. Keddie (eds.),
Shiism and Social Protest (New York, 1986) and J. Kostiner, 'Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf' in
M. Kramer (ed.), Shi'ism Resistance and Revolution (Boulder, 1987).
45. al Jazira al arabiyya, No. 1-31, London 1991-93.
46. Interview with Hamza al Hassan, see note 37.
47. Research on the Shia opposition was carried out in 1993-4 at the time when reconcilia-
tion with the Saudi regime was in its final stage.
48. For example, Gause argues that the political culture of Gulf states manifests itself in
the way the rulers employ a political language redolent of Islamic and tribal overtones
to convince their citizens of the legitimacy of their political system. Here the political
culture is reduced to the role of a 'legitimation formula'. F. Gregory Gause III, Oil
Monarchies, p.25.
49. Gause (see note 48) has an interesting discussion of how Gulf state rulers capitalise on
'tribalism' and 'Islam' to give themselves credibility. However, he seems to miss the
point that those two elements are not imposed from above, but are grounded in the
social and political fabrics of these societies. When rulers invoke these images, they
touch two important aspects of the lives of their citizens. Emphasizing the so-called
'mythical' and 'rhetorical' elements of the political culture leads him to ignore the social
organizational dimension of both tribalism and Islam in society.

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Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Middle Eastern Studies

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The Politics of Encapsulation: Saudi Policy towards Tribal and Religious Opposition

Author(s): Madawi Al-Rasheed and Loulouwa Al-Rasheed

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.32, No.1, January 1996, pp.96-119

chieftaincy pattern. Greater political sophistication was shown only in

looking at two examples, located at different historical periods, we aim

Kuwait. Consequently, when Ibn Saud recaptured Riyadh from the

The Iraq government is being placed in great difficulty by the influx

Therefore, while the state generally tackled the problem of tribes by

was regarded by the state to be potentially threatening as it is associated

principles of succession were unequivocally opposed as the Wahhabis

Eastern province), a symbol of the repression to which the community

images of the community which the Saudi-Wahhabi establishment had

of the Saudi regime, the opposition leadership invokes the discourse of

their communities recognize the bonds of kinship and tribal affiliation.

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