Professional Documents
Culture Documents
IN NEO-
TH( ISM
-
Prefaceby tlze Editor
'I his book of ph1hhophi cal t'ss.1 ·s complete s i11 English the publt-,htd
philmoph1 ca] work of :arduul M<:rcicr. His m .mu.1ls lu c bt·t·n t1,m-.-
l. tcd \ltl Ce 1916 . These tran l.1tiom ·0111111g .1s they do 110\\ .1t th<: t.: nd
of 1<J<J<J, complete not only tht· entry m Englt h of the ·,1rdi11 ,1l, but
hring-. to a do<;c our etlc)rts to cclebr.1tc once ,1g.iin the Ccntenni.11 of the
I Iigh •r Tnstitute of Philmoph .1t the C.uholic Umversity of Louvain .
Sinn: the Institute 110,v has .m ngli h langu,1gc division, it is ot1r hope
that the-;e transl.1tio11s , ill assi t many students in apprcci,1ting the
thought of the great ardinal.
W c will analyze them and comment on thcn1 in the final chapter of
this book entitled: "A tudy in Neo-Thomis1n." Cardinal Mercier's gi-
ganti and succe sful efforts to assist in launching the Neo-Thomic;t
Movement find many of their origins in these essays. The School of
Louvain is born in these pages. It now thrives both within the confines
of the Catholic world and far beyond its borders.
The n1ethod that Cardinal Mercier developed at Louvain and suc-
ceeded in having approved in Rome can be found in those pages. The
breath of his interests; the genius of his m.ind; the efforts to und erstand
and appreciate "every word of wisdon1, every useful thing by whomso-
ever discovered or planned and received with a willing and grateful
mind," as conunanded by Pope Leo in the encyclical "Aeterni Patris" is
nowhere better obeyed than in the thought and effort of Cardinal Mer-
cier. These essays show us what a debt we owe to him and these trans-
lations are our atten1pt to acknowledge that.
So many of my colleagues helped 1ne with these translations that I
shall leave it to the recording angel to remember them. Our heavenly
Father who sees in secret will reward them.
I must however, mention n1y colleagues who spent many hours ana-
lyzing and commenting on the texts, all of which helped in my study.
They are Professors Urbain Dhondt, Martin Moors, Sandra Rosenthal,
Gary Herbert, Henry Folse, Letitia Beard, Steve Berg, Carol Leake, Lar-
ry Warner, the psychiatrists at Tulane Medical School, the speech pa-
PREI-'ACE BY PROFESSOR RALPH MCINERNY XI
to be countered. This had the effect ofletting Descartes set the rules of
the game and in a manner Gilson noted among others, not least in Des-
cartes himself, one's adversary has a way of insinuating his thoughts even
into the attack upon him.
In order to get some sense of the intellectual milieu addressed by Ae-
terni Patris,we can consult the circumstances of two great conversions in
France, first that of Paul Claude!, second that of Jacques Maritain.
Claudel, in his n1.agnificent account of his conversion in Notre Dame
on Christmas Eve, 1886, tells us of the cultural atmosphere of Paris when
he entered the Sorbonne. He himself had stopped practicing his faith
after his First Communion, and in the Lycee read Renan's Life ofJesus
and lost his faith. When he received his prize at the Lycee Louis-le-
Grand from the great apostate himself, Claude! felt crowned by the
hands of Re nan. "At eighteen I believed what all the so-called cultivated
people of the time believed. The strong idea of the individual and con-
crete had been obscured in me. I accepted the monist and mechanist hy-
pothesis in all its rigor, I believed that everything was subject to laws, and
that the world was a chain of causes and effects that science was going to
explain perfectly tomorrow." Did this fill him with the progressive spir-
it, was he optimistic for the future, was his life given meaning by this re-
ceived opinion? "But all this seemed sad and boring." Claude! lived
in1.111orally,why not?, and little by little he fell into a state of despair. 5
"Recall those sad days of the 1880's, the time of the full flourishing of
naturalist literature. Never had the yoke of matter seemed more fixed.
Anything that had a name in art, science, literature, was irreligious. All
the so-called great men of the time ended by being hostile to religion.
Renan reigned." (P. 1009)
The time of which Claude! wrote was contemporary with the issu-
ance of Aeterni Patris. That the cultural malaise Leo XIII saw around
him, and for which he wished to propose a remedy, was real, is evident
in this testimony of Claudel, a man who would excel as poet, dramatist,
diplomat. That things had not changed a generation later is clear from
the case of Jacques Maritain. Raissa Maritain, in the memoir she pub-
lished when she and her husband were in exile in New York during
World War II, set down in unforgettable fashion the cri is she and
Jacques had come to as the result of the depressing materiali m of the
orbonne where they were tudents. If their profes or in the sciences
and in philmophy were to be believed the world is a product of chance,
there i no point to it, and the same must be said for human life, ince
human beings an: thcms ·Ives part of the material world without remain-
fi>. Leon XIII et la n:-;taur.tion des etudcs philosophiqucs. - Le Livre d'Or du Amtificat
de l.i1m .Xlll. Brm,<..-1-,,Sorn
'.·te hl·lgc d libr,iric, 1888.67-r31 lwithA.VanWeddingenJ.
J-IICAL ESSAYS
's pJ:IJLOSOP .
CARDINAL MERCIER
56
- never mind for the moment, h ·r actions and their laws. These ac- \
, d lyzes t e1
line that determines an ana. ll t al and inora iacu ties.
I £. 1 . Th ey are
P "bl mte ec u , h 1
tion depend upon sens1 e' each of them, ot ers on y specific.
ruled by laws, ome are commonl to. ethics, theo di cy h ave t h eir · foun-
chology, ogic, £. 1 · Ii
Among the.e 1aws, . P~Y tue O f h.1s nat u ral makeup man 1ee s inc ned to
111
dation. Be 1de, vir . things and events, the aspects and the
l not10nsamong
c ·
search 1orumversa ·. al and proper to all or d ers of reality
. h. h entire1y gener .
relation w IC ar~ . h s evidently a proper object: it constitutes a
This transcendentmqmry a , '. d . h .
. . fk 1 dae Philosophy m a wor , 1s t e science oflaws
distinct areao now e o · . ' d h · 1 .
and repre entat1v
. e and affective. functions
. . of. the I, an t at 1sa so the sci-
ence of objectivereality,seen m its 1rred~c1blee!,ements. In other words,
rhe philosophical scienceis concerned with the final causes and the first
principles." Followingthe lead of Aristotle, no one has better fixed the
di tinct characterof the philosophical science than St. Thomas. Long be-
forehand, Thomas refuted the disciples of both Comte and Littre, who
do not granthim this honor due to an etiological stubbornness. Famous
phil~so~hers , FredericUeberweg and Trendelenburg, have called Aris-
totelia_rusm_the objective doctrine par excellence! Thomism has been
conceivedm the same spirit.
rather
. a lamentable
· dnarrow-mindedness
r · A 11t'iqmty
· d.d 1 not possess the
mstruments
· require
fi d LOr these . delicate observat ions. Its sc1ent1
· · ·fi1c·method
--- was ill de· ne .dAs 1 Balmes
· al c said: our fathers solved , sometimes · th roug h
specu 1at10ns
· anf ogic LOnnulas' the problen 1s, w h 1c . h came firom t h e
re
observation o facts. ~oreover, . what master among the Scholastics
C
placed
· 1so h. much ·dvalue mto expenmentation as St • Th omas.? Fo11 owmg·
l-
Anstot ~, is gm e, a~d Albertus Magnus, his professor and the first nat-
ural ph1losoph~r of his century, St. Thomas applied himself so whole-
le ?eartedl~ to fixing_the relationsh~ps of the senses and of the spirit so that,
111 our times, ~e is accused, quite wrongly, of overemphasizing sense
knowledge ..It 1s, rathe~, Thonias who wants man, who is spirit and mat-
ter, to find m the sensible phenomenon the external stimulus of his in-
tellectual evolution. Thomas has marked, in a manner as magisterial as
Aristotle and with a better clarity, the part of both factors in the act of
understanding.
How many problems still remain without solution in the schools of
modem philosophy because one has lost sight of the respective role and
the mutual influences of matter and mind in the development of intel-
lectual life!
To equate, following the positivist, mental activity to bodily activity,
that is to make each equivalent fom1s of energy and to refuse a priorito
accept any means of knowledge other than external observation and ex-
perimentation; or to hold, with the last defenders of the Cartesian
school, that all mental activity, whether it is called sensation or thought,
instinct or free will, escapes the general laws of the material world - in
both cases one destroys the complex unity of the human nature.
If certain mental manifestations are signs of a power which does not
come from the world of material forces, then it is clear that it is not in
the world of material forces, or in the appearance or disappearance of a
heat or mechanical phenomenon that we will find the traces_of this high-
er power. The day when the spiritualist would try to furmsh the proof
that positivism demands of him, the spiritualist would simply deny that
it was even possible. . . . .
If there are principles of action other than maten_al ~nergies, then 1t 1s
through the witnes of consciousness that the pnnopl~s n~ust be a_f-
firmed. We hall not po it a priori,anterior to the whole se1ent1ficor p~il-
o ophical inve tigation, that only matter is in the realm of the po~s1bl~
111111d
and that the only mean of cognition in the reach of the human is
. d · t. 11 for that would be an un-
t h e extenor observatton an expemncnta 10 , <
· · - · · , to accent "the means of
Justifiable po tulate, theretorc 1t 1s nt:CC sary r
d mon tration" of the spirituali . t chool.
1n c AL ESSA. y:,
' p}IJLOSOP
58 CARDINAL MERCIER S
. b ervation in philosophy
1 O f interior o s onl~
The preponderant ro e . experimentalfact at least b
15
· terior acts an · h h ppens outside Of y h aV'
The consciousness of our in . of that whic a us. w hi
the same right as the observationance of the existenc~ a~d ~f ~he ~alue br a<
H ow wou ld we acquire. the .assur ly upon this 1rres1st1ble inte- w h:
1
f e cannot re
of our exterior observations w t we observe? p er.
rior affirmation which tells us tha . observation are the mechanical tiOI
f extenor d . h . ll
What fall under the grasp o h n be associate wit inte ectual
. . al henornena t at ca . If
or phys1co-chenuc P . ll I thinking 1tse • .
activity but this is not mte ectuallah t exists is endowed with corporeal
' . ·d t that t a · •
A prioriit 1snot evi en .d fbeing and of body are neither iden-
t"es· the 1 eas o i:
existence and proper 1 ' bl fi each other. There1ore, no one has Th
t ly insepara e rorn . f
tical nor abso1u e h . t demonstrate the existence o a non- un :
. h the one w o tnes o d
the ng t to st0P h h nly procedures that such a emonstration am
corporeal power throug t e o
Permits. . d ·
t mean that we mten · 1a t e men t a1 activity
d to 1sO · · fro
However, this oes no . tir 1
influence of the laws of thermodynanncs or, on the
comp1ete1y from any . . h • or
other hand, submit all aspects of mental mamfestat10ns to t ese physical
laws.
It sufficesto analyze the data of consciousness, upon which we rely
with good reason, in order to arrive at stating that the acts of knowledge,
of consciousness,of memory, of desire, of will, are divided in two com-
pletely different orders, the one sensible, the other suprasensible; all are
subject to the laws which regulate the activity of material agents, notably
to the law of duration or of time, and into all likelihood, to laws of the
equivalence of forces of nature and of the conservation of energy but
not ~ll are sub~ect_inthe sam~ way; the latter ones are subject onl; in a
mediate way, m virtue of their natural relationships with the fom1er.
vat::e e~~:trhdanhtwitn_e~ses?fthe interior sense and of external obser-
1s t e participat10n of the . d f
in the acts of knowled e d f . . organism an o material agents
The exterior ob g . an o willing of the sensibleorder.
. servat10n states with . . .
which increases each d th . ' . a prec1s1on and ·with a clearne s
hi h ay e mner relation O f d d h
g est ~ental manifestations and th s epen ence between t e
of chemistry, whereas th b . e laws of inechanics, of phy ic and
level 0 f e O servation of ·
a general law th· · consciousne s elevate to the
festation Of h ' is mtemal fact na 1 h ' ·
. .s t e soul (even tho h ' me Y, t at th e uperior man1-
1mmaterial ord ) . se t at we ra
sonin er , intellectual tho h fc nge an1ong the s11prasc11siblc or
g, are neve • ug t, or exan 1 I f
spondin h r practiced with b . P e, or th e \ rk rea-
g p enome f out em g a . ,
Here are th r:. na o the sensible d ccon1p n1ed b a corn.:-
A . e iacts. or er .
n inductio .
facts f n inferred . .
o exteriorob . precipttous]y c. •
servat,on ironi th e r- • I . . . )t
can make l1lind d " ...\c 1ur,c exan1m.1nont
1 po ed to 'ic in the world
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILO
SOPHICAL STUDIES
59
Before and after the- I 3th century there we re d octors whose tyl
of a worthless barbanty.
· bl Some melancholy paraph rasers, some · angry
s e wasold
men blame d t h eir trou e on language, . and de 1 d h h .
c are t at t e senou sness
of philosophy. ma d e e1oquence impossible · One sees a11too easily . m . the
severity of . science an excuse for an impotent dry A •f h
ness. s i t e one who
abounds m str?ng and deep thought_automatically despises words! What
treasures of wisdom. .could . there be m the mind of a man w h o consents
to write only banalities
. m .pedantic
. . form' · Is not all th i·s an i·11us1on
· o f na-
ive people? Without. servility. with regard to form , St . Th omas, 1i·k e St
Bonaventure, was, m the.bphilosophical
. genre, an excellent writ er. some·
L
me~ ~s competent as e1 mz and '!. C?u~in have justly praised the syl-
logistic_method. In~eed, the syllogi~m'. m imposing on the development
of the 1~ea of c_ertam unbreakable hrruts, thereby strengthens it by con-
taining it; and 1t prevents the poverty ~nd emptiness of thoughts being
concealed under th_e abu~dance of discourse. All truly philosophical
writers of modern times, m France and in England, have been anxious
to reproduce in their compositions the rich conciseness of which St.
Thomas remained the model. A literary critic as grave as Villemain has
recognized that the French language, the most philosophical in the
world, owes, for a great part, its limpidity to the Scholastics. Sainte-
Beuve has made the same confession.
Within the proper limits with which the human spirit has to be con-
tent in confronting infinite Intelligence, the examination and the inves-
tigation was ardently stimulated by the scholastic method and Cousin
regretted that this method was abandoned. No doubt, sometimes one
complicated too much the thought in some text on the authority of St.
Thomas. But with this text and following this master scholastics knew
how to find their own way and the originality of their personal idea was
affirmed with brilliance while they invoked a philosophy in order to sub-
stantiate it before the multitude. When one examines the differing opin-
ions on various subject in the scholastic schools (and they we_re
numerous), it i clear that the e opposing opinions all app~aled to Aris-
totle: this wa , at time , an excessive homao-e 0
to a very legitimatefi author-
ity. Each century ha seen the r turn of thi kind of re pect or some
illustrious genius that is for the scholar who is in fashion. Our genera-
. ' ' d · · f me
t10n cannot c ndemn pa . ed ao-es for exce ive a nuratton ° so
scholar, even bet\ t:l'll oppo cd . chool of teaching.
Ewn with regard to Anscotk, leaving a. idc the change~ sugge. ted by
the ( 'h · · c: • • l 1 •av has h1 proud mde-
, n ttan 1a1th,Thomas Aquina ..1 mo •t a\\..; · · 10
. logic. he d'1-
pcnlicncc of mind. Ht a< uses Ari cotlc w1th his errors ~ ' •
t h' - ' l laved by the t'Vl' s
11 ·s 1111dt from riscotl , \ 1th regard to t 1t: part P ' , .• .
u1 J · h -d b ~ the c cs thL c 1u t:
P 1 1 1n , llu in.ition the appl',1r.nee ot ot.., core.: ' ' t-l . ,
o tid I l ' . h . · 1 • t 1ry of mattt't o 11.:,\\ -
;i c ,h md flo, , the origm >fnv ·r , t 1..:iw.:n
OPJ-Il C AL ESSAYS
, S pBILOS
C ARDI N AL MER C I.ER
LEO XII
Objectivity of perception
The despot~sm of all our sensations, in the normal state; the most abso-
lute despotism_ of the indications of general sensibility, which if they
Ce were _underestimated would surely involve the alteration and the de-
s~ruction or the d~ath of the "subject"; finally, the despotism of first prin-
~iples and reasonm_g b~sed on the observation of reality; and with that,
m the s~stem of obJ~ctive perception, the satisfaction of the spontaneous
tendencies of consciousness and the anguish of consciousness confronted
by t~e theory of skepticism, which is contrary to the strongest sentiments
and m contradiction with experience: these are the arguments which al-
ways will establish that perception has an objective foundation in reality ·
and that the sensible or ideal representation must be basically in accord
with the world of things or noumena, as Kant calls them. Von Hartmann
has developed these arguments with a great wisdom in his book Fonde-
ment critiquedu Realism transcendental.Every once and awhile, Kant has
been led back by his better nature to an opinion close to this truth: "All
external perception," he says, "demonstrates by itself the existence of
something real." In the same way as U eberweg and von Hartmann have
remarked, Kant posited as the principal fact of the interior life "central
apperception" or the consciousness. But, in the conscious state, subject
and object mutually compenetrate, and on this terrain at least, Kant has
had to acknowledge "the fundamental or assimilatory objectivity" of the
representation which is precisely that which we have asserted for the
phenomena of sensation and understanding. Despite the sincere adnura-
tion that every impartial person must show because ?fthe ~nalytic power
of Kant in his writings in which so many recent d1scovenes w~re fore-
shadowed , it must also be held again t Kant that the representational re-
lationship of reality with the perceptive faculty, tendin_g spont~neou ly
to assimilat e the < bje t, is proved by universal observation. This funda-
CAR D INAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
H:~
:~
;~spect~, hpresupposethe parallelis: :f
temal state? The very laws of W be normal case, correspond to the ex-
;hatever .their value is in oth.er
tdhese_nsiblequality and the eali~rgamc.sign and the mental
relie
peri
dare
en oes 1thap
urement of th .
h re ty which t ·
pen t at the sensation .
I
s imu ates them. heco
of sensiblep e stu1:1ulus, if everything is " is plroportional to the meas- quali
. erception:>Th· pure y sub· • ,, .
Tame callsth · is relationship f . . ~ective m the fact tiall
ing_the imagee;:;;esenta_tive phenomenonoana~;1milat~on is so real that pred
nation"; but . he object. Janet has hallucmation" ubstitut- C pf
the i ' In any case i d very severely ·· • "
mage must be 1 ' n or er to const·t cnt1c1zed halluci- tor
sembl ,, £ a c ear s b 1 ute a pe
ther ~s. or the faculty d ~m ol of the rea11 ·ty drmanent ub titute, p r
e 1s in th b estmed an a ' b
resentation be e road sense of the to exercj e its activi sy1~1 ol cha~ re-
mines th tween special se . e tem1s, no relac· tyh on It. Certamly,
em. A S nsat1o ions ip f .
organsassi· ·1 s t. Thomas ns and th e phy . 1 o n1atenal rq,-
. rni ate th . Would 1ca pr
tions of the ;eth e1r proper ob . _ay: neither th oc e that deter-
er excited by d. ~ect 111it phy • al e ey e nor tht:> thl'r
1Verse • si
· sensible ob ·c
naeur~: but the mo-
~ t ' modify tht· milieu
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILOSOP
HICAL STUDIES 85
~
~~
Passiveby reason o~ its mdeter?1ma~101: and of its impotence to modify
the object, the sensible faculty is active m the vital assimilation of its ob-
ge ject. The cognitive faculties are, in virtue of their nature, oriented to-
he ward their ends, these things being objects of the external world, as in
Lhe sensation, or modifications of the ego, or finally, object s of intellectual
ed intuition as in ideas. These powers are by their very essence constituted
lIn
~re
his
1-
d
in function of an objective representation.The followers of the critical
school, since they call these functions "relative," bear witness to the dif-
ference of the mechanical or physiological functions of the body.
..
1t1ons w hose subjective . mode of b"-..
- dicv;
gn
Intelligence, therefore, h ~s co d consequently, the ex1stenc~ of cer- wou
ing is determined by the obJec~ an ' of the hunun consc1ousncs'I wha
.. d n the eyes fl . .
titudc is properly legitimate i £'. h sphere of re ex1ve cognitions t UC (
. a1·d t only ior t e d b J .
But, this inference is v 1 no . . directly involve , ut a so in the bcca
in which the question of ce_r~amtylis £'. ct all the difference between a oppr
muons. n ia , . . h' .
sphere of spontaneous cog . • dgnient consists 1n t 1s:in order () nc
. d a reflective JU .
spontaneous Judgment an . cl t the intelligence gives way to the thco
ousJU gmen, f h . .
to formulate a spontane . representations o t e imagination ly "a
. . . f l perceptions or h . fl
sohc1tat1ono externa . d' cted in its steps by t e m uence of Wh,
. b · t · to action or Ire . .
without emg pu m . . cl tO £'.ormulate a reflective Judgment only virt
·11 hereas it is 1e 11
our fir~e wi '. w h k ledge of objects and constantly led by the th e
when 1t applied to t e now .
deliberate intervention of the will. . ·11. on e
c. h ·
In 1act t e mterven ti.on or the non-intervent10n of
. the w1 m the ap- con
plication '0 r the intellectua~ faculty, knowledge of objects cannot change the
the intrinsic nature of the intellectual act. .
In its reflexive judgments intelligence is only detenmned to certainty
by the objective evidence of truth; it is, consequently, logical to con-
clude that in its direct judgments it is also capable ofletting itself be guid-
ed exclusively, whether unconsciously, or with consciousness, by the
manifestation of the objective union of the terms, spontaneously fur-
nished by observation.
sphere of spontaneous cogmtions . . n _aidg' ment consists in this: in order one will
. d d a reflective jL . theoretic :
spontaneous JU grnent an . d t the intelligence gives way to the
to formulate a spontaneous jU. gmen '-epresentations of the imagination ly said bi
solicitation of external per~eptionds_or rted in its steps by the influence of What! -
·h b · · to action or irec
wit out emg put 111 . . d to formulate a reflective judgment only virtue of
1 the existe
our fr~e will'. wherehasiktis eledge of objects and constantly led by the
when 1t applied to t e now . one infe ~
deliberate intervention of the will. . . . conclusi 9
In fact, the intervention or the non-intervention o_fthe will m the ap-
plication of the intellectu~ faculty, knowledge of objects cannot change the "subj
the intrinsic nature of the intellectual act.
In its reflexivejudgments intelligence is only determined to certainty
by the objective evidence of truth; it is, consequently, logical to con- stitute t
clude that in its direct judgments it is also capable ofletting itself be guid- these fac
ed exclusively,whether unconsciously, or with consciousness, by the ship of a
manifestationof the objective union of the terms, spontaneously fur- ofthe
nished by observation.
·eval thinker had written such a thing ' how mod ern day rat1onali .
d1ould have moc k e d sue h a person! A speculative th.m k er would a ts,
w · K h
w hat does 1t matter to
? s·
ant,
h' t at the whole social O d
r er co 11apses by Vlr _'J'
tu e of your . . system. mce t is. system is true . , let the oc1a· 1or d er collapse·-
ecause it is the system that 1s wrong (given so many of ·t 1 ·
b ressive . db b . ) S h i s e ements are
an har anch . h. uc a result . . shouldn't deter h.1gh er thi nki ng
Opp •
ne will. say per aps t at t .1s opposition . of the practi·cal, ord er wit· h th e·
O
eoretical shows
. . that there 1s a fault m the theoretical Th
• 1s " is
· very ng . h t-
th
said but it is. easy. to put your finger on the flaw ' of thi·s statement.
ly
What'· - .one is gomg . to show
. . us that the will presupposes ti1e ob. ·
IJCCt m
irtue .of its orgamc constitution
. , and . so ' consequently , we n1ust ad nut·
V
the existence of the object! Isn t this from the reasoning of the mind th
. ;:i S at
one inf~rs t.h is consequence. o, I ~ai:not logically take advantage of the
conclusion m order to escape skept1e1sm: I am systematically confined in
the "subjective," I have to stay there.
But one appeals to principles, to the demands of the will!
That's the key! But the apperceptive faculties also have laws that con-
stitute them. However, the innate and completely primitive tendency of
these faculties is to posit (in a way that will determine analysis) a relation-
ship of assimilation of things and of the ego, of the object and the subject,
of the mental phenomenon and of the noumenon, in the living unity of
consciousness. One respects the laws of the will: but don't let the critique
deny the laws of the representative faculties! The Critique has no answer
to this reflection that is based on the direct observation of the ego and of
its completely spontaneous and instinctive tendencies.
It is true: one admits today that on this point Kant contradicted him-
self The profound analysis ofKantianism made recently by D. Nolen of
the Faculty of Bordeaux, only intensifies the contempt of the refom1er
of "all future metaphysics." Unfortunately, this contem .pt bears on the
essence of the debate. This contempt would never have occurred in the
pursuit of knowledge, but because of the pursuits of the professors of for-
mal logic in the 14th and 15th centuries and because of Descartes, the
re ult has been that the philosophical tradition is now distru ted by even
the best thinkers.
tut<:SW
The fundamental realism or psychology of Saint Tho nus
bis syst,
nd th
The species is an abstract idea grasped by the mi f~om e observation st:qucn
of things in which it only exists as affected by the differenc~s that bring chat th•
about different individuals. In the famous quarrel about umversals, pre- che no
figured obscurely by Porphry and Boethius _to t~ac~~rs of the 1:'rivium, life- ()
St. Thomas holds already a "moderate realism, givmg the universal a substar
basic and virtual realness in reality, but giving it a formal or distinct ex- s n. It
istence only in the abstractive act of the spirit. ·
JS ''the
In nature, Thomas said following Aristotle, everything is individual· assiJnil
the universal as such exists only in the intellect that forms it by its act of tellc ·t
generalization. On this point once again Thomas and his mentor Aristo- cs. ary,
tle came to be accepted, much later, by the teachers of the natural sci- judgn
ences. been
tie ar
Apperception of my consciousness 1na p
alread
But in the multitude of sensible and intellectual rep resentat10ns
. it. ·
pro~er to diseem the central object or the "consciousness " w· h S is
gustme and Heiric d'Aux S Th · 1t t. Au-
the object of a habitual in~::dia!~ kn~n~asdrecognizes that the "ego" is
without the help of an idea-image. w e ge and that we perceive ego
0
ali ts
The habitual knowledge of th . . our Pi
When e sp1nt
we compose this statem . fects
ate kno~ledge of the ego wi~n\hconAce~mng~he habitual and in1medi- then
concemmg
will . the mter_nal
· sense and the e nstotehan an d sch elastic theory
nessgr~sap11itst~hole significance. From tgheenfieral apperception of life' we
, a tams co fi dl
ence; at the s ~ use y but with a di.re t c: 1· enmg o f consc10us-
1rst awak · .
. ame tim h . c 1ee mg h ·
imparted on him lf h e, . e distinguishes th h rs proper exist-
to him his first a se ' e discerns a non-per rolug the modifications
assertedin the thwareness.of an external w Id sona ele ment t h at indicates
cussionabout theesoryof immanent effort oorfM.~hese notions have been
and·m its· hrnits
. ense oft ofuch (Tastsinn) and ame
ofDelb . hed B'rran, m • the dis-
U ndersta
. nd how by oeu . : T aking all of 'th m. t e th eory of motility
exercised hi ' an intmtio ese ideas t
of the ?n s own self n and a complet 1 . ogether makes us
of b notion
. f the dist· , man go es firom hr· Ie y pn m 1·trve · ab tract10n .
0
eautiful · .
man perfe ' in his physical li£ d
Inct and h mse f to h
e one, the not'
.
t e notion of being,
which ma~~ _theseideas and e rst of all; and thlon of good, the notion
af:nd even ansointell_ectual facult~xtends them toe thn we under tand how
ar surpassingh.rgan1c grasping Th· · thems I e w or Id of idea
ies ha. ve in · for
1sow n generation· 1sfrs w hat Th e ves' a 1· ·
rvmg attrKtion
0111a say .
o th.In k ers and h. · s in t1 de, cription
t ts des· npuon
. . con u-
.
LEO XIII AND THE RESTORATION OF PHILO SOPHICAL STUDIES
95
cience as in every
. day · life?
h c Too foften, in this time , "to succee d" 1cor a
S
scholar is to abd icate
. . in th e 1ace o terrorism or unbridl e d firee d om. Free-
dom in n1oderat1on
· isf w at belongs .to great personages· , an d th ey are JUSt
.
as rare as m the era o Marcus " Aurelius who complained ab out th.is to th e
ods! Whatever the era. of .metaphysics" may be , i·deal constructions •
g
eem closed for a long t1n1e. Since the . tin1.e ofDesCartes , h ow many p h.i-
S
losop~er_shav_efound m~ny essential principles that are not already em-
bryonic m Anstotle and in Plato, these two n1.astersof analysis and mental
synthesis!
O r
10 differentm
f h.
Ilosophy.
oments of h
nd so we have h
partial synthe fi
ses rom hi h
us contnbutes
t e evolution of thi ~ C one has to lib rate,
n ng, the general synthe i.
power-
n. Mcrcit:r
Speech79
1883
It seems that there is nothing simpler than that part of the mechanism of
speech that we call a word, yet the word, even if it is only one yllabl
has a nearly infinite complexity. e,
The word is not only that movement of the lips that creates a vibra-
tion in the air and will produce in the interlocutor a cerebral excitation
which is a n~cessary prelimi~1ary of thought; it is above all an interior sigi~
of which articulated sound 1s only the expression, a mental conversation
of which exterior speech is only the continuation.
What is this interior sign? What is this exterior sign?
How did those two signs fuse together? How do they connect on the
one hand, with the thought of the one who is speaking, and on the other
hand, with the thought of the one who is listening?
The answer to those questions will make us understand the nature and
the mechanism of speech.
We know Bonald's aphorism: "Man thinks his words before speaking
his thought." "Speech would seem to have been at first necessary, in or-
der to establish the usage of speech," J. J. Rousseau said.
That which would come before the final manifestation of thought,
would be then a speech mentally intended.
And, in fact, when we make efforts to remember a name we forgot,
isn't it natural to say: It is a name that starts with a rna... that ends with
in or with on... it seems that I heard it, but I cannot remember it?
An error oflanguage, a mistaken connection, a lapse, are immediately
corrected by the one who hears them; which is an obvious sign tha_tthe
audience follows, with a kind of mental representation, every smgle
sound articulated by the speaker. . .
Which one of us hasn't found himself trying to remember m his sol-
itary thought the course of a lively discussion he was i11:volved~n? The
opponent's objection, the inflexions, the sound of his voice'. the ir~ny of
his pity, the weak help of a friend who tried to protect us, till the silence
79 L
· a pamle. - RQ , 23 (1888) 545-567 .
, 's PHILOSOPHI CAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER
CARDIN A
I22
You would like to cite an author. You remember his thought well, but
you hav • t reproduce it word for word, and you cannot remember the
exact c;entence, even though you see it, it i,; in that book, at the end of
the volume, you even have read it, you underlin ed it and marked it with
a sign. Y Llrthought doesn't have the characteristic of a heard sound, or
an articulative movement, but the form of an image with vague edg<.:s,
and not well defined. Without doubt, the mental vision is a powerful
auxili ry for thought.
or me, the immediate preparation of my lessons, meaning the fixa-
tion ,f ,t mode of thinking that must rule the elocution of my te_aching,
con ists in writing 011 a little piece of paper ,;omc wor?s'. five or s1xm~y-
underlining them once or twi ce according to the1r importance, give
b<.>,
number,. link thl'Jll with pan : nthc si~, so that I can ment~lly reread
th1.·111
them \ htlc I' spcak.ing, nd find them , s , lead to the expression of my
111
thou ,h
• ·, I f" r. · l Ji<>Wth •y represent numberc; to thcm-
I, 1t. ( '\Tl'r,1 0 . lllY. rrl ' Ill S M Id 11 • chat the most common
I\ ·s, numb ·r 1 for mst <lll' c. mt to I t: ' .
• I · · I · I · • <Jfth<-'number six. If the
Ill<:utt 1gn for thl:lll 1s .1 v 1sl1;1~1gn, t w nnag
ri ,. 1>11
/ 111 11,1, t d,• /11 i\111 , PP
11Jt11 7, -7<,.
ICAL ESSAYS
' HJLOS OPH
124 CARDINAL MERCIER S p
. I spe
d
rrio-ve 'o.osc~.
.,.
. n of the represented number 1dJlla Gal
. "th the nono . ' 0
ofl.S,
sound and motor image go wi . 1 of consciousness, m the clear-
. f; nor 1eve . Pers d char:
they find themselves at an in e A Englishman, Francis Galton 81 · te ,
· ess n ' pfll'lhe sotlric
obscure sphere of subconsciousn · . an inquiry about the power of
had in the past the great i ea
.d of having
. . ns extended eventua y to the
ll tO t_ rt)it1-ds_
. f h. f; How cinze ' the1r litl
visual representation o is e h oke with twenty members of the . a po
.
races of humamty. mong A others ' b of the Frenc h Instltute,
e sp . wit. h the Per, e beC atl
d mem ers d k d stag . ris
Royal Society of Lon don ~n c. boys and girls, an as e them to
rr ecu 0
. 1 st bhshments 1or
chiefs of educanona e a , . g to reproduce. Let us make note co h0
.. ili~Im~in . 'fhe P
answer the questionnaire of that questionnaire. writteri laril
. d the purpose
that those peop 1e i~ 1ore ut a well-defined object, your breakfast of this speech?
Think, Galton said, aboh . h i•n1 age that you conjure up for the No, the
mormng. fior instanc
· e• W at is t e
characteris j
eyers;t uestion: Is the image confused ~r t~tally clear? who are ~ 5
q • ll h b'ects distinctively reproduced together, or
2nd question: Are a t e O ~ h in edu~atl ~
t one single part of the scene t at comes out
is there only at one momen is the una.
of the whole? b we can c
· . The colors of the dishes the roast beef, the read, the
3rd quest10n. ' If,ve
mustard, the meat, the parsley, or other dishes that were on the table, are
terior thi1
they all distinctive and natural?82 . . .
think at t
Those questions give us quite a few mterestmg answers that we _will
be able to use here. While the children, the young persons especially, meamng
and the lower and middle class people clearly see the scene of the break- tance, it
fastwith all its details, to the point that they all declare that they can see ment o
it as if it were happening in front of their eyes, to the point that they Writi
would like to know how to draw and reproduce it, to the point that they profe o
visualizeit in its whole with just one look. On the contrary, rn.en of sci- tenvard
enc~,havethe i~pressio~, sometime~ that Galton is nuking fun of the_m, peakin
and . the mental imagery about wh1eh he consults then1 is a pleasant in- Wha
vention that does not stimulate anything in their consciousness or they languag
declare
. that they only see a coniusec. d w h ol e without
. ' lmes,
any defined .
nothing close to reality. Let
lingui t
I do not only speak about th hild . . b tter t
lnaudi, who can mentall r~: c prodigies, like Mondeux or Jacque ered in
they have seen written Inl o~nb~r columns of 20 or 30 nmnber that ln 1
players,like Morphy Bl kby e time on a blackboard or tho e che
Mall Gazette told abo t ach . urne ' Stemitz
· · '
and other , of whom the Pall
n
up t u t e1r uccc s befi h cl
I o 20 games, with a mask l . ore, v . could play 10, 15, an
pay of the opponent what . onht 1e1r eyes, just by being told on 'arb
piece as bee 11
------
81- C,alton I
8"
.
• 11q11mes
~. op cit p. R4.
int I
<•
.fae11l1y
o 1111111111 .
moved and v herr it h<, been
l t
PEECH £88 3
125
83. R.evi S .
84 ie nemifzqu e1
. Lessons o11the dis: 7 December I 0!!7
ta~esorti
'J I(' tl ('r• 10
" .
. sy'ef ,n.Vol. Ill
• IH
' p. I SJ.
h
SPEECH 1883
127
d ··
.h h
.. .
;s
edi~
A remarkableconsequence of the loss of that mental ability 1s,as I B, (1
. What is true for articulation is true also for the movements of writ- the
mgs. 86
ca
1 Let us suppose that the muscles that close the mouth to pronounce the to
1
p:~~::r/f:stt~~n ct~: f~st~d ;it~ ten thousand muscle fibers, which i ch
motor nerve centers t ·. . will t~en take as many nerve fiber in the
It is hard to . . o puhtit 111motion to articulate consonant . Bu
imagine t e work th t hild
nounce all the vowels and a a c has to produce to pro-
f< consonants of an 1 h b . . the
erent movements of arti· I . a P a et, to d1 cover the d1f-
ll bl . cu ation to b ·1d 1 . ti
sy a es into words the d .' ui etters mto yllable then
th ' n wor s into se t ·
e natural ~ourse of conversation h n ences, and then enten . into C l
]Here again, the study of sp ht at follows from all of thi .
on Y have t eec pathologi · .
varietie o go over the classic Work f e I very 111. tru ti \·e. u ll r
seau al~/an represent these patholoo-i: o Tphathlo t ee h w m:mv l
' ays answe d II o•e • at p · ·
danger" th h re a the questio 11 dd t1 nt, nted b · Rom-
' e ot er O . " s a re d h. .,
ne. Con ini " d e to 1111: then.· 1 110
' an when h • • . ll
e " ac; 1mt.1tcd : ··, K-
81i. )trickt'r op . l
• 111
, Para II.
' PEECII 1 88J
I ~ I
It i probable
. that. . the. range._ flosses. that " )1,1ppcn , 111 · lH: 1 111 • I1 1111. 111 1·
articulation
. or
. wntmg f 1 proportional t the .111• t ..
• " 01111 1<:SJOI) . ~01 th •
. "'f o
oonal
. alteration fo the nerve 1 . enters that. respe . c·t IVl •
· ,1y co111111,111d ti,. lllH 11,ir
ocular
· groups
1 o mu cu
f 1 a1 fibers work111g towarcl· ti1 • 1· .
ormat1011of th .
different e ements Id bo anguage.1· Stumbling
. over. s·Y11 ·•10
1.1cs,
. . sta1111n
, .
•rll)g,
rnumb ling, wou e exp. amed with . the same .tm 111 i1t1 1-· lJ>llt ·It WOLi 11 ( lH:
a waste to spen d m.ore time studymo- t, the 111'' " h '·1111' s111 of ex L ·nor · sp • •cI1.
But those images, what are they, where do they come from?
They are memories, sensations, souvenirs associated in our memory;
they are groups of memorial images of our perceptions. As ca_rlyas the
first months of his existence, the child perceives tastes, sou_nds,lights, and
t
color , tactile sensations. He has feelings of hunger or thirS , ~nd he has
some pleasure satisfying them. All of those per eptions arc linked to a
. d ·n other words and from
nerve center , where they leave b eh m a trac~, i · '
another point of view, an inuge or a souvenir.
"ld for example arouses at the
If an. object ' the n1ilk that d t h e ch 1 '
fee.re . ' h t, rouc h ' an d
. tions taste, s1g
ame tim e and at several tm1es dmerent . sensa
· . '
f images w1-11b,e c10 rn1cd as·
muscular en e, for example, an as ociauon ° ·
. ,r riteAcademytifMedfri11e,
c,pt -
0
7· Sec: Ku mau l. "S p •~ch P.1tbolog ic< ' Th;. HullettII J
. May nd June 1865;Jan ·t The Br,1it1
1 11 and Ilwu.~/it.
I-fJCAL ESSAYS
's pJ-IILosoP
CARDI A L MERCIER
132
kk I
't C) t, 71,, s
u/ of th, (h,td
. p. 354,
SPEECH 188 3
13 3
Re.,V
· . l) . , pp. 63-66 .
rmc tct r. 'fl1e Life o{il'cird
OPJ-!JCAL ESSAYS
's pJ.JILOS
MERCIER
CARDINAL
134 . 1.-...,-,e ri
l of the blood, or from the in- bliSIJ-»- .
h instab1ity esta }lysica.
. world or t e rriecaP }le no fl
from the exterior ' the sound of those whorn h· that P diffe :
t hear 1s
ternal organs.
· 1 the c
hild does no
f or w1
.th ear problems. But soon afte
l r sotlnd, 13all~
In pnnopke, he was born dea ·ated w 1-th the muscu
screamsawa e,
. ar sensations of
ti·onsare assoct . ges to motor images of articula-
J\S or. f 1{1
. percep d. ry 1rna bove o
d
the au itory d 1 nv the au ito peak not yet, for sure, the Ian a . d by tl
th an ary,,,., . lf ble to 5 ' . - ceive i
t~e moudthe child findshunse ae language of a parrot, pslttacism, as t0 liS
ten to ·
th
uon, an f nan but at lea5t h d by the need of articulating and by rfwe thU
age o a t , h"ld
1 ' pus e ·an of thotl
gu_
Le1b111tz. ·d
sa1 . When . . hat we can find in a large number
the c . of animals, 510 ·- 1
· stinctof imitationt
t he 111 . his mot er
h or nanny ta, natural sign of what sat-
. . 1 . t h a t doub .e
\Vl
·u be heard saymg to h
·u eat t e ea ' h rd ta and 1f the articu atlon of ta is one who is
isfieshunger,he wi . repll" t ttention to education, with the pleasure 0
f that mec
1 1
associ _ated,thanksto :t:h J~nw:il repeat ta to get the breast ~r the milk wonde rful
th
of satisfiedhunger, . . 1-s established between the child and his
Th commumcatton . .
We adm
bottie. en f h sation and the auditory image ta. We will only and of corn
motherbecauseo t e sen hild . h f
haveto mo dify h
t e sou nds articulated . by the c m
. d .t e sense o .the it is more '
convent10n · a1tongue received in the c1rcle he was. raise m, .to multiply the infinite
the waysof communicatingand thus language will be constituted. its melodi e
Andso hereis the link establishedbetween the thought of the mother source of
and the thoughtof the child, between the notions of the child and the spread ov e
notionsof hismother.From the group of images that mentally represent etry and tl
forthe mothersoft,liquid, white, opaque that we call milk, to the artic- and one
ulationof the word milk, from the articulation of the word milk for the
goodne ?
motherto the auditoryperception of the sound milk for the child from
th
at auditoryperception to the awakening of the image of the ~ove-
mentst_oexecute the expression of the word milk finally from the
awakerungof that motor i h • ' '
other images bal dimage to t e revival, because of association, of
, ver au tory bal · a1 .
milk,as well as gust t lf;' ver VIsu , and graphic of the word
0
thereis an uninterruapot ryd,h ~ctory, visual, muscular, of the milk it elf,
d e c am of · d
un er a singlename· I associate phenomenon that we call
i
Without doubt anguage_or speech.
speech·h · ' anguage is not es ·a11 d
c . · t e visualor tactil · sen ti Y a heard and expre e
tor blind e image for d f
born bli mutes - as that poo ea ?1ute , the tactile only image
, nd at th r 1 aura Bnd h
complete! 1 e age of two that h d gemen, 90 deaf mute w en
.
discussab
Ya tered '
. sense of taste d .
a a part'aJ 1 - en e oL m 11and near} l,
. stractid , an With h
visual
· image or theas of. God and of t h · w om Dr. H ve managed ' to
intelligencesth e tacttle irnage I e 111101 rtality of tht oul - the
eve d at are \ ·u· ' ay, can
ry ay life it . v1 ing to ex h erve a ring b 'tween rwo
, is the s , c angc th . ..
ound image th eir common 1dc1•• But 111
at tran p fi
· rts rom thought t t 1
I•
SPEECH 1883
1 35
----------
of whom he says a lot :fb~~tor _of Hippo into exile. Fir st, th e Italian,
th
mgs, then th e French and B elgians, of
. p. 146.
284.
285. "A co d .
and 3. n einnat,on that has no niora] valu " . . r • . . 2
286. Circu]ar 1etter to h Pr·
c. Billta, l 11a .fi.sa::1011cl1t:~hc/1<111<1.
general, 25 March 18 t e Superion of h .
287. Letter fro p 88. an ty In tttu te, by 1 mg1 L u17ti111. ,upcmir
esteemed . m , .E Lockhart
community <>fth . ' provcnc1al and ., I . • th'
e Fathers of (' J L pe, 1or of the d1,tm~ui,ht'd .rnd JLI'
· ,arity •1t London . 28 Ot tohl'J 1889 .
SOUND THE ALARM
349
, di erns a good with this compl'
,111I1t h unent· ''F
I
,, · Jl .. 11 is broader, smoot er, more courte . . . . rench and B ,1 ..
lh 11111 1 ous, it is edu e g1an
, ··2~, catcd and ac-
n1t• ._ 1 t cu comary to be discourteous with
Ir 1~ I·ho woul d 1ea f t h roug h those forty- · hcouneo us people. y 'l
hi~c ,, .h er . e1g t pages 0 f M e'
r l - 11uot di agree wit n1e; ouens1ve epithets t d . r. Billi-,'s
·Lu u 1 h , en entiou · · ' ·
''l c .1111, 100 n of persona c aracter abound· in
return obi
s insinuations
. ·,
l
1. ·c rare, almost imperceptible.
. ,
' Ject1ve di~cu<; -
,JO!l~JI - h h .
Tl1U ,at first, we t oug .t to let Mr. Billia's 1·nd 1ctment · g0 · 1
e Tho e to whom 1t was addressed will d. wit 1out a
respo1 l · . . rea 1t or the .
Id they read 1t, any response 1s superfluous Th d Y Wt 11not.
hou . h · e ec1amato
·cheauthor, the outng t nonsense of his accusations ry tone
ot d . h h exempts our rep!
l1 ould they not rea 1t, t en w at good is it for us to · Y·
di I occupy ourselves
irh our contra ctor. ·
" .d .
Ho,Ye,·er,after . cons1 eratlon, Mr. Billia . . is more quick-te mpere d t han
mean.We believe that down deep he 1s smcere and merits more th
. M h . an a
didainfulsilence. oreov~r, t ere 1s no shortage of people who would
·ayrhat a professor of Tunn has misled the Neo-Thomists of Louvain.
The eo-Th~mists of Lou~ain did not ha:e any response, so apparently
theyhad nothmg worth saying. So we believed that it was wiser to only
brietlytell the major grievances of the person who disagrees with us.
The eo-Thomists of Lou vain have a tendency to sympathize with
thepositivistswhile fiercely opposing Cartesian spiritualism. The Thom.-
islRevuemade an excellent response to this reproach with the following
linesthat we would like to make our own:
If Mr. Billia would want to know why we are sympathetic with
Taine, of whom we acknowledge the major shortcomings, and why
we are justifiably defiant concerning Cartesian spiritualism we would
admit to having suffered and suffered daily, from being confused
· ' · · h' h dl de-
w1ththe last cited to whon1 we gratmtously attribute t 15 ar Y
fensiblethe is. It is only ju t and wise to separate our cause, _ourgo~d
belief;,from hi of ,vhich we strongly believe certain pom_tst~ e
. ' . h' . nmunal ruination.
\Hon , o as not to be involved with 1111 m a coi
I th·1 h d'fficultic
1 and illogisms
to ay that we would clo~e our eyes to t c 1
ofpo Itl\'i t philosophy? · h . relaxed
If rnr
h d r. 1 1a would h we t,1kt.:n the trou t:
bl to rt:ad, wit ,l
d I , Lm•·o{the Co11-
~ ;. bro hur h •em to ,11lud• t , 11,m~\!J,t :r~the ess~ntialvice .']'b
opt 110 l·n ~~y.h. \ uld h1 . en that ·e I.11 ,
1
' h1l ophy.
, ILOSOPHI C AL ESSAYS
••ERcrER s pH
"' J\L ,.,
c J\RDI"
0 ere1
. . ot evident that all that exists is
• i 1t 1s n b . en,
·d that a prior' . The ideas of emg and body are f h~
e sa1 ' erues. not d1el
We hav rporealprop 1 ·nseparable from one another. The
'th co b lute y 1 re, tb 0 ~
dowed w1 are they a so din the end by not admitting to tho
. ·cal,nor . ht to respon se rJ1.
tit
1dent1 hasthe ng h existence of a noncorporeal pow
no one trate t e . er det1
fore, . to demons rnprise an identical demonstration. W
ho c1aim h t on1y co fl . e ir1g
w h procedurest a b 11·eve that thi s crude re ect10n replaces the
throug elvesto e ·
havepermittedo~rs from the profess~r _of Tunn. . . .
. flameddeclamations re positivists or matenahsts m supporting Welltb
in hether we a " h h .
Furthennore ,w . natural philosophy ;290 t at t ere 1snothing 0
{ life ;
that,,psychO1Ogybelongsm ble in the vegeta1 ce 11";291 th at concrete num- proof: '
. • 1forcestracea . h .. .
ofmunatena b' t 0 f sense perceptions; t en yes, we are pos1t1vists tient 11
Jdbe the o ~ec
berscou . . a ther with Aristotle and St. Thomas, and we are The
andmatenahsts, toi:,e
under t
proud . of this.
h nderstood in the encyc lope d.IC sense to w h 1c. h the an-
phI1osop y, u . . . within
• weredevoted, is comprised of three departments.
oents . . . philosophy
. of The
nature,rationalphilosophy,and ethics. Under the JUnsdict10n of the last cusmg
tworespectively are actionsof reason and free actions. Under the juris- After h
dictionofthefirstare the realities of nature.Among the realities of nature, of the a
shouldn't we ranklivingbeings first and chief among living beings, hu-
getting
mankind?
confro
Thephilosophy of lifeis calledpsychology, which has as its object hu-
ists, on
ma~s,calledhumanpsychologyor anthropology. Thus, psychology, in
parhticular hu~anpsychologyor anthropology, belono-s to natural philos- anicism
0
three t
op y.
h d f h'Mr. B1llia1?' us 00 muc onor m attnbutmg to us the £ather-
cnves t h h · • -
00 ° t 1sclass1ficatio • ·t · . . . compri
Doesh k h n, 1 is commonplace m scholastic philosophy.
losophers
e nowt at G d h. lf
in ph . ., If ho imse was studied among the medieval phi-
. and th
.
Anstotle's ys1csr e does not k now, he should take a good look at
phys· concei
Th ics, vo 1ume VIII d S judgrn
omas,lessons XIIIand fo .' an at t?e conunentary given by t.
spectthosecommet d llowmg. He will then be enlightened and re- \Vhat t
n s an lessons. Mr.
ciple o
under
289.Mr B'l!i let'
(Mr G . . i a speaksendl
Ti . autier is a C esslyof an Cth1li11
sc:oul ght_andthe La:tesianspiritualist MarguRm~nt between Mr . Gautier and Mr. ~cht:d''.
astic h'I s of t/1 c
VI[of P 1 osophy . e onservatio
' r. 1chet · a positivist)
is ·• in a brochure e~ocle ·
11
ourw k Point 0 f • of Enera w, froni J
290. M . or TheO . . view. R 0 Y. we appreciate the argument
..,., r.Bill', . ng,11oifC ecently \ I1
. haprer
he11'leth
1 ias review( ntcmporarfl ' ve ave consecrated ex pn!fcsso c '
0
35I
is a second proof of the materialism ofth "
11ere e neo h
· 1· f h -sc ola. tics'' .
the 111atena ism o t e neo-scholastics • . . · to Wit:
h Th h d is a d1st111 ct I
their ph ilosop y . . . e ea of the School of Lou ~ 1aracteristic of
ose fundamental th eses of Psycholoayth t h vain place am
th f . . o a t e first . . ong
material... 0 cour se, this 1s not proof it onl . pnn c1ple oflife is
· f · ' Y satisfies t 0 f6
denies the existence o an immaterial princi 1 . · a mn... He
in general.Zn p e in the cell and in life
212p . r count: in
293 p. I 30 and I Jf>. • . • ,ion of his thesis in o~ ri>{r
ss,i,11zc
Pr LWcPttmmcd our clv to <TIVC a shortened -.crh b,,ect of J scud)' c.\ p .
""'"°"
Dr.fin h r,.
-Af , w 1ch we nude from our point O vie ·
t· ·w t c o :.J
t10tt if Lfr, 1 t d1t1on r 91.. i.nd dition 18 97·
of matter. However, not even .
ral forces . a s1n_
the gene . d eerns to exist. On the contrary h
. d ible to f his kin s h h ,te
irre uc enon o t . . 1sciences, t e more t ey advance h
gle pheno:rable the ?iolof ~~cs and chemistry extend their co~tt ~
more mea mechanics, P ! ' f the mysteries oflife. ro
morewe see d manifestations o
overthe repute d precedently rem .arked, the two ma·
·ously an . h ~or saJ
As we have prev1 h
rntern
aterial universe, meanmg t e conservation
1 .h bY
Iaws which gove
d h onserva 1
t·on of energy, seem to app y wit the same
. . .1 trt
f massan t e c . well as non-living matena . ge
o 1· . g organismsas
·gor to ivm . h . l c: Ii£
n the rnec hanical and phys1co-c ennca . 1orces . in the
1
We ha~eseeif h getative life. Consequently, 1f the being that
O
manifestatio~s t h~ve that do not, it is not because of irreducibility an
. . penor to t mgs b b to
hvesissu h mrnon forces of matter, ut ecause of a special
0 f · £Orcesto t e co · d h' to
its d. which those forces are activate to ac 1evethe in-
modeaccor mg to 11b . f h . d . .d s
. . goa1of the 11·ving nature,
tnnsic . the we - e1ng o t e m 1v1 ual, and
t
the conservationof the species.
t
The conclusionof the first part of our thesis is that the first princi-
pleof the vegetativelife if not ~in:1plebut c~mplex,not imm~terial~but
material;becausethe charactenstIC of a being stems from its act10ns,
operarisequituresse.
Immediately followingthose lines, we approach the proof of the second
partof the thesisand we directly opposescholastic vitalism to materialist
organicismor positivism.Mr. Billia diluted the thesis into two parts. It g
is morecuttingthan this. Sl
. Whoeverreadswith attention the proof of the first part of the thesis \\:
directedagainst
. excess1ve · · 1·
· spmtua Ists, fimds the quest10n · IS · .c. · Th ose
1a1r.
who
. state
. Is at t e genera forces of n1atter cannot supp1Y an
m a thes· th h 1
t
immediateexplanaf £ h .c. .
wh· h c . ion or t e 1unct10ns of a cell has to make known a
ic 1orce1sthe v·t 1 • . .
ispositive}• d ~ a operation. Accordmg to Billia, the vital operation
Y irre ucible to th al ··
proofis mven, 1t
i:,•
• 1s
. only a e gener . forces of matter. Unless a positive . . d
the cellone O . gratmtous assertion to say that there exist in I
r severalmun •
However ·f . atena1forces.
£ ' i We In fact a e · . . . . .
orrna!ly separatedfi gr e with the pos1t1v1stson this pomt we ha\e
Billi rom the · '
a, our research hi h ~ in the second part the part cut out by Mr.
vegetablesoul. ' w c is th e nature of the,first prillciplcof lite, the )
Accordingt
cannotbe o.Mr. Billia, ther . . . hat ...
)
sensat· explained
10n. In f; with e is a lllanife tation of cellular hfe t .
out an · . .- · 1s
always . act, from his . m1111atenal force. Thi . mamfe tanon
anda li~:redb t~gether. B/hoint of view, "animation" and "feeling··,1rlel
g e1ng as made 1·t · h ce
are ordin -1 a gncvance again . t us t at •1
• "' To prove ~ ,1g.unst
an Y ens 1'bl<.:.-J.t. · u th'1t or,
SOUND THE ALAl{M
353
Shouldwe once more point out the difference between sensualism and
scholastic philosophy? These things have been said so many times that
wealmostfeel humiliated to go through this again. Certainly, intelli-
gencehas the same object as the senses, if we mean to say that those sen-
sitivethings on which animate knowledge stops are the materials from
whichintelligence borrows the positive elements of its concepts. But, in
sofaras they are objects of concepts, sensitive things no longer possess
the concrete characteristics that existed in external reality or under th e
actionof the senses. .
Withinphysical nature and under the action of the senses, ~n~ areth
d · ' · nd m time
eternuned- they are attached to a determined spot m space ~ b·
Inthe min . d , under the actions of the mte
. 11ectu ale,iacu lt'es
1 ' thmgs are a -
stract,detached from the determination of space and time.
294.,1111 .
29,·M Prtncipio sn1zientcimmateriale,"pp. I 3 I and 1 36 · . )'fieand sensibilities.
~- r Billi · h n organtc 1
H1 w ~- a ts fickle with aU the questions that touc O d bl jo·norance.
or~ are h h npar ona c 1,·
2%i . p 137 roug . not very J.ustified • and s ow an u
297.;_ ·. • .:~ KOLi'(). Ktl'TJ(JIS",
. ,a µf .. •
'tJfµ· • ll ow atfJT}T<id,Ua ).{y€Tal
··~ , 'o,m' ra
tolG €KG '
=
">rl.,ta, ¾01,A,;. - • · II ·hap.VI. t;aami. · do· Hacc
~'!I "r._ ,..~·. <7XT}µa,µ€y€0o~. De amma, 1., : (; ma,~111t11
'-Wtllftun
~ ,..,,,,
·
la tns1b1lia
u1e
sunt rsta quinque:motuS,q ' .b . ,iumerus, 1 '"' · Book II,
" De a1111na.
, ._ Stns
11111s · 0 ,nnr 1H .. · ·
~ XIu us unru unt propria,s d ,mt commuma
L MERClER ' S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
C.ARDINA
354
A
JV011 1 ,
e independently. existing . over th e t hinkin .
.b·l·tv
s11i. , of the certam.
sciences and sp 1
ecu ative . g subject renders h
·ontin1rencyof thmgs, but the invariable metaphysics I . t e pos-
l, '"' rfi . f h
. do-ethe pe ection o t ose things th t
norm h
t at we fir
. t is not the
JU :, . . a are th st and I
According to Rosmmi, the ideal bein . ere. a ways
. f h d. . g is not GO d b
ss met h mg o t e 1vme nature _302A d , ut it is
le 50 ·11 · .h h n no k neverth
ddsMr.Bi 1a, wit out t e presence of th nowledge is . e-
a h . d 303 at something 0 f h _Poss1ble,
cureto t e mm ·d · · t e d1vinena-
Allthese consi erat10ns· are more than twenty cent ·
chearguments o f Pl atomc . realism. We have responded un es old. They are
thesearguments, b ut smce we are forced w
. . d ' e w1 nefly
·ub . many times to
Certainly, se1ence emands a stable obiect . hd respond again.
.bl h J wit rawn fr h
cuationsof sens1 e p enomena. Aristotle and Pl om t e flue-
. d c 11 ato agree on th· 0 .
However, 1t oes not 10 ow that the stable obie J c a1
t ways respondis P mt.
. . . 1. .
enceas It does m nature, independent from intellig d s ~ sci-
. . f h 11 d ence an antenor to
cheactlvity o t ose ce s, an having . a stable and abs 1 t •
o u e existence
It suffices, by the explanation. of science , that 1·ntelligence has·the
power to represent concrete things and pass through nature to the fi _
mal,intelligible, and invariable universal objects. or
We judge, actually, the relative perfection of contingent thingsbased
on certain ideal types: beautiful things are based on the ideal beauty;
good things are based on an anterior type of goodness. However, these
idealtypes are themselves borrowed, by means of abstraction, from ex-
perience in such a way that, originally, the characters of intelligibleob-
jects,whether we have considered them in themselves or appliedthem
to contingent things, are derived from experimental data. .
What could this be, besides, this something divine, if it 1s n?t_a con-
tingentbeing not God himself but a real manifestation of the d~vme~e-
. ' ' · t nd firutereality
mg to the created mind? Could we say that contmgen a . . f h
• . · di t intmt10no t e 1n-
suppliesthe soul with the occas10n of having a rec d.
. M Billi epu 1atesontoloaism i:,· •
fimte? This would be ontologism and r. a r fi . ? This would be
. . . all t ·n the In mte.
Could we say fimte realities form Y con ai Mr. Mariano that
pantheism and Mr. Billia's point is to demonS trate to
neitherhe nor Rosmini are pantheists. . h Infinite is, thus,
. f h fimte to t e ... ts
The only possible relationship o t e h he divine mannes
th · · q to say t at t
. oseof effect to cause. But then, It ISia se • d
It If ·
e , lr1 .no matter what measure,
d'irec
tly to the mm ·
. anteno
· Uectual
· r to all inte bstrac-
. · eXJSt
Cenamly, ideal types of fimte beings hi·ch help us 6Ya
a · · • · ture w
ctivity, anterior to all those thmgs 111 na
d reason,the
h · chat for goo . of the
312 • . . fi II ws fro[Jlt I I sonierhlng
Ieo'1za.vol. rv,chap. 1. n. 2-6. "And it o onc.ebut neverchcess
the divine belon= to ideal jpuri:I cxi5cc
1h ' r.,• ••
rtllmf; t d to m n in nature.
("" " WM h ~h liana,p. 22.
I Mi:RClliR ' S PHIi osoPHIC:Al .ESSAYS
(I \ RPI '\
Severalcritic
\vith good in
CompleteInductionand
ScientificInduction337
1900
A colleague .
of ours, Professor Bersanni 338 one of the ed·t
. . '
f h
i ors o t e old-
est ItalianJournal of scholastic philosophy , Divus Thomas di·d h h
.. . . , us t e on-
or of cntiqumg son1e pages, from our treatise on Loaic which hd
. . d l . 6 , we a
devotedto the d escnpt10n _an ana ys~s of the inductive procedure .
In those pages, after having underlmed the difference between deduc-
tionand induction,_we ~ad put forward the opinion that modern scientific
induction,the frmtful instrument of the positive sciences, should not be
confusedwith the complete induction of previous times.
Our reasons were that while the completeinduction of former times is
a formof argumentation that is to be differentiated from the syllogism,
the modem scientificinduction can be reduced to the syllogistic proce-
dure- it is just a question of form.
Bersani disagrees with these statements, and he believes he can use
againstus the scientific renown of Aristotle and of the scholars of the
MiddleAges, whose ability we have, according to him, failed to recog-
nize.
In reply to our distinguished colleague, we will first ~xamin~ what is
the nature of scientific induction in order to see if there is any difference
fromwhat is expressed in a syllogism (I)• . t d by
We will then look in detail at the notion of induction a~pdrese~e d
B . . . . . ld . I d completem uction an
ersam.His not10n of induct10n 1s he to me u e 1 te in-
in I 1 Of 1O gy is used to comp e
comp ete induction; the princip e ana . . f h sarnenatureas
co~plete induction, which, according to Bersam, is O t e
st
nct completeinduction. . . d ction completedby
We will see that neither complete induction nor m .u ci·entific proce-
ap d. · s of stnct s
rocess of analogy will n1eet the con iuon
. ·t·que
. scienn i .
- ReFUf
337 Ob . . !etc et inducnon .
, · servat1onset discussion: Induction comp . . d-
lleo.col . . s· Amma
3311 aS/ique7 (1900) 204-228. 't apud Rcccnuore ·
n. ( f s I . . :i Vctcrcs c
\'tr , · • icr-.am,"De in<lucttom natura apm I)
•on cnt1cae"
· . f I er II v. ·
m Divus·n,omas (1900: · • s · '
, pfllLOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
MERCIER S
cARpINJ\L
From th .
den . e moment the nee . of its acci-
ts '.s properly establish d hessity of the bond between a subject and one th n have
to do is to
f proceed to th
e , t en we h
k
. . . .
ave attamed scientific certainty.
All we f epplica-
e Wor of a r1 . h.
1on the . d
B ' . nun does not PP cat1on or deduction. But, in t 1s w ork O a
ers;~ puts it, but from ~:oceed from like to like, as
e procedure whi h me to same. .k caoses
P roduce lik c go fi . . . I "h e .
lead~to e effects," is call de~ rom like to like, by virtue of the pnnc1p e alog)' _..,,..
it
the de probable conclus· e y a special name viz analoaicalinductionor ab,,·ng abo11t
rnonstr . ions suffi . £ . "' d not r1
ative certainty ;hi cie~t or day-to-day living, but it ocs
ch science demands.
oMPLETE INDUCTION AND SCIEN
TIFrc INnu
CTION
cer-
ll cail 348 C 11,2 ,
I •1 h · der Griechen,
p. ; / Aristotle, Topics,VIII, c. 1 I. Cf. also Zeller, Die P 11 osop ie r •
are~t 2 3
ob'-1- 349 • , N , 8wrropfjCTaL
KGAWS-,
cf.
At"· faTt 0€ ro'is- €vrropijCJaL(3ov).oµivot5' rrpovpyov ro
lStotle~ ...
et h . .fi t
;cci- 3·0 ',v1, ap ys1cslII r h very sio-n1ican
J • To th ' ' · . b
dded anot er 1::r . d
textA . e text of Aquinas that wa cited earlier, ca~ e a_ . d tion to the cerntu e
h'"' ofth. quinasoppose the coniectural character of Anstoteban in u_cgulars to a universal
plici- e syU • 'J • • go from sin d ll _
neith ogism, and writes: "Whoever uses mductton to thing is prove sy 0
er dern 11 . When . some
!(l\tJcaU. onstrates nor makes a necessary sy ogism.
h con-
. riecessary that t e .
clus Y,
it 1 I ·
s not necessary to quc . tion the cone usi 'on but it is
Th.1 does not 3 P
h pen in
10 .
n is tr • •10 alirv true. . . cf Tho-
di~io ue, given that the premi es are re ., bl to inducuon .... , ·
llQsAti •·-And it is to be expected that division is com para e
• qu10as"
3~1.
p-"teu,rina/. post., II, I ct. 4. .
r, Discourde receptiona l'Academie_f,anraise.
, HJLOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER S p
CARDIN A
t 011, f{ 01
~,i. , , ~ , a'p,vfl Kat 1 ·
fO'Tl 1 Tp1 r,vi•ov. KrrTa rovro urr; "
i, 11arro&,,i . An11/. Post.,I. S·
, HILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L _MERerER sp
cARDINA
_ Ob
3~7. . t la philosophte. thonu·ste. _ Revue
ne0. servationset discussion: La science moderne e d
SCo/ast' 1 f mo -
358''Lr iquq (1900) 229-23 I. . and reiect the resu ts o d?Are
· C1ow
etnPhil
f d science ~ necte •
050 can you accept the results o mo er? h ht inseparably _con d psy-
north Phy?Are not scientific and philosophICal t o~g d do not physwlogy an co-
cboiO: &rcatscientists the great modern philosophers? nnthusiastic appeal to yoougnr ize
tcllgi1llsts ~ ~ lopment of which you . ave hical thought? Do you u would expel
001, to th d h made an e not rec
~ di
these ctly tem &om modern philosop f thinkers, whom yo ize the truth
~ the tori permeated by the influence o hil sopher recogn
Of~ of p phy? And how, ~m~r,
c and deny that of the pr rru e · R,
c:s:a
};1o:faa. fasc. VI. 1 899·
ER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
C ARDINAL MERCI
D. Mercier
359. You can remember no doubt d. . .
(Rev.Neo-scol N ') . ' a iscus 5ion that we engaged in on this very subject
·, ov. 1 899 with Mr Bill· Th ' •
T. hontist school of Lo • f · ia. 1 anuable confrere had accu ed the neo-
uvam o a tendency I • ll
Into one volume under th , . . . · n a ene . of revue article , collected fina Y
. 1· e enigmatic tJtl •. L' . 1·1 1 d. . .
tion a . 1ttle like the doct fL . e. es,.11.< 1 sa11A .~osrino,he had taken a po 1-
hav - ors o ouvam· hm• ·ev. h h d
e pay on any ot Th . ' ·• er, e a per onally taken care not to
ch . m. ere were ve 6 d . .. . .
ur~, but some mcriminac ·
pcx1t . "
J I')'. ew octnnal umnm1 . m his volummou bro-
ion a ong th1 1 ,. "Th th
•"Th; or sometime
tcsqulVLSCs .
h, dd
e use cnunc · ·
me ·
f c neo -.Thonmt f Lou vain court e
w~ e. c ph1Io,ophy of the nco - T iat1011o a gravity which bordered on the gro-
. halways printed in capital I t . homm even leads to athci m."This word atheism
W1t exdam e tcrs: a <.care L . J
ation points . ' crow . ·t us .1dd that the cc t wa pnnkku
MODERN SCIENC E, AND TH
OMr Trc
PI-it Lo
Gtect
Ile,
llto
the
~ese
em
l'lle
the
n-
ot
of
e
ls
e359. (Cthat
dness· .
ontrnued)IAll o f that, 1t . well to remember, only calls back the lackof levelhead-
. 1s
respon,e th t m
one oves to fi d among professional philosophe<'• In tl,e mtro
· ducuon
· to the
""1ingthi' we wrote to the a<ticles of Mc Billi•, we couldn't stop omsdves from
s10n. · ter t hat, we entered resolutely and very obJecnve
5 remark Afi · · IY into
· discus-
O
othBut,
. <ts what has happened? Mr. Billia, who bad forgotten the precept "Do not d ro
What
<Idnot resp.;.',~"
t do not want them to do to you," took offense. Be insulted "'' bot he
~ll 1'his
'" Process ofour
di arguments
. · . · troduction was
rounded scuss1on is the best proof that the ,e,n,rk ,n our"'
.. ~ to the.restO i il h naive skill with whtch
.
i.r.,..
'8Rressorhas' t would be cruel and superfluous to spo t e d has ,~ured himself
thepubli given himself the illu~on of an easY vtetotY an
c the less honorable advantage of silence.
ScientificInduction360
1900
·odvcv
M B m. as a specimen
. of inductive reasoning. . Every. being. is com- o6Cl·ple 0
·oel .
r._ ersa_ y
pos1te or s1mp1e. e , t composite being is one; simple bemg 1s one. Thus , pflfoere 1
· · 365 . ciple o
every bemg is one. . . h h d . d . .
We do not contest M r. Bersaru's ng t to use t e wor .h m. uction
. m th·is pfl~J68 afl ~
broad meanmg.
. H 0 wever when he honors us wit a cnt1que of our
' h · I · · · hat e
1,0g1c
. on Loig1c,• h e 1·s not allowed to replace · t e·fispec1a bal
(iot1 t
treatise . · s1gn1fication
h we
.
• ·fi
gave to se1ent11c m · duction with a broader s1gm 1cat1on t at pleases hun Pro
ders d fe
1,/e e
to choose for himself . . . . . . . eproa
W e t oo, 11 ave recognized that m its undetermmed hi h
s1gn1ficat1on, in-
h r Tf
sai11
duction describes every procedure, no matter w c . one, t at moves r of St.
0
. cip1es t
from the particular to the general.3 66 _However, we w1s_h_to philosophi- prtn W
cally examine the inductiv~ pro?lem 1~ terms of wher~ 1t 1s posed today, search.T
we have immediately restncted mductlon to the practical method unan- but the ~n ·
imously used by the scholars in the domain of the exact sciences. "Qttidqwd
Our argument, our examples, borrows from chemistry, physics, and alliuscausa
biology - such as research in the laws of the combination of chemical adwjusop
bodies, the law of gravity, the law of the reproduction of living beings oww
- as well as from the content of our first article, showing that scientific Expose
induction, which we examine in nature, is not reasonably applicable to aswe hav e
human knowledge in general, but exclusively to the sciences of observa-
Logicand i
tion. It is the generator instrument of the exact sciences and not of oth-
ers. This usage is today the method of choice in science. which we
Therefore, observations that are not seen as scientific induction thus satisfaction
comprised - and they form an important fraction of the studies of our lastic have
colleagues - are misleading. 367 to truly re
complete
The second part of Mr. Bersani's studies is the expression of our thesis llltl, quitl S,
proper, ~hich our colleague adopts under the pretense of exposing us. tamq11
am tll
There 1sthere in th· d • • t1m1." - ,
. ,
th e second article. is regar , a page typical of them all - page 368 m
In order to comprehe d · · The eth
A ccor d.mg to Mr. Bersanin , It is 1
necessary
· to
• recall these in retrospect. a~achone·
Profound} ·d . 1 . ' comp ete mduct1on of the Ancients would be d1\ide.
Y 1 ent1ca to mcompl t · d . .
~--------- __ e_e m uction, what we call today sc1en-
365. Thi d
. .s oes not prevent Mr B . . .
syllog1st1cform. · ersaru from clamung that induction is irreducible to a
366. Logic,p. 140_
?67. Mr. Bersani who on]
induction h Y wants to see th d" 11d
between ' t at one h •
essentially •
unique proced . ·
e more 1ver e logical procedure ca e
·
. . says
d1t1on metap
h h ys1caJor math emat1c. aJ tndu
. ure,
t" tncs ncvenhele. s to make a di _tincnon
, ...; d · e, as absolute laws th c ion and physical induction. The first con-
we eny th h . , e second has h th .
There 15 . at p ys1cal inductio nl ypo CtICallaws.
author t b h · on °
a confusi f•
ideas that O
°n Y leads · ·
scientists to hypothetical conclu 1ons-
-
o e eld r . ur scI1olarly U t· r
Cruerio/o.Ry cspons1ble.We will t k co <:ague 1 not, by the way. thi: ir,
· a e account of this subject soon m our Sprt1• 11
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION
413
Aftertaking the parts of the observation from Divus 11zomasth~t are ir-
relevantto the debate, we return to the essential point of the dispute.
368
· PP-I I I and r r 2.
369.Mr. Bersani responds to us that the Latin adjective simile can be tra_nslated as_sem-
~:ance or a~same,became it defines an identity of accident, to wit, of quality, or an idcn-
ty of species.
Weare not going to keep insisting but we call the attention of our colleague to the
wordsof St. Th omas: ..S,wt . partes cntts .' sunt mbstanlta,
• q11a11t1·1a~• et qi,anlitas, etc... , ita et
.
P
q
artes unit 5 . · b t 1· est· Acqualc' 111111111111
i,i 1tnt idem, aeqiwle ct simile. Idem enim 111um1 w s 11 5 all ta
. s· ·1
uant,tate . I , "
37ri. 1 ~ 11n11m 1n qua/irate."In X A1ct.,book IV, ectun: _- · . . ,
tcprod~I ,\ent. Dist. Ill, q. IV, 9. The text that Mr. Ucrsam otes is an extract rntcgra 11 y
ced frorn page 226 of the Revue Neo- colastiquc,May r 9oo .
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
v-e!l
t se
clli ve11
In his first study, Fr. Bersani blamed us for calling the case of i d . ciiate itlc
101e""
,.,-:
,1J'l · \V 0
" comp 1ete, " an d accor d'mg to h.1s way o f t h.m k.mg, contrary ton uction bt-1t1t
iJ:r.V_' ct1at
every inductive procedure irreducible to complete induction u_s,t~at stY•esef'V~' cJ1e
• . value. 1s dis- 1,1tr 5 111
prove d o f scientific ofp13flet1arie
According to Aristotle, complete induction consists in the enu o ·gbtllP r?
,iJ1el be ·
111
tion of every particular case in which a fact can be verified "indurnt.era-
' c 10 per JosedJ1Uuow
omnium enumerationemprocedens,"to the effect that the power to affi C [o ·
collection is true of every part that composes them. 372 rrna 50, f oattl
ceso
Effectively, we believe and we mai?~ain that an enumeration of ob- sciefl 1·n.apPe
differs a
served facts never presents the dec1S1ve characteristics of scientific It s Nfr.ve
knowledge. Jess, saYf the P
An identical enumeration authorizes us to say that when at the same means,~5·rnilar i
s· I .
presentation, as far as our observations, such results can be considered as te~; e have gt._
acquired; but it does not permit the conclusion that the result is defini- w . 1
taskof proving
tive and that the proposition expressed is irreformable. Before I 846, we •fie honor of
enn h
Evidently, t c
371. At the first reading of this page, we could not believe our eyes. So that the reader therscales, nor 1
personally form his own judgment, we quote the page in its entirety: "Ex quo experti thesole wisdom
sumus aliquamproprietatemconstanterinveniri in mu/tis individuis ejusdernspeciei,certisumum
illam proprietatemad eorum naturampertinere,et quia natura eodem modo semperoperatur, certi
ofour modem t
etiam sumus eamdemproprietaternin reliquis individuis nondum observatisquoqueoccurrere. Si However,it is r
igitur Scholasticihocprincipium cognoverunt,quod unice supp/et experientiaedefectum,certocer- didnot escape
tius est ipsos hoc principium indigitasse tamquam fundamentum cui omnis indictioscientijiea thoughthey fail
innititur. Omne dubium aufert Scotus in I Sent. Dis. III q. IV- 'De cognitisper experientiam dico,
quod licetexperientianon habeaturde omnibus... tamen expertus infallibiliternovit quaditaestin a lessdefinitive
omnibus:et hocperistampropositionemquiescentemin anima: quidquid evenit ut i11pluribusab This tmly ci
aliqua causa non libera,est effectusnaturalis illius causae.'Cognito enim quod naturaest causa duction,wheth
ta/isphoenomeni,certisumus quod etiam reliquaindividus non observatacum taliphoenomeno se
produnt, sicquedicerelicebitet sic de ceteris,prout Scotus requiritad concludendumde necessitate in . The equivo
inductione.Non superest igitur ullum dubium, quin Scholasticiprincipium, quod nos vocavimiis s1onof the e t\\
analogiae,adhibuerinttamquam medium quo enumeratiosufficiensverecomp/etaevaditanteintel- tween an actua
lectum."Divus Thomas, fasc. rv,p. 368.
Fr. Bersani has thus already forgotten that he himself, in his first article, summed up
omni111n enunzer
our teaching concerning the foundation of induction in these terms: "Porro,i,i ejusse,z- tuhalwhole . In
tentia, talefundamentum est principium rationale,quod sic efferripotest: sufficiensratio,curp/iira t e evp .
.....enn-.
la,,,
et variaphoenomenaseu elementaab invicem independentiaconstanterordinateq11e cotzjungimt11r. y Wh ••tent
seu simul concurrunt,nequit essefortuitus contingentiwnaccidentiumco11wrsus, sed est ipsanat11ra ~A ere ext
. iv1r. Be .
entis, in quo iliaphoenomenaseu elementasic se prod,mt." Div us Thomas,p. 33. . s1on,b , . a111
· fr vithout
An d h e could not_ have ~ead the t~xt of Scotus that h_eb~rrowed om us, \es the inctu_'i includ.
readmg at the same time this declarat10n that accompanied 1t: Duns Scotus gt · . ct10
ame analysis with much more precision of the procedure through which the generahzah- l'h n in a
. o f experience
t1on · must operate. "When an effect frequently reproduce 1tse · If l inder t e
1 1'he to nch,.
h . fi "
action o a cause t at 1s not rec said Scotus "we must believe that t ts cuec t has 11at11r,1
. f h' a:
e tonclu
' '
lmks with its cause ... Because it is impossible that one necc.sary cause regu ary d e
l I pro-
?uces a same effect, if it is not, from its own principle of finality, determined to pro uc
It.
. . . . . 1· thJt ,ve
T he pnnc1pal solution of sc1ennfic induction is entirely within a few ine "''i-
·
b orrowc d fjrom Aristotle, from St. Thomas, and from the clever Doctor. " Revue 1,t<
Sd1ola1tique,May 1900, pp. 226-227.
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION
415
In his second article, 375 Mr. Bersani tries to escape from this dilemma.
Changing the example, the author writes:
Omne vegetans,brutum, homo est mortale.
Omne vegetans,brutum, homo, est omne vivens organicum.
Ergo omne vivens organicumest mortale.
-
sophwna, nequeparticulariterconcludit.Non enim in ilia minore habeturdistril!.:
376. Here is what follows in the text: "Ita quod sensus illitts minorisest: vegetaus,brutum,
homo exhauriuht totampotentialitatemviventis organici,ita quod non detur,needaripossitvivens
~rganicu~, quadnonsit aut vegetaus,aut brutum, aut homo.Et praecisein hacminorestat totavis
mduct,ams, quaeessentialiter est transitusa particulariad universale:in ipsaenim designaturopus
'~fel/ectusabstralientis
seugeneralizantiset a pluribus iriferioribusassurgentisad unum quid supe-
ri~s, quadiliaamniarepraesentat. fllud igiturpraedicatum'omne vivensorganicum'poniturut ter-
inmus_ abst'actionisintellectusideoque ut quid maais universalequam singula subjectai/lius
minons" 'b'd ' ~
377I·. 1 1 .,pp. 359-360. .th
· t 15regrettable that our author does not carefully separate these terms wi a dou-
ble me · · lf 10 · duces an
er an.mg,which renders his thought difficult to seize and he himse
ror.Alsoin th · d. · coupled with the
sub· " ' e example here in question, why is this a ~ecuve omne . .
~ect veoet b f: f Ob non not a uni-
ve~I I " ans, rutum, homo"? Induction portions the acts o serva ' .
a aw.The f: f . d · · the alleged specimen
here acts o observation portioned from in uctton, 10
•arethat th d d ad· all thosethere
aredead e vegetables, animals, men that we have enco1mtereare e ' . 1
anda/I 'so be tt; but all tho c there grouped together are not all vegetableS, all amma s,
111en ob · al n men the same as
1hC) e wh ' setved or ob\ervable. That all vegetable , al1antm s' a ' hi .
b o hav b O
b · Jy do not deny t s.
Ut wed c not ccn ob~t:rvc<l would be mortal , we vious . h
n o deny th . ' f h • d t've 1 procedure. m t e
31lleof ob . e right to ffinn from the upstart o t e 111 uc
ervat1on.
418
CARDINAL MERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS eC
•rite U
t,1f I (i
'J'lo
"pe
a group of subjects a common or universal term· "H b . ie~flg,\Njclie h' fof
b (t . l . . . . . a etur in ill . v act riate a
su s l utio, ocoplunum sub;ectorum,altcu;usterminicommunis .a inznor e coflc[of~ ,rS ifl Pc.
seu universal is.,, 1,)flbe1flo- orv'
of are c
But it is right there in front of your eyes that it is J.ust thr·s b . vreeJves eel.defl cs-
t
· al su st,tu( 5
a umvers term for a non-universal term that is sophistical. ionof ael'lt a t accl
tl1ef11
oJ'lt:i. gefl
However far you take the observation of beings that nou · h cori oritt!l iricOI
ns and
pro d uce themselves, and that we call vegetables,from those that no ~e- ~aidto b\etical
r11eir
and reproduce themselves, and spontaneously reproduce th unsh [iofl•1is tneO d tO
h h . e~e~1 . roe, e nee
t os~ t at we call a_nimals;and those, to make a long story short wh ' ,ts heflth he nee
nounsh themselves, reproduce themselves, feel, moving and rea ' . 0 · \V
it essO
ft d at
saning sciausflacureatl
t h emselves, those we call men: vegetables, animals, men, observabl
never form a finite number of existing beings. Given that, with all thes,
ecific
fl one o
sp . oature,
we ,ve £oun d m . orgarnzat10n,
. . we can t hus say that we have observedat ofchis
finite number of organized beings. a Mr Bersar
Now, is it not a manifest illogism to substitute the universal term or- Be'·cchat . n· can el
•fiinducno . .
ganized beings, all organizedbeings,for afinite number of organizedbeings? tJ ~ S " but th1 1
obJCCt ' b.
s . . . "Every su ~
However, says Mr. Bersani, I abstractedmy universal term from the ob- 0s1non. . ·
Hasnot our dist~n
served cases; in other words, from the organized vegetables, animals, and
men that I have observed and that are, in effect, a finite number, I ab- orderwith the logic.
stracted the nature of organized being and I seized right away their uni- In the ontological
versal character. 378 thatthe subjects 1
I can thus, later, in the conclusion, pass from the abstract to the uni- neverhave to show
versal, from the concept of organized being to the universal notion all Butmen of cien
organized beings,observed or observable, and say logically: "All organized presuppoe neither ~
beings are mortal." icalorder; they in1
whichlooks rea on
As if we can also, through a simple intuition of intelligence, see this fact cumstanceor accid1
of the essence of organization and immediately comprehend that death thenatureof . wh
is its necessary outcome! c n ·eq
theded11ctit1e
Mr. Bersani here falls prey to an error familiar to a good number of
scholastics, and that consists in believing that intelligence, because it ab-
Wehave et th
e e ·a1
stracts by law, is the faculty to seize immediately the specific essence ~f nn point .l id
being and its distinctive properties. In understanding these authors, it Afterthe tw
Ponsethat . c
seems that an intellectual view of things that fall prey to experience pe~- b . \\ h
could
mits us to apperceive immediately the intimate nature that they ~ave m e intr du·
common, and they have the appearance of belief that through this s~m1;,
marizing procedure is formed the famous "principium quiescensin amma
of which our contradictor complacently speaks, sort of a fireplace 5mol-
Beit that Mr. Bersani said somewhere (p. 344), the conclusion of scien-
tificinduction can express itself under this form: "P is the property of the
subjectS," but this is under the condition that we imply this other prop-
osition:"Every subject Sis endowed with the property P, omne S est P."
Hasnot our distinguished colleague here confounded the ontological
orderwith the logical order?
In the ontological order, it is absolutely necessary, without any doubt,
that the subjects S possess the property P, otherwise induction would
neverhave to show that P is a property of S.
But men of science who research the properties and nature of beings,
presupposeneither the existence nor the non-existence of this ontolog-
icalorder; they simply observe between P and S a frequent connection
whichlooks reasonably sufficient; they do not find it in contingent cir-
cumstancesor accidents; they conclude that it can only have its origin in
thenature ofS; where the proposition: "Pest proprietasS"; where, finally,
the deductive consequence: Omne S est P.379
f We have set the boundaries of our reply; we believe we have left no
essentialpoint aside from the discussion raised by Mr. Bersani.
After the two critiques of our amiable contradictor and the two re-
sponsesthat we have made here, we strongly doubt that new arguments
couldbe introduced in this debate.
' I Ill" 11111-~~ d L'V. I >pill .JI l~ contradict this d last dprcv1s1on, may the
1~•.111(- • · 1
1 pv1111i1ll\ to I onrn r , th . c ' tuse as un erstoo . D
· Mercier
fhe confroO
that\Ve prop
d@atlt
First
pi,i/oso~~~
wrote, is a
t1
weknownu
. on et•
ject 1s
presentsoffe
tinction,u
lastics,Balm
ensindivisw
nonseparatu
So,on tH
quence,ide
h~n?,unity
expression f this syllogism, whi ch we believe to be sufficiebntt_o
.179. (Co11ti1111crf)Thc distinction
pmdun· 11ndcran abbrcv1,1tcd form - and we take care to note t at we a
. h h ve ab rev1- tinct,is it
.,cod is ,·q,i,aknt in n,ality ro this mo" explicit expre~ion, . .h
"'Hvo terms only appear constantly conjoined if one is in natural connection wit sequentlv
the othl·r.
Follo\~i
Now cxpcriencc-s, numer u and varied, show that the terms A and B appear always Now
rnnjollltly. . ,, . the r
d111is11111
.,
Thus thrrc is between the ter111sA and B a natural connection, otherwise said, B a tf .
11.1tur.tl
property of the s11bjcctA." .
15
6~Becaus
Wl' h.1vc tot.illy onfor111cd to the general usage of logicians in respectively calling
1
((lt1s,·Jnd .'fft•t'fthe two terms between which is manifest a constant union and calling
neeaga.i1
1,1111,1/l1tn1m1
the 11c1t11ra/
co1111rction
that exists between the two.
Sec
~rl·ordmg to this usage, we can thus say, in an abbreviated form of syllogism: onddiw.
l·very rnnstant con nee tion is due to a natural liaison of cause and effect. ltleas !u,
~ow, hct\vt·cn A ,lnd 13 there is there a constant connection (,positoA sequitllrB).
llre Qt
I hu\ hl.'twecuA and B, there 1sthere a naturalliaison of cause and effect.
The Last ldo/ 438
1903
I.
The last idol, which Fr. Heb~rt wants to have a say about, is the personal
Godwhich Christian hun1amty adores. 439
"The All Powerful (the 'King of Kings'), is it not on e of tho se Ch al-
deanmetaphors that Christianity transmitted to us with its do ctrin e so
morallyelevated, but so mixed up, so encumbered from archaic con cep-
tionsand comparisons? The transcendent God is " an imaginati ve con-
structionmade to resemble no more our body, but our soul," it is "the
lastidol our minds protest against in so many reflections and from so
manyexperiences. " 440
"Scholasticsarrive at the conclusion of a personal God because they
desireit, they want a priori that God be personal. Unconsciously, they
replacetheir reason with their faith."
So, "the proofs of the existence of God, such as developed by St. Tho-
mas Aquinas in the first part of the Summa Theologica,are all 'unconscious
sophisms.'In each one we find, by following the unconscious mixture
ofreligiousbelief and simple reason, the same begging of the principle,
namely'personification a priori' of the divine Being. " 441
Isthis to say that philosophical reason demonstrates the immanenceof
theDivine?
No. St. Thomas was wrong to conclude a "personal God," but, on
0th
tbe er hand, "not authorized to deny the hypothesis of transce nd ence
byaffinningthat of in1manence."
D1.~eason puts us in the presence "of a mysterious beyond, an Idea!, a
1·r
· comp Ie t e express10n
Vtne'' '• " our con sciousnes s of R eality only has its .
We affi f h · fi
inn the aspec t of th e ne cessity of this Reality, o t em im te and
·
438,Lad .•
41,. crn1cre 1·d0 I
I1I.c.
.rJ . r_, c. - Rct 11c m:()-sco
1
lastiquc ro ( 1903) 73- 9, · I_J'b t R '' l'UC de
"'" y tHn of
""Claph • a 5111
dY on tlzf' diui11c J.
1l'
r w11ul ity,, by F,1t h er M a rec1 -ie er ' '
44< 'q11 ct d
~: p, 3'.> 7. r H1orale,Jul y, 1902, pp. 397 - 408 .
. Pp 3'J
40o.
The Last ldo/ 438
I.
The lastidol, which Fr. Hebert wants to have a say about ·s th
. . hum anity
Godwhich Chnst1an . adores. 439 , 1 e persona 1
"The All Powerful (the 'King of Kings '), is it not one of tho se Chal-
dean metaphors that Christianity transmitted to us with its doctrine so
morallyelevated, but so mixed up, so encumbered from archaic concep-
tions and comparisons? The transcendent God is "an imaginative con-
struction made to resemble no more our body, but our soul," it is "the
lastidol our minds protest against in so many reflections and from so
many experiences. " 440
"Scholastics arrive at the conclusion of a personal God because they
desire it, they want a priori that God be personal. Unconsciously, they
replace their reason with their faith."
So, "the proofs of the existence of God, such as developed by St. Tho-
masAquinas in the first part of the Summa Theologica,are all 'unconscious
sophisms.' In each one we find, by following the unconscious mixture
ofreligious belief and sin1ple reason, the same begging of the principle,
namely 'personification a prion·' of the divine Being. " 441
Is this to say that philosophical reason demonstrates the immanenceof
the Divine?
. la derni ~
43~ .
439 . r_
·,,r. ere i<lofe. - Remr nco-sco lastique 10 ( 1903) 73-9r · . H'b, t Rcv e de
..:..
""'I/IPh
y , tc1s1n or 4 d t.
t 11 Y on the dtvilll' pcrwiality, uy
Fat h t.:r MJr
• cc e er'
44< qui et dr 'J
I J 1 11
I.
- . - Rev11cneo-scolastiq11e
)(2 . •5 , sychologique.
I (. l.ibcncd'indit crcncc et le dc:tcrnuntme p · three
r l'JO 1903) gives
~IJ3 r S-17. . .rc,e11ccs,
December 17, cases imagined
'• 1n · n11l ra •u r (R,•i'III des coim et des ,ut!J• d to the three ·
I tc,n ,, • • • 1·« chat rcspot1
re ot the fr cdon1 ot 111<. 111ercnce
's PHILOSOPHI CAL ESS AY S
"'AL _MERCIER
CARDl1•
It .seemsso· After
. all, w h at does my power reduce itself
. to when I deter-
mine myself1fmy det · ·
D . . ermmations come to me from the desired object?
etermm1smfor determi . . h'
causes is th·151 d ~ism, is t is the one that proceeds from final
' ess estruct1ve 0 f fr ·11
efficientcauses? ee WI than the one that comes from
. It thereforeseems that th . .
stne qua non of psych . elmdifference of equilibrium is the condition
w . . 0 1ogica freedom
b e can imagine that Burida ' .
ecausenothing attracts h' n s ass would allow itself to die of hunger
er To im toward ·
M.an Would
supposethat it was th
d.
h one pail rather than toward the oth-
us, t e reas 1
cho act ifferently· pl d b on wou d be that the ass is a beast.
ose one O f h . ace etw . Id
to rnov t e two accord · . een two identical parts, he wou
Are ewashe pleases.If nece mg to his liking because he has the power
e not . ssary he ld .
choosethe 1 conscious, alasl th' Wou fhp a coin to decide.
east pe..c ·, at w
adage: Vid . iiect good e are too often determined to
. . eo rnelio or even ·1
Pnncipleof d r~proboque d . evi , according to the well known
from eterrni · ' etenoras
• . a desirew-·th1 nation is not 0 h equor? In this case because the
its ind . out . n t e ·d . . '
Tryeterrninatio rnotive: it is d . si e of motives, 1t proceed s thus
so n. es1re th ·
tests tnetirnes at ltse 1f decides to depart froJ11
Yourp0 , W-e add h·
dred t w-erto h 't is dee· •
o one . c oos h 1s1veex . . . -
Withhirn h et e Part th penment: A detenmm t con
t at h at ple
e Will not ases you. You can bet a bun -
succeed in making you pl.tee tht'
OM FROM INDIFFER E N C E AND PSYC
fREED lIOLOGICAL
DETEJ1MINrs ,.
l Vl 5I 5
504Th' d' ,
-o-· eo icee,n . 305.
:, ::,"Ti0 d . h . . fr one conanuo
. us absolutely indeter-
,
· es1re t at o n e d et ernunat10n come om h . . 1't either has source
min d · d'ffi
. e in 1 erence is to d esire th at it come natur Y O
all fr m not llmg. , npposedly indeter-
In th I . . . b cause a is su
. e sou , nor m th e bod y, nor m circumst anc es, e ation without any-
nuned H . . .thout prepar , . .
. · owever, here it is app earin g and existing WI . ki it seen as 1t ex1sts-
thin d'15 ' d · 1t or ma ng
This .g_ P0 sing of it th ere w ith o ut an gel or Go seeing h • If" Theod., n. 32°·
, h' throug itse . . fd -
I!>not only from n ot h ing, but eve n from not mg h ower to himsel eter
We. are• no Icss surprise d w h e n w e c Ia11n · t h a t m an ha.s t. e Pabsolute pnncip · · le that
minein th · b •cause it 1 an · ·eason to
n h· e prese nce o f p erfec tl y e qu al no non s, e . . e there 1s no 1 .
()t 1ng 1· d · h give n ca , 0 1n tl1e
1111, one without a reaso n . H oweve r, in t e . . 11uch reason tog h
a--ca l ·f h I ' r , is Ju. t as i b tween t e
firt d c t r t er th.111a n ghc prcns el y b ec.1u se t ic tc: Id die of hunger e 11. hus
\\
1rcn d , s wouh , uilibriu!11 an d pu 1t t
Ion rather than th e ,econ d . Burt a n :, ,is.
(>p..11\c f h 1 .J br eak t e cq
fr,m1 h ' •Y 1f \omc \c n:t im puhe d10 n o t .. tue of
1 poo d · 11r in vir
lh rprc I ltlll'nt . ,bid .. n . 304-307. · [L·c/ s11'.,;cic11trca
.1, . ent true
lnihw •r ru01 nt ot, I c1bn .1z •r st:. on I11•~ 1•J•tn O us· d,,m1 c1p '.I !.LI'
tru e < '
)r existent. n 0
statetll
, ·se even
tJwugh.
1•h <>n1d r that 110 tact wou ld be tou n I not otht:rWl
%,r •Utth c. er• 1' 111'a ut H 1cnt r ·,1 on tor. i t to h1:· chu s· am" '1 N tad<1l(~l?ll, ·, 3'
-·
c11tn tl 11 k \\;11 to ll\ . ,
' re, <>111, 110c 1t .1111hk.·I() ht· -no
, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER S
cAHDINA
. ble in et h ics.
. 506
11
. d pensa d . nl h
. alterable or 111 is . f Leibniz: Free om is o y t e spontaneity
mg un ]us1on o . • " D · 1 •
'we know the cone "s o11taneitas intell1(.~ent1s. es1re a ways ~1elds to
fan intelligent nature, p t good. We will add, I know, that if desire
, f he greates . . "11 .
the attraction o t d 'th detenninauon, 1t w1 not pursue it nec-
t t goo w1 . h h. .
Pursues the grea es. d t but we must recognize t at t 1s 1s an affir-
cssarily,1101t11eccs
5·anose cero,
. The doctnne · o f Le1·bn1z · 1s
· t h e expression
. d
mauon an ll ' ot an explanation.
. .
I · l dcterm1111sm.
of psycho ogi ahave t1e 1 aIternative of choosing between the freedom of
Do we thus · 1determinism;,
indifference aud psycholog1ca .
sor> - ,_,
· 1ncod
5()7·1· . '., I 80.
. ra,rede
I
Ph1fosof'/11e
'l 1,ipt tV)
• ll
f!H)M TNDIHEREN C E AND PSYCHOLOGr
,,111
:f:JJOM CAL DETERMINI SM 5I 7
06
!tis_thus up to me to move unreasonably: I will close my eyes to the
Jective considerations that would regulate my conduct if I would want
to 6e reasonable and I ill ·f •
voluntas. ' w say, 1 it see1ns good to me: stat pro ratione
A twenty-franc coin attra ts .
would yield to th 6 . . c me more than a one-franc coin; 1f I
e o ~ect1ve "pre al ,,
franc coin, my choice would b v ence, I would choose the twenty-
accordingto my fant h. e reasonable. But it pleases me to move
dI . asy, t is flatters If .
an reJect the twenty-fr . my se -esteem; I follow my whim
~o~ld throw a diamond _anchcom. ~uch is the prodigiou person who
1eeling0 f h' • in t e sea 1 d
Eve d 1·6
Is independe
nee.
n or er to give him elf the inten e
ry e I erate f; I ·
animal lack au t Is, after carefi I .
unreaso blsreason; man who . u consideration, an act of folly.An
na e ' 1s reason bl h - ·
In th h · a e, as the privilege ot bemg
et ree c h
f~rencethus find:s~st at We have ima . - . .-
c1pleof suffi1 . it place; it is e l . gtned above, the freedom ot md1t-
But, let usc1ent re xp ained ·h . .
h ason. Wit out contrad1ctmg thr pnn-
cases. asten to add th
' ese suppo . . . I
sition • re rd:uivdv, l: ·crptwn, 1
uct of his life, man normally takes a
cond k n account f
[fl th .ees and decides t_ota e part where he finds the o the objective
111ot1V he freely decide? greatest good.
ooeS terrninist cl aims . t h at, in. t h e presence f
'[he de d · 0
two une 1
'ble for me to etenmnedly not take th b qua goods it
. ·rnposs l . e etter I h. '
1s1 · an equivocat10n here. · s t 1strue?
'[here 1s .
'f he Obiiect
'J
of preference includes two elements· • a good and .t . .
1
he good that we prefer. s superiority
lfjlist overt . lf . b h 1· .
Preference
itse com~nses ot vo. itwn and preference of a oo
ab, • to say the elect10n of a superiority. g d, as such,
that15 .
atis ery good, m so far as good, can be freely desired E
Ev . . fi 1 · very spontane-
this vohtion can be ree y consented. It suffices for this th t d
ous b. ld a , un er a par
esire . ularaspect, the o ~ect cou appear, on the one hand as d b -
nc . ld b , a goo ut
onth e other
. hand, it cou e compared
. . with the total good an JU ged
d · d'
haut inferiorto 1t; that spontan~ous voht10~ could b~, on one hand, judged
the asgood, but at t~e san1e tii:11e, reflectively put m relationship with the
completesatisfaction of desire and, from this point of view, judged in-
n in sufficient.
Evenwhen desire is in the presence of a unique means, reason can it-
sur- selfalwaysquestion, according to the just reflection of Aristotle, how it
if I willuse it and immediately there has reason to exercise free.
this, Butwhen reason, turning away from the attention of the relationships
ea- thatexistbetween this good and the good, between this spontaneous de-
sireand thecompletereposeof desire, concentrating on the comparison be-
the tweentwo particular goods or between two desires, is it still free?
·ant No. Preference, as such, is not free. It is physically impossible for desire
ione tonot prefer the good that practical reason judges, hieet nunc,in sum, the
better.
Assuredly,the artist to whom we offered two paintings of unequal
valuehas the faculty of choosing the less good of the two. He is ~~eeto
sat I would do well to moderate my passion as a collector. Definitively,
this master painting that is offered to me will not make me happ~; after
nudst
sometime, I will have put it away with many others in th .e of
t
worksthatI no longer regard. Would I not do better to exercise maS ery
ofrny h
penc ants, even if they are legiumater
.. ., H e WI·11thus choose ' I sup-
Pose' the Iesser pamtmg
· · d
But th·15 · · ·d ed the less goo
. 1s becau e in the given case he const er . •
Nintin I ' 'h. d · It is in this capacity
that gas tie bettermeans of moralizing 1s esire.
hepreferred it. 508
Sr18. StTh ual under one aspect,
%thing . . onias says excellently: "If two things be proposed as _eql r point of superior-
1Hnders fi . . f h, . e parucu a 1., ra ~.,,,e·
tty,') th u rom cons1dcnng in one o t cm s0111 h " 11111 .11,eo
at the II h
q. 13a wi as a bent tow rds the one rat h er t han the ot er.
, rt. 6, ad 3. • .
. , f:R •s PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CA RDINAL MI:RCI ,
,od
·veh' d
J,~:ed
. h be chosen or not chosen. jt~~regi!i.. e1
The better paintmg can or not desired. •JtJ' (P
....1lltl . tJC
The lesser good can be c d · Th · h h h
· h · , ·mposes on es1re.
N · h O f the two c oice.5 1
1s
· t at as t e pow- de!tO J'
eit er f . h . of th e two terms of the alternative, to con ort1estJ.J'f'
er, in the presence O eit efir . • the freedom of exercise. - P . i.ol.lt
sent to the choice or to re use .It, is . . d h . .,v1ui
fer- J11Y P
But when one dec1•des to choo e a pamtmg . . an l w en f hattention con- \vheooo o
. 1 · l 011 the relativeart1st1cva ue o t e two canvas-
ccntrates itself exc usiv~ Y_ d d the better in1poses on desire. I havefhC
es prercrence as to what is JU ge . d fi .
' h~' b perform an act of denial an re use a gold com: be- other,f rriY
T e two
· eggar _can envi·sioned under their oceo
tween actions . moral aspect, the honorable e be.
one to accept a coPper coin and the heroic one not to accept . a gold
. coin' never di
_Accor!l
he chooses the heroic action, morally t?e better one. Bu~ 1f, havmg made
an abstraction of the respective morality of ~he two act10ns, the beggar I arnnot fr
would only consider the comparative pecuniary value of the two coins, duion5
he would be crazy not to choose the gold coin rather than the copper attentiont
com. pleases,
or.
Between two goods considered from the same point of view, to enmomen
choose deliberately the lesser one would not be to commit an act of free- thetwo P
dom but of folly. throught
Leibniz is correct when he writes: "We must not imagine that our a decision
freedom consists in an indetermination or in an indifference of equilib-
decidefo
rium; as if it were necessary to be equally inclined on the side of yes and
Weco
no, and on the side of different parties when there are several to be had ...
This equilibrium is absolutely contrary to experience. "509 topoint
Cardinal Cajetan admirably says: "It is essential to nature, all nature, clinethe
to have a single term. Consequently, which nature is of little import, it Theo
tends from all its forces, as much as it can, toward its proper end. Intelli-
ge~t nature_does not escape this universal law: asJar as possible,it inclines
~11its faculties toward its unique end. However, in a general fashion, an
1
?tellectual faculty does not allow itself to be confined to a unique direc-
t~on, t~ward a unique object. Only the tendency which has as its object
t_e u~;~rsal g~od is detennined and exclusive of all other determina-
~on. d e n?tion (ratio)of nature consists in the fact that it is, or ha
een, etennmed to a . b.
ry thing th u?ique O ~ect (ad 1mum). It follow that with eve-
at possesses this not' f . . ·
capacity', such a determmat10 . . ion t nature,
· ° there ex1 t , according to · it
tellectual nature
.
d'
' accor mg to all its
°
n a unique object (ad ,mum). And so, 111-
ill . d to a
unique object ace d' . powers, w be detemune
degree (gradus') do;sr mg _toIts capacity. The notion (ratio)of intellectual
b' involve (c · ) d termin ti.on to a un1qu ·
o ~ect so as to elicit 1.tnot( 1· . . ompatitur
c mt,ve) no d · · · b
r t nnmatton to a unique obJeCt O -
~( (
J:J. Lc:ibn
1z.'f11eod·
••
ICec
' I \t p,lrt \T,
, . J s. work pubhh d by p uI J n t.
OM FROM INDIFFERENCE AND PSY
FREED CiiOLocr
AL DH!:.R~ll
ISM 521
----------------
) l(J l
'/11
' II S11111.
I.. r • q. f,o, rt. 2.
's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCIER
CARDI.NA
. ust not represent itself over the type of mobile object in A group ofp
Self- desirem . d h b 1 .
unstable eqm'libriunr' it is onented towar t e a so f · ute good Just as the of elem~nta~
needleof a compassis oriented toward the north. I It we_re to encounter a new didact
absolutegood, it would be irresistib_ly _attracted toward_ It._B~t, because ticism than 1
it offersno part of it, because only hrmted goods are withm Its reach, it preface.
alwaysguards,with respect to them, a power of resistance that no mover This elem
canconquer.It finallydisposes itself of its determinations; the free action
dents who a1
is, followingthe expressive word of the English, a "self-determination,"
the doubts
andfreedomis essentiallythe property in virtue of which man is capable
them to giv
of determininghimself from reflected desire a spontaneous volition .
We tried,
cepts of p ·
D. Mercier
present sue
To teach
is clearer or
Then it i
be familiar
Doubtles
of the Chu
frorn who
511. "Next 'S
and Which
hi · ' at ensitiv ·
t s in threest
•
e imagination' h · • · and Doe it f◄
'Appet· ages.He show fi ' e points out the motive-principle m man, 1 here i,
ltesorn · s 1rsthow hi . xt at
'The cogn·. etirnesovercomes,h . ~ s principle is the deliberative rea on;~~: t study of
Whilesenit1vcfaculty,'of wh ' 'ow it is sometimes over ome by desire; and thir }h, a o h re
suousi . at reaso , h . t at p Y Ptep.i
Properto rati allllaginationexists al n . e 1 speaking here. Fir t. then, he ay_ JS 5
son· on ones,. to dc]·b ' so 1n h • . • · ·nation advanta
A. 1 crate tha · ot er .animals ' dehberaave 1magi .
. ot rea- th 'g ·
nd thisdelib . ' t 15
to Weigh alternative , , i a funcuon e te,1ch
lllostneeds erat1onr .
iuitab] to be d equ1rcsso whJt
nie e altcrnat1vone. Clearlya rne sort of rule or end by whi h to reckon ore
asurcfc e: Wh h ' rnan w·n •c d Ill
Willb or our act1· ic t alway t iollo\i ,' i.e., eek for, the better an ;, , J
e the 0ns rneasu , :I h d I •n:1ort:
n11dd!ettr , a criterion fco d' r1.:c y \Omc ~t.111dJrd , We n ·c r 1t I thl)
111()ftf r rn1nK what i, mo,t \\ orth tout~-' Ill..
1\( . j
1t• \Yllo
gi l1l of tht· ·
pr.1ct1cal rt•,1 on t\\mng 111.1
choice,
Concerning Scholastic
Teaching 512
Agroupof profe~sors publishe_d, for ~he _use of their classes, a new treatise
ofelementaryphilosophy. This treatise is edited in French and advocates
a newdidactic method, closer to the genius of Aristotle and to scholas-
ticismthan the traditional method. Here is how it is explained in the
preface.
Thiselementary treatise on philosophy is especially meant for the stu-
dentswho are preparing for theology and who want to be able to dispel
thedoubtsand answer to the objections of those who, one day, will ask
themto give an account of their spiritual convictions.
We tried, above all, to define with great precision the essential con-
ceptsof philosophical thought, to specify the terms of the problems, to
presentsuccinctly the solutions and their fundamental proofs .
. To teach this we chose the French language. There is no other which
15cleareror more logical.
512APtot>os . neo-scolastiq11e
I I (1905) 339-
1~7 de I enseignemenc de la scolastiquc . - Revue
, PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
MERCIER S
CARDINAL
524
D. Mercier
Responseto Dom Olivieri514
1905
how c:m he think about this? Dor s he _not recog~ize himself that habitual
le,,rning nly prepar es for the a ·t whil e th~ sens1~le character is the for-
m , I cause of sen ation? Is there thus not 111 the mtellect an intelligible
chara ·tcr that corr espond exactly to the sensible character of the sens-
c..?'' (p. 2 04. )
Our r spon e consists of two word s: To compare is not to identify.
Moreover, if the reproa ch that one addresses to us was just, it would
reach beyond our heads to Aristotle and St. Thomas.
Hrrc is wh at we aid on pages 222 - 2 25, incriminated by Dom Ol-
ivieri: Th senses sense only on the condition of having been placed
within a state to sense under the influence of a stimulus, just as the sci-
us
entist only thinks about the object of science on the condition of having
liI1
been placed in the state of thinking about it. In either case, this situation
f exercising a cognitive action relies on a subjective disposition. This is
od
a formal cause of either the senses or intelligence. In the language of the
pa
chool, the first is called a "sensible character" and the second is called ch
an 'intelligible character." The intelligible character, considered apart se1
from the moment of intellection, is "habitual"; the previously acquired rh
"treasure of the intelligible character" forming the intellectual habits. fu
The comparisonbetween the sensible character and habitual learning is de
thus founded: both are the formal dispositions that immediately prepare of
the expert-the senses or intelligence, according to the case-for cogni- se1
tion. p
The credit of this comparison does not belong to us; it goes back to ha
Aristotle, who institutes it in Book II of his treatise, On the Soul; St. Tho-
mas adopts it for his own purposes in the twelfth lesson of his commen-
tary on Book II; he writes: "With regard to sensation, the animal finds
itself in the condition wherein, with regard to learning, that of which he
has been previously informed. When an animal has an actual sensation,
it is like the scientist who, at a given moment, contemplates the object
of his knowing. Cum animaljam generatum est tune hoc modo habetsens11m,
siait aliquishabetscientiamquandojam didicit. Sed quandojam sentit sec1md11m
actum, tune se habetsiwt ille qui jam actu considerat."
But to compare sensible and intelligible characters is not to identify
them.
While the presence of the sensible character immediately incites the
senses to sense, the intelligible character can remain habitual and not
render intellection precisely on time.516 The intelligible character corre-
6
Shi · Thhismterpellauon by our contradictor renders our thought unintelligible: "Does
t c ,Ult or not recognize h · ,Jf h h b . hile
·bl
•11~1 c lhara ·te · h -
mi 1c t at a Jtual learning only prepares for the act v.J
Habitual I c r ~\ t c torm~ cau c of nsation?" This while i. not in i~ proper p ~ce.
carnmg I\ as much 3 formal cause a is the s n ible ch racter.
RESP O NS E TO DOM
OLIVIERI
533
d exactlyto the sensible determina t
pon . ll . n only wh .
of actlla1mte ect1on. en 1t is th c-
ouse e 1orrnal
.
We were thus• correct to compareth e £0 nna 1 d1sp ··
that of intelligence , but we were no less osit1on of the sen
to . l . . correct t 0 dd ses
,iotat allide11t1~a m any c1rcu1:11stances. a that they are
Let us consid er the two pnnciple complai n ts.
We have sensations
.
that arrive to us through th
h . r: .
d
e mo es of e t .
eS"we combm e t e m1ormat10n that they brin t . x enor sens-
, . . . g o us into a · l
d ception; moreover, we d1st1ngmsh them from on
. .
h . smg e per-
e anot er- m add. •
we have the mt1mate sense of arousino- the facultie th r. ' . ition,
. h d o s at rnm1sh them to
us.The scho 1ast1cs a rem arked that external sense b · . . .
· d , emg mtrms1cally
linked to a detennme organ,
. can. know neither the ob·~ects seize • d by
other organs nor
. be consc10us of its own activity · From thi
· th
s, e antici-•.
patedcon~lus1on: T_h~re n1ust be a s~nse, other than the external senses,
chargedwith combmmg all the sensible qualities of the diverse exterior
sensesinto a single perception, differentiating between them, and sensing
the act of sensation. The ancient scholastics delegated these multiple
functionsto a unique internal sense, "common sense." This sense, to the
degreethat it experiences the activity of its external senses, had the name
of "intimate sense" without ceasing to be always the same common
sense.At the time when the peripheral organs were regarded as the com-
plete subject of sensorial in1pressions, while the brain was supposed to
to
harborexclusively internal sensible activity, the opposition b_etwe _en ~x-
temalsensibility and internal sensibility naturally assumed an imagmat~ve
o-
form:on the surface, the external organs in contact wit· h the extenor
n-
world; inside and above a sense on guard in order to grasp the prey of
ds '
externalsenses and to follow the play oft h e1r· movemen t · But as.soon . as
. . . . . hat extent this mter-
the rnmd 1slifted beyond imagmat10n, it sees to w . . bl diffi-
. . . d h s even mextnca e
pretat1on1sprecanous; burdensome an per ap d £ 1 them. Did
cultiesrise from all sides. Aristotle and St. Tho~as ha efrt what it
th · • • h ? 5 ral believe so, om
ey succeed m d1 entanglmg t em. eve p ·u be and later Fa-
.
seems.As soon as our Psyclwlogieappeare , · ·
d R p et au
51 7 · W,: are h appy to fimd the occasion here to offer our thanks to the wise · dire_ ctorfofr
LA p_en see contemporaine. To avoid neglecting other more urgent works, it is impossi~led?1
us. e1ther tO we Jcome
- · . detail the observations that our wor k ins 11
· p1re. raJ
or to discuss m
him on several oc casions.
· lf we are not nustaken
. the present note W1·urespon d to se\eve
of them; th~ atte~tive analysis that he made of o~r teachings on sensation would deser
a eparatc d1scuss1on.We will not overlook this
518. Revue Thomiste S , b ·
, eptcm er- O ctober 1905, p. 454-
RESPONSE TO DOM OLIVIERI
535
W
to _ehave trouble comprehending how Dom ·
.d nu_sunderstandthe distinction between th e fr~e a
O
:J
i ht have been able
the voluntary, to
ntly that de-
1 encfy
1 spontaneity and freedom, an d to mam . t tn conseque
a . "The voluntary,
sire" · tten·
is a1ways free." He criticizes us for having wn ·
521 " . . belong to oneself,to
ot "'
· Free I
com,
" h
e wntes "was for the ancien • . 'Libenunest '1110d ca11M
· t the pnv1legc to
•
I' on 1• ' f ' rfi and actJOJ1S. S 457
u1 e , ese I, to bl.'.the re~pon 1blc aJ?Cfllo ones I e '
t
' d anent.) p. 454· cc P· ·
ti
s22' tw It·l "' (It I We who me ttahc, • wit· h cJlC, words to an ,\
1
2.\.s 11,capII.
I <>te7.
( Hnl ·, \L 1JIHIIN's l'HIIOSOl'lll(AI f'i\ YS
'i '
, In fl! r .
~2r
127 ~· / -llur ht 4 .
52 °11111 ll nrcin,;
,, • . . ~.., 8 are. 2.
• 1b1d. ~ e t lfJ.<111 .J11111. •\un111111 thcol., 1J - , q. ·
, 's p([ll osoPHICAI SA VS
l MERCffil 1
CARDIN A
D. Mercier
Modern Consciousnesss34
ry,
Lecture given at the meeting of
' Past
~ Vir~ the Young Lawyers of Antwerp.
l Your 28 APRIL 1908
c1er Editor's Note: Invited in April, 1908, by the lawyer Laurent Fierens,
President of the Conference of the Young Lawyers of Antwerp, to de-
livera speech at the general meeting of this group, his Eminence Cardi-
nalMercier chose as subject "Modern Consciousness." The meeting was
held 28 April 1908, at 8 p.m., in the room of the Crown Court in the
Law Courts of Antwerp. It was exceptionally well attended. After Mr.
Fierenshad spoken some words of welcome, his Eminence took the
floorand expressed himself in this way:
Ladies,Gentlemen:
Letme at first express my gratitude. I thank you for having c?me to this
palacethis evening in such a large number. I have not seen m you~ ea-
gernessa feeling of weakness. You have remembered 535 your old umv~r-
. pro1essor
sity c: and you have wanted h1n1, . t h roug h your presence ' toId
relive
the happy years he spent an1ong you. I am p Ieased t 0 find my o stu-
dentshere and I am proud of them. . d · ur di-
1
I also have a feeling of pride at the thought that we me u e m O ·cy
oceseof Malines not only the capital of the kmg . d om, but also your c1 '
Antwerp h. h
I · • ll tual traditions, w IC
am glad to finally see that the moral and mte_ e~ Th whole country
area . ·1 d 'thin1t e
Pnv1ege of this city are perpetuate wi . · f. onderful port,
Waspl d '
c . ease to learn about the imminent
. ex t en s10n o its w
torit knows t hat its
. prospenty• depen ds on it ·
-----
534
·Lac
2~Ap
5 ri 190g
~---------
•
.1 onsc1ence ·
, d Jeune Barreau
moderne. - Conferencedonne, a /'assemblee u
d'Anvers,
d h. and
d roun im
35.licrc h. 1 ers who crowde Ii~ Universityof
aniongt c speak r addre ed the numerous awy · 0 f the Catho c
Lou~ Whornhe recognized many of his old students
ERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL M
553
536
cf,.DcpJOtgc,
·
R, 1•11e
6 54·
Nco- Sr,>latiquc, February, r9o ), P·
, pHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
MERCIER S
CARDINAL
554
but it is significant that subjects who are
Ladies and G . . entlemen, ditions, su b.~ecte d to t h e same mtluenc- .
Yes, . . alor similar con .
d in 1dent1c effect collectively•
p1ace d e the sarne . h d h . ..
enerally pro uc bl f holding up their ea to t eir miheu, are
g of character, capa e o efer to spare themse 1ves t h e d 1"ffi culties of
es,Men
the exception. . Most .hurnans pr
c. ll w the way of the east euort.
1 rr A n d as every
struggle.T h ey Obedient . . .
1y io o the sight of people w h o are applauding .
k u111tat1on,as . '
example evo ~s who are laughing, who are making ges~ure~, provokes
who are shouting,. hing gesturing people gathenng m a crowd
di g shouting, 1aug '
app1au n ' b rried away and in' their· meetmg · t h ere anses
· de-
allowthemselvesto. hethe ca simple add1t10n .. of t h eir. persona 1 w1s . h es does
velopments • to· w Eh 1C perceptionevery image, . every t·a · · · an action.
ea initiates ·
not explam 1t. very , . .
This is one of the fundamental laws of psychology. 1:'he action, m turn,
in the fom of an example, sharpens the image, the idea that produced
1
it and in this way the collective action intensifies itself.
' When we only see the gross result and that of its initial cause escapes
us, it surprisesus, sometimes stupefies us, and masking our ignorance What
with an obscureword, we speak gravely of the psychology of the crowd.
It is necessaryto go back to the sourceto discover the origin of the cur-
rent: to go down the windings of the river again in order to see the suc-
cessive contribution of the tributaries that make its waters swell, to
measurethen its volume and elevation above the low-water mark.
What i~true in space verifies itself in time.
There 1snot ' in .a deterrnme · d era, m . our modem era for example a giveu
common
However . soul that is a c d .
. on ensation of the lives of previous ' generations.'
first
erful currents •d eras' as _we11as m
' mofcertam . certam. parts of the globe, pow- appli
1 eas and and t
who test its influence .d act10. n emerge, sharpening in most of those
leads ~oa collection of, 1i ent1cal d .. d feel"mgs o f sympathy or antipathy, . an d F
expla1n its · mtensity
· n v1 uals wh O can neit· h er understand and nor
1
Excellencies,
ladies, and gentlemen,
Tojudge is to cor.npare. . .
To be able to give an appreciat10n about the work ofDante Alighieri,
thatis, at the san1e time a correct and plausible one, we should find, in
themodern or contemporary literature, a point of comparison for it. I
confess that I do not know any.
Today,the idea of poetry suggests, at once, that of a creation where
imaginationand sensibility play the first roles. In the Dantesque epic,
theseare in the second plan; the philosophical and theological thought
isdominant.
The most famous works of the last centuries - Shakespeare's trage-
dies,AlexandreDumas' novels, Balzac's novels, Victor Hugo's epics -
alldeny any moralizing intention. The Divine Comedy is essentially of
moralinspiration, an apostolic work.
Whatis, then, the characteristic of that genius that all the admirers of
the Beautifulappreciate? What is that transcendent personality mad~ of
thatpeopleand acadenlics acclaim that which the Popes write encyclical
lettersabout, that whose glory gr~ws with the centuries?
th e author of the Divine Cornedy is a nian of science, a searcher for
::: truth._He is a philosopher, he is a believer and a theol~gian._ H~~-
r, he 15 also a man of action· he is the propagator of his beliefs, his
~d~ . , 1
ammated by the inspiration of the aposto ate. . .
1
th he profound unity of the synthesis of intelligence and hfe gives tof
e sacredp o f Dante Ahgh1en
. . . an accent o f smcer
· 1·ry, a strength o
Penetratio oem .
.
hl'itory. n that makes a 'special masterpiece
. o f 1t
• m· t h e gallery ofhterary
54
r .l • · I .
1,~ Is nit po' 14 , , d' • royale de Be giqu 6Jun
· H,1so
1 1
t JtH: de Dante . Lecture faire a I Aca cnue
(1921) 26~- .!89 .
A Study in Neo- Thomism
It wasthe American
· d philosopher, Josiah
. Royce (1855-1916) , w h o r:
nrst
echoedcaution an great expectations for the philosophical movement
launchedby Pope Leo the XIII with his publication of Aeterni Patrison
Augustthe 4th , 1879. 1 The Pope had just died and Royce was worried
about the successor and the future of Pope Leo's philosophical initia-
tions.
Ro_Yce'scaution was P?sed in his_expectations. He made three points.
first, 1fthe progress continued unhmdered, there would be great results
for Catholics and non-Catholics alike. He was quite conscious of the
placeof philosophy in Catholic intellectual life and because of the timing
ofLeo's initiative great unexpected results were obtained. Royce's praise
ofSt. Thomas was unbounded. He attributes to the Saint the highest ex-
pressionof scholasticism. Thomas was for him surely a theologian but
alsoa rational philosophical inquirer. His was an essentially synthetic and
ham1onizingmind. Not only was his erudition, for his time, enormous
but his reflective working over of his massive and often very heteroge-
neous materials was marvelously ingenious and through-going.
Professor Royce saw Pope Leo as directing us to restore the precious
wisdom of St. Thomas; to apply it to the defense of the faith; to study it
in it's original sources; to interpret it and to popularize it.
The Pope is right, said Professor Royce, in using the philosophy of
St. Thomas to combat error; to view and update the contemporary in
light of the ancient; to let the wisdom of St. Thomas shine forth and to
seek out and base one's thinking on the principles that St. Thomas used.
Professor Royce expressly cautioned us to understand the novelty of
Pope Leo's letter and to make good on any assertion about the truth and
especiallythe error of any philosophical position by doing what the Pope
commanded. Namely, to re-establish scholasticism in its integrity, and
secondly, bring scholasticism into explicit relation with mod~rn ~rob-
lems 50 that other thinkers may see the problem as a Catholic thmker
1. Jo\iah Royce: Fu.~itive Essays (pp. 429, Books for Libraries Press, Inc., Freeport,
NewYork. 1920). ce:Article: "Pope Leo's Philo ophica] Movement and its relation to
Mo<lrn1 thought" pp. 40R-429). First printed in Boston Eve11i11
.~ Tramcript,July29, 1903.
srL-D\ IN NH)-11\0MlSM
1 ~~ .
t h , ,,parently able to balance h.1s re 1·
19th Century, a nme ,, .
1gious b e 1· . with
1cfs
sitive . e ·'' ·as <1fand' play a key role 111
. .issues, · movmg· t h e c.
11eld ahead. To
his scientl
. 6 1c tra1111ng ,
,nttir·v aao , hen both science and religion afforded their
G • • •
t 1sover a ce .1 , o , . . .
0 h
dpractitioners ks tlexibility,is most unpressive, and he has certamly
earned our respect. .
As was the custom at that time, Msgr. Mercier proffered a complete
version of his psychological beliefs. For example, Williams James, who
was an active contemporary of Msgr. Mercier, did the same, as did all of
the other leaders in the field. Today, the notion of one person unifying
psychological theory is not tenable, and the most one might attempt is
the explanation of a specific phenomenon.
Surprisingly,Msgr. Mercier s psychology is very similar to contempo-
rary ~sy~hology.The primary differences are: ( 1) the specificity and so-
phi5ticat1onthat experimental research, methodology O and equipment
have added . to some o f h'1sgener al construct , and (2) the ' removal of hi.
co_n~1tment _to~he soul, its religious connection to God and the cul-
mmat1on
differences ofshhfe ldmbthe Be~t'.1fic v·151.on. Further, while neither ' of these
era and even nl ou e surpnsmg fi 1 ·
. ' e ust app 1es to all psycholocrists o fh. 1s
th
by all of today'sore scierecent
t. tlm
M es, an d t h e second has not been odiscarded
R ogers' self conceptnch lSts · daslO\N ' s pyram1'd of human development or
: 0P~ical ideas less explia~lgeb some 0 ~ the wording and made the philo-
M ~ f,or th e individual
1zat10 cit, · utl'we th1n k h'is u 1timate goal of self-actu al-
erc1er defended. imp ies many of the same notions that Msgr.
. However, Ms . ,
hnes
the b. of man gr. Mercier
. Y of today's gene
s psycholo gy otherwise paralleled the out-
ra1 p ychology t b . . .h
they uniqu
.
°
101ogi.calbasis fb
e y separat h
ehavior he
, stressed the
ext ooks. Begmnmg wit
l f ...
0b
~ects. Afte1 h e t e animal k' ro e o the enses and hoW than
tween men and r t en. discussmg . some mgdom fr l
f h . om p ant and inanimate \ ·~n
O
onl.Yman was caanimals bl ' he moved ah .td e sm ·lant1e · · in behavior b e-
11
tern
animals· If you allo pa e £of ' th us clear1y ea d. ffi to foe us on t l1ose actions tl1at
same an l .
co .. a ys1sin most w or th d'
e 1fferences 1 erenti
. at'mg man from ,111 other
gn1tivefunct1oning
. contem
d porary think' m word. ~
. mg. you will hnd that
s s an use oflangua mg, including the •'111phasi on
5
· ee fo , ge '- '·
86 l otnote 60 .
of. ani indebted .
Ne\\ Or!ean to niy collea
for their comment~
gue~ Dr, . (',ayIe and R. I
1<"\ard ( )l •
· ,on tr01n the Uni, r 1c,
A STUDY IN NEO - 'l'J{() MlSM
. of speech continues.
ca's aphasia and apraxia ry studies have indicated that rather than lo
R esults of. contempora . r 'fi ca1-
. h b ain being responsible 1or speci c language a d
. d .t s within t e r . .b d . n
1ze si e . h b ain contains circumscn e areas which are r
h function, t e r . e-
speec. c: h fi ctions with overlaps occurnng. Furthermore hu-
sponsible ior sue un ,. . . 1 .h 1 '
. t hysiologically identica wit respect to anguage and
man brams are no p . . . h h d
r the locahzat10mst approac to t e stu y of brain
speech Th ere1ore, , 1d bl .
function. · popu 1ar m
· Broca and Mercier s. era e to n1any . . .md ends , and rf"hereare
al
has b een rep1aced by neuropsychological/ neurohngmst1e approaches l ·
. bio_logl~f
L
linking areas to one another function~y, d~pe?ding upon the require- 11
nit1°
menst of the particular process under mvest1gat10n. . , .. . van Riet
More than eleven decades after MerCier wntmgs concernmg his
er's philos
thoughts about the origins an~ proce:ses ?f language and speec?, we
servation-
continue to admire and appreciate the mfimte nuances of these umquely
human behaviors, and to study their mechanisms with growing, yet still rnovesfro
infantile understandings.88 external c
In the article entitled, "Criminal Suggestions," written by Cardinal and satis
Mercier in r 897, there follows the theory that a person under hypnosis descriptio
will not do anything against their value system. Although the psychia- being, he
trists at Tulane University in New Orleans do not know of any study only the
that would validate the theory, they are of the opinion that it might be constitu
possible for a therapist using hypnosis to deceive a patient and persuade stantial p
him or her to do something he or she ordinarily would not do. Yet, the the spirit
doctors were reluctant to assert this because they would not know how dualism
to. clevis~an experiment to prove it. There is no acceptable research on or the p
this subJect. At the moment, all we have are anecdotes. The courts in
The
Ame_ricahave regularly denied the claim that "hypnosis made me do it."
show th
If this could be admitted in court, the possibilities for crime would be
endless.89
. The debate in the 19 th C entury on firee will .
and determimsm . • r
1ound
its most extreme formula( • h
suggestion C d. i~ns m t e controversy over crimes caused by
· ar ma1 Mercier d d
Bonyard case f A was no oubt familiar with the Eyrau -
caused a sensat:n 9~gTuhis~ 1889 · It lasted for I 8 111onths in France and
· s case as
troversial papers in th fil ' we sai·d ab ove, highlighted
. .
n1any con-
e es of lega1 me di cme · and forensic psyc h.1atry.
88. I am indebted fo h
D cpartment of c r t ese co
- d b
.
ommutUcative
mments to
Diso d
ll
T my co cague Gerald L. Culton, P 1. "
I D
89 . I am m e ted to r crs he U . .
Pita! for his commentsmy colleague Dr · Ed,war d Foruvcrs1ty
Jk M D
of Alabama.
· · Hos-
90 See· Plas R' . · u s, • . ofTulane Psychiatric
· ' ·· ' . cgme: "Hyster· .
Forensic Psychiatry" l
407, r998. <if;;
ta, Hypnosis
, nternationa/ )011rna/
d
111
Moral cnse in French 19th Ccntur\'
and P ycl1iatry,Vol. 2. I, No. 4, PP· 397-
A STUDY IN NEO-THOMISM
Biological Studies
T_here _are~o articles in which Car . .
b~~logicaJ sciences. These art" l dmal ~erc1er depends heavily on the
c
mtion of Life" and the "L 11~es _areentitled: "The Philosophical Defi-
V an R.iet uses an analysis ofocathizat1on
fi of. the .M ~scular Senses." Professor
t
er's philosophy.91 The Ca d. el rS a~ticle m his examination of Merci-
r ma examm 1·r, 1 ·
servation. Then through -nd . es em steps. First, through ob-
1 uct1on to the " h .
moves from the everyday conce t oflife me~ap y~1calentities." He
external cause to the scientific ~ h orhmot~on without any visible,
· fy. · e s ows t at his research · d
an sat1s
· · mg f to any contemporary b.101ogist . ,s d emands Having
is up-to-
oi
ate
d
escnpt1on o the structure and organi zat.ion °f th e fiunctions
· . of ab.ven
livina
d • h
emg, h e searches . for an exemplary cause · Th.1s cause must explam . notg
b
o y t e material parts of life, but also the complexity of the 1
nl t"t t" " · " Th. e ements
cons _1u 1~g ~n org~,msm.,, _isleads him to an explanation of a sub-
tantla_lpnnc1ple -. a_ so~l. . This way he overcomes the materializing of
the s_pmt or the spmtuahzation of the material. He thus dispels Cartesian
dualism a~ well ~s monism. Thus, he give the Aristotelian explanation
or the philosophical explanation of life.92
n The second article on the localization of the muscular senses merely
in show that Mercier's researchis up-to-date and is respectedby allbiolo-
gists.
Again, the reading of these articles attest to the fact that Cardinal Mer-
cier wanted the current state of positive sciences to be taken into con-
ideration. He recognized them and studied them . The Aristotelian
ynthe is, on which St. Thomas based himself,was basedon an embry-
onic science. Thus, their intellectual effort tried to compensate for the
shortageof data with hypotheses. While science developed,philosophy
closed its eyes and continued to reason from the medieval knowledge of
nature.
Cardinal Merci r strove to overcome this by insisting on the studythof
contemporaryscience. He helped the Neo-Thomist movement by ,s
'" tenc . Hy putting co-scholastici m in sync with the evoluuon of
1
n U111-.c:r
It) Pr
6l
FR'S PHIL\Jc>\Jr11n ,L1L nv;Jt\Y:5
CARDI AL .MERCI .
666
121. I am indebted
University fi to my colleag D · LovolJ
,
1?...2 . See· or thc~e co uc, r. Larry Warner protessor of Ar,thew: at
N 11ltncnt:-. •
XXVI!J_· cwrnan, J0 hn Henry·
· ulltvcrJtty
- .· 8kctchl's
, ,,;,pP·
3Io) p.261 . · (Alb,l House. Nt:'wYork. 19 ·
A STUDY IN NPO-THOMI 'M
Mercier had alrea~y _in his ina~g _ur~l lecture of October the 27 rh I 882 ,
utlined in very explicit tern1s his 111s1stenccon freedom of research and
~ e intrinsic-evidence criterion for all philosophical thought. In October
1
of 1 889, in his_S_Peechto t_he Co~gress of Mechelen, he qua] ified even
f 20
further this condition for_ph1losoph1cal work and dismissed as prejudicial
allwho thought that believers were only doing philosophy as an aid to
and under the direction of theology.123
Thus in Mercier's article of 1888, eight years after Van Weddingen's,
he side-steps the adversaries found in the newspaper and centers in on
the adversaries he finds in philosophy. The enemy for Mercier is posi-
tivism and agnosticism. Thus we find him studying positive science to
try to discern if the natural sciences actually limit themselves to or con-
formto the positivist equation of knowledge with the empirically given.
Is there not more to physics, chemistry, biology, and astronomy than
mere description and prediction? Must man forgo theological and met-
aphysicalspeculation to concentrate on observation of facts if they are to
arrive at intellectual maturity? Although Mercier has an empirical bent,
which shows him its limits, he is thereby open to metaphysics and em-
ploys Aristotle's two principles of substance and of causality. Mercier's
philosophy is from beginning to end a plea for metaphysics.
Mercier's essay shows how the Higher Institute _w~sfor1?-edat Lo~-
vain. Van W eddingen' s essay has none of this assoc1a~1~nw1~hthe p_os1-
tive science. Again, Mercier, always the pedagogue, d1v1deshis essaf mto
sixty-five sections, while Van Weddingen uses but two. yan W~ddmgen
supplies us with multiple footnotes from newspape_rs,p~11losoph1cal, clas-
. 1
s1ca, many Th · ·
ornistlc sourc , es and German and h1stoncal sources.. Mer- ,
. b 1 Mercier's footnotes update Van Weddmgen s
c1er · uses ut twe ve. h O1 hip at t h e H.1gh er Inst.t
1 u te.
article by quoting from recent sc ars - al f h h "J
ercier's article are an appra1s o w at p 1 os-
Th e 1ast fiour pages OfM . can b ecome m
at 1t · th e next. H e
0 Ph Y was m · th e 19th century an d Wh
. · has been renewe d and what yet needs to be.
traces how scho 1asucism f tion envisioned by the Pope 1s
h the work o renova
done. He shows ow b done by a group of scholars work-
the work must e
?ot done an d h ow h H. her Institute dedicated to research and to
mg together - hence t e ig ppropriate science "already made" and
teaching. This research muSt a
~ the
arriveat intellectual matunty? Although Mercier has an empirical bent
which shows him its limits, he is thereby open to metaphysics and em~
ples.
ploysAristo_tle'stwo p~nc_iples of substance and of causality. Mercier' s
Dugh
philosophy 1s from begmnmg to end a plea for metaphysics.
' ad- Mercier's essay shows how the Higher Institute was formed at Lou-
pec-
vain.Van Weddingen's essay has none of this association with the posi-
tivescience. Again, Mercier, always the pedagogue, divides his essay into
oly
sixty-fivesections, while Van Weddingen uses but two. Van Weddingen
tu-
t or-
. It
suppliesus with multiple footnotes from newspapers, philosophical, clas-
sical, many Thomistic sources, and German and historical sources. Mer-
cier uses but twelve. Mercier's footnotes update Van Weddingen's
articleby quoting from recent scholarship at the Higher Institute.
The last four pages of Mercier' s article are an appraisal of what philos-
ophy was in the r 9th century and what it can become in the next. He
traceshow scholasticism has been renewed and what yet needs to be
e
done. He shows how the work of renovation envisioned by the Pope is
not done and how the work must be done by a group of scholars work-
ingtogether - hence the Higher Institute dedicated to research and to
teaching. Thi research must appropriate science "already made" and
i,x-
123
. · "In aII the ,c.hooh ofT honmm , the Louvam . sch ooJ h as att ame · ,d prestige·The Cath-
.
ohcU . ti 1 nane movement. E, en
nivcr\1ty h. \ kepta rc,1)eccable distance rom any u tr,unor
ifthe • . Th · · - Ontology with con-
tnJttal intention wa, to recom ile th e An\totclt.1n - onuSr~c ~, _ b, .•
tenipor ·d a pou1t of contalt ct,, cen
ary uence provr d no t too frmtful , at le.1st It asstm: . .1 d
SC1tnce.1 ( • • I , - . •nnfic spirit m h1,tont a an
hl mu · tholil· thought .1nd 1t tavcm:d .111,ltlt 11:nm c;uc ·
pP p I () c,ph1l I r · e r h "
f h1bdult • 11I ·rrc \ ,11,1/r
1 • . 1• 1<)7 -·~ r11 . ~,~)· 0 • 1•) 8·
l / /J. ltH'Olr• ( 1'r e '> 1,1\:,1
RCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL ME
668
11.iloso
h w It is a never-ending effort of analysis and
r-JO
p d
wor
constantlyrnake t e ne . syn_ [lri.ilof P
thesis. h is vintage Mercier. In it he shows the vision Of h histott of
The last paragrap t e thoug or le
0 re
Pope: is rl1 the co
e here as Leo XIII has also seen, the beginning of th able be r
And so we hav ' . . e d tO
longed for agreernent between sCience and metap_hys1cs,perhaps of a
rie~et us ta
salutary rapprochement between reason and fa~th, and the noble
crowning of the tremendous work of the restorat10n of the Christian ercier saY
N1he
di tinct
s 0
philosophy. t
further .
We are now over roo years since the encyclical and Mercier's initial at-
rnarked, in
tempt to implement its directives. Our vision is different and less enthu-
the part of
siasticfor the implied answer which Pope Leo's and Cardinal Mercier's
visionsgive. Their efforts have made us more modest. I think we can un- cussing th
derstand our increased caution if we frame in all in the following man- Thornas"
duced the
ner.
If revelation wishes to be understood, to become theology, it needs this task a
an understanding of being and of man that does not directly derive from Scholastic1
it. It needs a philosophy in which man is already to some extent trans- the meth
?arent to ?imself; thus, revelation turns into theology when philosophy
is methodically at work within its purview.
The problem for every age, for every generation of believers is: what
philosophy?
F_ora Christian, it would seem to be a philosophy that allows, in some
fashion, at least the following affirmations:
•God exists.
•The world has come from God.
•Human beings know and love. And tal
•There is a discoverabl
. e et h.1cal system, and there are consequences to po e an
human behavior. surpa e
•Forhu b ·
•A d . man emgs, there is life after death. St.
nof, mt general' the truth 0 f reve 1at1on
· will not contradict the trut h
na ura1reason. Yl \
1n1
No philosoph~ has all the answers, no human construction has said the
_ alword - this would seem to be a reasonable conclusion from the
~::wry of philosophy. However, Mercier apparently thinks that the
thought of Aristotle, as re~ected on and modified by Thomas Aquinas,
i more or less the perfect instrument to explicate revelation and so en-
able the const~ucti?n o~ a viable theology. The only b,1sic things that
need to be revised m Anstotle are some of his scientific assertions.
Let us take some examples from Mcrcier's article. Early in the study,
Mercier says: "Following the lead of Aristotle, no one has better fixed
the distinct character of the philosophical science than St. Thomas."
Initial at-
Further on, with regard to mind and body, he says: "Thomas has
ss enthU-
marked, in a manner as magisterial as Aristotle and with a better clarity,
Mercier'
the part of both body and soul in the act of understanding." And in dis-
~ can un- cussing the role of experience and speculation, Mercier notes: "But
ing man- Thomas who, in a larger measure than any of his predecessors, intro-
duced the doctrine of Aristotle into the schools of the West, brought to
it needs this task an originality and an independence of spirit that the enemies of
ve from Scholasticism seem to ignore or pretend not to recognize." Regarding
the methodology of Thomas:
The method of the angelic Doctor was one of strictly logical demon-
stration; his didactic works are conceived in a more rigorous logical
i : what form than those of Alexander of Hales. Up to that point, in the West,
we did not have an example of such critical vigor associated with a
in ome language of constant lucidity and in which sobriety almost never en-
genders harshness.
And talking about Aristotle: "Aristot~e was the_~rst to ~e cribe the pur-
pose and the object of philosophy wi~h a precis10n which has not been
nces to surpassed." And then Thomas and Anstotle:
· uelcomed into hi two Smnma' all the profound
t. Th Ol11aS A qull1:1S Vv . . .
· fA · 1 h, rectified the maJonty of his faults and errors and
view o nstot e, e .
· d h b the ideas of Augustme and the Fathers of the
improve t em Y · lar, w1·11remam
. particu · as t h e sym-
Church. The . 11111111a T1,coloaim
"". '
111
.
· d m· it re1ects no fnntful theory, no progress, but
bol of Ca tho 1IC wis O ' • d
. ' ll h 111 · cuitions.1 of the human 111111 wit· h t h e supenor
·
d em 1mprt'gnares a t e
melY· light of the Gospel.
qu111J · bout the scope of Thomas' thinking: "When
fl t
thit Furthermore, he _~.1ys~ books on philosophy and on sacred science
JJl ,d. , . ·nnng 1us '
Th om.1s w ,l'i "" · . hi·ch preoccupy modern man were discussed
)bkn1-; ""
chtrl~ 111()<,t o f t h e pn
., Ano1 t h en,
. lf°i:erThoma,:
. . .
. ch \\ 1th p.l~',JOtl.
ER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MERCI
..;ea
dred , .
1iofl b\i n1s
. ld n age of Scholasticism was followed b 00 rcoflle ~ch a
Unfortunate1Y, this go A
e
very learne d Anstote
. 1·ran, Peter of Sy one
. o<ediflto s thel
of repaid decadence_-·· · This manual of fom1al logic ... thought if ~in, e b -..;e
. Swmna7ogicae. h b k fA . 101-
oP..pe 'J.f rriatl
wrote h1s . 1 , Joo-icalworks: to t e oo s o nstotle it add d bt O a oie
proved O
n Anstot e s i::,- • • kh ·11b
With all its spmt, Oc am w1 ase on this 1
e tbotlg_ eoero
· Jesstheses. ... . f . 1ew _1ioes, ·as a1
meam~g d false nominahsm, the cause o the rum of high qlJ:V t.. t ""
Joaic hrs narrow an er hYt11a tie
i:, op the froU
speculation. _ yorid caucioil
Mercieralwayspropo ses Thomas as the solution: "fbe
, \,·as
e'-·efl!
In the XIIIth century, St. Thomas had prepared in his works, which snl d) f\-' o'CO
flaI1ne, - horr
were as pur e as they were elevated, a remedy
. for the failure
. whose s 1n
··corne . rdl
conseque1 1 ce our generation itself experiences.
. . In recalling
. minds to -rhis is ha
t d the greatest initiator of true Scholast1c1sm, of him who realizes
suy .h b. bk h sho\"·nan
more than anyone the ideal, Leo XIII w1s es to nng ac to Chris- as h . ""-ill s\
tian knowledge the magnificence of a noble period. losop ) Abo
a success.
At one point in his work, Mercier discusses the scientific theories of the 0 f Cardinal .~
early20th century, then proceeds to graft onto them the Aristotelian/Th- tent to the 1
omistictheory of matter and form as if were the valid and ultimate un- dured becaus
derlying explanation. Unfortunately, the graft would seem to be very Professor
superficial,and the doctrine of hylomorphism contributes little. eo-Thomi
We should add then, as Mercier says, a concluding encomium:
expre it in
Those who have followed the history of Thomas' ideas know that no entific thou
~hristian thinker has surpassed the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. If sophical de
his works disappeared tomorrow, what master could replace him? So. we h
F~r the whole of humanity, the most perfect system is that which that are gen
b~ngs together the best thoughts of all systems, reunites them in a ing the met
wise.and harmoni ous or d enng, · · ·
preserves thmkmg from use Iess di- laid out £
~essrons, from mystical idealism as much as from narrow material-
ism, and adds to th c. Felician - E
Pl t A . e greatness a tested solidity. In this respect, a1ter
Ouar o, dnstotle was the greatest in the ancient world and Thomas in
mo em · c '
W . tunes 10 r Christian thinkers.
hat are the !mutations 0 f M . ' .
torical context Th . ercier s endeavor? There is a lack of his-
He is not seen· omas is not adequately seen as a product of his time •
. as one among • d
with and almost many m the Middle Ages who, confronte
Jewish thought ovedrwh~clmedby the influx of Greek and I Jamie and
th· k ' use t 1s ne I d'
In revelation and w Y Iscovered rational in trument to re-
the Ch · · present the r, J k f
nst1anconun . r u t a1,<1new theology for the . a e o
h
of t e MiddleAges· uthn'.ty.Al. 0 , Thomas \\as not the ;nly great thinker
somcwh . , ere wer, O th ~ :l
A at different b e ers Just as gifted but who constrncteL
sortstotle,for all his ~cuut~quallyviable, thcol~)gics. And, more b<1sicall.,
urcc of incn md · · I
,tnswl'.rsto h 1 • ' gt'nius, wa, not the final unique nt10n, 1
l ni,in quc,tions. t )4
A STUDY IN NEO-THOMISM
I. Cosmology
I. I There are two kinds of atomism: one a metaphysical theory,
called philosophic atomism or mechanism; the other purely sci-
entific, called chemical atomisn1 (9-rr).
I.2 The theory of n1echanism cannot be reconciled with the facts of
chemistry - notably with the constancy of atomic weights, affin-
ity, valency, the phenomena accompanying chemical combina-
tion, and the recurrence of the same simple and compound
species (12-21).
1.3 Mechanisn1 is incon1patible with the ascertained results of crys-
tallography (22, 23).
The mechanical explanation of gravity and the qualities of gase-
ous bodies is inadequate (25-27).
·s not a force nor is it a cause capable of pro-
L oca• 1 movemenh t ·lcal effect· it is, neither
. . .
transnuss1ble nor trans-
d uCing a mec am '
fonnable (30-34).
•· of bodies into matter and form involves no
I.6 The con1pos1t10n
contradiction (3 8-4 8) ·
t' al form intrinsically dependent upon matter is di-
Every su b stan 1
visible (49).
· bas only one substantial fom1 (48).
J.8 Every being
. ·nction may be made between material substance and
Area. l d 1st1
its quantity (57).
'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
L MERCl ER
cARJ)INA
2. Psychology
2. I
Vital
h acts.differ fro m th e act10ns
· o f morgamc
· · muc h a
· matter ma
t ebrare immanent whilst the latter are transitive (10). The first 2. l l
SU ~ect of orga . j'fc · ·
nic 1 e 1~ a matenal nature (13). \
2.2
Sense perccptio 15 · h . · n
is of a hi h n a yper-phy teal pcration; that i to ay,_tt
or orga ~ er nbaturethan any nature of\ hich inorganic bodic -.1 _
nic .su. stances· 0 f t hc v 'gcta ble kmgd
· m , re apao· lc.
1
Neverthcl, .
a11Yin .l mat 'na· 1organ a · 1t· stH~~ct
1
1.:ss,t I csse11t1 1. • ( ·o
51). · . ·
I
2.6 T~e c~1nm~n form .al obje~t of the intellect is being. Its proper
obJect 1s denved from sensible things, but is abstract and capable
of becoming a universal notion (88-92).
The intelligence is a passive faculty - potential intellect - which
has to be determined to intellection by some extrinsic action
(96). The determination of the intellective power to intellection
is effected by a double efficient cause, namely, by the imagina-
tion and an immaterial abstracting force, or active intellect (ror).
As soon as the intellective faculty is presented with a conceptual
determinant effected by the double cause, it passes ~ro~ power
to act; it knows, that is, expresses to itself wh_at~ ~hmg is (r?3).
The intellect knows first and directly the qmddities ~f sensible
things, and its own nature secondly and through reflection ( ro4) ·
2.8 The soul knows its own existence throug~ its own ac)ts;it kknows
· upon its acts (107 . 1t nows
its own nature through re flection -- ·
God indirectly' that is, by the process of composition, negation
and transcendence (ro8). . .
ry acts (rro). It is also a pnnc1ple
The will is a principle O f necessa
of free acts (rrr-IIS)· . . that 1s
nscious activity . subJec-
. _
1tan t of every co ·a11:, 1 0f
2.IO Pleasure is the resu . 1 erfect 121 . ( ) There is no speo iacu ty
. .
tively and objective Y P h tates appertain to the appet1t1ve
r: - but sue s
emotion or iee 1mg,
faculty (122). . •deas whilst animals have no
n 1versa1 1 '
has abstract, u . difference of nature between
2. I r Man a1on e , uentlY there 1sa
such idea ; conseq )
· al ( 12s- 1 .27 ·
man and anirn . f]uence upon one another (137).
, ·
005
acts a h , ve an ffi ·ent thoug h not abso1ute contro 1
in
2.12 Man s vao. as a really e .c1 ( 8)
·- free will h ... sofhissoul 13 ·
H is thcr acuv1ue
over the O (141).
. one ,;ub scance
.
2.13
The ego 1~
1ERCIER
's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDI 'AL
-oo
2.17 The human soul is not begotten by the parents but created by
God (162). 3·
3.
3. Criteriology
3.1 The truth of a thing 1 · .
· f h . or onto og1cal truth 1s a relation of conform-
ity o t at thing with th 1.d al 3.I
3.2
e e type of its nature (4-5).
The truth of kno l d .
and consi t • . we ge or logical truth is that of the judgment
. s s m its conformity with ontological truth (6).
3.3
Certitude is the firm
and determined b assent ?fthe 1nind to a truth after reflection
th
agreement of tw y e nund's perception of the identity or 3. l
o terms (8).
3.4
The question to be
an we d · ·
very general terms h re 111 criteriology nuy be tated in
are · · · a W ether th 1
Justifiable upo fl . e as. ents we n1ake spontaneous Y
3-S Th n re ect1on (9).
e Cartesian
ogy . statement of th . . . 1
Is not only inco e que tton considered in cnteno -
3.6 1
The quest· rnp ete but contradictory (10).
Ion co .d
t he bond h ns1 cred it . . 1·
t at unites sub·, 1 cntcnoloh"'Yi. re.11Jyt :vofold: (1) '
~c t and pr•·d · · . i • tib-
~ tr tL· m our JUl gn1t.:nts
--,
◄ SY OPS!
701
3.:.3 The moti,· , of historical certitude is one that i indirect but evi- 4.8
dent (67).
3..!.j. The 111otiwof the certitude of faith i one that is extrinsic and 4.9
,nnd , the authority of a witness (68).
llot e,·ident, 11
!ht>
certitude of the ,let of supernaturalfaith is con1patible wi th
4.10
its freedom, in.1much as the act remain free because of the in-
trinsicobscurityof it. bject (6 ).
9
3.26
T~:ere~re t\ 0 dis_tinctkinds of certitude: certitude arising from
e\:1denceand certitude of faith (70). 4, t I
3.27
Inunediateevidence is th fi d
truth (l 1). · e tr t an fundan1enta l criterion of
4.1...
{. I
4-. 1eneralMetaphysics
4-1
Theob,, ·t t'
{ ,2
Jt:c o llll'taphys. . .
Thedcni. ics 1. thc SUb . tann : of sen . ibl , things (7). •l
j Lllt'i nee i l
~t• f ,Ind ti . ' to k' distin l" • I · ·
tit ,,, 1 irt11• - . . guis ll'd Ill substance: the thi//~it-
1
1u,111d1 1t , -·
< <! . ' ,
<.xists,or, c.:ss<.·ncc and l' t'itl'HCL .l
◄ SYNOPSIS O
F PRINCipi\
L Doc-r
· RlNEs
4.35 Both the Latin words potentia and actushave a double meaning:
potentia passiva, subjectiva, or potentiality, must be distinguished
from potentia operativa,power of action or faculty, corresponding
to the difference between actus,meaning actuality or an intrinsic
principle of perfection, and actus,meaning action, the exercise of
a faculty (119).
The various kinds of being studied by metaphysics have in com-
4.36
mon a certain analogousness ( I 26)
. l ecei·ves the substantial form and by its union
4.37 Th e 1natena causer ( )
with it constitutes a new compound substance r33 .
. . . ·cally communicated to the matter,
1 cause is
. hintnns1 .
4.3 8 Th e fc
orma . . stitutes a substance of a deterrnmate
and by its union wit it con
kind(135). . · · o f movement
trinsic, active prmc1ple
The efficient cause is the ex
4.39
( 1 39). d gent is in the patient (144) .
. n of a create a . .
4.40 The acuo t" is applicable to immanent action,
f ''rnoven1en
The concept ~ . hat such action does not react upon the
4.41 . h restnct1on t
with t e k. git (146).
· tus evo 10
st1n1u d gents has the becoming of something as
. f create a
4.42
The acuon o Jwnt (148).
it'- formal resu
CIER 's PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MER
per fectio
4.51 (173)·
sto d . a metaphysical sense the principle of cau Ii
4.43 Under o dmthus·The existent thing to which existence -sa ty 1'here ar
be state · . . 1s not
may . exists
essential . m. virtue of some act10n external to 1t ( r) . 4.58 iotegritY
15
.
Besides iorm al' material
c.
. and efficient causes, "movement" aIso 13eautY_1
4.44
entails final causal1ty (r 52). 4.59 or dioat1 ,
There is intrinsic finality in nature ( l 52). . given 1
1s
4.45
4.46 The final cause may be defined as that for the sake of which Art nee
something is done or made ( l 53) • 4.60 pose s·, b
4.47 The causality of the final cause consists in an attraction which the The int
end exercises upon the appetitive power and in the consequent 4.61
nality 0
tendency in that power towards it (154).
The i
Nature is a substance considered precisely as the intrinsic first 4.62
principle of the operations proper to the being that produces or
guishe
undergoes them (155).
4.49 Law is the internal, fundamental determination in virtue of
which a substance, as first principle of action, tends to realize a
determinate end (156).
4.50 5.1 The i
Natural causes and effects must be distinguished from accidental
causesand effect (157).
suffici
prope
4.5r The exemplary cause is the mental type that an intelligent effi-
cient cause follows in producing his effect ( 162). 5.2 Ourk
2
4-5 The exemplary cause is at once an efficient and final cause and
~n extrinsic formal cause. Its peculiar causality consists in its be-
mg an extrinsic formal cause (163).
5.3
4.53 Among the four causes, there is only an analogical resemblance
(164).
4.54
Onto]ogi~al principles and causes are the same things; elements
are matenal causes; principles causes and elements are the rea-
sons of things (r6 5). '
4.55 rd
Ond er has been defined as the exact adaptation of thin Q'S to their
68
e s (r ). Order is understood in two senses: teleolo;cal order
and aesthetic d · di ·
d
an order of or er,
d. or, •in other word
' order of subor natwn
co-or inat1011( 169).
4,56
The order in th .
(17o). e universe proves the ·xi. tence of final cause.
7IT;
4.60 Art need not be used as an instrument for moral or religious pur-
poses; but it is not beyond the pale of the moral law (180).
4.61 The internal finality of things is the foundation of the relative fi-
nality of the universe; this constitutes its order (181).
5. Natural Theology
· o f 111etaphysical movement
An analy 1s furnishes a proof of the
5.7
exi tence of God (21 ) ·
An analysi of the efficient causality of natural agents furnishes a
proof of the existence of God (2 3). . ,6
)· -
The proof from the higher a pi ration of human nature does not
exceed probability (3J). 5.3
5-I 5 The moral obligatio b . . . .3
. L . n can e exp 1amed ,v1thout recourse to a di-
~me egisla~or; it is th erefore not an immediate proof of Hi ex-
istence, but ma much . . . .
furnish a f f as It 1 an mdication of contingency it doe
proo o a necessary Being (34).
5-I6
The metaphysical es ence of God 1· H1·
5.17 elf- ub i tence (36). ·3
God is absolutely imple (4 I).
5-18
God is perfect (44, 45).
5.19
God unites in H·
(46). tniself all th e perfection belonging to H1"iworks
5-20
God is infi · ·
Intte 1n erf .
5-2 I The . · . p ecnon (4, , 49).
act1v1tyof God .
5-22 Thou h ts uh_tant1al (57).
g t 111ay ·111d
'· niu~t b
• c attnbuted t God (5,i).
SYNOPSIS or PRINCIPAL DOCTRINES
The divine ideas are infinite in number, and yet are identical in
reality with the divine essence considered as the supreme arche-
type of all things (62).
God possesses knowledge of possible things (64).
God possesses the so-called "knowledge of vision" (65).
The object of His "knowledge of simple intelligence" God sees
in His essence (66).
The future effects of necessary causes God knows in the decrees
of His will (67).
j.30 There seems reason to distinguish with the Molinist school an
"intem1ediate" sort of knowledge in God different from His
knowledge of simple intelligence and that of vision (67).
5.3I The divine foreknowledge of free future acts is not incompatible
with the freedom of the latter (68).
5.32 In God, there is a will (69, 70).
5.33 The primary formal object of God's will is the goodness of His
own essence (7 r).
5.34 For its secondary material object, the will of God may have
whatever partakes of the divine goodness (72).
5.35 God loves the goodness of His Essence necessarily, and freely the
goodness He has communicated to created beings (73).
5.36 God never changes the free decree of His will (74). Inasmuch as
His will remains attached to its good, it is called by us love (75).
The divine will is omnipotent (76).
5.37
The world has been created by God (80-81).
5,38
God alone can create (82).
The world has need of being conserved by God in being ( 84).
The world is ubject to the action of divine providence (8 5, 86).
The providence and government of God are universal (87).
MERCIER'S PHILO OPHICAL ES A YS
CARDINAL
6-1
. f God and the free will of creatures are equall
T he sovereignty o . d ' y
5-42 . £ . b t none of the theones yet a vanced to show how
certain acts, uallycompatible is entirely satisfactory (88).
they are mutu
6.8
. e of evil in the world is not irreconcilable with
5.43
The eXIstenc
God's providence and government (89).
Scien
6.9
pre
6. Logic
Logic is the reflex study of the order that needs t~ exist in our
6.I cause
judgments, inferences and more elaborate reasomng processes
for them to lead us to truth (r). 6.IO Essen
Considered as the materials of knowledge, concepts are predi- clarion
6.2
cates that fallwithin one or other of the ten categories of thought Dedu
6.II
(14-15). empl
6.3 Judgment is the attribution of a predicate to a subject (28). Judg-
ments are either in necessary matter or in contingent matter, ac-
cording as the predicate attaches to the subject by a necessary or
a contingent bond, i.e. by one which is independent or not of
experience and of the existence things. The fom1er kind of judg- 6.12 lnduc
ment is the basis of the rational sciences and the latter of the ex- ploye
perimental sciences (3r -3 3). '
concr
~easoning is a process whereby the mind passes from immediate mulat
JUd~ents or principlesto a mediate judgment or conclusion.The cends
logic~}for_mit assumes is the syllogism or "discourse in which are th
certam ~hmgs being posited (in the premises) something else 6.13 The
nec~ssa;,ilyfollows (in the conclusion) simply from their being
posited (Aristotle, Anal., Pr. I, r) (47, 48).
6.5 The objective fou n daf10n o f t h e syllogism
· · d as cien
c: ll may be enunciate
10 ows· Reasonin · th b ·
th · . g is e nnging of some definite subject un d er
· e ary
e extension of an ab t · h. form
wh· h. . s ract type m order to infer that somet mg
ic is predicable of th b d fi-001
icable of th· d fi . ~ a stract type as such is likewise pre -
is e mite subject (49 ). lt pr
6.6
The necessity of the I .
is sometimes J ~ws that serve as principles of the syllogi I1l
d
uraland so metapd_iysical
epen mg on
and absolute,sometimes physicaland 11,lf-
d' . . . ll
ascertained (50.) con 1t10ns that have to be empmca Y
·1
SYN O P SI S OF PRIN C IPAL D OCT RI NES 7 11
science has as its starting point s cert ain first principl es, or
Eve ry h. h . di
6,7 firstjudgments, w ic are imme ately evident, n ecessary and
indemonstrable (5I) .
first principl_es enunciating the simpl e relation s of being and
6.8 non-being direct and co_ntrol not only every science but also
everyjudgment of th e nund (51).
Scientificdemonstration is a reasoning pro cess that sets out from
premises that ar_ecertain a~d l_eads to a logi cally certain conclu -
sion. The premises on which it rests must be tru e, ultimat e, im-
mediate, better known than the conclusion, prior to it, and the
causeor reason of its truth (63, 64).
Essentialdefinition, which states what something is, is the foun-
6.10
dation of science (79, 80).
Deduction or the synthetic method of reasoning, which is that
6.II
employed in the rational sciences, is one which begins with cer-
tain principles in necessary matter, and enables one by a process
of combination to deduce new relations and thus define what is
progressively presented for explanation (8 5).
6.12
Induction or the analytic method of reasoning, which is that em-
ployed in the experimental sciences, is one which begins with
concrete facts furnished by observation and ends with the for-
mulation of laws (86). Scientific induction is a process that as-
cends from facts to the nature of the things of which these facts
are the manifestation (90).
6.13 The method of philosophy is combined induction and deduc-
tion (94).
6.14 Science is a body of propositions which are evident, certain, nec-
essary, and universal, as well as arranged systematically so as to
formone whole, and which are drawn immediately or mediately
from the nature of the subject and furnish the intrinsic reason of
its properties and of the laws of its action (96).
7. Ethics
7.r Man has subjectively and really one last natural end (8, 9).
7.2 Regarded in the abstract and indeterminately the end of human
nature consists in happiness (10).
CARDINAL M ERCIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
712
'The Chi
7.3 d . the concrete and definitely the objective end f 7.11
Regarde
. not m
· any created goo d b ut m
. G o d ( II ) . o last en.cll
man• is m . f}ictlOI
1n
7.4 . o f the senses and of external
The act10n . .. causes can affect Without
. free will and respons161hty (27, 28).
destroymg 'fhe cat
7-18 which rr
7.5 The distinction between moral good and evil is real and intrinsic rnoral la·
(30).
'fhe mo :
7.6 The distinction between good and evil is. foun~ed on the con- 7.19
fom 1ity or want of conformity of our action with our supreme Theoriei
end (32). 7-20 ·1
]ead lo~
7.7 The morality of a human act is determined by its formal object,
7.21
By the
the circumstances and the end for which it is done (34). rights d
7.8 Neither individual nor social well being is the measure of moral ural or~
value (35-37).
7.9 7.22 One _is~
The evolutionist theory of Herbert Spencer leads logically to the larly 1n
negation alike of morality and of all distinction between right
and wrong (38). 7.23 Liberty
7.10 to have
Man is subject to a natural law, that is, to an inclination which
science
habitually disposes him to know and will the end of his rational
nature and what leads to it, as well as to discern and reject what 7.24
is contrary to it (40).
7-II 7.25
The moral obligation has its explanation and foundation in hu- nature
man nature (44).
7.12 law elf.
The ultimate reason of the distinction between good and evil, 7.26
and consequently of moral obligation and law, is found in God; The the
formally it is in the practical reason of Providence 945). freedon
7.13
There is no need to suppose in human nature a "moral instinct"
or a " 1 " d· ·
mora sense 1stmct from the intellect to account for our
knowledge of the moral order ( )_ 7.27
7.14 49
The first command f h · b
. ment o
done and evil avoided (so). t e natural law 1s that good must e
7.is
7.15
During the prese t f£ I h · b
1. .
It. .
s insufficient n
(sz). e, t ere 1sa sanction for the moral law, ut
7. [6 7.i9
After a time oft . l h .
th e virtuous
• . nab , t e length of which . we cannot .detennme,
will
wicked Will b e. eternally rewarded 111 a future hfe and the
e depnved forever of their happiness (53). 7.30
t
SYNOPSIS OF PRINcrp
AL DOCTRINES
7 r3
7.33 As God wills the existence of society, He also wills the existence
of authority which is a condition of its existence; but He leaves
the form of authority undetermined (II 6).
In 1994,
7.34 Since civil society is instituted for the good of the individuals
in Theol
composing it, it follows that the role of authority is to ensure re-
spect of rights and to provide opportunity for the development Keni , Le
of its members (u7). tury (199
Mercier.
7-35 !heState may not take the place of individual activity, nor may
it ta~e the place of parents in their duty of education, nor inter-
fere m the religion of its members (u8).
I --1 I;
3
Bibliography of
Ca,~dinal Mercier
DESIRE-JOSEPH MERCIER
Courses
Works
d' rticle de la Revue sur les CEuvres
I Observa tion s a pr?P~ 5 unl aC dina1 Dechamps, Archeveque de
,
com p 1etes e on d S Eminence ) e 81ar _483 [anon.: "Un A b onne, "] .
. 1 4
M a11nes. - RCath 47 ( 879 , , ·on d'ttn article de la R evue
J, ,1,rBosstt a 1occas1
2 Reponse a M . _le pro~sseiVelsen, 1879 [anon.].
catlwlique. M ahn es, an d h ·1osor1hi e de S. Thomas. Louvain, C.
d cours e P l r . V 1
iscour, d'ouvert1-1 re tt . English (1995) (Memoir o ume -
3 D - Trans. in
Peeters, I 8 2 , 3 5 PP·
MV). . Thomas. - RCath 53 (1882) 736-758 [par-
h . de saint
4 La phi lo_sop ie o. 3). .
tia l re print of n , . e et le libre arbitre. - RCath 54 (1883)
' ini m e rnecani q u) _ 108-123 (English this Volume
Le de tertng30-8 5o,· 5 5 ( 1 8he 84 50 59 '
s printed volumes o f M erc1er . ' s C ours de
687-7o 4 , 6 9 are t h. · 1 . l" d
~ E 'TV)- No s- -of the first editi~ns in t 1ssen~s were mhu t1Cp 1e
, • ·e S0111e i·ghtly varying con1n1on tit1e, sue as ours
Pl u·tosop rra•1 ph
· t1I1 d e r. at T1wmas
s1 d'Aquin, or Sornmaire du cours de Phi-
in .luto. g. ,pIue . de sa1t1
de p Iii 1OSl
CIER'S PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
CARDINAL MER
32 La philosophie d H
33 Le .. . e erbert Spencer. - RN 5 (1898) 5-29.
pos1tivisme et les , . , , . , . ,
- R.Ns6 ( 8 ventes nece sa1res des sciences mathemauquc ·
34 " l 99) I2-29 (ETV)
Ecco l'allarme" .
(ETV). - Un cri d'alan11c. - RN ... 6 (1899) I 44-I 58
35
~a _notion de la v' . , , ·. ,
tnt1tule:Jugc111,cnte (A propo 'TTw11mtt.
d'un arti k de la Re1111c
cnt ct ,. · , V) ()
vcnte). - R ' 6 (r899) 371-403 (ET .
BIBLIOGRAPH
y OF CA RDINAL MERCIER 719
6 La psychologie experimentale et la ph ·1 h.
3 BASB (1900) 42 1_450 _ 1 osop 1e spiritualiste.
_ English transl. New y ork _ Ch·
. 1cago, 190 2 .
Le bilan philosophique du XIX ·,
37 315-329. e s1ec1e. - RNS 7 (1900) 5-32,
- Transl. Spanish (190 4 ), English (1995 ) (MV).
Le commencement du siecle _ RNS (
38 . . . 7 1900) ro4-n7 (ETV).
Observat10ns
39 · et discussion: § r. La n t d , .,
l' · d · . a ure e 1a vente. § 2 Induc-
tion comp ete et 1n uct1on scientifique § L . ·
la philosophie thon1iste. _ RNS 3
(l ~ ) · a scien(Ece moderne et
. . . 7 9 0 190-23 l TV).
40 L'induct10n scient1fique. Seconde reponse a, M . B ersam. - RNS
(1900) 422-434 (ETV). · 7
PP·
(i 906). 2-_o
- R print: AUCL 71 (1907) xxv-xxxviii.
a
Lettreen respo_nse.aux feli~~tations adressees par la classe 1'occa-
(14 sionde sa no1mnation archiepiscopale. _ BASE (1906) 130_1 8 r.
4 3-490
' . . ail 13. - BASE (1913) 122-
4 VersI Unite. Lecture fa1te [ ... ]le 7 m 9
146,
- Repnnt: RNS 20 (1913) 253- 27 8 ·
-Transl. m English (1995) (MV).
\
Revueneo-sealast.ique.
Direction
Revuecath 1.
01que·R
Collaboration
,
' evue neo-scolast1que.
.
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
Annuair_e de l'U niversite catholique de Lou vain (including:
Append1ce, Analectes pour servir a l'histoire de l'Universite
catholique de Lou vain).
1 1
I ,.,;, · h , , k,d, ·, I I 8, I - 1926) was fou ndc, ,nd r,f Ph,
fi, c p,e,;Jrnc o du, /n,t,tut,
, ph1 n f th, ',ulwli\. lJnher~il) of Leuven. After hi studie in the da i , phd, ,p y, v,
tlll'nl n '1 ,1 Ill' snn in.11 y of Mcd1elen, 1ercier was ordained O 87 4), ,1brained a liu:n a 1
rli.•1,l1i
1
::1 I 'll\l'll (18°"'' ), ,111d became professor of philosophy at cc.hclen h 4m y r, I
I > ' he , .1, ·om111i1,..,jo11 ·d to inaugurate the chair of Thomistic philosophy c:rea ed a
l 1111, ., i , 11 I CllH'n .u tht' reque t of Pope Leo XIII. Mercier endeavored to reali1..eh pr ,gr.t
1
f, 11111il l in dit' t'lll)clical Aetf'mi Patris (1879): to restore the phil<1sophy c1f . 'f o
\ qui, ., h.11moni1c ir \\ ith the progres of modern science and thought , and extend it in ucna
l tl rl 't ienri fic .rnd soci.11disciplines. On the basis of his initial succes~, he asked for, and
r· , d , rhe support of rhe Pop for the creation of an Institute of Philosophychat would provid
.1 1 np ll'll' l'ducation in the various philosophical areas. When named president of chi institu e
( 1 JI)), f\ krcier gathered ollaborators from among his first scudenr.s and with their assiscanc:c
t med an inrernarional group of enthusiastic and devoted disciples. The &vue neo-scolastique
.1dc the writings of the institute available throughout the scholarly world . On Feb. 7, J 9(J{,,
f -rcit'r was named archbishop of Mechelen. He took a lively interest in problems of the un,-
v ·rs.ii Chur h and he was also preoccupied with Church Union. (Cf A. L. Wylleman , ' ercier.
I )t:sirt: Joseph' in Nrw CatholicEncyclopedia,Vol IX. New York, St. Louis, San Francisco, Toronto,
I o ndon, Sydney, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1967, p. 671-672).