PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO

G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages
in the Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the
defense that Maria Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State
Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an
injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the
employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both
actions simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the
widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.

Ruling:
No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although
she has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s
case is an exception because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s
negligence when she filed her claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She
was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well. The decision of the court is
affirmed.

PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO GASACAO
G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005
Facts:
Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao was the crewing manager of Great Eastern Shipping
Agency, Inc., which company was headed by his nephew. On August 4, 2000 appellant
and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment. The appellant
was arrested while his nephew remained at large. The lower court found Capt. Gasacao
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment. The Court of Appeals
also affirmed the decision. Hence, Capt. Gasacao appealed to the Supreme Court
claiming that he can’t be held liable for illegal recruitment because he was just a mere
employee of the manning agency. He also claimed that he was not aware of the law
against prohibition on bonds and deposits under section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations implementing R.A. 8042.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale
illegal recruitment.
Ruling:
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that he was just a mere employee of the
manning agency because he was the company’s crewing manager. As testified by the
witnesses, the accused appellant actively participated in the recruitment process from
receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants, and informing them of the
agency’s requirement of payment of performance or cash bond prior to the deployment.
The Supreme Court held further that appellants defense of ignorance is not
commendable as provided for by Article 3 of the Civil Code which states that ignorance
of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. The defense of goodwill is neither
unavailable because the appellant failed to deploy the complainants without valid
reasons.

Asiavest Limited vs Court of Appeals

November 21, 2012
295 SCRA 469 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law – Service of Summons to
a Non Resident –

Processual Presumption
In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay US$1.8 million or its
equivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd. Apparently, Heras guaranteed a certain loan in
Hong Kong and the debtor in said loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest, ran after
Heras. But before said judgment was issued and even during trial, Heras already left for
good Hong Kong and he returned to the Philippines. So when in 1987, when Asiavest
filed a complaint in court seeking to enforce the foreign judgment against Heras, the
latter claim that he never received any summons, not in Hong Kong and not in the
Philippines. He also claimed that he never received a copy of the foreign judgment.
Asiavest however contends that Heras was actually given service of summons when a
messenger from the Sycip Salazar Law Firm served said summons by leaving a copy to
one Dionisio Lopez who was Heras’ son in law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced against Heras in the
Philippines.

HELD: No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated (Asiavest was able to
adduce evidence in support thereto) and Heras was never able to overcome the validity
of it, it cannot be enforced against Heras here in the Philippines because Heras was not
properly served summons. Hence, as far as Philippine law is concerned, the Hong Kong
court has never acquired jurisdiction over Heras. This means then that Philippine
courts cannot act to enforce the said foreign judgment. The action against Heras is an
action in personam and as far as Hong Kong is concerned, Heras is a nonresident. He
is a non resident because prior to the judgment, he already abandoned Hong Kong. The
Hong Kong law on service of summons in in personam cases against non residents was
never presented in court hence processual presumption is applied where it is now
presumed that Hong Kong law in as far as this case is concerned is the same as
Philippine laws. And under our laws, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is
a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court,
personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible if such defendant is
physically present in the country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
against him. Without a personal service of summons, the Hong Kong court never
acquired jurisdiction. Needless to say, the summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid
service because the same does not satisfy the requirement of personal service.

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, GR No.

193707, 2014-12-10
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.[2] On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the... instant petition was sixteen (16) years
of age.[3] Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.[4] At that time, their son
was only eighteen (18) months old.[5] Thereafter, petitioner and her son... came home
to the Philippines.[6] According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in... the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to theson, Roderigo.[8] Not long thereafter, respondent came to the
Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing
thereat. To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.[11] On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the
letter.[12] Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit
with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.[16] Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order Subsequently,... respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss On February 19,
2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,[21] dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order[25] denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration

Issues:
Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law

Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner's
contentions.
we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195[34] of the New Civil
Code in demanding
support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that
he is subject to the laws
of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether... he is obliged to give support to his
child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.[37]
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's
son under Article 195
of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support... petitioner's
son altogether.
In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is... the same as our local or
domestic or internal
law.[44] Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has
not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine
law, which... enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.
the
Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is not
liable to give support to his
son after the divorce decree was issued.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by
law, said law would still
not find applicability,... Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a...
foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Principles:
the doctrine of processual presumption
WONG WOO YIU V VIVO
G.R. No. L-21076 | March 31, 1965 | J. BAUTISTA ANGELO
Doctrine:
Laws relating to family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even
though living abroad.
Facts:
1. The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding petitioner to be legally married
to Perfecto Blas
and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant, which was later on affirmed by the
Board of
Commissioners.
2. However, the same Board, composed of a new set of members, reversed BSI No. 3 and
ordered petitioner to be
excluded from the country.
3. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but the same was denied for lack of merit. She then filed
the instant
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction (considered as certiorari) before the Manila
CFI.
4. After the respondents filed their answer and the parties submitted a written stipulation of
facts, the court a
quo declared valid the original decision and restrained respondents from excluding petitioner
from the country.
Respondents interposed the present appeal.
5. It appears from the BSI proceeding that petitioner declared that she came to the Philippines
in 1961 for the first
time to join her husband Perfecto Blas to whom she was married in Chingkang, China on
January 15, 1929; that
their marriage was celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that the new set of Board of
Commissioners
found that petitioner’s claim was without basis, it appearing that in the entry proceedings of
Perfecto Blas had
on January 23, 1947 he declared that he first visited China in 1935 and married petitioner in
1936, it could not
possibly sustain her claim that she married Perfecto Blas in 1929; that in an affidavit dated
August 9, 1962
Perfecto Blas claimed that he went to China in 1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry
declaration he
admitted that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and lastly in 1941; and
that Perfecto
Blas in the same affidavit likewise claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four
years old so that
computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must have been in 1912.
Issue:
W/N petitioner presented sufficient proof to support fact of her marriage and can thus be
admitted as non-quota
immigrant in the country?
Held:
No. A lot of discrepancies were found in the statements made by petitioner and her
alleged husband in the
investigations conducted by the immigration authorities. Also, the only basis in support
of petitioner’s claim
that she is Blas’ wife is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft of substantial
proof of husband-wife
relationship.
Article 15 of our new Civil Code also provides that laws relating to family rights or to the
status of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known
that in 1929 in order
that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either
by a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or minister of the gospel
of any denomination
duly registered in the Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even
if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Blas before a village leader is valid
in China, the same is
not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68, as reproduced
in Section 19 of Act No.
3613, which is now Article 71 of our new Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of
the Philippines which is
valid under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can
be given to this contention because no proof was presented relative to the law of
marriage in China. Such being
the case, we should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a
foreign country it should
be presumed that it is the same as our own.
Since our law only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned therein, and a village
leader is not one of them, it is clear that petitioner’s marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this
jurisdiction.
Decision appealed from reversed.