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A STUDY

IN NEO-
TH( ISM
-
Prefaceby tlze Editor

'I his book of ph1hhophi cal t'ss.1 ·s complete s i11 English the publt-,htd
philmoph1 ca] work of :arduul M<:rcicr. His m .mu.1ls lu c bt·t·n t1,m-.-
l. tcd \ltl Ce 1916 . These tran l.1tiom ·0111111g .1s they do 110\\ .1t th<: t.: nd
of 1<J<J<J, complete not only tht· entry m Englt h of the ·,1rdi11 ,1l, but
hring-. to a do<;c our etlc)rts to cclebr.1tc once ,1g.iin the Ccntenni.11 of the
I Iigh •r Tnstitute of Philmoph .1t the C.uholic Umversity of Louvain .
Sinn: the Institute 110,v has .m ngli h langu,1gc division, it is ot1r hope
that the-;e transl.1tio11s , ill assi t many students in apprcci,1ting the
thought of the great ardinal.
W c will analyze them and comment on thcn1 in the final chapter of
this book entitled: "A tudy in Neo-Thomis1n." Cardinal Mercier's gi-
ganti and succe sful efforts to assist in launching the Neo-Thomic;t
Movement find many of their origins in these essays. The School of
Louvain is born in these pages. It now thrives both within the confines
of the Catholic world and far beyond its borders.
The n1ethod that Cardinal Mercier developed at Louvain and suc-
ceeded in having approved in Rome can be found in those pages. The
breath of his interests; the genius of his m.ind; the efforts to und erstand
and appreciate "every word of wisdon1, every useful thing by whomso-
ever discovered or planned and received with a willing and grateful
mind," as conunanded by Pope Leo in the encyclical "Aeterni Patris" is
nowhere better obeyed than in the thought and effort of Cardinal Mer-
cier. These essays show us what a debt we owe to him and these trans-
lations are our atten1pt to acknowledge that.
So many of my colleagues helped 1ne with these translations that I
shall leave it to the recording angel to remember them. Our heavenly
Father who sees in secret will reward them.
I must however, mention n1y colleagues who spent many hours ana-
lyzing and commenting on the texts, all of which helped in my study.
They are Professors Urbain Dhondt, Martin Moors, Sandra Rosenthal,
Gary Herbert, Henry Folse, Letitia Beard, Steve Berg, Carol Leake, Lar-
ry Warner, the psychiatrists at Tulane Medical School, the speech pa-
PREI-'ACE BY PROFESSOR RALPH MCINERNY XI

to be countered. This had the effect ofletting Descartes set the rules of
the game and in a manner Gilson noted among others, not least in Des-
cartes himself, one's adversary has a way of insinuating his thoughts even
into the attack upon him.
In order to get some sense of the intellectual milieu addressed by Ae-
terni Patris,we can consult the circumstances of two great conversions in
France, first that of Paul Claude!, second that of Jacques Maritain.
Claudel, in his n1.agnificent account of his conversion in Notre Dame
on Christmas Eve, 1886, tells us of the cultural atmosphere of Paris when
he entered the Sorbonne. He himself had stopped practicing his faith
after his First Communion, and in the Lycee read Renan's Life ofJesus
and lost his faith. When he received his prize at the Lycee Louis-le-
Grand from the great apostate himself, Claude! felt crowned by the
hands of Re nan. "At eighteen I believed what all the so-called cultivated
people of the time believed. The strong idea of the individual and con-
crete had been obscured in me. I accepted the monist and mechanist hy-
pothesis in all its rigor, I believed that everything was subject to laws, and
that the world was a chain of causes and effects that science was going to
explain perfectly tomorrow." Did this fill him with the progressive spir-
it, was he optimistic for the future, was his life given meaning by this re-
ceived opinion? "But all this seemed sad and boring." Claude! lived
in1.111orally,why not?, and little by little he fell into a state of despair. 5
"Recall those sad days of the 1880's, the time of the full flourishing of
naturalist literature. Never had the yoke of matter seemed more fixed.
Anything that had a name in art, science, literature, was irreligious. All
the so-called great men of the time ended by being hostile to religion.
Renan reigned." (P. 1009)
The time of which Claude! wrote was contemporary with the issu-
ance of Aeterni Patris. That the cultural malaise Leo XIII saw around
him, and for which he wished to propose a remedy, was real, is evident
in this testimony of Claudel, a man who would excel as poet, dramatist,
diplomat. That things had not changed a generation later is clear from
the case of Jacques Maritain. Raissa Maritain, in the memoir she pub-
lished when she and her husband were in exile in New York during
World War II, set down in unforgettable fashion the cri is she and
Jacques had come to as the result of the depressing materiali m of the
orbonne where they were tudents. If their profes or in the sciences
and in philmophy were to be believed the world is a product of chance,
there i no point to it, and the same must be said for human life, ince
human beings an: thcms ·Ives part of the material world without remain-

5. J>ul CJ.Hid I. ( )nwr ·, c11pr,1,,•, PJri,: B1blioth·que de l.1Pk1ade. 1965, "M l n r-


1011," pp. l 008 - 1014.
. . times when the great qu estions
. the umversity are . ] .
der. The first years m wers within which partICu ar proje ct~
loom. When one seeks for ~ns h eaning of life? What do es it al]
might be undertaken. What IS_ t . e m Id not shrug off cynically what
R . Mantam cou
mean? Jacques and aissa k .t a license to plunge into sensuality.
· ht nor ta en I as f ·
they were b emg ta~g 1.c. what is the point o going on? In
. nmg to hum .an ae, . . .d .f h
If th ere IS no mea 1 vowed to comrmt suic1 e i t ey
the Jardin des Plantesthe young co~p e
uld fi d wer to that quest10n.
co n no a~s f the addressee of the encyclical that launched the
Wh~n. one t~mks .o . ll t have such young people as Claude] and
Thonustlc Revival , it is we o f h . h
the Maritains in mind. All of the vaunted p_rogr~~s: ht e nmetee~t
century filled them with despair. The culture in w . IC t efywdetre tryindg
·
to get their beanngs gave th em non e • They were. pieces
. o .a e enn1ne
world that had got that way by chance. Despair is an obv10us re~pons~
· sueh a cu1tur al atmos phere . Is there a better response? Aeterni Patrzs
m
thought there was. , .
There was also a social-political context of Leo XIII s ~ncychc~l. Leo
was the first pope to be elected to a prison term in ~he Vauc~n. ~Is pred-
ecessor, throughout a long reign, had watched with ~owing dismay to
what was happening to Europe, to Italy, to Rome. Pms I~ had to flee
Rome for his life and when he returned he chose never again to set foot
out of the diminutive territory that had been allotted him. Leo XIII had
witnessed all that. In Germany the Kulturkampf of Bismarck was under
way, an overt war against Catholicism .. In France, religious orders were
still banned, with the famous Benedictine community of Solesmes in-
stalled on the Isle ofWight. The official view was that things were going
well. Barbara Tuchman, in The Guns of August has told the story of that
unreal period between 1870 and 1914 when the disaster toward which
Western culture had been reeling finally began. But that was in the fu-
ture . In 1879, the frail figure in white who looked out from the Vatican
and declared the world to be on its way to disaster must have seemed a
figure of fun, on the order of the bearded cartoon figure carrying the sign
urging others to Repent! Go back!
Now_ we see how prescient Leo was in judging that the principle of
the ~nh~htenment were a recipe for cultural and piritual di a ter.
Nothing 1smore commonplace today than talk of the failur of th En-
lightenment. ~t did not seem so to many when Leo •wrote. Perceptive
young p~o~le like Claudel an? the Maritain aw the nihili t in 1plication
of n1atenahsn1, but the perceive~ opinion r mained per eiv d opinion.
In_Pa?ama, the can~l acros the 1. thmu . begin to be dug; Al ac -Lor-
rame 1s d_eclaredan mt~gral part of ,cnnan y, lb en, "A I oll' Hou:c''
appears, m Fr~ncc Ant1-Je. uit laws are pa , t:d, A. J. Balfour write., ..
Defense of Ph11osophic
Leo XIII
and the Restoration of
PhilosophicalStudies66
1888

The scope of the Encyclical Aeterni Patris


The appearance of the Encyclical (~terni Patris)in which Leo XIII urged
the Christian n1asters to con1e back to the fundamental theses of tradi-
tional philosophy will remain one of the most considerable events of the
religious evolution of the last centuries.
What a spectacle that the head of the Roman Catholic Church to
whon1 the West owes, with its civilization, the possession of the treasures
of ancient literature, and the true text of Plato as also that of Aristotle,
n1akes audible to the pastors and to the clergy of the whole world his
voice which has always been listened to in order to recommend to them
the study of the first of human sciences and the investigation of ideal
things whose decay or prosperity is the infallible criterion of general cul-
ture! In these pages we would like to indicate, in broad terms, the sig-
nificance of what the Pope did fron1 the view of both philosophy and
religion.

The Pope sanctions the distinct place


of philosophy in the encyclopedia of the Sciences
Above all, the Encyclical sanctions, by underlining emphatically, the
rights and duties of philosophy, its characteristic as a "distinct science."
Nobody can deny the proble1n: it is the obvious aspect of the philosoph-
ical cri is of our tin1e. ince the fresh outbreak of positivism the tendency
has been to reduc n1etaphy ics to the broad st conclusions of the differ-
ent areas f knowledge. The result is also, at the same time, to suppress

fi>. Leon XIII et la n:-;taur.tion des etudcs philosophiqucs. - Le Livre d'Or du Amtificat
de l.i1m .Xlll. Brm,<..-1-,,Sorn
'.·te hl·lgc d libr,iric, 1888.67-r31 lwithA.VanWeddingenJ.
J-IICAL ESSAYS
's pJ:IJLOSOP .
CARDINAL MERCIER
56

. f rigin. But the methodolo!)\ ,


. uons o o l fi c, ra
th e ba ic ideal and all basic ques . t1·fie If there are men ta unctions
· than scien · h tb ·
w uld be more convenient their nature - t er~ mus e a disci- 11

- never mind for the moment, h ·r actions and their laws. These ac- \
, d lyzes t e1
line that determines an ana. ll t al and inora iacu ties.
I £. 1 . Th ey are
P "bl mte ec u , h 1
tion depend upon sens1 e' each of them, ot ers on y specific.
ruled by laws, ome are commonl to. ethics, theo di cy h ave t h eir · foun-
chology, ogic, £. 1 · Ii
Among the.e 1aws, . P~Y tue O f h.1s nat u ral makeup man 1ee s inc ned to
111
dation. Be 1de, vir . things and events, the aspects and the
l not10nsamong
c ·
search 1orumversa ·. al and proper to all or d ers of reality
. h. h entire1y gener .
relation w IC ar~ . h s evidently a proper object: it constitutes a
This transcendentmqmry a , '. d . h .
. . fk 1 dae Philosophy m a wor , 1s t e science oflaws
distinct areao now e o · . ' d h · 1 .
and repre entat1v
. e and affective. functions
. . of. the I, an t at 1sa so the sci-
ence of objectivereality,seen m its 1rred~c1blee!,ements. In other words,
rhe philosophical scienceis concerned with the final causes and the first
principles." Followingthe lead of Aristotle, no one has better fixed the
di tinct characterof the philosophical science than St. Thomas. Long be-
forehand, Thomas refuted the disciples of both Comte and Littre, who
do not granthim this honor due to an etiological stubbornness. Famous
phil~so~hers , FredericUeberweg and Trendelenburg, have called Aris-
totelia_rusm_the objective doctrine par excellence! Thomism has been
conceivedm the same spirit.

The_general connection of philosophy


. with natural and physical sciences
Wit?outdoubt, mental activitiesare b d. . .
sensibleactivitiesin the h oun in an intimate manner to the
uman person d f cc
ca11 ed body and soul. Th ~ ma e up o two parts con1D1only
m h e natural SCie b . th
e~suret e relationsof these tw . nces egin to furnish n1eans to
a• sciencewit· h a promisingfut O regions of activity. · · From there comes he
Justpromise. ure and which h al er
theprobables.nam~lythe psycho-physiolo as re ady given more than th
relation5h. ge_nes1s of sensations·th gy. There are inany problems: it
1ps with th ' e general 1 f · .. ·
mentof the d . e unconscious and h aws o sensibility and their
na whichare
t d
°
urat1on f
o6servabl h
psycho-physi·
t e con ·
ca1 acts. th
scions state; the 111eaure- th
s u y of dreams· . e; t e problems of ' e rare n1ental pheno111e- fir
problemsare th' child psychology d the creation of language· the 0
wh· h e areas f an ab '
,v-,ic the follow· o research of nom1al psycholom. •. The ·e an
weber w ing spec· r an ahno st 1. fi bl .
e ' Undt s h'ff ia ists have d n 1nite con1ple .·iry Ill th
rs.Thes h ' c 1 ' l-Iel h one ext d.
ousstud et esesniust n1 oltz, Goltz M raor inary \Vork: Fechner. JU
y. T'h occupy ' unk F . . h- d
reveaIan _os~Whodo . a considcrabl , _erner and m.u1yot .
ullJust1fiedfea :ot recognize tl _c p1ace In philosophical en-
r •or th le1r lll1 0
e o]idity P rt.ince \vould 111ro
of n . .
L ESSAYS
pI--Il CA .
's pI--IILOSO
RDI AL M ER C I ER L

. . But the methodolol)-\,


. uestions
O f o11gin.
If
l fi
there are men ta unctions
o,
.
rather a
the ba ic ideal and all ~asicthqanscientific. - there must be a discj_
, ment . ature . 1 Th instrurn
Ol
ild be more conve ent their n . and the1r aws. ese ac- was ill
w r. the 1110111 ' . actions . Th
- ne er mind , ior d alyzes their d moral faculties.
· , an an, al an nJ ey .are specula
Pline th,1t deternune .61e intellectuh' f them others o Y specific. observa
sens1 ' c o ' h . r-
tion s depend upon 0111111on to ea . theodicy have t eir 1oun- placed
ruled by laws,
ome are c I . ethics,
s chology , ogic , makeup man iee s me ine to
c. l . 1· d
Aristotl
Amon g these la\~S , P_ t e of his natural d events the aspects and the ural ph
• :I 111 vir u h · gs an ' .
dation . Be it_es, 1 tions among t m er to all orders of reality. hearted
· . 1versa no al and prop · ·
search in our
. toi vhic
un_ 11 are entirely gener•d ntly a pr oper obiect: J
1t. constitute s a
relatJO!lS know lej
. . . \ •emi en t 1·11quiry has, .evi e hy '.1n a word ' is the science . oflaw
Tl11Strau c f knowledo-e. Phi osop . ' 1 f the I and that IS also the sci-5 ter , t o
distinct are<1° t
g._ · functions O ' h ds te ll ec t9
and repre en 'ative and. auective. its . irre
. d uci"ble elements. In ot er hwor ,
Ari sto tl
f
ence o obiective
J
reality,
.
seen m
· conceme
d wi"th the "final causes andfixt ed first h
the philosophical sc~enceis of Aristotle, no one has better e t e und erjt
H o~
principles." Followmg the_lead h . al science than St. Thomas. Long be-
1 mod e
di tinct character of the philosopd_ ~ f both Comte and Littre , who
£i t d the 1sc1p1es o th e m
forehand, Thomas h.1111 hre ue
1" honor d ue to an eti.olocical stubbornness. Famous
o . lectu al
do not grant t ~ b d Trendelenburg, have called Aris- To e
philosophers, Fred~nc_Uederw~g an excellence! Thomism has been
totelianism the objective octnne par that is
conceived in the same spirit. accept
penm
school
The general connection of philosophy
instinc
with natural and physical sciences
both c
Without doubt, mental activities are bound in an intimate manner to the If C
sensibleactivities in the human person, made up of two parts commonly come
called body and soul. The natural sciences begin to furnish means to thew
measure the relations of these two regions of activity . From there come heat o
~science ~ith a promising future and which has already given more than er po,
Just
th pronuses:namelythe psycho-physiology. There are many problems: that p
e probablegenesisof sensations;
relationshipswith the ·
the dgeneral
h
laws. of sensibility and theu_
menr of the duration Ounconscious
f h h an· t e conscious state· ' the mea ure
0
h. h
:~;y psyc -p ys1cal acts; the rare mental phenome-
~f ;re observh~ble;the problems of the creation of language; e
reams· c ild psycho} d 6 ... Ththe
problems are th' ogy an a normal p ychology. e.
h. e areas of research 0 f I . ...I · , 1n
w 1chthe follow· . . · an a most infinite omp e . ·1t
w b mg spec1ah ts hav d h r
e er, Wundt Sch"ff H 1 e one e. traordinary w rk: Fee ne ·
ers. These thes:s mu1st' e rnholtz, Goltz, Munk , Ferrier and m,my oth-
. occupy a ·d
ousstudy.ThoseWhod0 cons1 erable place in philo ,phical . en·
reveal a . not recogmiz h • . w
n Utljustified fe c e t cir importan c e would cclll
ar ior the oJ'd 1 · f . or
tty o lll(•taph '\ir, l lrn:mne,
LEO Xlll AND THE RE TORATION OF p HILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 57

rather
. a lamentable
· dnarrow-mindedness
r · A 11t'iqmty
· d.d 1 not possess the
mstruments
· require
fi d LOr these . delicate observat ions. Its sc1ent1
· · ·fi1c·method
--- was ill de· ne .dAs 1 Balmes
· al c said: our fathers solved , sometimes · th roug h
specu 1at10ns
· anf ogic LOnnulas' the problen 1s, w h 1c . h came firom t h e
re
observation o facts. ~oreover, . what master among the Scholastics
C
placed
· 1so h. much ·dvalue mto expenmentation as St • Th omas.? Fo11 owmg·
l-
Anstot ~, is gm e, a~d Albertus Magnus, his professor and the first nat-
ural ph1losoph~r of his century, St. Thomas applied himself so whole-
le ?eartedl~ to fixing_the relationsh~ps of the senses and of the spirit so that,
111 our times, ~e is accused, quite wrongly, of overemphasizing sense
knowledge ..It 1s, rathe~, Thonias who wants man, who is spirit and mat-
ter, to find m the sensible phenomenon the external stimulus of his in-
tellectual evolution. Thomas has marked, in a manner as magisterial as
Aristotle and with a better clarity, the part of both factors in the act of
understanding.
How many problems still remain without solution in the schools of
modem philosophy because one has lost sight of the respective role and
the mutual influences of matter and mind in the development of intel-
lectual life!
To equate, following the positivist, mental activity to bodily activity,
that is to make each equivalent fom1s of energy and to refuse a priorito
accept any means of knowledge other than external observation and ex-
perimentation; or to hold, with the last defenders of the Cartesian
school, that all mental activity, whether it is called sensation or thought,
instinct or free will, escapes the general laws of the material world - in
both cases one destroys the complex unity of the human nature.
If certain mental manifestations are signs of a power which does not
come from the world of material forces, then it is clear that it is not in
the world of material forces, or in the appearance or disappearance of a
heat or mechanical phenomenon that we will find the traces_of this high-
er power. The day when the spiritualist would try to furmsh the proof
that positivism demands of him, the spiritualist would simply deny that
it was even possible. . . . .
If there are principles of action other than maten_al ~nergies, then 1t 1s
through the witnes of consciousness that the pnnopl~s n~ust be a_f-
firmed. We hall not po it a priori,anterior to the whole se1ent1ficor p~il-
o ophical inve tigation, that only matter is in the realm of the po~s1bl~
111111d
and that the only mean of cognition in the reach of the human is
. d · t. 11 for that would be an un-
t h e extenor observatton an expemncnta 10 , <
· · - · · , to accent "the means of
Justifiable po tulate, theretorc 1t 1s nt:CC sary r
d mon tration" of the spirituali . t chool.
1n c AL ESSA. y:,
' p}IJLOSOP
58 CARDINAL MERCIER S

. b ervation in philosophy
1 O f interior o s onl~
The preponderant ro e . experimentalfact at least b
15
· terior acts an · h h ppens outside Of y h aV'
The consciousness of our in . of that whic a us. w hi
the same right as the observationance of the existenc~ a~d ~f ~he ~alue br a<
H ow wou ld we acquire. the .assur ly upon this 1rres1st1ble inte- w h:
1
f e cannot re
of our exterior observations w t we observe? p er.
rior affirmation which tells us tha . observation are the mechanical tiOI
f extenor d . h . ll
What fall under the grasp o h n be associate wit inte ectual
. . al henornena t at ca . If
or phys1co-chenuc P . ll I thinking 1tse • .
activity but this is not mte ectuallah t exists is endowed with corporeal
' . ·d t that t a · •
A prioriit 1snot evi en .d fbeing and of body are neither iden-
t"es· the 1 eas o i:
existence and proper 1 ' bl fi each other. There1ore, no one has Th
t ly insepara e rorn . f
tical nor abso1u e h . t demonstrate the existence o a non- un :
. h the one w o tnes o d
the ng t to st0P h h nly procedures that such a emonstration am
corporeal power throug t e o
Permits. . d ·
t mean that we mten · 1a t e men t a1 activity
d to 1sO · · fro
However, this oes no . tir 1
influence of the laws of thermodynanncs or, on the
comp1ete1y from any . . h • or
other hand, submit all aspects of mental mamfestat10ns to t ese physical
laws.
It sufficesto analyze the data of consciousness, upon which we rely
with good reason, in order to arrive at stating that the acts of knowledge,
of consciousness,of memory, of desire, of will, are divided in two com-
pletely different orders, the one sensible, the other suprasensible; all are
subject to the laws which regulate the activity of material agents, notably
to the law of duration or of time, and into all likelihood, to laws of the
equivalence of forces of nature and of the conservation of energy but
not ~ll are sub~ect_inthe sam~ way; the latter ones are subject onl; in a
mediate way, m virtue of their natural relationships with the fom1er.
vat::e e~~:trhdanhtwitn_e~ses?fthe interior sense and of external obser-
1s t e participat10n of the . d f
in the acts of knowled e d f . . organism an o material agents
The exterior ob g . an o willing of the sensibleorder.
. servat10n states with . . .
which increases each d th . ' . a prec1s1on and ·with a clearne s
hi h ay e mner relation O f d d h
g est ~ental manifestations and th s epen ence between t e
of chemistry, whereas th b . e laws of inechanics, of phy ic and
level 0 f e O servation of ·
a general law th· · consciousne s elevate to the
festation Of h ' is mtemal fact na 1 h ' ·
. .s t e soul (even tho h ' me Y, t at th e uperior man1-
1mmaterial ord ) . se t at we ra
sonin er , intellectual tho h fc nge an1ong the s11prasc11siblc or
g, are neve • ug t, or exan 1 I f
spondin h r practiced with b . P e, or th e \ rk rea-
g p enome f out em g a . ,
Here are th r:. na o the sensible d ccon1p n1ed b a corn.:-
A . e iacts. or er .
n inductio .
facts f n inferred . .
o exteriorob . precipttous]y c. •
servat,on ironi th e r- • I . . . )t
can make l1lind d " ...\c 1ur,c exan1m.1nont
1 po ed to 'ic in the world
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILO
SOPHICAL STUDIES
59

only one substance believe that also the superio l ·c .


· d . r menta mam1estations
have as therr cause, an even as their adequate cause, matena. l ao-ent on
which they are seen as d ependent· but whoever k ho
' nows enoug to em-
brace the facts completely
. and to renounce no f . c
source o m1orn1at1on .
which nature has provided for us, will understand th t th 1 fd
·h a e aw o e-
p endency wit respect
"
to corporeal forces is only a scientifi
1 ·
c.
c conurma-
l f
tion oft h e aw o natura reciprocity" that regulates O ur men ta1activity. • •

The role of experience and speculation in the doctrine


of Saint Thon1as
T~e characterist~c trait of the phil_osophy of Saint Thomas is precisely the
umon of expenence and of rat10nal speculation, the combination of
analysis and synthesis.
What happens when after almost three centuries of philosophy going
from one extreme to another, between empiricism and idealism, until
tired and exhausted in sterile efforts, it falls into the abyss of skepticism
or throws itself desperately into the arms of vague and mysterious beliefs?
There is only one philosophy, that which responds adequately to the to-
tality of the demands of our nature. "Man is neither angel nor beast,"
said Pascal; he could have added: but he has something from each. In or-
der that a philosophy be really human, it is necessary that it takes me as I
am, in the integrity of my sensible and intelligent nature. The day when
Descartes, wishing to effect a refom1, consummated his break with tra-
ditional philosophy and pronounced the divorce between the thinking-
soul and the machine-body, he provoked exclusivism, followed soon by
hostility between physiological sciences and psychological sciences and
he thus brought about, by his exaggerated spiritualism, a powerful reac-
tion from the very materialism that he was struggling against. Between
the hypothesis of a substance which arises and develops little by little and
that of the sudden intervention of a being of a completely different na-
ture, the biological facts give more credit to the first hypothesis and one
understands that the scholars, who are not offered a middle way, take the
side of the so-called materialists, as Tyndall has done, in a bout of humor,
in the midst of the British Association.
And indeed, if one does not have anything to substitute for the insuf-
ficiency and confusion of philosophical theories springing from De~-
cartes; if one, like Cousin, abstracting himself from scholastic
philosophy, whose quiet progress has always sustained itself across the
systems that destroyed each other on all ides: then we ~ould h~v~ to
understand how the head of the eclectic school could see m matenalism,
idealism, skepticism and mysticisn1 (which are ceasel~ssly re_newed~,th e
~our perpetual phase of the history of philosophy with which he iden-
tifiesphilosophy itself
OPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOS

bizarre dialogue entitled OJ


of the introduction to this manual, th e vb~ry •s to explain the true sense Befi
the Grammarianor Of the Log1C1an. . . Its o ~ect• I portant of Anse l m ' s Writ- ofa w
. 1 the least im . d
of attributive nouns and 1s sure ~ the Categoriesan On Inter- rnen b
f Anstotle on y 1 .d
ings. But Anselm possessecl O h A lyticsthat alone prov1 es the ofph~
.
Pretation.The zealous logician a . . 1 eked t e na . 'fi
h. obiective sigm cance. The seven
. f . cl nd signa1s is J . d . aboun
key to the logic o Ansto e a h e a mind expenence in all
. f 1 how on eac pag H treas
other treatises o Anse ms . . to the extreme. owever, the
to wrl
the subtleties of logic, sometime~ ~omgtyle He includes in the Manolo-
. . . . . th Augustm1an s . f Ch . ive P
maJonty is wntten m e . . 1. d t eatises almost all parts o ns-
• d m specia 1ze r . Bona
gion, in the Pros/og1onan . . t grate these theses mto one
. • B h did not m e
tian teachmg. . utk nde often h e gave them only in a popular form. He
comprehensive
. • wor aelope di a o f re 11gi . •ous science · Alexander of Hales,
did not wnte an ~ncy 1 h tire work of Aristotle from the hands
h h djust received a most t e en h. taini
:f ~e aArabphilosophers, edited a great TheologicalSumma. T is com- cone
pleted the prece dmg. S ummasof Robert of Melun . and. of Stephen . Lang- write
ton. St. Thomas Aquinas imitated him in this. But _hiswork will surpass to re
by far the scope and the strength of the works of his predecessors. Thm

Exterior ordonance of the method of Saint Thomas


The method of the angelic Doctor was one of strictly logical demonstra-
tion; his didactic works are conceived in a more rigorous logical form
than those of Alexander of Hales are. His particular treatises and his com-
mentaries themselves are marked with an orderliness that is recognized
as corning from Aristotle. In his Summa Theologica,the most perfect of corn
his works, after having posed the disputed problem, the holy Doctor The
chooses, usually from tradition and from reason, the negative arguments ho\:
that one c?uld oppose to him, then he gives the solution, develops it and affir
presents his proofs and finally responds to difficulties. This procedure is tan
extended t~ the whole of the sacred discipline. Up to that point in the
W 10n
est, we did not have an exampl O f h ·· · ' ·h
I f
a anguage o constant lucidity and ie sue a cnt1cal
h· h b . ngor associated wit nu1
genders harshness V •h1 n w re so nety almost never en- totl
h
nas to gothic moi;ui~; ;ig / o~e com~ared the style of Thoma Aqui- ity.
.
°
idealism,in their cont n s 1 _t e . rSt ?~nod, so full of in piration and of
emp at1ve s1mphcity · h b .
illu
cension of their lines tow d . fi . ' In t e so er and lununou as- tio1
ar s 1n in 1ty.
ch
]
The dialectical form of h . th
Since the Rena1ssance
. h . t e scholastic work
of the Schol · O
' ne as cnticized l h Pl
lish it . h ast1cs,that St. Thomas h d a ot t e form and tht nit.•thod ta11
in t e sch00 J · a powe..c. 11
· s. 1
iu Y ·omributed to cst.1b- pu
f
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PH ILOSOPHICAL STUDIE S

Before and after the- I 3th century there we re d octors whose tyl
of a worthless barbanty.
· bl Some melancholy paraph rasers, some · angry
s e wasold
men blame d t h eir trou e on language, . and de 1 d h h .
c are t at t e senou sness
of philosophy. ma d e e1oquence impossible · One sees a11too easily . m . the
severity of . science an excuse for an impotent dry A •f h
ness. s i t e one who
abounds m str?ng and deep thought_automatically despises words! What
treasures of wisdom. .could . there be m the mind of a man w h o consents
to write only banalities
. m .pedantic
. . form' · Is not all th i·s an i·11us1on
· o f na-
ive people? Without. servility. with regard to form , St . Th omas, 1i·k e St
Bonaventure, was, m the.bphilosophical
. genre, an excellent writ er. some·
L
me~ ~s competent as e1 mz and '!. C?u~in have justly praised the syl-
logistic_method. In~eed, the syllogi~m'. m imposing on the development
of the 1~ea of c_ertam unbreakable hrruts, thereby strengthens it by con-
taining it; and 1t prevents the poverty ~nd emptiness of thoughts being
concealed under th_e abu~dance of discourse. All truly philosophical
writers of modern times, m France and in England, have been anxious
to reproduce in their compositions the rich conciseness of which St.
Thomas remained the model. A literary critic as grave as Villemain has
recognized that the French language, the most philosophical in the
world, owes, for a great part, its limpidity to the Scholastics. Sainte-
Beuve has made the same confession.
Within the proper limits with which the human spirit has to be con-
tent in confronting infinite Intelligence, the examination and the inves-
tigation was ardently stimulated by the scholastic method and Cousin
regretted that this method was abandoned. No doubt, sometimes one
complicated too much the thought in some text on the authority of St.
Thomas. But with this text and following this master scholastics knew
how to find their own way and the originality of their personal idea was
affirmed with brilliance while they invoked a philosophy in order to sub-
stantiate it before the multitude. When one examines the differing opin-
ions on various subject in the scholastic schools (and they we_re
numerous), it i clear that the e opposing opinions all app~aled to Aris-
totle: this wa , at time , an excessive homao-e 0
to a very legitimatefi author-
ity. Each century ha seen the r turn of thi kind of re pect or some
illustrious genius that is for the scholar who is in fashion. Our genera-
. ' ' d · · f me
t10n cannot c ndemn pa . ed ao-es for exce ive a nuratton ° so
scholar, even bet\ t:l'll oppo cd . chool of teaching.
Ewn with regard to Anscotk, leaving a. idc the change~ sugge. ted by
the ( 'h · · c: • • l 1 •av has h1 proud mde-
, n ttan 1a1th,Thomas Aquina ..1 mo •t a\\..; · · 10
. logic. he d'1-
pcnlicncc of mind. Ht a< uses Ari cotlc w1th his errors ~ ' •
t h' - ' l laved by the t'Vl' s
11 ·s 1111dt from riscotl , \ 1th regard to t 1t: part P ' , .• .
u1 J · h -d b ~ the c cs thL c 1u t:
P 1 1 1n , llu in.ition the appl',1r.nee ot ot.., core.: ' ' t-l . ,
o tid I l ' . h . · 1 • t 1ry of mattt't o 11.:,\\ -
;i c ,h md flo, , the origm >fnv ·r , t 1..:iw.:n
OPJ-Il C AL ESSAYS
, S pBILOS
C ARDI N AL MER C I.ER
LEO XII

of the Milky Way , the


h nature Ord
f Janet, t e Albert the Great, Thomas' et
enly spaces and o t ~1;1;nets. 67 Didn't thority in philosophical m::stet b ein g's freed<
and th~ mohvem~n acy of reason over au qual to that of Aristotle' s:i ets, very clearly t
proclaim t e pnm . Plato's wisdorn e · obscuriti es ar 1
and didn't he proclaim soul and its ir
. totle in philosophy exp ositio_n _th
. • 0 [A ns and th at 1t 1s 1
Th e supenonty hools of the
Ch · ·
nst1an West had of hi s tr eatise
. h
e that t e sc . d h' a
It was providential for~un h whose concis ene ss an teac mg lllethod T h e auth c
master as teacher in p~ilosoJeritableprodigious ~nowledge. Just lillliting ical and anal)
went hand in hand _w~th a k Aristotle's treatises embrace the who! b ee n criti ciz,
x1stmgwor s, h. h . h e h asty conclu
ourselves to the e h ' h . explained by im, w o is t e most eru_
I dae w ic is c: link ed up w
of human know e i:, ' h . k of all antiquity . How 1ortunate for his fol
. orous t m er fi - th e mo st fe1
dite, the most ng h . Aristotle was the rst to describe th
d t; the sc o1astics.1 .. e Th e schol aso
lowers an or . f hilosophy with a prec1S1on that has not been
ose and the o6~ect o p . . . ed their faitl
purp . d. d the foundations of certainty m science and refut-
surpassedHem icate h' H c: number of ~
. ·. • h th weapons of skeptical sop 1sts. e 1ormulated the fr9
ed skept1C1sm w1t e .. f h 1 . a gr eater
. . 1e of contradi'ction , the supreme cond1t10n o t e ogical order
pnnop that, with? ~
and discovered the theory of syllogism and the laws of demonstration , a n ew soe1e1
although he never applied them with the be~t r~sults .. He explained the gave credit
reasonof the concepts of substance and causality m their comprehensive- od, and an
ness;he founded the system of beings on the idea of internal activity and didn't alwa
specificfinality; he put in relief the concept of the harmony of things, commenta
and in the last analysislinked this harmony to the influx of the prime The infll!
mover, the immovable principle of mobile and limited causes. Besides, on so man
he analyzedthe attributes, the faculties, the nature of the human soul; neutralize
the precepts of ethics, of politics and of law; the rules of aesthetics and ed by the
of words. Such was the genius to which the labors of Albert and those totle fell i1
of his discipleSt. Thomas Aquinas used to establish the schools. neo-Platon
be 1nore h<
of the Mi
Omissions and faults in Aristotelianism would ha
On the other hand, Aristotle t 00 k . . . work in p
master[that is Plato] . h h care to d1stmguish himself from his
of foreign
what unfaithful'
int Wlt t e result th at 1ater sc holars see him• as a some-
erpreter of Plat O ' d · but one h
~ccused,not entirely . h s octnne. In fact, Aristotle ha been
importance to the sen
Wit out reaso
n, 0
f havmg· given a preponderant
ad . bl se aspect of k l d .
nura e terms the nat now e ge. Aristotle has des cribed in
he see ure and the im 6· · B
. ms to deny to th · fi . muta 1lity of the first being. ut St. Thon
provident' I · Is rst being i . . ~. . .
Ia mtervention 10 · h n erta1n section of hi wnnng; view of
t e gove · ·
rmng of thi, '\:orld and also thi tir-t unpr ve
67. Sec the scholar! The 11111
Salvatore T I y book of th
a arno·A ·
.
c cnunc
lie wi .d
. ristoti/e e la Scofastira 211ndt p/rcfcct of ~tutli ·s ,H tht · A11olhnam, 1,~
' {'/ · , f? /J.
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION O
F PHILOSOPHICAL T l)JHS

being's freedom of operations. Together with _. .


very clearly the notion of creation To th ~lato, Anstotle rejects
.. . · ese senous fault d , l bl
obscurities are added with regard to perso rty d . ' cp or"' e
soul and its immortality. These are gaps a:~ i dandco,~sciou ness of th.e
·· h d re un anc1es of the gen, 1
exposit10n t at evoted commentators have b c d ~r,i
. . al . een 1orce to rccogmze
and that it is not ways possible to explain th h 1 c. '
. • d . roug t 1e 1ragmentarv tat,
of his treatises an the hesitations of his editors. " ' ·'
• The author 1 ·of1the Organon
• . often delighted to th e ex tremc m · 1 l
t 1e o<r-
1caland .ana yt1ca
. . d c: consideration
. .
of things and of not ions. 1smet h O d ht>
· H' as
been cntic1ze . 1or the discussion. about loo-icalt,•
concept'1011sanoJ fcor t h e
hasty
. conclus10ns
. . . incomplete inducti·on and gratuitous
drawn from · ly
lmked up with abst_ractp~mc1ples. Thus, this has been the judgment of
the most fervent . Anstotehans, the best informed: Suarez , Tolet , c aJc ·.tan.
The scholastics separated themselves from Aristotle in all that contradict-
ed their faith. But the authority of Aristotle is just as troublesome in a
number of points that in other circumstances have been discussed with
a greater freedom. His interpreters introduced into physics some views
that, without them, would have never penetrated the scientific milieu of
a new society. In particular, their subjection to the opinion of the master
gave credit to (in spite of the eminent thinkers) an over formalist meth-
od, and an arbitrary and abstract metaphysics whose boastful writers
didn't always know how to maintain. As it always happens, mediocre
commentators and disciples took from the great Aristotle only his faults.
The influence of St. Augustine, this prodigious thinker who touched
on so many questions, will counterbalance, certainly, but he could not
neutralize completely this unhappy set of circumstances. It was aggravat-
ed by the error of the professors who, wanting to turn away from Aris-
totle, fell into an equally prejudicial excess of the renewed idealism of
neo-Platonics. From the point of view of the purity of the faith, it would
be more honest to say the following: the first spreading of the philos~phy
of the Middle Ages, already so glorious in its famous representatives,
would have been even more fruitful, if it had had, as a true model, a
work inspired by the Christian traditions, entirely free from a doct~ne
of foreign origin; this foreign doctrine was doubtlessly worthy of praise,
but one has to admit that it had many errors and weaknesses.

Saint Thomas and Aristotle


St. Th omas A quma . ed 1·nto his two S,m1masall the profound
we 1com . ul d d
• . d h · ·ty of his fa ts an errors an
views of Aristotle he recnfie t e maJon · f h Ch h
• ' · d the Fathers o t e urc .
improved them by the ideas of Augustine an · f h
Th c umma Tlzeolo'<ica . I ·u 1ain as the sym
in particu ar, wi ren · .
6 o 1o cat o-
11
11.c wisdom;
. • ' . h
it reject no fruitful t eory, no P
rogress but impregnate a
'
LEO XI II A ND THr." f'EST
' ' ORAT!O N 01 ·. PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 83

. The scholastic theory of knowledge


Accordrng to t. Thomas , th~e c-. 1act o f percept . . .
un Ies we do not place betw ,. b. ion remams umntelligible
· ·i • ' een o ~ect and sub· t · ·· .
o f as 11111ation, or if you like a kind of . ~ec , a ~nmitive relation
and of phenomena by the faculties of s psyc~1ical rec_eption ~f the object
less, the object is shown to each t ensatio~ and mtellection. Doubt-
turc of each and not oth . acub1ty, ac_cordmg to the constitutive na-
erwise, ut this spec· 1 · · ·
per onal and particular aspect of e . · ia approp?at10n is the
reaction of the senses or th p rceptio~ and results precisely from the
0 er powers m the f h b.
which solicits them • Far firon1 1111p. . presence
b. . o t e o. ~ect
1ying a p l
the subiect what we h h . h ure Y su ~ective reaction of
. tJ , ave ere is t e p nor · action· o f th e ob1ect
. on the
sub~ec . J

Objectivity of perception
The despot~sm of all our sensations, in the normal state; the most abso-
lute despotism_ of the indications of general sensibility, which if they
Ce were _underestimated would surely involve the alteration and the de-
s~ruction or the d~ath of the "subject"; finally, the despotism of first prin-
~iples and reasonm_g b~sed on the observation of reality; and with that,
m the s~stem of obJ~ctive perception, the satisfaction of the spontaneous
tendencies of consciousness and the anguish of consciousness confronted
by t~e theory of skepticism, which is contrary to the strongest sentiments
and m contradiction with experience: these are the arguments which al-
ways will establish that perception has an objective foundation in reality ·
and that the sensible or ideal representation must be basically in accord
with the world of things or noumena, as Kant calls them. Von Hartmann
has developed these arguments with a great wisdom in his book Fonde-
ment critiquedu Realism transcendental.Every once and awhile, Kant has
been led back by his better nature to an opinion close to this truth: "All
external perception," he says, "demonstrates by itself the existence of
something real." In the same way as U eberweg and von Hartmann have
remarked, Kant posited as the principal fact of the interior life "central
apperception" or the consciousness. But, in the conscious state, subject
and object mutually compenetrate, and on this terrain at least, Kant has
had to acknowledge "the fundamental or assimilatory objectivity" of the
representation which is precisely that which we have asserted for the
phenomena of sensation and understanding. Despite the sincere adnura-
tion that every impartial person must show because ?fthe ~nalytic power
of Kant in his writings in which so many recent d1scovenes w~re fore-
shadowed , it must also be held again t Kant that the representational re-
lationship of reality with the perceptive faculty, tendin_g spont~neou ly
to assimilat e the < bje t, is proved by universal observation. This funda-
CAR D INAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

111~ntal r lationship derive from the nature of things. In a general way,


Aristotle, St. Thomas and the whole Scholastic School d~duced_the sarne
1th
~on equence from th e analysis of perception toge th e~ ~ t~e mfallibil-
lty of spontaneous tenden cies in the whole class of h~mg bemgs. In this
method, the question of the object in itselfdisappears 111 a sens~ from the
cope of ideology. The task of the critique is to sho": the relatwnship of
P Y hical representation with the being in itself It _is true that we per-
eive "the forms" of sen ible or mental representat10n; but these forrns
pass1
have their partial cause in the object, in the special nature of the phe-
nomen a. Instead of underestimating the very character of perception it che a
is necessary to see in perception the substitute of the object. Knowledge ject.
is therefore bjective, although it is accommodated to special laws of the
ense organ, to distinctive reactions of the faculties. Let us admit with the
majority of modern thinkers that all physical phenomena are associated
with n~ovements. It will be true that sensible impression is transmitted in
a certam way to the eye and in a different way to other sense organs. Im-
manent resemblance, photography of the purely intentional ord d
· ·1 h . . er, an
smu ar · 1tot e ·measunng mstrument . of the physiolocists'o · Now , th ese are
certam·a1·y precise,· constant and faithful indicative signs'· But , wo UId n ,t t h.IS
speci m:press10non the sensory faculties be dependent in a
the perceived obj~ct or the perceived phenomenon? W~uldn~tenthse, on This
flector, the neural imp · b . e re-
age of being! As the rp:sys~~no- eh,as_p_ast thhmkershave said, the ideal im-
. P ysic1sts s ow bette h d . neo
calcu1at10nson the threshold O f . r eac ay m their
· h consciousness th · • the
mt e external stimulus in order th t h . ~r e mtens1ty required
ego, on the duration of perc t. a t e 1mpress10n be assimilated by the be b
t' · ep ions on th 1
ion, will not the internal state in th' e e ementary factors of sensa- hod

H:~
:~
;~spect~, hpresupposethe parallelis: :f
temal state? The very laws of W be normal case, correspond to the ex-
;hatever .their value is in oth.er
tdhese_nsiblequality and the eali~rgamc.sign and the mental
relie
peri
dare
en oes 1thap
urement of th .
h re ty which t ·
pen t at the sensation .
I
s imu ates them. heco
of sensiblep e stu1:1ulus, if everything is " is plroportional to the meas- quali
. erception:>Th· pure y sub· • ,, .
Tame callsth · is relationship f . . ~ective m the fact tiall
ing_the imagee;:;;esenta_tive phenomenonoana~;1milat~on is so real that pred
nation"; but . he object. Janet has hallucmation" ubstitut- C pf
the i ' In any case i d very severely ·· • "
mage must be 1 ' n or er to const·t cnt1c1zed halluci- tor
sembl ,, £ a c ear s b 1 ute a pe
ther ~s. or the faculty d ~m ol of the rea11 ·ty drmanent ub titute, p r
e 1s in th b estmed an a ' b
resentation be e road sense of the to exercj e its activi sy1~1 ol cha~ re-
mines th tween special se . e tem1s, no relac· tyh on It. Certamly,
em. A S nsat1o ions ip f .
organsassi· ·1 s t. Thomas ns and th e phy . 1 o n1atenal rq,-
. rni ate th . Would 1ca pr
tions of the ;eth e1r proper ob . _ay: neither th oc e that deter-
er excited by d. ~ect 111it phy • al e ey e nor tht:> thl'r
1Verse • si
· sensible ob ·c
naeur~: but the mo-
~ t ' modify tht· milieu
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOP
HICAL STUDIES 85

ray, cause in the organ a special determination whi.ch .


then constitutes a psy-
n1e chic symbol for the organ by means of which the spirit direct!
il- .
biect: "I nstan t aneous p h o t ograp h s ,, 111
. the sensati·o •y . grasps
t he O J . • • • ns o f vision, as
:his Rabier says, m a general way are 111dicat1veand organic signs after the
the manner of s~h_Ygmographs and myo~aphs. The neural impression sen-
IOf sitizedby a hvmg organ, transubstant1ated by the activity of the so 1 • _
.h h . um
er- timately unite d wit t_ e org~msm, becom~s for the cognitive faculty,
·ms which corresponds t~ it_,the mst~ui~ent of Its own act of apperception.

~
~~
Passiveby reason o~ its mdeter?1ma~101: and of its impotence to modify
the object, the sensible faculty is active m the vital assimilation of its ob-
ge ject. The cognitive faculties are, in virtue of their nature, oriented to-
he ward their ends, these things being objects of the external world, as in
Lhe sensation, or modifications of the ego, or finally, object s of intellectual
ed intuition as in ideas. These powers are by their very essence constituted

lIn

~re
his
1-
d
in function of an objective representation.The followers of the critical
school, since they call these functions "relative," bear witness to the dif-
ference of the mechanical or physiological functions of the body.

Sensation is an act of the composite


on
re- This point is of extreme gravity: The least obscurity in this matter can
weaken or misrepresent the scholastic doctrine . Nothing is more erro-
neous than to hold with the Cartesians that the soul is the simple witness,
the total cause, "the exclusive recorder of sensations." Nothing would
be better than to hold that sensation is an activity of the composite, the
body animated by the soul. But, it is necessary, in this case, to put in clear
relief the principle of Aristotle and of St. Thomas: the action of the su-
perior principle compenetrates, transforms, and transubstantiates, if one
daresto write this, the inferior action. If the organs of the human body
bec~me the co-principles of sensation, "this is not by s~me. corporeal
~uahty," to speak with St. Thomas; it is that the soul, which is subs~an-
ct tiallyunited to them exercises in them the vital and sensitizing functions
at pred_isposingthe org;nic impression to become the intermediary of per-
t- ception. It is by this development that the living body becomes a co-fac-
tor 0 ~ sensation; and it is this development which prepares th e soul to
Perceive the material objects.

In what sense is sensation not a si1nple phenomenon


Regard ·d · . . . absolutely simple
e m its complex totality sensation 1s not an ·
r Phenom . ' . . k the scope sen-
.
sation enon: the cholast1cs followmg Anstot 1e, new . 1
a d · ' 1 d 111t 11e genera
LI Ph"s Tn the co mposed nature of the bodily organ Paye . r~•-sst·
" e· hc organs, animated by the soul, react on t her 1eura' 1imp "' · 0115-
's pHIL OS OPHICAL ESSAYS
86 CARDINAL MERCIER

. the impressions from their purel


d . . which pass .bl y
and serve as interme 1anes the state of sens1 e matter or ob
. l o-icalstage to d . -
mechanical and p hysio 0 o· the centralizing an perceptive activ- Th e deb
. h. d. posed then, to h .
ject, w h 1c 1spre 1s , . biect. T ese steps are integrated point o~
f h consoous su J • • ,
ity of the sou1 o t_ e d the same defi111t1veprocess. Jecrual J'
moreover, mt . h e un ity of one an. consists of, stnct . 1y, two 1ogical . n, _ unit e su(
· n of sensation . 0
The comp lete actio •n pressions caused by matenal obiects trary , as
• · t" n of neura 1i 1 · f J
ments: the sens1uza10 . lated by the soul or o the "internal blind syr
. . h rk of organs anm 1
an d th 1sis t e wo _ . k . nd the perception, proper y so called solute la·
" S holast1cthm ers say, a · ' As lor
sense, as c d ,, . a fact of principle supenor to matter of
b · "a kind of know 1e ge, is . • ·h d .' we do 11
emg of sensitizat10n 1s, wit regar to sensible
the soul The phenomenon
knowledge, · as matter c1othed with the final reqmre
. d d. ..
1spos1t10ns:materia world ar
limits _o ~
causae. reflexiv e
the give
The role of the internal sense in sensation tivity.
The
Fontaine, who is the first doctor graduated from the Thomistic School
of Louvain created through the initiative of Leo XIII, concludes: nify: tru
fuse the
It is necessary,in order to explain what sensation is about, to appeal his dou
to a factor other than the vital principle considered as such. It is this deman
new faculty which, by reacting to the impression elaborated by the which
sense organ, makes us sentient. As its action is subordinated to the ex- Ther
istence of this impression, this new faculty is intrinsically detem1ined doubt a
~nthat it differs from the vital principle. Vital principle is always act- tity oft
1?g and always de~ermined; however, the sensitive principle is a pas- the ace
si~e faculty and it requires, in order to pose its act, an external termini
stimulus. One sees th c h h. · · ·
, ereiore, t at t 1spnnc1ple 1s less dependant on But.
matter than the vital a f ·ty· . . . .
h. t 1 c ivi , not constituting the body m its nature, jective
~fiis ~cu ty uucl~rgoesin another way the influence of organic mod- There£
1 cati?n~ to wh1~h the principle of life is attached by the close t and
most mt1mate umon · neve th 1 . . 1· con eq
mediately d h .' r e ess, It Is ikely that it reacts alway im- hu1nan
an t at It feels in itself k. d
then we have 1 any m of stimulus· but up to In fa
' on y a rawsensation th t . ' h. h respect
we are not consc· I b ' a is to ay, a en ation of w 1c
Scholastics intern l ious. t elong h h
. . s to anot er faculty called by t e But
d a sense or intimate . . , . b
emonstration in ord . ~ense,to notice this react10n Y san1e 0
have given the nam erfto ~asp It, an activity to whi h th , Modem d t nn
on th e o sensible co . I n tit
. e organism but ·t · · nsciousnc s. Thi la t depends a so C
ing d I is attached t O . b d
happens ependence; freer fro 1t Y the bonds of a le . deman - th t in
i h m attachment · d } t
becau e thn t e body and it· happcn ti , it oe . not ah: ay · ee w 1•1
ey are not noticed . . lat many . n ation e r.1pc u~
But it is tirnc tn the body.
to recall the s h J .
, o asc1 do t •
nne about intelligible ,1rts.
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

The act of intellection - its objective character


The debate be:"veen dogma~ism and skepticism bears essentially on the
point 0 ~ knowmg ~h:ther, m _the ~o-fold _phenomenon of our intel-
lectualJudgrnen_ts,it ~s the obJe~t itself w~nch determines the spirit to
unite such a subject with such a given predicate or whether, on the con-
trary, as Kan~ wanted, _the intellectual j~1dgment is purely and simply a
blind synthesis of a subject and of a predicate, posited in virtue of an ab-
solutelaw of our natural constitution.
As long as it is only a matter of the existence of certitude in general,
we do not have to preoccupy oneself with the existence of the external
world and the refutation of idealism; the debate does not go beyond the
limitsof the ideal order; and in this very order itself it is restricted to the
reflexiveexamination of the judgment that forms understanding about
the givens that are provided to it by the spontaneous exercise of its ac-
tivity.
The skeptic himself understands perfectly well what these words sig-
nify:truth and error, knowing truth and being in error, he does not con-
fusethese two notions. But, if he understands himself, in order to dispel
his doubt, to attach himself to truth and to repudiate error, then he can
demandno other thing than the intuition of this objective identity about
which we have just spoken.
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for the exclusion of
doubt and possession of certainty is the acceptance of the objective iden-
tity of the terms of intellectual judgment or, what amounts to the same,
the acceptance of the passive subordination of the intelligence to the de-
termining action of the object itself.
But in many cases this passive subordination of intelligence to the ob-
jective cause that acts on it is manifested in a triumphant splendor.
Therefore, in many cases the mind will be in possession of certainty and
consequently the existence of certain knowledge imposes itself on the
human mind.
In fact, in many cases intelligence passes from doubt to certitude with
respectto the same object. .
But this succession of states of doubt and of certainty, relative to the
sameobject, would be inexplicable given the theory that certitude was
;eterrnmed by a exclusively subjective manner, in virtue of the natural
th
on5tttution of the subject. Indeed, one would explain m this hypo esis
that intelligence was naturally and always in suspense with rega rd to
0th
s~me ~r?positions, or naturally and always had ~o adhere to any er
th
p oposition, but it would be in1possible that, with regard to e ame
~r_oposition, that 1t be first in suspense and then detcnnine d to .idhere
vith ccrtainty.
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 87

The act of intellection - its objective character


The debate be~een dogmatism and skepticis1n bears e sentially on the
point of knowing whether, in the two-fold phenon1enon of our intel-
lec~ualjudgn1en_ts, it ~s the object itself which detem1ine the pirit to
umte such a subject with such a given predicate or whether, on the con-
trary, as Kant wanted, the intellectual judgment is purely and , imply a
blind synthesis of a subject and of a predicate, posited in virtue of an ab-
solute law of our natural constitution.
As long as it is only a matter of the existence of certitude in general,
we do not have to preoccupy oneself with the existence of the external
world and the refutation of idealisn1; the debate does not go beyond the
limits of the ideal order; and in this very order itself it is restricted to the
reflexive examination of the judginent that forms understanding about
the givens that are provided to it by the spontaneous exercise of its ac-
tivity.
The skeptic hin1self understands perfectly well what these words sig-
nify: truth and error, knowing truth and being in error, he does not con-
fuse these two notions. But, if he understands himself, in order to dispel
his doubt, to attach hin1self to truth and to repudiate error, then he can
demand no other thing than the intuition of this objective identity about
which we have just spoken.
Therefore, the necessary and sufficient condition for the exclusion of
doubt and possession of certainty is the acceptance of the objective iden-
tity of the terms of intellectual judgn1ent or, what amounts to the same,
the acceptance of the passive subordination of the intelligence to the de-
termining action of the object itself
But in nuny cases this passive subordination of intelligence to the ob-
jective cause that acts on it is manifested in a triumphant splendor.
Therefore, in many cases the mind will be in possession of certainty and
consequently the existence of certain knowledge imposes itself on the
human mind.
In fact, in many cases intelligence passes from doubt to certitude with
respect to the same object. . .
But this succession of states of doubt and of certamty, relative to the
same object, would be inexplicable given the theory that certitude was
determined by a exclusively subjective nunner , in ~irt_ue o~ the natur~l
constitution of the subject. Indeed, one would explam m t~is hypothesis
that intelligence was naturally and always in suspense with regard to
some propositions, or naturally and always had to adhere to any other
proposition, but it would be impossible that, with rega~d to the same
proposition, that it be first in suspense and then deternuned to adhere
With certainty.
Tl'rcAL ESSAYS
' PHILOSOPn
88 CARDINAL MERCIER S

..
1t1ons w hose subjective . mode of b"-..
- dicv;
gn
Intelligence, therefore, h ~s co d consequently, the ex1stenc~ of cer- wou
ing is determined by the obJec~ an ' of the hunun consc1ousncs'I wha
.. d n the eyes fl . .
titudc is properly legitimate i £'. h sphere of re ex1ve cognitions t UC (
. a1·d t only ior t e d b J .
But, this inference is v 1 no . . directly involve , ut a so in the bcca
in which the question of ce_r~amtylis £'. ct all the difference between a oppr
muons. n ia , . . h' .
sphere of spontaneous cog . • dgnient consists 1n t 1s:in order () nc
. d a reflective JU .
spontaneous Judgment an . cl t the intelligence gives way to the thco
ousJU gmen, f h . .
to formulate a spontane . representations o t e imagination ly "a
. . . f l perceptions or h . fl
sohc1tat1ono externa . d' cted in its steps by t e m uence of Wh,
. b · t · to action or Ire . .
without emg pu m . . cl tO £'.ormulate a reflective Judgment only virt
·11 hereas it is 1e 11
our fir~e wi '. w h k ledge of objects and constantly led by the th e
when 1t applied to t e now .
deliberate intervention of the will. . ·11. on e
c. h ·
In 1act t e mterven ti.on or the non-intervent10n of
. the w1 m the ap- con
plication '0 r the intellectua~ faculty, knowledge of objects cannot change the
the intrinsic nature of the intellectual act. .
In its reflexive judgments intelligence is only detenmned to certainty
by the objective evidence of truth; it is, consequently, logical to con-
clude that in its direct judgments it is also capable ofletting itself be guid-
ed exclusively, whether unconsciously, or with consciousness, by the
manifestation of the objective union of the terms, spontaneously fur-
nished by observation.

The reciprocal position of Kantian criticism


and Scholastic thinking
One sees that the traditional phil h •
thinking rests less ~sop Y' m order to differ from Kantian
' on a very p 1aus1ble I · f h
perception. Perhaps Kant would hav/na ysis O t ~ phenomenon of ap-
knowledge of the thing in .t lf h not posed his famous problem of
h h
. e ad been initiated more d
I se or e would h
. . .
ave posed 1t otherwise, 1
·r
eep 1y mto S h O l . .
ism. Barthelemy Saint-Hil · c astic1sn1 and Aristotelian-
A ·st0 1 aire prefers th t K
n t e well or that he would h fc a ant would not have known
suspects that Kant knew St Th ave orgotten him earlier on in life. One
century e · omas and th
purel ~~n 1~ss. In order to get out f h _e great scholar of the I 3th
leave~1_tsu~ect1ve knowledge brin ~ t e_impasse \Vhere hi y. tern of
up to th ·u
being as ob1i . e w1 : the voluntary
gs intelhge
d . nee to a tand till, Kant
free Work aJect1ve· ·h an act1 f: 1 · ·
d h ' wu out that the t k . ve acu tie he avs po it
h n t e re . . a i not . ' ; ' .
t e objective r sponsib11ity Would impo ed on the will a, its
org · eenters int h not be .
anic constitut' o t e framew k . concc1v bk. Therefore,
rnanne . ion of the . or ofh1s d . . .h
sh r in Which K . practical facu]t· o tnnc, tn ·1rtt1<.:ot t t.
. owstno ant tried H.:s.An i O . h
re clever
ncss tha1 . to esca,)
, t e 1O!:,.,TJ
. 11 kc . ' e t'c , here 1s t t.
1 it showsind ( , pt1n in. Hi w l\' out
cprnd, ll -t.: ot-1111n,~
. I ,n
' •-
T1ICAL ESSAYS
' PHILOS OP n
88 C ARDINAL MERCIER S

.. hose subjective mode of b dieval thi :


an 1uons w . e-
h
lntelligence, therefore, ~s coi:,d consequently, the existence of cer- would ha
ing is determined by the object an ' of the human consciousness what doe'
. . .. d in the eyes fl . ..
t1tude 1s properly leg1t11nate c. he sphere of re ex1ve cognition tue ofY~ 1
. . . 1·d ly1ort . s because it
But, this inference 1sva 1 not o_n . directly involved, but also m the
/5
in which the question of ce_r~amty f; ct all the difference between a oppre ssiv 1

sphere of spontaneous cogmtions . . n _aidg' ment consists in this: in order one will
. d d a reflective jL . theoretic :
spontaneous JU grnent an . d t the intelligence gives way to the
to formulate a spontaneous jU. gmen '-epresentations of the imagination ly said bi
solicitation of external per~eptionds_or rted in its steps by the influence of What! -
·h b · · to action or irec
wit out emg put 111 . . d to formulate a reflective judgment only virtue of
1 the existe
our fr~e will'. wherehasiktis eledge of objects and constantly led by the
when 1t applied to t e now . one infe ~
deliberate intervention of the will. . . . conclusi 9
In fact, the intervention or the non-intervention o_fthe will m the ap-
plication of the intellectu~ faculty, knowledge of objects cannot change the "subj
the intrinsic nature of the intellectual act.
In its reflexivejudgments intelligence is only determined to certainty
by the objective evidence of truth; it is, consequently, logical to con- stitute t
clude that in its direct judgments it is also capable ofletting itself be guid- these fac
ed exclusively,whether unconsciously, or with consciousness, by the ship of a
manifestationof the objective union of the terms, spontaneously fur- ofthe
nished by observation.

The reciprocal position of Kantian criticism


and Scholastic thinking
O?e ~eesthat the traditional philosophy, in order to differ from Kantian
thmkmg, restsless on a ve
. p h ry Plausi·ble anaIysis
.
of the phenomenon of ap-
Percept10n. er aps Kant would h .
knowledge of the thi·ng • . If ahvenot posed his famous problem of
m itse or e wo ld h . . . essence
he had been initiated mo d . u ave posed 1t otherwise, 1f
. re eep 1y mto S h O1 .. pursuit
ism. Barthelemy Saint-Hil . c asticism and Aristotelian-
A· aire prefers that K n1al lo
nstotle well or that hew Id h ant would not have known
ou ave forgott h. . result h
suspectsthat Kant knew St Th en im earlier on in life. One
century even less. In order ~o ge~mas afnd th e great scholars of the I 3th the be
purely. subi . knowledge b .out o. the imp asse w h ere his. system of
Jecttve
Ieavesit up t h . nngs mtell ·
b · 0 t e will: the v 1 igence to a standstill Kant
eing as objec . . o untary and a . f; . ' .
free work dt1ve;without that the t k . ctive acult1es, he says, posit
an th as 1s not · ·
the obiectiv e responsibility would unposed on the will as its
J e reente · not be ·
organicconst1·t . rs Into the framewo k fh · conceivable. Therefore,
ut1on of h r o 1sd · .
manner in whi h K t e practical f:ac . octnne, m virtue of the
sh c ant t · 1
u ties A d
ows rnore clever ned to escape I . · n so we see, here is the
ness tha · ogical sk · ·
n it shows inde , ept1c1sm. His way out
pe nd ence of nlind. If any Me- pl f
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILO SOPHICAL STUDIE
9

·eval thinker had written such a thing ' how mod ern day rat1onali .
d1ould have moc k e d sue h a person! A speculative th.m k er would a ts,
w · K h
w hat does 1t matter to
? s·
ant,
h' t at the whole social O d
r er co 11apses by Vlr _'J'
tu e of your . . system. mce t is. system is true . , let the oc1a· 1or d er collapse·-
ecause it is the system that 1s wrong (given so many of ·t 1 ·
b ressive . db b . ) S h i s e ements are
an har anch . h. uc a result . . shouldn't deter h.1gh er thi nki ng
Opp •
ne will. say per aps t at t .1s opposition . of the practi·cal, ord er wit· h th e·
O
eoretical shows
. . that there 1s a fault m the theoretical Th
• 1s " is
· very ng . h t-
th
said but it is. easy. to put your finger on the flaw ' of thi·s statement.
ly
What'· - .one is gomg . to show
. . us that the will presupposes ti1e ob. ·
IJCCt m
irtue .of its orgamc constitution
. , and . so ' consequently , we n1ust ad nut·
V
the existence of the object! Isn t this from the reasoning of the mind th
. ;:i S at
one inf~rs t.h is consequence. o, I ~ai:not logically take advantage of the
conclusion m order to escape skept1e1sm: I am systematically confined in
the "subjective," I have to stay there.
But one appeals to principles, to the demands of the will!
That's the key! But the apperceptive faculties also have laws that con-
stitute them. However, the innate and completely primitive tendency of
these faculties is to posit (in a way that will determine analysis) a relation-
ship of assimilation of things and of the ego, of the object and the subject,
of the mental phenomenon and of the noumenon, in the living unity of
consciousness. One respects the laws of the will: but don't let the critique
deny the laws of the representative faculties! The Critique has no answer
to this reflection that is based on the direct observation of the ego and of
its completely spontaneous and instinctive tendencies.
It is true: one admits today that on this point Kant contradicted him-
self The profound analysis ofKantianism made recently by D. Nolen of
the Faculty of Bordeaux, only intensifies the contempt of the refom1er
of "all future metaphysics." Unfortunately, this contem .pt bears on the
essence of the debate. This contempt would never have occurred in the
pursuit of knowledge, but because of the pursuits of the professors of for-
mal logic in the 14th and 15th centuries and because of Descartes, the
re ult has been that the philosophical tradition is now distru ted by even
the best thinkers.

The fundamental law of the infalliability of primitive tendencies


In pointing out to ,hristian thinker the teachings of St. Thomas whi_ch
were a contmuation of the teachings of Aristotle, of Plato at1<l,of s.~mt
Aub'u5tine, Leo XIII rcc..1llshis listeners t the most dcpendabk ba e~ of
hum;m thought. of crt1tude and also f tht: true ritique of our facu~ue~.
W ' f- Tl 1as the nnno-
l -. noted ,1 littk· earlier ' in the philosophy
. o• - t. -,ion
f '· r ..
0 l1 " nnut1ve
P ot th · obJt: ·tiv • value .md of the real 'i1g111hcanct: t e P
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
94

tut<:SW
The fundamental realism or psychology of Saint Tho nus
bis syst,
nd th
The species is an abstract idea grasped by the mi f~om e observation st:qucn
of things in which it only exists as affected by the differenc~s that bring chat th•
about different individuals. In the famous quarrel about umversals, pre- che no
figured obscurely by Porphry and Boethius _to t~ac~~rs of the 1:'rivium, life- ()
St. Thomas holds already a "moderate realism, givmg the universal a substar
basic and virtual realness in reality, but giving it a formal or distinct ex- s n. It
istence only in the abstractive act of the spirit. ·
JS ''the
In nature, Thomas said following Aristotle, everything is individual· assiJnil
the universal as such exists only in the intellect that forms it by its act of tellc ·t
generalization. On this point once again Thomas and his mentor Aristo- cs. ary,
tle came to be accepted, much later, by the teachers of the natural sci- judgn
ences. been
tie ar
Apperception of my consciousness 1na p
alread
But in the multitude of sensible and intellectual rep resentat10ns
. it. ·
pro~er to diseem the central object or the "consciousness " w· h S is
gustme and Heiric d'Aux S Th · 1t t. Au-
the object of a habitual in~::dia!~ kn~n~asdrecognizes that the "ego" is
without the help of an idea-image. w e ge and that we perceive ego
0
ali ts
The habitual knowledge of th . . our Pi
When e sp1nt
we compose this statem . fects
ate kno~ledge of the ego wi~n\hconAce~mng~he habitual and in1medi- then
concemmg
will . the mter_nal
· sense and the e nstotehan an d sch elastic theory
nessgr~sap11itst~hole significance. From tgheenfieral apperception of life' we
, a tams co fi dl
ence; at the s ~ use y but with a di.re t c: 1· enmg o f consc10us-
1rst awak · .
. ame tim h . c 1ee mg h ·
imparted on him lf h e, . e distinguishes th h rs proper exist-
to him his first a se ' e discerns a non-per rolug the modifications
assertedin the thwareness.of an external w Id sona ele ment t h at indicates
cussionabout theesoryof immanent effort oorfM.~hese notions have been
and·m its· hrnits
. ense oft ofuch (Tastsinn) and ame
ofDelb . hed B'rran, m • the dis-
U ndersta
. nd how by oeu . : T aking all of 'th m. t e th eory of motility
exercised hi ' an intmtio ese ideas t
of the ?n s own self n and a complet 1 . ogether makes us
of b notion
. f the dist· , man go es firom hr· Ie y pn m 1·trve · ab tract10n .
0
eautiful · .
man perfe ' in his physical li£ d
Inct and h mse f to h
e one, the not'
.
t e notion of being,
which ma~~ _theseideas and e rst of all; and thlon of good, the notion
af:nd even ansointell_ectual facult~xtends them toe thn we under tand how
ar surpassingh.rgan1c grasping Th· · thems I e w or Id of idea
ies ha. ve in · for
1sow n generation· 1sfrs w hat Th e ves' a 1· ·
rvmg attrKtion
0111a say .
o th.In k ers and h. · s in t1 de, cription
t ts des· npuon
. . con u-
.
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILO SOPHICAL STUDIES
95

tutes with his theory h of hhappiness, one of the most remarkabl f


his system and per aps t e most original of anythin he w e ~arts o
uently very exact to hold with Thomas and .t g rot~. It is con-
seq . f h . , i seems agamst s
hat the .first notions
f b . o. t h e intellect
f,
are the most umversa
. ' 1 ones and cotus,
that
tthe notion o emg 1s t ·e undamentalh .appercept'ion °f our conscious
.
fe. On .the ot h er h an d , .in t e actual . existence h uman reason is . bound
li
substantiallyto the .organized h. body,. . in the unity of one and th e same per-
son. Its proper ob~ect, w ich. is unmediately propo rt'10na1 to its . nature
is "the essence of the . material substance ' " in as much as th.1s essence 1s .'
assimilatedby . the intellectual faculty and that the essence serves th e m- .
tellect as a pomt of .departure
. to form spontaneously the umversa
· 1 nec-
essary, evident. principles,. . which lf . are the bases of all ou r fi'ur th er
judgments. Th ~sreaso~ing itse is made so rapidly that it has mistakenly
been called an innate idea. On the other hand, the representative facul-
ties are not simple, inert and passive instruments: as Aristotle and Tho-
mas put it, by their constitutive virtuality the representative faculties are
already inclined to their proper act towards which they are pushed with
a natural energy by the stimuli of the external world and those of con-
sciousnessand the positive concurrence of the first cause. The personal
and subjective side of knowledge as well as its objective significance is
once more safeguarded.
Our perceptive faculties are, therefore, absolutely intuitive, as the ide-
alistswould have it. Physiology and reason demonstrate that the act of
our perceptive faculties is successive, complex. The sensible object af-
fects the peripheral nerves relating to any determined perceptive organ:
the neural network centralized by the brain already informed by the soul
stimulates the sensitive principle to react on the impression, on "the im-
pressedspecies." In the presence of this stimulus coming from the object,
the mind, in virtue of its proper energy, strips being or the perceived
phenomenon of its accidental m.arks in order to disengage its essence and
make it "intelligible"; finally, the understanding, triggered by the essen-
tial form, places the final act of perception and produces "the expres~ed
species," that is, the mental concept, the internal word. The abstractive
action of the mind has been called by antiquity "the active intellect" be- th
cause of its function of eliminating the accidental characte~istic~from ~
object. The last step of understanding is called "the possible mtelle~t,
not because it implies a pure potency but because intelligen~e receives th
andexpresses in this last moment the essential form of the obiect or e
phenomenon . throu<Th0
a kind of judgrnent.

.
1 Th can be d1sagreea bl e
Th e e different tenns came fron1 Anstot e. ey nd
to modern thinker even though they have not always fou bettedr
tc T ' • b ·r: rmly understood an
therms.
h h b tcnw; arc far from havmg r:
een
f hunuo riod of decadence, th e
Y ave ccon1c, among the pro1essor o t e pe
' 1osoPHICAL ESSAYS LJ':0 )(Ill
CARDINAL MERCIER S PHI

. . . .. f the faculties. We do not plead an . between t1


non . .
occasion for a nd1culous ?iviswnd~s ite the rigor and the spirit of uni0 · e being in
act1V
cause for the words! Bu~ 1~ fact, _P contemporary psychology, usin . we must
finite, .
1
that it is forced to use in its ana ysish,lastic distinctions. Soberly inte g . 1 and indis
h same sc o . . r- uca .
other words, repro duces t e • e exact and is consistent with th e substantia 1
. d h appears w1s , , . . e th d.
preted, this mo _emt eory h B thelemy Saint-Hila1re contests this· they are iver
teachings of Anstotle, althoug a~ nsistent with nature ' different ope~a
and what is even better, the theory is co .
sarne substant1 2

Unity of the act of intellection


Distinctio1
This . has to be sa1 ·d abou t the heart of the question. In the . still somewhat
fluid language of experimental psychology, there remam some gray are- The elements
. ]arly 1·n some details. There were professors who overloaded accidents," St.
as, particu
the psychologicalprocess with supe~uou~ elements. Already Godfrey of distinction ma
Fontaines,one of the most penetrating thinkers of the I 3th century, re- minations of
acted againstthis excess that the coming age would push to an extreme. cording to T
But it sufficesto go through, for example, the work of St. Thomas on between adve
The Wordfor in order to see with what foretaste for the future and with since this fun
what wisdom Thomas analyzed the phenomenon of intellectual percep- essence. The
tion. The intellect, he says, when it is informed by the species, is obliged ulties as their
to act. But, the end of every act is its object: the object of intelligence is named the "n
essencewhose i_mageinforms it, but this image is the principle of oper- this is the opi
~tio~and _ofact10nonly by reasonefthe objectfrom which it derives:the ob- The Plato
~ectits_elfIs n~t present in the soul informed by the species since it exists vergne, had h
m :eality outside of the soul. However, the act of the soul is not external its faculties an
to it; to understand is indeed 1· · · . .
. . a 1vmg motion: so m v1rtue of the nature ti on . Accordi
which leads 1t to understand h hb .
t h fi . . sue or sue emg and in virtue of its na- tu te accidents
ure, t e rst act of mtellige · h · . .
of th • d . nee is t e assimi1at1on of the obiect by means A nseln1., said t
e speciesan once this act . 1 d J
in thesametimethat th . d is P ace , understanding takes place. It is tin ction as is
ject is represented ande mm . represents the object to itself, that the ob- which, at first
conceived Just h .
tellect and the speci·es · as at t e outset of the act, the m- th e St. Bonav
. are not two be· h .
perceived species are O nl tngs,rat er that the intellect and the kin d of reduc
act there is no more th Y one and th e same th"mg so at the end of the co mes rather
· an one term I h '
Ject, engendered and prod d b ' nam~ Y t e perfect likeness of the ob- of th e facultie
~0rd; one callsit the totai°ce Y_th e Intellect. This resemblance is the of p assive cap,
1struly p • expression of th O b" . •
but a nur . erceived. It resembl . e ~ect m which the object ers. e tin1at tl
h es a mirror h If.
to say· ror t at does not exceed h b ""!ere the object reflects it e ' :hsunpty virtt
knowie~ever?ad Aristotle or any t ~ emg that it represents. We dare O
ere that
cc
unity ge with such a decisive ot er profes or interpreted the act of n natur ,, 1
. ness and su h . th . I
St. Thom d c a grasp for it constitutive faculti l:
self,since obas_oes not hold With D P Ychologi t
v1ously\ escartes th · · of t. Thorn
ve perceive it b . · at we know the ego 1I1it-
y its acts and that there is a distinc- r aldi .
tin ti
XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOPHICA
LE0 L STUDIES
97

tw een. these acts and the substance of. the soul


00n. bebeing .
whi.ch h
separates t e
acove
m potency from the real exercise of its acts · Only m · th 1
e n-
. we must observe, are the essence and the activity complet 1 ·d
firute, . . . h h. h . . e y 1 en-
ticaland in~stmc~. But, wit is ab1tual ~rec1sion, Tho1nas maintains
the substantial umty ?f the_ soul: the facult1e~ are not multiple entities,
they are diverse_mamfestat101:s of the psych1c~l activity resulting from
different operations but connng from one pnnciple and one and the
samesubstantial source.

Distinction between the essence of the soul and its faculties


The elements which are distinct from the substance are not all "simple
accidents,"St. Thon1as writes, recalling without doubt of the significant
distinctionmade by Aristotle between intrinsic accidents or active deter-
minations of the subject and the simple adventitious occurrences. Ac-
cording to Thomas, the proper function of a being is somewhere
between adventitious happenings and substance, holding the middle,
since this function proceeds simultaneously from the foundation of the
essence.The essence of the soul, he says admirably, is related to the fac-
ulties as their cause and their goal. So the faculties are rather fittingly
namedthe "natural properties of the soul" and according to St. Thomas,
thisis the opinion of St. Augustine.
The Platonists of the 13th century, in particularly William of Au-
vergne,had held against Aristotle that the soul is absolutely identical with
itsfacultiesand that between the soul and its faculties there is no distinc-
tion. According to other Medieval scholars, the psychical powers consti-
tute accidents of the soul. St. Bonaventure, after St. Augustine and St.
Anselm,said that between the soul and its faculties there is the same dis-
tinction as is found between an efficient cause and its instruments;
which, at first sight, would seem to agree with the second opinion. But
the St. Bonaventure brings the faculties back to the soul's essence by a
kind of reduction: per reductionem,as he expresses it. Henry of Ghent
comesrather close to this view, but exaggerates it by explaining the r?le
of the faculties by a divine illumination which sees the faculties as a kind
of passivecapacity, unfortunately not well described. The be st interpret-
ers st1· ' · d nl
.e mate that Henry of Ghent as well a Duns Scotus imagine ~ "!
\simply virtual di tinction between the soul and its faculties and it is
t ere that Scotus named rather ob curely "a formal distinction, founded
~hn nature." In fact, the cholastics distinguished especially th e forces a?d
p facult1es bY t h e1r
e . act rather than by their• o b~ects.
. . 1·t wa a very wise
o{~hologist f the I 3th century' Godefrey of Fontaine ' comme1~tator
reai~ T_homa , pointed thi fact out. In thi sense they could consider a
istinction b 'tween the facultie although distinct only in the poten-
J-IJCAL ESSAY 1,f. O }( II
's pJ-111osoP
CARDINAL MERCIER

art of the matter that t . oint the


t t h e he o, rh1s P tal re
1itself But a .t is important to note th rr1en .
cy of the essence of th:i sou is still with ush 1 sychical energies fro111the .....tuitl'
the. us i.~
day this d~fficult.proSt e;~ornas deduces t t:Jr unity. The time Woul~ sc10 _, a verl
· orJ.J.Y
sureness with which · 1 and safeguard s ht is the essence of the soul is . does n
same essence of the so:ould hold that thouhga statement. The conflicts t1n1tY h a u
h Descartes ' · of sue l , throU~ h i
in t e
come w en . the obscurity l cts show clear y enough the ttJte,
without reflect111gon h ses of rnenta a
the interruption, and the p aect of his statement. 'fyndall ~as
. d oneous asp . al rnouons
1c
precanous an err
consciousn
The soul as substantial princip~e . . . since the egd
.. • t school to reject with disdain the be the p_ro
· he pos1t1v1s '
It is fashionabletoday, m t The old theory has been replaced by 'This 1s
concept oft he sou a
1 s a substance. . 1 h
d f groups of mterna p enomena mk-
1· that the fac
· sness an
one of statesof consciou . h
° me organism. But what would be the that this co1
. h h other m t e sa . ·1
ing up one wit t e . h t central reflector that assmu ates them to ornetry. Stu
· ness wit ou a •
statesof consciou_s d •n a word what is the soul itself? No one of man can
. lf without a sunp1e mona ' 1 , d . h
itse ' h b 1. · the existence of the soul emes t at sensa- Lhuys wan
among those w o e ieve m . " . . 1 1 h role of" gia
.
twn "'m the mechan1·cal viewpoint , consists m a mo ecu ar c ange
' · ted to some nerve with a speed of 27 to. 34 meters per . sec- ly, this hig
commumca
ond. They agree with Taine w~? depicts very ~recis~ly and graphic~lly stage of a c
the material and external conditions of percept10n: from the physical consciousp
viewpoint, the neural network is a combustion of the neural substance disciple of
that in burning releases heat. In the chemical viewpoint, it is a decom- wholly co1
position of the neural substance that loses its phosphorized fat and its position tlJ
neu~e. In the physiological viewpoint, it is the working of an organ Lewes, pr
that like all organs alters itself by its proper working and has the need of m.echanis~
a renewal of the blood in order to function anew. and St. T
maintaine
The conscious spirit is distinct from the organism unity of i
After all that, it remains certain th h
TheM
combined and interlac d . fi .at t e movements, however they were is the dir
e to m mty · b
and are resolved into 1·m ' remam rute and static phenomena held this
1 and exc·t1 ·
puses f .
~ee_n these impulses and the fact atrn~s o different directions. Be_- adopted
m~rute and in the mecha • h of con cious perception the abyss 1s cept, pe
It .d h rust t eory th .
. Is saI t at neural matter h h ere IS nothing to cross that abyss! on thi
tion Thi · • h as t e property b ense,"
sel · s Is ng t. But modified . to e modified by it func-
ves, cons · motions n ·
The five c~ousness, unless some . ever give, a a re ult to them- n1an, T
or six milr consc 1ou l Perior
are wasting th . _ion cells, the two . 1" s e ement per eivc them.
61 ture, a.
ripheral nerv e1~time repeating and l 1,0~fiber of the cer bral corte;{
111 b e , in a w
era le ceUsb d. . ay so as to li k
mu t1p]y·
mg t he 1mpre
. . ion ot- pe- n1adt: u
y 1sr1nct fib
1 ers with n up betw ecn , h · Calh:d .
t emselvc the 1nnu-
out there b think,
cmg any confu i n. Up co
fllCAL ESSAYS
100 ' PHILOSO P
CARDINAL MERCIER S

•fi activity in man


The unity of the speCl ic . .
. f these terms. God, for him, is Pure
St. Thomas avoids the confuswn
1
°.
are beings
that have no n1atter. Accordin
· 1· · f h g
act but the angels and t e sou h · the mulup 1e1ty o P enomen
' . . resents in 1 h . a
to St. Thomas, human activity P d end on the sou as t e1r defini-
h nomena ep 1 h .
a true, total unity; th ese P e ess immanent y t e virtue of the St.
rfi t forces poss
tive cause. The most pe. ec lete being we must pose a unique vog
n each comp
inferior forces. A n so d 1 ll be associated wit. h su b or d'mated en- thin
substantial form which ~a? ve;J w; 1 etrating them, of maintaining them the
ergies but on the co nd1t1?n p sential influence. for
and of directing them by ithsown esf firom the unity of the interior life stall
d ws anot er proo
St. Th omas ra . . . t·on of the soul prevents the operations a C<
firom th'is f:act that . a hvmg opera 1
" hich would not happen if the principle of
of the body and vice versa w . . ,, int ~
all these actions were not essentially umque.
thu
1n

The breadth of the psychology of Saint Thomas


~t, ~
JeCt
you can see quite clearly that in the Thomist psychology there is a place bel
for all the research to which psychophysics has so usefully taken up. The
substantialunity of consciousness and of life in man, the relationship of
body and soul dominated by this higher unity in all their functions pro-
vide the great spiritual doctrine which is open to great debate according
to Jouffry and Maine of Biran as it was with Gilbert de la Porree and
William of Auvergne. Despite the undeveloped physics of his era, St.
Thomas _t~~k.t?e op~ortunity with his theory to examine the phenom-
e~a 0 _fdiv1S1bihtywhich already preoccupied St. Augustine the multi-
plication oflower animals b di · · b dd' '
th· ki d Th Y viswn or u mg and other problems of
Is n · e Pope praises th h f
d b H . e researc es o observation and without
ou t, e thought m particula O f h . l . '
studieswhen He ga th d . r P ysio ogical and anthropological
. with good grve e da vice
ce1ve . to philos op h ers an d t h eo l ogian
. ' to re-
discovery whereve/1~te an with gratitude every thought and all u eful
may come fro ,, Th .
to applaud these researche . th d _m.. onusts will be the fir t one
to this time all the p · · sal, ey O it with even more sincerity ince up
fund nnc1p results of 0 b . .
amental theses. servat1on have confinned their
The Thomist theo .
the mind/6 d ry concerning the 1d
cathol' ho Y school of Montp . ~ou , ebated in great depth by
ic sc olars b I . e11ier 1 tod 1. I t.
Vach ut a so even by . ' ay ace aimed not on oy
. erot upholds th. h rat1onalist .
to beheve i h 1st eory and T '
and that th1~~ e substantial identity f lhs.ot a_ ure . th, t "all we declare i
s is a leoif o t e pn . ] h
Everyone k o• In1ate con clus·
10
b n ip e flife and f thoug t
de!' nows th b n ased 11 ..
icate matter. The e eautiful book of a_multitud • of fact . .
1earned acadein. . r, n tsquc Bouillil'r tl th 1,
ic1an re;:1 d
)to uce..,n t only thl' dol.-
EO :XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILO
L SOPHICAL STUDIES
IOI

·nes o£Aristotle, of St. Augustine,


. of St · Thom as and of Sh
t?
ncsW
hile adding the conclus10ns drawn from m O d h~eat c olas-
ern P ys1ology.

The principle of individuation


Thomas cannot avoid expressing his opinion on th . h. .
St. e in his . . b h' h h b a eSIS ighly m
vogu time. hut w 1C h as . . ecome
. almost foreign
· "1or modern
·nkers:from wh1c comest e md1v1duality of the creat db . fi
thl h ?W k e emg, rom
the form or from t_ e ~atter.. ~ . no~ Th~mas' response: If one looks
c the external pnnc1ple of md1v1duat1on 1t will be sai ·d th at It· 1S
• SUb-
1or . '
stan ce or such a
. form or .such a detern1med bringing
. . about b th •
Y eir umon .
a complete bemg, an_d11: ~he l~st r~sort 1t 1s the creative cause. But the
internalprinciple of md1v1duat10n
. . l f 1s. not the . form, the forn1 is spec1.61c,
thus general a? d t h e pnnc1p e o . umversahty. So it must be the matter,
in as much as 1t has thre_edirn.ens1?ns .. In fact, as Giles of Rome explains
it, individual substance is that which 1s not predicated of any other sub-
ject and which does no: exist in any other subject. But, these attributions
belongto corporeal bemg only by reason determined by the dimensions
with which it is endowed. And so it follows that matter affected by cer-
tain dimensions is very n1uch the intrinsic principle of individuation.
One of the interpreters who, in the rationalist school, has well under-
stoodSt. Thomas, B. Haureau of the Institute, observes that the conclu-
sion of Thomas returns to that one where Descartes holds that the
extension in length, breadth, and depth constitutes the nature of sub-
stancesince all these attributes that one can imagine in corporeal being
presupposeextension. Haureau confuses individuation with nature.

The first cause


The consideration of things leads the mind to the investigation of the~r
cause.St. Thomas, by arguments that are considered to this day classic
~houghsometimes hotly disputed, demonstrates the contingency 0 ~ be-
m~ by showing their passivity, their dependence. He proves t~at bemgs,
th
~hich are dependent, and impotency imply a cause absolutely m act, at
is,a first and necessary unmoved mover. th •
This is the thesis of Aristotle as well as of Plato but elevated by eir
noble disciple, Thomas, to a perfection that these thinkers could e:7er f
have thought of St. Thon1as, in a reasoning whose force equals c anty,
dedu fi h ctivity of the first
ces rom the notion of pure act or from . t e pure a
cause,all the attributes of an infinite Being. . · d' ct
He h · · f h. first Being is a ire
s ows m particular that the perfectton °
t is h
resu_ltof its e sential independence. From which it follo:v~ t~at t e oph
erat1on0 f h d acuv1ty m as muc
t e fir~t Being, which is pure an necessary
l EO xnr AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOP HICAL STUDIES
II7

cience as in every
. day · life?
h c Too foften, in this time , "to succee d" 1cor a
S
scholar is to abd icate
. . in th e 1ace o terrorism or unbridl e d firee d om. Free-
dom in n1oderat1on
· isf w at belongs .to great personages· , an d th ey are JUSt
.
as rare as m the era o Marcus " Aurelius who complained ab out th.is to th e
ods! Whatever the era. of .metaphysics" may be , i·deal constructions •
g
eem closed for a long t1n1e. Since the . tin1.e ofDesCartes , h ow many p h.i-
S
losop~er_shav_efound m~ny essential principles that are not already em-
bryonic m Anstotle and in Plato, these two n1.astersof analysis and mental
synthesis!

The divergencies of systems


Our sincere conviction is that on a great nun1.ber of points the disagree-
ments between the great scholars and the learned n1oderns are more ap-
parent than real: they have their source rather in the religious and
political dissents than in philosophy; often the n1ethod differs more than
the doctrines.
Not that it is necessary to deny modern people their special role in the
philosophical pursuits! The ancients had had their mission, we have ours.
They have traced out the speculative and general structures of philoso-
phy. In the present, the investigation of details and the application of the
experimental and psychological method back to principles and laws takes
precedent over this theoretical construction. In this sense, a considerable
part of philosophy is getting renewed. Those who would come after us
will be able, in a better way, to show the agreement of facts and ideas.
Each century each thinker aspires to associate in his lonely contem-
plation the different moments of the idea.
Each individual has his part in the immense work; some pursue the
patient analysis of facts; others consider a synthesis, still others search for
the ultimate laws or persist in the search for the bond of thin~s an~ the
unity brings into one package the separated phenomena; and, m this al-
ready glorious multitude, arise from time to time some people who open
th
up in unsu pected ways or teachers delineating in a stroke of e ~en
everything that the stages of science have already gone through. The m-
~entors of the great systems have this merit, that they left thought above
itself and provoke its progress, even in their ~istakes. ~hese people
marked with the incredible gift of foresight, superior to their pe_ers,seem
to b, . . h h b nd the wisest doc-
e predestmed to pomt out to bret ren t at, eyo 1
trines and the most rem dated n1ethod ' horizon remain _perhapsa wayfs
fo b"d i:,- . c. · · t mulates the e -
r 1 d n to our curiosity, but in which the tascmanon s i
fort d . · . .,
to general science.
an project-; some light even onto region open th
lt will, !ways rcmam tmc that these intuitions mingled wi dark~es hare
a lot f I h d a presumpuon t ,1t
0 •1 v ·ry sma11number; and how many 1ave a ·
pJ-IICAL ESSAYS
' pHILOS O
CARDINAL MERCIER S
118

the whole of humanity, in th


· d"bl rrors! For __r-_ • e
is witnessed to by mere 1 e e the most penect system is th
hould know, . at Leo:,
opinion of those w h o s h of all systen1s, reumtes them .
which brings toget?er the be~t tho::Se~es thinking from usel~ss digre: rable
a wise and harmoniou s or?enng, P h as from narrow matenalis 111and A.t
·
sions, from myst1ca· 1 1·dealism as.d.muc In this respe ct, aflter Pl ato, Anstotl
· in fr :i
adds to the greatness a teste_d soh
1
1d
St. Thomas as with St. Augustine enali
che
was the greatest in the ancient wdor t'.mes for the Christian schools. The
· ur mo ern 1 e 5eard
and St. Bonaventure m O ld es with veneration the deep know!
· hom the wor se
1earne d Pope, m . . - saults
w h lied to us this notion by which a
d h · h · eatness as reca n ofso
e ge eig temng gr f h'. h could be of unexpected happiness. The
act the consequences w ic
O B h 1 S · fo
' d xegete of Aristotle, at e en1y amt-Hilaire
1
learned trans ator an e · d · '
. sub,iect
wrote to us on th1s J
with these words, so senous un er hrs pen·•

I entirely share your opinion on the E~~ycli~al of His H~liness . It is


doubtlessan event for Catholicism but 1t 1sthis also for the intellectual
world. Recent history in France saw philosophy being forbidden: to-
day an enlightened Pope has restored it to first place. The lesson
comesfrom above: one has to hope that it will be heard.
lffiill(]
A w~ll-knownAristotelian,Charles Waddington, delivers an almost par-
allelJudgment on the Encyclical of Leo XIII and adds: confu
ofthe
In the patriotic education to which France accords today a privilege hi \
and where the sciences have d all · d h . . .
Wh d . gra u Y gam e t err legitimate place. nece
at must onunate are the h ·• b
youth of th t h. h . umamtres ecause they speak to our and t
good the iJea7B1cuttgihves value to the life of man, the b eautiful, the u nfu
' · e cause of th h ··
cause confusedwith th t f h . e umamtres thus understood be- outo
it adheres to science ba . P I1osophy which, in the same time that
0
di CO'
.
1iterature Y Its methods · a1
by its obiect O h ' Is, so touches on the highe t po il
. . . J . n t e one h d .
IZing1t; on the other ha d . li an , rt elevates science by ideal- conti
a d C · n It va date th
n °
dreamin f
imagination by disc . s e presentiment s of the heart
ovenng the p · · 1
not b
go . nncrp e of what th e po et was erate<
~~thematics, Aristotle said d Ency,
a : ' oes not know h . kno~
t e differen ce of good and
into I
That is also true of h .
erature the task f p ys1cs,chemist Of Gt
physics to d o celebrating the ry or physiology: it leave to lit- \V<, r
f h
?0 nethe1essve 6 ~ In· reality. Wonder
emonstrat
Th s O t e good and t meta-
in this World i~a ea:t1fuI, because it e ta k can ee m diffi cult ; it i
tions of humanity me With politic al respond , und er p ain of failure
. struggle ' to th e n bk . t ,unh i-
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOPH
ICAL STUDIES I 19

The crowning achievement of the work of Leo XIII


t
n Leo XIII has conceived a great _work and he has expressed it in the favo-
rable moment marked by providence.
At the beginning of th~s cer:itury, sensualism and materialism reigned
in Franc~, transcendental idealism and pantheism in Germany, phenom-
enalism m England and the professors of the catholic schools left to
themselves, without tr~dition, _exhausted their dispersed strength in the
search for a new doctnne which would react effectively against the as-
saultsof error and which could respond to the doubts and the torments
of society.
For some thirty years, however, there has been a return to the teach-
ings of the past and it is getting stronger each day. Sanseverino, Signori-
ello and soon after Prisco and Talamo at Naples, Liberatore and Zigliara
in Rome, Cornoldi and Venturoli at Bologna; Gonzalez in Spain, Kleut-
gen and Stockl in Germany, Grandclaude in France and, much closer to
us, Father Lepidi, O.P ., Professor Dupont followed closely by his col-
leagues at the Catholic University of Louvain, Van Weddingen at the
Royal Academy of Brussells, all recalled the attention of scholars to the
immortal works of Aristotle and of his commentators. Because of the
confusion of systems whose debris covers the soil of philosophy, because
of the fascination for novelty and the natural tendency for man to put on
re his works his own name and the seal of his own personality, then it is
necessaryto have a penetrating mind in order to discern the materials
r and the main lines of future reconstruction. We have to have courage to
e unfurl before the world of the wise a flag which looks like a rag worn
out by the centuries, shredded by the blows of free thought and modem
discoveriesunder the protection of which it seems to have become im-
possibleto march to the conquest of truth. But the work of renovation
continues with a prudence and a sureness with regard to which one will
not be able to thank enough those who have led it or who have coop-
erated in it. When Leo XIII promulgated before the world his immortal
Encyclical Aeterni Patris, scholastic philosophy was no more an un-
~nown; it had already passed from a disdainful silence of fo_r?etfulness
Into public discussions and its power was revealed in the ~efimtive defeat
of Guenther, Froschammer and Gioberti. So the encyclical of the Pope
Wasnot only heard but understood and since I 897 one can no 1?nger
count the books the Revues and the Academies that have contmued
wich a generous ~rdor, one can say enthusia tically, the laborious work
is
of the first days. Here, we cannot give detail of all the names; but we
e
Wouldhave to at lea t name the following: the Fathers De San an~ Pesch,
~a~ella, Stentrup, Ehrle, Jungn1ann, Meyer and Costa-Rosse~tl of the
. ociety ofJesu , the Father L;pidi Dummermuth and Coconmer of the.
D0 . ·
minican Order, th<.:writings of' Pecci· and of ato Ir1 m. Ita}y. tho C of
pJ-IICAL ESSAYS
's pJI!LOSO
ARDlNAL MERCIER

f Morgott and of Kaufmann .


G tberlet, o V f S in
neid of van Herding, o f u f Qom et de orges, o auve of
Sch ' . d those o . h '
Germany and in Sw1tzerlan ' hilosoph1cal Revues sue as la Sci-
. · F ce· the P · I al l c· ·
Msgr. de la Bouillene 111 ra~ , le Divt1sThornasm t. y, a ienaacris-
c11zae la Fede la Scie11za Jta/,ana,I ·t ,n/1iechretienne,directed by Msgr
., I dep 11oSOr • l c. d .
tiana in Spam, /es Aww cs f, Pl '[oson/11e recent y ioun ed by Dr
l ch 11r 11 r d . R .
d'Hulst in Paris, DasJaI,rJll - . like the Acea emia omana di S
. M te1·· the Acadenues . C d. al p . .
Komn1er m uens , h st Enunent ar m s ecc1 and
.d d er by t e mo 1 h .
Tommaso pres1 e ov . dd them the specia c airs of Thomist
. .
Z1ghara; and, 1'f you aUow h hto a been founded
. us ' at the Catholic. Univer-
philosophy like those whic t avfeLeoXIII and which, in five years has It seerns t
· fL
s1ty o ouv~m a _ .
· t the requesndo three doctors dedicated henceforth ' to speech tb
graduated eight 11cent1atesa . d has a nea :
• t dies and already established m a group an eager to propa-
sch o1astlc s u , , d k The ~
gate and develop the teachings that they have learne to now and to
tion in _t
love. which 1s
The work of Leo XIII is not finished. Our glorious Pope is one of
ofwhic i1
those selectmen in whom a very great genius is served by an energetic
ofwhicH
and perseveringwill. In the Middle Ages one did not jump over the
What
t~~esholdof philo_so~hyuntil one had combed the trivium and the quad-
nv111111 and had ass11mlated all of the known and cultivated sciences. The How
greatmetaphysiciansof this golden age of philosophy never understood one han <
that one would ~ttempt to make the general synthesis of human knowl- hand, \.Vj
edge
. h before.havmg examined m · detail t h e c.
1acts that constitute it It goes The a
wit out saymgthat the science of thin b h . . . . the med
ularcausesprecedesthe st d f gs Y t eir proximate and part1c-
longerpossibletoday £or u ! more general causes. Doubtless, it is not
0 Wek
a smg1e man to 1 11 his thou
0 f mathematics of natural . exp ore a at once the domain
]' . ' sciences of h. t · l . der toe
re igioussciences but teanl k ' is onca , philolooical moral and
.' wor can n k l'?~ ' Th at
mea~urefor the msufficiencyofth . d:a_ e up the deficiency in a large
vers1ty ' d'ffi · from the abso b.e m 1v1dua 11·rutiat1ve.
1 enng ·· · A research uni- would
reers and wh r mg preoc · And
and 'not ere each cultivates a spe ·a1bcupat1ons of profe sional ca-
' content to · · Cl ranch O f h in'tit,
unceasinglyi h a~sinulatethe already uman knowledge,
fullyto the£ n t ~ science in the mak' completed science, cooperate
• . 0 nnat1on of . mg, and th .

O r
10 differentm
f h.
Ilosophy.
oments of h
nd so we have h
partial synthe fi
ses rom hi h
us contnbutes
t e evolution of thi ~ C one has to lib rate,
n ng, the general synthe i.
power-

1onged for agreeme ere, as Leo XIII h .


utary rappr h nt between . as also see h
of th oc ement beh.. science and · n, t e beginning of the
e tremend •ween r metaph · ..
ous Work of th ea on and faith y IC ' perhap oL1 .•11-
e restoration f ' a nd the noble er wniug
o the Ch . .
nst1an philo ophy.

n. Mcrcit:r
Speech79
1883

It seems that there is nothing simpler than that part of the mechanism of
speech that we call a word, yet the word, even if it is only one yllabl
has a nearly infinite complexity. e,
The word is not only that movement of the lips that creates a vibra-
tion in the air and will produce in the interlocutor a cerebral excitation
which is a n~cessary prelimi~1ary of thought; it is above all an interior sigi~
of which articulated sound 1s only the expression, a mental conversation
of which exterior speech is only the continuation.
What is this interior sign? What is this exterior sign?
How did those two signs fuse together? How do they connect on the
one hand, with the thought of the one who is speaking, and on the other
hand, with the thought of the one who is listening?
The answer to those questions will make us understand the nature and
the mechanism of speech.
We know Bonald's aphorism: "Man thinks his words before speaking
his thought." "Speech would seem to have been at first necessary, in or-
der to establish the usage of speech," J. J. Rousseau said.
That which would come before the final manifestation of thought,
would be then a speech mentally intended.
And, in fact, when we make efforts to remember a name we forgot,
isn't it natural to say: It is a name that starts with a rna... that ends with
in or with on... it seems that I heard it, but I cannot remember it?
An error oflanguage, a mistaken connection, a lapse, are immediately
corrected by the one who hears them; which is an obvious sign tha_tthe
audience follows, with a kind of mental representation, every smgle
sound articulated by the speaker. . .
Which one of us hasn't found himself trying to remember m his sol-
itary thought the course of a lively discussion he was i11:volved~n? The
opponent's objection, the inflexions, the sound of his voice'. the ir~ny of
his pity, the weak help of a friend who tried to protect us, till the silence

79 L
· a pamle. - RQ , 23 (1888) 545-567 .
, 's PHILOSOPHI CAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER
CARDIN A
I22

were m. soun d e d in our ears as if we found ourselve s the


of the group we . s .
b . t of our failure ·
su ~ec l law th at human thought takes, m the . conscioUs,
It is then a genera d thought, of a menta 11y perceived sound
f understoo h c: f . ,
ness, the form o an the outside under t e iorm o an articulated
· translated to
before b emg . boP .
sound or a wntten sym ·u· h done me the honor of reading this Will
Several of you who wi ave e affirmatively, but I wouldn 't be sur-
ted to answer m . .
probably be temp ould be of an opposite opim~n.
Prised that some w h University of Vienna, declares that he
fessor at t e h. · · h
Stricker, _a pr~ . ima es accompanying IS mtenor t ought
doesn't notice his audit~ry h g kes to others, but rather an attempt of
and directing the expression e ma
articulative movements. He says:
I th.nk my own th ou ghts through auditory. images, but only .
never i .
with motor representations, and nevertheless , it IS thanks to heanng
that I learned a large part of the words I know. .
. wit. h out a dou bt , thanks to hearing ' that
It 1s . I learned
. Italian. .I
know the persons and also the circumstances m w?1ch I lea~ed this
language. I managed, with a lot of ?ral an_d ~ud1to~ exercises, to
come to the point of being able to thmk easily m Italian, but I nev~r
think in auditory images, if I don't intentionally remember certam
persons and conversations.
I must say nearly the same about English. Besides learning a couple
of rudiments, it is because of conversation that I have learned that You\:
language. lfI start thinking in English, I just reproduce some oral mo- you h ·
tor representations.
exact
All those facts wouldn't be understandable ifl didn't connect with
the he~ring of the words, some oral motor representations. the v
Taking all those reasons into consi·d · I · · ·
that I connect my own words produced b erat1on, mamta1n the assertion
·
tion, wit· h eve~t h'mg I hear and' understand Yeve my motor
h representa-
been able to discover the initial feelings. ' n t ough I have not
Yet, while continuing my research I .
1
cover those feelings directly. First I p ' ~arned httle by little to dis-
somebody read to me while articulati ' erce1ved th em on the hps, . when
1
noticed that I accompanied every rn ng oudly and distinctively. I
wit. h a fceeling on my 1·ips. Soon after 'I p,d' and b of t h e one speaking
h.
somet mg strongly articulated, I actual} iscovered ~h at, when I heard
'
Some experiments I did on other pery repeated It inwardly
h
not t_ e only one able to perceive those sons feelinalso taught me that· I wa
It is true that I met some persons wh d gs.
li . h . . . o eciared
stenmg
h. to w at I dist111ct1velyarticulated h at fir t th h
yt mg o f what they felt when reading t ey d1'd not Pe • at• w en
O
r w 11en think' rce1ve an-
Ing. But th t
S l'J . J.c . 11 I ~>sS
I ;/. I

thO'>l' ,11,, ·rum, ., ar • co tlltaJi ct 0ry(()l",JJ(j


1 f ,n 1
only ,1 Ln a lon g •x<:rcii.<.·th l l ,i Y rn:itt ·r, I,., au,< ii ,
' iny•,·1 1nm t
ings upo11 I1 ·aring what wa, said.~" ' ' "P rec1v • th,,•,(•fi ,,I
And, inf.Ht , lon 't w, s .. th. cl11.11 ( ,p
II'JI)!, w 11
up sylbbl<.:by syllabi , arti ·ul, ting 1' l <·r l, n on 'Y wor<l,hr :.~11 g
1
write? I 011't W<.'know that th. p .r<,;on-,w}ioYln v.t ·r,, wha . h · I. am ,,
1 .
tion gen ·rally sp •ak so ·a\ily its 'Kt . II . · • viva, 1c,u., nna14111:i
, · ' LI, y lt1' 1J",'-r(" ll"
1 he• man who h :h .,I.,•c •h diffi ·lilt Ic'i
' . ,pontan •ou, · I t · 1.
ti ·ubt1vc 1110v•men ts, doc sn · 't h"'
.... 1 on l w • Iv • Y
) , t 1 · to
rn:, k may c ar-
sometimes? ,w<.: " tnrn out l<J1d
And, wh,. ti . thinking out loud'· Jud '~ tram Jatm· g ·m the < ut 1 ·d , · }1
ut wanting
J · k'
to, hthe mus cular arti ulatioi11, 11 t
r
. h h> " c, ~it
go W it t c <.:xcrc1,;c c,f
our t 1111
· 111
g.J • c hyperactive
· man who crnw•<...., th,·
... pub]' 1 }
1c p ac<.:,wit 1
out
. sce111g
. . w .iat s gorng on around .him , mak1' ng unaware gestures, mov
mg his lipc; strongly, . show
. s a typ1cal manifostation of the moto r ,and
mus u Iar aspect of rntcnor speech, do esn't he?
. We ha_v<.:_ scr n the role of the resonant image, of the articulativeimage
m the bmldmg f the '.11cnt~lp~enomcnon that rules the final expression
of our th . ught. Herc 1sa thJrd image that has a c,;c k ctcd place next to the
two previous ones, and that could even come in first; it is the visual im-
age, whi h i. in the capacity of local memory as one of its principal
form.

You would like to cite an author. You remember his thought well, but
you hav • t reproduce it word for word, and you cannot remember the
exact c;entence, even though you see it, it i,; in that book, at the end of
the volume, you even have read it, you underlin ed it and marked it with
a sign. Y Llrthought doesn't have the characteristic of a heard sound, or
an articulative movement, but the form of an image with vague edg<.:s,
and not well defined. Without doubt, the mental vision is a powerful
auxili ry for thought.
or me, the immediate preparation of my lessons, meaning the fixa-
tion ,f ,t mode of thinking that must rule the elocution of my te_aching,
con ists in writing 011 a little piece of paper ,;omc wor?s'. five or s1xm~y-
underlining them once or twi ce according to the1r importance, give
b<.>,
number,. link thl'Jll with pan : nthc si~, so that I can ment~lly reread
th1.·111
them \ htlc I' spcak.ing, nd find them , s , lead to the expression of my
111
thou ,h
• ·, I f" r. · l Ji<>Wth •y represent numberc; to thcm-
I, 1t. ( '\Tl'r,1 0 . lllY. rrl ' Ill S M Id 11 • chat the most common
I\ ·s, numb ·r 1 for mst <lll' c. mt to I t: ' .
• I · · I · I · • <Jfth<-'number six. If the
Ill<:utt 1gn for thl:lll 1s .1 v 1sl1;1~1gn, t w nnag

ri ,. 1>11
/ 111 11,1, t d,• /11 i\111 , PP
11Jt11 7, -7<,.
ICAL ESSAYS
' HJLOS OPH
124 CARDINAL MERCIER S p
. I spe
d
rrio-ve 'o.osc~.
.,.
. n of the represented number 1dJlla Gal
. "th the nono . ' 0
ofl.S,
sound and motor image go wi . 1 of consciousness, m the clear-
. f; nor 1eve . Pers d char:
they find themselves at an in e A Englishman, Francis Galton 81 · te ,
· ess n ' pfll'lhe sotlric
obscure sphere of subconsciousn · . an inquiry about the power of
had in the past the great i ea
.d of having
. . ns extended eventua y to the
ll tO t_ rt)it1-ds_
. f h. f; How cinze ' the1r litl
visual representation o is e h oke with twenty members of the . a po
.
races of humamty. mong A others ' b of the Frenc h Instltute,
e sp . wit. h the Per, e beC atl
d mem ers d k d stag . ris
Royal Society of Lon don ~n c. boys and girls, an as e them to
rr ecu 0
. 1 st bhshments 1or
chiefs of educanona e a , . g to reproduce. Let us make note co h0
.. ili~Im~in . 'fhe P
answer the questionnaire of that questionnaire. writteri laril
. d the purpose
that those peop 1e i~ 1ore ut a well-defined object, your breakfast of this speech?
Think, Galton said, aboh . h i•n1 age that you conjure up for the No, the
mormng. fior instanc
· e• W at is t e
characteris j
eyers;t uestion: Is the image confused ~r t~tally clear? who are ~ 5
q • ll h b'ects distinctively reproduced together, or
2nd question: Are a t e O ~ h in edu~atl ~
t one single part of the scene t at comes out
is there only at one momen is the una.
of the whole? b we can c
· . The colors of the dishes the roast beef, the read, the
3rd quest10n. ' If,ve
mustard, the meat, the parsley, or other dishes that were on the table, are
terior thi1
they all distinctive and natural?82 . . .
think at t
Those questions give us quite a few mterestmg answers that we _will
be able to use here. While the children, the young persons especially, meamng
and the lower and middle class people clearly see the scene of the break- tance, it
fastwith all its details, to the point that they all declare that they can see ment o
it as if it were happening in front of their eyes, to the point that they Writi
would like to know how to draw and reproduce it, to the point that they profe o
visualizeit in its whole with just one look. On the contrary, rn.en of sci- tenvard
enc~,havethe i~pressio~, sometime~ that Galton is nuking fun of the_m, peakin
and . the mental imagery about wh1eh he consults then1 is a pleasant in- Wha
vention that does not stimulate anything in their consciousness or they languag
declare
. that they only see a coniusec. d w h ol e without
. ' lmes,
any defined .
nothing close to reality. Let
lingui t
I do not only speak about th hild . . b tter t
lnaudi, who can mentall r~: c prodigies, like Mondeux or Jacque ered in
they have seen written Inl o~nb~r columns of 20 or 30 nmnber that ln 1
players,like Morphy Bl kby e time on a blackboard or tho e che
Mall Gazette told abo t ach . urne ' Stemitz
· · '
and other , of whom the Pall
n
up t u t e1r uccc s befi h cl
I o 20 games, with a mask l . ore, v . could play 10, 15, an
pay of the opponent what . onht 1e1r eyes, just by being told on 'arb
piece as bee 11

------
81- C,alton I
8"
.
• 11q11mes
~. op cit p. R4.
int I
<•

.fae11l1y
o 1111111111 .
moved and v herr it h<, been

l t
PEECH £88 3
125

moved; I speak · about the scientists w or k'mg on mscn . . t'


old nianus npts, about the orators and f P ions or decoding
. · men o letters · 1
per. ons, Ga 1ton says m the report ab h. . . m genera . Several
out is mqm ll
rinted chara tcrs all the words they ar t'icu 1ate d · the ry, d menta
, y see in
P
to the sound of their speech but to the· . ' _Y on t pay attention
. . . ir visua 1 eqmvalenc th d.
th elf n11nds their speech as if they unrolled 1 . ~' e'!rea m
per; a p litician declares that he someti· a ~ngl piece of imagmary pa-
. · . mes iee uncomfort bl h
tage because
• · his. unagmation clashes aga·mst th e scratches and a e on 1t e
correct10ns 111 his manuscripts. unc ear
.The
· , phonetic
1. image,
d the n1otor · 1image
. image ' the visua · .
of objects or
w11ttcn.., anguage, o they constitute in its inte gn·tY th e mtenor · · sign· of
speech ;
No, there. . is a fourth
. image
. ' which has neither
· th e unportance
· nor th e
characten tic of umversahty .. of the three others , but w h.ich , fior th e men
who
. are used
. to wntmg
. . the expression of their thoughts m · newspapers,
m. education,
. or m busmess, .. can sometimes take a very amaz·mg fiorm, 1t ·
1s the image_ of the wntmg movements of the hand, the graphicimage,if
we can call it something like that.
If we start dreaming, in our solitude, in the midst of the silence of ex-
terior things, with a non-moving body, eyes closed, about what we
think at the moment when we mentally represent a bizarre word, whose
meaning cannot be interpreted right away, the word abracadabra, for in-
stance, it would not be surprising to see ourselves trying some move-
ments of the finger as to write the word abracadabra.
Writing excites and supports the work of thinking and that is why
professors of literature tell their students to write first and to correct af-
terwards. Was it not Cicero who advised those working in the art of
spealcing to compose their introduction at the end of their work?
What is then the nature of the interior phenomenon that tells us our
language, which simply means the expression of our thoughts?
Let us use a new process of analysis, cerebral pathology, the study of
lingui tic pathology. The typical forms of aphasia will help us understand
better the importance of the information of consciousness that we gath-
ered in the prcviou'i pages. . . . .
In 1861, Broca, urgcon of Bicetre, had 111 his service an old ret~red
per on, known under the nickname of Tan, because for all the questions
he was asked, he could only answer with that word tan, always accom-
panied with a variety of gestures, with whic~ he_always managed to ex-
prc'> most of his idea. . He heard very distmctively the speech of the
pcr,om he wa~ c;pcaking to, could read and write, did no~ show any
. . . d d h. If under tood with gestures
P t1ho Iogtcs of mtdhgcncc an ma e limsef h. tongue and larynx were
ano \ ntm~. But rvco though the muse• cs O· list , ound and .his. eterna 1
llot p,tr ly:11.:
d, IH.:( ould only produce inarticu a c
pJ.JICAL ESSAYS
' 1-II
LosO
CARDI AL MER C IER S p
r,Jr• ~
ating ability of the movement }leaC
the coor din . . h. s tlie Je }11
monosyllable ta11.He had 1oSt f articulative images, w 1ch pre-
0 \N}1 }1 i
of articulated language, th_eme1? ~so we recall from reading Professor oeeC
S_r tO
dominate with a stressed intensity, Broca discovered that the nerve sub- parts,
Stricker of Vienna. At the autopsy,d the third left frontal convolution tJ-iepara
lace at . h 1
stance of the old man was reP ·a1 The linguistic pat o ogy correspond- ori C
by a pocket full of serous maten .IIasiaor aphemia. rr1t1ch 0
ing to that lesion is called motor~p f psychic verbal aphasia. I take the ariother
Here 1s . another case of aphasia, h o i·ck person struc k most o f t h e time _Bt1the
h. Duva1. t e s , .
description from Mat ias · d quickly from paralysis; but, accord- arid wr<
le}._"'recovere .
by an attach of apop ,., 'f h ons living with him, he seemed to re- the lettt
. b · ns t e pers .
mg to the o servati? O h ould not 0a-ive the nght answer to the
. d f d ·d· uc because e c • pbeno~
main . ea an 1 10 k d d did not follow conversations. But a careful
quesuons he. was as •e t. ' an showed that he was neit· h er clea f nor i·d·1otic hirn to ~
and methodJCexanuna 10n . . · f-Ier
se if after a while of silence he was spoken to
H e was not .dea f.
, becau , and un i
d hi·n1 so that he could not see the movement of the lips
standing beh111 , legibly
he turned hi head. He heard, but he did not answer correctly, because
if, for instance, he was asked: "how old are you?", he would answer: handw j
"I'm fine thank you." He was not deaf because he also turned around at
Tha
1
the sound of an opening door, a window moving because of the wind, psychi
and even the sound of a pin falling on the floor. We
After having answered wrong to several questions, he was well aware pictur
that his answerswere not good enough, he got impatient. "I don't know memo
what you are saying," he would yell, "what are you saying? I don't un- We
derstandyou! Cure me!" He was not idiotic. And actually if h _ vi ual
swered v st · , e an
h k \ rong to a que ion, he would express himself correctly when tate ,
~ft
ineo~v~~~;:ngehotsuslFy,
wthhenhe expressed his own ideas and responded
· ur ermore he re d d l
Mr.
written questions He re d th ' a an correct y answered any
· a e newspape l
defeatedhis opponent Th h . r, some nove s, played chess and
· us, t at sub1ect ·h
He spoke, he read he w t Wh ~ was neit er deaf nor idiotic.
· · ' ro e at did h h
rrussmgthe understanding of.the s e ave missing then? He wa
of verbal auditory images he poken language. He lost the memory
pichhoticdeafness.He had a le~as struck with verbal amnesia or verbal
0 t e brain.83
The
sion at the first left tern 1 1 ·
pora convo ution th
case which we
Charcot,84is cer . now review, borrow
most beautifiI tamly, as the eminent ~d from the work of Mr.
verbalblindne~s examples that you can fiprda~t1tioner noti e ' one of the
. n In the 1001
c
1 of aphasia called

83. R.evi S .
84 ie nemifzqu e1
. Lessons o11the dis: 7 December I 0!!7
ta~esorti
'J I(' tl ('r• 10
" .
. sy'ef ,n.Vol. Ill
• IH
' p. I SJ.
h
SPEECH 1883
127

Mr. H. P ... , a 35-year-old man with a m.iddl 1 1 f


the h ead o f a commerci ·al h ouse wrote and de eve
1 0
o culture ' was
while hunting, he felt paralyzed on his ,rightre~d a odt.d n October 9,
· d' si e an emonstrated a
speech impe 1ment. After four days he started t0 h.
h · fb · ' move is paralyzed
parts, to t e pomt o emg able to stand up and th h · ·
· ten d ed to d.isappear.
the para1ysis, ' e ap asia' especially
the On October 28, an .important event occurred . M r. p d'd i n ,t h ave th at
tn.e much of a problem
. with speech , he only someti·mes use one wor d fior
d
rd, another. His hand
d . free enough so. that he could wn·t e very 1egi·bly.
was
re, But he wa~te to give. an_order relative to his business. He took a pen
the and wrote it, then, behevu1:g he had forgotten something, he asked for
fuJ the letter back to complete it, ~anted to go over it, and then this typical
le. phenomenon became very obvious: he couldwrite but it was impossiblefor
to, him to read his own handwriting.
ps, Here is a patient whose intelligence kept all its lucidity, he could speak
and understand the speech of somebody else, he could write, he wrote
se
legibly enough to give an order, but when he wanted to read his own
er: handwriting, he was totally unable to do it.
at That patient had lost visual image efthe words, he was struck by verbal
d, psychic blindness. The cortical layer was injured at the parietal lobe.
We remember the fact noticed by Calton that, in general, scientists
re picture objects as confused even though some of them have an excellent
w memory for verbal, written, or printed signs.
We find again that visual memory, even with the double nuance of
visual memory of objects and verbal visual memory in the pathological
n state, in the following history of a patient, Mr. K, a merchant in Vienna.
d Mr. K was an educated man, spoke fluent Gem1an, French, Spanish, and
y modem Greek:
d I hurry to answer your letter, and I beg you to excuse my incomplete
knowledge of the French language , that imperfection makes it a little
difficult for me to make the exact expression of what I have to tell you.
As I told you, it was very easy for me to represent inwardly to m~self
the persons interesting to me, colors and objects of any nature, ma
word, everything reflected by the eye. .. . .
Allow me to tell you that I was using that ability m my studies: I read
what I wanted to learn, and closing my eyes, I co~ld see clearly the let-
ters in every detail; it was the same for the physiognomy of persons,
countrie ' citie I visited in my longjourneys, and as I told you above,
for every object that had been een by my eyes.
uddenly that mwar. d v1• 10n
• h a t o t a]ly disappeared. Even today,
1
with the bes~ intentions, J cannot represent to myself the feat~res of ~Y
children my wife or any object that'! u e daily. Thus, hav_i ng esdta -
' ' d ·
lic;hc<l that r have completely lo t inwar viswn, yot
· 1'11ea 11y un er-
J-IICAL ESSAYS
. 's p1-n1osoP
ERCJER
CARDINAL M

. an absolute way. 1.,et


h anged in f h . . .b
· 11prcss1
II
•ons are c esent to mysel w . at 1s v1s1 . le ' and witl
stand that my ablc to repr I have daily surpnses when I Jt is
I1 t 1'111 not emory, .
Now
. t a
. ll retaine. d abstract m for a 1o ng time '
n1y sensat10ns or in-.
••i- her.
hav111gtota Y t have known w It seems to me that a corn- is Ul
see things _that l dlllL~~ing indefinitely ?te n~e and of course my nature J11e
, . t·ons 111stca, . 1y ex1se , . .
prcsS · , 11a occurred m 11 Before, I was 1n1press10nable A
1kte change < · • able way. Im Id '
lhas. bccn modificdinda nouce rich fantasy. Today ' I'm ca ' co ' and rny all o
• · . and I 11a a anY
cnthm1ast1c,' an more. .
c tasycannotwander Y f' ard representat10n, my dreams have gle.
ian . 11 h senseo inw . d h b fc
Lackingtota Yt e · n1 dream m wor s, w en e ore, I had acte
·c. d Today Io Y
al-,0 been mocl111 e · ' •
•· · 1perception.
1s
in my dreamsa v ua . if you ask me to represent to myself pen
. , better examp1e. · ki
Herc 1\ even a
the. tower
, Of Notre Dame, a s
heep grazing, or a boat sin ng, I would
ou that even 1.fl am perfectly able to d1st1ngu1s t ose three
a~swcrY . ' d k wing very well what they are about, they have
d1ffcn:ntthmgsan no
110 meaning
.
· to me, firomthe point of view of 1nwar v1s10n.
·
. .

d ··
.h h

.. .
;s
edi~
A remarkableconsequence of the loss of that mental ability 1s,as I B, (1

alreadytoldyou,the changein my nature and n1y impressions. I'm not he 1


ascapable of sorrowor moral pain. I'll tell you that, having recently wit
losta relativewhichI wasclose to, I felt a less greater pain than ifI still obs
hadthe powerof representingto myself with inward vision the phys-
iognomyof that relative, the phases of the disease he had to go
through,and especiallyif I could still see inwardly the exterior effect
produce,dby that earlydeath on the members of the family.
I don t knowifI'm expl · · ll h fc
that this . mward
. . . thatammg
v1s1on .151 k.we . w at I eel, but I can assure you
uncommonway and it still ac·st mg fc m me today existed before in an
theX... Univer'.ty c exi s or my brother, professor oflaw at
s1 ' wr my fathe . 1·
world,andfor a sister t 1 d r_,onenta 1st known in the scientific
In conclusionI b ' a ente pamter .
h . .
w o 1s qmte appreciated.
lf h . ' egyou to notice th I' b .
se t e thmgsthat I w . . at m o hged today to tell my-
onl h d . ant to retam m
Y a to picturethem w·th my memory, when before, I
Wh·1 i my eyes
I e the lossof the abili . .
Mr.K,theloss f h . ty of visual repr .
tial.H:eca _o t e abilityof visu 1 esentat1on of objects is total for
Iettersforn·Writethe Greek and G a represe n tation ·
of words is only par-
e , instancei G erman al h b
reekWordsth . n reek, e,8 J' 9 ,Ir p a ets, but he forgets several
Wellb
' . ut to readth
at IIlclud h ' ~' ' '/J Z Wh en he is asked to spe11
e t ose letters h ' ·
t0 Wnt h e sarne , e und
fact e t ose same WordsWritten b erstands, he writes them
seet~awt ehllas becaus:ords _himselfbefor y sorn_ebody else, he is obliged
helpedbt he aItcrati00 certain d . e read1n B 1
Of etails of th g. ecause of that ast
Y earj Verbal e story O f h .
ng or wn·t· niemory t e patient we can
ing can b . '
· e partially corrected or
SPEECH 188 3

e finish this study of the troubles of sp l


Let 111 . eec 1 path 1 .
·th a last typical case, reported by Mr p 1·tr . h O og1e or aphasia
w1 . . · es in t e R ·
·s a case of psychic agraph1a: the patient does 't h evue de rnedecine.
It I ·1 . . n ave a pa 1
oves it eas1y, uses 1t m a normal way to d ra yzed hand
he rn . eat an get d '
. unable to coordmate the moves necessary r 0 . . rcsscd, but he
1s . . u r Writing } h
mernoryof graphic-signs. . . , 1 c as 1ost the
At the time of the examination, Mr. Pitres sa M
didn't demonstrate any sigys, f r. L ~as a?lc to use
allof his faculties, he . 1 . n o speaking d ffi 1 .
nyproblem of articu at10n of words, he could re d 1 d . 1 icu ties,
a . . dh d . a a ou ' without 5111 .
gle hesitation, an e rea , with the same ease cu . .
, rs1ve or printed char-
a -
acters.
After Mr. L sat comfortably at a table he was give
k e d to wnte • ' n some paper and a
Pencil and was as the word Bordeaux w ·th h. • h
·1 1 . 1 is ng t hand
He took the penci , p aced 1t properly between his fingers d ·
· ·h ·fli · . . , an apparent-
ly held 1twit out st1 ness or pam, but .it was impossible cu0 r h.1m to wnte .
a singleletter. However, he totally realized mentally the characters need-
ed to write a word. He spelled the letters that were in the composition,
B, 0 , r, ... He showed us the letters in a newspaper. "I know very well "
he said, "how to spell the word Bordeaux, but when I want to wri~e
with my right hand, I don't know what to do anymore ... "To make the
observation easier, we asked Mr. L if he was well aware of the form of
an isolated letter, the letter L for instance. He answered yes and to prove
it to us, he looked for it and showed it to us in several printed or hand-
written words. We then asked him to write that letter on a piece of paper
with is right hand. He took the pencil but only managed to trace illegible
lineswithout any connection to the letter L. The same series of phenom-
ena happened for numbers.
It would be difficult, it seems to me, to find observations more mean-
ingfulthan the previous ones. Integrity of reading, hearing, and speech,
intelligence good enough and conservative enough so that the patients
could tell with precision what kind of trouble they had, finally the near
total abolition of writing going with keeping of the other forms of lan-
guage,here are all the required condition of a fact, so that we _caneStab-
lish the nature of characteristics of agraphia.85 Thus, the location of th at
typicalform of aphasia of aphasia of the hand, as it has been called, seems
small.It seems to be l;cated at the upper part of the second left frontal
convolution of the cerebral hemisphere.

It 15 · to gather the elements of our double psycI10logi·caland pathological


· time .
st
analyis, and to give the solution to the problem we are udymg. Exte-

- . . d b Pallet in: The i11teriorlan-


ia Xtr ct from the R1•iuc of ,\,f cdidne, r 884, No. 1r, ette
1 Y
~ •flp. I U- r Ji.
sorJJI C Al ESSAYS
I 30 CARDINAL MER !ER'S PHILO

. d sian that comes before speech


rior speech is the expression
.
° fan mwar
of 1angu , ·
o . h
age What 1s t e nature of the
in the series of the phenomenon Jd and J. J. Rousseau must have
.
inward .
sign? . a s01111d 1maoe,.
Is 1t . a, as Bona . s Stricker o fv ienna
· c laims?
. A
.
thought? Is it a motor1111a,(!C q
fartwdat1011,a
.
f h
signs as some o t e results of
. f b " t or wntten , . . .
visual image either o o ~ec s ;> Or finally, 1s 1t a motor image ef
, . . d demonstrate. . b h
Galton s mqutry ten s to . k when thinkmg a out t e sense of
. .
wntmg, as we were tem , pted to nm
1
the word abracadabra? . h terior word is only a mirror, is at
. d d 0 f which t e ex
The mwar 11,or, •d when we stated that the extreme
once all of that, and that is why w_e sa1_
. . . f h d is only an 1llus10n. .
s11nphc1tyo t e wor . f the mental sign, language, m the usual
The exteriorword expresswn ° h ki
f , h
sense o t e wor ' and ' d especially the spoken language, speec
f . l . nd al
, a of
·
current change 111 soe1a · l commerce ' is a movement o art1cu at1on _
ready extremely complicated. .
We know that the muscle is composed of a certam number of fibers,
invisible to the eye. We know that for each muscular fiber there is a
nerve fiber and that each nerve fiber must receive a stimulus of a central
nervous system cell to innervate the muscular fiber.
Iv
, ,
One is the muscular contraction that is used to form vowels, another
the
is the one for consonants. Furthermore, there are a near infinite number
of vowels and consonants. There is a quantity that is difficult to count in
each human languages, and each of those articulated sounds are related po
to a different form of the organs of articulation. 0

. What is true for articulation is true also for the movements of writ- the
mgs. 86
ca
1 Let us suppose that the muscles that close the mouth to pronounce the to
1
p:~~::r/f:stt~~n ct~: f~st~d ;it~ ten thousand muscle fibers, which i ch
motor nerve centers t ·. . will t~en take as many nerve fiber in the
It is hard to . . o puhtit 111motion to articulate consonant . Bu
imagine t e work th t hild
nounce all the vowels and a a c has to produce to pro-
f< consonants of an 1 h b . . the
erent movements of arti· I . a P a et, to d1 cover the d1f-
ll bl . cu ation to b ·1d 1 . ti
sy a es into words the d .' ui etters mto yllable then
th ' n wor s into se t ·
e natural ~ourse of conversation h n ences, and then enten . into C l
]Here again, the study of sp ht at follows from all of thi .
on Y have t eec pathologi · .
varietie o go over the classic Work f e I very 111. tru ti \·e. u ll r
seau al~/an represent these patholoo-i: o Tphathlo t ee h w m:mv l
' ays answe d II o•e • at p · ·
danger" th h re a the questio 11 dd t1 nt, nted b · Rom-
' e ot er O . " s a re d h. .,
ne. Con ini " d e to 1111: then.· 1 110
' an when h • • . ll
e " ac; 1mt.1tcd : ··, K-

81i. )trickt'r op . l
• 111
, Para II.
' PEECII 1 88J
I ~ I

con.·• Another one £'.


would
b . end l} h1s. wo J(IS . 1 . Wll. 11 th<,.· S'l II · 1
would say . b if
011t1 1or OI1JOUr
'
vcntif"t·or
. ·
v l . J·
Cllllr!Ot.
· • ine ~y .1hl• 1 •
'
A patient called ~aqu~t , could write his nam1:. 1f h , ..1 ,
the nickname of his wife, he would writ , " l> \;"' • s ,\\k~d l<> w, 11•
"P ' H c , qw,•t th · i 1 111 f
month aquet, etc. e was like a< 111,.,• • ·11llll · • t 11at onr ' . • 1l' <> tlH·
1
way repeated the same move .87 · l put l(>!!, ·t 1 ·r, .ii

It i probable
. that. . the. range._ flosses. that " )1,1ppcn , 111 · lH: 1 111 • I1 1111. 111 1·
articulation
. or
. wntmg f 1 proportional t the .111• t ..
• " 01111 1<:SJOI) . ~01 th •
. "'f o
oonal
. alteration fo the nerve 1 . enters that. respe . c·t IVl •
· ,1y co111111,111d ti,. lllH 11,ir
ocular
· groups
1 o mu cu
f 1 a1 fibers work111g towarcl· ti1 • 1· .
ormat1011of th .
different e ements Id bo anguage.1· Stumbling
. over. s·Y11 ·•10
1.1cs,
. . sta1111n
, .
•rll)g,
rnumb ling, wou e exp. amed with . the same .tm 111 i1t1 1-· lJ>llt ·It WOLi 11 ( lH:
a waste to spen d m.ore time studymo- t, the 111'' " h '·1111' s111 of ex L ·nor · sp • •cI1.

As to the i,zteri.ors~gt~,w~ aw that it is composed, at least or •ducatc<l


p~rsons o~ four d1sti~ct images: auditory ~mage of sound, visual image
ot the wntten or pnnted word, motor image of movcm •nts of the
tongue, and the lips necessary for the articulation of the word, and final-
ly, the motor image of m.oven1ents of the hand working toward s writing
the word.
Sometimes, those four images seem to have a more or ks s equal im-
portance in memory, it is probably the ordinary case for most people.
Sometimes, one of them surfac s to the point of sending the others in
the sphere of darkness or even into unconsciousne s, a we saw in the
case of Stricker, it might have been Bonald's case as well. It also belongs
to one of the players who, with closed eyes can play one or even several
chess gan1es.

But those images, what are they, where do they come from?
They are memories, sensations, souvenirs associated in our memory;
they are groups of memorial images of our perceptions. As ca_rlyas the
first months of his existence, the child perceives tastes, sou_nds,lights, and
t
color , tactile sensations. He has feelings of hunger or thirS , ~nd he has
some pleasure satisfying them. All of those per eptions arc linked to a
. d ·n other words and from
nerve center , where they leave b eh m a trac~, i · '
another point of view, an inuge or a souvenir.
"ld for example arouses at the
If an. object ' the n1ilk that d t h e ch 1 '
fee.re . ' h t, rouc h ' an d
. tions taste, s1g
ame tim e and at several tm1es dmerent . sensa
· . '
f images w1-11b,e c10 rn1cd as·
muscular en e, for example, an as ociauon ° ·
. ,r riteAcademytifMedfri11e,
c,pt -
0
7· Sec: Ku mau l. "S p •~ch P.1tbolog ic< ' Th;. HullettII J
. May nd June 1865;Jan ·t The Br,1it1
1 11 and Ilwu.~/it.
I-fJCAL ESSAYS
's pJ-IILosoP
CARDI A L MERCIER
132

. ce nters. Thanks to the inter-


nve
. . quence in
• the percep
ters w 1
-u
naturally act together so
f h '
an indirect conse . k h rn these cen to arouse one o t e associ-
h t lin t e ' • ornes .
central fib ers t a . r excitation c that follows 1t up, the other
· n exteno rnory
that each n_me a . h the central rne . e by indirect concomitant e:x- J1
ated sensations wit d t the sarne urn
. ·ube arouse a
~e~one s W1 tl ble before being able to speak, tJ
citations. · perfec Ya ' . h"t h
than a year is f ct liquid, opaque w 1 e, unger 51
A child ofle 5 · ges o s011 , h
. · his brain the irna h he can reach, among ot er ob- tl
to associate m table w ere . . .h ill . .
. t ati fied. Put on a · ·ng aw h 1·te opaque hqmd,
an d t hirs e w . raise his \'
. mething shiny contami . . k bottle. 88 The percept10n of the g
Jects, so .1 h ets his ffil 1 . h ·
arms and shout unti e g ding cerebral image, w erem is
. the correspon . f . fi d
white liquid arouses
t ry
.
image o
f sugar , the images o satls 1e hunger
brought back the gusta_ . J
0
fa white opaque liquid becomes little
. h the visual image 0
and thmt, sot at . al •gn of what calms hunger, what we call
by little for the child the natur s1
by the name of food. · · milk b 1 h hil
When the mot her, breast feeding or givmg a. . ott e tod er c · d,
· Iates the sound ,n,·tkor one of those prov1S1onary soun s, ta. for m-
aracu .
stance,as the mother and nanny are accustom~d to ~o, some~hmg will
be added to the group of images already constituted m the mmd of the
child to represent what calms down hunger. That something is a new
image, the auditory image of the sensation ta, and henceforth, that image
will be enough to arouse the entire group, just as any other element of
the natural group formed before will arouse the auditory image ta with
the other images of the complete group.
Later,when the child learns how to write and read two new imaoes
the verbal and visual image 0 f th d f . . '. . -0
group, so that the complete gr e soun o .rm 1
k will JOm the preVIous
the images of s . .d oup representmg milk will have, besides
ugar, 1iqm ' opaque hi h d. .
heardsound milk th b . . w te t e au Itory image of the
, e ver a1visual 1m f h .
of the signmilkand th d bl ~ge O t e wntten or printed letters
· f e ou e motor 1 f h
mg o the same word mage o t e articulation and writ-
This phenom ·f
ed . enon o association a d h .
imagesare not only pecur n . t e coming to ether of a ociat-
teamsterswh· h Iar to a child h h - .
brinPi . ic make a horse go . h ' t e arsh con1mands ot their
l:r'ng into the · , ng t or left h · ·
we see ap . _animal s mind an . . ave the < me eflec t ot
peanng h a oc1at1o f ·
. T~e history of~~: e chiJ~' mind. n °
m1age , the .1me th,1t
signis associatedo .. evolution of langua
nginallyWith the · al pr \'t' th, t the vt rbal
unage o b.
~ect.

kk I
't C) t, 71,, s
u/ of th, (h,td
. p. 354,
SPEECH 188 3
13 3

)Vietaphoris the _basicsupport oflanguage. And the


pare two objects and to apply to the sec d h l1letaphor is used
1
roconfthe first. This is the definition of Mr AonD t e na111e and the im-
aae o h h h . · · armesteter
:,We can see t at paper as t e thickness of a leaf nd ·
of the image of the leaf to the "leaf, of p w' a we apply the
narne · aper. hen a ·
metaphor, the image of the first obiect st wnter ere-
acesa . J • ays transparent b •
'.wne,that image loses its color, . we lose the rein ein b ranee of ,· ut dwith
nd object seems to ren1a111by itself without . k . it an the
seco . b. h . , any 1m with the one
that,
historically, gaveh irt. to 1t. When we speak 0 f t h c 1eaf of p
don't remen1ber t e nnage that gave its name b . aper,
we h. f h , ut we only have to
a back in the 1story o t e word to find in general th • c. . ' .
'Do . .. . eir 1am1lylmks
with a pnnut1ve image. 89
Do we . think about
. the sea, . Mr. Breal wonders . . ' when w e speak a6 out
swering.a quest10n, . greetmg . a passer-by ' failmg in an ent erpnse, • car-
an
ryinga weight, ch~osmg the nght n1on1ent or being opportunistic? And
yet, all those locutions are grafted from sea or naval words. When Sal-
Justem~de C~tal~na s~y "Cum vos considero,milites, et cumJac~arestraaes-
tHmo... he didn t thmk any n1ore than we do about the ongins of the
expressionsthat seem so easy to him. And yet, considerois a metaphor
borrowedfrom astrology, and aestumo from bank.
Transpositions that at first seem choking to us become so common
that we no longer notice why they are strange. We speak of a high
sound,a warm voice, flashy color, a bitter work, without thinking that
we transport a notion from one organ to another. We speak of a light
spirit,a strong heart, an enlightened intelligence, an upright soul, a polite
society,without thinking that we have passed the physical order on to
the spiritual and inoral order. But in reality, at the origins of those ex-
pressionsand many others, we find the association of a name to the im-
ageof an object and the transferal of that name-image from one object
to another.
We have assisted the association of the notion with the word heard,it
now remains to follow the association of this same notion with the word
expressed.
How does a child come to represent a specific type of object by one
word?
th
. The first scream of a newborn child is a reflex movement, as ~ bleat-
ingof the lamb that is born or the chirping of a chick that breaks it~ egg-
shell Th . ' h bout moves his feet
· e child yells as he is put down, as e turns a , .
andh d . . . d r: h'm1 to move his organs
an s; 1t 1sa natural nece s1ty and a nee tor .
Und h . . · th t continually come
er t e influence of thousands of exc1tanons a

Re.,V
· . l) . , pp. 63-66 .
rmc tct r. 'fl1e Life o{il'cird
OPJ-!JCAL ESSAYS
's pJ.JILOS
MERCIER
CARDINAL
134 . 1.-...,-,e ri
l of the blood, or from the in- bliSIJ-»- .
h instab1ity esta }lysica.
. world or t e rriecaP }le no fl
from the exterior ' the sound of those whorn h· that P diffe :
t hear 1s
ternal organs.
· 1 the c
hild does no
f or w1
.th ear problems. But soon afte
l r sotlnd, 13all~
In pnnopke, he was born dea ·ated w 1-th the muscu
screamsawa e,
. ar sensations of
ti·onsare assoct . ges to motor images of articula-
J\S or. f 1{1
. percep d. ry 1rna bove o
d
the au itory d 1 nv the au ito peak not yet, for sure, the Ian a . d by tl
th an ary,,,., . lf ble to 5 ' . - ceive i
t~e moudthe child findshunse ae language of a parrot, pslttacism, as t0 liS
ten to ·
th
uon, an f nan but at lea5t h d by the need of articulating and by rfwe thU
age o a t , h"ld
1 ' pus e ·an of thotl
gu_
Le1b111tz. ·d
sa1 . When . . hat we can find in a large number
the c . of animals, 510 ·- 1
· stinctof imitationt
t he 111 . his mot er
h or nanny ta, natural sign of what sat-
. . 1 . t h a t doub .e
\Vl
·u be heard saymg to h
·u eat t e ea ' h rd ta and 1f the articu atlon of ta is one who is
isfieshunger,he wi . repll" t ttention to education, with the pleasure 0
f that mec
1 1
associ _ated,thanksto :t:h J~nw:il repeat ta to get the breast ~r the milk wonde rful
th
of satisfiedhunger, . . 1-s established between the child and his
Th commumcatton . .
We adm
bottie. en f h sation and the auditory image ta. We will only and of corn
motherbecauseo t e sen hild . h f
haveto mo dify h
t e sou nds articulated . by the c m
. d .t e sense o .the it is more '
convent10n · a1tongue received in the c1rcle he was. raise m, .to multiply the infinite
the waysof communicatingand thus language will be constituted. its melodi e
Andso hereis the link establishedbetween the thought of the mother source of
and the thoughtof the child, between the notions of the child and the spread ov e
notionsof hismother.From the group of images that mentally represent etry and tl
forthe mothersoft,liquid, white, opaque that we call milk, to the artic- and one
ulationof the word milk, from the articulation of the word milk for the
goodne ?
motherto the auditoryperception of the sound milk for the child from
th
at auditoryperception to the awakening of the image of the ~ove-
mentst_oexecute the expression of the word milk finally from the
awakerungof that motor i h • ' '
other images bal dimage to t e revival, because of association, of
, ver au tory bal · a1 .
milk,as well as gust t lf;' ver VIsu , and graphic of the word
0
thereis an uninterruapot ryd,h ~ctory, visual, muscular, of the milk it elf,
d e c am of · d
un er a singlename· I associate phenomenon that we call
i
Without doubt anguage_or speech.
speech·h · ' anguage is not es ·a11 d
c . · t e visualor tactil · sen ti Y a heard and expre e
tor blind e image for d f
born bli mutes - as that poo ea ?1ute , the tactile only image
, nd at th r 1 aura Bnd h
complete! 1 e age of two that h d gemen, 90 deaf mute w en
.
discussab
Ya tered '
. sense of taste d .
a a part'aJ 1 - en e oL m 11and near} l,
. stractid , an With h
visual
· image or theas of. God and of t h · w om Dr. H ve managed ' to
intelligencesth e tacttle irnage I e 111101 rtality of tht oul - the
eve d at are \ ·u· ' ay, can
ry ay life it . v1 ing to ex h erve a ring b 'tween rwo
, is the s , c angc th . ..
ound image th eir common 1dc1•• But 111
at tran p fi
· rts rom thought t t 1
I•
SPEECH 1883
1 35

. hment oflanguage. We do not believe we h


stablis .d . . ave to get lo t 111
. l. h
e hysical cons1 erat10ns, as 1t has often bee d 11g
01etap nomenon. Th e n1ost plausible . n one, to b a" f
he reaso 11 a d. vare o
hat p ccor mg to · h
t d different from gesture, strikes the mind eve 1·r. . . u is ~ at
soun ' . 1 1 · h. • n It 1s mattent1
Ball said very c ever y 1n 1s introduction of th k . e·
AsDr. 91 d · e wor mentioned
ve of Kussmaul, soun 1s a projectile, where o-esture .
abo h · l k. o 1s on 1y per-
. ed by the
ce1v . one w o 1s oo 1ng, sound can be heard wit• h out h avmg .
listen to it.
to b h .d erat10ns
.
[fwe think a out t e cons1 . . . we
. .just developed O n th e mtenor
• .
signof thoug~t, the extenor sign which 1sits expression, the link that ties
that double sign to the thought of the one who is speakino- and to th
one who is list~ning, we can not be shocked by the infinitt complexi;
of that mechanism that we call speech and that we handle with uch a
wonderful ease.
We admire the richness of resources of the telegraph and telephone,
and of course, we are not wrong, but the mechanism of speech, even if
it is more common, is it not more admirable? The human voice, with
the infinite differences of its tone, for different individuals, the system of
itsmelodies and the chords of its songs, speech with its inexhaustible re-
sources of expression, that can be proven by the millions of idiom
spreadover the world or revived by linguistic with the charm of po-
etry and the energy of its eloquence, is not that a ma terpiece of nature
and one of the brightest proofs of providential power, wi dom, and
goodness?
D. Mercier
Pro£ or at the University of Lou vain
Sound the Alarm2so

Mr. Billia, a lyceum professor and libero docentcat the Ui . .


Turin takes Neo-Thomi sm to task. 281 H e says Neo -Th _11vc~s1ty of
1 I h · · .sts, fiercely opp , 01111
danaerous s ope. t court s t e pos1t1v1 I) s111 1s on 'a
o d 1·b 1 c . .
Cousin, and e 1 erate y 1orgets 1deahst doctrin es. Am oscs esCart
h cs· 'and
fL
Thomists, those o ouvam · are the mo st dangerou s. ong a11t c N eo-
Mr. Billia rings the alarm. "Sound the alarm!". 282
With charitable intentions he warns us of the danger It
too late; we are marchmg . toward athei.sm. Even more •our may ph "l not h6c
. . . "A h . . h , 1 osop y
is athe1st1c.He wntes: t e1sm 1s t e first and last word of your philos-
ophy, the first and last ~ord of your apologetics. "283As if the vigilant
guardian of s?und doctnnes would doub~ the efficiency of his argu-
ments, he wntes the word ATHEISMO m enormou s print. It makes
you shudder.
Be on guard, Mr. Billia. You are handling a sword with two cutting
edges.Your are claiming that we are professing a deep-seated atheistic
philosophy "out of obedience." You call it "a system of philosophy by
decree."According to you, you are dealing with "philosophers who are
obeyingorders coming from above." Since Neo-Thomists are only sub-
jects,wouldn't the most culpable be those who se commands they obey?
How can a believer be comfortable in a society where the leaders are
promotingatheism? Mr. Billia is not a man of doctrine, but of feeling.
Philosophy suppose s a self-control permitting the objective observa-
tionof facts and calm adaptation with regard to the impartial compre-
hension of other's doctrines. Mr. Bi11ia definitely does not possess these
qualities. His style is inflammatory , as is his thought, so d? his judgments
lack balance. That which he perceives at first as a doctnne has real and

22~r1· "Ecco I,allarme"- Un cri J'a larm e. - R euuc nco-sco


, ta5tiquc
· 6) (1899) 144-158.
. .
~I Th .
a d. e author has formulatcJ his critiq ue in a sen e O artic ,esf · I in Nuol'o
. R1rnr(?tlllcnto,
~)' Fratclli
n a combine
1k · d brochun: of 48 p,1ge., ent 1cIcJ 1, ,n.t,·I?1·IV d,· 'S• A1H1st1110,
•' 180-,, ,
Jee~,;
2~-, .
..1· onno. He contrad, t\ hirmdt b1, undcr.,tandmg PH I ·10 ~0 PI1y by decree.1
.... fere i I I · · " 146
28t1 h l t le a arm . . . that we w,rnte<l to g1w. P· l. I ,ccio is atheism."
P 13'J. e t \\.or<l,md rh · fiN o( vour
, philmo phy, and of your apo og
, PHIL OSO PHI C AL ESSA Y S
ME R CIE R S
CA RDINAL

Th becom e evident to him oft en as disa


.11 o-inary consequenc_es· l heyJ·ump s w ith 1mpetuo
· · w it· h out kno\V
s1ty, ~-
nao. · diate Y e h Id -
t O us and then 1mme_ . erence . Tho se w o wou
11 read Esiafio d'
r , . . drble mco . ld ) ..., ,
. l confiim 1s th e sam e thm g we w ou . say
ing , leading to mere . , no matter
S. Aios tino (the trt e . wo uld not find our appr ec 1at1on. H ere are
its severity and exaggerat10n,
two examples. . ears to be a ferv ent Chri stian. H e wrote
The professor of Tuhn~ aflppe nce of th e Bibl e. H e pr eac h es int ernal re-
. und er t e m u h. h · d
tou chmg pages "worldlin ess and pa gani sm w 1c. mva es even the
form to count e: ,,284 H e falls on his kn ees each tim e h e sp ells Truth
hearts of Cat?olrcs. . al T and G. Very good . How eve r, thi s fervent
d G od with a cap1t b d. d
an °
Christian has no sense of his obli gation
. . to ho e C1ence
h lian respect for re-
. . h . H is mor e Ro sm1111ant an at o c .
Ir01ou
0 s aut onty. e • db h p d · h.
•Wh en d. · the decree sanct10n. e y t e ope , an. . m w 1ch the
rscussmg
Congr egation · of the Holy See has forbidden
. . . forty d propositions
h. f · extract
· · •ed
tiron1 th e wot·ks of Rosmini , .Mr. B1lha
. " d1sregar s t ,,1s act o .Jun sd1ct1on
0f h ' her authority and qualifies It as deplorable. He wntes that the
ig . .
condemnation 1s depnved of all mar va ue. a1 1 2ss All e 1se 1s
· t h e 1anguage
of the religious saints, whose interests he imagines he is defending.
"Authority has to be obeyed," wrote the general superior of Charity
Institute, "I thus beg all of our superiors to abstain from now on teach-
ing, defending, or following by any means, those forty propositions; and
to obtain the same obedience from their Brothers who are their respon-
sibility."2 86 the p
"Respect is owed to Rosmini and at the same time we are obligated ist Rei
to declare," added the Provincial of London, "that we accept ex animo lines t
t?e decree from the Sacred Office relative to the condemned proposi-
If
tIOns
er. "287extracted principally from the posthumous works of its Found-
Ta
We would like to cite th .
0fh R . . ese courageous declarations so that the cause
t e osnuni Father would 111 · ' al
which th ey h ave repudiated
. . no way be confused with an appe
Here is the second fact Th .
guishes at the been . · e author of L'esiglio di S. ARostinodistm-
1 i:,~nrungof his broch · ) h
re egate, so it seems th D ~re two categones of p eop e w o

----------
of whom he says a lot :fb~~tor _of Hippo into exile. Fir st, th e Italian,
th
mgs, then th e French and B elgians, of
. p. 146.
284.
285. "A co d .
and 3. n einnat,on that has no niora] valu " . . r • . . 2
286. Circu]ar 1etter to h Pr·
c. Billta, l 11a .fi.sa::1011cl1t:~hc/1<111<1.
general, 25 March 18 t e Superion of h .
287. Letter fro p 88. an ty In tttu te, by 1 mg1 L u17ti111. ,upcmir
esteemed . m , .E Lockhart
community <>fth . ' provcnc1al and ., I . • th'
e Fathers of (' J L pe, 1or of the d1,tm~ui,ht'd .rnd JLI'
· ,arity •1t London . 28 Ot tohl'J 1889 .
SOUND THE ALARM

349
, di erns a good with this compl'
,111I1t h unent· ''F
I
,, · Jl .. 11 is broader, smoot er, more courte . . . . rench and B ,1 ..
lh 11111 1 ous, it is edu e g1an
, ··2~, catcd and ac-
n1t• ._ 1 t cu comary to be discourteous with
Ir 1~ I·ho woul d 1ea f t h roug h those forty- · hcouneo us people. y 'l
hi~c ,, .h er . e1g t pages 0 f M e'
r l - 11uot di agree wit n1e; ouens1ve epithets t d . r. Billi-,'s
·Lu u 1 h , en entiou · · ' ·
''l c .1111, 100 n of persona c aracter abound· in
return obi
s insinuations
. ·,
l
1. ·c rare, almost imperceptible.
. ,
' Ject1ve di~cu<; -
,JO!l~JI - h h .
Tl1U ,at first, we t oug .t to let Mr. Billia's 1·nd 1ctment · g0 · 1
e Tho e to whom 1t was addressed will d. wit 1out a
respo1 l · . . rea 1t or the .
Id they read 1t, any response 1s superfluous Th d Y Wt 11not.
hou . h · e ec1amato
·cheauthor, the outng t nonsense of his accusations ry tone
ot d . h h exempts our rep!
l1 ould they not rea 1t, t en w at good is it for us to · Y·
di I occupy ourselves
irh our contra ctor. ·
" .d .
Ho,Ye,·er,after . cons1 eratlon, Mr. Billia . . is more quick-te mpere d t han
mean.We believe that down deep he 1s smcere and merits more th
. M h . an a
didainfulsilence. oreov~r, t ere 1s no shortage of people who would
·ayrhat a professor of Tunn has misled the Neo-Thomists of Louvain.
The eo-Th~mists of Lou~ain did not ha:e any response, so apparently
theyhad nothmg worth saying. So we believed that it was wiser to only
brietlytell the major grievances of the person who disagrees with us.
The eo-Thomists of Lou vain have a tendency to sympathize with
thepositivistswhile fiercely opposing Cartesian spiritualism. The Thom.-
islRevuemade an excellent response to this reproach with the following
linesthat we would like to make our own:
If Mr. Billia would want to know why we are sympathetic with
Taine, of whom we acknowledge the major shortcomings, and why
we are justifiably defiant concerning Cartesian spiritualism we would
admit to having suffered and suffered daily, from being confused
· ' · · h' h dl de-
w1ththe last cited to whon1 we gratmtously attribute t 15 ar Y
fensiblethe is. It is only ju t and wise to separate our cause, _ourgo~d
belief;,from hi of ,vhich we strongly believe certain pom_tst~ e
. ' . h' . nmunal ruination.
\Hon , o as not to be involved with 1111 m a coi
I th·1 h d'fficultic
1 and illogisms
to ay that we would clo~e our eyes to t c 1
ofpo Itl\'i t philosophy? · h . relaxed
If rnr
h d r. 1 1a would h we t,1kt.:n the trou t:
bl to rt:ad, wit ,l
d I , Lm•·o{the Co11-
~ ;. bro hur h •em to ,11lud• t , 11,m~\!J,t :r~the ess~ntialvice .']'b
opt 110 l·n ~~y.h. \ uld h1 . en that ·e I.11 ,
1
' h1l ophy.
, ILOSOPHI C AL ESSAYS
••ERcrER s pH
"' J\L ,.,
c J\RDI"
0 ere1
. . ot evident that all that exists is
• i 1t 1s n b . en,
·d that a prior' . The ideas of emg and body are f h~
e sa1 ' erues. not d1el
We hav rporealprop 1 ·nseparable from one another. The
'th co b lute y 1 re, tb 0 ~
dowed w1 are they a so din the end by not admitting to tho
. ·cal,nor . ht to respon se rJ1.
tit
1dent1 hasthe ng h existence of a noncorporeal pow
no one trate t e . er det1
fore, . to demons rnprise an identical demonstration. W
ho c1aim h t on1y co fl . e ir1g
w h procedurest a b 11·eve that thi s crude re ect10n replaces the
throug elvesto e ·
havepermittedo~rs from the profess~r _of Tunn. . . .
. flameddeclamations re positivists or matenahsts m supporting Welltb
in hether we a " h h .
Furthennore ,w . natural philosophy ;290 t at t ere 1snothing 0
{ life ;
that,,psychO1Ogybelongsm ble in the vegeta1 ce 11";291 th at concrete num- proof: '
. • 1forcestracea . h .. .
ofmunatena b' t 0 f sense perceptions; t en yes, we are pos1t1vists tient 11
Jdbe the o ~ec
berscou . . a ther with Aristotle and St. Thomas, and we are The
andmatenahsts, toi:,e
under t
proud . of this.
h nderstood in the encyc lope d.IC sense to w h 1c. h the an-
phI1osop y, u . . . within
• weredevoted, is comprised of three departments.
oents . . . philosophy
. of The
nature,rationalphilosophy,and ethics. Under the JUnsdict10n of the last cusmg
tworespectively are actionsof reason and free actions. Under the juris- After h
dictionofthefirstare the realities of nature.Among the realities of nature, of the a
shouldn't we ranklivingbeings first and chief among living beings, hu-
getting
mankind?
confro
Thephilosophy of lifeis calledpsychology, which has as its object hu-
ists, on
ma~s,calledhumanpsychologyor anthropology. Thus, psychology, in
parhticular hu~anpsychologyor anthropology, belono-s to natural philos- anicism
0
three t
op y.
h d f h'Mr. B1llia1?' us 00 muc onor m attnbutmg to us the £ather-
cnves t h h · • -
00 ° t 1sclass1ficatio • ·t · . . . compri
Doesh k h n, 1 is commonplace m scholastic philosophy.
losophers
e nowt at G d h. lf
in ph . ., If ho imse was studied among the medieval phi-
. and th
.
Anstotle's ys1csr e does not k now, he should take a good look at
phys· concei
Th ics, vo 1ume VIII d S judgrn
omas,lessons XIIIand fo .' an at t?e conunentary given by t.
spectthosecommet d llowmg. He will then be enlightened and re- \Vhat t
n s an lessons. Mr.
ciple o
under
289.Mr B'l!i let'
(Mr G . . i a speaksendl
Ti . autier is a C esslyof an Cth1li11
sc:oul ght_andthe La:tesianspiritualist MarguRm~nt between Mr . Gautier and Mr. ~cht:d''.
astic h'I s of t/1 c
VI[of P 1 osophy . e onservatio
' r. 1chet · a positivist)
is ·• in a brochure e~ocle ·
11
ourw k Point 0 f • of Enera w, froni J
290. M . or TheO . . view. R 0 Y. we appreciate the argument
..,., r.Bill', . ng,11oifC ecently \ I1
. haprer
he11'leth
1 ias review( ntcmporarfl ' ve ave consecrated ex pn!fcsso c '
0

Physicalorod of psycho]p.188) of page y syc/ioloRya. a critique of positivism. ,.


Withh natur1 ogy WI. 14 of o p ,-rort,
t e gen a science , l1ch is ab, I
291 ()
ur syrholol?)'·Herc 1s what we \ h.
era) s and I ,o u tcly I ' i ·n t c
.) n Page13(PanofpluJ a so the phi!
back t 1e -;amc as that currently usec t I "'
. 1M Osoph o,ophy 0 t' 1 . . -ho Ot-
' r.Billi d. Ycalled Ph . t 1c n11ddlc age~ r,lJlk\ p\l
a 1sn1issed y,1cs." ' '
Page 57 of ) ,, h1lc
(we rcn~t.:J t 111~•1
our / s}'r/1()/<~\?)'
SOUND THE ALARM

35I
is a second proof of the materialism ofth "
11ere e neo h
· 1· f h -sc ola. tics'' .
the 111atena ism o t e neo-scholastics • . . · to Wit:
h Th h d is a d1st111 ct I
their ph ilosop y . . . e ea of the School of Lou ~ 1aracteristic of
ose fundamental th eses of Psycholoayth t h vain place am
th f . . o a t e first . . ong
material... 0 cour se, this 1s not proof it onl . pnn c1ple oflife is
· f · ' Y satisfies t 0 f6
denies the existence o an immaterial princi 1 . · a mn... He
in general.Zn p e in the cell and in life

Wellthen, with Billia: 1) the thesis according to wh · h h .


ife is material is a materialist thesis• ) we as ic h~ e first principle
of l . . ' 2 sert t 1s the · · h
proof;and 3) there 1s 111 the cell and in all living be. . sis wit out
tientimmaterial principle . rngs m general a sen-
The author refers to page 57 of our Psycholoay293 L t' .
6 • e s put t 61s page
f h
underthe eyes o t e reader. However first of all let's ·t h
. . ' , s1 uate t e text
withinits context.
The treatise of Psyc~ologris divided ~n_to t~ree sections respectively fo-
cusmgon the vegetative life, the sens1t1ve life, and the intellectual life.
Afterhaving described, in the First Article (pp. 21-52), the vital functions
of the cell and the organisms were derived from it, we are asking, when
gettinginto the Second Article, how those should be explained. We are
confrontedwith three possible explanations: that of the extremespiritual-
ists,on which side our contradictor belongs; that of the materialists , org-
anicism; and the scholastictheory. We are exposing ex professoeach of those
threetheories. To the first two, we are opposing the third, stating that it
comprisestwo sections: one directed "against excessive spiritualism,"
and the other "against the organicism of the materialist schools." Is it
conceivable after this that our contradictor classifies us, without proper
judgment, ;mong th~ materialists? We do not want to let this go, but
whatthoughtlessness! ·1 ·
. . . · h
Mr. Bilha says that we are denymg wit out proo f the immatena
h
pnn-
.
· I
cipe of the life of those organisms. He can o Y say s
nl o because e ll11S-
understoodthe scope of the question. h' h M Billia in-
.Let's Judge
. it. Here is word for wor d , page 57' w lC r.
cnminates:
. . etal a vital force of one
TO be able to a sert that there exists m the veg ' h.1ch are in play
other than nature than those o f corpore al forces,.d w ti'fy .
with111t e
h
. , d b ble to i en , . 1
in the mineral kingdom one shoul e a h enon positive Y
' st 0 ne p enom
cornplexus of living phenomena, at lea

212p . r count: in
293 p. I 30 and I Jf>. • . • ,ion of his thesis in o~ ri>{r
ss,i,11zc
Pr LWcPttmmcd our clv to <TIVC a shortened -.crh b,,ect of J scud)' c.\ p .
""'"°"
Dr.fin h r,.
-Af , w 1ch we nude from our point O vie ·
t· ·w t c o :.J
t10tt if Lfr, 1 t d1t1on r 91.. i.nd dition 18 97·
of matter. However, not even .
ral forces . a s1n_
the gene . d eerns to exist. On the contrary h
. d ible to f his kin s h h ,te
irre uc enon o t . . 1sciences, t e more t ey advance h
gle pheno:rable the ?iolof ~~cs and chemistry extend their co~tt ~
more mea mechanics, P ! ' f the mysteries oflife. ro
morewe see d manifestations o
overthe repute d precedently rem .arked, the two ma·
·ously an . h ~or saJ
As we have prev1 h
rntern
aterial universe, meanmg t e conservation
1 .h bY
Iaws which gove
d h onserva 1
t·on of energy, seem to app y wit the same
. . .1 trt
f massan t e c . well as non-living matena . ge
o 1· . g organismsas
·gor to ivm . h . l c: Ii£
n the rnec hanical and phys1co-c ennca . 1orces . in the
1
We ha~eseeif h getative life. Consequently, 1f the being that
O
manifestatio~s t h~ve that do not, it is not because of irreducibility an
. . penor to t mgs b b to
hvesissu h mrnon forces of matter, ut ecause of a special
0 f · £Orcesto t e co · d h' to
its d. which those forces are activate to ac 1evethe in-
modeaccor mg to 11b . f h . d . .d s
. . goa1of the 11·ving nature,
tnnsic . the we - e1ng o t e m 1v1 ual, and
t
the conservationof the species.
t
The conclusionof the first part of our thesis is that the first princi-
pleof the vegetativelife if not ~in:1plebut c~mplex,not imm~terial~but
material;becausethe charactenstIC of a being stems from its act10ns,
operarisequituresse.
Immediately followingthose lines, we approach the proof of the second
partof the thesisand we directly opposescholastic vitalism to materialist
organicismor positivism.Mr. Billia diluted the thesis into two parts. It g
is morecuttingthan this. Sl
. Whoeverreadswith attention the proof of the first part of the thesis \\:
directedagainst
. excess1ve · · 1·
· spmtua Ists, fimds the quest10n · IS · .c. · Th ose
1a1r.
who
. state
. Is at t e genera forces of n1atter cannot supp1Y an
m a thes· th h 1
t
immediateexplanaf £ h .c. .
wh· h c . ion or t e 1unct10ns of a cell has to make known a
ic 1orce1sthe v·t 1 • . .
ispositive}• d ~ a operation. Accordmg to Billia, the vital operation
Y irre ucible to th al ··
proofis mven, 1t
i:,•
• 1s
. only a e gener . forces of matter. Unless a positive . . d
the cellone O . gratmtous assertion to say that there exist in I
r severalmun •
However ·f . atena1forces.
£ ' i We In fact a e · . . . . .
orrna!ly separatedfi gr e with the pos1t1v1stson this pomt we ha\e
Billi rom the · '
a, our research hi h ~ in the second part the part cut out by Mr.
vegetablesoul. ' w c is th e nature of the,first prillciplcof lite, the )
Accordingt
cannotbe o.Mr. Billia, ther . . . hat ...
)

sensat· explained
10n. In f; with e is a lllanife tation of cellular hfe t .
out an · . .- · 1s
always . act, from his . m1111atenal force. Thi . mamfe tanon
anda li~:redb t~gether. B/hoint of view, "animation" and "feeling··,1rlel
g e1ng as made 1·t · h ce
are ordin -1 a gncvance again . t us t at •1
• "' To prove ~ ,1g.unst
an Y ens 1'bl<.:.-J.t. · u th'1t or,
SOUND THE ALAl{M

353

£ ctions need immaterial forces he quot fi


·c1un . h c 1· ' es rom th 0
g;iJllall·"we adnut that t e 1ee mg of lovecorr _ se who follo
1Yndh. right mo 1ecu 1es m . h b .
t e ram and th c .
esponds With
a movement
w
c.. 11 1 t e .c. ' e 1ee1ing Of /
11° nt from the le1t. We know more facts b iate with a
1overne " ' yes, ut th h
ll ]waysescapes us. e w Y of the
facrtsha n on page 256 of our Psychology we opp .
e '
rn s to those w
h
o c
1aim
. sensation. ' is a me ose,
h .
using I
a most the
samete 1 ' . c anica 1phen
very same argument. But sensationis someth· °menon
bythe • . mg e1se othe th
. . other than the life of the animal, other than th 1.c r an nu-
tnt1on, . h e lie of oraan · ·
al Is it possible t at a man who pretends to di·sc h 6
ismsin
gener • . . uss t e problem 0 f
lifemisunderstands such a fundamental distmction? 295 s
A last proof that we are steeped in is that we have kd
b . 296M B'll• ran e number
n1ongsensible o ~ects.
au, .. H r. 1 1a, as well as anyone else, has t h e ng . ht
to doubtthi_s~roposit10n. o:Vever, he_does not have the right to be as-
tonishedas 1f1t ~ere an unbehevabl~ thmg. This proposition is expressly
supportedby Ans~o~le~97 and recapitulated by St. Thomas.298 Thus, if
thethesisis maten~1s~1_c,the lyceum professor from Turin has to place
theprimaryresponsibility on those two masters of thought.
Butno. Here as everywhere, Mr. Billia confuses the concrete and the
abstract,sensible things that are many with plurality.

Shouldwe once more point out the difference between sensualism and
scholastic philosophy? These things have been said so many times that
wealmostfeel humiliated to go through this again. Certainly, intelli-
gencehas the same object as the senses, if we mean to say that those sen-
sitivethings on which animate knowledge stops are the materials from
whichintelligence borrows the positive elements of its concepts. But, in
sofaras they are objects of concepts, sensitive things no longer possess
the concrete characteristics that existed in external reality or under th e
actionof the senses. .
Withinphysical nature and under the action of the senses, ~n~ areth
d · ' · nd m time
eternuned- they are attached to a determined spot m space ~ b·
Inthe min . d , under the actions of the mte
. 11ectu ale,iacu lt'es
1 ' thmgs are a -
stract,detached from the determination of space and time.

294.,1111 .
29,·M Prtncipio sn1zientcimmateriale,"pp. I 3 I and 1 36 · . )'fieand sensibilities.
~- r Billi · h n organtc 1
H1 w ~- a ts fickle with aU the questions that touc O d bl jo·norance.
or~ are h h npar ona c 1,·
2%i . p 137 roug . not very J.ustified • and s ow an u
297.;_ ·. • .:~ KOLi'(). Ktl'TJ(JIS",
. ,a µf .. •
'tJfµ· • ll ow atfJT}T<id,Ua ).{y€Tal
··~ , 'o,m' ra
tolG €KG '
=
">rl.,ta, ¾01,A,;. - • · II ·hap.VI. t;aami. · do· Hacc
~'!I "r._ ,..~·. <7XT}µa,µ€y€0o~. De amma, 1., : (; ma,~111t11
'-Wtllftun
~ ,..,,,,
·
la tns1b1lia
u1e
sunt rsta quinque:motuS,q ' .b . ,iumerus, 1 '"' · Book II,
" De a1111na.
, ._ Stns
11111s · 0 ,nnr 1H .. · ·
~ XIu us unru unt propria,s d ,mt commuma
L MERClER ' S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
C.ARDINA
354

. h cholastics, the m.aterial object of intelli


it1depet1
ding to t e s h c: gence . j\l~~e, of the c
Accor f h other senses; however, t e wrmal object 0 f. Is the
sibih~ eocY of
same a~ th at oh t eme as the form .al object of the senses. "Nih .1 in~elli- ot1t111g erf e
ce is not t e sa d 1· d .1 estin .
~ e the p
gen d priusfiuerit in sensu, se a to mo o est in intellet ,, in.
fl tu quo non
t~ ~c
· cu I .
h to say that, according to the scholastics, sensiti · h't is Judg
Accor
ding t<
.
nd1culous t en . n· Ve t 1n rJl.etbing
are the proper J
obiects of human mte 1gence.
• • h G d
d is not a sensible bemg. T us, o cannot be an 06.
gs Jess sMr. :Billia:
N ow, Go . h h 1 . 'd ~ectof adds the rnir
human intelligence and 1t follows t at sc o ast1c 1 eology logically leads ture to
.Allthese cot
to atheism. . . ments
beg Mr. Billia to take the pams to read, 1f not the SummaTh 1 the ar gu .
We h 1 . h'l eoog- gumen
ica,at least a manual dealing with sc o ast1c p 1 osophy. He would learn these ar
Certainly, s<
how human reason rises from the knowledge of the essence of material
things to the analogic and negative noti?n of the Divine Being. In to- tuations of sen
day's life, it is the only knowledge to which, through our natural forces, However, it
ence as it does
d1
we could aspire.299
the activity of
Before closing this controversy, let's change roles for a moment and tell It suffices,
Mr. Billia why we are not in ecstasy over his idealism. power to repr
Mr. Billia's idealism is more than vague. Each time he seems closeto mal, intelligibl
defining it, we realize that our contradictor designated it with a collec- We judge,
tion oflabels. It is the philosophy of Plato, St. Augustine, St. Bonaven- on certain id
ture, DesCartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, Rosrnini, etc. good things a
However, there is a point of doctrine that the professor from Turin ideal types are
was able to discern from the discussions among the idealist schools. penence in su
"There is a point," he writes, "on which we insist with Plato, Rosmini, jects, whethen
St : ~ugu stine,_and with Malebranche and Gerdil; a point on which Ros- to contingent
rmm a_greeswith Gioberti; the point being that ideas are not the work of What coul
~hermnd , but rather the objective light of intelligence, a divine light.It ~ingent being,
is th e ~eat battle that idealism and subjectivisn1 has been engaged in for ing to the ere
centunes. "300 supplies the s
·d The
a1· "idea"
. . has t 0 b e un d erstood m
. an objective
. . sense. Th e eredit . of
. finite'· Th·lS W
I·aa 1s in
1 e ism m this way · 1 Th Couldw e ay
the s is to c ose the access to subjectivism. e e . 'k
ame way as the Plat · ·d · • · the thin - Pantheism
ing subject omc 1 ea, mdependently ex1stmg over . 301 n. an
1
· t possesses an unalterable, absolute, universal reality- either h
T e no
he on}
;99 . ~hen all is said and do . . irit. Here those 0 f y
s a trait that we l ne, the liberodoce11teofTurin does not reject the sp · had ·
•tself . effcect
been ta· eave to the read h . ts Afterit in no
. c uned that sens r er w o cares to appreciate the fine polll · I' scien-
tistsheld at Fribourg. uhaismdwas loudly affirmed by the last ongrcss of cathod1_c//1dii1III' CeM-.,.;
patren- p/r'/ , e a ded· ''Th Cotl 1 '
actiVi,"<qnl
em \T,1 1 osophorum
a. we e
om . ·
nrpotentcn d h
e new known symbol: credo in 1111 11111
·ub 'n1ath·f
I · :v1 Ie ccers
ty, nt
St P I" xpect the next ,. an t osc who do not agree with t ,1s " o
· au. p congress t f: ls'fy h . nd che e 1,
thankGod. 49. lie passes b o a l t c works of t. Augusnne a d certain)·
3f)()_p 'we Willnot d Y the Works of St. Augustine and . t. Paul, an ~- ~O.So.fi.
cstroy Mr B·11· . b
~ ,th di
3< . 49. 1
l 1. p.20 _ · ta rochurcs!
' t.J..c.
SOUND THE
ALARM

A
JV011 1 ,
e independently. existing . over th e t hinkin .
.b·l·tv
s11i. , of the certam.
sciences and sp 1
ecu ative . g subject renders h
·ontin1rencyof thmgs, but the invariable metaphysics I . t e pos-
l, '"' rfi . f h
. do-ethe pe ection o t ose things th t
norm h
t at we fir
. t is not the
JU :, . . a are th st and I
According to Rosmmi, the ideal bein . ere. a ways
. f h d. . g is not GO d b
ss met h mg o t e 1vme nature _302A d , ut it is
le 50 ·11 · .h h n no k neverth
ddsMr.Bi 1a, wit out t e presence of th nowledge is . e-
a h . d 303 at something 0 f h _Poss1ble,
cureto t e mm ·d · · t e d1vinena-
Allthese consi erat10ns· are more than twenty cent ·
chearguments o f Pl atomc . realism. We have responded un es old. They are
thesearguments, b ut smce we are forced w
. . d ' e w1 nefly
·ub . many times to
Certainly, se1ence emands a stable obiect . hd respond again.
.bl h J wit rawn fr h
cuationsof sens1 e p enomena. Aristotle and Pl om t e flue-
. d c 11 ato agree on th· 0 .
However, 1t oes not 10 ow that the stable obie J c a1
t ways respondis P mt.
. . . 1. .
enceas It does m nature, independent from intellig d s ~ sci-
. . f h 11 d ence an antenor to
cheactlvity o t ose ce s, an having . a stable and abs 1 t •
o u e existence
It suffices, by the explanation. of science , that 1·ntelligence has·the
power to represent concrete things and pass through nature to the fi _
mal,intelligible, and invariable universal objects. or
We judge, actually, the relative perfection of contingent thingsbased
on certain ideal types: beautiful things are based on the ideal beauty;
good things are based on an anterior type of goodness. However, these
idealtypes are themselves borrowed, by means of abstraction, from ex-
perience in such a way that, originally, the characters of intelligibleob-
jects,whether we have considered them in themselves or appliedthem
to contingent things, are derived from experimental data. .
What could this be, besides, this something divine, if it 1s n?t_a con-
tingentbeing not God himself but a real manifestation of the d~vme~e-
. ' ' · t nd firutereality
mg to the created mind? Could we say that contmgen a . . f h
• . · di t intmt10no t e 1n-
suppliesthe soul with the occas10n of having a rec d.
. M Billi epu 1atesontoloaism i:,· •
fimte? This would be ontologism and r. a r fi . ? This would be
. . . all t ·n the In mte.
Could we say fimte realities form Y con ai Mr. Mariano that
pantheism and Mr. Billia's point is to demonS trate to
neitherhe nor Rosmini are pantheists. . h Infinite is, thus,
. f h fimte to t e ... ts
The only possible relationship o t e h he divine mannes
th · · q to say t at t
. oseof effect to cause. But then, It ISia se • d
It If ·
e , lr1 .no matter what measure,
d'irec
tly to the mm ·
. anteno
· Uectual
· r to all inte bstrac-
. · eXJSt
Cenamly, ideal types of fimte beings hi·ch help us 6Ya
a · · • · ture w
ctivity, anterior to all those thmgs 111 na
d reason,the
h · chat for goo . of the
312 • . . fi II ws fro[Jlt I I sonierhlng
Ieo'1za.vol. rv,chap. 1. n. 2-6. "And it o onc.ebut neverchcess
the divine belon= to ideal jpuri:I cxi5cc
1h ' r.,• ••
rtllmf; t d to m n in nature.
("" " WM h ~h liana,p. 22.
I Mi:RClliR ' S PHIi osoPHIC:Al .ESSAYS
(I \ RPI '\

. the ideal. They exi t, in a certain £ash·


•nr·esenr
non ro .rt:r lly conceive
· what creat ion ·
t ong s
ot"the One who ererna
. . ures w0, In the
h ht
whci; d · est, 111
theywouldbe, "q11od.fr1ct11111
· J Ipso
h vita crat." But th e exiuld be'
. an its eterna
ofthi tran.ccndentBe111g . t oughts escapes us at thstence
ment,whenwe arefonn111g our pnmary knowledge and firs; . e_mo.
which upportus and are 111clispen able 111our reachin g up to pnnc1ples
God '
D.Me.rc1er
·
A prop

Severalcritic
\vith good in
CompleteInductionand
ScientificInduction337
1900

A colleague .
of ours, Professor Bersanni 338 one of the ed·t
. . '
f h
i ors o t e old-
est ItalianJournal of scholastic philosophy , Divus Thomas di·d h h
.. . . , us t e on-
or of cntiqumg son1e pages, from our treatise on Loaic which hd
. . d l . 6 , we a
devotedto the d escnpt10n _an ana ys~s of the inductive procedure .
In those pages, after having underlmed the difference between deduc-
tionand induction,_we ~ad put forward the opinion that modern scientific
induction,the frmtful instrument of the positive sciences, should not be
confusedwith the complete induction of previous times.
Our reasons were that while the completeinduction of former times is
a formof argumentation that is to be differentiated from the syllogism,
the modem scientificinduction can be reduced to the syllogistic proce-
dure- it is just a question of form.
Bersani disagrees with these statements, and he believes he can use
againstus the scientific renown of Aristotle and of the scholars of the
MiddleAges, whose ability we have, according to him, failed to recog-
nize.
In reply to our distinguished colleague, we will first ~xamin~ what is
the nature of scientific induction in order to see if there is any difference
fromwhat is expressed in a syllogism (I)• . t d by
We will then look in detail at the notion of induction a~pdrese~e d
B . . . . . ld . I d completem uction an
ersam.His not10n of induct10n 1s he to me u e 1 te in-
in I 1 Of 1O gy is used to comp e
comp ete induction; the princip e ana . . f h sarnenatureas
co~plete induction, which, according to Bersam, is O t e
st
nct completeinduction. . . d ction completedby
We will see that neither complete induction nor m .u ci·entific proce-
ap d. · s of stnct s
rocess of analogy will n1eet the con iuon

. ·t·que
. scienn i .
- ReFUf
337 Ob . . !etc et inducnon .
, · servat1onset discussion: Induction comp . . d-
lleo.col . . s· Amma
3311 aS/ique7 (1900) 204-228. 't apud Rcccnuore ·
n. ( f s I . . :i Vctcrcs c
\'tr , · • icr-.am,"De in<lucttom natura apm I)
•on cnt1cae"
· . f I er II v. ·
m Divus·n,omas (1900: · • s · '
, pfllLOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
MERCIER S
cARpINJ\L

. totle and the Scholastics


f-loWAns .
III. Regarded Induction
of the inadequacy of the procedure of
1pletelYaware
Aristotlewas con .
enumeration. .d h least harmful ren1edy to the insufficiency f
roVl e t e
In order to P .
r 0
Aristotle suggests the appea mg to someone else's
. le enumeration, 0
sunp
In fa~
. . cture Bersani obviously commits the fallacy of begging the vatio
347. (Continued) 1
At_nis _Juhinng b~tween an induction concerned with necessary matter right
· ~-After. d1stmgu1s ned with observation, he supposes t h at m · both cases there is
quest101 vide
and an mduct10n
. h concer b d
r theprincipleof analogy,a necessary on etween t h e pred1eate
b . and
already'.prior
to t e use 0
'.I d.
othe
Wh nit is a question of judgments regar mg necessary matter, such as "the
the sub~ect. · d grasps ng· h t away a£i T
. terethan one of the parts", then t h e mm ter one or two
woe1sgrea
h I .. · f.
examplesthe import of the statemen~. W~en 1t 1s a quest10n o Judgments regardi~g con-
tingent matter, it is necessary, Bersam ~ealizes, to use th~ ~rocedures of the experimental
method described in John Stuart Mills A System of Logic,m order to guarantee the eXJst-
ence of a necessary connection. orde
But, firstly,induction concerned with necessary matter is not induction, as we have
this
already said, except in a very improper sense of the term. A whole and a part of the
whole are indispensable for providing the mind with the materials from which it
abstractsthe concepts of whole and part, but the grasping of the relation of whole to part
is immediate, it is expressed immediately in an unprovableprincipleviz. "the whole is greater
than its part". The designation, by Bersani, of an induction concerned with necessary
matter is only induction in a very improper sense.
But, in the sciences of observation, Bersani subordinatesthe use of the principle of
~nalogyand the generalization of experience to the use of the experimental method ~
to th e meth0ds of experimental inquiry which John Stuart Mill describes so well in his
A SystemofLogic"(p.43). So,
h How hi could. Bersam· not h ave seen that the use of experimental methods 1s · ly
· precise
t lete
at w ch differentiate 1 •
are in
. s e mcomp ete mduction of modern thinkers from t e com-
th · h
p ' or comp 1eted mduc( dieva}
inductive p d ' °
ion
f h
t e old thinkers. When in our description
. . of the
.
or deducti~~ce ure, we s~oke of a phase that was prelimina~ to the phase of ap~licadt1on
, it was precisely b h w1she to
speak.While b . a out t e use of inductive methods that we
. o servat1on on its d . . with cer-
tamty between a h . . own oes not ordinarily lead to differentiating . n
c ance comc1de d . ntauon ca
Iead to a sure diffi . . nee an a necessary connection, expenme at
th h erent1atmg and ·t • £ h al thods are
e eart of scientifi . d '. i is or t is reason that the experiment rne bvi-
o d. ic m uction B h fiOre an o
us isagreement. · etween Bersani and myself there is, t ere '

From th .
den . e moment the nee . of its acci-
ts '.s properly establish d hessity of the bond between a subject and one th n have
to do is to
f proceed to th
e , t en we h
k
. . . .
ave attamed scientific certainty.
All we f epplica-
e Wor of a r1 . h.
1on the . d
B ' . nun does not PP cat1on or deduction. But, in t 1s w ork O a
ers;~ puts it, but from ~:oceed from like to like, as
e procedure whi h me to same. .k caoses
P roduce lik c go fi . . . I "h e .
lead~to e effects," is call de~ rom like to like, by virtue of the pnnc1p e alog)' _..,,..
it
the de probable conclus· e y a special name viz analoaicalinductionor ab,,·ng abo11t
rnonstr . ions suffi . £ . "' d not r1
ative certainty ;hi cie~t or day-to-day living, but it ocs
ch science demands.
oMPLETE INDUCTION AND SCIEN
TIFrc INnu
CTION

t especially someone wise348, because h


. dmnen, . , . , e says th
JUv· this other wise person s Judgment has ex . ' e presumption
isrhatver as the judg1nents of people are so oftepedr~~ce to back it up
iJowe , h Id nl n Iuerent .
P d these judgments s ou o y be used aft or even op-
pose ' checking,. Anstot
. 1e use d " apories ,, ther careful d b
che k.
c mg. As a
vay Of ' e e ate 0 f
\ . h he was always careful to use before laun h. contraries,
~cyOf whtc 349 c mg any doctrinal re-
else's search.
Albert the Great and .
St. Thomas Aquinas3SOuse th
h . .fi e same langua
One can o n1y ad mire t e sc1ent1 c caution of the . . . ge.
. . 1 f . .fi se intrepid thmke
In fact' the pnncip
. b
e o sc1ent1 c progress is not pure d .
h . . . an simple obser-
rs.
;ingthe ation of what 1s, ut, rat er, 1t 1s the experimental meth d p
11latter v.crhtlysays:"Th e me th o d o f o b servat1on . 1s. unable in most o . asteur
ere~ rIo . h . . . cases to pro-
te and
videngorous proofs,
. ,, w ereas 1t 1s the task of experimentation to exc1ude
as"the otherexplanat10ns.
or two The person who does experiments, the one who conquers nature, is
g con- constantlygrappling with facts that have not yet been revealed and
~me~tal whichexist, for the most part, only as potential natural laws. The domain
e exm-
ofthe experimenter is the possible unknown, not what has been, and in
·e have orderto search for the unknown, the experimenter summons to his aid
of the thismarvelous experimental method. It can be truly said of the experi-
·ch it mentalmethod, not that it always succeeds, but that it rarely deceives
to part andthen only those who use it badly. Experimentation eliminates some
greater
proposals,gives rise to others, asks questions about nature, forces nature
cessary
to respond, and only stops when the mind is fully satisfied. The charm
ofour research, the delight of science consists in the fact that, no matter
whenor where, we can provide justification for our principles and proof
ofour discoveries.351
So,the most ardent defenders of Aristotelian and scholastic induction
· the end compelled to recognize that althoug h t h e Greek andme-
arein
dievalthinkers did not challenge the necessity of scientifici nduction,nev-

cer-
ll cail 348 C 11,2 ,
I •1 h · der Griechen,
p. ; / Aristotle, Topics,VIII, c. 1 I. Cf. also Zeller, Die P 11 osop ie r •
are~t 2 3
ob'-1- 349 • , N , 8wrropfjCTaL
KGAWS-,
cf.
At"· faTt 0€ ro'is- €vrropijCJaL(3ov).oµivot5' rrpovpyov ro
lStotle~ ...
et h . .fi t
;cci- 3·0 ',v1, ap ys1cslII r h very sio-n1ican
J • To th ' ' · . b
dded anot er 1::r . d
textA . e text of Aquinas that wa cited earlier, ca~ e a_ . d tion to the cerntu e
h'"' ofth. quinasoppose the coniectural character of Anstoteban in u_cgulars to a universal
plici- e syU • 'J • • go from sin d ll _
neith ogism, and writes: "Whoever uses mductton to thing is prove sy 0
er dern 11 . When . some
!(l\tJcaU. onstrates nor makes a necessary sy ogism.
h con-
. riecessary that t e .
clus Y,
it 1 I ·
s not necessary to quc . tion the cone usi 'on but it is
Th.1 does not 3 P
h pen in
10 .
n is tr • •10 alirv true. . . cf Tho-
di~io ue, given that the premi es are re ., bl to inducuon .... , ·
llQsAti •·-And it is to be expected that division is com para e
• qu10as"
3~1.
p-"teu,rina/. post., II, I ct. 4. .
r, Discourde receptiona l'Academie_f,anraise.
, HJLOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER S p
CARDIN A

thinkers to grasp the full significance of


. s left to rnodern
ertheless it wa • 352
f · duction.
h' type o m
t is h. k rs of antiquity and of the Middle Ages
. .d that the t m e . . d .
We have Just sai ·cyof scientificin uction.
did not challenge
the necessi
. h. king they ant1e1pate
· · d b 1
y severa centuries
In fact, throu g h their t m ' 1· f
h and caught a g 1mpse o t e pnnciple h ·
sciet
erirnental researc h
modern exp_ . d d' ects current researc • pri~
. h now 1nsp1resanh. tr of Aristotle, wh1c . h d 1 .h h
wh1c ea wit t e delicate can
We know the,. teac mgs
• of principles. He says: "R epeate d sensat10ns
.
ther
pro ebl m of the iorrnauon d
• s and the memories engen er expenence; the .
sch
1 ve after them rnemone ' . h h h
ea . h k tO the faculty of abstract10n t at t e uman soul pos- due
expenence, t an s
.
. f · 1
· th ough the putting aside o smgu ar aspects TO€/.I TTapa
' " ,
sesses,gives nse, r f b. tha
, 11 ' t that which refers to a great number o su ~ects, namely, the tice,
ra TT0M1a, o • d fi · b
· 1 And an abstract nature related to an m e mte num er of in- cam
uruversa. . , . . . . f ,,353
dividual thmgs 1sa pnnc1ple of science or o art.. . . finn
St. Thomas says: "A doctor realized that a particular medication cured ular
the fever of Socrates, Plato and a good number of sick people suffering an e
from the same illness - and this is a kind of experiment with respect to mak
how this medication cures a fever. If he pursues this fact and his mind are
arrives at the abstract notion that this kind of herb cures a fever-stricken
the
person,he thus grasps one of the rules of medicine."
Duns Scotus has also analyzed with great precision the method ac-
cording to which the generalization of an experience should be carried
out. e t
the
S~otussaysthat when an effect of a non-free cause happens frequently,
one 1sforced to accept th at th.is euect
a: h as natural links
· · its
· cause, be- ofn:
with
cause a. necessary
d . cause can produce the same effect regularly only 1f · t he
cause 1s eterrnmed b 1·ts . .
______ 1 of finality, to produce the effect. 35~
,_Y__::P_n_n_c~ip~e

352. Pesch writes: "From this it :145.(


touchedUberweg wh h . would appear that some of the truth would have
. en e said:'The full . . . . . . 1\ Otn
wasrealizedonly 1·n rec . Significance of mducnve reasoning for science
3 . ent times' "_ f d nt
3553.:,uistotle, Posterior AnalyticsII c. Pesch, System der Logik, § 127 .
. 4. I say, ' w1·thregard to th· ' 'c. 19.
1s• not had Of every singula bmgs knov1vnth rough experience that although experience ·
tunes n h r Ut only 0 f ' 1v
' even elessan expert · f:~,1: many, and not at every rime but only at JJ1aI . '
everywhereTh· . in dJJJblyk h . . . . . d
" h · is is possible th nows w at a thmg 1s and what 1t 1 ahvays.1n
w atcvere rough th· · · I·
cause"Th· vemuatesin multiple is pnnc1ple which re ide in the mind, narnc),
· 1sprop · • cases from fi a-. f that
ing sense os1t1onis known t h . a non- rec cau e is the natural encct o
organs b o t e nund fro err-
opposedto · ' ecause a non-er • even though it obta111,it d.1ta 111
. ~~ u~~c ~
is not ordained non-free-cause's) fi r cannot , m mu)tipl ca e , produce .111t: )
free effecto .... However a free ina _ity or an effect to which it (the non-free cause
r not to p d cau~c 1s O d · , of a
reIat1onsh1pt ro ucc the . r arncd either to produce the opr 0sit c .,
nat I o a frcqu ti oppo ite of a c. • « r"c1.11
ura effect n Y produc ·d a- ir1: Cuect . , o a free am(.' ha, no
.. . . c Cl[t'ct b ·r
' Ut I the cau~ 1s non - frt·e the t' et
11·t I' J
,KpLETE INDUCTION AND SCIENTIFIC IND
co,.. ucnoN

asic analysis and explanation of what is . . .


fhe b • · h fc . scientific ind .
ho le and entire m t e ew 1mes that we h . uct1on is
dw ave Just ·t d fi
fou!lSt Thomas, and Duns Scotus.355 cr e rom Ar-
istotle,. ·
. tle has not only understood how the type of 1· d .
Aosto n uctron th t
. ;r;c
1 as opposed to complete, should work- he h 'c a we cal1
sac11t~ fi ' as even 1oreseen i
. cipalmethods. A passage rom PosteriorAnalytics (II ) . ~s
pon h d f Al . ' r 9 rs an apph
. n of the met o o agreement. so m the Posteri 'or A . -
caoo . . na1yttcs(I, s)356
is even ment10n of the method of di_ffierence unc. t
there . · 1or unate 1y the
scholasticswere more or less incapable_ of making use of this form ;fin-
duction- even _though they graspe~ ~ts power - because, more often
thannot, they did not ha~e t_he reqms1te means to distinguish, in prac-
tice,between a chance comc1dence and a naturalbond. In fact, when it
cameto determining the existence of a fixed natural law, there was no
firmbasisfor making the general statement: a necessary cause cannot reg-
ularlybring about either an effect that is contrary to its natural bent or
aneffectthat it is not naturally determined to produce. This statement
makesit allowable to conclude that, if there exist necessary causes which
arepredisposedby an internal tendency to produce determined effects,
thenthese effects will be produced regularly and will be codified under
laws.But this statement does not authorize either the categorical affirma-
tionthat there are principles of internal finality in nature and so also caus-
a esthatare predisposed to bring about determined effects, or, even less,
thecertain affirmation that such or such an often-observed conjunction
oftwoparticular facts is one of the existing laws of nature.
e
4

345(C • • ul use in multiple cases,


·e . · ontmued) That a particular effect comes from a partic ar ca ' . thi ·
ISsom hi . . fi di h' nature with s acc1-
e dentatet ng arrived at through experience - while m ng t is . d h t what-
· • · · 1 d1scovere t a ,
... one time, and with that accident at another time, tt ts a 50 fr this nature.
"er the di · . rr a1 follows om
n vers1ty of accidents, a particular enect ways . b t through the
,nerefore. . 'd t of this nature, u
e "'tu . • it 1s not through some accident, some acct en
... re its 1f h h D s Scotus, 11
se
I I 11t d. III, q.
·'
4•9. e t at such and such an effect results; cf. Jo n un

355,It . . e and St. Thomas Aquin~s


corn,_Willbe noticed that the references here to An sto tl hich deals with sci-
...e ll'Otn h . f h Oroanonw 1
enceha .t e Posterior Analytics,i.e. from that part O t e. 6 h deal with compete
induc:t IS certain, whereas the most significant citauons th at latter works, Aristo-
...on c h Ti . s In t ese h
ticd....Js ome from either the PriorAnalytics or t e opir · d 'th conclusions t at are
·• resp .
~ proi.._,
f
· cctively with the formal aspect o rcasomn
. g an w1
_
356 "'Die. ~ · (J(JKfA€lxa)..KqJ
1 4,jAoi, " ., , • ofo11 nu LCJ , Kai
Pt)'1u"rp , ~Tt orav d</>atpovµil'luV imdp(r, 7;pum». _, dat· d</)mp€fkvTo~,, 5"
1"0(iianr-ltTr<ip(olXJL 8uo onlla[ d,Ua Kai TOV xaAKOVl 'A \ \1 ' ovrrp<JTM'• 1_1Ou
""'"fAi " 'paroi;-· n-"'
ll'AJ-r. ~- •AU , ov .,.,v, ·
rov axryµaros- T/ rrf , ,,.01-; a,l,lot5",KaL
• rouTo

t 011, f{ 01
~,i. , , ~ , a'p,vfl Kat 1 ·
fO'Tl 1 Tp1 r,vi•ov. KrrTa rovro urr; "
i, 11arro&,,i . An11/. Post.,I. S·
, HILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L _MERerER sp
cARDINA

ent of holding it against Aristotle that he


h. kforarnom .
Cananyonet in d h procedure of the experimental method~
nderstan t e .d h h. . ·
didnotbetteru c. . hness Aristotle di not ave at is disposala
ldb sheer100 11s · .
Thatwou e . ctly nor precision scales to weigh matter, nor
k easuretimeexa '
doc tom ure temperature, nor a barometer to measure at-
athermometer to meas h .
. nor a telescope to observe the eavens, nor a nucro-
mosphenc pressure, . .
scope to examineminutelythe basic mak_eup of matter and of orgaruc
allhehadwasthe capabilityof making what we would calltoday
tissue;
"crude observations." The wisdom of genius, the patience of reflection,
thedetachment in the researchfor truth can, together with crude obser-
vations,contribute greatlyto the development of rational speculation;
and,inthisdomain,the superiorityof Aristotle and of his Christian com-
. ' St· Thomas Aqumas,
mentator · · to day uncontested. However, an en-
1s
thusiasm · · 1 Mr.
d . onourpart£or the past must not degenerate into an irrationa
evot1on. Wedo not h 1. . . phas1
thattheywouldb h ave to c aim for these loyal thinkers a pnvilege
the
creatingthesc· e t e first to repudiate - the privilege of completely
iences.The sc. talps
according asnew .iences are something that can develop only
meansof mv t. . Lou
es igation are discovered.
D. Mercier fron
Modern Scienceand
ThomisticPhilosophy357
1900

Mr.LuigiCredaro, a professor at the University of Padua, wishes to em-


phasizethat we have a sincere respect for science. He gives homage to
thecreation of a course and to the erection of a laboratory of experimen-
talpsychologyat the Higher Institute of Philosophy at the University of
Louvain.He appreciates the impartiality and the care we take to con-
frontthe most significant thinkers of modern thought with Aristotelian
andThomistic thought. But for all of that he is surprised. How can we,
heasks,accept the results of modern science and reject modern philos-
ophy?Ar.enot the thoughts of modern science and modern thought in-
dissolubly
joined. 358
Hasour distinguished confrerewho questions us in these terms, has he
thoughtout well and in precise sense the questions which he addresses
tous?
.t
What is this thing called modern philosophy? Who represents _it.
From w h.1ch umvers1ty
• • chair. 1s • taug htr..,Wh ere can one find a precise
. 1t
bookon it? .
I sureIY see in very great numbers p hil osop h ers and systems . of phi-d
Iosop hY,but modern
' .'
philosophy, which wo uld corned from sciences an
t · any way
\Vhi h · · · ·t I o no m
c in their own way would give them its spin ' .d a1· that now
seeth I , . b . enated i e ism
t k at. t s an abstraction . Could 1t e a reJuv_ . ..,I .t the voluntarism
a esa place o fh onor m
• many German umv · ersitiesr s i

_ Ob
3~7. . t la philosophte. thonu·ste. _ Revue
ne0. servationset discussion: La science moderne e d
SCo/ast' 1 f mo -
358''Lr iquq (1900) 229-23 I. . and reiect the resu ts o d?Are
· C1ow
etnPhil
f d science ~ necte •
050 can you accept the results o mo er? h ht inseparably _con d psy-
north Phy?Are not scientific and philosophICal t o~g d do not physwlogy an co-
cboiO: &rcatscientists the great modern philosophers? nnthusiastic appeal to yoougnr ize
tcllgi1llsts ~ ~ lopment of which you . ave hical thought? Do you u would expel
001, to th d h made an e not rec
~ di
these ctly tem &om modern philosop f thinkers, whom yo ize the truth
~ the tori permeated by the influence o hil sopher recogn
Of~ of p phy? And how, ~m~r,
c and deny that of the pr rru e · R,
c:s:a
};1o:faa. fasc. VI. 1 899·
ER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
C ARDINAL MERCI

fS h nhauer? Ort h e animism of Wundt? . Or


. the. .radical
. pheno lll-
0
· c ope · . .t
f z· h n? 0 r IS 1 n ot rather the empmco-cnt1c1sm
. of Richard
emsm o ie e · . of Volkelt? Or of Paulsen m favor of meta
Avenarius? Or the reaction -
physics?
Maybe 1t . comes firom England ' or from the semi-positivism
· colored
. . f H bert Spencer? Or perhaps 1t comes from the ne-
w1th the momsm o er . . 0 h ld 1 .
.
opohtan pant h eism
· of Vera and his d1sc1ples? d .r s hou h one h ook into
the true p hi.1osophi cal thought that is foun, m t Be t oug ts of the
French neo-cntlcs · · such as Renouvier ' Secretan,
. . or outroux? If these
philosophical thoughts are all indissolub~yJomed to t~e results of modern
·
science, we ll then , here are the conclus10ns thath.denve h from ld
these same
"
·
prermses. If o nly one,,would
. looically
t>- follow,
. ;,w 1c we wou call the
modern Philosophy, which one would 1t be. . .
From one point to another, there is only a str~1ght lme. On t?e co~-
trary, routes which, starting from a common pomt, ~ake an oblique di-
rection and in all directions separate themselves m every way and
become infinite in number.
This multiplicity of diverse and opposed systems which approach the
same scientific facts is the manifest proof that modern thought does not
come from facts that are updated in every way by the discovery of
learned men in true philosophical synthesis.
The philosophy of the 20th century is yet to be made. The neo-Th-
omists have the ambition to do their part in its making. They study facts,
all the facts in the diverse faculties of the mechanical sciences, physics,
chemistry, mathematics, general biology, cerebral physiology, psycho-
physi~s,and in economic and political sciences. They endeavor to realize
~he diverse expressions of modern thought and to discern that which is
m harmony with experience and that which is separated from experi-
ence. The cadres of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy are large
enou~h to embrace all the observable facts and our confidence in the
th 15st
tru rong enough to not doubt that this could happen. 359

D. Mercier
359. You can remember no doubt d. . .
(Rev.Neo-scol N ') . ' a iscus 5ion that we engaged in on this very subject
·, ov. 1 899 with Mr Bill· Th ' •
T. hontist school of Lo • f · ia. 1 anuable confrere had accu ed the neo-
uvam o a tendency I • ll
Into one volume under th , . . . · n a ene . of revue article , collected fina Y
. 1· e enigmatic tJtl •. L' . 1·1 1 d. . .
tion a . 1ttle like the doct fL . e. es,.11.< 1 sa11A .~osrino,he had taken a po 1-
hav - ors o ouvam· hm• ·ev. h h d
e pay on any ot Th . ' ·• er, e a per onally taken care not to
ch . m. ere were ve 6 d . .. . .
ur~, but some mcriminac ·
pcx1t . "
J I')'. ew octnnal umnm1 . m his volummou bro-
ion a ong th1 1 ,. "Th th
•"Th; or sometime
tcsqulVLSCs .
h, dd
e use cnunc · ·
me ·
f c neo -.Thonmt f Lou vain court e
w~ e. c ph1Io,ophy of the nco - T iat1011o a gravity which bordered on the gro-
. halways printed in capital I t . homm even leads to athci m."This word atheism
W1t exdam e tcrs: a <.care L . J
ation points . ' crow . ·t us .1dd that the cc t wa pnnkku
MODERN SCIENC E, AND TH
OMr Trc
PI-it Lo

Gtect
Ile,
llto
the
~ese
em
l'lle
the

n-

ot
of

e
ls

e359. (Cthat
dness· .
ontrnued)IAll o f that, 1t . well to remember, only calls back the lackof levelhead-
. 1s
respon,e th t m
one oves to fi d among professional philosophe<'• In tl,e mtro
· ducuon
· to the
""1ingthi' we wrote to the a<ticles of Mc Billi•, we couldn't stop omsdves from
s10n. · ter t hat, we entered resolutely and very obJecnve
5 remark Afi · · IY into
· discus-
O

othBut,
. <ts what has happened? Mr. Billia, who bad forgotten the precept "Do not d ro
What
<Idnot resp.;.',~"
t do not want them to do to you," took offense. Be insulted "'' bot he
~ll 1'his
'" Process ofour
di arguments
. · . · troduction was
rounded scuss1on is the best proof that the ,e,n,rk ,n our"'
.. ~ to the.restO i il h naive skill with whtch
.

i.r.,..
'8Rressorhas' t would be cruel and superfluous to spo t e d has ,~ured himself
thepubli given himself the illu~on of an easY vtetotY an
c the less honorable advantage of silence.
ScientificInduction360
1900

SecondReply to Mr. Bersani


Recently, Fr._Be~sani ~edicated a secoi:id article to the critique of our
ideasconcermng mduct10n. The first art1cle361 consisted of twenty pages
thesecond362 consisted of thirty-six. '
In a condensed form, the observations of our distinguished colleague
wouldhave been, without doubt, easy to understand. Elaborate as they
are,they leave us with a troubled mind with regard to the real intention
oftheirauthor. If we put them down in the form of a column, with our
commentson the opposite page, the column of our remarks would be
framedby distinguo.
We abandon this work with confidence in the attentive reader in or-
derto limit ourselves here to the most salient points of the debate.
We have to consider the observations addressed to us in three parts:
someare irrelevantwith regard to our theory; others are exactly formu-
la~ingour theoryitself;a third group, finally, brings up questions of doc-
tnneor exegesis, which presents a real disagreementbetween our honored
colleagueand us.

Thefirstgroup of observations is misleading. h


Mr. Bersani calls every logical process that leads to the parts of t . e
wholem · duct1on.
· " Process us a partibus
. ' avwyry
ad to tum vrr , · ' vel induct10 .
vocatu r. "363Th us understood induction . h · 1
as its p ace in mathematics
.
and m t h . ' f
. e ap ys1cs as well as in the sciences o o servauon. b . Evidence h for
b
thIS . ' • 364 h. h . t fort y
argument 1sfound in the Summa Tlzeologtca , w IC is pu

360. L'indu . . . Revue neo-scolastiq11e


7
(19oo) ction scientifique. Seconde reponse
22
a M. Ber am. -
36t ~ -434_
· DivusTh
362.ibidf: omas,I 900, fa c. I.
3<> ' asc 4 d'.
3. l,i i,iduc;.. . . mtur. Et quemadmodumw_-
lflusratio ionequ1ppesingulaquaeque a.ffenmwrctJere congen · d evincendumab-
110 Pies seu t •d d probarecum a
esks inducere,ita didmus aliquod 111ucen ° ' I • rationeset testes,

q d at""'L 1
" uutu,,a 1·
, ..111
,
~ 11cu ....._ . a uu,• toto conwnirt huiu tot,us
. smgu
· Iae partes' ve ut,
364 .....,'" ~diu '"· p. JS. cfr. p. 357.
-1,q XI
' "J
'a I
CIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
412
CARDINAL MER

·odvcv
M B m. as a specimen
. of inductive reasoning. . Every. being. is com- o6Cl·ple 0
·oel .
r._ ersa_ y
pos1te or s1mp1e. e , t composite being is one; simple bemg 1s one. Thus , pflfoere 1
· · 365 . ciple o
every bemg is one. . . h h d . d . .
We do not contest M r. Bersaru's ng t to use t e wor .h m. uction
. m th·is pfl~J68 afl ~
broad meanmg.
. H 0 wever when he honors us wit a cnt1que of our
' h · I · · · hat e
1,0g1c
. on Loig1c,• h e 1·s not allowed to replace · t e·fispec1a bal
(iot1 t
treatise . · s1gn1fication
h we
.
• ·fi
gave to se1ent11c m · duction with a broader s1gm 1cat1on t at pleases hun Pro
ders d fe
1,/e e
to choose for himself . . . . . . . eproa
W e t oo, 11 ave recognized that m its undetermmed hi h
s1gn1ficat1on, in-
h r Tf
sai11
duction describes every procedure, no matter w c . one, t at moves r of St.
0
. cip1es t
from the particular to the general.3 66 _However, we w1s_h_to philosophi- prtn W
cally examine the inductiv~ pro?lem 1~ terms of wher~ 1t 1s posed today, search.T
we have immediately restncted mductlon to the practical method unan- but the ~n ·
imously used by the scholars in the domain of the exact sciences. "Qttidqwd
Our argument, our examples, borrows from chemistry, physics, and alliuscausa
biology - such as research in the laws of the combination of chemical adwjusop
bodies, the law of gravity, the law of the reproduction of living beings oww
- as well as from the content of our first article, showing that scientific Expose
induction, which we examine in nature, is not reasonably applicable to aswe hav e
human knowledge in general, but exclusively to the sciences of observa-
Logicand i
tion. It is the generator instrument of the exact sciences and not of oth-
ers. This usage is today the method of choice in science. which we
Therefore, observations that are not seen as scientific induction thus satisfaction
comprised - and they form an important fraction of the studies of our lastic have
colleagues - are misleading. 367 to truly re
complete
The second part of Mr. Bersani's studies is the expression of our thesis llltl, quitl S,
proper, ~hich our colleague adopts under the pretense of exposing us. tamq11
am tll
There 1sthere in th· d • • t1m1." - ,
. ,
th e second article. is regar , a page typical of them all - page 368 m
In order to comprehe d · · The eth
A ccor d.mg to Mr. Bersanin , It is 1
necessary
· to
• recall these in retrospect. a~achone·
Profound} ·d . 1 . ' comp ete mduct1on of the Ancients would be d1\ide.
Y 1 ent1ca to mcompl t · d . .
~--------- __ e_e m uction, what we call today sc1en-
365. Thi d
. .s oes not prevent Mr B . . .
syllog1st1cform. · ersaru from clamung that induction is irreducible to a
366. Logic,p. 140_
?67. Mr. Bersani who on]
induction h Y wants to see th d" 11d
between ' t at one h •
essentially •
unique proced . ·
e more 1ver e logical procedure ca e
·
. . says
d1t1on metap
h h ys1caJor math emat1c. aJ tndu
. ure,
t" tncs ncvenhele. s to make a di _tincnon
, ...; d · e, as absolute laws th c ion and physical induction. The first con-
we eny th h . , e second has h th .
There 15 . at p ys1cal inductio nl ypo CtICallaws.
author t b h · on °
a confusi f•
ideas that O
°n Y leads · ·
scientists to hypothetical conclu 1ons-
-
o e eld r . ur scI1olarly U t· r
Cruerio/o.Ry cspons1ble.We will t k co <:ague 1 not, by the way. thi: ir,
· a e account of this subject soon m our Sprt1• 11
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION
413

•fi . duction. If this is complete, he writes, then it is by m f h


0 c in "S' .1 eans o t e
rinciple of ~nalogy: tmi es causaeproducu~tsimiles effectus."
p There is, m effect, _w~ reply, a form of mduction dependent on the
principle of analogy; 1t 1s call~d anal?gicalinduction. We say this in our
Logic368 and there we _saywhy. the_ d1fferenc~ between scientific induc-
. n that engenders science, and this form of mduction that only engen-
uo il' 369
dersprobab 1ty.
We defended the great doctors of the Middle Ages, which Mr. Ber-
sanireproaches us for misunderstanding. We presented evidence in hon-
or of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, in particular, who had comprised the
principles~hat_inspire.and direct ~s ~o~ay in scientific experimental re-
search.This pnnc1ple 1snot at all: S1mtlescausaeproducuntsimileseffectus,"
but the one that the clever Doctor formulated in these excellent terms:
"Quidquidevenit ut a pluribus ab aliqua causanon libera,est effectusnaturalis
alliuscausae... quia causanon liberanon potestproducereet in pluribuseffectum,
ada9usoppositumordinaturvel ad quern ex forma sua non ordinatur... ."37 0
Now what does our distinguished colleague make of it?
Exposed in a beautiful page, page 368, is the theory of induction such
aswe have, in the first place, comprised and defended in our Treatiseof
Logicand in our article. He borrowed the citation from Duns Scotus,
which we furnished for him and he faithfully reproduced, and then in
satisfactionhe vainly concludes: Thus, there is no more doubt, the scho-
ction
ilitii lasticshave employed the principle that we have called analogy, in order
n OIOlli' to truly render complete before the regard of intelligence a primary in-
completeenumeration of particular cases. "Non superestigiturullum dubi-
um, quin scholasticiprincipium, quod nos vocavirnusanalogiae, adhibuerint
tamquammedium quo enumeratiosiifficiensvere completaevadit ante intellec-
tum."371
The ethics of this incident is, it seems to us, that it is always wise to
attachoneself to what unites before preoccupying oneself with what can
divide.

Aftertaking the parts of the observation from Divus 11zomasth~t are ir-
relevantto the debate, we return to the essential point of the dispute.

368
· PP-I I I and r r 2.
369.Mr. Bersani responds to us that the Latin adjective simile can be tra_nslated as_sem-
~:ance or a~same,became it defines an identity of accident, to wit, of quality, or an idcn-
ty of species.
Weare not going to keep insisting but we call the attention of our colleague to the
wordsof St. Th omas: ..S,wt . partes cntts .' sunt mbstanlta,
• q11a11t1·1a~• et qi,anlitas, etc... , ita et
.
P
q
artes unit 5 . · b t 1· est· Acqualc' 111111111111
i,i 1tnt idem, aeqiwle ct simile. Idem enim 111um1 w s 11 5 all ta
. s· ·1
uant,tate . I , "
37ri. 1 ~ 11n11m 1n qua/irate."In X A1ct.,book IV, ectun: _- · . . ,
tcprod~I ,\ent. Dist. Ill, q. IV, 9. The text that Mr. Ucrsam otes is an extract rntcgra 11 y
ced frorn page 226 of the Revue Neo- colastiquc,May r 9oo .
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
v-e!l
t se
clli ve11
In his first study, Fr. Bersani blamed us for calling the case of i d . ciiate itlc
101e""
,.,-:
,1J'l · \V 0
" comp 1ete, " an d accor d'mg to h.1s way o f t h.m k.mg, contrary ton uction bt-1t1t
iJ:r.V_' ct1at
every inductive procedure irreducible to complete induction u_s,t~at stY•esef'V~' cJ1e
• . value. 1s dis- 1,1tr 5 111
prove d o f scientific ofp13flet1arie
According to Aristotle, complete induction consists in the enu o ·gbtllP r?
,iJ1el be ·
111
tion of every particular case in which a fact can be verified "indurnt.era-
' c 10 per JosedJ1Uuow
omnium enumerationemprocedens,"to the effect that the power to affi C [o ·
collection is true of every part that composes them. 372 rrna 50, f oattl
ceso
Effectively, we believe and we mai?~ain that an enumeration of ob- sciefl 1·n.apPe
differs a
served facts never presents the dec1S1ve characteristics of scientific It s Nfr.ve
knowledge. Jess, saYf the P
An identical enumeration authorizes us to say that when at the same means,~5·rnilar i
s· I .
presentation, as far as our observations, such results can be considered as te~; e have gt._
acquired; but it does not permit the conclusion that the result is defini- w . 1
taskof proving
tive and that the proposition expressed is irreformable. Before I 846, we •fie honor of
enn h
Evidently, t c
371. At the first reading of this page, we could not believe our eyes. So that the reader therscales, nor 1
personally form his own judgment, we quote the page in its entirety: "Ex quo experti thesole wisdom
sumus aliquamproprietatemconstanterinveniri in mu/tis individuis ejusdernspeciei,certisumum
illam proprietatemad eorum naturampertinere,et quia natura eodem modo semperoperatur, certi
ofour modem t
etiam sumus eamdemproprietaternin reliquis individuis nondum observatisquoqueoccurrere. Si However,it is r
igitur Scholasticihocprincipium cognoverunt,quod unice supp/et experientiaedefectum,certocer- didnot escape
tius est ipsos hoc principium indigitasse tamquam fundamentum cui omnis indictioscientijiea thoughthey fail
innititur. Omne dubium aufert Scotus in I Sent. Dis. III q. IV- 'De cognitisper experientiam dico,
quod licetexperientianon habeaturde omnibus... tamen expertus infallibiliternovit quaditaestin a lessdefinitive
omnibus:et hocperistampropositionemquiescentemin anima: quidquid evenit ut i11pluribusab This tmly ci
aliqua causa non libera,est effectusnaturalis illius causae.'Cognito enim quod naturaest causa duction,wheth
ta/isphoenomeni,certisumus quod etiam reliquaindividus non observatacum taliphoenomeno se
produnt, sicquedicerelicebitet sic de ceteris,prout Scotus requiritad concludendumde necessitate in . The equivo
inductione.Non superest igitur ullum dubium, quin Scholasticiprincipium, quod nos vocavimiis s1onof the e t\\
analogiae,adhibuerinttamquam medium quo enumeratiosufficiensverecomp/etaevaditanteintel- tween an actua
lectum."Divus Thomas, fasc. rv,p. 368.
Fr. Bersani has thus already forgotten that he himself, in his first article, summed up
omni111n enunzer
our teaching concerning the foundation of induction in these terms: "Porro,i,i ejusse,z- tuhalwhole . In
tentia, talefundamentum est principium rationale,quod sic efferripotest: sufficiensratio,curp/iira t e evp .
.....enn-.
la,,,
et variaphoenomenaseu elementaab invicem independentiaconstanterordinateq11e cotzjungimt11r. y Wh ••tent
seu simul concurrunt,nequit essefortuitus contingentiwnaccidentiumco11wrsus, sed est ipsanat11ra ~A ere ext
. iv1r. Be .
entis, in quo iliaphoenomenaseu elementasic se prod,mt." Div us Thomas,p. 33. . s1on,b , . a111
· fr vithout
An d h e could not_ have ~ead the t~xt of Scotus that h_eb~rrowed om us, \es the inctu_'i includ.
readmg at the same time this declarat10n that accompanied 1t: Duns Scotus gt · . ct10
ame analysis with much more precision of the procedure through which the generahzah- l'h n in a
. o f experience
t1on · must operate. "When an effect frequently reproduce 1tse · If l inder t e
1 1'he to nch,.
h . fi "
action o a cause t at 1s not rec said Scotus "we must believe that t ts cuec t has 11at11r,1
. f h' a:
e tonclu
' '
lmks with its cause ... Because it is impossible that one necc.sary cause regu ary d e
l I pro-
?uces a same effect, if it is not, from its own principle of finality, determined to pro uc
It.
. . . . . 1· thJt ,ve
T he pnnc1pal solution of sc1ennfic induction is entirely within a few ine "''i-
·
b orrowc d fjrom Aristotle, from St. Thomas, and from the clever Doctor. " Revue 1,t<
Sd1ola1tique,May 1900, pp. 226-227.
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION
415

at seven planets formed an ellipse around the sun W Id h


knewth h kn · e cou t us
a: that every planet t en own formed an ellipse arou d al
awrDl h b . . n a centr
. but it would ave een quite imprudent to have said ofth .h
star, h k em, wit -
out reServe' that t ese seven nown . planets formed every cons t e11at10n
·
0 f p1 anets in the solar system. Since Le Verrier ' we now kno w, 1n · euect,
«
an eighth planet, and who would be so obstinate as to say that this is a
closednumber? . . .
So, following M~. Bersaru, 1~duct1~n, the generator procedure of the
sciencesof nature, 1s not essent1~y ~1fferent from complete induction.
It differsin appearance because of its 1ncon1plete appearance, but it is no
less,saysMr. Ber~an~,virtually complete. It is complete, in effect, and by
meansof the pnnople of analogy that the author expresses in these
terms:"Similar causes produce similar effects. "373
We have given a reply to our amiable contradictor.374 We had the
taskof proving to him that we have safeguarded, better than he, the sci-
entifichonor of Aristotle and the scholarly medieval logicians.
Evidently,these masters of thought, who had at their disposition nei-
therscales,nor thermometer, nor microscope, nor power, but through
the sole wisdom of their genius, had accomplished what the multitude
of our modem experimenters have realized through their patient work.
However,it is remarkable that the principle of truly scientific induction
didnot escape them, that they had the same methods of discerning, al-
thoughthey failed at the task of applying it, what only could have been
a lessdefinitive conquering of the sciences of nature.
This truly scientific induction is a procedure other than complete in-
duction,whether provided for or disproved by the principle of analogy.
The equivocation of those holding, with our contradictor, the confu-
sionof these two procedures, is couched in the identification made be-
tween an actual whole and a universal law. Complete induction, "per
omniumenumerationemprocedens,"is the same as collective groupings, ac-
tualwholes. Induction properly speaking, the foundational _in~trumentof
the experimental sciences has the same universal laws. This is to say th e
lawswhere extension is p~tentially indefinite. . .
. Mr.Bersani is under an illusion himself concerning this maJor ~on~u-
~Ion,by including the conclusion of complete induction wi th scientific
ind;ction· m · a ame ambiguous defirution,·· ·
totum umversale.
he conclusion of complete induction is a totum.
The conclusion of cientific induction i a universale.

(p. 366 ) as concerning the sense


416 CARDINAL MERCIER 's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

What we call totum universale,the application of two procedu


.
thus ambiguous because of that comp lexity,
. an d necessanly
. complex
res,
.
b ls_
~
, Jtt
1J rttl
cause of that ambiguity. e ,11trl
P.
~ :ectt
We wanted to touch upon the rights of our colleague and his rnist k 5tlb~o'
in dissecting the specimen ofinduction that we borrowed from Arista~!e
to Wlt:. e, ble•
pi 1/t
Onmis honw, equus, mu/us est longaevus. °~
/iott1
Omnis homo, equus, mulus est quidquid vacatbile. It Sl
Quidquid vacat bile est longaevum. ,,vi
In this example, we said, the attributes of the second proposition,
It d
quidquid vacatbile,is particularly placed, extended to that which is an at- riifY:
tribute of an affirmative proposition. ''V1
So, it is one of two things: either this same term, quidquidvacatbile,is e:dsto
placed, in the conclusion, universally, and in this case, the reasoning is a Co
sophism; or, here it is particularly placed, and then the conclusion is nev- Eid
er scientific, but extended there to the science that is universal. signi
In fact, we continued, the expression quidquid vacat bile designates an !ogic
a
actual whole, thus particular; because the meaning of the argument is as law.
follows: Or
All men, all horses, all mules that we know have a long life. serve
So, these men, these horses, these mules that we know form a whole butis
collectionofanimalsknown as being deprived of bile.
conc
Thus, the whole collectionofanimals known as being deprived of bile
have long lives.
Alth
The thesis of Mr. Bersani, according to whom the completeinductionof
thel
Aristotle and scientificinductionwould be two convertible terms, is obvi-
ously entrapped in this dilemma:
Either the conclusion of complete induction is universal, but then it 3 6.
is sophistical, because it sins against the second rule of the syllogism, latius lto,no
_,
hos·
Or it is particular and, in this case, it is logical, but it is not scientific.

In his second article, 375 Mr. Bersani tries to escape from this dilemma.
Changing the example, the author writes:
Omne vegetans,brutum, homo est mortale.
Omne vegetans,brutum, homo, est omne vivens organicum.
Ergo omne vivens organicumest mortale.

The~ he adds, in the disguise of commentary: "Allatum specimennequeest

-
sophwna, nequeparticulariterconcludit.Non enim in ilia minore habeturdistril!.:

375. Divus 'n1omt1s,


fa~c.IV:
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION
417

·catioalicujustermini de subjectisterminis (in quo st t . .


..1;oatJ~ d . d b . . l l . a ratioparticular-
~:, nraeaicati) se su st1tut10, oco p unum subiectoru 1. . ..
. ttonispr [' b ·u· b . - m, a 1cu1ustermini
,.za . seu universais, quo
....mi./rt~ "376
a I is a strahitur tanquamgen . .
us a suispart1bus
~s 5,Peuusspveaevus. •• ·
si,b1ect1v1
~-1 ever in
.
this examp
. t h e preceding
1e, as m . one the soph· . pa1-
pow , , ism is
able. . . rr. h . . "
P What signifies, m euec_t, t .~ nunor premise: Omne vegetans,brutum,
omnevivens organicum ?
/lomo est
It signifies: .
"Vegetables,an~mals, men that w~ know are organizedbeings."
It does not sigmfy, we cannot, without offense to logic, make it sig-
at- nify: .
"Vegetables,ammals, men that we know are all organized beingsthat
le,is existorcanexist." 377
ISa
Consequently, we again present our dilemma:
ev- Eitherthe proper conclusion: "Ergo omne vivens organicumest mortale,"
signifies"Thus, organizedbeings are mortals," and then the conclusion is
logical,but it does not express a universal, and by consequence, scientific
law.
Or the proper conclusion signifies: "Thus, all organized beings, ob-
servedor observable, are mortals," and then the conclusion is universal,
butis illogical, because the term organized beingsis more extended in the
conclusionthan in the premises.
ile
Althoughthe minor premise is an affirmative proposition, it has never-
theless,saysMr. Bersani, a universal predicate, because it substitutes for

376. Here is what follows in the text: "Ita quod sensus illitts minorisest: vegetaus,brutum,
homo exhauriuht totampotentialitatemviventis organici,ita quod non detur,needaripossitvivens
~rganicu~, quadnonsit aut vegetaus,aut brutum, aut homo.Et praecisein hacminorestat totavis
mduct,ams, quaeessentialiter est transitusa particulariad universale:in ipsaenim designaturopus
'~fel/ectusabstralientis
seugeneralizantiset a pluribus iriferioribusassurgentisad unum quid supe-
ri~s, quadiliaamniarepraesentat. fllud igiturpraedicatum'omne vivensorganicum'poniturut ter-
inmus_ abst'actionisintellectusideoque ut quid maais universalequam singula subjectai/lius
minons" 'b'd ' ~
377I·. 1 1 .,pp. 359-360. .th
· t 15regrettable that our author does not carefully separate these terms wi a dou-
ble me · · lf 10 · duces an
er an.mg,which renders his thought difficult to seize and he himse
ror.Alsoin th · d. · coupled with the
sub· " ' e example here in question, why is this a ~ecuve omne . .
~ect veoet b f: f Ob non not a uni-
ve~I I " ans, rutum, homo"? Induction portions the acts o serva ' .
a aw.The f: f . d · · the alleged specimen
here acts o observation portioned from in uctton, 10
•arethat th d d ad· all thosethere
aredead e vegetables, animals, men that we have enco1mtereare e ' . 1
anda/I 'so be tt; but all tho c there grouped together are not all vegetableS, all amma s,
111en ob · al n men the same as
1hC) e wh ' setved or ob\ervable. That all vegetable , al1antm s' a ' hi .
b o hav b O
b · Jy do not deny t s.
Ut wed c not ccn ob~t:rvc<l would be mortal , we vious . h
n o deny th . ' f h • d t've 1 procedure. m t e
31lleof ob . e right to ffinn from the upstart o t e 111 uc
ervat1on.
418
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS eC
•rite U
t,1f I (i
'J'lo
"pe
a group of subjects a common or universal term· "H b . ie~flg,\Njclie h' fof
b (t . l . . . . . a etur in ill . v act riate a
su s l utio, ocoplunum sub;ectorum,altcu;usterminicommunis .a inznor e coflc[of~ ,rS ifl Pc.
seu universal is.,, 1,)flbe1flo- orv'
of are c
But it is right there in front of your eyes that it is J.ust thr·s b . vreeJves eel.defl cs-
t
· al su st,tu( 5
a umvers term for a non-universal term that is sophistical. ionof ael'lt a t accl
tl1ef11
oJ'lt:i. gefl
However far you take the observation of beings that nou · h cori oritt!l iricOI
ns and
pro d uce themselves, and that we call vegetables,from those that no ~e- ~aidto b\etical
r11eir
and reproduce themselves, and spontaneously reproduce th unsh [iofl•1is tneO d tO
h h . e~e~1 . roe, e nee
t os~ t at we call a_nimals;and those, to make a long story short wh ' ,ts heflth he nee
nounsh themselves, reproduce themselves, feel, moving and rea ' . 0 · \V
it essO
ft d at
saning sciausflacureatl
t h emselves, those we call men: vegetables, animals, men, observabl
never form a finite number of existing beings. Given that, with all thes,
ecific
fl one o
sp . oature,
we ,ve £oun d m . orgarnzat10n,
. . we can t hus say that we have observedat ofchis
finite number of organized beings. a Mr Bersar
Now, is it not a manifest illogism to substitute the universal term or- Be'·cchat . n· can el
•fiinducno . .
ganized beings, all organizedbeings,for afinite number of organizedbeings? tJ ~ S " but th1 1
obJCCt ' b.
s . . . "Every su ~
However, says Mr. Bersani, I abstractedmy universal term from the ob- 0s1non. . ·
Hasnot our dist~n
served cases; in other words, from the organized vegetables, animals, and
men that I have observed and that are, in effect, a finite number, I ab- orderwith the logic.
stracted the nature of organized being and I seized right away their uni- In the ontological
versal character. 378 thatthe subjects 1
I can thus, later, in the conclusion, pass from the abstract to the uni- neverhave to show
versal, from the concept of organized being to the universal notion all Butmen of cien
organized beings,observed or observable, and say logically: "All organized presuppoe neither ~
beings are mortal." icalorder; they in1
whichlooks rea on
As if we can also, through a simple intuition of intelligence, see this fact cumstanceor accid1
of the essence of organization and immediately comprehend that death thenatureof . wh
is its necessary outcome! c n ·eq
theded11ctit1e
Mr. Bersani here falls prey to an error familiar to a good number of
scholastics, and that consists in believing that intelligence, because it ab-
Wehave et th
e e ·a1
stracts by law, is the faculty to seize immediately the specific essence ~f nn point .l id
being and its distinctive properties. In understanding these authors, it Afterthe tw
Ponsethat . c
seems that an intellectual view of things that fall prey to experience pe~- b . \\ h
could
mits us to apperceive immediately the intimate nature that they ~ave m e intr du·
common, and they have the appearance of belief that through this s~m1;,
marizing procedure is formed the famous "principium quiescensin amma
of which our contradictor complacently speaks, sort of a fireplace 5mol-

.. . " . . 'fi. ·t iliqiwscnsu


J78. Our tnend did not hesitate to wme (p. 365): I,,ductio.went1ca cs ' ....
int0mplrtaet aliquo e,isu comp/eta,quia dum sensusv1detaliqua, i11te/lcctus
tlllllliu pmpwt.
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION
4L9

. in our intellect, which would brightly flame u . .


deflng with experience. p W1t11 the slightest
ontact c . .
c U fortunately 1or us, 1t 1s not so. We only arrive at th d' . .
~ Of
n . . h h h . e 1stmct1vena
f beings m passmg t roug t e1r properties a d h . .-
cure O c d. · h · . . ' n t eir propert
elves are con1oun mg, m t eir ongm in the p Al Al ies
cheJ11S . d. ' e e-me e of their
·ngent accidents. To 1scern the necessary properti fb . .
conn ·d · . . es o emgs with
. contingent acc1 ents 1s a work of scientific inductiot Th. . d
the1r . l d h. 1. 1sm uc-
. said to be mcomp ete, an w 1ch Mr. Bersani does not .
tion, . · 1b h k appreciate
. role, 1s theoretica , ut e nows
its . very well how to take advantage of
. when the need to conclude 1s sensed
1t . in the facts themsel ves. C on-
sciousness of the necessary properties of being leads us mediatelyto their
specificnature and an acc~unt 1sre~dered after_the deductive application
ofthisnature, one of particular subjects of an indefinite number.

Beit that Mr. Bersani said somewhere (p. 344), the conclusion of scien-
tificinduction can express itself under this form: "P is the property of the
subjectS," but this is under the condition that we imply this other prop-
osition:"Every subject Sis endowed with the property P, omne S est P."
Hasnot our distinguished colleague here confounded the ontological
orderwith the logical order?
In the ontological order, it is absolutely necessary, without any doubt,
that the subjects S possess the property P, otherwise induction would
neverhave to show that P is a property of S.
But men of science who research the properties and nature of beings,
presupposeneither the existence nor the non-existence of this ontolog-
icalorder; they simply observe between P and S a frequent connection
whichlooks reasonably sufficient; they do not find it in contingent cir-
cumstancesor accidents; they conclude that it can only have its origin in
thenature ofS; where the proposition: "Pest proprietasS"; where, finally,
the deductive consequence: Omne S est P.379
f We have set the boundaries of our reply; we believe we have left no
essentialpoint aside from the discussion raised by Mr. Bersani.
After the two critiques of our amiable contradictor and the two re-
sponsesthat we have made here, we strongly doubt that new arguments
couldbe introduced in this debate.

379.Th · . d of differences, etc.


__. e significance of the inductive methods - of concor anc~, . . If
ISunde d . . I f . nufic induct10n. our
cont di rst00 only in light of the fundamental pnncip e O scie .d of these
rn hra ctor had remembered he would have een the bases of what we sa1 I f
et odsas b . ' . S0 . the case for exarnp e, o
th11sy!J . etng capable of being expressed in syllogism. is N ' antecedent
og1sm·"A . . rr. fiOUows ow, any
beingp . · cause (necessary) posited, its euect : h (presumed
0s1te<l d t s t e cause '
total . ' any consequence follows. Thus, any antece en 1
or part1aI) Of any consequence that is its effect (presume d) ·"
I 't> < A IU >I Ni\ I Ml fi r JI u\ l'IIJI O!)OPIIJCAL ESSAYS

' I Ill" 11111-~~ d L'V. I >pill .JI l~ contradict this d last dprcv1s1on, may the
1~•.111(- • · 1
1 pv1111i1ll\ to I onrn r , th . c ' tuse as un erstoo . D
· Mercier

fhe confroO
that\Ve prop

d@atlt
First
pi,i/oso~~~
wrote, is a
t1
weknownu
. on et•
ject 1s
presentsoffe
tinction,u
lastics,Balm
ensindivisw
nonseparatu
So,on tH
quence,ide
h~n?,unity
expression f this syllogism, whi ch we believe to be sufficiebntt_o
.179. (Co11ti1111crf)Thc distinction
pmdun· 11ndcran abbrcv1,1tcd form - and we take care to note t at we a
. h h ve ab rev1- tinct,is it
.,cod is ,·q,i,aknt in n,ality ro this mo" explicit expre~ion, . .h
"'Hvo terms only appear constantly conjoined if one is in natural connection wit sequentlv
the othl·r.
Follo\~i
Now cxpcriencc-s, numer u and varied, show that the terms A and B appear always Now
rnnjollltly. . ,, . the r
d111is11111
.,
Thus thrrc is between the ter111sA and B a natural connection, otherwise said, B a tf .
11.1tur.tl
property of the s11bjcctA." .
15
6~Becaus
Wl' h.1vc tot.illy onfor111cd to the general usage of logicians in respectively calling
1
((lt1s,·Jnd .'fft•t'fthe two terms between which is manifest a constant union and calling
neeaga.i1
1,1111,1/l1tn1m1
the 11c1t11ra/
co1111rction
that exists between the two.
Sec
~rl·ordmg to this usage, we can thus say, in an abbreviated form of syllogism: onddiw.
l·very rnnstant con nee tion is due to a natural liaison of cause and effect. ltleas !u,
~ow, hct\vt·cn A ,lnd 13 there is there a constant connection (,positoA sequitllrB).
llre Qt
I hu\ hl.'twecuA and B, there 1sthere a naturalliaison of cause and effect.
The Last ldo/ 438

1903

I.

The last idol, which Fr. Heb~rt wants to have a say about, is the personal
Godwhich Christian hun1amty adores. 439
"The All Powerful (the 'King of Kings'), is it not on e of tho se Ch al-
deanmetaphors that Christianity transmitted to us with its do ctrin e so
morallyelevated, but so mixed up, so encumbered from archaic con cep-
tionsand comparisons? The transcendent God is " an imaginati ve con-
structionmade to resemble no more our body, but our soul," it is "the
lastidol our minds protest against in so many reflections and from so
manyexperiences. " 440
"Scholasticsarrive at the conclusion of a personal God because they
desireit, they want a priori that God be personal. Unconsciously, they
replacetheir reason with their faith."
So, "the proofs of the existence of God, such as developed by St. Tho-
mas Aquinas in the first part of the Summa Theologica,are all 'unconscious
sophisms.'In each one we find, by following the unconscious mixture
ofreligiousbelief and simple reason, the same begging of the principle,
namely'personification a priori' of the divine Being. " 441
Isthis to say that philosophical reason demonstrates the immanenceof
theDivine?
No. St. Thomas was wrong to conclude a "personal God," but, on
0th
tbe er hand, "not authorized to deny the hypothesis of transce nd ence
byaffinningthat of in1manence."
D1.~eason puts us in the presence "of a mysterious beyond, an Idea!, a
1·r
· comp Ie t e express10n
Vtne'' '• " our con sciousnes s of R eality only has its .
We affi f h · fi
inn the aspec t of th e ne cessity of this Reality, o t em im te and
·

438,Lad .•
41,. crn1cre 1·d0 I
I1I.c.
.rJ . r_, c. - Rct 11c m:()-sco
1
lastiquc ro ( 1903) 73- 9, · I_J'b t R '' l'UC de
"'" y tHn of
""Claph • a 5111
dY on tlzf' diui11c J.
1l'
r w11ul ity,, by F,1t h er M a rec1 -ie er ' '
44< 'q11 ct d
~: p, 3'.> 7. r H1orale,Jul y, 1902, pp. 397 - 408 .
. Pp 3'J
40o.
The Last ldo/ 438

I.
The lastidol, which Fr. Hebert wants to have a say about ·s th
. . hum anity
Godwhich Chnst1an . adores. 439 , 1 e persona 1
"The All Powerful (the 'King of Kings '), is it not one of tho se Chal-
dean metaphors that Christianity transmitted to us with its doctrine so
morallyelevated, but so mixed up, so encumbered from archaic concep-
tions and comparisons? The transcendent God is "an imaginative con-
struction made to resemble no more our body, but our soul," it is "the
lastidol our minds protest against in so many reflections and from so
many experiences. " 440
"Scholastics arrive at the conclusion of a personal God because they
desire it, they want a priori that God be personal. Unconsciously, they
replace their reason with their faith."
So, "the proofs of the existence of God, such as developed by St. Tho-
masAquinas in the first part of the Summa Theologica,are all 'unconscious
sophisms.' In each one we find, by following the unconscious mixture
ofreligious belief and sin1ple reason, the same begging of the principle,
namely 'personification a prion·' of the divine Being. " 441
Is this to say that philosophical reason demonstrates the immanenceof
the Divine?

thNo.th St. Thomas was wrong to conclude a "personal God," but, on


e o er hand, "not authorized to deny the hypothesis of transce nd ence
byaffirmingthat of immanence."
D.1ReasonPuts us in the presence "of a mysterious beyond, an Ideal, a
if Vine'' '· '' our con sciou sness of Reality only has 1t· con p 1e te express10n
.
1
1
Weaffirn th e asp ect of th e necessity . of this. R· e a11ty,
· 0 f the infimte and

. la derni ~
43~ .
439 . r_
·,,r. ere i<lofe. - Remr nco-sco lastique 10 ( 1903) 73-9r · . H'b, t Rcv e de
..:..
""'I/IPh
y , tc1s1n or 4 d t.
t 11 Y on the dtvilll' pcrwiality, uy
Fat h t.:r MJr
• cc e er'
44< qui et dr 'J
I J 1 11

44: p 3~7. morar, uly, r902,, pp. 397- 408 .


. Pp. 39~-400.
ton1,
TeachingPhilosophy
busly
n the at the Schoolof Louvain and
0 ctor
501
>fne,
, on
the GregorianUniversity
'stence
tence
f, has
pd be
Msgr.Mercier, the distinguished professor at the University at Louvain
rages
e de- givesus the honor of addressing the Bien Publicwith the following letter.
diffi-
Louvain, December 9, 1903
eroer
DearEditor:

Inthe different philosophical and theological milieus of Rome and Lou-


vain,we were expecting with curiosity the result of the general contest
ofthe Gregorian University, published yesterday by the Bien Public.This
year,actuallyfor the first time, students taught at the Institute of St. Tho-
m~sin Louvain took part in the contest. One of those students is Mr.
~ich?lasBalthazar, from the diocese of Liege; the_ second on~ is Mr.
. essma,from the diocese of Catana, whose archep1scopal seat is occu-
pied,as everybody knows by H.E. the Cardinal Nava di Bontife, who
rests1Il
· the Belgian. hearts 'with so deep and so thankful memones. ·
An experiment had to be tried. . . .
th
At e Gregorian University the teaching is exclusively in Latm: it is
address
. ed exc1us1vely
• to clerics ' as it must prepare t h em d.irec tlY for dog-
tnaticth l ' . . . · h d with all the
ri h eo ogy that the Grego nan U mvers1ty 1s on ore ,
gAts,htoteach with predilection and success. . £
t t e In t' • · · tent and m 1orm,
qu·ite d1.ffi s 1tute. of Lou vain ' the teaching 1s, m 1con h
sarn . erent. It 1saddressed to an elite of young ay peop le and . '
at t e
fou~;une,to an important group of ecclesiastics. By the will ofhitsau~::
er, it has been established in the heart of a university so t at, at
5ot,l' ., , ·_
Ct1Je1gn • 1'Univers1te gregon
'nnc- Lt cm nt d la philosophic a !'Ecole de Louvain et a
8
ttn Public,
I I December 190 3. ·
MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL
510

. of metaphysics, of cosmology, of p~ychology, of mora 011t.


classes of lo~ic, h d of theodicy that are formmg the fundam I, pretef1S1
of social philosdo_P_
f the tra 1t10na
Y af programs we could more easily add classenta]
' h . 1 es of
gerice o·
part _o . general biology, anatomy, p ys10 ogy, psycho-ph When
p
hys1cs chermstry,
'
. F h h
. al and political sciences. urt ermore, t e philoso h
ys- forfllt1la
. logy econonuc
10 . f 1 d , . . p y more tH
' . t only the object o a earne expose, It is still c
of St Thomas is no .h h h on- univer
. d . t ching done in French, wit t e t oughts of the moder
forme in a ea Wh h h n ant
' masters of philosophy. oever as ad the opportu
or contemporary • k b h -
. d the written or published wor s y t e doctors or agregesof powe: .
mty to rea bl . h K tion, it 1
the school of Lou vain, has been a e to rea 11ze t at ant,_Herbert, Spen-
wouldn
cer, eour te , M arx, Fouillee ' Boutroux,
. Bergson, are cited
. and studied
with the same attention as Anstotle, St. Thomas Aqumas, Suarez, and you wa1
Furth
Cajetan. . .
It has been recognized that the method used m Louvam has its advan- thor, it ·
tages. It is difficult to penetrat~ into ?-on-b~lieving milie~s or simply of- Then
ficial milieus, with books wntten m Latin. That fact 1s deplored by teaching
several and we understand it. So, the language that DesCartes and Leib- fessors c
nitz used could have been used by Lavoisier, Claude Bernard, even by teach th
Helmholz and Pasteur. But we have to deal with a universal fact, deeply Then
implanted in the world of intellectuals: Latin is not the language of the istotle's
universities and academies any longer. Irremediably, I fear, it is supplant- and the
ed by modern languages. Among different reasons, this one is decisive: leagues
the sciences of observation are interdependent; the biologist needs phys- I ha
ics and chemistry, the psychologist needs biology; and we know nowa- lologist
days that in all the big European countries, a large amount of people and Vir
don't follow the Latin humanities before getting into scientific work. But
We have to accept and speak and write in modern language, unlesswe Inga co
want to banish their collaboration. The·
. A nd , th anks to the language used for its publications, the works com- Balthaz;
mg fr?m th e Institute of Lou vain have attracted the favorable or ho5tile after ha·
attentwn of foreign philosophers about our beliefs. Belgian
The stu_dentsof the Institute St. Thomas took part in the officialcon- soon a
tests of philosoph · B 1 · d 1 here
Th
1
Y m e gium, at the Institute of France, an e sew · nation
t e ast three master's degrees awarded by the jury of the university con- Phy ic
ests come from that school.
first pl a1
But, those successe . . d. The in-
dispensabl s generate agamst our teaching a preJU ice.
e cu 1ture of ·
h,
f h.l10 sop Y•
l'wo
other than th h _sciences, the study of the systems o P the the Uc
sense of th ehsc O1aSt1cand often contradictory to it don't they lose 't th
oe \
e t ought of St Th ' .de aren th C(
we going to l . · 0111as?What we win on one 51 ' : 11a e lll
the methods osfelhton the other? In two words students taught follo\\Jt·o~ ll1ed<ll
o t e [ st1· ' · f 11or
their work th d n tuce St. Thomas, wouldn't they be 111e ,,_- "th~ ,
th
elusively tr~dit~ ayl ey would get in contact with teachings more t R()lll '
iona, and . d ,
proposed m Latin? () b.11 t
TEACHING PHILOSOPHY
51 I

onsideration for good order we have be


out of C
taj ,
' en oppos d h
• ns What must come first before anything . , e to t ese
taj etensio · e1se, 1t s the · u·
of pr f the thought of the author, Aristotle or St Th r . mte 1-
enceo . l l d · omas 1or msta
Ys- g h the thought 1s c ear y un erstood, the interpret t· f . nc_e.
W en T h a ion o lts Latm
hy c
1orrn
ula is very easy. o say t at, we took for base an e
d h .
.
xpenment of
n- han 20 years starte at t e semmary of Malines c t. d
moret . on mue at the
tn Um•versityofLouvam. ·r
U- On the contrary, we argue, 1 you ask to a young intelligen h
. . b . . ce, w ose
af 1 1
powerof attent10n 1s o v1ous y ess maintained, a first effort of transla-
tion, it is to be feared that the amount of mental energy that is available
ied wouldn'tbe enough for the comprehension of the abstract thought that
d youwant to have understood.
Furthermore, is it true that to have understood the thought of an au-
n- thor,it needs to be taught in the language used when it was written?
f- Then, all the students of all the big seminaries would receive scripture
teachingthat is insufficient, because nowhere as far as we know, the pro-
fessorsof exegesis speak Hebrew to explain the Old Testament, or to
y teachthe new one.
ly Then, we would be wrong to study with respect the comments of Ar-
he istotle'swork, that St. Thomas gave us, because they are written in Latin
t- andthey were composed following a Latin version that one of his col-
e: leaguesin religion, Guillaume de Moerbeke, made for him.
s- I have been told that the Germans are the best Latin and Greek phi-
lologists,but in the high schools and universities, they explain Horace
andVirgil,Plato and Aristotle, in the German language.
.
But those considerations ' as decisive as they seem to me, were expect-
e mga confirmation.
The record, published yesterday by the Bien Publicgave it to us. !"1-r.
Balthazarhas only studied philosophy at the school St. Th~~as. Right
e afterhaving passed his doctorate, he left for Rome, and resi?mg_at th e
BelgianCollege he followed the classes of the Gregorian Umversity A~ f
soonas the end 'of his first year in a contest that the be st students O a
nafIona1· · attended in the matter
ities ' of dogmatic· th eo 1O gy where meta- h
h · · '
P ysics15 incontestably closely linked, Mr. Nicolas . Balth azar won t e
firstplace '
T · . d ia and therefore,
wo
the su contests were about matters concernmg ogn h' • . · one of
. d fc etap ys1cs,111
th · ccessmust go to the best trained nun s or m tudent of
ose c d place - a s
theA ontest, Mr. Balthazar obtained the secon tl h won the gold
tnencan College arriving first - in the other or Y e
llledaJ. · .
The Mr Messina resides m
Ron-.second student of the eminary Leo XIII' h. same contest of
.,,e at the c ollege Leonine; he arnve
~ .
· d fi1fith at t at
tic th ology.
cIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MER

then those facts: They show with great wisdom that


we have. .to recall .
ted to approve without bl anung
· w h at 1s
· done some-
the authonties wan ' . .
he methods used at the Institute of Louva1n.
where e1se, t d. h .
Unity of purpose,diversity.of ~etho~~ a~cor in? tot ~ c1rcui:11stances
they work in: in necessariisunitas, in dubtis libertas, in omnibus caritas,so is
the motto of the Catholic action. His Holiness Pope Pius X reminded
us of it beforewith his supreme authority to the ones who, young and
old, work in Italyfor the development of the social Catholic charities.
Pleaseaccept,I pray you, dear editor, the expression of my most dis-
tinguishedsentiments.
D. Mercier
Freedom
from Indifference
and
Psychological
Determinismso2

I.

I havet~e p~vver _to determine myself to move. The essence of my free-


domresides in this power. I am the master of my actions.
Nevertheless, am I able to move however I so wish?
Ifl am free because I detern1ine myself, will I therefore be even freer
when my determination emanates more completely from my desire
alone?My freedom will perfect itself to the extent that I emancipate my-
selffrom motives of action; will it attain a higher degree when my desire,
not submitting to the influence of any motive, will be established in per-
fectindifference?
Three cases realize this ideal indifference. 503
Thefirst case:Desire is in the presence of two goods that reason judges
asperfectly equal: I have no reason to prefer one to the other. ~~en 1
chooseone, I will choose it because it will please me to choose it. my
desirewill be sovereign. il f
.
Imagme Buridan's ass, placed at an equ al d. t
is an ce from two pa so
oatsabsolutely the same. f water of an

In the place of two pails of oats, imagine · two g1asses o
. · s of equally
1 hps. two com
equa volume at an equal distance from your '
shinygold within reach of your hand. d ffer themselves to
O
Second case:In the preceding case, two equa~ golof.s hi·ch no desirable
· of de ire. Another case can presen t itse m w ts
the ch01ce
go0 d 1· f the present par ·
s met in either one or the other 0

- . - Rev11cneo-scolastiq11e
)(2 . •5 , sychologique.
I (. l.ibcncd'indit crcncc et le dc:tcrnuntme p · three
r l'JO 1903) gives
~IJ3 r S-17. . .rc,e11ccs,
December 17, cases imagined
'• 1n · n11l ra •u r (R,•i'III des coim et des ,ut!J• d to the three ·
I tc,n ,, • • • 1·« chat rcspot1
re ot the fr cdon1 ot 111<. 111ercnce
's PHILOSOPHI CAL ESS AY S
"'AL _MERCIER
CARDl1•

. , . a .n es this supposition: Two black points are


M r. Alfred fouill _eim fgi per. My pen is held at a height of two ce
. iece o pa . I . d . n-
itten on aw hite p . from the two points. t is eCided that I w·11
wr al distance . b h I
timeters at an equ of the two points, ut I ave no reason t
fallon on e h 'lib . o
allow my pen to . han over the other. T e eqm num of my desire
pose it over one rather t
is perfect. d of indifference, it is realized here.
the free om •
f
I I possess h two pr ece ding cases, my consciousness is awak-
The thirdcase:1n t e before m e two equa 1 motives, · · I see t hat I have
ened I see that I h ave 1·k· "h . .
. · f h . 1 will decid e perhaps to my 1 1ng ow 1t will please
neither o t em, b .c
,, b 1 ·11at least know wh at I do; e1ore movmg,
· I Ioo ked .
me, ut w1 . h' b
1 have the faculty to move otherwise, and t 1s eco _mes pure whim,
the stat pro ratione voluntas,a stab in the dark. I have an intellect that dis-
cerns between good and bad , between a lesser good and a greater good.
I see clearly that part A is worth more than part B, but it pleases me to
close my eyes in the light and to opt blindly by chance for one of the
two parts or even for the less good of the two simply because it pleases
me to move according to my fantasy.
Afterhaving imagined these three cases, let us return to our question:
Does man possessthe freedom of indifference?

It .seemsso· After
. all, w h at does my power reduce itself
. to when I deter-
mine myself1fmy det · ·
D . . ermmations come to me from the desired object?
etermm1smfor determi . . h'
causes is th·151 d ~ism, is t is the one that proceeds from final
' ess estruct1ve 0 f fr ·11
efficientcauses? ee WI than the one that comes from
. It thereforeseems that th . .
stne qua non of psych . elmdifference of equilibrium is the condition
w . . 0 1ogica freedom
b e can imagine that Burida ' .
ecausenothing attracts h' n s ass would allow itself to die of hunger
er To im toward ·
M.an Would
supposethat it was th
d.
h one pail rather than toward the oth-
us, t e reas 1
cho act ifferently· pl d b on wou d be that the ass is a beast.
ose one O f h . ace etw . Id
to rnov t e two accord · . een two identical parts, he wou
Are ewashe pleases.If nece mg to his liking because he has the power
e not . ssary he ld .
choosethe 1 conscious, alasl th' Wou fhp a coin to decide.
east pe..c ·, at w
adage: Vid . iiect good e are too often determined to
. . eo rnelio or even ·1
Pnncipleof d r~proboque d . evi , according to the well known
from eterrni · ' etenoras
• . a desirew-·th1 nation is not 0 h equor? In this case because the
its ind . out . n t e ·d . . '
Tryeterrninatio rnotive: it is d . si e of motives, 1t proceed s thus
so n. es1re th ·
tests tnetirnes at ltse 1f decides to depart froJ11
Yourp0 , W-e add h·
dred t w-erto h 't is dee· •
o one . c oos h 1s1veex . . . -
Withhirn h et e Part th penment: A detenmm t con
t at h at ple
e Will not ases you. You can bet a bun -
succeed in making you pl.tee tht'
OM FROM INDIFFER E N C E AND PSYC
fREED lIOLOGICAL
DETEJ1MINrs ,.
l Vl 5I 5

at you have in your hand to the side th h


alassth . d h at e wo Id
o ll 00 to put 1t own on t e left, you put •t d u suggest. He
re s y . d I own on th .
sts to you to put It own on the right yo . e nght. He
suftggye
11
ou will continue this gam .e as long a~ you WI put It down on the
le • • u want and I
our patience pernuts. as ong as his
an Yd . h
You are thus qmte t e master of your move . .
themwith a sovereign indi~erence. ments, you dispose of
Leibniz responds that this freedom of indiff ere • h. .
. al nee is w ims1cal, im-
ossible,and unmor .
p l D . . . d
It is whimsica: esire 1s never 1n ifferent. The univ .
. . erse constitutes a
vastharmony m which every monad cooperates toward th . .
" e rea11zat1on
ofthe greatest good of the whole. Although I cannot always see the rea-
sonfor an inclinatio~ that makes me cho?se_ between two parts that ap-
pearequal, there will always be a certain impression, no matter how
imperceptible,that deterniines me. "5 04 ·
It is impossibl e: Whether we suppose desire is deprived of motives,
whetherwe suppose it is influenced by equal motives, the conception of
a positivechoice through an indifferent desire is equally absurd because
it would be the negation of the principle of sufficient reason.sos

Thisso-called freedom of indifference even presents something immoral


because,if it is a perfection, it will be necessary to attribute it to God. "It
is thusthat God, before creating the world, saw nothing bet~er in virtue
than in vice and because his ideas did not show him that virtue would
havebeen more worthy of his love than vice." And "this allows for no
distinction betw een natural right and positive right. There will be no th-

504Th' d' ,
-o-· eo icee,n . 305.
:, ::,"Ti0 d . h . . fr one conanuo
. us absolutely indeter-
,
· es1re t at o n e d et ernunat10n come om h . . 1't either has source
min d · d'ffi
. e in 1 erence is to d esire th at it come natur Y O
all fr m not llmg. , npposedly indeter-
In th I . . . b cause a is su
. e sou , nor m th e bod y, nor m circumst anc es, e ation without any-
nuned H . . .thout prepar , . .
. · owever, here it is app earin g and existing WI . ki it seen as 1t ex1sts-
thin d'15 ' d · 1t or ma ng
This .g_ P0 sing of it th ere w ith o ut an gel or Go seeing h • If" Theod., n. 32°·
, h' throug itse . . fd -
I!>not only from n ot h ing, but eve n from not mg h ower to himsel eter
We. are• no Icss surprise d w h e n w e c Ia11n · t h a t m an ha.s t. e Pabsolute pnncip · · le that
minein th · b •cause it 1 an · ·eason to
n h· e prese nce o f p erfec tl y e qu al no non s, e . . e there 1s no 1 .
()t 1ng 1· d · h give n ca , 0 1n tl1e
1111, one without a reaso n . H oweve r, in t e . . 11uch reason tog h
a--ca l ·f h I ' r , is Ju. t as i b tween t e
firt d c t r t er th.111a n ghc prcns el y b ec.1u se t ic tc: Id die of hunger e 11. hus
\\
1rcn d , s wouh , uilibriu!11 an d pu 1t t
Ion rather than th e ,econ d . Burt a n :, ,is.
(>p..11\c f h 1 .J br eak t e cq
fr,m1 h ' •Y 1f \omc \c n:t im puhe d10 n o t .. tue of
1 poo d · 11r in vir
lh rprc I ltlll'nt . ,bid .. n . 304-307. · [L·c/ s11'.,;cic11trca
.1, . ent true
lnihw •r ru01 nt ot, I c1bn .1z •r st:. on I11•~ 1•J•tn O us· d,,m1 c1p '.I !.LI'
tru e < '
)r existent. n 0
statetll
, ·se even
tJwugh.
1•h <>n1d r that 110 tact wou ld be tou n I not otht:rWl
%,r •Utth c. er• 1' 111'a ut H 1cnt r ·,1 on tor. i t to h1:· chu s· am" '1 N tad<1l(~l?ll, ·, 3'

c11tn tl 11 k \\;11 to ll\ . ,
' re, <>111, 110c 1t .1111hk.·I() ht· -no
, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER S
cAHDINA

. ble in et h ics.
. 506
11

. d pensa d . nl h
. alterable or 111 is . f Leibniz: Free om is o y t e spontaneity
mg un ]us1on o . • " D · 1 •
'we know the cone "s o11taneitas intell1(.~ent1s. es1re a ways ~1elds to
fan intelligent nature, p t good. We will add, I know, that if desire
, f he greates . . "11 .
the attraction o t d 'th detenninauon, 1t w1 not pursue it nec-
t t goo w1 . h h. .
Pursues the grea es. d t but we must recognize t at t 1s 1s an affir-
cssarily,1101t11eccs
5·anose cero,
. The doctnne · o f Le1·bn1z · 1s
· t h e expression
. d
mauon an ll ' ot an explanation.
. .
I · l dcterm1111sm.
of psycho ogi ahave t1e 1 aIternative of choosing between the freedom of
Do we thus · 1determinism;,
indifference aud psycholog1ca .

SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION

. db y t h e 1·deas ofJouffroy , Paul Janet replies to the partisans


Inspire . of psy-
.
·h I · 1 d terminism that the two goods between which a choice
c o ogica e bl "I . ,, h "
St be made is very often not compara e: magine, e says,
rnu. · h an el-
evated motive on one hand and an interested motive on t e other.
Where is the common measure?" 507 ous. \
So be it. But is this anything other than a loophole? After all, are these
two goods, which should theoretically not be compared, are they not in Is it d1
factrelated to the same standard, sometimes egotistical, sometimes disin-
terested,according to the disposition of the person?
Furthermore, there are goods of the same order, related to the same type
be~een which desire is invited to choose: two glasses of water; two
0
coms_ ~ gold. Here is another example: We offer an artist, a great lover
of pamtmgs, the choice between some scribbling and the painting of a
master.Is he free:>Will h c . . d . .
d' h . · e preier, ts it a rmss1ble that he prefers the me-
10crec_o1ceto the better choice?
We cite the saying· vid z· . .
tion is beside th · . eo me ioraproboque,deteriorasequor, but this ctta-
e question The d .fi . . d .
selfplaced betw b· a age ven es itself when desire fin s 1t-
een an a stract d d /.
et nuncto desire I . goo an a concrete good presented 11c
h · am consc1ou th r /
t he .best is not always th e one s,th ere10re
. that the oooodJ. udged abstract Y
c oice must be mad b at is oncretely de. ired. But \Yhen the
to de · · . e etween two
sire, ts It not inev·t1 bl h concrete good pre ented hfr ct ,11111c
Cert · I a Yt e b t
itoriouam Y,I can consider and e ter one that way prefc rence?
llun t s ~ora son to honor h' understand that it i good, that it i Ill r-
e ogive c 1s parent d ·
action 1 . my iather such a k s an not, n v rthele de ire l11r Cf
, Will h · mar of · ' d
ioraprobo per aps prefer a I respect a. I should. T thi e]eyate
que, dete · vu gar]y , · • ,f
norasequor. ' cgott, t1cal . ati faction: vid 1> 1111. -

sor> - ,_,
· 1ncod
5()7·1· . '., I 80.
. ra,rede
I
Ph1fosof'/11e
'l 1,ipt tV)
• ll
f!H)M TNDIHEREN C E AND PSYCHOLOGr
,,111
:f:JJOM CAL DETERMINI SM 5I 7

? Is t his not practically because I estin 1ate thi· . r: .


,vrhy . . s In1enor s f [; .
w · 101c. • me in this 111O111ent, 111the disposition . h. a is action
b •rter ' · m w 1ch I
as t If in the concrete c1rcun1stances in which I presently
c d inyse ' . · am called to ;i
1111 ·t is in its concrete environment
1 that de . act.
,J vcver, sire must b .
~ ovd··tis here that we 111ustsee it at work. e env1-
1

10;~e' ~xperien~e of_the bet is irrelevant._


the gan1bler decided to win his b t
In effect' we. 1magme
. d e , expectmg
.
e must wm 111 or er to prove the freedom that he eith
tI1ath . h. If . er correct 1y
of . correctlyattributes to 1111se. However m order to wi· h' h
or111 . ' n 1s6et, e
doesnot have a choice between two movements , one on the ng · h t, t h e
heron the left. At each n101nent, he must nuke the movement _
ot h h' d . . con
traryto the one t . at 1s etern11mst partner suggested to him. Thus, at
eachmoment, a s1~gle 111oven1ent leads to the ~imed result; desire only
e hasa means to arnve at the goal that, hypothetically, it is assigned: it is
notfreein the choice of its movements.
1-
r. We have confused a rotation of movements, moreover all spontane-
ous,with the freedom of their rotation.
e
'm Isit thusnecessary to conclude with Leibniz that desire always proceeds
determinentlytoward its greatest good?
No. It is arbitrary to claim that desire is always under the influence,
e consciously or unconsciously, of a prevailing motive.
0
Betweentwo glasses of water, between two coins, between two roads
r ofthesame length and the same direction, and other alternatives of the
a sametype, it seems indisputable that desire is objectively indifference.
J~stthe same, in the supposition of Mr. Fouillee, no objective solicita-
tionatt:actswill to the right rather than to the left, to the left :at~er than
tothe nght. Desire is thus, from this objective point of view, mdiffer~n~.
Doesit follow that desire cannot freely decide itself and t~at, if it
·c makes a free decision its determination could be "without sufficient rea-
son"? '
· · wi·nnot alw ays be
N0 · p·1rst of all, it is to be noted that detemunat10n
aJree de · · .
. cision. A large number of acts 111 the course 11e ar
1·£'. e spontaneous
.
and,in th . . . · st to decide be-
tw e ma_ionty of cases in which will has no mtere . f h
een tw0 h · . . lf with either o t e
t\v . c 01ces 1t realistically allows 1tse to go
o With . ' ent 1y to exer-
cise· out takmg the trouble to deliberate or, consequ '
· Its freed
Calton ~m. . d , work covered-up
afterth ' w O had found fault in the details of a ay s . eflective
delib e campaign · said that he had trouble unrave · a smg1e r
1mg '
erate c ,
n , 1rce act 1·
Utin sh . . . . . d•fference, we be ieve
thata c ore, even m the cases of objective m i d· H w is it?
iree d . . . . . . h pose . o
l)oesd _ecision1s possible. The guest10n is t us . . the scales of
baIance· cs1re' as we say throw the we1g • h t O f 1·rs act10n m
tn Ord '
er to get out of balance?
, HILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
ERCIER S p
CARDINAL M
518

. b t what is its meaning? Desire is not an


· · enious, u · .c. d · t ·
The metaphor is mg mobile object; 1or esire, o move 1snoth-
. t cause that displaces a •u the hypothesis where we are placed
effi oen However, 1 . l '
. ther than to love. alternative objects, at east nothing to
mg o ·
1n the two r-. . .
·s nothing to 1ove d . can want to depart irom its mdiffer-
th ere i h that esire
refer. How is it t en . . to come from an absolutely indeter-
p d termination L .b . .d "
ence? To want a e indifference, is this not, as e1 mz sa1 ' to want it
mined and complete h ' ?"
lly from not mg. . . c. . .
co come natura k that desire can want its act10n 1or ItselfJust
. · d.1d not remar
But_Lei6mz. able of thinking its thought. In the absence of all ob-
as the intellect is capfi bn·ng my hand over the glass of water that is
. . n I am ree to .
Ject1ver~aso , h old coin that is on my left, umquely for this
1y nght or over t e g . .
on n h I . l der that is I love to move. I exercise my desire
reason of psyc o ogicaor .. ' . '
for the pleasure of exerc1smg it. . . . . .
Moreover, I have a special pleasure m exerc1s1ng my desire without
there being necessity, because I find there, beyond the pleasure of the
action, the feeling of my personal independence.
Decision, without objective motive, has thus its sufficient reason in
the jurisdiction of my psychological life.
This motive of psychological order will even counterbalance or sur-
passin weight those that I would perhaps find in objective reality, if I
were paying attention. But I have the power to not pay attention . In this,
I am unreasonable, without a doubt, but I have the power to be unrea-
sonable.

06
!tis_thus up to me to move unreasonably: I will close my eyes to the
Jective considerations that would regulate my conduct if I would want
to 6e reasonable and I ill ·f •
voluntas. ' w say, 1 it see1ns good to me: stat pro ratione
A twenty-franc coin attra ts .
would yield to th 6 . . c me more than a one-franc coin; 1f I
e o ~ect1ve "pre al ,,
franc coin, my choice would b v ence, I would choose the twenty-
accordingto my fant h. e reasonable. But it pleases me to move
dI . asy, t is flatters If .
an reJect the twenty-fr . my se -esteem; I follow my whim
~o~ld throw a diamond _anchcom. ~uch is the prodigiou person who
1eeling0 f h' • in t e sea 1 d
Eve d 1·6
Is independe
nee.
n or er to give him elf the inten e
ry e I erate f; I ·
animal lack au t Is, after carefi I .
unreaso blsreason; man who . u consideration, an act of folly.An
na e ' 1s reason bl h - ·
In th h · a e, as the privilege ot bemg
et ree c h
f~rencethus find:s~st at We have ima . - . .-
c1pleof suffi1 . it place; it is e l . gtned above, the freedom ot md1t-
But, let usc1ent re xp ained ·h . .
h ason. Wit out contrad1ctmg thr pnn-
cases. asten to add th
' ese suppo . . . I
sition • re rd:uivdv, l: ·crptwn, 1
uct of his life, man normally takes a
cond k n account f
[fl th .ees and decides t_ota e part where he finds the o the objective
111ot1V he freely decide? greatest good.
ooeS terrninist cl aims . t h at, in. t h e presence f
'[he de d · 0
two une 1
'ble for me to etenmnedly not take th b qua goods it
. ·rnposs l . e etter I h. '
1s1 · an equivocat10n here. · s t 1strue?
'[here 1s .
'f he Obiiect
'J
of preference includes two elements· • a good and .t . .
1
he good that we prefer. s superiority
lfjlist overt . lf . b h 1· .
Preference
itse com~nses ot vo. itwn and preference of a oo
ab, • to say the elect10n of a superiority. g d, as such,
that15 .
atis ery good, m so far as good, can be freely desired E
Ev . . fi 1 · very spontane-
this vohtion can be ree y consented. It suffices for this th t d
ous b. ld a , un er a par
esire . ularaspect, the o ~ect cou appear, on the one hand as d b -
nc . ld b , a goo ut
onth e other
. hand, it cou e compared
. . with the total good an JU ged
d · d'
haut inferiorto 1t; that spontan~ous voht10~ could b~, on one hand, judged
the asgood, but at t~e san1e tii:11e, reflectively put m relationship with the
completesatisfaction of desire and, from this point of view, judged in-
n in sufficient.
Evenwhen desire is in the presence of a unique means, reason can it-
sur- selfalwaysquestion, according to the just reflection of Aristotle, how it
if I willuse it and immediately there has reason to exercise free.
this, Butwhen reason, turning away from the attention of the relationships
ea- thatexistbetween this good and the good, between this spontaneous de-
sireand thecompletereposeof desire, concentrating on the comparison be-
the tweentwo particular goods or between two desires, is it still free?
·ant No. Preference, as such, is not free. It is physically impossible for desire
ione tonot prefer the good that practical reason judges, hieet nunc,in sum, the
better.
Assuredly,the artist to whom we offered two paintings of unequal
valuehas the faculty of choosing the less good of the two. He is ~~eeto
sat I would do well to moderate my passion as a collector. Definitively,
this master painting that is offered to me will not make me happ~; after
nudst
sometime, I will have put it away with many others in th .e of
t
worksthatI no longer regard. Would I not do better to exercise maS ery
ofrny h
penc ants, even if they are legiumater
.. ., H e WI·11thus choose ' I sup-
Pose' the Iesser pamtmg
· · d
But th·15 · · ·d ed the less goo
. 1s becau e in the given case he const er . •
Nintin I ' 'h. d · It is in this capacity
that gas tie bettermeans of moralizing 1s esire.
hepreferred it. 508
Sr18. StTh ual under one aspect,
%thing . . onias says excellently: "If two things be proposed as _eql r point of superior-
1Hnders fi . . f h, . e parucu a 1., ra ~.,,,e·
tty,') th u rom cons1dcnng in one o t cm s0111 h " 11111 .11,eo
at the II h
q. 13a wi as a bent tow rds the one rat h er t han the ot er.
, rt. 6, ad 3. • .
. , f:R •s PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CA RDINAL MI:RCI ,
,od
·veh' d
J,~:ed
. h be chosen or not chosen. jt~~regi!i.. e1
The better paintmg can or not desired. •JtJ' (P
....1lltl . tJC
The lesser good can be c d · Th · h h h
· h · , ·mposes on es1re.
N · h O f the two c oice.5 1
1s
· t at as t e pow- de!tO J'
eit er f . h . of th e two terms of the alternative, to con ort1estJ.J'f'
er, in the presence O eit efir . • the freedom of exercise. - P . i.ol.lt
sent to the choice or to re use .It, is . . d h . .,v1ui
fer- J11Y P
But when one dec1•des to choo e a pamtmg . . an l w en f hattention con- \vheooo o
. 1 · l 011 the relativeart1st1cva ue o t e two canvas-
ccntrates itself exc usiv~ Y_ d d the better in1poses on desire. I havefhC
es prercrence as to what is JU ge . d fi .
' h~' b perform an act of denial an re use a gold com: be- other,f rriY
T e two
· eggar _can envi·sioned under their oceo
tween actions . moral aspect, the honorable e be.
one to accept a coPper coin and the heroic one not to accept . a gold
. coin' never di
_Accor!l
he chooses the heroic action, morally t?e better one. Bu~ 1f, havmg made
an abstraction of the respective morality of ~he two act10ns, the beggar I arnnot fr
would only consider the comparative pecuniary value of the two coins, duion5
he would be crazy not to choose the gold coin rather than the copper attentiont
com. pleases,
or.
Between two goods considered from the same point of view, to enmomen
choose deliberately the lesser one would not be to commit an act of free- thetwo P
dom but of folly. throught
Leibniz is correct when he writes: "We must not imagine that our a decision
freedom consists in an indetermination or in an indifference of equilib-
decidefo
rium; as if it were necessary to be equally inclined on the side of yes and
Weco
no, and on the side of different parties when there are several to be had ...
This equilibrium is absolutely contrary to experience. "509 topoint
Cardinal Cajetan admirably says: "It is essential to nature, all nature, clinethe
to have a single term. Consequently, which nature is of little import, it Theo
tends from all its forces, as much as it can, toward its proper end. Intelli-
ge~t nature_does not escape this universal law: asJar as possible,it inclines
~11its faculties toward its unique end. However, in a general fashion, an
1
?tellectual faculty does not allow itself to be confined to a unique direc-
t~on, t~ward a unique object. Only the tendency which has as its object
t_e u~;~rsal g~od is detennined and exclusive of all other determina-
~on. d e n?tion (ratio)of nature consists in the fact that it is, or ha
een, etennmed to a . b.
ry thing th u?ique O ~ect (ad 1mum). It follow that with eve-
at possesses this not' f . . ·
capacity', such a determmat10 . . ion t nature,
· ° there ex1 t , according to · it
tellectual nature
.
d'
' accor mg to all its
°
n a unique object (ad ,mum). And so, 111-
ill . d to a
unique object ace d' . powers, w be detemune
degree (gradus') do;sr mg _toIts capacity. The notion (ratio)of intellectual
b' involve (c · ) d termin ti.on to a un1qu ·
o ~ect so as to elicit 1.tnot( 1· . . ompatitur
c mt,ve) no d · · · b
r t nnmatton to a unique obJeCt O -

~( (
J:J. Lc:ibn
1z.'f11eod·
••
ICec
' I \t p,lrt \T,
, . J s. work pubhh d by p uI J n t.
OM FROM INDIFFERENCE AND PSY
FREED CiiOLocr
AL DH!:.R~ll
ISM 521

. ly and universally - but only with re d


je~th1v~ aard to universal good. "510 gar to a certain obie t .
wit rev . d 1 . . J c ' Le.
s there 1s a e us1on m the experien h
Thu , ·u h
to put free w1 to t e test.
ce t at Fo ·u,
lll ee propose .
order h 111
,--1 supposed agreement t at freedom is ess . ll
pe . . . ent1a y the £
without obJective 1not1ve, one thing to a 1 acu1ty to pre-
fer,v . h ld . not 1er. How
my pen 1s e at an equal distan ce fr 0111th ever, he says
when . . . e two p · ·,
ve no obJective motive to place the pen on omts A and B,
I ha .. . one rather th
er The suppos1t1on rea 11zes thus the id eal co d. . an on the
h
ot · ·u B . h.
ce of my free w1 . ut , m t 1s experience I am
n 1t1ons for a11
fi expen-
.
en ' not ree. Thus, I will
neverbe.
According to Mr. Fouillee, here is the proof in th· .
. . ' is expenence that
h d
I amnot free. In t e suppose er s1tuat10n, there are only tw o poss1 .bl '
e con-
clusionsand bot h are t h e euects of chance. Either I will
, h. I ·u l no 1onger pay
attentionto anyt mg, w1 c ose my eyes and allow my hand t d .
·11d. fi o o as 1t
pleases,or, I WI irect my eyes rom one point to another and, at a giv-
en moment, tired of the experience, I will place my pen on the one of
thetwo points that I will find myself thinking about and that will have
throughthis coincidence, one more reason in its favor. In order to mak;
a decisionin the two hypotheses, I renounce deciding, and I let chance
decidefor me.
We could respond to Mr. Fouille that it is up to me to pay attention
to point A and not to pay attention to point B. It is thus I who will in-
clinethe pen toward A rather than B.
The observation would be just, but will it not simply displace the
question?
If no objective reason invites me to prefer A to B, there is nothing
morethat invites my desire to be attentive to A rather than to B. .
Does it follow that I must make my decision for either A or B umque-
lybecauseI desire it? .
This would be to identify free action with a whimsical desire.
What must we conclude? . £ example
AmI or am I not free to chooseone of the two points, or '
pointAi .
. . her for example point
AmI or am I not free to preferone pomt to anot '
A over po· t ff1
in . . all I want to move, to
Yes, I am free to choosepoint A. Hypothetic yfl, • I see that I
touch fter re ecuon, b
one of the two points. However, a f only the o -
\\·ou]d d . .. b king account o . 1
. not cpart from my mdee1s1on Y ta ycholog1ca mo-
motives, but I place the pen on point A from aOpsthe other hand,
Jt~ct1ve
ive to . . . . d to ,nave. n
' Wit, in order to touch a point, Ill or er

----------------
) l(J l
'/11
' II S11111.
I.. r • q. f,o, rt. 2.
's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER
CARDI.NA

. t B because I do not need to touch .


lace t he Pen on poinin orderto move. Th ere1ore,
r-
I freely tPoint
I do not P ch rny goa 1' . ouch
B in order to rea fi dornof exercise .
. t A I have the ree the pen on A ratherthan on B because h
pom · fi ee to put d . I ave
But r am not ererr fi t oint to the secon pomt.
the irs P . (
n0 motive to. pr:1•
ll I h ave no obiective
J
motive.
Hypotheuca Y, . 1 otive because whether I touch A, or wheth
sychologtca rn ' I . er
I haveno P goa1IS . attained·, in both cases, am moving, moreove r, I
I touch B, ~
1
1
J. lly in both cases.
am moving enuca ble preference can only be motivated. Thus I d
a reasona , o
Howev~r,h. the freedomof preference.511
not have, m t IS case,

. ust not represent itself over the type of mobile object in A group ofp
Self- desirem . d h b 1 .
unstable eqm'libriunr' it is onented towar t e a so f · ute good Just as the of elem~nta~
needleof a compassis oriented toward the north. I It we_re to encounter a new didact
absolutegood, it would be irresistib_ly _attracted toward_ It._B~t, because ticism than 1
it offersno part of it, because only hrmted goods are withm Its reach, it preface.
alwaysguards,with respect to them, a power of resistance that no mover This elem
canconquer.It finallydisposes itself of its determinations; the free action
dents who a1
is, followingthe expressive word of the English, a "self-determination,"
the doubts
andfreedomis essentiallythe property in virtue of which man is capable
them to giv
of determininghimself from reflected desire a spontaneous volition .
We tried,
cepts of p ·
D. Mercier
present sue
To teach
is clearer or
Then it i
be familiar
Doubtles
of the Chu
frorn who
511. "Next 'S
and Which
hi · ' at ensitiv ·
t s in threest

e imagination' h · • · and Doe it f◄
'Appet· ages.He show fi ' e points out the motive-principle m man, 1 here i,
ltesorn · s 1rsthow hi . xt at
'The cogn·. etirnesovercomes,h . ~ s principle is the deliberative rea on;~~: t study of
Whilesenit1vcfaculty,'of wh ' 'ow it is sometimes over ome by desire; and thir }h, a o h re
suousi . at reaso , h . t at p Y Ptep.i
Properto rati allllaginationexists al n . e 1 speaking here. Fir t. then, he ay_ JS 5
son· on ones,. to dc]·b ' so 1n h • . • · ·nation advanta
A. 1 crate tha · ot er .animals ' dehberaave 1magi .
. ot rea- th 'g ·
nd thisdelib . ' t 15
to Weigh alternative , , i a funcuon e te,1ch
lllostneeds erat1onr .
iuitab] to be d equ1rcsso whJt
nie e altcrnat1vone. Clearlya rne sort of rule or end by whi h to reckon ore
asurcfc e: Wh h ' rnan w·n •c d Ill
Willb or our act1· ic t alway t iollo\i ,' i.e., eek for, the better an ;, , J
e the 0ns rneasu , :I h d I •n:1ort:
n11dd!ettr , a criterion fco d' r1.:c y \Omc ~t.111dJrd , We n ·c r 1t I thl)
111()ftf r rn1nK what i, mo,t \\ orth tout~-' Ill..
1\( . j
1t• \Yllo
gi l1l of tht· ·
pr.1ct1cal rt•,1 on t\\mng 111.1
choice,
Concerning Scholastic
Teaching 512

Agroupof profe~sors publishe_d, for ~he _use of their classes, a new treatise
ofelementaryphilosophy. This treatise is edited in French and advocates
a newdidactic method, closer to the genius of Aristotle and to scholas-
ticismthan the traditional method. Here is how it is explained in the
preface.
Thiselementary treatise on philosophy is especially meant for the stu-
dentswho are preparing for theology and who want to be able to dispel
thedoubtsand answer to the objections of those who, one day, will ask
themto give an account of their spiritual convictions.
We tried, above all, to define with great precision the essential con-
ceptsof philosophical thought, to specify the terms of the problems, to
presentsuccinctly the solutions and their fundamental proofs .
. To teach this we chose the French language. There is no other which
15cleareror more logical.

Thenit is the mission of every priest to be an apostle of truth; h~ mu st


befamiliarwith the living language of those to whom he i~ speaking.
Doubtless,the Latin language is the liturgical and canomcal lan~age
ofthe Church. It is, in addition, the language of St. Thomas 1:-q~mas,
fromwhom we have the honor to obtain . our p hil osophical pnnc1ples,
andwh·ich every pnest
. should be able to stu dy 1n · t h e O rio-inal
. o~
works.
. ;:>
Doesit follow that it is essential to teach St. Thomas m Latin. f
There is
· no question that in the Roman sermnanes, • · 1·n the houses. hil o
st
udyof r . cholastICp os-
Oph re igious congregations where for three years s . a-. rs great
Yprep . ' h of Latin oue
adva ares one exclusively for theology, t e use ·a1 ·ronments
th ntages· W e readily. understand that, 1n . t h ese spec1 .. env 1 '
e teache d , . I r tradition.
rs on t dream of departing into a secu a

512APtot>os . neo-scolastiq11e
I I (1905) 339-
1~7 de I enseignemenc de la scolastiquc . - Revue
, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
MERCIER S
CARDINAL
524

ching of scholastic philosophy bee


. 1to the tea . . ause
B ut is .Latin
.
esse~ua . L tin? Is it preferable
wntten m a
in every circumstance;,
.
it w as ongmall y
we think not. f Greek and Latin li_terature speak the language of
O
Do th e professors . d that of Cicero to comment on the p
1 . the Ilia ' or . ro
Hom er to exp am . fessors who teach Sacred Scnpture explain
A rchia?Do the semmt~~ I~~s of the Apostles in Greek? The most en-
Genesis in Hebr ew, h 1 t ·c philosophy consult St. Thomas' commen-
t s of sc o as 1 . .h
lightene d mas er h O f Aristotle when, in all hkeh ood, St. Thomas
taries on the thoug t •
d Aristotle in translation . . . . .
only _rea k ledged by everyone that, 1n practice , It 1s possi-
It is therefore ac now . I h h h.
h h h ght of an author m a anguage ot er t an 1s own.
ble to teac t e t ou · h ·1 h ·
Moreover, we think that teaching scholastic . p 1 osop y m French is
the best initiation into the study of the philosophy and of the theology
of St. Thomas Aquinas in their original language. .
That no one cry "paradox, " we base what we are saying on a double
experience. We ask pardon of the reader for making this personal, but
we believe that, in this debate French is the best language to use as a ve-
hicle for the teaching of Thomistic philosophy. Only experience must
have the last word.
For five years I taught scholastic philosophy at the Malines seminary.
The classicaltreatise was that of Gonzalez. I did my best to help the stu- lan
~ents understand the text by means of summaries in the form of ques- St. B
tions _and answers, which I worked up in Latin and wrote by hand TH
especiallyfor them. It was not worth the trouble.
It was to be decided tO l . h ence
For som t. I h d e~p am t e text and the summary in French.
e ime a been u h h
ers of the use f L . smg t e met od that the most ardent defend-
o atm must ne ·1 .
parts:the material fi ' cessan Y, use. I gave my lessons m two
was rst prese t d . L .
son repeated the s h n e m atm; the second part of the les-
. ame t ought. h
It didn't take 1 m t e vernacular.
th . me ong to notic th ld
. e attention of the 1· t e at, as much as the second part he
if th st is eners so m h h
e udents were waitin 'rc uc t e first left then1 sleepy. It was as
. Also,as soon as I wa g ~r the second half to listen
in French d s permitted t 0 d · •
0
I had b an , as soon as the · ll' so, I resolved to begin teaching
them . eeLn~nderstood I p mfite igent look of my students told me that
in atin 111· ' ro Ited b h ·
hearddev 1 ' a few chose Y t eir good 1nind-set to repeat to
e oped d n Words h h .
maswasgr an Proven in F ' t e t eses whi h they had JUSt
Before, whasped and . . rench Th. . . h -
Infinitely b .· is time the Latin of St. T 0
ehmptyWordsenAW..e used Latin tehtter, It wa loved.
t ou h ,· tter h ' e texts O f d
I kg t and so0 h t e French t. Thon1as were hollow an
ta e th n t er c. expla · d
e freedo ea1ter, the b nation' th y became refine
111of u . Y ccamc p . . ry
rging rny co]l rcc1 1011act to tht: memo ·
eagur , \: ho tea ch phil , ophy to
CO CERNING C
l-l0LAsnc T
EACBrt--rc

do the experiment by proof and trial I


::sults for ~hem. . . confidently foresee the sa
Al 0 , this experunent was resumed d me
· an pursu d ·
e\\' audience at t h e U mversity of Lou . e since 1832 b r
n . h c. . vain. Nu eiore a
le belonging to t e taculties of philos h merous young la
P' . · op y and li Y peo-
f the sciences, assisted at our lessons Th terature, of law d
o h b . ese Were d ' an
French but t e su stance of scholastic tea h . one entirely ·
c. h. c mg was re 1 1 in
in Latin. I use d , 1or t is purpose a choi·c f gu ar Yreproduced
. ' e o texts b
rwo S1m1mas and the rrunor philosophical w k f arrowed from the
. or so St Th
Severalquotes from CaJetan and Suarez com 1 d · omas Aquinas.
p ete or serv d 1·u .
nate the thoug h t o f t h e Master. Still today all th . e to UITil-
. , e courses m ph·l h
at the St. Thomas Aqumas school are taught by th· h i osop Y
. . 1smet od.
What 1s the result? It is dual. Scholastic philos h · 1
· · op Y is oved because
we understan d its meanmg. . At the end of two or three years, th e young
peopl~ come to read, without effort, the original works of St. Thomas
andhis commentators. ~ere are t~e ~acts, t?ey are manifest, and they are
constant. The most obstinate prejudices will give way before them.
It is important, therefore, on the one hand, to speak the language of
our contemporaries, to go to them, to make ourselves understood by
them, to devote ourselves efficaciously to doing them good.
On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that the official
languageof the Church, that is, the writings of St. Augustine, St.Jerome,
St.Bernard, and of the great thinkers of the Middle Ages, is Latin. .
The method which we advocate and which a double fruitful expen-
ence confirms, takes into account this double _considera~on. ~eside~,
isn't it by this method that the child learns on his mothers knee. Until
. al ld · d the elements of an
he has, m every sense from the re wor , acqmre . b 11
. . d b the word will not e un-
i dea, his mother can tell him the wor , ut
demoed." The word before the idea is nonsen:e. . h'l hy has had
I know that an object10n .
wi
·u b h h novice in p l osop
e t at t e h k Latin courses.
Latm . h · yes e too
courses before entering t e seminary._ ' ble of understand-
.
But runety-nine f h d d he is not capa
times out o a un re ' . h derstand a lecture
.
mga Latm phrase when he ears · h 1·r How will e un
of which, . a1one,
. h b st act character
t hat pre ents to him new idea , t e a r
demandsall the intellect's efforts? d tood would be oflittle
Bec;1de:, · fl tly un ers ' h till less
cla sical L~tin, were 1t uen f scholastic philosop y, s barely
use-to philosophy It is not the language o ·1 hy - one must .d t
· . d phi osop r di no
t hat of theologians. The LatJn ha no . _ chey thereiore
niak . ,. d Lucretius
e n exception for Cicero an , . . familiar
producea tt:chnical philo oph1cal }angufa?tes. cxorcssion~ is Lhat1ne111inary.
H0 v vcr nd e~p ci,11ly,m · no ne o i · dent r
cnteru
1g t e 5
t versions
en i by the stu differen
u to b re dily unde coo<. . fi om the es,
V h I
' Y
.
rncddunng-.1. ·tot: :-,
. •·1,,.htycJrs, r
CIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL M ER

. n·es words were learned, but little or no en-


of texts, use of dictiona ' . d d uort
uccession of ideas. One ha rea , one had not spo
was ma d e to grasP a S _
ken or heard spoken. · d .
What I have just said will perhaps be contra~icte by theonsts of clas-
. h' b t am sure that my words will be echoed by most of
sica1 teac mg, u I . ·1 h · h ·
ed to teaching phi osop y in t e serrunaries
th ose w h o are aCcustom . . . ei
The adoption of French as a teachi _ng language is therefore a first in-
novat10n. w h'ich we believe we must, m the name . of an already long ex- ~
penen· ce , recommend to the .benevolent attent10n . of our colleagues.
we have a second recommendation for which we also claim to have
afl
fe
experienced. It concerns the order in which, according to us, philosoph-
th
ical material must be taught.
Philosophy is, by definition, the search for the fundamental principles
0
by means of which reason must be able to understand and explain all that
is knowable.
These principles are in the definitive work of the mind, at the mo- rea
ment when it realizes things that are already known; they are a point of fo
departure. But, in the order of the acquisition of what we know, they Its
are the point of arrival. rue
Observation, that of the exterior world and that of consciousness, is l
the philosopher's only source of information. Common observance be- sp
comes precise and enriched by the efforts of scientists, who are the im- aca
mediate purveyors of the materials on which philosophical reflection Cl
dwells. ]
Als?, the ancient scholastics who together embrace all the knowledge di
accessibleto reaso~, distribute it in three parts: the physical, mathemati- act
cal,_and metaphysical, between which there is a relationship of subordi- wh
nation.
enc
The p~ysical, which is represented today by Cosmology and Psychol-
. b .the first co nc 1usions.
ogy, furrush · C osmology researches the nature of m-
'
orgaruc od1es·Psycholo th fli · cl
humankind. ' gy, at O vmg bodies, vegetable, animal, an
This general physical h .
co-chemical and biolo .rart -. t e cosmological - leans on th: physt-
eralizesthe co . gi al sciences. In repeated cases mathematics gen-
nc1usions of the ph . I d '
The metaphysic 1 h ysica an extends the results.
study of substa a pus es abStraction further and takes as it object the
nee, common to in · b · · · b
stance, per se and 1-t ll orgamc od1es and to the hvmg; su -
, s coro ary p .
T he law of th ... ropert1es. 5 t 3
b . e acqms1t1onofh k b f◄ e
a stracting, to abstract the uman nowledge is to perceive e ?r
the quantity, to abst hnature of the sensible things before ab tracting
· ract t ose b fc Tl
------- · e ore penetrating to the substance. 1e
513. See Mercier'
s Introductionto "' ·1
r,u oso'Phy d ()
a11 ntolo~. p.1ra. I .
CONCERNING SCHOLASTIC .
TEACHING

her must, to conform to the connat 1


philosopoceed thus: after having recognized ;hra hste~s of the human
·rid pr b · at e 1s d
t1ll ' spontaneous o servat10n, but also of ph . e_rendent not
onlyalonciences, he will study first, cosmology andys10-chhe1111cal and bio-
Joo1cs
t,·
. d
taphys1csan onto ogy.
1 H . psyc ology th
e will relate er ·t . 1 , en gen-
eral rnalle)' this branch of philosophy has certitu~/n~ ogy ~o psychology.
ActU , f. . as its object th
of certain acts o mte 11 igence. , e prop-
e1heodicy will complete the speculative philosoph 0 f h
wallythe world, by its character of contingency ~ dt e real world.
Ac ' f . al C fi . . ' ea s reason to the
. a:nnation O a pnm
aw . k ause rom which it has its exi t
1 h
B .
s ence. y its per-
£ ctions it ma es us specu ate w at inust be the supreme Id 1 f .
te '. . ld b . . . . ea o which
thesechmgsm the wor must e distant snnilanties.
Philosophers have always . l notedh two . branches
. of philosoph y, one th e-
oretical,the other practlca . We ave mdicated the obiect of th 6
. l . l d J e 1rst.
The second, practica , .inc u es ordinarily the study of the actions of
reasonand that of free actions - logical and moral - and traces the rules
fortheir right direction. Logic is, truly, a practical science, even an art.
Itshowshow to manage reason and make it serve the knowledge of vir-
tue.
Moralityis the consideration of humankind as free agents, morally re-
sponsible for their actions. Practical logic studies them in their individual
actionsand in their social relationships: individual morality or ethics, so-
cialmorals or natural law.
But logic is also, eminently, a speculative science. The rules, which. it
dictatesto practical reason, presuppose the theoretical study of the char-
acteristicsproper to abstraction, and the universal concepts throug _h
whichthe sciences and philosophy are organized. As a speculative sci-
ence,it has its place efterthe sciences, afterall the philosophy of the real
world,considering that logic's object is the scienceof science.
This duality of the aspects oflogic creates a difficulty. When one ho~ds
tothe scientific point of view there is no doubt that one muSt put ~ogic,
. ' h 1 · · sist on this and
a_speculativescience, in the last place. The sc O aStlCSm . h
nghtiyso. The philosophy of nature - physics, mathematics,_ metap ys-
ics h . b . t the beingof reason.
- asas its object real being. Logic has as its O ~ec ' h fleeted
Obv· 1 · before t e re
ious Y, the direct study of real bemg comes
study
H of th e b emg
. o f reason. 1 s directing the
owever, from the didactic point of view, th e ru he refore on the
Properu
th
f l b c
se o reason are in their p ace e1ore
their use t e
'
'
r; hold of philosophy. . f . e by teaching and
di . e have tried to conciliate the exigencies o sc1ehncb 01nning of the
'>tingu·h. . . . n at t e eo- d
co 15 mg the art of logic which is give . f hilosophy an
ursework,undt:r the title: ;,Preparatory teach111g o p
,..

CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

scientific logic," and which is the crowning glory of speculative philos-


ophy. . .
Finally, the history of ph1lo~ophy, understo_od as the history of ideas
rather than the history of philosophers, furnishes, under the form f
comparison and contrast, a study para~el to the doctrinal explanatio~s
contained in the other parts of the treatise.
In summary, the complete treatise of ~hilosophy is _composedin two
volumes, where the material is arranged m the following order: prepara-
tory (orpreliminary)teachingof p~iilosophy;_
co~1t~ology,
psych_ology,criteriology,
ontology,theodicy,logic,moralphilosophy, tndtvtdualand social,and thehistory
ofphilosophy.
we heartily recommend to our honored colleagues, the adoption of
this order of distribution of the material. It conforms to the natural de-
velopment of thought; it is in the spirit of A~stotelian and Thomistic
philosophy. On two occasions, first at the seminary at Malines, later at
the University of Louvain, we successfully used the system indicated
above.
Logic, at the beginning of philosophic teaching, is barely intelligible
and without attraction. The student who has not yet been put in touch
with the science of the real is incapable of understanding the reason for
the existence of a science of science. He is not interested in speculations
of which he sees no use and it is to be feared that his impression of bore-
dom, if not of disgust, may extend, and for a long time, to all of philos-
ophy.
On the contrary, making him reflect on the things he observes or
senses in the bodies and laws of exterior nature - life, sensation,
thought, intention - will make him realize at once that it is not neces-
sary to say farewell to the real world in order to philosophize . He will
begin to appreciate a teaching with a significance which is immediately
within ~is ~asp, and he will take for his life the persuasion that a man
~eflectsmev1~ably,good or bad, from cosmology, psychology, metaphys-
ics · The logic of these sciences will come later its role will then be un-
derstood. '
In addition, the criteriological problems rest indispensably on the re-
sults acquired in psychology.
1~ th e past, at_the department of philosophy and literature at the Uni-
versity of Louvam, we began the teaching of philosophy with logic. for
;:v~ral years _now, we have begun with psychology. Criteriology and
gic are earned over to the second year. Experi nc p aleswell for the
new method.
. ' we re al"ize t hat d"ffc
Nevertheless
b 1 erent practical consid tions rna b
an o stacll!to the adoption of the program that w d ....... , ...r .... Th ~ re,
CONCERNING SCHOLASTIC TEA( ·
-HING

. h to leave all latitude with regard to this to h


,vew1s . ry eac professor or di-
O
f the serruna .
rector . w of this, t h e mo d e o f pu bl.ication
· of the cou s .
Invie h 1 . r e w1116c double·
. . A willanswer to t e p an which we prefer Howe , d' . ·
edition . £ . .h h . . · ver, c 1t1onB
willremain more in c?n o~rmty wit t e ~idactic n1ethod generally fol-
and the material will be presented in the following O d . Lo .
10wed, l r er. ig1c,
Ontology, Criteriol?gy,.Cosmo ogy~ ~oral Philosophy,Theodicy,Historyof
Philosophy. Thus, it will be pe_~ssible for the professor to follow, in his
teachl·ng, the order that he will Judge to be the best.
We offer with confidence to our honored colleagues, this summary of
he coursework in philosophy at the Institute of Louvain. We would
~ongratulateourselves if we were able to c~ntribute th~s to spread this
inthe placeswhich they would be most fertile; the doctnnes, so sane, so
strong,and always so young, of St. Thomas.

D. Mercier
Responseto Dom Olivieri514
1905

The Revue thomistewas recently515 concerned .h


.ons.The two authors who were charged with wit ~y lateSt publica-
t1 0 l . d ana1yzmg the new d.
tions of my nto ogte an my Psychologiedid so with d ·11 e 1-
expresshere my sincere _gratit~de to them. goo wi , and I
Mytwo con1rades paid particular. attention
. to the poi·nts w h ere 1 de-
viatefrom what passes as authentic instruction of St Tho A .
· · al · . · mas qumas
"in Thormstlc manu s, or the hke, published for thirty or so years." Ac-
cordingto the statements of the learned Dominican, the innovations in-
troduced in my On~ologie"embarrassed Thomistic metaphysics-one
doesnot say scholastic-from several heterogeneous and incompatible
elementsborrowed from the spiritualist metaphysics of Platonic, Augus-
tinian,ontological, Leibnizian, or W olfian inspiration. Inadequately ap-
pliedand poorly adjusted to the 'style' of Thomistic architecture, these
doctrines had assuredly falsified our traditional teaching." R. P.
Schlinckerwill allow me to tell him that there is no statement that might
be more agreeable to me on account of its author and its object.
The courteous and moderate criticisms of Dom Olivieri reveal as
muchgood will as a compliment on the part of the author. I accept them
withgratitude and will consider them again at the time I rework my vol-
ume of Psychologie. The distinguished Benedictine makes his observa-
. • . · h. h I oposed to
tionspnnc1pally on two points, on the manner m w ic pr
· . . . . h f " ommon sense and
interpretthe Anstotehan and Thomistic t eory O c .
intimatesense" and on the explanation that I gave of free will.
W · . · al· · · ms First a word to
e willreturn shortly to these two pnncir cntlClS . . for having
t
answerthe criticism that is incidentally directed agamS us
confusedsensible characters with intellectual habits: t to attribute
D0 O 1· h t we are mcorrec
m . writes, "We do not be 1eve t a 'bl haracter. It seems
to the h . . ·1 .
h aut or the aim of ass1mi ating a t h b't5 to the sensi e c
d otherwise. But
t at the comparison that he makes cannot be interprete

514. R' , · (1 05) 573-583·


515 Nepon,ca Dom Olivieri.- RevueThom15ce 1 3 9
· umbers2 and 4 of this year 190 5.
r
1
CARDlNAI MfRCI ER S PHII O OPHI CAL ESSAYS

how c:m he think about this? Dor s he _not recog~ize himself that habitual
le,,rning nly prepar es for the a ·t whil e th~ sens1~le character is the for-
m , I cause of sen ation? Is there thus not 111 the mtellect an intelligible
chara ·tcr that corr espond exactly to the sensible character of the sens-
c..?'' (p. 2 04. )
Our r spon e consists of two word s: To compare is not to identify.
Moreover, if the reproa ch that one addresses to us was just, it would
reach beyond our heads to Aristotle and St. Thomas.
Hrrc is wh at we aid on pages 222 - 2 25, incriminated by Dom Ol-
ivieri: Th senses sense only on the condition of having been placed
within a state to sense under the influence of a stimulus, just as the sci-
us
entist only thinks about the object of science on the condition of having
liI1
been placed in the state of thinking about it. In either case, this situation
f exercising a cognitive action relies on a subjective disposition. This is
od
a formal cause of either the senses or intelligence. In the language of the
pa
chool, the first is called a "sensible character" and the second is called ch
an 'intelligible character." The intelligible character, considered apart se1
from the moment of intellection, is "habitual"; the previously acquired rh
"treasure of the intelligible character" forming the intellectual habits. fu
The comparisonbetween the sensible character and habitual learning is de
thus founded: both are the formal dispositions that immediately prepare of
the expert-the senses or intelligence, according to the case-for cogni- se1
tion. p
The credit of this comparison does not belong to us; it goes back to ha
Aristotle, who institutes it in Book II of his treatise, On the Soul; St. Tho-
mas adopts it for his own purposes in the twelfth lesson of his commen-
tary on Book II; he writes: "With regard to sensation, the animal finds
itself in the condition wherein, with regard to learning, that of which he
has been previously informed. When an animal has an actual sensation,
it is like the scientist who, at a given moment, contemplates the object
of his knowing. Cum animaljam generatum est tune hoc modo habetsens11m,
siait aliquishabetscientiamquandojam didicit. Sed quandojam sentit sec1md11m
actum, tune se habetsiwt ille qui jam actu considerat."
But to compare sensible and intelligible characters is not to identify
them.
While the presence of the sensible character immediately incites the
senses to sense, the intelligible character can remain habitual and not
render intellection precisely on time.516 The intelligible character corre-

6
Shi · Thhismterpellauon by our contradictor renders our thought unintelligible: "Does
t c ,Ult or not recognize h · ,Jf h h b . hile
·bl
•11~1 c lhara ·te · h -
mi 1c t at a Jtual learning only prepares for the act v.J
Habitual I c r ~\ t c torm~ cau c of nsation?" This while i. not in i~ proper p ~ce.
carnmg I\ as much 3 formal cause a is the s n ible ch racter.
RESP O NS E TO DOM
OLIVIERI

533
d exactlyto the sensible determina t
pon . ll . n only wh .
of actlla1mte ect1on. en 1t is th c-
ouse e 1orrnal
.
We were thus• correct to compareth e £0 nna 1 d1sp ··
that of intelligence , but we were no less osit1on of the sen
to . l . . correct t 0 dd ses
,iotat allide11t1~a m any c1rcu1:11stances. a that they are
Let us consid er the two pnnciple complai n ts.

We have sensations
.
that arrive to us through th
h . r: .
d
e mo es of e t .
eS"we combm e t e m1ormat10n that they brin t . x enor sens-
, . . . g o us into a · l
d ception; moreover, we d1st1ngmsh them from on
. .
h . smg e per-
e anot er- m add. •
we have the mt1mate sense of arousino- the facultie th r. ' . ition,
. h d o s at rnm1sh them to
us.The scho 1ast1cs a rem arked that external sense b · . . .
· d , emg mtrms1cally
linked to a detennme organ,
. can. know neither the ob·~ects seize • d by
other organs nor
. be consc10us of its own activity · From thi
· th
s, e antici-•.
patedcon~lus1on: T_h~re n1ust be a s~nse, other than the external senses,
chargedwith combmmg all the sensible qualities of the diverse exterior
sensesinto a single perception, differentiating between them, and sensing
the act of sensation. The ancient scholastics delegated these multiple
functionsto a unique internal sense, "common sense." This sense, to the
degreethat it experiences the activity of its external senses, had the name
of "intimate sense" without ceasing to be always the same common
sense.At the time when the peripheral organs were regarded as the com-
plete subject of sensorial in1pressions, while the brain was supposed to
to
harborexclusively internal sensible activity, the opposition b_etwe _en ~x-
temalsensibility and internal sensibility naturally assumed an imagmat~ve
o-
form:on the surface, the external organs in contact wit· h the extenor
n-
world; inside and above a sense on guard in order to grasp the prey of
ds '
externalsenses and to follow the play oft h e1r· movemen t · But as.soon . as
. . . . . hat extent this mter-
the rnmd 1slifted beyond imagmat10n, it sees to w . . bl diffi-
. . . d h s even mextnca e
pretat1on1sprecanous; burdensome an per ap d £ 1 them. Did
cultiesrise from all sides. Aristotle and St. Tho~as ha efrt what it
th · • • h ? 5 ral believe so, om
ey succeed m d1 entanglmg t em. eve p ·u be and later Fa-
.
seems.As soon as our Psyclwlogieappeare , · ·
d R p et au

. . d' tanccdfrom the act


51£,{C0 I I11. l i\ a di po ioon rs
ntmued) Hm\cvcr learning, as ta tiui • . ·· n •chic
Wh~ th · · 11111
•diared1spo~1t1° · n as the ps)
c crmblc character i alw.1y~an 111 . said this: As soo , sJtion is
Poorty intcrpr t d by I)om ) the passage te:-ctua11y . • f the ~cn\es.the st:11.
.. d 10 the power o
ti n ( 1b) ch r.i t r) 1 produce . • since the
~cd J •fi·•rs from intell1genc~lyinvolve
. . I cn c I c neccss.in
•IC!letoi"" y m p in , th.1t phptt~ 11
· ·n ·r: does not
Jl)(C 1gc; l
. 34 CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

ther Elie Blanc517 reproached us for having incorrectly judged as.


.ffi l . Insufii
cient the responses of St. Thomas to t h e di cu ties to which J m k -
. . . b k T d
allusion and which I reproduce m my 00 · o ay, Dom Olivie ·
a e an
. H . n re-
proaches us for the same t h_mg. o_wever, 1 owe _it_totruth to say that
by declaring themselves satisfied with the Thom1st1c explication th '
psychologists are hardly dedicated to e~igh~e-~ng the doubts of th~::
who remain unsatisfied. The effort of their cr~t1nsm ':as directed instead A
against the means that we suggested to reconcile the givens of conscious- it
ness and their ancient interpretation with the most recent teachingsof \
anatomy and cerebral physiology. Our attempt to explain does not please th
them, they declare, or pleases them less than the old Thomistic explica- fri
tion. cit
I clearly see the weak points of my essay; I never hid them; my friends th
bring them constantly to attention; there would be, moreover, very
many other things to say against the theory that they advocate and per- tio
haps very many other things to oppose to their criticism, but if we want- bd
ed our case to be adequate, it would be necessary for it to be long, very tu
long as a matter of fact, and very difficult to comprehend by the readers eni
.
who do not possess amongst themselves the whole dossier of the cause.
In short, it is a matter of making a choice between two opinions un-
doubtedly closer to conjecture than to demonstration. With these freely
discussed complex problems, one is tempted to say: Unusquisquein sensu
suo abundet. I insist on saying that this is not because I distrust the value
of the objections that are directed toward me, but I sense that, unlessit T
is considered ab ovo and with a certain fullness, the discussion would be ac
sterile and, I fear, fastidious. It seems wiser to me to wait until we are
called upon to edit anew and thus to revise our book in order to profit
from the observations of our distinguished contradictors.
But Dom Olivieri raised a more general question of greater impor-
tance in the second article that he had the kindness to dedicate to us. The
debate here is clearly outlined; the discussion will be easier to follow;it
is a matter of the analysis of free will.

Dom Olivieri defines freedom: "The privilege to be of oneself, to belong


to oneself, to be the responsible agent of one's life and acts; liberumest
quod causasui est."518

51 7 · W,: are h appy to fimd the occasion here to offer our thanks to the wise · dire_ ctorfofr
LA p_en see contemporaine. To avoid neglecting other more urgent works, it is impossi~led?1
us. e1ther tO we Jcome
- · . detail the observations that our wor k ins 11
· p1re. raJ
or to discuss m
him on several oc casions.
· lf we are not nustaken
. the present note W1·urespon d to se\eve
of them; th~ atte~tive analysis that he made of o~r teachings on sensation would deser
a eparatc d1scuss1on.We will not overlook this
518. Revue Thomiste S , b ·
, eptcm er- O ctober 1905, p. 454-
RESPONSE TO DOM OLIVIERI

535

When is an agenth "causa sui" and, consequent! fi


h b h. . . y, ree?
Every time t ~t _e o eys 1s.intelligence.
And since_de~ire 1s the appetite of beings endowed with . .
anaCt of desire 1s always free.519 Intelligence,
We were thus wrong to oppose freedom to desire.
Dom Olivieri places his criticism under the patron O f S
· " And forasmuch asaoe m . t. Thomas
O
Aquinas.T he H o 1y D octor wntes: . .
h . ,, an is rational is
it necessarythat man ave a £iree will (Ia, q. 83. art. I). "We touch here ,,
writesDom O., "upon the center of scholastic theory: freed . n1'
b , . 11. . om is o y
thepow~r to_o. ey ones 1?-te 1g~nce; It comes e?-tir~ly from that faculty
from~hich 1t 1s necessarily ~enve~ and to :1"h1ch1t is strictly propor-
tionedm the mode and quantity of its extens10n. How simplified would
thetheory of freedom be if we wanted to recognize this truth!"
The Holy Doctor writes elsewhere: "Tota ratiolibertatisex modocogni-
tionisdependet.Appetitus enim cognitionemsequitur, cum appetitusnon sit nisi
boniquadsibiper vim cognitivamproponitur... Et ideasijudicium cognitivae vir-
tutisnonsit in potestate alicujus sed sit aliunde determinatum,neeappetiusejus
eritinpotestateejus, et per consequensnee motus nee operatioabsolue."(de Ver-
it.,q. 24, art. 2) Dom O. recognizes that, according to us just like accord-
ingto him, the root of freedo1n is in intelligence, but he believes that we
aremistaken about the manner in which freedom proceeds from intelli-
gence.
According to Dom O. "In order for the act of desire to be free, St.
Th_omas is satisfied with r~quiring judgment, the cause a_ndprinciple ~f
action,to be the personal work of the agent. The reasonmg of St. Th. -
mas.•• is · impeccable:
· · des1re
1f · r10 11 ows mte · 11· 1gence and only. causes lts
judgmentto be realized-be this necessarily-it is clear tha_tif _th e lattller
isthe work of the agent 'in potestate agentis, · , t h e act of desire
. , 1s. equa d d Y_
so· On the contrary, if judgment
' . impose
1s • d firom the outside ' a1tun e e
'l'berum
terrn ·
inatum,'the desire that follows is equ Y impo all · sed : However, 1
hether we
eS/quadcausasui est': thus we are free or not deperrcli?g ohnwl · of St.
areor are not the master ' of our Judgments. . Still agam, t e ogic
Thom · · 2
1 as Is Irreproachable. "5 0 1
ss confused con-
fli n order to orient the reader in this always more kor e es let us state
ct of ideas that the response to a criticism of a boo assun1 '
~-----------
519 d
- . p. 450. nable to fin an
~2()_ p . · d in vain; we are u i/, real-
ace. · 457- We reread these last lines that we JUSt cite . hat would 11emsar}
cptabJ. . . t of desire t
ize . c sense in them. After all, we imagmc an ac k f
.t Jlldgnie f. . Id b free' . .15 the wor o
"' nt o intcll1gencc and that wou c : . fits act10n, c 1-
, t pnnc1p 1c o
the .we sav ' th at d c~ire
. 1s. fn.:c:as soon a~JUugrrn:n
.J

h desire chat ·ioht
h . utside, t e
1 agenc·< I . ·d from t e o nt that nug
fl\Vst • >n t le contrary, if Judgment 1 impo c ·ve of a judgeme .d de~ire
nritbe 11l()tfree but I~ equally imposed. But do we co~~e1 oscd from the outs! e,
11tlpr>stdt ie w k f . dgc mcnt unp .
fi or <> th agent? What can a JU
roni the l>llt idc'' h •?
, J-!JLOSOPHJCAL ESSAYS
MERCIER Sp
c.ARDJN.AL

. h ur contradictor has, according to us


ion t at o . L .b . .d . ,
. d. ly without evas . •ntelliaent1s" as e1 mz sa1 , with free-
1nune 1ate . ''spvntane1tas t o
confused spontane1ty, . .
desire is free as soon as 1t has m prin-
O f
dom. No it is not true th at an .act vidently personal wor k o f t h e agent. It
'. a necessan1y, e . . fi
ciple a Judgment, ct of desire is ree.
is not at all true that e~ery s~metirnes freely, the voluntary act proceeds
Sometimes necessanly,
from desire. .. there are some that are necessary because
If there are free vo 1iuons, . only possible subor d.mate to t h e necessary L
free volition from a means is d
s ontaneous volition of an e°: . .
p The first movement of des1re is ne~essary. ..
supervene. It will supervene on the condition that
nly
Freedom can . go on the bounty of the object · o f a first necessary desire
·
reason, refl ectm . . . '
finds a double aspect in it, apperce1ves on one hand _agood m_the object
and judges consequently that the object under this aspect 1s good to
want, but remarks on the other hand that this good is not the entiregood
andjudges consequently that the object under certain aspects is not good
to want. This double aspect, proper to every good end and object of two
considerationsopposed to reflected reason, explains the indetermination
of desire, its freedom.
And is the judgment that precedes volition within my power? Ac-
cording to St. Thomas, it must be so; "if my judgment is not within my
P.ower," .. he says, " my appet1t1on · · w1·11not be any more so· et ideo si1"11di-
cIum coan1f1 ·rt
6 . v _vi u _
i:e (1s _11on · ·
stt in potestatealiayus, sed sit ali1mde ' detenninatwn,
neeappetit11s eJUS ent m potestateejus."
it is not my · h is in my po. wer asfiar as its
Yes, Judgment . exerme . is concerned.As uredly,
of judgmentng t to see white as. bl ack or to see black a white; the object
is imposed
according to my liki 0
n mleh,1 do not have the freedom to pecify it
6ut
my reflect1oneither to h . ave the f:acu 1ty to apply or not to applv
. ng,
f w at 1sgood O t O h ·
0 my spontaneous desir d r w at 1 defective in the object·
med_eci ·deellYto chose the ob· to prolo ng t h"1 app 1·
e, an ICation until it ple,1e
med1ately.deci·des my free v ~ect · Th e Judgment
. . or. to reiJee t it. · that im-
R eflection is · 0 1it1on 1s th ·
only possibl fi . u m my power.
correct to sa . "p e or a p1ritu, l b. .
quodratio, 1·Y· ro tanto necesscc~t d Ja u ~ect. t. ThomJ. - 1'- chu
reason isfi
ia ts est" Th·
·
. quo w, 110 sit. 1·1 . . .. x /1lic IJ')1)
.
1s does not 1 1 >en irl>1tm
freedom. · orma1lyj,rce,. t h'1s means thnean to · ay t h at C\'t'l)' ,Kt directed b\'
"Rationality"
. .
at rca on is th (
· c P ychok gic l) n'11t)t
,-
free Wt·11: its ffi Is • the ,.,uffi1c1cn
.
capable of uflic1cnt rea on b t and necl: ,arv1 ps
re cct" . c aus h ·
agent is capabl ~011; lts ncccss c t c rea on,,bl
e o rrflection M ,1ryrcason be au
· or ovc r' t }1t· utTid
RESPONSE T O DOM O
llVIERI
537

. reason of free will is contingent good li .


·ective . . h ness, nuted ll
J xist withm our reac . These two reaso to a the goods
chate, . ns, one p h 1 .
biecuve, comp 1ement one another syc o og1cal the
other O J • • • '
Everyconcrete object bemg a good and bei 1 .
.on can consider in this object both its gngdon Ya partial good, re-
·h flecti from this, .
the reasonable agent only has t 0
oo ness and 1·t d r .
k s eiective-
nesS• . provo e th ·
. reflection on the objects offered to its desires . d e exercise of
its m or er to h
becausethey are good or not to want them be cause the a want t _em
insum, in order to want th em freely. Y re defective,
We naturally imagine here the words of Leo XIII · h. E .
"Wh d h. m is ncychcal
Libertas: atsoever goo . t mgs there are on earth , reason JU . dges that
each. and everyone can . exist, and equally cannot exist·, and th ere1ore,
r by
that thisvery fact, dete~mmes that no~e of them must necessarily be laid hold
rre, of,and so has furmshed to the will the power and option to chose what
ect it pleases.But, as regar?s the contingency,as it is called, of these goods we
ato havespoken of, for this reason man can judge that he has a soul, which
ood isby nature simple, spiritual and partaking in thought."
od If we are not mistaken, there is an error at the base of all these criti-
cismsthat our kind contradictor addresses against us. At the start of his
rn
article,he appropriates the words of the ancient scholastics: "Liberumest
on
quadcausasui est." We adopt this with him.
,\(-
But according to him, it seems that the formula signifies: The agent is
freewho finds in himself the principle of his actions; "causasui" would
my
thusindicate an efficient cause. The fairly liberal translation 521 of the au-
11di-
thorsuggeststhis interpretation; his method of arguing requires it.
11n,
. However, in the thought of Aristotle, from whom this bit of s;ntence_
isborrowed, "causasui" avroD EVEKa,designates a final cause. 'Av0pw
rro) tA€v0€pO~6 avroD €V€KG KGL µr; d,Uov.522 Freedom is co~-
paredhere to slavery. The slave does not work for himself but for_his
master.The free man works and acquires not for another_bu~ for him-
self.523In th e expression. "causasttt,
. ,, causa1s
· no t m· the normnative
. case-- .
as h b · h ablative case, st11
t e translation "efficient cause" assumes- ut mt e k
callsa ve[gratia;it is a question here of the endfor whichth e agent wor s.

W
to _ehave trouble comprehending how Dom ·
.d nu_sunderstandthe distinction between th e fr~e a
O
:J
i ht have been able
the voluntary, to
ntly that de-
1 encfy
1 spontaneity and freedom, an d to mam . t tn conseque
a . "The voluntary,
sire" · tten·
is a1ways free." He criticizes us for having wn ·
521 " . . belong to oneself,to
ot "'
· Free I
com,
" h
e wntes "was for the ancien • . 'Libenunest '1110d ca11M
· t the pnv1legc to

I' on 1• ' f ' rfi and actJOJ1S. S 457
u1 e , ese I, to bl.'.the re~pon 1blc aJ?Cfllo ones I e '
t
' d anent.) p. 454· cc P· ·
ti
s22' tw It·l "' (It I We who me ttahc, • wit· h cJlC, words to an ,\
1

2.\.s 11,capII.
I <>te7.
( Hnl ·, \L 1JIHIIN's l'HIIOSOl'lll(AI f'i\ YS
'i '

in thl' 'itrict JCccptJtKC ot t!~l'


\\
ord. i" what nen•1,~arilypr(>eccdsfrom
tk irl' umkr the dm:ction ot mtdhgcnce. he properly voluntJry ant.·-
dudt·-. con..,tr.tint ,rnd ,1 bck of con c10u . nes, on the one h,md, ,llld frt • "'it
(I

dom on thl' other."


But, 111 Revcrl'nd I ,1tha. tht·n.· i not ,l 'iinglc word to be t,lkl·n fro111 b
thl', · two ltm:
11
1 ,,/,mt,n}'-.ignific,. 111 ,1 ,l!Cllcm \c:mc. th,1t_which procc:c:d,from dt•\trc:
dl'\ltl' ,ii,;nifil', n.w,on.1bk ,1ppct1tc. evc:rythmg th,1t prnt c:cd~from ,lppe. d
me gtmkd b · re.mm I'> volunt,uy
1Imvl'H'r, n:rt.1111 olu11t.iry ,1cts ,m: 11eccssary, ,rnd others arc frt·t·.
I h1.:former .m:. in ,1 ,pt·rt.11ddirntion, strictlyspc,1ki11g,voluntary, pon- 1
t.mcou,; the ),lttn .ire: opposc:d to th · former and ,1r • called free. p
ho ,m1on!,rstthe srh J.1st1c-;cvc:r denied this d1stinct1on?
l t·t m li,trn to t. Thon us. Voluntary excludes comtrarnt , nd 1gno-
r,111<. of thl' conditions i11which the exercise of de ire employ, melf:
"J "olo11t,11i11111 Fidct11r cs c n!i11sprincipi11mest i1tipso operante(et sicexcl11ditur
1·10/c11ti,1),
it,1ta111c11 q11od11>sc opcm11s sciats('<it!as
cimm1stautiasq11a:conwrnmt
,1d<lJll'rc1ricwc111 (ct per hoc cxc/11di tur ig,wrantia qtta?causalinvolw1tarhm1)"... d
"011111c id est vol1111tarirm1 n1i1s1principium est intra cum scientiacircwnstantiari- 0
11111.
"S24
l3ut volunta1y thus understoo d , "voluntariun1 cujus principimnest intra
mm cog11itio11efi11is,"is necessary or free: it com pr eh ends voluntary, "in
the trict acceptance of th e wo rd , vo lunt ary th at is on ly voluntary, and
oluntary that is free, velle and eligere. Every free ch oice is volun tary "el-
('<ereest velle," but every vo lunt ary act is not free, "non omne velleel-
" 525 This is how St. T hom as expr esses him self: "Genus electionis
('<ere. est
uol,,'.itari
um, quiaprcedicatur universaliter de clectione et est in plus. Undeonmis
l'lect,o est quoddam voluntariwn, non autem omnino sunt idem electio et volim-
tariumsed voltmtarium est in plus." Eve n childr en and anim als commit vol-
~ntary acts, but they do not commit an act of choi ce because they are
incapable of deliberatin g. " Pueri et alia animalia communicant voluntario,in-
q_,w11 t"'n _proprio motu aliquid spo11te operantur; non autem communicant elec -
flo,~, ~It/a 110 n OP_
erant1'.r
ex deliberatione quad requiritur ad election.em."
. e~ire has as its obJect the absolut e good th e end· free choice has as
its obJ1 ect on e go O d reIat1ve
· to another good' the mean ' s that lead to an
end. W e say· I want t 0 b h , .
· e appy; w e do not say: I choose happiness.

524 - " Tile ho111o propric dicitur / 'b · 011 · nitn


domilloru,n Sllnf et d '. er '111111 est alterius causa, sed est cause suiipsuis. Servi e
lio111i11
es sunt 5, 11•1• propter o111111
os ope t . . . . .
ran ur, et e,s acqu1ru11tqu1cqu1d acqummt. t L 'beri autem
• psorum 11tpot e 5 1'/ 11· •
11 M J ]cct.
4. ' acq irentes et operantes." St. Thoma s, in XII et. '
525 . In his Swn TI I .
ma 1eo og,ca ([ a Ila: . "I ·s evi-.
dent that the will can b ' · 9- 8, an . 3), St. Thoma s says expressively: t 1
· e moved to th d • . . whereas
It cannot be moved to th e en , Wit 11out bemg moved to the means,
e mean s, as such , unle ss it moved to the end ."
RESPONSE 1 O DOM {) J IV ,
- ll :RI
539

., rio[tmtaset electiopertinent ad unam potentiam .1.


v, d' . Sd l 'sci icet ad ap ,(
ui volllntas wtur. e vo untas nominat hui d' pc itum ration-
a/etH ,q l l . :J usmo t potentia,

wm11. 1 bo,wmabsoute; e ectw. autem nominat actum 9.usdem pate t'actumrela-


. b n seamdiunquad pertinet ad nostramoperatio n UP relatu,n
Ill ot1111 u l . nem, per quam i l'
m ordinamur... v o untas magis estfinis ' quam ei•t d n a iquod
bonI'electio :1.S quo est adfi
estsolum eorum qucesunt adfinem non aute . . fl . nem.· •
Sed . d l . fi . ' m tpsws ims Volu
essefeltces, quo est u timus tnis, et hoc dicimusnos v ll S d · · · -
,11115 • fi 1· e e. e nonconvenit
·1ce•e q,wd eligamus nos
h? esse e tees. Ergo electionon est ·de l .
1 m vo untat1.
d ,, , . "s2r,
Is this clear enoug .

TO conclu. de, we will return directly to th e th esis· that Dom 01·1v1


·en• op-
posesagainst ours. . .
Objection - The Bened1ctme professor writes: " Velieand eligere for the
ancientswere two equally voluntary acts, and we would consequentl
notbe able to find support concerning this distinction in order to oppos~
freeto voluntary.
Respo nse- Let us make the distinction: Velie and eligerewere for the an-
cientsand are for us voluntariesin the genericacceptance of the word, con-
cedo.
In a strictacceptance,5 27 velle is not opposed to eligere,nego.
Objection - "According to them, freedom would seem more like an
obliga tory attribute of desire, and necessity would seem more like an ex-
ception."
Response- On the contrary, the necessaryvolition of the universal
good anticipates every series of free actions, is contained in every free
volition,is the first reason of every desire of choice. "Id quad estpropter
sebonum et volitum,estfinis. Unde voluntaspropieest ipsiusfinis. Ea veroqua?
st;ntadfinem, non sunt bona vel volita propter seipsa, sed ex ordinead!nern.
Lttde voluntas in ea non Jertur nisi quatenusfertur in finem: unde hocipsum
quodin eisvult, estfinis. "528 .
It · · 1 t ry· it 1sthe no-
tsnecessarythat one not depreciate the stnct vo un a ·
blestact of desire. .
?bJection- "However by the simple reason that desire is th e appetite
ofint u· ' . d 111
. d ce and by nature
a . e igent beings , it cannot be determine a van
Ulllquedesire." . .
Resp O th contrary it is nee-
es onse- This propo sition is erroneous. n e ' to want
th5ary to say with St. Thomas that desire is determined by ~atudre dhere
e good· . 11 d termme to a
to th fi Ill general, just as intelligence 1s natura Y eh . llect· for the
e 1rstp · • . d to t e inte ·
PtJnc · nnc1p1es. "This is evident m regar I like manner
ip1es of 111tellectualknowledge are naturally known . n

, In fl! r .
~2r
127 ~· / -llur ht 4 .
52 °11111 ll nrcin,;
,, • . . ~.., 8 are. 2.
• 1b1d. ~ e t lfJ.<111 .J11111. •\un111111 thcol., 1J - , q. ·
, 's p([ll osoPHICAI SA VS
l MERCffil 1
CARDIN A

ovemcnts nrnst be omething naturall


. f luntary n1 . h ·u d y
the principle ~ _vo ood in general, to w~LC _h t e WI ten s na_turally,as
villed. Now this 15 g_ b . , ·t· and :wain 1t 1s the last end, which stands
\J
es each power
to 1ts o 0ec ' '
h. i:, fi · · I
"ppetible as the irst prmc1p es of demon-
do .0 to t 1n c,5 ,, '
in the same relati ? . 'blo> " 5 11111mathcol. Ja 2,1.\ q. IO, art. 1.
. 111te 11 1g1 e ....
strations to thmgs . f rther: "Est q11oddumbonum quod est propterse
. . ft .
T I1e H o ly Doctor . . says , L1 Ii ibct rationc111 11/ tn111 et Irn;usmo
_ 1111s; . d', bonaex
.,.. • ,r re/1C1tas,
appetwi 1c, sic, .I' I q11a <
t .. ,,aturali 01 ;,n q11ada111
.
necessitate onrnesappetunt
.
11cms1tatc . ' . I
1111aerct vo ,111 as.
/' ,a bona qt1ibt1s
. .
11011cx1stent1bus,non potest aliquis
esse.I'rc1;ccs
. ···
51esse11t
.
a ,qi '
it ex ecessitate appe1 •&1.1ia. et max11ne· apud eum qui
11
. , re/,x /ia'ccftalllessei . . zt· .
es5cJ' • ' . , . r· etfiortctalia rnnt esse, ~ et 1nte igereet s1qua alia
ta/emord111cm P mpere·
1 -
s1111f 529
sirnilis." . " . .
,.. • "Therefore " concludes our contrad1ctor, desire 1snever
0 u1ect1011
- ' . . ,,
deter~ninedby a unique want: thus, It 1s always free.. .
Then he adds, "And we do not see but one possible except10n; this
would be the case where an object, amassing in itself the entire being,
would be presented to intelligence. We could thus say that it exhausts its
capacityas well, and consequently, as that of desire, which would be de-
termined from this moment on. Beyond this hypothesis, we do not see
that an act of desire might not be free."
Response - Once again, how can our distinguished contradictor al-
low himselfto write, "desire is always free"?
On the contrary, it would never choose a means with freedom if it
were not spontaneously determined from the want of good in general.
Wh~t t~,e.autho_rad~s and calls a "hypothesis" is not at all a hypothesis.
111 rea1'.ty, ip_sefims se habetin appetibilibus sirnt prima principiadem-
11It1mus
onstrat1011um
Ill intelligibilibus." '

To this first complaint dir d . . .


action, Dom dd ecte agamst our psychological analysis of free
O · a s a second
In the examination f fr · to the exercise of free w1·u
one re 1atlve .
O
second nature virt ede~cts, we should have included "habits," that
d , ues an vice R ..
e our response to se b. s. . ecourse to habit would have facihtat-
1
lf we had treat d vera o ~ect1on .
the cnt1c1sm
. . . of our e diex professo
. . mora 1fireedom, we would have deserved
st
psychO Iogy. Our goal wmgu1shed correspondent. But we were study111g .
f
of psych Ol0<~ica
. l freedom· as thto fianalyz e t h e fr ee act, to scrutinize the nature
o good
. orb a abits tl1 ec irst free act, w h'1ch precede the 1cqu1 ...JtlO!l
db '
Ob~ect of O . ' ere1ore had b, . . ' ·
man h ur analysis.Tot , . to e the pnnc1ple. if not the muque
or t e ev·11 111anuse th ·
reat vanabl e' con d'1t10ns
. .
in which the virtuous
eir moral fire, e dom . eemed to us to be beyon d
RESPONSE TO DOM OLIVIERI
541

thescope of our work; to speak of it would have been to encroach upon


thetreaty of ethics.
We do not want to put down the pen without addressing to our ed-
ucatedcolleague the expression of our cordial esteen1 and our grateful
sentiments.A superficial appreciation that asks no more than a vertical
glanceof the table of contents is hurtful to the person who is the object;
on the other hand, the passionate and courteous contradiction assumes
anattentive reading and is a testimony of a well understood interest for
theauthor to whom it is addressed. This n1eans that we are grateful to
DomOlivieri for his comn1.ents; we did not hope for anything better.

D. Mercier
Modern Consciousnesss34
ry,
Lecture given at the meeting of
' Past
~ Vir~ the Young Lawyers of Antwerp.
l Your 28 APRIL 1908

c1er Editor's Note: Invited in April, 1908, by the lawyer Laurent Fierens,
President of the Conference of the Young Lawyers of Antwerp, to de-
livera speech at the general meeting of this group, his Eminence Cardi-
nalMercier chose as subject "Modern Consciousness." The meeting was
held 28 April 1908, at 8 p.m., in the room of the Crown Court in the
Law Courts of Antwerp. It was exceptionally well attended. After Mr.
Fierenshad spoken some words of welcome, his Eminence took the
floorand expressed himself in this way:

Ladies,Gentlemen:

Letme at first express my gratitude. I thank you for having c?me to this
palacethis evening in such a large number. I have not seen m you~ ea-
gernessa feeling of weakness. You have remembered 535 your old umv~r-
. pro1essor
sity c: and you have wanted h1n1, . t h roug h your presence ' toId
relive
the happy years he spent an1ong you. I am p Ieased t 0 find my o stu-
dentshere and I am proud of them. . d · ur di-
1
I also have a feeling of pride at the thought that we me u e m O ·cy
oceseof Malines not only the capital of the kmg . d om, but also your c1 '
Antwerp h. h
I · • ll tual traditions, w IC
am glad to finally see that the moral and mte_ e~ Th whole country
area . ·1 d 'thin1t e
Pnv1ege of this city are perpetuate wi . · f. onderful port,
Waspl d '
c . ease to learn about the imminent
. ex t en s10n o its w
torit knows t hat its
. prospenty• depen ds on it ·

-----
534
·Lac
2~Ap
5 ri 190g
~---------

.1 onsc1ence ·
, d Jeune Barreau
moderne. - Conferencedonne, a /'assemblee u
d'Anvers,
d h. and
d roun im
35.licrc h. 1 ers who crowde Ii~ Universityof
aniongt c speak r addre ed the numerous awy · 0 f the Catho c
Lou~ Whornhe recognized many of his old students
ERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL M

ot live on bread alone. It is necessary th


ople d o n .c at th •
However, pe t stifle their concern wr moral duty. Tha k e1r
. erns do no l b . n God
matenal cone . here in such a arge num er m order to I' ,
when I see Y~
u com.mg h .
h I realize that among you t ere will always
1stent
_0
f h1losop Y, l Ii h . remain
°
a lesson P b
noteworthy num er ~
f this intellectua e te t at constitutes the h
onor
a £ e of the nat10ns. . .
and the ore k gain and I immediately enter mto my subject
Thus, I than you a .

. .th what is consciousness?


To.begin_ wi
Consciousness, ' i·n psychology , is the science of what happens insideof
us. In a wor d , 1.t is knowledge . . of the self .
According to this defimt10n, modern cons~iousness would therefore
be the knowledge that modern society has of its~lf .
But is there a modern consciousness? Is there, m the society where we
are, in the age we belong to, a soul whose heartbeat we could hear, could
become conscious of?
I know very well that there is a popular psychology, that is to saya
studyof the more or less irresistible currents that run through the major-
ity of the population, arouses them and often leads them to act in ways
that we could not sufficiently justify by simply adding up the actions of
the units which compose them. We attribute so vaguely to the majority.
vol
as
th su~h,so~e distinguishing, conflicting individualities, the result being
at It astorushesus and it seems that it furnishes us by the fact of its in-
gn
coherent cluster onl · · al l . '
N ' Y a prov1S1on exp anation of the phenomenon.
ot long ago, I read in the history of the pontificate of Pius IX the
a
accountof the ass · · f . h
Roman people did assmation ·o his minister ' Count Rossi. For a year, t·ffe
m
When he left h. alnot nuss an occasion to acclaim its new pontl ·
th 10
times unharnes~:d ~~e, e crowd cheered when he went past, some-
enough opport • . horses, hung around his car. There were not
W ll unities for them t O fi I .
_e, one day the p ree y express their exuberant JOY-
a~sociatehimselfw· hope had to reassess his consciousness and refuse to
nnglead it a guerrill a- · · ry
• ersWantedag · a Ouensive which son1e revolutiona
:• wash~o addressthe ~insl~Austria. His cour~geous minister Count Ros-
om Is R.i ar iament . , . g
of the h ng. A crowd ,., in a speech of peace and J.ustice conun
C ance vvasgath . rt
of the palacery, the minister, at enng; they were re tless. In the _cou
turned his h ' Wasstruck o hth~ moment he clin1bed up the staircase
art ead soni n t e nght .d . h he
theery.Count Ross·1 e ltliserabfefell s1 e with a stick; and :v en ·d
. honored
It IS d in,
.::,uests collapsed 1n
1'h · a pow 1plunged '- a dagger into his carotld
l
i'
satisfio;e, let's go e gang of a oo of his own blood. Fear para y~~ /
cessi:e ·.But, in theet s go!'' Asfocc~niplice shouted "E fatto! Via! J ,a.
n in the streetsevfening,the rt e crowd, it dispe'r ed. indifferent or
o th crowd fc0 , ' . ro-
e capital rmed again in a hideou P d
' carrying the s, a in in triumph 311
MODERN CONSCl(>Us
· N l:SS

553

. the limits of their cruelty by singing th , . .


ushing .d h C cir hornbJ , .
p 0 f the resi ence w ere ountess Rossi w . rdraiiis in
fro?t. the victim's dagger, decorated with flow ~pt Wit b lwr sons, ,1!1d
ho1sung h. d h.
,-vrh is it that t 1s crow w 1ch yesterday l d
ers, up Lo ti1 .
c Windows.
w y ·u b fi .d f. 1a a horro f .
. h perhaps wi e a ra1 o it tomorrow is fi, , . l l r o cnnit,
wh1c ' evens 1 y proud <)f'.
? lt to-
day. h · 1 fi d ·
Dear God, t ere 1s on y a 1ve- ay interval between P'.)!m
d Friday. On Palm Sunday, the Jewish people : ' unday and
Goo . h d. . . , 11H:n,women . d
dren acclaim t e 1vme 1mracle worker who l)a . ' d • .in
of chil ' . . h h b. ' sst.: among them
do1 ·ng good, restoring sig t to t e lmd, hearing to the d, f
. . h d k . ca ' movc1w:m
t0 t
he paralytics. T e crow ta es off their outer vcstnierits 1
ore . d h. · anCLspread
chembefore ~hnst, un er is steps, and four days later, during Thursday
andFriday mght, now . . the same people . . who have sung · "Ilos annafi/' 1 10
We David!" trea~ the d1vme J~sus ~s a king m the theater, blindfolding him,
uld spittingin his_face, slapp~ng hu:n. _And :-7hen Pontius Pilate, overcome
withcompass10nfor his silent victim, tnes to obtain for him that at least
ya heis not made out to be lower than a notorious murderer, the crowd
or- intoxicatedwith hatred responds, "No, no, set Barrabas free, cmcify Je-
ays sus,cruc!figatur! That his cursed blood falls on us and our children!"
of Ladiesand Gentlemen, here is the crowd with its instincts sometimes
ty, voluptuous,sometimes savage. Here it is such as it reveals itself when
mg givena free rein.
m- You know it, Ladies and Gentlemen, Judges, Attorney General, ex-
aminingmagistrates. We have known it in olden days in the arenas of
the ancientRome. We find it again in the bullfights in Spain. We_ see it
the movingaround in public on days where there are riots. It stamps its feet
"ff in the theater.
Is this to say that they, this riotous collective, have a common so_ul?
Doesa crowd have a soul? Is there one, at t h e very 1east , in a collect1ve
organization,a society? .
D kh · • . . .
. ur e1m, the pos1t1v1st soc10logist, says so. e e • H stimates that society
• d
1sa · • d k annot be exp1ame
n entity suigeneris whose properties an wor s c . h 1 ·
b h ' . A sooal w o e is
Yt e psychology of the individuals who compose it. . . ly
not1'd · · 1 theSIS1snot pure
ent1cal,he says to the sun1 of its parts. Sooa syn d tially
tnech . . . ' h mpoun essen
. anical, 1t 1s chemical that is to say that t e co
differsfr '
M om the components.536 . e family spirit in the
sarnohreover,doesn't there exist, mamfestly, th e s~m . ti·tution in the
e om • h · d cat1ona 1ms '
sa . e, t e same espritde corpsm every e u
rnereoi,.,.., . . . d ? h
u ti ...,..,ent, m the same rcli01ous or er. h B laian s0111, t e
riasn' · 0
• k 0 f t e e i::,·
Fre h t It become commonplace to spea
nc sou/?

536
cf,.DcpJOtgc,
·
R, 1•11e
6 54·
Nco- Sr,>latiquc, February, r9o ), P·
, pHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
MERCIER S
CARDINAL
554
but it is significant that subjects who are
Ladies and G . . entlemen, ditions, su b.~ecte d to t h e same mtluenc- .
Yes, . . alor similar con .
d in 1dent1c effect collectively•
p1ace d e the sarne . h d h . ..
enerally pro uc bl f holding up their ea to t eir miheu, are
g of character, capa e o efer to spare themse 1ves t h e d 1"ffi culties of
es,Men
the exception. . Most .hurnans pr
c. ll w the way of the east euort.
1 rr A n d as every
struggle.T h ey Obedient . . .
1y io o the sight of people w h o are applauding .
k u111tat1on,as . '
example evo ~s who are laughing, who are making ges~ure~, provokes
who are shouting,. hing gesturing people gathenng m a crowd
di g shouting, 1aug '
app1au n ' b rried away and in' their· meetmg · t h ere anses
· de-
allowthemselvesto. hethe ca simple add1t10n .. of t h eir. persona 1 w1s . h es does
velopments • to· w Eh 1C perceptionevery image, . every t·a · · · an action.
ea initiates ·
not explam 1t. very , . .
This is one of the fundamental laws of psychology. 1:'he action, m turn,
in the fom of an example, sharpens the image, the idea that produced
1
it and in this way the collective action intensifies itself.
' When we only see the gross result and that of its initial cause escapes
us, it surprisesus, sometimes stupefies us, and masking our ignorance What
with an obscureword, we speak gravely of the psychology of the crowd.
It is necessaryto go back to the sourceto discover the origin of the cur-
rent: to go down the windings of the river again in order to see the suc-
cessive contribution of the tributaries that make its waters swell, to
measurethen its volume and elevation above the low-water mark.
What i~true in space verifies itself in time.
There 1snot ' in .a deterrnme · d era, m . our modem era for example a giveu
common
However . soul that is a c d .
. on ensation of the lives of previous ' generations.'
first
erful currents •d eras' as _we11as m
' mofcertam . certam. parts of the globe, pow- appli
1 eas and and t
who test its influence .d act10. n emerge, sharpening in most of those
leads ~oa collection of, 1i ent1cal d .. d feel"mgs o f sympathy or antipathy, . an d F
expla1n its · mtensity
· n v1 uals wh O can neit· h er understand and nor
1

You know, Ladi.es and G


0 kilomet
8ocean · that runs
. er~wide, ent-1emenh: th e gigantic· Gulf Stream current,
- its mn 1n rus 1ng fl00 d
its benefi •a1fl er waters are w s across the depths oft h e
land, No ci ow prevents the c arm and . bl ue and melt the icebergs, and
. banksrway,
its and f.from bemg . impn· ountnes 0 f t he north Great Britain Ire-
o its bed saned i h . ' '
warm them the •r
are cold and h n_t e glaciers. But the layers of
path· ' re Would soon' be d1 t e 1nner waters did not constantly
L d. eso1 ·
tot~ ies_a~d Gentlem at1on and death pread in their
e ongins f h en, l w l
rent which o t e Gulf St ou d like to
beneficial spreads over o ream in our n gdoba k with you thi evening
net of ur ge 10 ern .
dangersthat warm and bl neration h society, analyze the cur-
run on society' ue Waters ' s ow y ou where it extcn d 1t ·5
s glac·ial banks.
' and br·mg to your attention the
MODERN CONSCIOUSNESS
555

This is the only time, alas, that I will talk to


varm waters
. and blue layers. Thi's evening . you
I willabout streams, about
\
things, m abstract language, deliberately ' . only tell you arid
· d hil , persevenngl b
In se1ence an p osophy, metapho d . . Y a stract.
. .c h . rs are eceivm Th
take the image
. . 1or t e idea.. Now ' the iin age is . poetryg. nl eyhmake . you
0
its place m science and philosophy. ' Y t e idea has
Moreover, I have to present • . . to my judges , b efiore whom I
day as d efien. d ant, two ll11tigatmg circumstan ces, w h.ich obl" appear fi to-
ain of their benevolence, further their impa r t·a1· . iges
I k or meb a
.--d gr ·
certain. The first is that the lecturer you have add .
sionalphilosopher and that at his age sees the tw retyssm_g
i ity which
_nowto e
you i~~ p_rofes-
. . , en time recidiv1t d
linquents
. as
·hnothing but
d b mcorrigibles.
· The second ~ e-
· th at your president
is
QUessmgwit out ou t, with. surety from the farm•1· iar g1ances of those'
0
men of the bar, my weak . pomts, has. kindly declared to me th at h e w1.11
address,not the Archbishop of Malmes ' but his old profiessor of philos-
es ophy.
ce
What are then, Ladies and Gentlemen, the directing influences in our
d.
modern society? What are the ideas that dominate the intellectual elite
r-
of our generation whose repercussions are livelier felt within our society?
e- Becausesuch is definitely the sense that is attached to the ill-defined ex-
to
pression:modem consciousness.
I distinguish two elements in the contentof modem consciousness, two
givens,if you like, of a vast problemthat needs to be resolved. I distinguish,
'a firstof all, the experimental method, the generalizations that permit the
ns. applicationof mathematics and the mechanics of those things in nature
w- andthe universal cult for the natural sciences evoked by these methods.
se Following this, I distinguish the general, profound, and incoercible as-
nd pirationsfor a moral and social ideal.
nor Some superficial minds have tried to identify these two givens, but
theirirreducibility to a common measure appears to be more and more
nt, evidentand it has posed, implicitly among you, explicitly among many,
the the problem of their reconciliation . st t d
a11d Concerning this problem, the philosopher who had the rongeS an
re- 2 4
greatestinfluence on modern thought, Emmanuel Kant (17 4-rSo ), ~as
of r . f t. g the speculative
P oposed a solution. This solution consists o separa lil
tl,·
, prob! . . h. In other words, Kant
ems of science from those relative to et ics. . d
eir hasdissociated the two givens of the content of consciousness, lil or er
t 0
to ~event, more surely, that they be r~iis0nd erS ~ d. We certify that he
j!)~
. owever, the results did not meet his expectauonsal. d nd that to-
-vr- ha~ in th·15 d · O f 1nor or er a
,L way compromised the foun auons h f: ·th in the
i1' u.iythe h . h dO ot even ave ai
cht ob· , . eir~ of his philosophical thoug t n
~ccnvcvalue of science.
ThePoeticGenius efDantes61
Lectureby His Eminence the CardinalD.J Mercier
1921

Excellencies,
ladies, and gentlemen,

Tojudge is to cor.npare. . .
To be able to give an appreciat10n about the work ofDante Alighieri,
thatis, at the san1e time a correct and plausible one, we should find, in
themodern or contemporary literature, a point of comparison for it. I
confess that I do not know any.
Today,the idea of poetry suggests, at once, that of a creation where
imaginationand sensibility play the first roles. In the Dantesque epic,
theseare in the second plan; the philosophical and theological thought
isdominant.
The most famous works of the last centuries - Shakespeare's trage-
dies,AlexandreDumas' novels, Balzac's novels, Victor Hugo's epics -
alldeny any moralizing intention. The Divine Comedy is essentially of
moralinspiration, an apostolic work.
Whatis, then, the characteristic of that genius that all the admirers of
the Beautifulappreciate? What is that transcendent personality mad~ of
thatpeopleand acadenlics acclaim that which the Popes write encyclical
lettersabout, that whose glory gr~ws with the centuries?
th e author of the Divine Cornedy is a nian of science, a searcher for
::: truth._He is a philosopher, he is a believer and a theol~gian._ H~~-
r, he 15 also a man of action· he is the propagator of his beliefs, his
~d~ . , 1
ammated by the inspiration of the aposto ate. . .
1
th he profound unity of the synthesis of intelligence and hfe gives tof
e sacredp o f Dante Ahgh1en
. . . an accent o f smcer
· 1·ry, a strength o
Penetratio oem .
.
hl'itory. n that makes a 'special masterpiece
. o f 1t
• m· t h e gallery ofhterary

54
r .l • · I .
1,~ Is nit po' 14 , , d' • royale de Be giqu 6Jun
· H,1so
1 1
t JtH: de Dante . Lecture faire a I Aca cnue
(1921) 26~- .!89 .
A Study in Neo- Thomism

It wasthe American
· d philosopher, Josiah
. Royce (1855-1916) , w h o r:
nrst
echoedcaution an great expectations for the philosophical movement
launchedby Pope Leo the XIII with his publication of Aeterni Patrison
Augustthe 4th , 1879. 1 The Pope had just died and Royce was worried
about the successor and the future of Pope Leo's philosophical initia-
tions.
Ro_Yce'scaution was P?sed in his_expectations. He made three points.
first, 1fthe progress continued unhmdered, there would be great results
for Catholics and non-Catholics alike. He was quite conscious of the
placeof philosophy in Catholic intellectual life and because of the timing
ofLeo's initiative great unexpected results were obtained. Royce's praise
ofSt. Thomas was unbounded. He attributes to the Saint the highest ex-
pressionof scholasticism. Thomas was for him surely a theologian but
alsoa rational philosophical inquirer. His was an essentially synthetic and
ham1onizingmind. Not only was his erudition, for his time, enormous
but his reflective working over of his massive and often very heteroge-
neous materials was marvelously ingenious and through-going.
Professor Royce saw Pope Leo as directing us to restore the precious
wisdom of St. Thomas; to apply it to the defense of the faith; to study it
in it's original sources; to interpret it and to popularize it.
The Pope is right, said Professor Royce, in using the philosophy of
St. Thomas to combat error; to view and update the contemporary in
light of the ancient; to let the wisdom of St. Thomas shine forth and to
seek out and base one's thinking on the principles that St. Thomas used.
Professor Royce expressly cautioned us to understand the novelty of
Pope Leo's letter and to make good on any assertion about the truth and
especiallythe error of any philosophical position by doing what the Pope
commanded. Namely, to re-establish scholasticism in its integrity, and
secondly, bring scholasticism into explicit relation with mod~rn ~rob-
lems 50 that other thinkers may see the problem as a Catholic thmker

1. Jo\iah Royce: Fu.~itive Essays (pp. 429, Books for Libraries Press, Inc., Freeport,
NewYork. 1920). ce:Article: "Pope Leo's Philo ophica] Movement and its relation to
Mo<lrn1 thought" pp. 40R-429). First printed in Boston Eve11i11
.~ Tramcript,July29, 1903.
srL-D\ IN NH)-11\0MlSM

,,·ottll1 idc ,n1thentic I sc1emes


. etbic1l v,1lucs to be inspired by Ll11VLrsa
1 · , I
1 11
ot.r 10 twht.
~ He .
c.1ut1ons us about moral and ethical' valtI''S
' -..
tl1at ..11.e rat1on
. -·
1 1
,1
vJlucs being .threatened
• l l b strong emotional attachmct)ts . . Ano1 ,c,
l
p l'J · for ,1 patnot1s111
. . t 1at
. 1as some very
. . dcsirablL'
· ' coi 1sequcnccs ; cspc-
I dsbecause p,1cnot1sm 1s ,1 powerful lllJUnction to respect tl1 , I, . f
-i,11\'
l • , . . 8\ C nt CS 0
rhe democratic g,unc. ' ·
'
Girdinal . is quite aw,11-cof this problem · He k nows t h at 1,atreu 1
Mercier
.., and
fi.)rthe Germans 1s dangerous . .
that , ·t o f a11f:a-
hetcrophobia is. t\1e, h ca1
n,iticism. However, the Cardmal 1s no German-hater. He detest s what
rhe)·
. .did,. but he respects them. as persons.
. . That
. is why the c,, . J's pa-
..r d ma
monsni 1sbased .on .somethmg that 1s mfimtely above 11u 11. It 1·s. b ase-d on
order, law ~nd JU_st1~eand t~rough them man 's reason discovers God.
Thus there 1s no bnut to acnfice, endurance and heroism that will serve
V
this absolute. And there is no place for immediate ambitions or insane
- cauti 0
us hatred and the rapture of victory. On the very day Gemrnny was defeat-
ne lies. ed, the Cardinal offered his hand to Baron von der Lacken. The Cardi-
a ~ In
~t 1t elf n~l's lesson is that Pat:iotism and Endurancewill bring Belgium to a
egitin..:
••uze wisdom that allows nations to be strong and prosperous, defiant in de-
~nt thus feat, magnanimous in victory. 84
hon is to
nd peace
Psychological Studies
uncom-
Cardinal Mercier's fundamental project of conducting scientific research
e of the under the direction of philo ophy is nowhere better exemplified then in
·fulne his articles on psychological studies. Reading his Psychology(1 I editions
from 1883 until 1923) and seven of the articles we have translated for this
volume shows how and to what extent he developed a familiarity with
this new science. We find this in his familiarity with the biological psy-
chology of Helmholtz and the more properly psychiatric work of
Wundt, but also an awareness of the problematic of what is now called
the unconscious. He was a student of Charcot in Paris. He also partici-
pate s in an investigation of a remarkable range of psychical phenomena
(hallucinations, somnambulism, association, apperception, etc.) and an
eve r-present capacity to bring all of this into discussions with modern
philosophies of rationality and judgem_ents. . .
As we saw above in hi classic work 111 T/,e Orig111s
of ContemporaryPsy-
clwfogy(l g ), he compared and contrasted Thomistic psychology with
97

, . Sec VanJcvdde, foon: "Con:nn11ntJn~nism and Patr\otism," Etl1icalPcrspcrti11cs (\'ol.


8 ')') CJthohr Un1ver~1ty of Lcuven) pp. t80-191.
~- N _ Scc. () 1..t. 1Lcon
() 1, Nm;l, 7 • : " Le Card111JI Meroer ct I' fapnt de son oeuvre plulosopluque," Le
84 'rti ,·Ile~ I Jmcrttll, np6, pp. 19, 3 17).
I ' I,I/II Ilt'LIII (l > ~ ' '
, ·R's PHI t osoPHICAl 1~s A YS
1
'\l' RlH •
C RDl AI

. . d' ,Tto Cardinal Mercier, the only adequate re-


t · Accor m~
dern curren . ·~ .
. 1· Tl . .
·s from the Anstote 1an- 1onust1c doctrin
1110 . d1fhcnlty come e
spons e to th is . ni of 111an.o:i ..,- .
of the substantial u htyl . t t- d Cardinal Mere1er a remarkable man 86
111
Present- day Psyc . o og1s ~ ho helped < found the field of p ychology in the •

r,. a Ph'lo opher-pnest


cu
e
1 . \ ·hen the discipline C1ocuse d on some very sen-

1 ~~ .
t h , ,,parently able to balance h.1s re 1·
19th Century, a nme ,, .
1gious b e 1· . with
1cfs
sitive . e ·'' ·as <1fand' play a key role 111
. .issues, · movmg· t h e c.
11eld ahead. To
his scientl
. 6 1c tra1111ng ,
,nttir·v aao , hen both science and religion afforded their
G • • •

t 1sover a ce .1 , o , . . .
0 h
dpractitioners ks tlexibility,is most unpressive, and he has certamly
earned our respect. .
As was the custom at that time, Msgr. Mercier proffered a complete
version of his psychological beliefs. For example, Williams James, who
was an active contemporary of Msgr. Mercier, did the same, as did all of
the other leaders in the field. Today, the notion of one person unifying
psychological theory is not tenable, and the most one might attempt is
the explanation of a specific phenomenon.
Surprisingly,Msgr. Mercier s psychology is very similar to contempo-
rary ~sy~hology.The primary differences are: ( 1) the specificity and so-
phi5ticat1onthat experimental research, methodology O and equipment
have added . to some o f h'1sgener al construct , and (2) the ' removal of hi.
co_n~1tment _to~he soul, its religious connection to God and the cul-
mmat1on
differences ofshhfe ldmbthe Be~t'.1fic v·151.on. Further, while neither ' of these
era and even nl ou e surpnsmg fi 1 ·
. ' e ust app 1es to all psycholocrists o fh. 1s
th
by all of today'sore scierecent
t. tlm
M es, an d t h e second has not been odiscarded
R ogers' self conceptnch lSts · daslO\N ' s pyram1'd of human development or
: 0P~ical ideas less explia~lgeb some 0 ~ the wording and made the philo-
M ~ f,or th e individual
1zat10 cit, · utl'we th1n k h'is u 1timate goal of self-actu al-
erc1er defended. imp ies many of the same notions that Msgr.
. However, Ms . ,
hnes
the b. of man gr. Mercier
. Y of today's gene
s psycholo gy otherwise paralleled the out-
ra1 p ychology t b . . .h
they uniqu
.
°
101ogi.calbasis fb
e y separat h
ehavior he
, stressed the
ext ooks. Begmnmg wit
l f ...
0b
~ects. Afte1 h e t e animal k' ro e o the enses and hoW than
tween men and r t en. discussmg . some mgdom fr l
f h . om p ant and inanimate \ ·~n
O
onl.Yman was caanimals bl ' he moved ah .td e sm ·lant1e · · in behavior b e-
11
tern
animals· If you allo pa e £of ' th us clear1y ea d. ffi to foe us on t l1ose actions tl1at
same an l .
co .. a ys1sin most w or th d'
e 1fferences 1 erenti
. at'mg man from ,111 other
gn1tivefunct1oning
. contem
d porary think' m word. ~
. mg. you will hnd that
s s an use oflangua mg, including the •'111phasi on
5
· ee fo , ge '- '·
86 l otnote 60 .
of. ani indebted .
Ne\\ Or!ean to niy collea
for their comment~
gue~ Dr, . (',ayIe and R. I
1<"\ard ( )l •
· ,on tr01n the Uni, r 1c,
A STUDY IN NEO - 'l'J{() MlSM

However ., it was his. metaphysical comm·t1 ment , t hat ~et M , M .


apart from most o f h 1s colleagues and most 0 f d , sgr. etT1er
· to ay s research I10 I
ogists. An d _asso o fiten h appened in that era, the con . · P'-Y( -
of the soul m psychology typically manifested itself inflJ_t aboL1tthe roll·
very existence of the soul, as well as the free "'. 11 discussionsof th<:
• • vv 1 versus etennin. . I
bate that still contmues today. · ism ( e-
His writings,, d on b. those h.topics. clearly demonstrat c h is . ab·i·
1 ity to
" wear
two"hats h anh com d hme L 1s philosophy with his sci, . ence. H is ' l 887 pap<:r
on T oug t an t e . aw .of the Conservation of Energy " was an at-
tempt to resolve the. d1scuss10n on whether thought was a fiorm o t· encr-
'5'!·H~ could hav~ JUSt supporte~ the notion that thought was a form of
psychic energy without mechamcal equivalents in the brain (i.e., think-
ing_v~ould n~t gene~ate h~at), and tak~ the pro-metaphysical viewpoint.
This 1sespeoally salient given the relationship of the Law of the Conser-
vation of Energy to free will. However, he was a scientist of sufficient
stature to evaluate the arguments put forth and state: "We believe that
under the conditions it has been started, the debate will not lead any-
where. This is the conclusion we draw from a critical examination of the
arguments put forward by the two parties." It is interesting to imagine
pow some of these arguments might have fared if the participants had ac-
cessto functional MRI or PET scan equipment and could readily meas-
ure the changes in temperature and activity throughout the brain
associated with different kinds of cognitive behavior.
Two of his other papers, translated in the volume, dealt more _directly
with the topic of free will. During I 883-84, he wrote "Mechanical De-
termination and Free Will" in two parts. In 1904, he sub~eq~ent!:' wrote
"Freedom from Indifference and Psychological Deternunat1on. ~e _set
the stage by writing: "No one dares to contest that there is a certai~ hdn_k
· l henomenon and its 1-
of necessary dependence between a parucu ar P
• onsequently a certam. deter-
h h
verse . . material antecedents an . d .t at t k ere is what c is this. necessary 1in- k · "
rrurnsm in nature. The tnck 1s to now b d n raith rather
. · argument ase o 1• '
B ecause this has had to be a su b~ecuve d d Msgr Mercier
r. . . t be resolve to ay. ·
than 1act, the confhct 1s no c1oser O h ch a rigorous de-
£ Hows· "To stretc su
went on to write his escape as O · 1world is to deny the
terminism beyond the limits of the pu r ely corporeah free will of human
. . . d en more so t e
spontaneity of sensible beings an ev . . f: a1· " His acknowledge-
.. .ahstic at ism. .
vo11t1on and to subscribe to maten . . is impressive; h1s re-
. . " x1sts in nature b
ment that "a certain determinism e · ·. . . !S no pro(rress
0 has een
fter his wnung. ' b
sponse was predictable. A century a ess in the century e-
d been no progr . f d '.
made on this is-me, just as t h ere h a . te that many o to ay.s
r h. · · · -sting to no r } r
l()~e ic;\Vritings. However, it is interc. .. ersonal philosophy ior t 1e1
scientists have unknowingly develope~ a P 1 , been based on Msgr.
, .. . h t nup;ht 1avc
personal and profes ional hves t a
IER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MERC

.. I . -kely that future scientists will continue to do


. , wntmQS. t is 11 1 b1 so
Meroer s . ::, M QT Mercier was ab e to a ance the demands
- tunes to come. so . . .fi
for cen d . e and thus become a s1gm 1cant figure in th
f hilosophy an sc1enc . . . e
0
P. f h 1 gy as an independent d1sc1p1me.
creation o psyc o o . d b h 1 . h. h
th er articles stud1e y psyc o ogy m w 1c Msgr
There are two o . · h . ·
. tt mpts his synthesis of soence and philosop y. The first is an
M erc1er a e · 1 ·
. "S ch" He discusses a few pathologica cases m I 888. My
art1c1e on pee · . . .
es again expressed apprec1at10n that these ideas
psych o1ogy co lleagu
,yould be in a cleric's head over 100 years a?o. .
Cardinal Mercier's queries and speculat10ns concerning the origins
and processes of language and speech are surprisingly cogent when one
considers that their formulations occurred over one hundred and fifteen
years ago. Worldwide communication systems were not developed in
the 188o's; thus, Mercier's sphere of influence primarily was European.
Fortunately, much of the early thinking and empiricism pertaining to
these complex human processes was being developed in that region at
that time by notables, such as Broca, Charcot, W ernicke, and Kussmaul.
Many of Mercier's initial questions in the article entitled "Speech" are
representative of questions asked by conten1porary students of the sub-
ject. The thesis of the article is, in Mercier's words, "what is then the
nature of the interior phenomenon that tells us our language which sim-
ply meai:15the expression of our thoughts?" The answers to his questions
concerrung the r?le~ of auditory, visual, motor, and graphic images in
human _commurucat1ons continue to be fom1ulated and debated today,
even with the volumi nous emp1nc · · al an d sc1ent1fic
. . data available..
r:
Perhaps
d . the . most . compl et e1Y ven·fi e d o f Meroer. ,s thoughts are those
ioun m his discussion · h
speech b child Th c~ncernmg t e acquisition of language and
sounds ,Zith ren. hat :,hildren learn language naturally by associating
many ot er 1orms of · •
explanation Furth h. memones contmues as the prevalent
· ermore is ·•
pendent of speech ex . ' d brecogmtwn that language n1ay be inde-
1
lize gestural signs ;0 c~ ame . Y th e example of deaf children who uti-
' mmumcate the sam .d . h .
to day s classroom lectures H . e common 1 eas, 1s taug t m
people, "it is the sound 1·m· e rhecogmzed, also, that for nom1al hearing
11.sh ment oflanguage " R age t at tra fi
d. nsports rom thought to the estab-
. . . ea mg and w.. .
academic skills acquired th h ntmg language are now viewed as
uti·lize visual
·
and graphic· roug tea c h mg · and learning. Althouoh they
a d. . Images they I o
u itory infrastructure. Th . ' are argely based upon the orioinal
man I • ere 1stoday 0
. k anguage Is spoken and bas 'd ' acceptance as fact that natural hu-
Im age de l d · · < • c upon 'soun d with · ai1 aud1·tory-vocal
1 ti · h · ve ope m a do mmant h · ' ' '
e t, wit m the temporal and fi emisphere of the brain usuall th
damageatc 1.th rontallobe D· . '
di·•o d, er end of the tract ofit ~- is olution of the linkage or
, r er . en re ult · 1
111 anguagc and/ or peech
A STUDY IN
NEO-THOMISM
639

~ ercier's use of pathologicall c .


readm g and w riting to illununat:th al~:~d d~sordersof language, speech,
our language" was in its infancy . he llltenor phenomenon that tells us
. 1 . lll t e I 880' T 0 d ,
t h e b ram es10ns that produce . s: ay s understandings of
I .
are so mew 1at different. They neurogenic
b dis· or ers o f communication
d
. are ased not 01 11
o f a fcew cases with autopsy fiit1 d· b Y upon the observation
·h · • mgs u t also
wit . ngorous scientific empi·r·icism · ' and non u~on many . . cases studied
mques, such as CT scans, MRI's and PET -mvas~ve imaging tech-
on ly structural sites of lesion but 1 bscansto visually evaluate not
. . , a so cere ral blo 0 d fl d
hsm durmg communicative activity. ow an metabo-
A new concept, not readily apparent in M . , .
of that time, is that of apraxia This di.so d efrciers work or m others
< • r er o motor prog · h
become understood as an intermediarv proce b h rammmg as
h avior · b ·1 ss etween t ought and be-
or etween language and speech Beh · · 1 d.
. . . avior, me u mg speech re-
qmres_ a programmed senes of neural impulses beh" · ·
c v. een intent10n an t e
d' h
resultmg voluntary, . controlled movements , whethe ·t b
r i e construct10n ·
of a block desigrr or the spontaneous utterance of a sentence. Some of
the l~nguage and speech behavior in the cases discussed by Cardinal
Mercier are now better understood utilizing the concept of apraxia.
Broca's famous patient Tan, is recognized by many now as having had
an apraxia of speech because as Mercier noted: Tan " ... heard very dis-
tinctively the speech of persons he was speaking to, could read and write,
did not show any pathologies of intelligence and made himself under-
stood with gestures and writing ... even though the muscles of his tongue
and larynx were not paralyzed, he could only produce inarticulate
sounds and his eternal, monosyllable tan." Broca, in 1861, described the
condition as a loss of the "special faculty for articulated language," refer-
ring to the loss of speech, and he labeled it aphenua. Despit~ Broca's ob-
jections, Trousseau, in 1864, coined for it the term aphasia. Although
Broca concluded from his study of autopsied cases such as Tan that the
faculty of articulate speech could be localized to the third frontal convo-
lution hi name became linked to that area as Broca's area, a11d_dama?e
'
to Broca's area, it wa wntten, pro uce
. d dB roca 's or motor . aphasia.
. Stnct
. . f h occurs m a relative1y pure
interpretation pecifies that apraxia o speec . . . . .
h · with 1ts lingmstic compo-
fom1 such as with Tan, as does motor ap asia . d d. prehen-
d ·· nd 1111 1 au 1tory c0111
ncnts of agrammatic speech an wntmg, a h two conditions
sion deficit, not exhibited by Tan. U~fortu~ate y, kt enlyfor astute cli-
1
d. a:,
c.
ir quentlv coexist . .
makmg tucrenua· l diagnosis ' a tas o
. K , ote' "irom-.
. ' , '· a has1a, earn wr ,
nic1ans.In a rct ent ch.1ptcr about Broca s P. , r to have the
III • ·i d b 13oca did not app1;:a
c y. the first t aticnt dt.:scn)t' Y r ' . • debate 1bout Bro-
,
}ndr,,111 th.it be 1rs his 1umc. "87 Th u · t hc, hngenng~ ' .

•. J -r,~nd t'ditJOil, 1997 .


. I 11/ill(' /) /l(JTI ( .• -
. I{ ·rr1 It J, Ill 1//dUclar,·cli 'mr,11!1111,·
...111~ i; .
CIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MER

. of speech continues.
ca's aphasia and apraxia ry studies have indicated that rather than lo
R esults of. contempora . r 'fi ca1-
. h b ain being responsible 1or speci c language a d
. d .t s within t e r . .b d . n
1ze si e . h b ain contains circumscn e areas which are r
h function, t e r . e-
speec. c: h fi ctions with overlaps occurnng. Furthermore hu-
sponsible ior sue un ,. . . 1 .h 1 '
. t hysiologically identica wit respect to anguage and
man brams are no p . . . h h d
r the locahzat10mst approac to t e stu y of brain
speech Th ere1ore, , 1d bl .
function. · popu 1ar m
· Broca and Mercier s. era e to n1any . . .md ends , and rf"hereare
al
has b een rep1aced by neuropsychological/ neurohngmst1e approaches l ·
. bio_logl~f
L
linking areas to one another function~y, d~pe?ding upon the require- 11
nit1°
menst of the particular process under mvest1gat10n. . , .. . van Riet
More than eleven decades after MerCier wntmgs concernmg his
er's philos
thoughts about the origins an~ proce:ses ?f language and speec?, we
servation-
continue to admire and appreciate the mfimte nuances of these umquely
human behaviors, and to study their mechanisms with growing, yet still rnovesfro
infantile understandings.88 external c
In the article entitled, "Criminal Suggestions," written by Cardinal and satis
Mercier in r 897, there follows the theory that a person under hypnosis descriptio
will not do anything against their value system. Although the psychia- being, he
trists at Tulane University in New Orleans do not know of any study only the
that would validate the theory, they are of the opinion that it might be constitu
possible for a therapist using hypnosis to deceive a patient and persuade stantial p
him or her to do something he or she ordinarily would not do. Yet, the the spirit
doctors were reluctant to assert this because they would not know how dualism
to. clevis~an experiment to prove it. There is no acceptable research on or the p
this subJect. At the moment, all we have are anecdotes. The courts in
The
Ame_ricahave regularly denied the claim that "hypnosis made me do it."
show th
If this could be admitted in court, the possibilities for crime would be
endless.89
. The debate in the 19 th C entury on firee will .
and determimsm . • r
1ound
its most extreme formula( • h
suggestion C d. i~ns m t e controversy over crimes caused by
· ar ma1 Mercier d d
Bonyard case f A was no oubt familiar with the Eyrau -
caused a sensat:n 9~gTuhis~ 1889 · It lasted for I 8 111onths in France and
· s case as
troversial papers in th fil ' we sai·d ab ove, highlighted
. .
n1any con-
e es of lega1 me di cme · and forensic psyc h.1atry.

88. I am indebted fo h
D cpartment of c r t ese co
- d b
.
ommutUcative
mments to
Diso d
ll
T my co cague Gerald L. Culton, P 1. "
I D
89 . I am m e ted to r crs he U . .
Pita! for his commentsmy colleague Dr · Ed,war d Foruvcrs1ty
Jk M D
of Alabama.
· · Hos-
90 See· Plas R' . · u s, • . ofTulane Psychiatric
· ' ·· ' . cgme: "Hyster· .
Forensic Psychiatry" l
407, r998. <if;;
ta, Hypnosis
, nternationa/ )011rna/
d
111
Moral cnse in French 19th Ccntur\'
and P ycl1iatry,Vol. 2. I, No. 4, PP· 397-
A STUDY IN NEO-THOMISM

M erci. er agr ees wi.th D


qu estion
bly s i n t h e Cardinal's
dev ise r. Bramwell fro . Londd o11~'
article wh.rnh who poses the last two
som ethin an . enment to rove 1C un er 1e h ow cou ld one possi-
exp ·
g agamst their val p that a person under hypnosis did
ue system.

Biological Studies
T_here _are~o articles in which Car . .
b~~logicaJ sciences. These art" l dmal ~erc1er depends heavily on the
c

mtion of Life" and the "L 11~es _areentitled: "The Philosophical Defi-
V an R.iet uses an analysis ofocathizat1on
fi of. the .M ~scular Senses." Professor
t
er's philosophy.91 The Ca d. el rS a~ticle m his examination of Merci-
r ma examm 1·r, 1 ·
servation. Then through -nd . es em steps. First, through ob-
1 uct1on to the " h .
moves from the everyday conce t oflife me~ap y~1calentities." He
external cause to the scientific ~ h orhmot~on without any visible,
· fy. · e s ows t at his research · d
an sat1s
· · mg f to any contemporary b.101ogist . ,s d emands Having
is up-to-
oi
ate
d
escnpt1on o the structure and organi zat.ion °f th e fiunctions
· . of ab.ven
livina
d • h
emg, h e searches . for an exemplary cause · Th.1s cause must explam . notg
b
o y t e material parts of life, but also the complexity of the 1
nl t"t t" " · " Th. e ements
cons _1u 1~g ~n org~,msm.,, _isleads him to an explanation of a sub-
tantla_lpnnc1ple -. a_ so~l. . This way he overcomes the materializing of
the s_pmt or the spmtuahzation of the material. He thus dispels Cartesian
dualism a~ well ~s monism. Thus, he give the Aristotelian explanation
or the philosophical explanation of life.92
n The second article on the localization of the muscular senses merely
in show that Mercier's researchis up-to-date and is respectedby allbiolo-
gists.
Again, the reading of these articles attest to the fact that Cardinal Mer-
cier wanted the current state of positive sciences to be taken into con-
ideration. He recognized them and studied them . The Aristotelian
ynthe is, on which St. Thomas based himself,was basedon an embry-
onic science. Thus, their intellectual effort tried to compensate for the
shortageof data with hypotheses. While science developed,philosophy
closed its eyes and continued to reason from the medieval knowledge of
nature.
Cardinal Merci r strove to overcome this by insisting on the studythof
contemporaryscience. He helped the Neo-Thomist movement by ,s
'" tenc . Hy putting co-scholastici m in sync with the evoluuon of
1

n U111-.c:r
It) Pr
6l
FR'S PHIL\Jc>\Jr11n ,L1L nv;Jt\Y:5
CARDI AL .MERCI .
666

. St Thon1a , appears too strong and d.ffi


_ h.111kino- following · 1 1cu1t
wav ot t v' d 121
'- b the rea er·
to tollov\,' h h beautiful · an d t h e goo d are 1·d ent1fied
· as a
knov t at t e d . cen~
Yet, we· · Platom·c philosophy. It is a octnne. open to perversi·ons
111
tral doctnne_ A forn 1 of it is to be found 111the last two lines f
. mantle sense. . h h b o
111a ro G . Um· "Beauty 1s trut , trut eauty - that is ll
Keats' Ode to a reoa11 . k "122 . a
ye kno, on earth and all ye need to now.

Mercier and Aeterni Patris

On the fourth of August, 1879, in the second year ofhisyontificate, Leo


XIII issued his encyclical Aeterni Patris for the restoration of Christian
philosophy in Catholic schools according to the spirit of the Angelic mer
Doctor, St. Thomas Aquinas. aph
The Holy Father laid out a fourfold task for Christian thinkers. First,
get to know and appreciate St. Thomas. Secondly, call attention to the
arn
great phases of his work. Thirdly, emphasize his directing principles.
And fourthly, show that his doctrine is firn1 enough and supple enough
to adapt itself to all new scientific thought and to make any and all ad-
aptations. It was a formidable task. The Pope was firm and full of expec-
tations.
In Belgium, the very first to respond to this clarion call from. the Holy
Father was the Reverend Doctor Alois Van W eddingen. A brilliant stu-
de?t at Louvain, too sickly to remain in the Society of Jesus, he was or-
damed for the M~chelen diocese and became a chaplain to the King. It
was he who descnbed what qualities the professor of Thomistic philos-
ophy should have at Louvain and it was he who first reco1nmended the
name ofD' esire· ' M ercier.
· Born on the 18th of August 1841, he died pre-
maturely on the seventh of July 1890.
In 1880
i: '
he wrot e a fifity-e1g· h t-page response to the encychc· al• We
have be1ore us the f◄ourt h ed.ition.
· · d.iate
1 Van W eddingen makes an mune
appea to the classic l f · · · H 1·s
conce d . h a sources o Thonusn1 especially Anstotle. e
me wit the d
give to th
· · ' ·
. a verse publicity that the newspapers 111 Be gium
1 ·
e encyclical Th · t ch
the position th b r · e newspapers, ever afraid of authonty, at a
Cardinal M at . e i_everscan think freely. .
ty-four-page . ercier m 1888 ·
rewrites Van W eddingen' es ay w1t1 a · } SL'<-
art1c1e of his own.

121. I am indebted
University fi to my colleag D · LovolJ
,
1?...2 . See· or thc~e co uc, r. Larry Warner protessor of Ar,thew: at
N 11ltncnt:-. •
XXVI!J_· cwrnan, J0 hn Henry·
· ulltvcrJtty
- .· 8kctchl's
, ,,;,pP·
3Io) p.261 . · (Alb,l House. Nt:'wYork. 19 ·
A STUDY IN NPO-THOMI 'M

Mercier had alrea~y _in his ina~g _ur~l lecture of October the 27 rh I 882 ,
utlined in very explicit tern1s his 111s1stenccon freedom of research and
~ e intrinsic-evidence criterion for all philosophical thought. In October
1
of 1 889, in his_S_Peechto t_he Co~gress of Mechelen, he qua] ified even
f 20
further this condition for_ph1losoph1cal work and dismissed as prejudicial
allwho thought that believers were only doing philosophy as an aid to
and under the direction of theology.123
Thus in Mercier's article of 1888, eight years after Van Weddingen's,
he side-steps the adversaries found in the newspaper and centers in on
the adversaries he finds in philosophy. The enemy for Mercier is posi-
tivism and agnosticism. Thus we find him studying positive science to
try to discern if the natural sciences actually limit themselves to or con-
formto the positivist equation of knowledge with the empirically given.
Is there not more to physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy than
mere description and prediction? Must man forgo theological and met-
aphysicalspeculation to concentrate on observation of facts if they are to
arrive at intellectual maturity? Although Mercier has an empirical bent,
which shows him its limits, he is thereby open to metaphysics and em-
ploys Aristotle's two principles of substance and of causality. Mercier's
philosophy is from beginning to end a plea for metaphysics.
Mercier's essay shows how the Higher Institute _w~sfor1?-edat Lo~-
vain. Van W eddingen' s essay has none of this assoc1a~1~nw1~hthe p_os1-
tive science. Again, Mercier, always the pedagogue, d1v1deshis essaf mto
sixty-five sections, while Van Weddingen uses but two. yan W~ddmgen
supplies us with multiple footnotes from newspape_rs,p~11losoph1cal, clas-
. 1
s1ca, many Th · ·
ornistlc sourc , es and German and h1stoncal sources.. Mer- ,
. b 1 Mercier's footnotes update Van Weddmgen s
c1er · uses ut twe ve. h O1 hip at t h e H.1gh er Inst.t
1 u te.
article by quoting from recent sc ars - al f h h "J
ercier's article are an appra1s o w at p 1 os-
Th e 1ast fiour pages OfM . can b ecome m
at 1t · th e next. H e
0 Ph Y was m · th e 19th century an d Wh
. · has been renewe d and what yet needs to be.
traces how scho 1asucism f tion envisioned by the Pope 1s
h the work o renova
done. He shows ow b done by a group of scholars work-
the work must e
?ot done an d h ow h H. her Institute dedicated to research and to
mg together - hence t e ig ppropriate science "already made" and
teaching. This research muSt a

. tl,e Louvain school has attained prestige. The Cath-


fThonusm,
123. "In all the schoo is O ble distance from any ultramontane movement. E\"en
, t 1 rcspccta . I . . l
olic Univer\tty has k cp ' , cik the Anstotd1an -T 1om1stic Onto ogy with con-
if the initial intennon \
vas co rccon . . d . f
fruitful, at least 1t assure a pomt o contact between
0
temporary sc1enci: P roved not · "fi1c spirit
h . tod It favorc d .111aut h cnnc· sc1ent1 · · 111
· Iustoncal
· ,md
• h O I . tboug t an
and Cat
'>OcrH ..e "
philmoptm .al re~l·.1r1..h-:· . •t A,,iv · Laval, 1972, pp. 252) o. 158.
. . I l> r .. Sat101rI
Sec : fh1bJu t, icr c ·
A STUDY IN N EO-THOMISM

~Aercierhad already in his inaugural lecture of Oct b h


[V~ . r ·
dined. in. very·dexp 1c1t.·terms
.. . Oerte27
h
t 1882
oU . his ms1stence on freedom of researc h an d'
the intr111s1c _-ev1_ ence cntenon for all philosophical thought. In October
~oof 1889, in his speech to the Congress of Mechelen he 1·r. d
,, · d.t . .c h.l . , qua 1ue even
c. ther this con 1 ion 1or p I osoph1cal work and d. . d . . .
1ur I h b 1· ismisse as preJud1c1al
who thoug 1t t at e 1evers were only doing ph 1·l h .
all di · osop Y as an aid to
an d under th e rectlon
. , .of theology.1 23
T hus in Mercier s art1c 1e of 1888 eight year s afite v W dd .
. '. r an e mgen's,
e Side-steps. the adversanes . found
. m the newspaper an d center s m . on
h
the adversaries he . finds . m philosophy. Th . e enemy
. f;or M erc1er
· 1•s posi-.
tivismand ag~ost1c1sm. Thus _we find him studying positive scien ce to
, Le0 try to discern 1f. the . . natural . sciences actually limit thems elves to or con _
tian fonnto the pos1t1v1stequation . of knowledge with the empiricall y given. ·
gelic Is there not more to p h ys1cs, chemistry, biology, and astronom th
. . d d. . y an
mere descnption ~n pre 1ct10n? Must man forgo theological and met-
~1rst, aphysicalspeculat10n to co?centrate on observation of facts if they are to
1

~ the
arriveat intellectual matunty? Although Mercier has an empirical bent
which shows him its limits, he is thereby open to metaphysics and em~
ples.
ploysAristo_tle'stwo p~nc_iples of substance and of causality. Mercier' s
Dugh
philosophy 1s from begmnmg to end a plea for metaphysics.
' ad- Mercier's essay shows how the Higher Institute was formed at Lou-
pec-
vain.Van Weddingen's essay has none of this association with the posi-
tivescience. Again, Mercier, always the pedagogue, divides his essay into
oly
sixty-fivesections, while Van Weddingen uses but two. Van Weddingen
tu-

t or-
. It
suppliesus with multiple footnotes from newspapers, philosophical, clas-
sical, many Thomistic sources, and German and historical sources. Mer-
cier uses but twelve. Mercier's footnotes update Van Weddingen's
articleby quoting from recent scholarship at the Higher Institute.
The last four pages of Mercier' s article are an appraisal of what philos-
ophy was in the r 9th century and what it can become in the next. He
traceshow scholasticism has been renewed and what yet needs to be
e
done. He shows how the work of renovation envisioned by the Pope is
not done and how the work must be done by a group of scholars work-
ingtogether - hence the Higher Institute dedicated to research and to
teaching. Thi research must appropriate science "already made" and

i,x-
123
. · "In aII the ,c.hooh ofT honmm , the Louvam . sch ooJ h as att ame · ,d prestige·The Cath-
.
ohcU . ti 1 nane movement. E, en
nivcr\1ty h. \ kepta rc,1)eccable distance rom any u tr,unor
ifthe • . Th · · - Ontology with con-
tnJttal intention wa, to recom ile th e An\totclt.1n - onuSr~c ~, _ b, .•
tenipor ·d a pou1t of contalt ct,, cen
ary uence provr d no t too frmtful , at le.1st It asstm: . .1 d
SC1tnce.1 ( • • I , - . •nnfic spirit m h1,tont a an
hl mu · tholil· thought .1nd 1t tavcm:d .111,ltlt 11:nm c;uc ·
pP p I () c,ph1l I r · e r h "
f h1bdult • 11I ·rrc \ ,11,1/r
1 • . 1• 1<)7 -·~ r11 . ~,~)· 0 • 1•) 8·
l / /J. ltH'Olr• ( 1'r e '> 1,1\:,1
RCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL ME
668
11.iloso
h w It is a never-ending effort of analysis and
r-JO
p d
wor
constantlyrnake t e ne . syn_ [lri.ilof P
thesis. h is vintage Mercier. In it he shows the vision Of h histott of
The last paragrap t e thoug or le
0 re
Pope: is rl1 the co
e here as Leo XIII has also seen, the beginning of th able be r
And so we hav ' . . e d tO
longed for agreernent between sCience and metap_hys1cs,perhaps of a
rie~et us ta
salutary rapprochement between reason and fa~th, and the noble
crowning of the tremendous work of the restorat10n of the Christian ercier saY
N1he
di tinct
s 0
philosophy. t
further .
We are now over roo years since the encyclical and Mercier's initial at-
rnarked, in
tempt to implement its directives. Our vision is different and less enthu-
the part of
siasticfor the implied answer which Pope Leo's and Cardinal Mercier's
visionsgive. Their efforts have made us more modest. I think we can un- cussing th
derstand our increased caution if we frame in all in the following man- Thornas"
duced the
ner.
If revelation wishes to be understood, to become theology, it needs this task a
an understanding of being and of man that does not directly derive from Scholastic1
it. It needs a philosophy in which man is already to some extent trans- the meth
?arent to ?imself; thus, revelation turns into theology when philosophy
is methodically at work within its purview.
The problem for every age, for every generation of believers is: what
philosophy?
F_ora Christian, it would seem to be a philosophy that allows, in some
fashion, at least the following affirmations:
•God exists.
•The world has come from God.
•Human beings know and love. And tal
•There is a discoverabl
. e et h.1cal system, and there are consequences to po e an
human behavior. surpa e
•Forhu b ·
•A d . man emgs, there is life after death. St.
nof, mt general' the truth 0 f reve 1at1on
· will not contradict the trut h
na ura1reason. Yl \
1n1

The apparent problem wi h . ' Ch


that in practice he h l t ~erc1er s endeavor is that it would seern bol
th~ philosophy inv ° dds.th ere is only one suitable philosophy, namely,
His enthusiasm h'o 1ve m. the 1111
. th eo 1ogre
. al thmking
. . of Thomas Aquinas. .
li :y
Th 0 mas uses to ' e is .conv1ct1on regar d'mg the rational instrument that
From w here comes 1icate Chr· t'
xph. · 1s• practically unboun ded·
!sian revelation Furth,
t hat Th 0
. mas has all this enthus1asm.? p erhaps because he genuinely t h.mks Th I
rnonrturnof Leo XIII e al~swers, but also, maybe because he takes the
~o i~rlla Y, too seriously. ' n10 t
\ ith
A STUDY lN NEO-flIOMlSM

No philosoph~ has all the answers, no human construction has said the
_ alword - this would seem to be a reasonable conclusion from the
~::wry of philosophy. However, Mercier apparently thinks that the
thought of Aristotle, as re~ected on and modified by Thomas Aquinas,
i more or less the perfect instrument to explicate revelation and so en-
able the const~ucti?n o~ a viable theology. The only b,1sic things that
need to be revised m Anstotle are some of his scientific assertions.
Let us take some examples from Mcrcier's article. Early in the study,
Mercier says: "Following the lead of Aristotle, no one has better fixed
the distinct character of the philosophical science than St. Thomas."
Initial at-
Further on, with regard to mind and body, he says: "Thomas has
ss enthU-
marked, in a manner as magisterial as Aristotle and with a better clarity,
Mercier'
the part of both body and soul in the act of understanding." And in dis-
~ can un- cussing the role of experience and speculation, Mercier notes: "But
ing man- Thomas who, in a larger measure than any of his predecessors, intro-
duced the doctrine of Aristotle into the schools of the West, brought to
it needs this task an originality and an independence of spirit that the enemies of
ve from Scholasticism seem to ignore or pretend not to recognize." Regarding
the methodology of Thomas:
The method of the angelic Doctor was one of strictly logical demon-
stration; his didactic works are conceived in a more rigorous logical
i : what form than those of Alexander of Hales. Up to that point, in the West,
we did not have an example of such critical vigor associated with a
in ome language of constant lucidity and in which sobriety almost never en-
genders harshness.

And talking about Aristotle: "Aristot~e was the_~rst to ~e cribe the pur-
pose and the object of philosophy wi~h a precis10n which has not been
nces to surpassed." And then Thomas and Anstotle:
· uelcomed into hi two Smnma' all the profound
t. Th Ol11aS A qull1:1S Vv . . .
· fA · 1 h, rectified the maJonty of his faults and errors and
view o nstot e, e .
· d h b the ideas of Augustme and the Fathers of the
improve t em Y · lar, w1·11remam
. particu · as t h e sym-
Church. The . 11111111a T1,coloaim
"". '
111
.
· d m· it re1ects no fnntful theory, no progress, but
bol of Ca tho 1IC wis O ' • d
. ' ll h 111 · cuitions.1 of the human 111111 wit· h t h e supenor
·
d em 1mprt'gnares a t e
melY· light of the Gospel.
qu111J · bout the scope of Thomas' thinking: "When
fl t
thit Furthermore, he _~.1ys~ books on philosophy and on sacred science
JJl ,d. , . ·nnng 1us '
Th om.1s w ,l'i "" · . hi·ch preoccupy modern man were discussed
)bkn1-; ""
chtrl~ 111()<,t o f t h e pn
., Ano1 t h en,
. lf°i:erThoma,:
. . .
. ch \\ 1th p.l~',JOtl.
ER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MERCI
..;ea
dred , .
1iofl b\i n1s
. ld n age of Scholasticism was followed b 00 rcoflle ~ch a
Unfortunate1Y, this go A
e
very learne d Anstote
. 1·ran, Peter of Sy one
. o<ediflto s thel
of repaid decadence_-·· · This manual of fom1al logic ... thought if ~in, e b -..;e
. Swmna7ogicae. h b k fA . 101-
oP..pe 'J.f rriatl
wrote h1s . 1 , Joo-icalworks: to t e oo s o nstotle it add d bt O a oie
proved O
n Anstot e s i::,- • • kh ·11b
With all its spmt, Oc am w1 ase on this 1
e tbotlg_ eoero
· Jesstheses. ... . f . 1ew _1ioes, ·as a1
meam~g d false nominahsm, the cause o the rum of high qlJ:V t.. t ""
Joaic hrs narrow an er hYt11a tie
i:, op the froU
speculation. _ yorid caucioil
Mercieralwayspropo ses Thomas as the solution: "fbe
, \,·as
e'-·efl!

In the XIIIth century, St. Thomas had prepared in his works, which snl d) f\-' o'CO
flaI1ne, - horr
were as pur e as they were elevated, a remedy
. for the failure
. whose s 1n
··corne . rdl
conseque1 1 ce our generation itself experiences.
. . In recalling
. minds to -rhis is ha
t d the greatest initiator of true Scholast1c1sm, of him who realizes
suy .h b. bk h sho\"·nan
more than anyone the ideal, Leo XIII w1s es to nng ac to Chris- as h . ""-ill s\
tian knowledge the magnificence of a noble period. losop ) Abo
a success.
At one point in his work, Mercier discusses the scientific theories of the 0 f Cardinal .~
early20th century, then proceeds to graft onto them the Aristotelian/Th- tent to the 1
omistictheory of matter and form as if were the valid and ultimate un- dured becaus
derlying explanation. Unfortunately, the graft would seem to be very Professor
superficial,and the doctrine of hylomorphism contributes little. eo-Thomi
We should add then, as Mercier says, a concluding encomium:
expre it in
Those who have followed the history of Thomas' ideas know that no entific thou
~hristian thinker has surpassed the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. If sophical de
his works disappeared tomorrow, what master could replace him? So. we h
F~r the whole of humanity, the most perfect system is that which that are gen
b~ngs together the best thoughts of all systems, reunites them in a ing the met
wise.and harmoni ous or d enng, · · ·
preserves thmkmg from use Iess di- laid out £
~essrons, from mystical idealism as much as from narrow material-
ism, and adds to th c. Felician - E
Pl t A . e greatness a tested solidity. In this respect, a1ter
Ouar o, dnstotle was the greatest in the ancient world and Thomas in
mo em · c '
W . tunes 10 r Christian thinkers.
hat are the !mutations 0 f M . ' .
torical context Th . ercier s endeavor? There is a lack of his-
He is not seen· omas is not adequately seen as a product of his time •
. as one among • d
with and almost many m the Middle Ages who, confronte
Jewish thought ovedrwh~clmedby the influx of Greek and I Jamie and
th· k ' use t 1s ne I d'
In revelation and w Y Iscovered rational in trument to re-
the Ch · · present the r, J k f
nst1anconun . r u t a1,<1new theology for the . a e o
h
of t e MiddleAges· uthn'.ty.Al. 0 , Thomas \\as not the ;nly great thinker
somcwh . , ere wer, O th ~ :l
A at different b e ers Just as gifted but who constrncteL
sortstotle,for all his ~cuut~quallyviable, thcol~)gics. And, more b<1sicall.,
urcc of incn md · · I
,tnswl'.rsto h 1 • ' gt'nius, wa, not the final unique nt10n, 1
l ni,in quc,tions. t )4
A STUDY IN NEO-THOMISM

ed years later those limitations are now apparent and b •


Onhundr . . . . , are emg
. . Cardmal Mercier s Institute has d eve I-
o\'ercome by h1stoncal research.
·nto such a research 1nst1tute.
oped I
We have then, through our study of these essays, examined the
thoughtof a m~n who, ba~ked b~ a Pope, and with tremendous personal
qualities,energies a?d ta~t1cal skills,_produced a great victory for philos-
ophythat was and 1s frmtful and with an international renown "far be-
yondthe fr~ntiers of the Catholic Church."
The caution that Professor Royce echoed in the beginning of this
studywas even strengthened in our own time by the Catholic writer
FlanneryO'Connor when she characterized Thomism as something that
"comesin horrible wrappers."
This is hardly a description of the Louvain effort. For what our study
hasshown and a historical understanding of the Higher Institute of Phi-
losophywill substantiate N eo- Thomism in Louvain enjoyed and enjoys
a success.Above all, it has passed the test of time. The pioneering efforts
of Cardinal Mercier and his colleagues gave an original and precise con-
tent to the idea of Neo-Thomism. Pope Leo's Institute at Louvain en-
dured because of that original insight and effort.
Professor Jean Ladriere characterizes the Louvain scho?l's vers~on of
Neo-Thomism by the fourfold concern to deliver what is essen_tial,~o
expressit in contemporary language, to keep it in c~osecontact with ~ci-
entific thought, and to take a position in proportion to proper philo-
sophical debates of the time. 125 h .
So we have as the Stagirite said, in this study touched upon t e topICs
' ' . d h in our own way by emp1oy-
that are germaine to our thesis an we ave, h Id
. . . lf ·ng the new to renew t e o -
mg the method of Mercier himse -usi . h. al world of Desire-
.
laid out for you, dear rea er, d the phi 1osop 1c
.
. . . h Cardinal MerCier.
Felician-Francms-Josep -
New Orleans, Louisiana
July 15, 2000
Feast of St. Bonaventure

. y Louvain classmate, Rev. Dr. Romuald


,flecuons to m . . fA . w, h '
d for che5C re . . he Catholic Umvcrstty o menca, vvas mg-
124 I am inde b te Conun1ss1on. t
. . . of the Scorus . . . .
( ,recn. 0 [ M' _. d Renewal vol. 3, Louvam Philosophical Studies
ton, I)(, nd f)ick; '[rad1t1011 an '
l 2S ~ ·c Bo1Jcau a 52.
'r e,s, 1•J93· P·
7, Lcuvl'll l
ld u:-;~ R 01 ; PHTLOSOI>HICAL TERMS

' f , 1u d C't in se illdistinctmn, ab aliis vero distinctum (S


·~
/ I q. _{ . ,1. 4) ·
) ., 'I
uni. The-
I tdividuation (principle of): That which constitutes a
. ~ , 1 , , . . lf d . . nature an
. J !i,·idu~11,
.
1.c 0111p ctt m 1tse an incommunicable and .
ttll _ . . . . . ' , In the
, ist' t matena1 b 111gs niakes It possible for 1t to be real· d .
·t;niber f b in , that ar really distinct whilst specifically 1tzhe In a
(ll(,l'fl. 11ct. 28 [). F n11a quae sunt recept1b1les . .
in mater· e same
· d.
.
•· hrmtur per 111atena111;
1 quae autem non est receptibilis ·n m 1a, 1n .1_
' ' . 1
indivduatur per 1psa1n ( 11111. Theo!., I, q. 3, a. 2, ad and atena ). '
3 4
Induction: A proce of knowledge which starts with the obs
1u.erent acc1'd ents ex h'b
" tion f the n1any d·cr. 1 ited by a substanceerva-
d
0
di. - rs which of then1 are invariable connected and reveal :~e
pre enc~ ~fa ~roperty (Cn't., 61; L~g., 86 ~). This is scientificinduc-
1;011as di t~~gms~ed_from ~ompl~te 1nduc~101:.In syllogismo accip-
itur ogmt10 a11CuJu uruversal1bus not1s; 111inductione autem
conduditur universale ex singularibus quae sunt manifesta (In J
A>st.A11al.,r. I).
68 Infinite: See perfecti01z.
69 Intellect: Synonymous with intelligence. In a more restricted sense
it means the active intellectual faculty, as distinguished from the
pa sive intellect or understanding (q.v.), and may be defined as the
powerof abstraction whereby the sensible object of human knowl-
edgeis disengaged from its individual conditions and rendered in-
telligible(Psych., 101, 104). Necesse est quod sit intellectus ad hoc
guodpossit onmia intellibilia facere actu, qui vocatur agens (De III
Anima,r. ro.)
0
Intension:The san1e as comprehension(Log., 17).
r Intention:A sort of "intellectual view." In omnibus intentionibus
hoccommuniter verum est quod intentiones ipsae non sunt in_re-
bussedin anima tan tum, sed habent aliquid in re respondens scihcet
~aturam(In I ent. di t. 3 3, q. r, ad 3). An intellectual act is one of
. firstintention: when it i directly concerned with some real ob-
Ject·it is one of a "second intention" when it is concerned no~ wi th
the 0 b' . form it· a sum~s 111the
. ~ectknown it elf bu c \Vith the pec1al .
lll1ndby, the act of kno\ ledge (Loe. 6, not ) . N 0nu·na pnnue m-
t<:nt1n1· sunt qua rebu unt unp . • 1ta. ab o 1ute,.. n1ediante. concep-
t1onc - c . . . . nuna auten1
. · qu H:rtur ir1tdlc ·tu\ up •r 1p an1 r n1 tn e, no _
cundi • . • • b non ecun
dun1 iru nt1 n1s unt ill qu. 1111ponunturr~ u . . quam
(JUo<l10
· c: unt · J • un iun1 quo d su b• tu1t 1ntent1om
int ll
qu . )
,I lt i • ·is (/ (' , ,11. (,u,., . I2 ·
Synopsisof Principal Doctrines

In the Form of Theses Stating the Principal Doctrines M · t · d ·


. 1M · , am ame m
Cardma erc1er s Manuals

I. Cosmology
I. I There are two kinds of atomism: one a metaphysical theory,
called philosophic atomism or mechanism; the other purely sci-
entific, called chemical atomisn1 (9-rr).
I.2 The theory of n1echanism cannot be reconciled with the facts of
chemistry - notably with the constancy of atomic weights, affin-
ity, valency, the phenomena accompanying chemical combina-
tion, and the recurrence of the same simple and compound
species (12-21).
1.3 Mechanisn1 is incon1patible with the ascertained results of crys-
tallography (22, 23).
The mechanical explanation of gravity and the qualities of gase-
ous bodies is inadequate (25-27).
·s not a force nor is it a cause capable of pro-
L oca• 1 movemenh t ·lcal effect· it is, neither
. . .
transnuss1ble nor trans-
d uCing a mec am '
fonnable (30-34).
•· of bodies into matter and form involves no
I.6 The con1pos1t10n
contradiction (3 8-4 8) ·
t' al form intrinsically dependent upon matter is di-
Every su b stan 1
visible (49).
· bas only one substantial fom1 (48).
J.8 Every being
. ·nction may be made between material substance and
Area. l d 1st1
its quantity (57).
'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCl ER
cARJ)INA

tended thing are themselves extended


h rts o f an eX and
1.10 All t c pa d. isible indefinitely (5 8).
. ·onscqucnce IV
JIJ C .
h le are not actual but potential parts ( 59 ).
The parts o f a w o
i. rr
wers of a material being afford grounds for va
The forces or po . d h r-
1. I 2 . . di tinctions bemg ma e among t em (67-7r).
IOU , spccl6IC s
. unity of a chemical compound is a fundamental 2,.5
f. l 3 The essentla1
e Scholastic theory (8o-8 2 )-
tene t Of th
The Scholastic theory is in ham1ony with all the facts of chem- 2,.6
1.14
ist1y and physics (83-9 5-
The order of the universe and the unity of living beings furnish
I. I 5
a cogent proof of the Scholastic theory (96- r or). 2-7
I. l 6 The arguments drawn from the specific div_ersity of properties
and from the opposition that appears to exist between certain
properties of matter furnish only incomplete proofs of the Scho-
lastic theory (106).
r.17 Dynamic atomism is irreconcilable with several ascertained facts
(108, 109).
r.18 There is form.al extension in the material world (113-116).
r.19 The essence of a body is not force or a collection of forces (rr7,
rr8).

r.20 Actioin distansis a physical impossibility ( 121).


r. 2 r Tempusest numerusmotus secundumprius et posterius (132, 133). and
1
-
22 Real space is a relation of distance in three dimensions ( r 44,
145).
2.9 Th
of
2.10

2. Psychology
2. I
Vital
h acts.differ fro m th e act10ns
· o f morgamc
· · muc h a
· matter ma
t ebrare immanent whilst the latter are transitive (10). The first 2. l l
SU ~ect of orga . j'fc · ·
nic 1 e 1~ a matenal nature (13). \
2.2
Sense perccptio 15 · h . · n
is of a hi h n a yper-phy teal pcration; that i to ay,_tt
or orga ~ er nbaturethan any nature of\ hich inorganic bodic -.1 _
nic .su. stances· 0 f t hc v 'gcta ble kmgd
· m , re apao· lc.
1
Neverthcl, .
a11Yin .l mat 'na· 1organ a · 1t· stH~~ct
1
1.:ss,t I csse11t1 1. • ( ·o
51). · . ·
I

e11 nous appetency


. is of a higher order than the nat ura 1 ten d en-
;.3 _·esof brute bodies and of vegetables. Nevertheles s, It
L1 · 1s
• an or-
aanic faculty (68, 69).
"As the ani1nal puts. . forth spontaneous movements , 1.e.
· move-
ments the deterrmn1ng . reason of which is of a psychi·ca1nature
so likewise does rn.an 1n the exercise of his sensuous life (75). '

The first subject of sensibility is a single substance, which is ma-


terial. It is of a higher nature than that of the vegetable (?8-8I).

2.6 T~e c~1nm~n form .al obje~t of the intellect is being. Its proper
obJect 1s denved from sensible things, but is abstract and capable
of becoming a universal notion (88-92).
The intelligence is a passive faculty - potential intellect - which
has to be determined to intellection by some extrinsic action
(96). The determination of the intellective power to intellection
is effected by a double efficient cause, namely, by the imagina-
tion and an immaterial abstracting force, or active intellect (ror).
As soon as the intellective faculty is presented with a conceptual
determinant effected by the double cause, it passes ~ro~ power
to act; it knows, that is, expresses to itself wh_at~ ~hmg is (r?3).
The intellect knows first and directly the qmddities ~f sensible
things, and its own nature secondly and through reflection ( ro4) ·

2.8 The soul knows its own existence throug~ its own ac)ts;it kknows
· upon its acts (107 . 1t nows
its own nature through re flection -- ·
God indirectly' that is, by the process of composition, negation
and transcendence (ro8). . .
ry acts (rro). It is also a pnnc1ple
The will is a principle O f necessa
of free acts (rrr-IIS)· . . that 1s
nscious activity . subJec-
. _
1tan t of every co ·a11:, 1 0f
2.IO Pleasure is the resu . 1 erfect 121 . ( ) There is no speo iacu ty
. .
tively and objective Y P h tates appertain to the appet1t1ve
r: - but sue s
emotion or iee 1mg,
faculty (122). . •deas whilst animals have no
n 1versa1 1 '
has abstract, u . difference of nature between
2. I r Man a1on e , uentlY there 1sa
such idea ; conseq )
· al ( 12s- 1 .27 ·
man and anirn . f]uence upon one another (137).
, ·
005
acts a h , ve an ffi ·ent thoug h not abso1ute contro 1
in
2.12 Man s vao. as a really e .c1 ( 8)
·- free will h ... sofhissoul 13 ·
H is thcr acuv1ue
over the O (141).
. one ,;ub scance
.
2.13
The ego 1~
1ERCIER
's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDI 'AL
-oo

. - ·rual although its highest exalted activity


oul is spin ' . . all '
The hun~an al d free, depends extnns1c y upon matt
. h · mtdlectu an
\Y hlC 1
er
(r.t-3·144, q. ). . . . . 3
. •mple· 1.e. 1t 1s composed neither of quanti-
2.I .
The human ou 11 s1 . , )
.
tanve nor o f~constitutive parts (r45-r47 .
.onal soul together form one single substance
2. 16 The bod an d ra tI . l l. '
one nature or pe rson ( 1so-153). The rat1ona sou 1s the substan-
rial fom1 of this single substance ( l 54, 1 55) ·

2.17 The human soul is not begotten by the parents but created by
God (162). 3·

2 .I t The human soul is by its nature imn1ortal; in point of fact it will


urvive the body, and will live for ever (167-169).
3.
2 . 19 If a purely natural end had been appointed for man, it would
have consisted in a synthetic knowledge of the order of the uni-
verse through its supreme Cause and in the love of God consid-
ered as the beginning and end of all things ( l 70). For its perfect
happiness, the soul requires its reunion with the body (172).
2.20 The supernatural end of the human soul is a direct intuitive 3.
knowledge of God, which is the Beatific Vision ( 17 3).

3.
3. Criteriology
3.1 The truth of a thing 1 · .
· f h . or onto og1cal truth 1s a relation of conform-
ity o t at thing with th 1.d al 3.I
3.2
e e type of its nature (4-5).
The truth of kno l d .
and consi t • . we ge or logical truth is that of the judgment
. s s m its conformity with ontological truth (6).
3.3
Certitude is the firm
and determined b assent ?fthe 1nind to a truth after reflection
th
agreement of tw y e nund's perception of the identity or 3. l
o terms (8).
3.4
The question to be
an we d · ·
very general terms h re 111 criteriology nuy be tated in
are · · · a W ether th 1
Justifiable upo fl . e as. ents we n1ake spontaneous Y
3-S Th n re ect1on (9).
e Cartesian
ogy . statement of th . . . 1
Is not only inco e que tton considered in cnteno -
3.6 1
The quest· rnp ete but contradictory (10).
Ion co .d
t he bond h ns1 cred it . . 1·
t at unites sub·, 1 cntcnoloh"'Yi. re.11Jyt :vofold: (1) '
~c t and pr•·d · · . i • tib-
~ tr tL· m our JUl gn1t.:nts
--,

◄ SY OPS!

701

• > or objective? 2) What value h h


·ccnvc as t e ter
J t'? (Ir). rns of our judg-
111eJ1
. itia1state of the n1ind when einb k .
The lil . h . ar ing upon th .
. riwde 1s not t e universal doubt of th k . e question
of cer . d .h e s ept1c h
. aJJriortan wit out reason the nlind's b. . , w o sus-
pec.ts . 1d b a 11ity to kno
. 10 r the umversa ou t of Descartes h. h w truth
(I 6) , I . . f . . . ' w ic wron 1
to some propositions o vvh1ch lt is inlp s'bl g Y ex-
rend5 . os i e to have
t and rests upon reasons which are quit .h any
dollb , e Wit out value
(I7)·
theory of "three primary truths" is useless as a r c. .
'The . h " h . ,, e1utation of
icislll since t e t ree pnmary truths are not fund
skept ' d . amenta 1
·ses of all our en1onstrations ( r 8- r 9).
preml
The }eaitiinate
o
state .of the mind
ffi when
. attacking the proble mo f
.:.9 knowledgeconsists 1n not a irrmr.ig a pri~r~ either its ability or
irsinabilityto kno': _the truth, but 1n exar~un1ng by reflection the
valueof our cognitive acts and, accordingly, of our cognitive
faculty(:w).
Assoon as we begin to exan1ine our knowledge, we find there
;.ro are some immediatepropositions, which cannot be proved yet
compelour assent (22).

).II Thecriterion of truth for our inm1ediate J.udgments of the ideal


ordermust not be extrinsic, or subjective, or mediate, but it must
beintrinsic, objective and in1D1ediate (23).

;.12 Inthosecertain judgn1ents \vhich are imn1ediate we attribute the


predicateto the subject because it is apparent that the predicate
objectivelybelongs to the ubject and not exclusively because
thenaturalcon titution of our cognitive faculty co1npels us to do
0 (33).
i-IJ A. h
gaint t e po itivi~t it n1u t be J · t:rted that truth of the id ,ll
0rder~avea uni\ er al \ .1h1t ( 6-3 l)) ~ 1nd , g,1in t Kt11t fir tl tlut
analvt
' 1c J.udgnwnts con c int<. n1,,H1on, . J Jl l l
1110 . e · n .1 ' t 1at t lL
fiundament I . . 1 , '. . .
a pnn 1p ·s >t th 1r , not ~ nth 'tl · ,1 pnon
Judm1cm( ). '
Th 111ribl
·ht h
l 1h
• J'llll () ', ( I' ll 1 · \I rss .\Y
I I ll S
\ I \I I I'
(I 3
of ,
, 1 k.is of sp,Kc , ud time are not
it rh,' t rIl t I . . -tc,nJ fi·1 om t h e data {jf istC
,'1 111, t I .11th'\ •,
' JH I 1
)I inns .1 )!'iti.1
\\ '.I '
--•1t ·•: ··
I' 1t h 'I ,
0 det
, ,,, 1; 11111, • s)
f I
, , ,,l ·11 't h'
\ • I' .
..,
. '
dt·111t1mtr.1tw11, ,1st H.: are se -evident
I ' If PO
I ., ,Jt, ti\ I r ·,1u11 4.3 bU I
l' t tth ' 11'l

, , ~ of 110 proo( but it would be un- J ·t Th


' , ,, ,Julll 1
, · 1 )\I ,,tl
. ,11 . ( • ·) . 4.4 for
rn 11h,' I' ' . II th ·111 i 11 question .'1.'I.
1l i1,1(1) I .I J . I . of
H'.l' · . , . )nin rr emplc cu m t 1e rational sci-
. 1i '1hi ' tl\ ' l' !t ,1:-.l ~ . . 5u1
!'hi' , .tlu' ,,t
t Ulldt'rtlllllt
• i l \' tht' critinsm ofJ hn Stuart Mill (s8).
,
• l ly
'Il l ,, l~ tH • . f h
• • 1 wkdo-e ot the cx1stc11rco t e external
,
\ \ • 1,111,
. 1t tl ill
·
t' t'l't,1111 r,.110 ~ T~
4.5
",,,li N') . . of
I . ii h. \llll l.Jtll)ll
· O
f induction
the 11, tural
.
tendency
1s
.
sub- fo
f h ' . '().~hll,l\'l' l \' t't',lSlHl
• tint' the , dem,1nd ddimte properties (63).
~(.lll1D • , . . th
. O\\ .tl po,, ,t ·r tht' •senses are, strictly peaking, mcapable of
J..! I Bvtht·ir
4.6 T
,itr.i ining l°t'rtitu k (64- ). (2
J ..!.! ·. ,il lt· bv• inductive argument
Tllt' rt'.lmll 1:-. ~ to
. obtain . certain
knowkdgcnmcemi11g the permanent properties of sensible ob- 4.7 T
je ·ts ((>5
). ( ')

3.:.3 The moti,· , of historical certitude is one that i indirect but evi- 4.8
dent (67).
3..!.j. The 111otiwof the certitude of faith i one that is extrinsic and 4.9
,nnd , the authority of a witness (68).
llot e,·ident, 11

!ht>
certitude of the ,let of supernaturalfaith is con1patible wi th
4.10
its freedom, in.1much as the act remain free because of the in-
trinsicobscurityof it. bject (6 ).
9
3.26
T~:ere~re t\ 0 dis_tinctkinds of certitude: certitude arising from
e\:1denceand certitude of faith (70). 4, t I
3.27
Inunediateevidence is th fi d
truth (l 1). · e tr t an fundan1enta l criterion of

4.1...
{. I
4-. 1eneralMetaphysics
4-1
Theob,, ·t t'
{ ,2
Jt:c o llll'taphys. . .
Thedcni. ics 1. thc SUb . tann : of sen . ibl , things (7). •l
j Lllt'i nee i l
~t• f ,Ind ti . ' to k' distin l" • I · ·
tit ,,, 1 irt11• - . . guis ll'd Ill substance: the thi//~it-
1

1u,111d1 1t , -·
< <! . ' ,
<.xists,or, c.:ss<.·ncc and l' t'itl'HCL .l
◄ SYNOPSIS O
F PRINCipi\
L Doc-r
· RlNEs

(13)- Existence is that wh · h 7o3


of a thing. is
. that. which c~cnstitutes
~ctualizes
. essenee (14) T
istence,. it is. an fimdeterniinate sub,iect
. it what it is·, in
. rel
. he
. es<;enc,c
deternunat10n rom existen ce ( rs). J , Which r . a~ionto· cx-
ece1ves1tsult
·bl b . . nnate
p0 ss1 e emg 1s an essence considered .
but capa bl e o f so existing ( 1 8). as not existingin. nature
There are. htwo b kinds of possib i·1·ity . mtri
. . .
former is t e . a h sence of. contrad· 1ct1on
.. . ns1c and extri . The
111 tl1 . ns,c.
of an .essence, t e.c latter implies the existence
. eofconstitutive notes
sufficient
. 1reason 1or the existence of an essenc another h . . being' as
Jyposs1b e (I 8). e t at 1s1ntrinsical-

The ultimate basis of .a being's extrinsic p oss1 ·b·i· . the .


11ty 15
4.5 of Go d ( I 9) . Th e b as1s of an essence, s int . . . . existence
· h ·b rmsrcpossibility ·
found m t e sens1 le world considered abst 1 nd is to be
the intelligence (20, 21). ract Y a analyzed by

The individual is principally known by its dim ens1ons


· · space
m
4.6
(25).
The formal reason of the individuality of a being is its own entity
(26).
The principle of individuation is primary matter as the founda-
4.8
tion of quantity (29).
There is a real distinction between essence and existence (32,
4.9
33).
There are six transcendental properties of being: essence, thing,
po
unity, distinction, truth and goodness - ens, res, unum, aliquid,
venun,and bonwn (38).
4.I I The idea of non-being, distinction and indefinite plurality arise
from the different impressions we receive from two or more ob-
ject (40).
4.12 Unity 1 the undividedne s of a being (41).

4.13 The notion of unity is antecedent to that of definite plurality


(43).
Met ph y ic:il composition and phy ical composition are not m-
comp, tibk \\ith the sub,tanttal unity fa being (so 5r).
11
'tri111ret1d•11talunity is to be distingui . ht:d from prcdicamc
taluni-
ty ).
, r10s0PH[CAL ESSAYS
" c rER s PH A real di
AL MER
CARDI dents (9
. c·on of conformity with an ideal type ,rhere is
. 1 truth is a re1a 1 )
action (1
Ontologica "ble reality (6r .
4.r6 d from sens1
abstracte .. tis what serves as the object of some ,rhe fou
wo aspects. 1 . f b .
The good has t and it is the adaptat10n o a emg to its end the ade
4.17 tendency (67)
natural
'[here a
(68)- . d thing is the object of a natural tenden-
10 gical or er, a . . d
In the onto _ . d· nd it is good because 1t 1s a apted to its 'fhe pn
cy because it 1~ g °d0

end. In the log1ca1or er,


a the "desirable" is prior to the "suitable" stract w1
ruality a1
~~- .
is to be
·t d to the nature of a bemg because they are
Good things are shutreebyit can realize its end, and consequently tential"
means w e . '
so ~1311Y d . derived from the good end they make 1t possi-
their goo ness is h n1 1.
c. h ture to attain. Hence, t e o y way to exp am the 4.34
ble 1or t e na . 1 · d
f things is by refernng them as re atlve goo s to one
goodness o
or more absolute goods (70). Both t
4.35
The end is the principle of perfection fo~ the n~ture t~at tends potentia
4.20
towards it: it is the first principle of actuat10n of its passive pow- from po
ers (71). to the
4.21 Evil is essentially relative, inasmuch as it is the privation of a
good (75).
4.22 Betv.reenbeing and its transcendental properties there is an in- 4.36
completevirtualdistinction (76).
4.23 The mind obtains its first principles from a comparison of the
transcendental notions (78). 4.37 The 111

T~er~ are three first principles: the principle of identity, the


pnnciple of contradiction and the principle of excluded middle 4.38 Th
(79).
and b ·
Th ~re arefsu~stances (83). A substance exists in itself and is the kind ( 1
Su 6~ect o accidents (8 ).
4 4.39 Th
4.26
Substance, considered 1 . . .
(1 9
i:
tion is call d as comp ete m itself for existence and
telli~ence :t suff~itum, or hypostasis;when endowed with
hypostasis'is calt:d e ha_person.The characteristic perfection
ac-
in-
of a
4.40
Th
. (88- 9 r).
su s1stence 4-41
4.27
An accident is a bein th
ih
poses a subject in wh? h _atd~es not subsist in itself but pre up- . h tl
4-28 It is ic itex1ts(92).
preferableto hOId l
existe
· nee a the subst
that an a ·d
. cci ent ha the amc actuality o
f
. ance wh1 h . d
c It etcrmint:s (93).
S't Ol'SIS 01 PRIN C IPAI
- DO CTRIN ES

A rc<1l distinction exi ts between b


dent s (94-9 _·). su stance and some of its acci-

Ther e i a real di tinction betwe


.J.
-3° Ktion ( I 04). en su 6 stance and its powers of

The foundation for the classificat' 1011 f c. .


. . o 1acult1esis to b £ d •
tl1e a dequate d1 tmction of their £ . e oun m
orma 1o 6~ects (ros).
4._p Th ere are real relations ( 1o9).

4.33 The pri~ciples of change or movement, considered in the ab-


stract
al. without reference to any material d e t ermmat1ons
. . are ac-
~u ity and potentia~~ty (112, 1~3). By movement in met~physics
1sto _be understood the actuality of a subject that is formally po-
tential " (II 5).

4.34 Every movement reqmres a mover distinct from the thing


moved (116).

4.35 Both the Latin words potentia and actushave a double meaning:
potentia passiva, subjectiva, or potentiality, must be distinguished
from potentia operativa,power of action or faculty, corresponding
to the difference between actus,meaning actuality or an intrinsic
principle of perfection, and actus,meaning action, the exercise of
a faculty (119).
The various kinds of being studied by metaphysics have in com-
4.36
mon a certain analogousness ( I 26)
. l ecei·ves the substantial form and by its union
4.37 Th e 1natena causer ( )
with it constitutes a new compound substance r33 .
. . . ·cally communicated to the matter,
1 cause is
. hintnns1 .
4.3 8 Th e fc
orma . . stitutes a substance of a deterrnmate
and by its union wit it con
kind(135). . · · o f movement
trinsic, active prmc1ple
The efficient cause is the ex
4.39
( 1 39). d gent is in the patient (144) .
. n of a create a . .
4.40 The acuo t" is applicable to immanent action,
f ''rnoven1en
The concept ~ . hat such action does not react upon the
4.41 . h restnct1on t
with t e k. git (146).
· tus evo 10
st1n1u d gents has the becoming of something as
. f create a
4.42
The acuon o Jwnt (148).
it'- formal resu
CIER 's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MER

per fectio
4.51 (173)·
sto d . a metaphysical sense the principle of cau Ii
4.43 Under o dmthus·The existent thing to which existence -sa ty 1'here ar
be state · . . 1s not
may . exists
essential . m. virtue of some act10n external to 1t ( r) . 4.58 iotegritY
15
.
Besides iorm al' material
c.
. and efficient causes, "movement" aIso 13eautY_1
4.44
entails final causal1ty (r 52). 4.59 or dioat1 ,
There is intrinsic finality in nature ( l 52). . given 1
1s
4.45
4.46 The final cause may be defined as that for the sake of which Art nee
something is done or made ( l 53) • 4.60 pose s·, b
4.47 The causality of the final cause consists in an attraction which the The int
end exercises upon the appetitive power and in the consequent 4.61
nality 0
tendency in that power towards it (154).
The i
Nature is a substance considered precisely as the intrinsic first 4.62
principle of the operations proper to the being that produces or
guishe
undergoes them (155).
4.49 Law is the internal, fundamental determination in virtue of
which a substance, as first principle of action, tends to realize a
determinate end (156).
4.50 5.1 The i
Natural causes and effects must be distinguished from accidental
causesand effect (157).
suffici
prope
4.5r The exemplary cause is the mental type that an intelligent effi-
cient cause follows in producing his effect ( 162). 5.2 Ourk
2
4-5 The exemplary cause is at once an efficient and final cause and
~n extrinsic formal cause. Its peculiar causality consists in its be-
mg an extrinsic formal cause (163).
5.3
4.53 Among the four causes, there is only an analogical resemblance
(164).
4.54
Onto]ogi~al principles and causes are the same things; elements
are matenal causes; principles causes and elements are the rea-
sons of things (r6 5). '
4.55 rd
Ond er has been defined as the exact adaptation of thin Q'S to their
68
e s (r ). Order is understood in two senses: teleolo;cal order
and aesthetic d · di ·
d
an order of or er,
d. or, •in other word
' order of subor natwn
co-or inat1011( 169).
4,56
The order in th .
(17o). e universe proves the ·xi. tence of final cause.
7IT;

l)ertec tion 1neans everything that befits the natu f .


re o a 6emg
(I73)·
There are three objective conditions of the beautiful
r. . d d , name1y
integrity or penect1on, ue or er, and splendor (i 7S). '

Beauty _jsthat ~uality of a work w?ereby, because of a happy co-


4.59
ordinat1on of its various parts, an ideal type to which it is related
is given intense expression and made to excite admiration ( 179).

4.60 Art need not be used as an instrument for moral or religious pur-
poses; but it is not beyond the pale of the moral law (180).

4.61 The internal finality of things is the foundation of the relative fi-
nality of the universe; this constitutes its order (181).

4.62 The immanent relative end of the universe should be distin-


guished form the transcendent relative end ( r 82, r 83).

5. Natural Theology

5.1 The idea of God is that of an absolutely simple perfectio~. It_is


.d. t al theology with its
sufficient and necessary for prov1 mg na ur
proper object (5). . .
. 1 erfections of the d1vme
5.2 Our knowledge of the absolutely simp. elp ocess of attribution,
• b of the tnp e pr
essence we acquire Y means Th. • a method of proce-
d (6) lS IS
elimination and transcen ence · ( )
. 1 d' g nor use1ess 7 ·
<lure that is neither rms ea m . . · b sed on
d (a) Agnosticism IS a
5.3 The existence of God can be yrove( . ) (b) Comte's "Law of the
. . •
a pnnciple that IS not se
If-evident . 10the· history of sCienc· e or off
Three Stages" finds no sup~ofirtd1~n the mental development o
• · t ven 1e 1 f ( ) (c) The natu-
philosophy, and it IS ?o y loaical proo r I .
. . . · · 1thout an °- · ntal meth od, and
the Individual; it is V: gress to the expenrne (r r) (d) The
. their pro d b Comte .
ral sciences owe· · met h o d as extolle ·Y ce o f God does not
not to the pos1t1v~ d to arrive at the ex1s~en·ns our incapacity
min s . rnainta1 ,
failures o f some of traditiona 1ism
prove, as the t beory . .
to de1nonstrate it (12). ed (a) Ontolog1srn IS ?ased
usf be prov · d. ted by experience
. O f Go d m . . contra ic . h f
5.4 The existence f 1.de as, and ,,1t.ispower 1ess to establish . t e a .-
h
on a false t e,~ ry O
Philosophy is ere subjective sentiment IS
(r3). (b) The Newe God (14). (c) M
finnation o_fth~ot;~eal religion (15).
no foundation
_ .l' ·s PHIi OSOPHICAL ESSAYS
l tER( 11· ' '
CA RDI

.d . f of the existence of God is an a posteriorione


5.5 Tlie 011Jv vah P100 1 · 1
, '
1 . I araument of St. Anse m mvo ves the fallacy
( 6) The onto ogica ' ::,
lfB·e,ro·i1io-
the Question (17, 18).
0 t,t> b

t ALwustme • ,s argument from our knowledge . of possible es-


5.6
·
encc ~1s not <111
. 1·111111ediate proof of the existence of God (19).

· o f 111etaphysical movement
An analy 1s furnishes a proof of the
5.7
exi tence of God (21 ) ·
An analysi of the efficient causality of natural agents furnishes a
proof of the existence of God (2 3). . ,6
)· -

5.9 An analy is of the contingency of beings furnishes a proof of the


existence of God (24).
5.10 An analysis of the degrees of perfection manifested in beings fur-
ni hes a proof of the existence of God (27).
·.29
5.1 I An analysis of the order of the universe furnishes a proof of the
existence of God (28).
5.12
The scientific proofs of the existence of God are not valid unless 5.30
completed by the introduction of certain philosophical consid-
erations (31).
5-I 3
The argument from the common con ent of mankind is valid if 5-3I
not pressed too far (32 ).

The proof from the higher a pi ration of human nature does not
exceed probability (3J). 5.3
5-I 5 The moral obligatio b . . . .3
. L . n can e exp 1amed ,v1thout recourse to a di-
~me egisla~or; it is th erefore not an immediate proof of Hi ex-
istence, but ma much . . . .
furnish a f f as It 1 an mdication of contingency it doe
proo o a necessary Being (34).
5-I6
The metaphysical es ence of God 1· H1·
5.17 elf- ub i tence (36). ·3
God is absolutely imple (4 I).
5-18
God is perfect (44, 45).
5.19
God unites in H·
(46). tniself all th e perfection belonging to H1"iworks
5-20
God is infi · ·
Intte 1n erf .
5-2 I The . · . p ecnon (4, , 49).
act1v1tyof God .
5-22 Thou h ts uh_tant1al (57).
g t 111ay ·111d
'· niu~t b
• c attnbuted t God (5,i).
SYNOPSIS or PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES

The knowledge of God considered subjectively is a single act of


adt:quate comprehension (60, 61).

The knowledge of God, from the point of view of content, has


for object in the first place the nature of God and then all things
JC
tual and possible (6 r).

The divine ideas are infinite in number, and yet are identical in
reality with the divine essence considered as the supreme arche-
type of all things (62).
God possesses knowledge of possible things (64).
God possesses the so-called "knowledge of vision" (65).
The object of His "knowledge of simple intelligence" God sees
in His essence (66).
The future effects of necessary causes God knows in the decrees
of His will (67).
j.30 There seems reason to distinguish with the Molinist school an
"intem1ediate" sort of knowledge in God different from His
knowledge of simple intelligence and that of vision (67).
5.3I The divine foreknowledge of free future acts is not incompatible
with the freedom of the latter (68).
5.32 In God, there is a will (69, 70).
5.33 The primary formal object of God's will is the goodness of His
own essence (7 r).
5.34 For its secondary material object, the will of God may have
whatever partakes of the divine goodness (72).
5.35 God loves the goodness of His Essence necessarily, and freely the
goodness He has communicated to created beings (73).
5.36 God never changes the free decree of His will (74). Inasmuch as
His will remains attached to its good, it is called by us love (75).
The divine will is omnipotent (76).
5.37
The world has been created by God (80-81).
5,38
God alone can create (82).
The world has need of being conserved by God in being ( 84).
The world is ubject to the action of divine providence (8 5, 86).
The providence and government of God are universal (87).
MERCIER'S PHILO OPHICAL ES A YS
CARDINAL

6-1
. f God and the free will of creatures are equall
T he sovereignty o . d ' y
5-42 . £ . b t none of the theones yet a vanced to show how
certain acts, uallycompatible is entirely satisfactory (88).
they are mutu
6.8
. e of evil in the world is not irreconcilable with
5.43
The eXIstenc
God's providence and government (89).
Scien
6.9
pre
6. Logic

Logic is the reflex study of the order that needs t~ exist in our
6.I cause
judgments, inferences and more elaborate reasomng processes
for them to lead us to truth (r). 6.IO Essen
Considered as the materials of knowledge, concepts are predi- clarion
6.2
cates that fallwithin one or other of the ten categories of thought Dedu
6.II
(14-15). empl
6.3 Judgment is the attribution of a predicate to a subject (28). Judg-
ments are either in necessary matter or in contingent matter, ac-
cording as the predicate attaches to the subject by a necessary or
a contingent bond, i.e. by one which is independent or not of
experience and of the existence things. The fom1er kind of judg- 6.12 lnduc
ment is the basis of the rational sciences and the latter of the ex- ploye
perimental sciences (3r -3 3). '
concr
~easoning is a process whereby the mind passes from immediate mulat
JUd~ents or principlesto a mediate judgment or conclusion.The cends
logic~}for_mit assumes is the syllogism or "discourse in which are th
certam ~hmgs being posited (in the premises) something else 6.13 The
nec~ssa;,ilyfollows (in the conclusion) simply from their being
posited (Aristotle, Anal., Pr. I, r) (47, 48).
6.5 The objective fou n daf10n o f t h e syllogism
· · d as cien
c: ll may be enunciate
10 ows· Reasonin · th b ·
th · . g is e nnging of some definite subject un d er
· e ary
e extension of an ab t · h. form
wh· h. . s ract type m order to infer that somet mg
ic is predicable of th b d fi-001
icable of th· d fi . ~ a stract type as such is likewise pre -
is e mite subject (49 ). lt pr
6.6
The necessity of the I .
is sometimes J ~ws that serve as principles of the syllogi I1l
d
uraland so metapd_iysical
epen mg on
and absolute,sometimes physicaland 11,lf-
d' . . . ll
ascertained (50.) con 1t10ns that have to be empmca Y
·1
SYN O P SI S OF PRIN C IPAL D OCT RI NES 7 11

science has as its starting point s cert ain first principl es, or
Eve ry h. h . di
6,7 firstjudgments, w ic are imme ately evident, n ecessary and
indemonstrable (5I) .
first principl_es enunciating the simpl e relation s of being and
6.8 non-being direct and co_ntrol not only every science but also
everyjudgment of th e nund (51).
Scientificdemonstration is a reasoning pro cess that sets out from
premises that ar_ecertain a~d l_eads to a logi cally certain conclu -
sion. The premises on which it rests must be tru e, ultimat e, im-
mediate, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and the
causeor reason of its truth (63, 64).
Essentialdefinition, which states what something is, is the foun-
6.10
dation of science (79, 80).
Deduction or the synthetic method of reasoning, which is that
6.II
employed in the rational sciences, is one which begins with cer-
tain principles in necessary matter, and enables one by a process
of combination to deduce new relations and thus define what is
progressively presented for explanation (8 5).

6.12
Induction or the analytic method of reasoning, which is that em-
ployed in the experimental sciences, is one which begins with
concrete facts furnished by observation and ends with the for-
mulation of laws (86). Scientific induction is a process that as-
cends from facts to the nature of the things of which these facts
are the manifestation (90).
6.13 The method of philosophy is combined induction and deduc-
tion (94).
6.14 Science is a body of propositions which are evident, certain, nec-
essary, and universal, as well as arranged systematically so as to
formone whole, and which are drawn immediately or mediately
from the nature of the subject and furnish the intrinsic reason of
its properties and of the laws of its action (96).

7. Ethics
7.r Man has subjectively and really one last natural end (8, 9).
7.2 Regarded in the abstract and indeterminately the end of human
nature consists in happiness (10).
CARDINAL M ERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
712

'The Chi
7.3 d . the concrete and definitely the objective end f 7.11
Regarde
. not m
· any created goo d b ut m
. G o d ( II ) . o last en.cll
man• is m . f}ictlOI
1n
7.4 . o f the senses and of external
The act10n . .. causes can affect Without
. free will and respons161hty (27, 28).
destroymg 'fhe cat
7-18 which rr
7.5 The distinction between moral good and evil is real and intrinsic rnoral la·
(30).
'fhe mo :
7.6 The distinction between good and evil is. foun~ed on the con- 7.19
fom 1ity or want of conformity of our action with our supreme Theoriei
end (32). 7-20 ·1
]ead lo~
7.7 The morality of a human act is determined by its formal object,
7.21
By the
the circumstances and the end for which it is done (34). rights d
7.8 Neither individual nor social well being is the measure of moral ural or~
value (35-37).
7.9 7.22 One _is~
The evolutionist theory of Herbert Spencer leads logically to the larly 1n
negation alike of morality and of all distinction between right
and wrong (38). 7.23 Liberty
7.10 to have
Man is subject to a natural law, that is, to an inclination which
science
habitually disposes him to know and will the end of his rational
nature and what leads to it, as well as to discern and reject what 7.24
is contrary to it (40).
7-II 7.25
The moral obligation has its explanation and foundation in hu- nature
man nature (44).
7.12 law elf.
The ultimate reason of the distinction between good and evil, 7.26
and consequently of moral obligation and law, is found in God; The the
formally it is in the practical reason of Providence 945). freedon
7.13
There is no need to suppose in human nature a "moral instinct"
or a " 1 " d· ·
mora sense 1stmct from the intellect to account for our
knowledge of the moral order ( )_ 7.27
7.14 49
The first command f h · b
. ment o
done and evil avoided (so). t e natural law 1s that good must e
7.is
7.15
During the prese t f£ I h · b
1. .
It. .
s insufficient n
(sz). e, t ere 1sa sanction for the moral law, ut
7. [6 7.i9
After a time oft . l h .
th e virtuous
• . nab , t e length of which . we cannot .detennme,
will
wicked Will b e. eternally rewarded 111 a future hfe and the
e depnved forever of their happiness (53). 7.30

t
SYNOPSIS OF PRINcrp
AL DOCTRINES
7 r3

The Christian doctrine that th ·


. . e sinner who fi I
last end must 111addition to the ree Y turns from his
. f • .
infliction o positive pain is not eternal loss of h appmess
· a-
suuer th e
. . . opposed to reason (54).
The categorical 1111perative of K .
1
which moral good and evil may b a~~ ~ no_ moral standard by
moral law (56). e 1stmgui shed, nor is it a true

7.I9 The moral law is immutable and · k


is now to all (57).
7.20 Theories of Secular or Independent M ]"
lead logically to impracticable conclu . ora(ity are not true, and
sions 66, 67).
By the natural law, the individual po · • .
· h d · · . ssesses In Justice certain
ng ts uties 111respect of his neighbor inde d f
. · 1 re 1ationship (70-7 ).
ura1or po 1itica pen ent 1y o any nat-
4
7.22 One is bound injustice to respect the good ofa th ·
. . . . . no er, particu-
larly m respect of his life, his liberty and his property ( 6-n).
7
Liberty imp~es the rig~t_to work (i.e. to follow some profession),
to have one s own op1mons, and to act according to one's con-
science (78-81).

7-24 The right of property is derived from human nature (87).


7-25 The theory of communism is based on a misunderstanding of the
nature of the goods of this world and would make the natural
law self-contradictory (88, 90).
7.26 The theory of collectivism is inconsistent with the dignity and
freedom of man; and its realization would hinder social progress
and impose upon the State a task beyond its capacities and in-
compatible with its natural function (91, 92).
The titles to property are occupancy, prescription, and the right
of te tament and of inheritance (94-97).
. .
7.28 The purpose of the institution o f marnag
· e is the good of the
spomes and of the children (99, mo).
. b d rests on the rational love of
The perpetuity of the mama_ge on called for in the education
the spouses and on the reqmremenc 5
of the children (ror-104). . d·
7.30 . . . . an aspect of pantheism an I
The the ry of the . pint-State 15 , to which it belongs
.••
su b~<:ct to the ,une cntic1 m •15
che sy'-tcm
(107).
ERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDI NAL M

The theory which places the juridical _basis. of society in a free


7.3r tract either explicit or understood, 1spatient of everal inter-
con , . d . 'bl
pretations, all of which lead to ma nuss1 e conclusions (109 _
112).
According to the Christian conception, civil society is constitut-
7.32
ed by the union of individual persons and has no reality of its
own. Its foundation is in the nature of man, and this draws its
origin from the designs of God (II 4, II 5).

7.33 As God wills the existence of society, He also wills the existence
of authority which is a condition of its existence; but He leaves
the form of authority undetermined (II 6).
In 1994,
7.34 Since civil society is instituted for the good of the individuals
in Theol
composing it, it follows that the role of authority is to ensure re-
spect of rights and to provide opportunity for the development Keni , Le
of its members (u7). tury (199
Mercier.
7-35 !heState may not take the place of individual activity, nor may
it ta~e the place of parents in their duty of education, nor inter-
fere m the religion of its members (u8).

I --1 I;

3
Bibliography of
Ca,~dinal Mercier

In 1994, Prote sor Leo K eni s published a bibliography of the Professors


in Theology and Cano n L aw o f the Catholic University ofLouvain. See:
Keni, Leo: The Lo u va in Faculty of Theology in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury (1994, Leuven: Uni ve rsity Press). Pages 163-172 are about Cardinal
Mercier. We reprin t it her e with additions.

DESIRE-JOSEPH MERCIER

Courses

I 2- r 87 Thon1i stic Philosophy

Works
d' rticle de la Revue sur les CEuvres
I Observa tion s a pr?P~ 5 unl aC dina1 Dechamps, Archeveque de
,
com p 1etes e on d S Eminence ) e 81ar _483 [anon.: "Un A b onne, "] .
. 1 4
M a11nes. - RCath 47 ( 879 , , ·on d'ttn article de la R evue
J, ,1,rBosstt a 1occas1
2 Reponse a M . _le pro~sseiVelsen, 1879 [anon.].
catlwlique. M ahn es, an d h ·1osor1hi e de S. Thomas. Louvain, C.
d cours e P l r . V 1
iscour, d'ouvert1-1 re tt . English (1995) (Memoir o ume -
3 D - Trans. in
Peeters, I 8 2 , 3 5 PP·
MV). . Thomas. - RCath 53 (1882) 736-758 [par-
h . de saint
4 La phi lo_sop ie o. 3). .
tia l re print of n , . e et le libre arbitre. - RCath 54 (1883)
' ini m e rnecani q u) _ 108-123 (English this Volume
Le de tertng30-8 5o,· 5 5 ( 1 8he 84 50 59 '
s printed volumes o f M erc1er . ' s C ours de
687-7o 4 , 6 9 are t h. · 1 . l" d
~ E 'TV)- No s- -of the first editi~ns in t 1ssen~s were mhu t1Cp 1e
, • ·e S0111e i·ghtly varying con1n1on tit1e, sue as ours
Pl u·tosop rra•1 ph
· t1I1 d e r. at T1wmas
s1 d'Aquin, or Sornmaire du cours de Phi-
in .luto. g. ,pIue . de sa1t1
de p Iii 1OSl
CIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MER

. Tl omas d'Aquin. For ease of survey, we incl d


. Ionsaint z
Iue h d' "C u e
/osop se h
di · ns ere an
d not under the ea 1ng ourse texts in
au-
these e "uoOur mam . ti.tle is the title of the first separate edition of
rograph·
the printed text. . . ,. .
. d
Logzque.2n e ., d Louvain, Uystpruyst-Dieudonne, Pans, Alean,
6
1g97, viii-285 PP· . ·t h' I ·1
d
- r st e . as pa rt 1 of Cours de Phi
h . osop te, vo
, , l 8 . l, entit ed Logiqueet
...
: d'O
Notions n o• °t loia;eou de Metap yszque genera e. I 94, vm-2 91 PP
·
_ 3rd ed. 1902, xi~-367 PP·
- 4th ed. 1905, xvi-4o7 PP·
_ sth ed. 1909, vii-407 PP·
_ 6th ed. 1919, viii-408 PP·
_ 7th ed. 1922, xii-408 PP· .
-Transl. in Polish (1900), Spanish (1902), Portuguese (1903), Ital-
ian (1906), English (1912).
7 MetaphysiquegeneraleOU Ontologie. 3rd ed., Louvain, Uystpruyst-
Dieudonne; Paris, Akan, 1902, xx-580 pp.
- 1st ed. in autograph, 1886.
- 2nd ed. as part 2 of Cours de Philosophie,vol. 1, entitled Logique
I
et Notionsd OntologieOU de Metaphysiquegenerale, 1894, 342 pp.
- 4th ed. 1905, xxiii-620 pp.
- 5th ed. 1910, xxiii-620 pp.
- 6th ed. 1919, xxiii-620 pp.
- 7th ed. 1923, xxiii-620 pp.
-. Transl. in Polish (1903), Spanish (1903), Portuguese (1904), Ital-
ian (19rr), Arabic (1912), English (1938).
8
Psychologie. 5th ed., Louvain, Uystpruyst-Dieudonne; Paris, Akan,
I 899, XX-583pp.
- Ist ed. in autograph, 1883 _
I
- 2nd ed. in autograph, 1888.
- 3rd ed. as vol 2 of C d Ph ·z · · R 1
ens,. ·p ans
. Akan· · Br 1ours
S e. , ,t osophte. Louva1n, Peeters- ue - I
_ 4th ed' 2nd' usse s, oc1ete belge de librairie, 1892, 520 PP·
Pruyst- 0 ieu: asdonne·:d.p of. Cours
Al de Philosophie' vol. 2. Louvain, Uyst-
-6thed ' ans, can, 1894, viii-542 pp . I
. 190-1904 2 V0 1 ..
- 7th d 1 ' s., vu-377, 394 pp.
e · 905 2 vol ···
- 8th ed . 1908' 2 vol s., viu-377,
... 394 pp.
I
· - 9th ed ' s., vui-380, 400 pp .
. 1912 2 vol ..
- 10th ed ' s., xu-3 80, 400 pp .
. 1920 2 vol ..
- Irth ed 1 2 ' s., xu-396, 400 p . l
· 9 3 2 vol .. P
- Transl. in Polish s., X11-397,400 pp.
guese (1904) Ger (1902), Spanish (1902) Italian (1903), Portu-
' rnan 1906 1 ' )
- 9o7, 3rd ed., 1923), Engli h (193 ·
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CARDINAL M .. 1.11Jo,
ERCIER
,,e<
l\\O,

9 CriterologieOtt Tlzeoriegeneralede la certitude d d L .


Superieur ~e Philosophie, r s_99 , xii-J?r ~p~ e ·, ouvam, Institut
3
_ 1st ed. m autograph, entitled Theon·ed l .
1884. e a connmssancecertaille'
- 2nd ed. in autograph, entitled Du fondem t d l .
- 4th ed. 1900, xii-426 pp. en e a cerfltude,I 889.
- 5th ed. 1906, xvi-428 pp.
- 6th ed. 19rr, vii-407 pp.
- 7th ed. r9r8, iv-408 pp.
- 8th ed. 1923, iv-444 pp.
- Transl. in Polish (1901), Spanish (1902), Portuguese (r904) Ar-
abic (r912), English (r938). '
IO
La pensee et la loi de la conservation de J'energie. - Le Museon 6
(1887) 215-223 (ETV).
II
Leon XIII et la restauration des etudes philosophigues. - Le Livre
d'Or du Pontifical de Leon XIII, Brussels, Societe belge de librairie,
1888, 67-131 [with A. Van Weddingen] (ETV).
12
La parole. - RQS 23 (1888) 545-567 (ETV).
lJ La creation d'une Ecole superieure de Philosophie al'Un!versite _de
Louvain. - La Sciencecatholique5 (1890-91) 1-16. Trans. m English
(1995) (MV).
Rarmortsur les et11dessupen·euresde philoso1:hie,pre~Cf~te
audCponh~lres
de
Malines,
rr le 9 septembre1891· Louvam,
· Institut Supeneur e 1 oso-
phie, 1891, 32pp.
- 2nd ed. 1898. ) Spanish (r 9o2 ) and English (r995)
_ Transl. in Italian (19ol '

(M V) · A Ill tales de philosophiechretienner 22


Les deux critiques d e Kant · -
(I 91) 269-287.. .fi ues mtemat10na
. . ux des catholiques. Sciences
Le congre sc1ent1 g S J2 (1892) 198-202.
philosophiques. - RQ_ d 1 vie. - RQS 32 (1892) 398-466
La definition p h I·1OS oph1gue e a
(ETV). • thomiste de Domet de Vorges. -
. ct la psychologie
La perception r (ETV).
2 ) 6"2- 63 . . v·1v11s-r,
n( '~·lS 32 (1 9
I'- -
d . . S . Thomae Aqumat1s. -
trmae 1 t1omas

De instauratione 1~~42r' 449-454 (ETV).


(rx 93 ) 38,-3~ • ~ -sco1astigue. - RNS 1 (1894) 5-18. Trans. in
8
hie: nt:0
20 L phi]o,op (MV).
Enghs· J1 (1995)
----------::--:-- ~-----~------------------: 7

CJ FR'S Pllfl OSOPIIICAL E SAYS


CARDINAL MER , .

ture et clans l'art. - RN I (1 894) 263 - .28S , 6


Du beau dans la na . ' .139-
2r
J48 (ETV). . I ] , l' .
, par Mgr. Mercier . . . a occasion de la r,, .
. urs prononce
D isco ·r, ' -.llltsl'
22
d portrait e
. 1 2 decembre r 894. - Ma11!1cstatio11
. ,
c11 /'l, <, ·
01111
"', 1c
7
e son . Prelatdomestiquede a Sallltete Uon XII, I dside111 I•
Mar Memer, . d S, . . L, . 1<
6
· , • r de Philosop/11eet u eml/la1re COil Ill iiro~,-
1'Jnstitut5 r1pene1~ , h S . , y ~sc11r
.
al'Umvers,e ·t' cat/w/ique. - 2 dcceni re 1894 -
0· d 011ven1r
, J}fth/i(, J>ar
1c
Conn.te, orga11 1·sateur, Louvain, Uystpruyst- ieu onnc, 189s
· ' 33_.53,
( )l :-it:

67-72 (ETV). tiotl <.

La theorie des trois verites primitives. - RNS 2 ( l 895) 7-26 1.1ph •


23
(ETV). L 'in 1
24 La localisation du sens musculaire. - RNS 2 (1 895) 206_209 (19
(ETV). L'uni
25 L'aanosticisme. A propos du livre de A. Balfour, "Les fondcmcnt (l 9 I
de hfoi." - RNS 2 (1895) 402-419 (ETV).
L pl J

26 La psychologie de Descartes et l'anthropologie scolastique. - RN 3.. 1-3


2 (1895) 183-199, 229-241; 4 (1897) 386-407; 5 (1898) 193-199.
43 r di
27 Les originesdelapsychologiecontemporaine.Louvain, Institut upericur
2_4-2
de Philosophie; Paris, Alcan, 1897, xii-486 pp.
- 2nd ed. 1908, xvi-493 pp. 44 [R 'P(
- 3rd ed. 1925, xvi-470 pp. sumo,
- Transl. in Polish (1900), Italian (1903; 2nd ed., 19m), Spani h J\,finut
(1904), Portuguese (1904), English (1918). F no
z8 Discussion de la theorie des trois verites primitives. - RN 4
(1897) 56-72 (ETV).
2
9 Pourquoi le doute methodique ne peut etre universel. - R 4 45
( 1 897) 182-198 (ETV).
30
Les sugg~stions crirninelles. Debat contradictoire au Congre de
neurolo01e de B ll
t,• ruxe es. - RNS 4 (1897) 408-415 (ETV).
31 L'enseignementh '( All I
b c re zen. ocutionprononceeen l'eglise de Wavre e 1l
octore 898 Nivell I
1 · · 8
pp. · es, mpnmene classique, C. Guignarde, r 89 , 21 47 I

32 La philosophie d H
33 Le .. . e erbert Spencer. - RN 5 (1898) 5-29.
pos1tivisme et les , . , , . , . ,
- R.Ns6 ( 8 ventes nece sa1res des sciences mathemauquc ·
34 " l 99) I2-29 (ETV)
Ecco l'allarme" .
(ETV). - Un cri d'alan11c. - RN ... 6 (1899) I 44-I 58
35
~a _notion de la v' . , , ·. ,
tnt1tule:Jugc111,cnte (A propo 'TTw11mtt.
d'un arti k de la Re1111c
cnt ct ,. · , V) ()
vcnte). - R ' 6 (r899) 371-403 (ET .
BIBLIOGRAPH
y OF CA RDINAL MERCIER 719

6 La psychologie experimentale et la ph ·1 h.
3 BASB (1900) 42 1_450 _ 1 osop 1e spiritualiste.
_ English transl. New y ork _ Ch·
. 1cago, 190 2 .
Le bilan philosophique du XIX ·,
37 315-329. e s1ec1e. - RNS 7 (1900) 5-32,
- Transl. Spanish (190 4 ), English (1995 ) (MV).
Le commencement du siecle _ RNS (
38 . . . 7 1900) ro4-n7 (ETV).
Observat10ns
39 · et discussion: § r. La n t d , .,
l' · d · . a ure e 1a vente. § 2 Induc-
tion comp ete et 1n uct1on scientifique § L . ·
la philosophie thon1iste. _ RNS 3
(l ~ ) · a scien(Ece moderne et
. . . 7 9 0 190-23 l TV).
40 L'induct10n scient1fique. Seconde reponse a, M . B ersam. - RNS
(1900) 422-434 (ETV). · 7

41 L'unite et le nombre d' Apres saint Thomas d' Aquin. _ RNS


(1901) 258-275 (ETV). 8

42 Le phenomenisn1e et l'ancienne metaphysique. - RNS 8 (1901)


321-337 (ETV).
43 De distinctione essentiae ab existentia. - Divus Thomas 7 (1901)
254-265 (ETV).
44 [Report on the Catholic University ofLouvain.] - Royal Commis-
sionon University Education in Ireland. Appendix to the SecondReport.
Minutesof evidence, taken in Nov. and Dec., Dublin, Thom & Co., E.
Fonsouby; W estnlinster, Eyre and Spottinwoode; Edinburgh, Ol-
iver and Bayd, 1901, 204-214, 224 [3l5-317: documents + 2 dia-
grams].
45 Note sur l'ouvrage de M. De Wulf "Les philosophes belges"
(textes et etudes). T.I.: Le Traite "De unitate formae" de Gilles de
Lessines.- BASE (1902) rr-14.
46 La nature du raisonnement. - Revue de Philosophie2 (19o2) 165-
179 (ETV).
47 "La scienceclericale."Une polemique avecL'Independancebeige.Lou-
vain, Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 19o3, 4 1 PP·
8
4 Note sur I'ouvrage de L. Janssens:
"P I t" es de Deo uno ad
rae ec i~n d .. Thomae
modum comn1entarii in Sumn 1am th eologicam ivi
Aquinatis."- BA B (1903) 147-r5 6 .
49
La derniere ido]e. - R S IO ( 1 9o3) 7 3-~r. d !'existencede DietL
- pub]1shcd eparatdy: Les preuves thomistes . e (ETV).
J•0 uvam, Institut Supcneur
, . de Pl11·1osoph1e ' 1903, 2 4 PP·
. , ll _
So J • . h-, e de la distinct10n ree ~ ;n
)1,c ll\\Jons. I. Objecttons contre la t es d b tances orgamsees.
tr l\•sscnc. tt l'cxi\tcn e. fl. Les forces cs su
MERCI ER 'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL
720

• tence de Dieu et le monisme. - RNs ro


reuves de 1,ex1s
III. Les p (ETV).
5 4
(1903) rB -zoA d pontificat de Leon XIII. - Le XXe Si'
La pensee ma1tresse u ec1e, 64
51
25 July 1903. ' b S
l philosophie d Her ert pencer. - Le XXe 65
52 Quelques notes sur a
Sicrle,II December 1903. . , ', . ,
. de la philosoph1e a 1. Ecole de Louvam
b et a l'Uni-
53 L' e~se1gnement
, , . e _ Le Bien Public, II Decem er 1903 (ETV).
verslte aregonenn .
~II . Causeriefiaite
54 Idealet 1 11s1011.
I a!'Association
. . .du Col!eae
des. ancienseleves o
. R ombaut a~ Malines, le 23 avnl 1903. Ma mes, H. D1enckx-Beke
Sa111t- 1
fils, 1094, 18 PP·
55 Note sur l'ouvrage de M. De Wulf: Introduction a la philosophie
neo-sco1astique.- BASB (1904) 51-54.
68
56 La liberte d'indifference et le determinisme psychologique. -
RNS II (1904) 5-17 (ETV).
dephilosophiea!'usagedes classes,editepar desprojes-
57 Traiteele111entaire
seursde l'InstitutSuperieurde Philosophie,1905, 2 vols., 678, 588 pp.
[Mercier's contributions: vol. 1: "Introduction et notions prope-
deutiques. Psychologie; Criteriologie. Metaphysique generale;"
vol. 2: "Theodicee. Logique" .]
- 7th ed. 1925.
- Transl. in Spanish (1910), Italian (2nd ed., 1913), English (2nd
ed.).
58
L'~~pansion mondiale de l'activite belge et la philosophie. - Con-
gres d'Expansion economiquemondiale tenu aMons du 24
international 70
28 1
;;' decembre9°5 sous le hau.tpatronage de Sa Majeste le roi Leopold 71
et dugottvernementbeige.Rapports. Section I- Enseignement (Vol-
~meIII), Brussels, Hayez, r905, Io pp.
59 Apropos de I'e ·
339_347 (ETV).nseignement de la scolastique. - RNS 11 (1905)
60 Reponse a Dom 01' . . 72
(ETV). ivien. - Revue 17zomiste 13 (1905) 573-5S3
6r
Le mouvement h·1 . .
beige.Opiniond' p I'o/_soph1que finterview]. - E. Ned, L'b1c(('e
62 une e zte 18 B
L'art et la ' Jo-z9o5, russels, De\vit, 1905, 81-95. 73
6 mora 1e. _ Le Bi .
3 OraisonJttnebrcde en Public, 2 5 May I 90 5.
A.~cheveq11e de M, /' S. En-,. le Cardinal Picrrc-LambrrfGoosSellS,
laine d " a Illes pro11 ' , Ii
e ,laint,Ro111
1, ' c11I' r(!lisc111l'f
Ollceecmx f1m/>raillcs, n>pV.-
aru.Louvain I . ~ , . , 1 ·1 , plut>
• , nstitut upt:neur de P 11 oso
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CARDINAL MERCIER 721

PP·
(i 906). 2-_o
- R print: AUCL 71 (1907) xxv-xxxviii.
a
Lettreen respo_nse.aux feli~~tations adressees par la classe 1'occa-
(14 sionde sa no1mnation archiepiscopale. _ BASE (1906) 130_1 8 r.

(1 Lettre en re:p?ns~ aux felicit~tions adressees par la classe a l' occa-


5 ,ion de son elevation au cardmalat. - BASE (
1907) 442_443 .
L'encyclique et la philosophie. (Discours prononce a l'Universitc
06
ck Louvain.) - Revue pratique d'apologetique5 (1907) 399_407
(ETV).
De modo a~gumentandi ad ex rebus huius mundi contingentibus
67 Dei existentiam. - Documenta Ecclesiastica
Mechlinicnsia1 (February
1907)6 pp.
6 A 111cs
Seminaristes. Conferences.Brussels, Action catholique; Paris,
Beauchesne; Louvain, E. Wamy, 1908, XVI-272 pp.
- 13th ed. 1926.
- Transl. in Italian (1908, 1920), Dutch (1909), Spanish (1909),
English (1910), Gern1an (1910), Polish (1913), Hungarian (1919).
par le
6 Lel\1odemisme.Sa position vis-a-vis de la science,sa condamnation
9
PapePie X (Science et foi, 2). Brussels, Action catholique, (1908),
45 pp.
- Enlarged edition: (Science et religion, 528). Paris, Bloud, 1900,
60 pp.
- Transl. in German (1908), Dutch (1909), English (19rn).
o Un discours du Cardinal Mercier. - RNS 15 (1908) 5-1 I.
r Discours de Son Eminence le Cardinal Mercier. - 1834-1909.Liber
Memorialisdes Fetes Jubilaires de l'Universite catholiquede Louvaill,
Louvain, C. Peeters (1909), 133-154.
- Reprint: AUCL 74 (1910), lv-lxvii.
2 RetraitePastorale. Brussels, Action catholique; Paris, B~auchesne;
. • lxi pp [ 3 ooo copies, 1926].
Louvam E Wamy 1910, xvi-372- v · 1 ' .
-Tran~l. in Italia~ (19II), German (19II), English (1912), Hun-
garian (1912), Dutch (1914), Spanish ( 1921)-
, ,. ·on du monument Bossuet,
3 Discours prononce [... ) a 1 mauguratl _ BASE (1911)
2
dans la cathedrale de Meaux, le 9 octcbre 191 I.

4 3-490
' . . ail 13. - BASE (1913) 122-
4 VersI Unite. Lecture fa1te [ ... ]le 7 m 9
146,
- Repnnt: RNS 20 (1913) 253- 27 8 ·
-Transl. m English (1995) (MV).
\

ERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS


CARDINAL M

P rononce, [•· ·] }ors de la reception au Palais, le


Discours
75 decembre - BASE (1914) 1-2. 31
I 9 I 3.
• • I • Apinel aux ames. sacerdotales
L .(Retraite
E precheea\ ses
La ie ,nteneure. r 1
v Action catho 1que; ouvam, . Warny
retres).Brusse1s, . ] ' 1918,
P .
.xx1v-506 P ·
p [rs ' 000 copies, 1923 .
_ Italian transl.
. . . 1e dans la vie. moderne. Pages chosies
chnstlamsn ) et rerneilliespar L.
77 LeI\T .., Paris, Perrin, 1918, iv-310 pp. (ETV.
1'/oe.
f Mayence (ed ·) , La· correspondance de S. E. le, Cardinal Mercieravec
le· GOUvernement General allemand pendant .
I occupation
.
_
1914 1918.
Brussels,A. Dewit; Paris,]. Gabalda & C1e, 1919, Xl-506 pp. Trans.
in English (1920).
79 Le genie poetique de Dante. Lecture faite a l'Academie
royale de
Belgique, le 6 juin 1921. - BASE (1921) 265-289 (ETV).
So Collectioepistolarumpastoralium, decretorum,aliorumque documentorum
quaepro regiminedioecesisMechliniensispublicataefuerunt. Malines, H. MV
Dessain, 1910-1924, 4 vols. [vols. 15-18 of the collection].
NBW
8r CEuvres pastorales.Actes. Allocutions. Lettres. Brussels, A. Dewit; Lou-
vain, E. Warny; Paris, J. Gabalda, 19u-1926, 7 vols .
NCE
RCath
Course Texts in Autograph RNS
82 RPL
Theodicee.
Louvain, Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1884.
83 RQS
Philosophie
moraleet Droit nature!. Louvain, Ghysebrechts et Peeters,
1886.
- 2nd ed. 1890.
RTHP

Cosmologie.Louvain, Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1887.


Introductionala h1·1 h .
l 891, 72 pp. P osop te et Cours de logique.Louvain, C. Peeters,

Revueneo-sealast.ique.
Direction

Revuecath 1.
01que·R
Collaboration
,
' evue neo-scolast1que.
.
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
Annuair_e de l'U niversite catholique de Lou vain (including:
Append1ce, Analectes pour servir a l'histoire de l'Universite
catholique de Lou vain).

BABL Bulletin _de l'Academie Royale de Belgique. Classe des lettres


et des sciences morales et politiques.
BASB Bulletin de I' academie Royale des sciences, des lettres et des
beaux arts de Belgique
BN Biographie nationale [de Belgique].
ETV English this volume
MABLMemoires de I' Academie Royale de Belgique. Classe des Let-
tres. Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie van
Belgie. Klasse der Letteren.
MV Mercier Memoir Volume
NBW Nationaal Biografisch W oordenboek.
NCE New Catholic Encyclopedia
RCath Revue catholique
RNS Revue neo- colastigue
RPL Revu e philo ophique de Louvain
RQS R evue de question cientifigue
RTHP Univ er ite de Lou vain. Recueil de travaux d'histoire et ~e phi-
lol bric. Univ ersiteit van L~uven. Publicaties op het geb1ed der
re chicdt:ni en der filologi '.
UCLBUnivcr itt' c:atholiquc de Louvain. Bibliographie 1834-1900.
L uv. in, 1900 .
's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARD IN AL MERCIER

iron 163, 180


411, 528, 546, 566, 589
irredu cible element s 56
intercentral fibers 132
. doctrine 17 irregular movement s 284
intenne diary
irreproachable logic 26
intermediary forces 14
. knowledge 372 irresistible suggestion 325, 326
intenne diary
.
mterme d1·ary of the senses 242 irritability of the protoplasm
156, 158
160, 172, 195
intermediary theory 15, 19 '
intermediate element 363 .
isolation 42, 78, 107, 160, 171, 185
317
.
mterme d.1ate ource of mechanical ef-
546 ' '
isomerism 82
fects 20
internal world 295 isosceles triangle 399
.
interpretation 99, 157, 163' 204' 290' 324,
Italian Parliament 593
337, 362, 364, 365, 369, 372, 373, 377, Italian Thomists 215
378, 382, 437, 511' 533, 537, 547, 556, Italians 2 I 7, 348
557, 563, 568, 575, 576, 584, 586, 600
Italy 119,211,212,214,215,217,512,596,
intestinal villa 167 602, 604
intestine 154, 167
J
intimate life of God 11l
James, William 571, 626
intimate nature 281, 418, 582
Jerusalem 579, 605
intimate reasons 319
Jesus Christ 109, 382, 385, 386, 577
intimate sense 76, 86, 239, 242, 321, 322,
531, 533 Jews 105, 106, 601
intolerance 105, 106 Johannie Apocalypse 603
intrepid thinkers 403 John Paul II xiv, xviii
intrinsic constituent 491 journals 211, 212, 217, 556, 559
intrinsic dependence 76 journey 386, 606
intrinsic determination 24 joy 112, 231, 232, 235, 242, 243, 245, 251,
intrinsic goal 180, 251, 352, 598 264, 549, 552, 591
intrinsic motive 269 judged knowledge 371, 372
intrinsic possibilities 344 Judgement and Truth 357, 358
intrinsic possibility 141, 493, 496 judgment 65, 87, 88, 95, 118, 140, 143,
intrinsic possibility of essence 493 147, 206, 234, 268, 273, 276, 278, 315,
intrinsic reason of truth 324 316, 318, 320, 339, 340, 341, 351, 357,
366, 368, 369, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375,
intussusception 187, 188
378, 379, 380, 403, 461, 476, 535, 536,
invagination 167, 198 546, 597
invariable norm 355
judicial facts 325
invention 99, 124, 247 248
249 572 576 jurisdiction 37, 39, 348, 350, 518
579
' ' ' ' ' jurisdiction of the sensitive 37
inverse square law 79
invertebrates 82 justice 90, 234, 288, 328, 485, 552, 560,
561, 599, 603, 604, 605
inward representation 128
'.nward vision 127, 128 justification 20.., 403
inward word 130 juxtaposition 188, 427
Ireland 554 juxtapo ition of particlt:s 188
K
Kaiser Wilhc1rn II 655
CARDINAL
CI ER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

1 1
I ,.,;, · h , , k,d, ·, I I 8, I - 1926) was fou ndc, ,nd r,f Ph,
fi, c p,e,;Jrnc o du, /n,t,tut,
, ph1 n f th, ',ulwli\. lJnher~il) of Leuven. After hi studie in the da i , phd, ,p y, v,
tlll'nl n '1 ,1 Ill' snn in.11 y of Mcd1elen, 1ercier was ordained O 87 4), ,1brained a liu:n a 1
rli.•1,l1i
1
::1 I 'll\l'll (18°"'' ), ,111d became professor of philosophy at cc.hclen h 4m y r, I
I > ' he , .1, ·om111i1,..,jo11 ·d to inaugurate the chair of Thomistic philosophy c:rea ed a
l 1111, ., i , 11 I CllH'n .u tht' reque t of Pope Leo XIII. Mercier endeavored to reali1..eh pr ,gr.t
1
f, 11111il l in dit' t'lll)clical Aetf'mi Patris (1879): to restore the phil<1sophy c1f . 'f o
\ qui, ., h.11moni1c ir \\ ith the progres of modern science and thought , and extend it in ucna
l tl rl 't ienri fic .rnd soci.11disciplines. On the basis of his initial succes~, he asked for, and

r· , d , rhe support of rhe Pop for the creation of an Institute of Philosophychat would provid
.1 1 np ll'll' l'ducation in the various philosophical areas. When named president of chi institu e
( 1 JI)), f\ krcier gathered ollaborators from among his first scudenr.s and with their assiscanc:c
t med an inrernarional group of enthusiastic and devoted disciples. The &vue neo-scolastique
.1dc the writings of the institute available throughout the scholarly world . On Feb. 7, J 9(J{,,
f -rcit'r was named archbishop of Mechelen. He took a lively interest in problems of the un,-
v ·rs.ii Chur h and he was also preoccupied with Church Union. (Cf A. L. Wylleman , ' ercier.
I )t:sirt: Joseph' in Nrw CatholicEncyclopedia,Vol IX. New York, St. Louis, San Francisco, Toronto,
I o ndon, Sydney, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967, p. 671-672).

DavidA. Boileau(b. 1930) is a priestof theArchdioceu


of New Orleans,PhD!Louvain1961. FormerDean of
St. john'sSeminaryin Little Rock,Arkansas,he teacher
ethicsand is chainnanof the philosophydepartmentat
Loyola Universityand at Notre Dame Seminary in
New Orleans.He has directedthe Institute of Human
Relatiomat LoyolaUniversityand the LouisianaCommitteefor the Humanitit1
and Human Servicesfor the InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters.He i1
presidentof the North AmericanAssociationof alumni and alumnaeof Louvainj
Instituteof Philosophy.

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