Rufino v.

Endriga,

Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP)
for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines.1 The CCP is to
awaken the consciousness of the Filipino people to their artistic and cultural heritage
and encourage them to preserve, promote, enhance, and develop such heritage. 2
PD 15 created a Board of Trustees ("Board") to govern the CCP. PD 15 mandates the
Board to draw up programs and projects that (1) cultivate and enhance public interest
in, and appreciation of, Philippine art; (2) discover and develop talents connected with
Philippine cultural pursuits; (3) create opportunities for individual and national self-
expression in cultural affairs; and (4) encourage the organization of cultural groups and
the staging of cultural exhibitions.3 The Board administers and holds in trust real and
personal properties of the CCP for the benefit of the Filipino people.4 The Board invests
income derived from its projects and operations in a Cultural Development Fund set up
to attain the CCP's objectives.5

The consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding
involving two sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the
contending groups, both claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal
right to hold office. The resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the
provision of PD 15 on the manner of filling vacancies in the Board.

The Case
Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In G.R. No. 139554, petitioners Armita B. Rufino
("Rufino"), Zenaida R. Tantoco ("Tantoco"),6 Lorenzo Calma ("Calma"), Rafael Simpao, Jr.
("Simpao"), and Freddie Garcia ("Garcia"), represented by the Solicitor General and
collectively referred to as the Rufino group, seek to set aside the Decision7 dated 14
May 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50272 as well as the Resolution
dated 3 August 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration. The dispositive portion of
the appellate court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
1) Declaring petitioners [the Endriga group] to have a clear right to their respective
offices to which they were elected by the CCP Board up to the expiration of their 4-year
term,
2) Ousting respondents [the Rufino group], except respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco, from
their respective offices and excluding them therefrom, and
3) Dismissing the case against respondent Zenaida R. Tantoco.
SO ORDERED.8
In G.R. No. 139565, petitioners Baltazar N. Endriga ("Endriga"), Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
("Lagdameo"), Patricia C. Sison ("Sison"), Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano ("Potenciano"),
and Doreen Fernandez ("Fernandez"), collectively referred to as the Endriga group,
assail the Resolution dated 3 August 1999 issued by the Court of Appeals in the same
case insofar as it denied their Motion for Immediate Execution of the Decision dated 14
May 1999.
The Antecedents
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO
30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of
Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original
founding trustees, who were all appointed by President Marcos, were Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, Juan Ponce-Enrile, Andres Soriano, Jr., Antonio Madrigal, Father
Horacio Dela Costa, S.J., I.P. Soliongco, and Ernesto Rufino.
On 5 October 1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos
issued PD 15,9 the CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-
municipal public corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics." 10 PD 15
increased the members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive
Order No. 1058, issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11.
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for
the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new
trustees to the Board. Eventually, during the term of President Fidel V. Ramos, the CCP
Board included Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano, Fernandez, Lenora A. Cabili
("Cabili"), and Manuel T. Mañosa ("Mañosa").
On 22 December 1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada appointed seven new trustees
to the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two
other incumbent trustees. The seven new trustees were:
1. Armita B. Rufino - President, vice Baltazar N. Endriga
2. Zenaida R. Tantoco - Member, vice Doreen Fernandez
3. Federico Pascual - Member, vice Lenora A. Cabili
4. Rafael Buenaventura - Member, vice Manuel T. Mañosa
5. Lorenzo Calma - Member, vice Ma. Paz D. Lagdameo
6. Rafael Simpao, Jr. - Member, vice Patricia C. Sison
7. Freddie Garcia - Member, vice Irma Ponce-Enrile Potenciano
Except for Tantoco, the Rufino group took their respective oaths of office and assumed
the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
On 6 January 1999, the Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto before this Court
questioning President Estrada's appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board.
The Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board
"shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular
meeting x x x." In case "only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the
surviving trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP]." The
Endriga group claimed that it is only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the
President of the Philippines fill such vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking
officers of the CCP.
The Endriga group asserted that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino
group, only one seat was vacant due to the expiration of Mañosa's term. The CCP Board
then had 10 incumbent trustees, namely, Endriga, Lagdameo, Sison, Potenciano,
Fernandez, together with Cabili, Father Bernardo P. Perez ("Fr. Perez"), Eduardo De los
Angeles ("De los Angeles"), Ma. Cecilia Lazaro ("Lazaro"), and Gloria M. Angara
("Angara"). President Estrada retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as
trustees.
Endriga's term was to expire on 26 July 1999, while the terms of Lagdameo, Sison,
Potenciano, and Fernandez were to expire on 6 February 1999. The Endriga group
maintained that under the CCP Charter, the trustees' fixed four-year term could only be
terminated "by reason of resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause." Presidential
action was neither necessary nor justified since the CCP Board then still had 10
incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to fill by election any vacancy in the
Board.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and control
of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the CCP
"shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation x x x."
The Court referred the Endriga group's petition to the Court of Appeals "for appropriate
action" in observance of the hierarchy of courts.
On 14 May 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision under review granting the
quo warranto petition. The Court of Appeals declared the Endriga group lawfully
entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the appellate court's Decision
ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board.
In their motion for reconsideration, the Rufino group asserted that the law could only
delegate to the CCP Board the power to appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees
of the Board. The law may not validly confer on the CCP trustees the authority to
appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would be officers of equal rank and
not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP trustees to elect their
fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of "officers lower in
rank" than the appointing power.
On 3 August 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals also denied the Endriga group's motion for
immediate execution of the 14 May 1999 Decision.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
Meanwhile, Angara filed a Petition-in-Intervention before this Court alleging that
although she was not named as a respondent in the quo warranto petition, she has an
interest in the case as the then incumbent CCP Board Chairperson. Angara adopted the
same position and offered the same arguments as the Rufino group.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that Section 6(b) of PD 15 providing for the manner of filling
vacancies in the CCP Board is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. Section 6(b) of PD 15
mandates the remaining trustees to fill by election vacancies in the CCP Board. Only
when the Board is entirely vacant, which is not the situation in the present case, may
the President exercise his power to appoint.
The Court of Appeals stated that the legislative history of PD 15 shows a clear intent "to
insulate the position of trustee from the pressure or influence of politics by abandoning
appointment by the President of the Philippines as the mode of filling" 11 vacancies in
the CCP Board. The Court of Appeals held that until Section 6(b) of PD 15 is declared
unconstitutional in a proper case, it remains the law. The Court of Appeals also clarified
that PD 15 vests on the CCP Chairperson the power to appoint all officers, staff, and
personnel of the CCP, subject to confirmation by the Board.
The Court of Appeals denied the Rufino group's motion for reconsideration for failure to
raise new issues except the argument that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional. The
Court of Appeals declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 6(b) of PD 15 since
the Rufino group raised this issue for the first time in the motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals also held, "Nor may the President's constitutional and/or statutory
power of supervision and control over government corporations restrict or modify the
application of the CCP Charter."12
The Court of Appeals, moreover, denied the Endriga group's motion for immediate
execution of judgment on the ground that the reasons submitted to justify execution
pending appeal were not persuasive.

Villena v. Secretary,
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the
Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of
Makati, Rizal, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed
bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of
the law profession. The respondent recommended the suspension of Villena
to the President of the Philippines, in which it was verbally granted. The
Secretary then suspended Villena from office. Villena filed a petition for
preliminary injunction against the Sec. to restrain him and his agents from
proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to
suspend and order investigation over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend
Mayor Villena. As to the power to order investigation, it was provided in
Section 79 (C) of RAC that Department of Interior was given the authority to
supervise bureaus and offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in
relation to Section 86 of the same Code which granted the said Department of
executive supervision over administration of provinces, municipalities and
other political subdivisions. This supervision covers the power to order
investigation because supervision “implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render power real and effective.”However, unlike this
power to order investigation, the power to suspend a mayor was not
provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the Secretary
of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the
Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of
suspension. Yet this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of
Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that “the acts of the
department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President,
presumptively the acts of the President.” The power to suspend may be
exercised by the President. It follows that the heads of the Department under
her may also exercise the same, unless the law required the President to act
personally or that situation demanded him so, because the heads of the
departments are assistants and agents of the President.

Araneta v. Gatmaitan, (2 Topics)

FACTS:

The President issued EO 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in San

Miguel Bay, and the EO 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as a
response for the general clamor among the majority of people living
in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the
area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl
fishing.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing
a complaint for injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary
injunction with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as
Civil Case No. 24867, praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said executive order; to
declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be
just and equitable in the premises.

ISSUE: Whether Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 were valid, for
the issuance thereof was not in the exercise of legislative powers
unduly delegated to the President.

RULING:

Yes. As already held by this Court, the true distinction between

delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring of authority or
discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former
necessary involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in
the latter the authority or discretion as to its execution has to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

In the case of U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1, We also held, the
power to delegate - the Legislature cannot delegate legislative power
to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules
and regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law
or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the
act is delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to

take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Philippines and b.) it
authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was
complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its
legislative intent. The President did nothing but show an anxious
regard for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of
general concern which were in consonance and strict conformity with
law.

Gascon v. Arroyo,
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order,
petitioners seek to annul and set aside the "Agreement to Arbitrate"
entered into by and between the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by Executive Secretary Joker T. Arroyo, and ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio
Lopez, Jr., dated 6 January 1987, to settle the claims of ABS-CBN for
the return of radio and television stations (TV Station Channel 4), and
to enjoin the Arbitration Committee created under the aforesaid
agreement from adjudicating the claims of ABS-CBN.
The record discloses the following facts:
The Lopez family is the owner of two (2) television stations, namely:
Channels 2 and 4 which they have operated through the ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation.
When martial law was declared on 21 September 1972, TV Channel
4 was closed by the military; thereafter, its facilities were taken over
by the Kanlaon Broadcasting System which operated it as a
commercial TV station.
In 1978, the said TV station and its facilities were taken over by the
National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it as the
Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4).
After the February 1986 EDSA revolution, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) sequestered the
aforementioned TV Stations, and, thereafter, the Office of Media
Affairs took over the operation of TV Channel 4.
On 17 April 1986, the Lopez family, through counsel, ex-Senator
Lorenzo Tanada, requested President Aquino to order the return to
the Lopez family of TV Stations 2 and 4.1
On 13 June 1986, the Lopez family made a written request to the
PCGG for the return of TV Station Channel 2. On 18 June 1986, the
PCGG approved the return of TV Station Channel 2 to the Lopez
family.2 The return was made on 18 October 1986.
Thereafter, the Lopez family requested for the return of TV Station
Channel 4. Acting upon the request, respondent Executive Secretary,
by authority of the President, entered into with the ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio
Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate",3 pursuant to which an
Arbitration Committee was created, composed of Atty. Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., for the Republic of the Philippines, Atty. Pastor del
Rosario, for ABS-CBN, and retired Justice Vicente Abad Santos, as
Chairman.
Thereupon, petitioners,as taxpayers, filed the instant petition.
Before discussing the issues raised in the present petition, the Court
will first resolve the question of whether or not the herein petitioners
have the legal personality or standing to the the instant case.
There have been several cases wherein the Court recognized the
right of a taxpayer to file an action questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or law, on the theory that the expenditure
of public funds by an officer of the government for the purpose of
administering or implementing an unconstitutional or invalid law,
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.4
The present case, however, is not an action to question the
constitutionality or validity of a statute or law. It is an action to annul
and set aside the "Agreement to Arbitrate", which, as between the
parties, is contractual in character. Petitioners have not shown that
they have a legal interest in TV Station Channel 4 and that they will
be adversely affected if and when the said television station is
returned to the Lopez family. Petitioners, therefore, have no legal
standing to file the present petition.
In addition, the petition is devoid of merit.
Under the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
also known as the Freedom Constitution), which was in force and
effect when the "Agreement to Arbitrate" was signed by the parties
thereto on 6 January 1987, the President exercised both the
legislative and executive powers of the Government. As Chief
Executive, the President was (and even now) "assisted by a Cabinet"
composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by
and accountable to the President.5 In other words, the Members of
the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in
person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments
performed in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.6
Respondent Executive Secretary had, therefore, the power and
authority to enter into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS- CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the
President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid
and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto.
Moreover, the settlement of controversies is not vested in the courts
of justice alone to the exclusion of other agencies or bodies.
Whenever a controversy arises, either or both parties to the
controversy may file the proper action in court. However, the parties
may also resort to arbitration under RA 876 which is a much faster
way of settling their controversy, compared to how long it would take
if they were to go to court. In entering into the "Agreement to
Arbitrate", the Executive branch of the government merely opted to
avail itself of an alternative mode of settling the claim of the private
respondent ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation for the return of TV
Station Channel 4. Court held that where the government takes
property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government
without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent. That is, as it should be, for the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.8
Finally, neither the "convening of Congress" nor the "recent
declaration of the President that PTV-4 shall remain as the
information arm of the government" can render "ineffective and
unenforceable" the "Agreement to Arbitrate" because at the time of
the signing of the said agreement, the President was exercising both
the legislative and executive powers of the Government, and since
the "Agreement to Arbitrate" is valid, it is "enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law for the
revocation of any contract."9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Fernan, C.J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr. J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that the Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order should be dismissed. I reach
this conclusion on the same ground adduced by my learned
colleague, Padilla, J., i.e., that petitioners "have no legal standing to
file the present petition." A decision on the merits rendered in a case
where the petitioners do not have the necessary legal standing,
would in essence be a decision not rendered in a proper, justiciable
controversy or case. Such a decision appears to me to be very close
to a decision rendered in a petition for declaratory relief or for an
advisory opinion. The Court, of course, has no jurisdiction ratione
materiae over declaratory relief cases or petitions for advisory
opinion. It seems to me that disregard of the requirement of legal
standing, where such requirement is applicable, would in effect
amount to the Court acting in cases where it has no subject matter
jurisdiction.
I believe that is all that is necessary to decide this case. Accordingly,
the statements made by the Court in respect of the substantive issue
raised that is, the validity of the agreement to arbitrate said to have
been entered into between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation are, I submit
with respect, unnecessary and therefore obiter. That substantive
issue is important; it, among other things, would presumably affect
the validity and enforceability of any award rendered by the arbitral
tribunal. But it should be litigated in a proper case or controversy,
between parties who have legal standing to file the case and legal
interest in the subject matter of the case if only for the reason that
then the Court might hope to have the benefit of thorough analysis by
counsel of the substantive issues raised.

Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that the Petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order should be dismissed. I reach
this conclusion on the same ground adduced by my learned
colleague, Padilla, J., i.e., that petitioners "have no legal standing to
file the present petition." A decision on the merits rendered in a case
where the petitioners do not have the necessary legal standing,
would in essence be a decision not rendered in a proper, justiciable
controversy or case. Such a decision appears to me to be very close
to a decision rendered in a petition for declaratory relief or for an
advisory opinion. The Court, of course, has no jurisdiction ratione
materiae over declaratory relief cases or petitions for advisory
opinion. It seems to me that disregard of the requirement of legal
standing, where such requirement is applicable, would in effect
amount to the Court acting in cases where it has no subject matter
jurisdiction.
I believe that is all that is necessary to decide this case. Accordingly,
the statements made by the Court in respect of the substantive issue
raised that is, the validity of the agreement to arbitrate said to have
been entered into between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation are, I submit
with respect, unnecessary and therefore obiter. That substantive
issue is important; it, among other things, would presumably affect
the validity and enforceability of any award rendered by the arbitral
tribunal. But it should be litigated in a proper case or controversy,
between parties who have legal standing to file the case and legal
interest in the subject matter of the case if only for the reason that
then the Court might hope to have the benefit of thorough analysis by
counsel of the substantive issues raised.

Lacson v. Roque,
The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some
allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against a certain judge
(Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A
special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special prosecutor
recommended the suspension of Lacson to the President. The
President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued
a suspension order against Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president
from his post.
HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision
granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. It is true that the President “shall . . . exercise general
supervision over all local governments,” but supervision does not
contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or
suspend municipal officers is not well taken. Removal and suspension
of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable
and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided
for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be done
“conformably to law;” and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines he “may at any time remove a person from any position of
trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines.” Again,
this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this
case, the allege libelous act of Lacson cannot be considered as
disloyalty.

Mondano v Silvosa

FACTS:
 Petitioner is the duly elected and qualified Mayor of Mainit, Surigao.
 Consolacion vda de Mosende filed a complaint with the Presidential
Complaints and Actions Committee accusing him of raping her daughter
and concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter.
 The Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to Silvosa,
provincial governor of Surigao, for immediate investigation, appropriate
action and report.
 Silvosa issued an Administrative Order suspending Mondano from office.
Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from
further proceeding.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of suspension by the provincial governor is illegal.

RULING:
Yes.

The Supreme court held that the President’s power of general supervision over
local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law in
accordance with the constitutional limitation.

Here, the Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in
Sec. 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices
under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the
provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as granting upon the corresponding department head direct control,
direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that reason he
may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in
office, such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10,
Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.

Thus, if “general supervision over all local governments” is to be construed as the

same power granted to the Department Head in sec 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision.

Supervision - overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties.

Control - power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a

subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of
section 79 (c) of RAC.

Ang-Angco v. Castillo,
On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development
Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the Secretary of Commerce and Industry
requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities from
the customs house which were imported without any dollar allocation
or remittance of foreign exchange. Said commodities consisted of
1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not covered by any
Central Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company
addressed an identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was
also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank.
Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company, likewise wrote said
official urging that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned
concentrates. Not content with this step, he also wrote to Dr. Andres
Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging, the same
matter. Then Secretary Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo
stating, "Senator Sabido is taking this to you personally. Unless we
have legal objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the
concentrates upon payment of all charges in pesos. Please expedite
action."
Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central
Bank, thru Mr. Gregorio Licaros, submitted to the Monetary Board a
memorandum on the joint petition of the company and Sabido Law
Office for authority to withdraw the concentrates from the customs
house stating therein that it sees no objection to the proposal. The
Monetary Board, however, failed to take up the matter in its meeting
of October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve
any dollar allocation or foreign exchange, and of this decision Mr.
Licaros was informed.
Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central
Bank, on October 13, 1956, the counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far East
Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs
Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate
release of the concentrates, but this official seeing perhaps that the
importation did not carry any release certificate from the Central Bank
advised the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate
from the No-Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the case. In
the morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, of said Office,
wrote a letter addressed to the Collector of Customs stating, among
other things, that his office had no objection to the release of the
1,188 units of concentrates but that it could not take action on the
request as "the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar
Import Office within the contemplation of R.A. No. 1410." The counsel
already referred to above showed the letter to Collector of Customs
Ang-Angco who upon perusing it still hesitated to grant the release.
Instead he suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove
the ambiguity appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the
letter stating that the same was neither a permit nor a release.
Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by
telephone, Collector of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the letter
after which the Secretary verbally expressed his approval of the
release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, while
still in doubt as to the propriety of the action suggested, finally
authorized the release of the concentrates upon payment of the
corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes.
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the
release of the concentrates in question he immediately ordered their
seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the
warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against
Collector of Customs Ang-Angco charging him with having committed
a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint
President Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee
to investigate Ang-Angco composed of former Solicitor General
Ambrosio Padilla, as Chairman, and Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt.
Col. Angel A. Salcedo, as members. Together with Collector Ang-
Angco, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, was also investigated by the same
Committee, who was also charged in a separate complaint with
serious misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the State. As a result, Collector Ang-Angco was suspended from
office in the latter part of December, 1956.
After the investigation, the committee submitted to President
Magsaysay its report recommending that a suspension of 15 days,
without pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the
period of his suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was
reinstated to his office by Secretary Hernandez, but the decision on
the administrative case against him remained pending until the death
of President Magsaysay. After around three years from the
termination of the investigation during which period Ang-Angco had
been discharging the duties of his office, Executive Secretary Natalio
P. Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered a decision on the
case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and considering him
resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to
reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.
Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-
Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to
the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing him
from office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to
have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of Civil
Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final,
besides the fact that such decision is in violation of the guaranty
vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in the civil
service against removal or suspension except for cause in the
manner provided by law.
In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by
authority of the President, denied the request for reconsideration. Not
satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a
memorandum to President Garcia reiterating once more the same
grounds on which he predicated his request for reconsideration.
Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, in letter
dated July 1, 1960, denied the appeal. In this instance, Secretary
Castillo asserted that the President virtue of his power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct action
and dispose of the administrative case in question inasmuch as the
provisions of law that would seem to vest final authority in
subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government over
administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction cannot divest the
President of his power of control nor diminish the same.
Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to
him to secure his reinstatement to the office from which he was
removed without any valid cause or in violation of his right to due
process of law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a
petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The
Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for
injunction.
The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary
Natalio P. Castillo in acting on his case by authority of the President
in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice thereof,
violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers and
employees in the classified service in that he acted in violation of
Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which vests in the
Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to decide administrative cases against officers and employees in the
classified service, deprived him of his right of appeal under Section
18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose
decision on the matter is final, and removed him from the service
without due process in violation of Section 32 of the same Act which
expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or
employee from the civil service shall be accomplished only after due
process, and of Section 4, Article XII of our Constitution which
provides that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall be
removed except for cause as provided for by law." Since petitioner is
an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a
presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance
under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from
the service by the President in utter disregard of the provisions of the
Civil Service Act of 1959.
Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained
by petitioner. They admit that if the theory is to be considered in the
light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the same may
be correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law as it now stands provides
that all officers and employees who belong to the classified service
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil
Service and as such all administrative cases against them shall be
indorsed to said official whose decision may be appealed to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals from whose decision no further appeal can
be taken. They also admit that petitioner belongs to the classified civil
service. But it is their theory that the pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law applicable to employees in the classified service do not
apply to the particular case of petitioner since to hold otherwise would
be to deprive the President of his power of control over the officers
and employees of the executive branch of the government. In other
words, respondents contend that, whether the officers or employees
concerned are presidential appointees or belong to the classified
service, if they are all officers and employees in the executive
department, they all come under the control of the President and,
therefore, his power of removal may be exercised over them directly
without distinction. Indeed, respondents contend that, if, as held in
the case of Negado v. Castro, 55 O.G., 10534, the President may
modify or set aside a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at
the instance of the office concerned, or the respondent employee, or
may even do so motu propio, there would be in the final analysis no
logical difference between removing petitioner by direct action of the
President and separating him from the service by ultimate action by
the President should an appeal be taken from the decision of the Civil
Service Board of Appeals to him, or if in his discretion he may motu
proprio consider it necessary to review the Board's decision. It is
contended that this ruling still holds true in spite of the new provision
wrought into the law by Republic Act 2260 which eliminated the
power of review given to the President because the power of control
given by the Constitution to the President over officers and
employees in the executive department can only be limited by the
Constitution and not by Congress, for to permit Congress to do so
would be to diminish the authority conferred on the President by the
Constitution which is tantamount to amending the Constitution itself
(Hebron v. Reyes, L- 9124, July 28, 1958). Indeed this is the
argument invoked by respondent Castillo in taking direct action
against petitioner instead of following the procedure outlined in the
Civil Service Act of 1959 as may be seen from the following portion of
his decision.
In connection with the second ground advanced in support of your
petition, it is contended that in deciding the case directly, instead of
transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil Service for original
decision, his Office deprived the respondent of his right to appeal to
the Civil Service Board of Appeals. This contention overlooks the
principle that the President may modify or set aside a decision of the
Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of either the office
concerned or the respondent employee, or may even do so motu
proprio (Negado vs. Castro, 55 O.G, No. 51, p. 10534, Dec. 21,
1959). There would therefore be no difference in effect between
direct action by the President and ultimate action by him should an
appeal be taken from the decision of the Commissioner of Civil
Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The result is that the
President's direct action would be the final decision that would be
reached in case an appeal takes its due course.
Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the
President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner
even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the provisions
now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner sustains the
negative contending that the contrary view would deprive him of his
office without due process of law while respondents sustain the
affirmative invoking the power of control given to the President by the
Constitution over all officers and employees, belonging to the
executive department.
To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of the Civil
Service Act of 1959 it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative cases of all
officers and employees in the classified service for in said section the
following is provided: "Except as otherwise provided by law, (the
Commissioner shall) have final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees
in the competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to
the employees." The only limitation to this power is that the decision
of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a
period of 90 days after the same has been submitted for decision,
whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act
2260). It should be noted that the law as it now stands does not
provide for any appeal to the President, nor is he given the power to
review the decision motu proprio, unlike the provision of the previous
law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was expressly repealed by
the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the
decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be reversed or
modified motu proprio by the President. It is, therefore, clear that
under the present provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case
of petitioner comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the
procedure laid down therein in connection with the investigation and
disposition of his case, it may be said that he has been deprived of
due process as guaranteed by said law.
It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and
suspension of the officers and employees of the classified service are
subject to the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by law"
(Section 16 [i], Republic Act No. 2260). The question then may be
asked: Is the President empowered by any other law to remove
officers and employees in the classified civil service?
The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of the
Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent portion of which we quote:
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare
vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
(United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from
any position of trust or authority under the Government of the
(Philippine Islands) Philippines.
The phrase "conformably to law" is significant. It shows that the
President does not have blanket authority move any officer or
employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the
law that passed by the legislative body particularly with regard the
procedure, cause and finality of the removal of persons who may be
the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above stated we have such
law which governs action to be taken against officers and employees
in classified civil service. This law is binding upon President.
Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provides:
Power to appoint and remove. — The Department Head, the
recommendation of the chief of the Bureau or office concerned, shall
appoint all subordinate officers and employees appointment is not
expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, and may remove or punish them, except as especially
provided otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.
The phrase "in accordance with the Civil Service is also significant.
So we may say that even granting for administrative purposes, the
President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head of
the Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is still subject to
the Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know with regard to
officers and employees who belong to classified service the finality of
the action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil
Board of Appeals.
Let us now take up the power of control given to President by the
Constitution over all officers and employees in the executive
department which is now in by respondents as justification to override
the specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of control
couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its
extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes,
supra, had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to
mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," 1 to
distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal
government, but the decision does not go to the extent of including
the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive
department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of
control over the acts of the subordinate and not over the actor or
agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may set
aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties.
That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used
in administrative law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section
79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices under his
department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of
the chiefs of said bureaus or offices", and under Section 74 of the
same Code, the President's control over the executive department
only refers to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a
settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a
government, body, or individual,2 and it cannot be said that the
removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over
a specific policy of government.
But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that
it would entirely nullify and set at naught the beneficient purpose of
the whole civil service system implanted in this jurisdiction, which is to
give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the
classified service, in derogation of the provisions of our Constitution
which provides that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall
be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law"
(Section 4, Article XII, Constitution).Here, we have two provisions of
our Constitution which are apparently in conflict, the power of control
by the President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the
protection extended to those who are in the civil service of our
government embodied in Section 4, Article XII. It is our duty to
reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in a manner that
may give to both full force and effect and the only logical, practical
and rational way is to interpret them in the manner we do it in this
decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson v.
Romero:
... To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the
appointing power subject to removal or forced transfer at any time,
would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the whole
Civil Service System and structure. The country would then go back
to the days of the old Jacksonian Spoils System under which a
victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if so minded,
sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color
or affiliation from him, and sweep in his Political followers and
adherents, especially those who have given him help, political or
otherwise. (Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, 754)
There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the
President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove
officers and employees who belong to the executive department if
they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified
service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to
remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero,
supra), but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong
to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which
says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of
department" (Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to
these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of
departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their
removal precisely in view of this constitutional authority. One such
law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the
appointment of inferior officers in the heads of departments it may
limit and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public
interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the
appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the
removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the
officers so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional
prerogative of appointment to officers independently of legislation of
Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not only in
making appointments but in all that is incident thereto. (U.S. v.
Perkins, 116 U.S. 483)
In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent
Executive Secretary, even with the authority of the President, in
taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without
submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary
to law and should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately
reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila,
without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil
Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.

Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. v.Paño, (2 Topics)

The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of
the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had
been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources — yielded an affirmative answer from the lower court.1
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals
upon the provisions of Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a
1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of
Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a
portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was
officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared
agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants2
applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area. This was protested by
Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they
are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales
application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict,
rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the
application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose
Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
— on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held
that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of
the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public
interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend
on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they
have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted
land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of
Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be
subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual
occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to
reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." It may be well
to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the
Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts as found in said
decision.
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First
Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has
full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive
Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect.
And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a quo
dismissing plaintiff's case.
1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The
precept there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to
questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchment
claim is that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also
upon the President.
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law
is of constitutional origin.3 So, too, is his control of all executive
departments.4 Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege
to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their
acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or
reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the
correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the
Office of the President.5 This Court has recognized this practice in
several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved
by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the
President's appeal.6 In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this
last remedy of appeal was considered a fatal defect, warranting
dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative
remedies.7
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the
President reposes upon the President's power of control over the
executive departments.8 And control simply means "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."9
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot
undo an act of his department secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary
herein is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, petitioner
asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the presidential
power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is
argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act
personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the
President must exercise in person.10 Not as correct, however, is it so
say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive
Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he
perform in person.11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The
President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious
executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive
Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule
which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional
setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.12
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is
equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone
of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one department
head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot
intrude into the zone of action allocated to another department
secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that
where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of
the President," his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is
to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority
of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President
may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do
so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated
by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the Chief Executive,
and cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed.
Costs against plaintiff. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The learned opinion of Justice Sanchez possesses merit and inspires
assent. A further observation may not be amiss concerning that
portion thereof which speaks of "the standard practice" allowing
appeals from [decisions of Secretary of Natural Resources affirming
the action taken by the Director of Lands] to the Office of the
President. That for me is more than a "standard practice." It is sound
law. The constitutional grant to the President of the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices yields that
implication.1
If this were all, there would be no need for an additional expression of
my views. I feel constrained to do so however in order to emphasize
that the opinion of the Court appears to me to reflect with greater
fidelity the constitutional intent as embodied in the above provision
vesting the power of control in the Presidency.
The question asked in the opening paragraph of the opinion — "May
the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse
a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources [?]" — merits but one
answer. It must be in the unqualified affirmative. So the Court holds.
That is as it should be. Any other view would be highly unorthodox.
Nonetheless, the thought seems to lurk in the opinion of a
respectable number of members of the bar that a provision as that
found in the Public Land Act to the effect that decisions of Director of
Lands on questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources2 constitute a
limitation of such power of control. This view might have gained
plausibility in the light of Ang-Angco vs. Castillo,3 where the
procedure set forth in the Civil Service Act in 1959 was held binding
in so far as the President is concerned in the case of disciplinary
action taken against non-presidential appointees.
The argument that what the then Executive Secretary acting for the
President did was justified by the constitutional grant of control
elicited no favorable response. The Court apparently was not
receptive to a more expansive view of such executive prerogative.
This is not to say that what was there decided was entirely lacking in
justification. It is merely to suggest that it may contain implications not
in conformity with the broad grant of authority constitutionally
conferred on the President.
It is well-worth emphasizing that the President unlike any other official
in the Executive Department is vested with both "constitutional and
legal authority"4 as Justice Laurel noted. Care is to be taken then lest
by a too narrow interpretation what could reasonably be included in
such competence recognized by the Constitution be unduly restricted.
If my reading of the opinion of Justice Sanchez is correct, then there
is a more hospitable scope accorded such power of control. For me
this is more in keeping with the fundamental law. Moreover there
would be a greater awareness on the part of all of the broad range of
authority the President possesses by virtue of such a provision.
Reference to the words of Justice Laurel, who was himself one of the
leading framers of the Constitution and thereafter, as a member of
this Court, one of its most authoritative expounders in the leading
case of Villena vs. Secretary of Interior,5 is not inappropriate. Their
reverberating clang, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, should drown all
weaker sounds. Thus: "After serious reflection, we have decided to
sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad
proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of
government which we have adopted and considering the
departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United
States [1887], 122 U.S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. St. Rep.
1141; see also U.S. vs. Eliason [1839], 16 Pet., 291; 10 Law. ed.,
968; Jones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey vs. Chapman [1880], 101 U.S. 775; 25 Law. ed.
915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10 Law. ed. 264.)"
The opinion of Justice Laurel continues: "Fear is expressed by more
than one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of
qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the
assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for
acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or
improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said, are serious.
Fear, however, is no valid argument against the system once
adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential
background of the type of govenment established under our
Constitution, in the light of certain well-known principles and practices
that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With
reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is
one purpose which is crystal clear and is readily visible without the
projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begin with the
enunciation of the principle that 'The executive power shall be vested
in a President of the Philippines.' This means that the President of the
Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and
no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political
positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language
of Thomas Jefferson, 'should be of the President's bosom confidence'
(7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General
Cushing, (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), 'are subject to the direction
of the President.' Without minimizing the importance of the heads of
the various departments, their personality is in reality but the
projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly
characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 'each head of a department is, and must be the
President's alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority' (Myers vs. United
States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21 at 30; 272 U.S. 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed.,
160). Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain powers
under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the
constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a
matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental
autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the
executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If
the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he
assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department
is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he
appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive,
not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President,
should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire
Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before
that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of
Daniel Webster, is the last repository of popular government. These
are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential type of
government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system
itself. We cannot modify the system unless we modify the
Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by any subtle
process of judicial interpretation or construction."
Chavez v. NHA,
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant
petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing
Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No.
(MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and
Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time,
Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of
many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite
into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-
Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private
sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed
MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the
bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual
development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial
site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and
reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with
the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as
enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government
shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a
reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in
the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a
schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the
project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-
site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA
was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes
and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The
original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The
reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79
hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by
President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an
enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the
establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey
Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later
reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement
whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent
agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing
structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
1 Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and
authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested
exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner
2 Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by
DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
3 Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged
lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man
4 Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no
declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use
5 Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands
6 Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
7 Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to
acquire lands of public domain
8 Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to
the SMDRP
9 Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
1 Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for
integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be
responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project
are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs),
favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or
entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA
is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under
consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
2 Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have
granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the
DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for
the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR
which are exercises of its power of supervision over the
project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs
that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the
reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine
President.
3 The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued
by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President
Ramos.
4 Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be
 no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that
these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these
lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and
disposable lands under the BOT law.
5 Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property
rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may
deem appropriate.
6 There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right
to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It
was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The
bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18,
1992.
7 RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid
“a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at
least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In addition, when the
lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial
lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any
qualified person.
8 This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information
on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article
III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.
When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by
virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after
the passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation
cannot be disturbed or questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at
the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said
project, but did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

Maceda v Macaraig
GR No 88291, May 31, 1991

FACTS:
Commonwealth Act 120 created NAPOCOR as a public corporation to
undertake the development of hydraulic power and the production of power
from other sources. RA 358 granted NAPOCOR tax and duty exemption
privileges. RA 6395 revised the charter of the NAPOCOR, tasking it to carry
out the policy of the national electrification and provided in detail NAPOCOR’s
tax exceptions. PD 380 specified that NAPOCOR’s exemption includes all
taxes, etc. imposed “directly or indirectly.” PD 938 dated May 27, 1976 further
amended the aforesaid provision by integrating the tax exemption in general
terms under one paragraph.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NPC has ceased to enjoy indirect tax and duty exemption with
the enactment of PD 938 on May 27, 1976 which amended PD 380 issued on
January 11, 1974

RULING:
No, it is still exempt.
NAPOCOR is a non-profit public corporation created for the general good and
welfare, and wholly owned by the government of the Republic of the
Philippines. From the very beginning of the corporation’s existence, NAPOCOR
enjoyed preferential tax treatment “to enable the corporation to pay the
indebtedness and obligation” and effective implementation of the policy
enunciated in Section 1 of RA 6395.

From the preamble of PD 938, it is evident that the provisions of PD 938 were
not intended to be interpreted liberally so as to enhance the tax exempt status
of NAPOCOR.

It is recognized that the rule on strict interpretation does not apply in the case
of exemptions in favor of government political subdivision or instrumentality. In
the case of property owned by the state or a city or other public corporations,
the express exception should not be construed with the same degree of
strictness that applies to exemptions contrary to the policy of the state, since as
to such property “exception is the rule and taxation the exception.”

Noblejas v. Salas,
In effect, the fundamental issue submitted to Us is whether or not
Fiscals Castillo and de Guzman had authority to sign and file the
amended information adding petitioner as one of the accused in the
abovementioned case of People vs. Carlos.
The answer to this question is not difficult to find. It cannot be
disputed that the reports of Fiscal Aquino of March 4 and June 20,
1968 did not refer to any particular and individual case of so-called
land grabbing in the province of Rizal. A cursory reading of said
reports readily discloses that they cover all the cases then in the
hands of the Office of the Fiscal of Rizal, more specifically those
enumerated above. Upon the other hand, it should likewise be
beyond question that the exculpatory memorandum of Fiscal Aquino
to the Secretary of Justice of September 2, 1968 quoted above refers
to all of said cases also.
Such being the case, and inasmuch as this exculpatory memorandum
was approved by the Secretary of Justice, the finding that no criminal
liability may be attached to petitioner Noblejas for any of the land
grabbing cases in the province of Rizal and the decision not to
prosecute him may be said to be those of the Secretary already, not
of Fiscal Aquino anymore. In other words, the contention of
respondent fiscals here, citing the case of Matute vs. Abbas, CA-G.R.
No. 304303-R, a decision of the Court of Appeals, misses the point
entirely, for under the circumstances, what they have reviewed and
overruled was not the actuation and resolution of their predecessor,
but those of the Secretary of Justice. This, it is definite, they have
neither the personality nor legal authority to do.
In Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640, the Court elucidated on the
superior authority of the Secretary of Justice over fiscals thus:
Importantly, it must be borne in mind that while it is true that a fiscal in
exercising his discretion as to whether or not to prosecute somebody
for an offense performs a quasi-judicial act, the functions that he
discharges as an officer of the government are basically executive.
He belongs to the executive department rather than to the judiciary. If
indeed, in some instances, his salary is paid by the corresponding
local governments, he does not thereby become a part thereof, for he
is always within the ambit of the national authority when it comes to
the supervision and control of his office, powers and functions. As a
matter of fact, Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code places
him under the "general supervision and control" of the Department of
Justice together with other prosecuting officers and under Section 74
of the same code, the Secretary of Justice as "Department Secretary
shall assume the burden and responsibility of all activities of the
Government under his control and supervision." (Uichangco vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al.,
L-17328, March 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 547.) Consequently, the
constitutional power of the President of control of all executive
departments, bureaus or offices (Sec. 10, Art. VII, Constitution of the
Philippines) should he considered as embracing his office. Withal, the
prosecution of crimes is part of the President's duty to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed" (Id.) and the Secretary of Justice is,
by the nature of his office, the principal alter ego of the President in
the performance of such duty. (Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67
Phil. 451) whereas the working arms of the Secretary in this respect
are the fiscals and other prosecuting officers. On the other hand,
Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code defines the extent
of a department secretary's powers in the premises this wise:
SECTION 79 (c). Power of direction and supervision. — The
Department Head shall have direct control, discretion, and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction and
may, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding,
repeal or modify the decisions of the chief of said bureaus or offices
when advisable in the public interest.
In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, We explained that the import of
this provision is that the power of control therein contemplated
"means the power (of the department head) to alter, modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter." In Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825, December 24,
1965, 15 SCRA 569, our learned present Chief Justice made it plain
that under Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, cited above, "the
power of control ... implies the right of the President (and, naturally, of
his alter ego) to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officer of the national government, as well as to
act in lieu of such officers." In fact, Section 37 of Act 4007, spells out
this power in these precise terms: "The provisions of the existing law
to the contrary notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority,
duty, function, or activity is entrusted to a chief bureau, office, division
or service, the same shall be understood as also conferred upon the
proper Department Head who shall have authority to act directly in
pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or revoke any decision or
action of said chief of bureau, office, division or service." Accordingly,
that section 83 confers upon the Secretary only "general supervision
and control" may not construed as limiting or in any way deminishing
the pervasiveness of the Secretary's power of control under Sec. 79
(c) which is constitutionally based, since he acts also as alter ego of
the President."
Upon these premises, We cannot see how the position of respondent
fiscals can be sustained, there being no showing that they had
previously cleared with the Secretary of Justice their purported
inclusion of petitioner in the amended information in question.
Accordingly, while the point of estoppel raised by petitioner may not
be well taken, it results that petitioner's motion to quash must be
granted upon the ground that respondent fiscals had no authority to
file the impugned amended information insofar as it includes
petitioner as one of the accused therein. With this conclusion We
have arrived at, it goes without saying that in all the other cases of
supposed "land grabbing" pending either in the office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal or in the Courts of First Instance of said province
covered by the memorandum of Fiscal Aquino of September 2, 1968,
approved by the Secretary of Justice as above stated, more
particularly those enumerated on pages 5-6 of this decision, any
criminal action or prosecution against petitioner would be
unwarranted and legally unauthorized.
Respondents claim that inasmuch as petitioner had already ceased to
be Land Registration Commissioner, by resignation, at the time they
filed the amended information at issue, there was no need for them to
comply with Circular 97 of the Secretary of Justice aforequoted. This
argument overlooks the fact that the action taken by the Secretary of
Justice on the memorandum of Fiscal Aquino was not merely for the
purposes of said circular, but rather a review of the action of the fiscal
by virtue of his power of supervision and control over him.
The foregoing considerations being sufficiently decisive of the instant
petition, We deem it unnecessary to pass on the other issues raised
and discussed by the parties.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are granted. The orders of respondent
judge of February 6 and March 6, 1970 in the case of People vs.
Genoveva Carlos, Criminal Case No. 19574 of his court, denying the
motion to quash filed therein by petitioner are hereby set aside and
respondent court and fiscals are enjoined permanently from including
petitioner as an accused in said case. Respondents fiscals and
whoever may act in their stead are further enjoined from taking any
criminal action against petitioner in regard to the so-called "land
grabbing" covered by this decision, particularly those enumerated
above.

Jacob v. Puno,

The question raised if the petition is whether respondent Minister of

Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in directing the Provincial
Fiscal of Camarines Sur "to desist from filing in court the
corresponding informations against respondents based on your
resolution, or to move for their dismissal if they have already been
filed, and to thereafter dismiss the twin complaints filed in your office
under I.S. Nos. 1162 and 1163, reporting the action you have taken
on this directive within ten days from receipt hereof." (p 35, Rollo)
The facts of this case are as follows :
Herein petitioner, Tomasa Vda. de Jacob, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur two (2) criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents which purport to have been executed
by her deceased husband, Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob, to wit:
(1) A Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1977 over a parcel of
residential land situated in the Poblacion, Municipality of trigaon,
Province of Camarines Sur, in favor of Jorge M. Centenera, this deed
was ratified on the same date before Notary Public Teodoro Alarcon
and had for instrumental witnesses Pablo Paqueo Jr. and Amelia
Lamit. This is the subject of I.S. No. 1162.
(2) A Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 20, 1976 conveying
ownership of 454,987 square meters of agricultural land situated at
Barrio Mabalodbalod, Municipality of Tigaon Province of Camarines
Sur, to Dr. Daniel Mercado and Dr. Alfredo V. Silva. This deed was
ratified on October 25, 1976 before Notary Public Jose Cea and had
as instrumental witnesses, Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis.While this
deed is the only one involved in I.S. No. 1163, records show that
sometime thereafter, on January 24, 1977, Dr. Jacob appears to have
executed another deed of sale covering the same parcel of land to
Daniel Mercado only. This deed was ratified on the same date before
the same Notary Public, Jose Cea. (pp. 32-33, Rollo)
In charging herein private respondents, namely: Jorge Centenera,
Teodor Alarcon, Pablo Paqueo Jr., Amelia Lamit Alfredo Silva, Jose
Cea, Miguel Moll and Olympio Clapis with falsification of public
documents, petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who, since January 16,
1979, had been the court-appointed guardian of the then incompetent
Dr. Alfredo Jacob, claims that respondents connived and
confederated with each other in falsifying the two deeds of absolute
sale aforementioned by making it appear therein that her husband
participated in the execution thereof as seller when in truth and in fact
he never did so participate in any manner as he was already
seriously ill and practically bed ridden on October 20, 1976 and
December 2, 1977 when the said documents appeared to have been
executed.
After preliminary investigation, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ceferino P.
Goce on May 15, 1979, issued separate resolutions in I.S. Nos. 1162
and 1163 recommending the filing in court of the corresponding
informations for falsification of public documents by private individuals
as defined and punished under Article 171, par. 2 in relation to Article
172, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code ... (P.46,Rollo)
The private respondents appealed the aforementioned resolutions to
the respondent Minister of Justice, who, on April 15, 1981, directed
the Provincial Fiscal to desist from filing in court the corresponding
informations against the respondents. Reasons for this directive are
—
While the three medical certificates submitted in evidence tend to
indicate that Dr. Alfredo Jacob underwent medical treatment since
1975 for arteriosclerosis and Parkinsons disease, these could not be
considered weighty enough to give credence to the claim that Dr.
Jacob could not have been at Camarines Sur on December 2, 1977
to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale involved in I.S. No. 1162. There
is no showing that he was no longer ambulatory and mobile while
undergoing treatment.
In this regard, it will be noted that the descriptive portion of the
Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Rodolfo Talag indicating the weak
physical condition of the patient and the uncoordinated movements of
his legs has reference to the physical condition of Dr. Jacob at the
time of examination immediately prior to the issuance of the medical
certificate on March 18, 1978. This observation is amply fortified by
the suggestion in the medical certificate that the patient undergo
immediate hospitalization. It in no way reflects the patient's state of
health on December 2, 1977 when he executed one of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in question.
Also, there is nothing in the medical certificates issued by three
different doctors that would suggest that Dr. Alfredo Jacob could not
have been in Camarines Sur on October 20 when he executed the
Deed of Absolute Sale subject matter of I.S. No. 1163. The medical
certfficates do not indicate that he was confined or was under
treatment from May 31, 1976 when he was discharged from the
hospital after a cardio-vascular clearance to the date when the deed
of October 20, 1976 was executed.
Moreover, the categorical declarations of the instrumental witnesses
and Notary Public Teodoro Alarcon who respectively participated in
the execution of the deeds in question, to the effect that Dr. Jacob
actually and personally executed the Deed of Absolute Sale referred
to cannot simply be overcome by the aforementioned medical
certificates, most especially in the absence of corroborating evidence
tending to show in definite and precise terms that Dr. Jacob was
actually not in Camarines Sur on the dates of the execution of the
deeds in question. Complainant herself could not qualify to assert this
fact considering that on the dates of the execution of the said
documents she was not yet married to Dr. Jacob.
Besides, even without the aforementioned declarations of the
instrumental witnesses and notary public, the medical certificates,
standing alone, which raise merely assumptions cannot destroy the
presumption of regularity in the execution of documents.
In their totality, we are of the opinion that the evidence on hand
cannot sustain a prima facie case of falsification of public documents
against respondents in both cases. (pp. 33-34, Rollo)
The first and second motions for reconsideration of the
aforementioned order of respondent Minister of Justice were deed.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner arguing that respondent
Minister "has transcended his authority to merely determine the
existence of a prima facie case in pursuance of P.D. No. 911 and in
so doing arrogated to himself the prerogatives or power vested in the
courts." (pp. 28-29, Rollo)
It is apparent from the facts above-stated that certiorari does not lie.
The power of supervision and control by the Minister of Justice over
the fiscals cannot be denied. As stated in Noblejas vs. Salas, 67
SCRA 47, "Section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code defines
the extent of a department secretary's power. The power of control
therein contemplated means (the power of the department head) to
alter, modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter.' 'The power of control . . . implies
the right of the President (and, naturally, of his alter ego) to interfere
in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the
officers of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers.' " For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons
who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are
shown to be guilty of a crime, the Minister of Justice is likewise bound
by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless false
or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction
of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based
upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence would
warrant the filing of the action in court. As he has the power of
supervision and control over prosecuting officers, the Minister of
Justice has the ultimate power to decide wich as between conflicting
theories of the complainant and the respondents should be believed.
"It should be realized that when a man is haled to court on a criminal
charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for
his family as well. Therefore, it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the
evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the
existence of prima facie case before filing the information in Court.
Anything less would be a dereliction of duty (Bernardo vs, Mendoza,
90 SCRA 214)."
The remedy of complainant in a case where the Minister of Justice
would not allow the filing of a criminal complaint against an accused
because it is his opinion that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain
an information for the complaint with which the respondents are
charged of, is to file a civil action as indicated in Article 35 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense,
charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action
is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace
finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute
criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender, Such civil action may be
supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's
motion, the court may require the plaintfff to file a bond to indemnify
the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be
presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Further, Presidential Decree No. 911 specifically provides:
... Provided, Finally, That where the resolution of the Provincial or
City Fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor is, upon review, reversed by
the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice, the latter may, where he finds
that no prima facie case exists, authorize and direct the investigating
fiscal concerned or any other fiscal or state prosecutor to cause or
move for the dismissal of the case, or, where he finds a prima facie
case, to cause the filing of an information in court against the
respondent, based on the same sworn statement or evidence
submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary
investigation.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.