SANLAKAS VS. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY by Martin 6.
6. Whether or not the issuances are tantamount to exercising martial law powers
TINGA; FEBRUARY 3, 2004
FACTS:
 Three hundred junior officers and enlisted men from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) staged a mutiny by storming the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City on
July 27, 2003
 The mutineers cried of corruption in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; demanded for
the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP)
 In lieu of the said mutiny, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and called on the AFP to suppress the rebellion
 The mutiny ended on the evening of July 27, 2003
 After negotiations with the soldiers to return to their barracks, the President lifted the
state of rebellion five days later on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435
 Petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa (PM), and Social Justice Society (SJS), in
relation to Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, contend that:
o The declaration of a state of rebellion is not required to call out the armed forces
o Due to the cessation of the rebellion, there exists no factual basis for the
imposition of a state of rebellion in an indefinite period (the mutiny ended on
the evening of July 27, 2003; the state of rebellion ensued for five days until
August 1, 2003)
o The report circumvents the report requirement, which requires the President to
make a report 48 hours after the proclamation of martial law
 Petitioner Suplico, et al., contends that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the
President is an indirect exercise of emergency powers
o Said petitioner contends that under Section 23 (2), Art. VII of the Constitution,
such exercise of emergency powers is exclusive to Congress, and that the
declaration made by the President thus results to the latter’s usurpation of their
said exclusive power
 Petitioner Senator Pimentel contends that the presidential issuances constitute an
unwarranted exercise of martial law power, which is baseless under the Constitution
o Said petitioner fears that the said declaration of the President may pave way
for the unconstitutional imposition of warrantless arrests
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitions are moot and academic
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing
3. Whether or not a declaration of a state of rebellion is required to call out the armed
forces
4. Whether or not there is factual basis for the imposition of a state of rebellion
5. Whether or not said declaration constitutes exercise of emergency powers
1
HELD/RULING:
1. Petitions are moot and academic, although the Supreme Court recognizes jurisdiction
over cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review
 The petitions are deemed moot and academic, because the state of rebellion has
been lifted already on August 1, 2003
 The Lacson vs. Perez precedent proved that this case is capable of repetition; in the
said case, an angry mob that stormed Malacanang on May 1, 2001 has compelled
the President to call upon the AFP and PNP to suppress the rebellion through
Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1
 In this case, the Supreme Court went on to assess the validity of the President’s
declaration
2. Petitioners Sanlakas, PM, and SJS, have no legal standing to sue; Petitioners Suplico et al.
and Pimentel (Members of Congress) have standing to sue
 Whereas petitioners Sanlakas et al. are considered “people’s organizations” that
represents the interest of the people, the Supreme Court is still observant of the rule
that only real parties in interest or those who would suffer a direct injury from the
controversy, are the ones who may invoke the judicial power
 Petitioners Members of Congress have made clear the validity of their legal standing,
since their contention involving the alleged usurpation of the President of their
constitutional power speaks of their incurrence of direct damage
3. For purposes of exercising the calling out power, the President is not required to declare
a state of rebellion
 Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution: …whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
 Section 18, Art. VII of the Constitution grants the President, in her capacity as
Commander-in-Chief, the following powers:
o Calling out power
o Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
o Power to declare martial law
 In order for the President to exercise the latter two powers, these two conditions
must exist:
o Actual invasion or rebellion
o Exercise of said power required for ensuring public safety
 The aforementioned conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out
power
  The Constitution of the United States of America (USA) serves as the foundation of
the overall concept of the President’s power as Chief Executive and Commander-In-
Chief
 Residual executive powers of the President, as suggested by Justice Cortes, rests
upon the President
o Such is due to the highly unitary and centralized nature of the Philippines
government
o Exemplified in Marcos vs. Manglapus, wherein residual executive power is
practiced by the President by barring the return of former President
Marcos due to perceived threats of destabilization against the government
and other forms of socio-political disturbances

4. There is factual basis for the implementation of a state of rebellion

 Section 18 (3), Art. VII of the Constitution: The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, ad must promulgate its decision thereon within three days from
its filing.
 No proof was shown by the petitioners that the President has acted without factual
basis

5. Power exercised by the President in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces is in consonance with her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief

 There was no instance wherein the President has acted beyond her powers as both
Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief

6. No. Said declarations are not tantamount to the declaration of martial law

 No indication that military tribunals have taken over jurisdiction over civil courts
 No indication of curtailment of civil and political rights
 No indication of President’s encroachment of other branches of government
 No indication of attempt, at all, that President attempted to exercise martial law

Petitions DISMISSED.

2
 Aquino vs Enrile [59 SCRA183]
FACTS: The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related, either briefly
or in great detail, in the separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were
arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), “for
being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and
state power in the country and to take over the Government by force …”
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial
law.
ISSUE: The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the
validity of Proclamation No. 1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions
claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry?
Is the question political or justiciable in character?
RULING: Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question is
political and therefore its determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons
are given at length in the separate opinions they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez
adds that as a member of the Convention that drafted the 1973 Constitution he believes that
“the Convention put an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial law
proclamation and its continuation is political and non-justiciable in character.”
Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the
Court’s jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-
embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should
abstain from interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation, dealing as it does with national
security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. But the Court should
act, Justice Barredo opines, when its abstention from acting would result in manifest and
palpable transgression of the Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice, no reception of
evidence being contemplated for purposes of such judicial action.
It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those opinions involves
disparate methods of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President
3
on the existence of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon
the Courts. He disagrees vehemently with the ruling in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,
December 11, 1971, and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905),
and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that
Lansang need not be overturned, indeed does not control in these cases. He draws a distinction
between the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
which was the issue in Lansang, and his power to proclaim martial law, calling attention to the
fact that while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege except in the instances
specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification with respect to the declaration
of martial law.
Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there
is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise
emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the
Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is
such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his
responsibility being directly to the people.
Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz
Palma. They hold that the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into
by the Court, and would thus apply the principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers
to the power of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The
recognition of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be emphasized, is
there expressly distinguished from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal
cases, and is limited to ascertaining “merely whether he (the President) has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine
the wisdom of his act.” The test is not whether the President’s decision is correct but whether,
in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying this test, the finding by the
Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President’s proclamation of
martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in that finding. The
factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, particularly in
regard to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had
been exacerbated, as events shortly before said proclamation clearly demonstrated. On this
Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely refrained from discussing
it.
Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability
is of not much more than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not
unduly exercised by Americas decisions on the subject written in another age and political
clime, or by theories of foreign authors in political science. The present state of martial law in
the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial precedents.
In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence
as in an ordinary adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country
when Proclamation No. 1081 was issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the
cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant people residing here at the time. Many
of the facts and events recited in detail in the different “Whereases” of the proclamation are
of common knowledge. The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that
while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions
except in isolated pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial
law all over the country, ignores the sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a
modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and identifiable
groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most subtle kind,
necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground
propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of
armed and ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-
column activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion which
by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted
effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.
Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their
opinions, is that the question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the
transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that “all proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective
even after … the ratification of this Constitution …” To be sure, there is an attempt in these
4
cases to resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that, however, is
behind us now. The question has been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Executive
Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31, 1973), and of course by the existing political
realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relations with other countries.
On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muñoz Palma withholds her assent to any
sweeping statement that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all “such
proclamations, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President.” All that she concedes is that the transitory provision merely gives them
“the imprimatur of a law but not of a constitutional mandate,” and as such therefore “are
subject to judicial review when proper under the Constitution.
Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the
present cases into the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of
martial law — has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum
of July 27-28, 1973. The question propounded to the voters was: “Under the (1973)
Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do you want
President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial
Law?” The overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens between
15 and 18 years, voted affirmatively on the proposal. The question was thereby removed from
the area of presidential power under the Constitution and transferred to the seat of
sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that power by the President
in the beginning — whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable — this Court
is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.
 OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION
[GR L-54558, 22 May 1987]
IN RE: Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
FACTS:
On 24 December 1979, herein Petitioners – all, of which, are civilians – were arrested by the
military and were subsequently detained at Camp Crame and were then transferred to Camp
Bagong Diwa. Sometime in 1980, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces created the
Respondent Military Commission No. 34 for the purposes of trying the said Petitioners of their
alleged crimes. Hastily, the said Respondent Commission sentenced the Petitioners to death.
Petitioners now come to the Supreme Court to challenge the said Military Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the actions of the military are Constitutional?
HELD:
It must be noted that in 1981, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045, thereby
officially lifting Martial Law. Furthermore, between 1981 and 1986, the Petitioners were given
provisional liberty thereby rendering their Petitions for Habeas Corpus moot and academic.
It has been held in a long line of cases that Military Commissions/Tribunals have no jurisdiction
to try civilians for alleged offenses when Civil Courts are open and functioning. Such being the
case here, the respondent Military Commission’s actions of trying the Petitioners and
rendering sentence is null and void.
And assuming that the same does have jurisdiction, the fact that the trial(s) were conducted
hastily – i.e., the Petitioners were never actually given a chance to defend themselves or even
present their own evidences – due process was actually denied to the Petitioners; hence, their
sentence should be treated as unconstitutional.
5
Case digest #2:
OLAGUER V. MILITARY COMMISSION
In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed
in Camp Bagong Diwa. Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1)
unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate
President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile,
Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose
Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs.
Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7)
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the
petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.
HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the
case reached the SC Olaguer and his companions were already released from military
confinement. “When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of
habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot
and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their
confinement in military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.” But the military
court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it rendered) still continues to subsist.
ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to
try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.
HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or
tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial
law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open
and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and
void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
 Navales vs Gen. Abaya (GR No. 162318, October 25, 2004)
Facts:
 Consolidated petitions for habeas corpus and prohibition
 Oakwood Incident: On July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and
enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout
Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s Special Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered
the premises of the Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards
and took over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted
explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the
soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the ABS-CBN News (ANC)
network and claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. (i.e.: the graft and corruption
in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to the “enemies” of the State, etc.)
They declared their withdrawal of support from the chain of command and
demanded the resignation of key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo
administration. PGMA gave them until 5p.m. to give up their positions and return to
the barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a “state of rebellion”
and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. An
agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres.
Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was over. The soldiers agreed to
return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
 August 1, 2003 - DOJ charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the “Oakwood
Incident” with violation of Article 134-A (coup d’etat) of the Revised Penal Code (filed
w/ RTC)
 September 12, 2003 – 243 of accused filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the RTC
assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military tribunal in accord w/ RA
7055 and, order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause
against 316 of 321 accused in which failure to do so should cause dismissal of case.
 October 20, 2003 - While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the
Resolution finding probable cause for coup d’etat against only 31 of the original 321
accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of
evidence.
 November 14, 2003 – RTC admitted Amended Information, charging only 31 of
original accused with coup d’etat. It expressly stated that the case against the other
290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who are subject of
the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed
 Meanwhile, Capt. Reaso, et al. and 1Lt. Navales, et al. were charged before the
General Court-Martial with violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96, 97. The
31 charged in the Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets.
 February 11, 2004 – acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the
original accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148)
issued an Order rendering contents of OM moot and academic and all charges before
court martial against the accused and former accused declared not service-
connected but rather absorbed and in furtherance to alleged crime of coup d’etat.
6
 March 1, 2004 - General Court-Martial set on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial
of petitioners for violations of the Articles of War
Issue: whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
Held: NOOOOO.
 The sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148), that all charges before the
court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in
furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, was made without or in excess of jurisdiction
and thus cannot be given effect. (null and void)
o The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the
Omnibus Motion, which prayed for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over all the charges filed before the military courts in accordance with Rep.
Act No. 7055.
o The said Omnibus Motion was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the
original accused under the Information dated August 1,2003. However,
this information was subsequently superseded by the Amended
Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31 were charged
with the crime of coup d'etat.
o In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the Amended
Information was admitted and the case against the 290 accused, including
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said Order
became final and executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof
had been filed by any of the parties.
o Therefore, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus
Motion on February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been rendered
moot by the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61) admitting
the Amended Information under which only31 of the accused were
charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290.
 It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against
them was dismissed because they were no longer parties to the
case.
 In view of this the case against aforesaid accused, the Court,
therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges
filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor
reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there
being no motion filed by the prosecution to reconsider the order
or by any of the accused.
 Such declaration was made by the RTC (Branch 148) in violation of Section 1, RA 7055
o RA 7055 did not divest the military courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92and Articles 95 to
97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected
crimes or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the
court-martial.
 o In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148)
cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those
charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the President
etc.), 64 (Disrespect TowardSuperior Officer), 67 (Mutiny or Sedition), 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General
Article) ofthe Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-
connected offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Military courts
have jurisdiction.
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Once vested by law on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by
any body other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
 Writ of Habeas Corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court (includes
General Court-Martial) which has jurisdiction to do so. It should not be allowed after
the party sought to be released has been charged before any court or quasi-judicial
body. This rule applies to Capt. Raso, et al., as they are under detention pursuant to
Commitment Order issued by Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 70 of
Articles of War.
 Writ of Prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from
usurping/exercising a jurisdiction/power with which they have not been vested by
law. The General Court-Martial has jurisdiction has jurisdiction over the charges filed
against 1Lt. Navales, et al. under RA 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to
prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.