C.

DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed
some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986)
when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering
its erratic release and limited readership";

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly";
and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective
must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent
with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324,
325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528,
551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030,
1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-
1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188,
192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-
273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367,
370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599,
600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940,
964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

1
 d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547,
1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-
1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804,
1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849,
1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-
532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677,
679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the
meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while
the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at
large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs.
Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus
proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of
Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party
to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to
apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the
particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the
rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The
circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not
a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer
of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the
present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any
other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the
people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where
the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided, ...
2
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court
has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following
its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication.
Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus,
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a
public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and
legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this
time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are
kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to
the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people
have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica
de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad
con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word
"shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the
people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously,
presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such
as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all
concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the
requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government
repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set
forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional,
was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for
the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S.
559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination,
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are
among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest

3
 from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit
said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that
an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not
been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced
by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of
this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as
a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are
of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had
not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the
following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This
elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to
file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that
4
issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did not have to be 'Published;
that publication when necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was
not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is
the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal
laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others,
and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people
in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the
public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which
any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules
and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and
directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which
that body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or
the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the
laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and
that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
5
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore
necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision
supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to
the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that
this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it
obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not
our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said
Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need
to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the
government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or
reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 169364

Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Peralta, and
Bersamin*, JJ.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and
KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y Promulgated:
MEFANIA,
Respondents. September 18, 2009

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted, or
Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of
Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

6
 Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order [1] of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial Court
in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and
115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:

That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered around
San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable
purpose.[2]

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually
associate with prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;

5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayorin its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash [3] on the ground that
Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.

In an Order[4] dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to file their
respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the States
police power and justified by the Latin maxim salus populi est suprem(a) lex, which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to
the interest of the greater number, thus:

Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on police power,
Professor Freund describes laconically police power as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. (Citations omitted). In fact the persons acts and acquisitions are hemmed
in by the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex (the
god of the people is the Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the
greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex A
lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes
proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night
and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in
the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the prosecution
proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the accused in the indictment cant be
categorized as a crime.[5]

The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated that there
was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited
sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.

7
 Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
[6]
directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article
202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in
its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the
equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary
and unreasonable classification.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Courts ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
[7]
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202
(2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.

On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order
of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is
ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.

SO ORDERED.[8]

In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal protection clause. It
held that the void for vagueness doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville,[9] where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the
trial court ruled:

The U.S. Supreme Courts justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally
applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.

Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support offers
too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.

Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession when there
are many who are without visible means of support not by reason of choice but by force of circumstance as borne
out by the high unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact that he cannot
find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.[10]

On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the trial court declared:

The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of the
equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those covered by the law
and those who are not.

Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon
one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.

Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of
support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects
of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. [11]

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE[12]

8
 Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[13] the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to
free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the
presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may
regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.

On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. They insist
that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws; that
the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2)
unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.

The Court finds for petitioner.

The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign
power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged. [14]However, in exercising its power to
declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so
that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid. [15] This requirement has come to
be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law.[16]

In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,[17] the Court recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to criminal
statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:

At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore
the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge.
An appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to
Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded
examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the rudiment
that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[18]

The first statute punishing vagrancy Act No. 519 was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and passed by the Philippine
Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a
provision on vagrancy.[19] While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by
the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:

ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. The following are vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable purpose;

5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
9
 Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayorin its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering about public
or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This
provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined vagrant as every person found loitering about
saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support.The second
clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in
general terms public or semi-public places.

The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S. Supreme
Courts opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville [20] case, which in essence declares:

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that [all persons] are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.

Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending
conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.
S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business
activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo,
332 U. S. 1.

The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted to the
regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and
impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a
specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc.
v. United States, supra.

The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally innocent.
Nightwalking is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State,
202 So.2d at 855, only the habitual wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, common night walkers. We know,
however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation
will result.

Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that loafing was a national virtue in
his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.

xxxx

Persons wandering or strolling from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel
Lindsay. The qualification without any lawful purpose or object may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons neglecting
all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold
or served would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may
be casing a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern
to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.

The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them.
They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part,
responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These
amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy
submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.

xxxx

Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted
may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:

The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before
the magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction'
for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and
convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate solution. Foote,
Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.

10
 xxxx

Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice given a
potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police.
Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering punishment by analogy.
Such crimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system.

xxxx

A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold,
or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too
precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being
nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the
police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies
equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so
tipped that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as
well as majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. [21]

The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute; and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the
application of discriminatory law enforcement.

The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails to give fair
notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith. [22] This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this
jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions. [23]

Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof, which
are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code 257) provided, as follows:

Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who use
juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets,
traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and
brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual
loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting
houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction
in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits
as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of
time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are
otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest
to Article 202 (2) any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be persons wandering or strolling
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object. But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified
by without visible means of support while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling without any lawful purpose or
object, which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a trap for innocent acts.

Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. [24] Thus,
as with any other act or offense, the requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that
may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the
respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or search, is

11
therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than
suspicion or possibility.[25]

Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for, absent
this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making
the arrest.[26]

The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and
effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and
seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents
him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure
agreeable.[27]

As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on
respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason,
we are not moved by respondents trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case.

Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of Article 202
except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars,
harassing watch-your-car boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts
that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the training ground for petty offenders
who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people
being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled if not killed by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from
withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit
publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by
rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed;
robbers, thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life savings by
conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing
a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public
places, day or night.

The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or else we can never say that we
have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace,
civility, decency and morality in them.

This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted to maintain
minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient
times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by
our Constitution.[28] Civilly, they are covered by the abuse of rights doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code
concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. [29] This provision is, together with the
succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order.[30]

12
 In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches of the
peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some
appropriate action in court to assert their claims. [31] Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him
by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
unnecessary injury.[32]

Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts from public indecencies and immoralities, to public
nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to societys basic sensibilities and their
adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a
public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated. [33] As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the proceeds
of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions.[34] Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.

Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor
or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.

Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime which
punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions
that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society,
as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.

Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on their
effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the
streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-
abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national
parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and
restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around,
casing homes and establishments for their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a mans house is his castle,
[35]
outside on the streets, the king is fair game.

The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.

Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and
considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.[36] The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is
based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other
departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied,
crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. [37]

It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by
the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the

13
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. [38] As an obvious police power measure, Article 202
(2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in Special
Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO,
CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial
Court of Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE
AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES,
JR., respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at
ang karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) 1 Joint Discipline Board
because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of
Domino Lux Fraternity. This is the backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis-a-vis the
University's right to academic freedom.

ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the following: (1)
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and
private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the
motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting private
respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5

Factual Antecedents

Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, two violent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving
private respondents occurred:

x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that one week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap
was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently
angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the
remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in
the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.

After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student
Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent
Aguilar. But no apology was made.

Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus.
Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a person whose description matched

14
 James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly "nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them
remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."

Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.

Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy
candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys
were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head
with something heavy in his hands – "parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him.
Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.

Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap
said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running
with the group.

Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual
accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at
their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang."

Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in Miguel Building.
However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy
Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend from another friend who lives somewhere in the
area.

As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw
several guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of the
restaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But,
respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr.
Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were chased by respondent Lee and two others.

Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He was
able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a lead
pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, then returned to Mr. Pascual.

Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see
respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic) as also one of the members of the group.

In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while
respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes shouted:
"Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascual for the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their
handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two
hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to the campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there
were three cars roaming the vicinity.6

The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano,
and Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar,
James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.

The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents
with "direct assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private
respondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-
BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325),
Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-
25121.

The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and
Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers. 9

As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board 11 was
formed to investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing 12 to private respondents
on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:

Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against
you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y.
Cano.

You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for
you and your witnesses to give testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you
give your testimony or those of your witnesses.

15
 On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your
witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed testimony.

Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.

For your strict compliance.13

During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi,
summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:

First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the few instances when he was picked-up by a driver,
a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular date,
respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to
pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine Ports Authority
where the elder Bungubung is also employed.

Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.;
picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque (on a Wednesday
in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same
route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at the South
Harbor.14

xxxx

Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He
said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said
that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.

Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to
corroborate Valdez' alibi.15

xxxx

Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he
was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works in the apartment of
his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workers according to him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00
p.m. when he arrives from his classes. The workers get paid everyday.

Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listed there, supposedly attesting to the fact that he
paid the workers at the date and time in question.16

xxxx

Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some of
the officers that we were preparing."17

On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES
PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-
MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.

In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.

SO ORDERED.21

Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of
DLSU. The motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.

On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorariand injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May
3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of the Senior Vice-
President for Internal Affairs.

16
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or
other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution
dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.

Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petition to correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of
his original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition.27

On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121, 28 in
view of the authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).

On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention 29 in Civil Case No.
95-74122. Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private
respondents.

On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of all petitioners, except James Yap. On June 20, 1995,
petitioners filed a supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.

On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order32 denying petitioners' (respondents there) motion to dismiss and its
supplement, and granted private respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the
Order reads:

For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in its behalf is/are
restrained and enjoined from –

1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
the petitioners-in-intervention from the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995,
affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and

2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent De La
Salle University and to immediately allow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees until their
graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.

WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any and all persons
acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed from:

1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention and the Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and

2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent (De La
Salle University) and to forthwith allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll and complete
their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive bond
in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention will
pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will finally decide that
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.

The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit. Respondents are directed to file their Answer to
the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

SO ORDERED.33

Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on
September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an
urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court.34 Aguilar also prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll
him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995, respondent Judge
issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which reads:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further orders,
you the said DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other person
assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering
the automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the
said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the
courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation from said
school.36

On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari 37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.

17
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for
all private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 The
Resolution states:

RESOLUTION 181-96

RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR
THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS,
DISAPPROVED.

RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE
REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39

Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his
classes, prompting his lawyer to write several demand letters 40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll
private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private
respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution
No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996
which states:

Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply
with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar
and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain and speedy remedy available, considering the set
deadline for enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as a student of the
institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll,
pending the Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by DLSU.

SO ORDERED.41

Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar
to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU. 42

Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss 43 in the CA,
arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.

On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar,
disposing thus:

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is hereby directed.

SO ORDERED.44

On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows:

It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory in character, the pendency of a Motion for
Reconsideration notwithstanding.

After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.45

On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from
the CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the
transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.

On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47

On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order granting private respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to
reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order reads:

In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and
respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.

18
 The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be in force and effect.

Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at petitioners' expense.

SO ORDERED.48

Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of
the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.

On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.

On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners,
and enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case
No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.

On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner
DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of
records52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a
certificate of completion/graduation in his favor.

Issues

We are tasked to resolve the following issues:

1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning that
impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules.

2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.

2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?

3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.

Our Ruling

Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners 53 that while CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of
other private respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the
CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge
– CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner
DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation.

This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues
involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance
of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-
religious reverence that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when its rigid
application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their operation. 55

I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the

power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.

Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga
institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.

Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, even those involving students in secondary and
tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4, 56 15(2) &
(3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of 1982."

According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over
expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the
right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its students. The clear concern of R.A.
No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic
plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8
does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of

19
institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which
the CHED has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had any authority over student disciplinary
cases.

We cannot agree.

On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education,
Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes."

Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:

Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission
on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.

The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and
attached to the office of the President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and
private.

The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:

Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out
effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and

o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement of growth
or development of higher education.

Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.

First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher
learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, as
well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the
DECS.

Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level
would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree
granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private." That would be absurd.

It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is
under the CHED authority.

Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality
education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law
is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the
continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective
leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.

It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students
on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher
learning of their right to academic freedom.

Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had
authority over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those of
the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62

Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should therefore be read in conjunction with the
provisions of R.A. No. 7722.

Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported
post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher
Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation,
recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what
petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where
the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

20
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of
any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.

IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.

Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.

The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn
and inflexible.65

In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards
which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and
with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case." 66

Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of
due process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that
must be respected even in administrative proceedings. 68 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied
to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.69 So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.70

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard
through pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 72

Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board.
Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-
25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses
against them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the imposition
of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."

IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes determination of who to
admit for study.

Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang
karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional
academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. 74 According to
present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who
may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. 75

It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any
field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds
basis in the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a
right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," 77 such
right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU,
therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.

IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.

Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang
substansyal.

As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi may succeed as a
defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration
of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime."78
21
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established by
witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of
the offended parties.81

Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused. 82 Alibi is an inherently
weak defense and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83Jurisprudence holds that denial, like
alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that
accused were at the scene of the crime and were the victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one
hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses. 85

The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor
preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such
reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1 They were
unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to
have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.

We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several students found guilty of hazing:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and
found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly
undermine the authority of the administration of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935,
1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87

Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve to claim a venerable institution as their own, for
they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. 88 It must be
borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty
values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. 89

As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at
the time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that he submitted
before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:

C E RT I F I CATI O N

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of this Certification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at
about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan Hall, inside Camp
Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with an affair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine
Constabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI from said Batch '89 affair.

That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our permission to leave and we
saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.

April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90

The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar
(ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto
(Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and
disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape criminal liability. But
where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes
commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused. 92

Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible defense for what could really be the
truth as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor. 93

III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.

Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.

It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the
establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as
vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." 94 This power, however, does not give
22
them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of
proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That
would give rise to a due process question.95

We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of
the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for
few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve suspension,
dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future,
hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that,
appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure. 96

Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section
77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for being
undesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October
15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while
CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it
may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer
credentials immediately issued.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and G. R. No. 167011

ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS Promulgated:

GARAY,
Respondents. December 11, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

R ES OLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Spouses Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May
2008 from the Decision of this Court dated 30 April 2008, affirming the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the
COMELEC En Banc.
23
We find that petitioner has not raised substantially new grounds to justify the reconsideration sought. Instead, petitioner presents
averments that are mere rehashes of arguments already considered by the Court. There is, thus, no cogent reason to warrant a
reconsideration of this Courts Decision.
Similarly, we reject the contentions put forth by esteemed colleagues Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissent, dated 2 September
2008, which are also mere reiterations of his earlier dissent against the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Tingas incessant assertions
proceed from the wrong premise. To be clear, this Court did not intimate that penal statutes are beyond scrutiny. In our Decision,
dated 30 April 2008, this Court emphasized the critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged. We drew a lucid
boundary between an on-its-face invalidation and an as applied challenge. Unfortunately, this is a distinction which Mr. Justice Tinga
has refused to understand. Let it be underscored that on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes, as is sought to be done by petitioners in
this case, may not be allowed. Thus, we said:

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a
criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial
invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. We have so enunciated in no
uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, thus:

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases.
They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)

"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While
mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our
jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the
equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution,
not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue
delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose
cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual
requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
these words:

"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought,
and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way
they might be decided."

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly
strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of
a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)[1]

Neither does the listing by Mr. Justice Tinga of what he condemns as offenses under Republic Act No. 8189 convince this
Court to overturn its ruling. What is crucial in this case is the rule set in our case books and precedents that a facial challenge is not the
proper avenue to challenge the statute under consideration. In our Decision of 30 April 2008, we enunciated that the opinions of the
dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed
as a facial challenge.[2] On this matter, we held:

An appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in
relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An
expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would be antagonistic to the
rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory. [3]

24
 In conclusion, I reiterate that the doctrine embodied in Romualdez and Estrada remains good law. The rule established in our
jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case
may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes maybe hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement
of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I
have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to
deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a
mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied
to him.

As structured, Section 45 enumerates acts deemed election offenses under Republic Act No. 8189. The evident intent of the
legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to
subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this
score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the
present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.

In People v. Gatchalian, the Court had the occasion to rule on the validity of the provision of the Minimum Wage Law, which
in like manner speaks of a willful violation of any of the provisions of this Act. This Court upheld the assailed law, and in no uncertain
terms declared that the provision is all-embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in the Act which embodies the very
fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.

Finally, as the records would show, petitioners managed to set up an intelligent defense against the informations filed
below. By clearly enunciating their defenses against the accusations hurled at them, and denying their commission thereof, petitioners
allegation of vagueness must necessarily be rejected. Petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption of constitutionality in favor
of the law. The constitutionality must prevail in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.

The phraseology in Section 45(j) has been employed by Congress in a number of laws which have not been declared
unconstitutional:

1) The Cooperative Code

Section 124(4) of Republic Act No. 6938 reads:

Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court.

2) The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8371 reads in part:

Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to

3) The Retail Trade Liberalization Act

Section 12, Republic Act No. 8762, reads:

Any person who would be found guilty of violation of any provisions of this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than eight (8) years, and a fine of at least
One Million (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Twenty Million (P20,000,000.00).

For reasons so stated, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

25
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x----------------------x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.

x----------------------x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x----------------------x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines
and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public attention and
thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-
collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections.
These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege
speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But
on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI
Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed
three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and
authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. 3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He
prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The
Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth –
the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of
wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the
possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28,
26
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a
legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials. 9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in
the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. 11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September
7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to
prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

-I-

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their
pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and
rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield
procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them." 26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the
"Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of
electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country.
They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are
worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through
the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without
being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the
useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29

27
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s
and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily
involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the
petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case
of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and
controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend
to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be
granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case
presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit
the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He
likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. 40 Having been overtaken
by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy
to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 41

- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. 42 Publication is indeed imperative, for
it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations,46 we said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of
the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the
OSG’s explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of
the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem
fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
28
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-
four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the
same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than
majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished
by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that
the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the
composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations,
of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the
succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with
respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one
Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term
of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the
possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall
begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference
in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue
into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
come within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in
each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

29
 If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at
the Senate’s internet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make
any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said
rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance
with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty
at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure
the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of
prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry
in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183626 October 4, 2010

SURIGAO DEL NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SURNECO), Petitioner,

vs.
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision dated April 17, 20082 and the
Resolution dated June 25, 20083 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99781.

The antecedent facts and proceedings follow—

Petitioner Surigao Del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) is a rural electric cooperative organized and existing by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 269.

On February 8, 1996, the Association of Mindanao Rural Electric Cooperatives, as representative of SURNECO and of the other 33
rural electric cooperatives in Mindanao, filed a petition before the then Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for the approval of the
formula for automatic cost adjustment and adoption of the National Power Corporation (NPC) restructured rate adjustment to comply
with Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7832.4 The case was docketed as ERB Case No. 96-49, and later consolidated with identical petitions of
other associations of electric cooperatives in the Philippines.
30
The relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7832 for compliance are Sections 10 and 14, which provide—

Sec. 10. Rationalization of System Losses by Phasing Out Pilferage Losses as a Component Thereof. – There is hereby established a
cap on the recoverable rate of system losses as follows:

xxxx

(b) For rural electric cooperatives:

(i) Twenty-two percent (22%) at the end of the first year following the effectivity of this Act;

(ii) Twenty percent (20%) at the end of the second year following the effectivity of this Act;

(iii) Eighteen percent (18%) at the end of the third year following the effectivity of this Act;

(iv) Sixteen percent (16%) at the end of the fourth year following the effectivity of this Act; and

(v) Fourteen percent (14%) at the end of the fifth year following the effectivity of this Act.

Provided, that the ERB is hereby authorized to determine at the end of the fifth year following the effectivity of this Act, and
as often as is necessary, taking into account the viability of rural electric cooperatives and the interest of consumers, whether
the caps herein or theretofore established shall be reduced further which shall, in no case, be lower than nine percent (9%)
and accordingly fix the date of the effectivity of the new caps.

xxxx

Sec. 14. Rules and Regulations. – The ERB shall, within thirty (30) working days after the conduct of hearings which must commence
within thirty (30) working days upon the effectivity of this Act, issue the rules and regulation as may be necessary to ensure the
efficient and effective implementation of the provisions of this Act, to include but not limited to, the development of methodologies
for computing the amount of electricity illegally used and the amount of payment or deposit contemplated in Section 7 hereof as a
result of the presence of the prima facie evidence discovered.

Corollary thereto, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IX of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7832 provide—

Section 4. Caps on System Loss allowed to Rural Electric Cooperatives. – The maximum rate of system loss that the cooperative can
pass on to its customers shall be as follows:

a. Twenty-two percent (22%) effective on February 1996 billing.

b. Twenty percent (20%) effective on February 1997 billing.

c. Eighteen percent (18%) effective on February 1998 billing.

d. Sixteen percent (16%) effective on February 1999 billing.

e. Fourteen percent (14%) effective on February 2000 billing.

Section 5. Automatic Cost Adjustment Formula. – Each and every cooperative shall file with the ERB, on or before September 30,
1995, an application for approval of an amended Purchased Power Adjustment Clause that would reflect the new system loss cap to be
included in its schedule of rates.

The automatic cost adjustment of every electric cooperative shall be guided by the following formula:

Purchased Power Adjustment Clause

A
(PPA) =
B – (C + D)

Where:

A = Cost of electricity purchased and generated for the previous month

B = Total Kwh purchased and generated for the previous month

C = The actual system loss but not to exceed the maximum recoverable rate of system loss in Kwh plus actual company use
in kwhrs but not to exceed 1% of total kwhrs purchased and generated

31
 D = kwh consumed by subsidized consumers

E = Applicable base cost of power equal to the amount incorporated into their basic rate per kwh.

In an Order5 dated February 19, 1997, the ERB granted SURNECO and other rural electric cooperatives provisional authority to use
and implement the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) formula pursuant to the mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR,
with a directive to submit relevant and pertinent documents for the Board’s review, verification, and confirmation.

In the meantime, the passage of R.A. No. 91366 led to the creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), replacing and
succeeding the ERB. All pending cases before the ERB were transferred to the ERC. ERB Case No. 96-49 was re-docketed as ERC
Case No. 2001-343.

In the Order dated June 17, 2003, the ERC clarified ERB’s earlier policy regarding the PPA formula to be used by the electric
cooperatives, viz.—

After a careful evaluation of the records, the Commission noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the ERB was silent on
whether the calculation of the cost of electricity purchased and generated in the formula should be "gross" or "net" of the discounts.

Let it be noted that the power cost is said to be at "gross" if the discounts are not passed-on to the end-users whereas it is said to be at
"net" if the said discounts are passed-on to the end-users.

To attain uniformity in the implementation of the PPA formula, the Commission has resolved that:

1. In the confirmation of past PPAs, the power cost shall still be based on "gross," and

2. In the confirmation of future PPAs, the power cost shall be based on "net."

The electric cooperatives filed their respective motions for clarification and/or reconsideration. Hence, the ERC issued an Order 7 dated
January 14, 2005, stating that the PPA was a cost-recovery mechanism, not a revenue-generating scheme, so that the distribution
utilities or the electric cooperatives must recover from their customers only the actual cost of purchased power. The ERC thus adopted
a new PPA policy, to wit—

A. The computation and confirmation of the PPA prior to the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the
approved PPA Formula;

B. The computation and confirmation of the PPA after the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the
power cost "net" of discount; and

C. If the approved PPA Formula is silent on the terms of discount, the computation and confirmation of the PPA shall be
based on the power cost at "gross," subject to the submission of proofs that said discounts are being extended to the end-
users.8

Thereafter, the ERC continued its review, verification, and confirmation of the electric cooperatives’ implementation of the PPA
formula based on the available data and information submitted by the latter.

On March 19, 2007, the ERC issued its assailed Order,9 mandating that the discounts earned by SURNECO from its power supplier
should be deducted from the computation of the power cost, disposing in this wise ¾

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby confirms the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA) of
Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. (SURNECO) for the period February 1996 to July 2004 which resulted to an over-
recovery amounting to EIGHTEEN MILLION ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY
FOUR PESOS (PhP18,188,794.00) equivalent to PhP0.0500/kwh. In this connection, SURNECO is hereby directed to refund the
amount of PhP0.0500/kwh to its Main Island consumers starting the next billing cycle from receipt of this Order until such time that
the full amount shall have been refunded.

The Commission likewise confirms the PPA of SURNECO for its Hikdop Island consumers for the period February 1996 to July 2004
which resulted to an under-recovery amounting to TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FORTY
FIVE PESOS (PhP2,478,045.00). SURNECO is hereby authorized to collect from its Hikdop Island consumers the amount of
PhP0.0100/kwh starting the next billing cycle from receipt of this Order until such time that the full amount shall have been collected.

Accordingly, SURNECO is directed to:

a) Reflect the PPA refund/collection as a separate item in the bill using the phrase "Previous Years’ Adjustment on Power
Cost";

b) Submit, within ten (10) days from its initial implementation of the refund/collection, a sworn statement indicating its
compliance with the aforecited directive; and

32
 c) Accomplish and submit a report in accordance with the attached prescribed format, on or before the 30th day of January of
the succeeding year and every year thereafter until the amount shall have been fully refunded/collected.

SO ORDERED.10

SURNECO filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the ERC in its Order 11 dated May 29, 2007 on the ground that the
motion did not raise any new matter which was not already passed upon by the ERC.

Aggrieved, SURNECO went to the CA via a petition for review,12 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, seeking the annulment of the ERC Orders dated March 19, 2007 and May 29, 2007.

In its Decision dated April 17, 2008, the CA denied SURNECO’s petition and affirmed the assailed Orders of the ERC.

On June 25, 2008, upon motion for reconsideration13 of SURNECO, the CA issued its Resolution denying the same.

Hence, this petition, with SURNECO ascribing error to the CA and the ERC in: (1) disallowing its use of the multiplier scheme to
compute its system’s loss; (2) ordering it to deduct from the power cost or refund to its consumers the discounts extended to it by its
power supplier, NPC; and (3) ordering it to refund alleged over-recoveries arrived at by the ERC without giving SURNECO the
opportunity to be heard.

The petition should be denied.

First. SURNECO points out that the National Electrification Administration (NEA), which used to be the government authority
charged by law with the power to fix rates of rural electric cooperatives, entered into a loan agreement with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). The proceeds of the loan were intended for use by qualified rural electric cooperatives, SURNECO included, in their
rehabilitation and expansion projects. The loan agreement imposed a 15% system loss cap, but provided a Power Cost Adjustment
Clause authorizing cooperatives to charge and show "system losses in excess of 15%" as a separate item in their consumer’s bill. Thus,
the cooperatives charged their consumer-members "System Loss Levy" for system losses in excess of the 15% cap.

SURNECO states that, in January 1984, it was authorized by the NEA that all increases in the NPC power cost (in case of NPC-
connected cooperatives) shall be uniformly passed on to the member-consumers using the 1.4 multiplier, which is divided into 1.3 as
allowance for 23% system loss and 0.1 as provision for the corresponding increase in operating expenses to partly offset the effects of
inflation.14 Subsequently, the NEA, through NEA Memorandum No. 1-A dated March 30, 1992, revised the aforesaid issuance as
follows—

Pursuant to NEA Board Resolution No. 98, Series of 1991, x x x, the revised cooperatives’ multiplier will be as follows:

1.2 – Rural Electric Cooperatives (RECs) with system loss of 15% and below;

1.3 – RECs with system loss ranging from 16% to 22%;

1.4 – RECs with system loss of 23% and above.

SURNECO posits that, per NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, the NEA had authorized it to adopt a multiplier scheme as the method to
recover system loss. It claims that this cannot be abrogated, revoked, or superseded by any order, resolution, or issuance by the ERC
prescribing a certain formula to implement the caps of recoverable rate of system loss under R.A. No. 7832 without violating the non-
impairment clause15 of the Constitution.

We disagree. SURNECO cannot insist on using the multiplier scheme even after the imposition of the system loss caps under Section
10 of R.A. No. 7832. The law took effect on January 17, 1995. Perusing Section 10, and also Section 11,16 providing for the
application of the caps as of the date of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7832, readily shows that the imposition of the caps was self-
executory and did not require the issuance of any enabling set of rules or any action by the then ERB, now ERC. Thus, the caps should
have been applied as of January 17, 1995 when R.A. No. 7832 took effect.

Indeed, under NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, the use of the multiplier scheme allows the recovery of system losses even beyond the
caps mandated in R.A. No. 7832, which is intended to gradually phase out pilferage losses as a component of the recoverable system
losses by the distributing utilities such as SURNECO. However, it is totally repugnant to and incompatible with the system loss caps
established in R.A. No. 7832, and is repealed by Section 1617 of the law. As between NEA Memorandum No. 1-A, a mere
administrative issuance, and R.A. No. 7832, a legislative enactment, the latter must prevail. 18

Second. The ERC was merely implementing the system loss caps in R.A. No. 7832 when it reviewed and confirmed SURNECO’S
PPA charges, and ordered the refund of the amount collected in excess of the allowable system loss caps through its continued use of
the multiplier scheme. As the ERC held in its March 19, 2007 Order—

On January 14, 2005, the Commission issued an Order adopting a new PPA policy as follows: (a) the computation and confirmation of
the PPA prior to the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the approved PPA Formula; (b) the computation and
confirmation of the PPA after the Commission’s Order dated June 17, 2003 shall be based on the power cost "net" of discount; and (c)
if the approved PPA Formula is silent in terms of discount, the computation and confirmation of the PPA shall be based on the power
cost at "gross" reduced by the amount of discounts extended to customers, subject to the submission of proofs that said discounts are
indeed being extended to customers.
33
However, the Commission deemed it appropriate to clarify its PPA confirmation process particularly on the treatment of the Prompt
Payment Discount (PPD) granted to distribution utilities (DUs) by their power suppliers, to wit:

I. The over-or-under recovery will be determined by comparing the allowable power cost with the actual revenue billed to
end-users.

II. Calculation of the DU’s allowable power cost as prescribed in the PPA formula:

a. If the PPA formula explicitly provides the manner by which discounts availed from the power supplier/s shall be
treated, the allowable power cost will be computed based on the specific provision of the formula, which may either
be at "net" or "gross"; and

b. If the PPA formula is silent in terms of discounts, the allowable power cost will be computed at "net" of discounts
availed from the power supplier/s, if there be any.

III. Calculation of DU’s actual revenues/actual amount billed to end-users.

a. On actual PPA computed at net of discounts availed from power supplier/s:

a.1. If a DU bills at net of discounts availed from the power supplier/s (i.e., gross power cost minus
discounts from power supplier/s) and the DU is not extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue
should be equal to the allowable power cost; and

a.2. If a DU bills at net of discounts availed from the power supplier/s (i.e., gross power cost minus
discounts from power supplier/s) and the DU is extending discounts to end-users, the discount extended to
end-users shall be added back to the actual revenue.

b. On actual PPA computed at gross:

b.1. If a DU bills at gross (i.e., gross power cost not reduced by discounts from power supplier/s) and the
DU is extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue shall be calculated as: gross power revenue less
discounts extended to end-users. The result shall then be compared to the allowable power cost; and

b.2. If a DU bills at gross (i.e., gross power cost not reduced by discounts from power supplier/s) and the
DU is not extending discounts to end-users, the actual revenue shall be taken as is which shall be compared
to the allowable power cost.

IV. In the calculation of the DU’s actual revenues, the amount of discounts extended to end-users shall, in no case,
be higher than the discounts availed by the DU from its power supplier/s.

The foregoing clarification was intended to ensure that only the actual costs of purchased power are recovered by the DUs.

In the meantime, SURNECO submitted reports on its monthly implementation of the PPA covering the period January 1998 to July
2004 and attended the conferences conducted by the Commission on December 11, 2003 and May 4, 2005 relative thereto.

The Commission evaluated SURNECO’s monthly PPA implementation covering the period February 1996 to July 2004, which
disclosed the following:

Schedule 1, Main Island

Period Covered Over Over

(Under) (Under) Recoveries
Recoveries (In kWh)
(In PhP)
February 1996 to 20,737,074 0.2077
December 1998
January 1999 to (2,548,280) (0.0097)
July 2004
TOTAL 18,188,794 0.0500

Schedule 2, Municipality of Hikdop

February 1996 to 70,235 0.3190

December 1998
PPA Plus Basic
Cha[r]ge

34
 January 1999 to (2,548,280) (0.0097)
July 2004
TOTAL (2,478,045) (0.0100)

The over-recoveries were due to the following:

1. For the period February 1996 to December 1998, SURNECO’s PPA computation included the power cost and the
corresponding kWh purchased from Hikdop end-users. The Commission excluded those months which SURNECO did not
impose variable charges to Hikdop end-user which resulted to a total net over-recovery of PhP21,245,034.00; and

2. SURNECO’s basic charge for Hikdop end-users were beyond the approved basic charge for the period February 1996 to
September 1998 resulting to a net over-recovery of PhP128,489.00.

SURNECO’s under recoveries for the period January 1999 to June 2004 were due to the following:

1. For the period August 2001 to June 2004, SURNECO erroneously deducted the Power Act Reduction Adjustments (PARA)
in the total purchased power cost of its PPA computation resulting to an under-recovery of PhP1,377,763.00;

2. SURNECO’s power cost and kWh computation includes Dummy Load resulting to an under recovery amounting to
PhP226,196.00; and

3. The new grossed-up factor scheme adopted by the Commission which provided a true-up mechanism to allow the DUs to
recover the actual costs of purchased power.19

In directing SURNECO to refund its over-recoveries based on PPA policies, which only ensured that the PPA mechanism remains a
purely cost-recovery mechanism and not a revenue-generating scheme for the electric cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its
authority to regulate and approve the rates imposed by the electric cooperatives on their consumers. The ERC simply performed its
mandate to protect the public interest imbued in those rates.

It is beyond cavil that the State, in the exercise of police power, can regulate the rates imposed by a public utility such as SURNECO.
As we held in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company20—

The regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules
for the control and regulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a public purpose and is
affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the
common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is
continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

Likewise, SURNECO cannot validly assert that the caps set by R.A. No. 7832 are arbitrary, or that they violate the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution for allegedly traversing the loan agreement between NEA and ADB. Striking down a legislative enactment,
or any of its provisions, can be done only by way of a direct action, not through a collateral attack, and more so, not for the first time
on appeal in order to avoid compliance. The challenge to the law’s constitutionality should also be raised at the earliest opportunity. 21

Even assuming, merely for argument’s sake, that the ERC issuances violated the NEA and ADB covenant, the contract had to yield to
the greater authority of the State’s exercise of police power. It has long been settled that police power legislation, adopted by the State
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not only over future
contracts but even over those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by
the State to promote public welfare.22

SURNECO also avers that the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) removed the alleged arbitrary caps in R.A. No.
7832. We differ. The EPIRA allows the caps to remain until replaced by the caps to be determined by the ERC, pursuant to its
delegated authority under Section 4323 of R.A. No. 9136 to prescribe new system loss caps, based on technical parameters such as load
density, sales mix, cost of service, delivery voltage, and other technical considerations it may promulgate.

Third. We also disagree with SURNECO in its insistence that the PPA confirmation policies constituted an amendment to the IRR of
R.A. No. 7832 and must, therefore, comply with the publication requirement for the effectivity of administrative issuances.

The PPA formula provided in the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 was only a model to be used as a guide by the electric cooperatives in
proposing their own PPA formula for approval by the then ERB. Sections 4 and 5, Rule IX of the IRR directed the electric
cooperatives to apply for approval of such formula with the ERB so that the system loss caps under the law would be incorporated in
their computation of power cost adjustments. The IRR did not provide for a specific formula; therefore, there was nothing in the IRR
that was amended or could have been amended relative to the PPA formula. The IRR left to the ERB, now the ERC, the authority to
approve and oversee the implementation of the electric cooperatives’ PPA formula in the exercise of its rate-making power over
them.1avvphi1

We likewise differ from SURNECO’s stance that it was denied due process when the ERC issued its questioned Orders.
Administrative due process simply requires an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.24 It means being given the opportunity to be heard before judgment, and for this purpose, a formal trial-type hearing is

35
not even essential. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable chance to demonstrate their respective positions and to
present evidence in support thereof.25

Verily, the PPA confirmation necessitated a review of the electric cooperatives’ monthly documentary submissions to substantiate their
PPA charges. The cooperatives were duly informed of the need for other required supporting documents and were allowed to submit
them accordingly. In fact, hearings were conducted. Moreover, the ERC conducted exit conferences with the electric cooperatives’
representatives, SURNECO included, to discuss preliminary figures and to double-check these figures for inaccuracies, if there were
any. In addition, after the issuance of the ERC Orders, the electric cooperatives were allowed to file their respective motions for
reconsideration. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that SURNECO was not denied due process.

Finally, the core of the issues raised is factual in character. It needs only to be reiterated that factual findings of administrative bodies
on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by
substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant, 26 more so if affirmed by the CA. Absent any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of ERC, we must sustain its findings. Hence, its assailed Orders, following the rule of non-interference on matters
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming their special technical
knowledge and training, must be upheld.27

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 17, 2008 and the Resolution dated June 25, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99781 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SOUTHERN VS ANTI-TERRORISM 632 SCRA 146

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State
and Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-
government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR),
represented by their respective officers [3] who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of
Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees
(COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students
(LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers, [4] and joined by concerned
citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John Manansan, OSB,
Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban
sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples
Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers [5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana
Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
179157.

36
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Southern Tagalog Region,[7] and individuals[8]followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council [9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP,
also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP)
Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies
for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of
Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-MoneyLaundering Center, Philippine Center on
Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail.

Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.

Petitioners lack locus standi

37
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[11]

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary [12] summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not
only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully
entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced
or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as
will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been
subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark
windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of
the [S]tate.[14]

Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to
show any connection between the purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante,
HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law.[15] The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settledand not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining
what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must

38
 be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in
the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as
true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice
of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed link to
the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to
their organization and members.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America [17] (US) and the
European Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes
note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration
would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. [19] Such statement notwithstanding,there is
yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372.Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-
organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription
under RA 9372.

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio,
Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,[20]urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration [21] of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the
government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of
recent development is the filing of the firstcase for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before
the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to
the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges
against them.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives
Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-
Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the
Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and
COURAGE.[26]

39
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the
enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal
Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it
easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.

Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The
IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with
standing.[27] The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional
rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus
standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown
even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of
RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state
that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human
rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate
danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine
of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there
is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, [28] whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.[29]

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[30]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

40
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC[33] cannot be more emphatic:

[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it
must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversyadmitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be
premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events. [34] Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to
operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]

The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections [36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative
action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[37] to rule
on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the
Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. [38]
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal
statute, challenged on vagueness grounds,since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to
assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1), [41] proscribing the provision of material support to
organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that they intended to provide support
for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.[42]

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372
forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activitythat they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a
real and existing one.

41
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is
not its function.[43]

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal
and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.
[45]
Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settleactual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein

certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism [46] under RA 9372 in
that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present
case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-
for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech
cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]

The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. [50] It added that, at any rate, the
challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election
offense[53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.
[54]

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion [55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court
found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an
as-applied challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review

42
of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the
main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and
no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could
not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases . They
are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its
face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly
proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,
the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, whilestatutes found vague as a matter of
due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they
might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a
departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without
concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v.
Harris

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate
task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on
the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to
be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for
a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under
a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law

43
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
[57]
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.[58]

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. [59]

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.[60]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle [61] in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds
for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. [62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts
formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.[63]

The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-
face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed.[64]

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may
be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of
penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing
and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal
statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are
not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from
defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or
overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing
to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties
44
 and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise
the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that
the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that
motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws
"very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
[66]
(Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, [67] observed that the US Supreme Court
has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, [68] and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia
v. Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically
addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression.[71]

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners,
a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder
Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its entirety. [72] It
stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant.[73]

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of
the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague,
developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty under law. [75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, [76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases,
similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the
present case.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a

facial analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the
offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated
special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful
demand in the definition of terrorism [77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech
clause.

The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

45
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an
unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component
of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the
crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy
in one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer
to take down a sign reading White Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than
conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish
socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case
where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking
or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many
other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society. [79] (italics and underscoring supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct. [80] Since speech
is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the
therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in
said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo
a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor
allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, acting G.R. No. 178296

through its owner, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL
CORPORATION, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
NACHURA,
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED ABAD, and
INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA MENDOZA, JJ.
SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-

46
HHMSC),
Respondent. Promulgated:

January 12, 2011

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 30, 2005 and
Resolution dated June 4, 2007. The assailed Decision affirmed the dismissal of a petition for cancellation of union registration filed by
petitioner, Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation, owner of Heritage Hotel Manila, against respondent, National Union of Workers in the
Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), a labor organization of
the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila.
The case stemmed from the following antecedents:

On October 11, 1995, respondent filed with the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-
NCR) a petition for certification election. [2] The Med-Arbiter granted the petition on February 14, 1996 and ordered the holding of a
certification election.[3] On appeal, the DOLE Secretary, in a Resolution dated August 15, 1996, affirmed the Med-Arbiters order and
remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the holding of a preelection conference on February 26, 1997. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied on September 23, 1996.

The preelection conference was not held as initially scheduled; it was held a year later, or on February 20, 1998. Petitioner moved to
archive or to dismiss the petition due to alleged repeated non-appearance of respondent. The latter agreed to suspend proceedings until
further notice. The preelection conference resumed on January 29, 2000.

Subsequently, petitioner discovered that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) its annual financial
report for several years and the list of its members since it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, on May 19, 2000,
petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the non-submission of the said documents.
Petitioner prayed that respondents Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted from the list of
legitimate labor organizations. It further requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings. [4]
On June 1, 2000, petitioner reiterated its request by filing a Motion to Dismiss or Suspend the [Certification Election] Proceedings,
[5]
arguing that the dismissal or suspension of the proceedings is warranted, considering that the legitimacy of respondent is seriously
being challenged in the petition for cancellation of registration. Petitioner maintained that the resolution of the issue of whether
respondent is a legitimate labor organization is crucial to the issue of whether it may exercise rights of a legitimate labor organization,
which include the right to be certified as the bargaining agent of the covered employees.

Nevertheless, the certification election pushed through on June 23, 2000. Respondent emerged as the winner. [6]

On June 28, 2000, petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner, [7] stating that
the certification election held on June 23, 2000 was an exercise in futility because, once respondents registration is cancelled, it would
no longer be entitled to be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. Petitioner also claimed that some
of respondents members were not qualified to join the union because they were either confidential employees or managerial
employees. It then prayed that the certification of the election results and winner be deferred until the petition for cancellation shall
have been resolved, and that respondents members who held confidential or managerial positions be excluded from the supervisors
bargaining unit.
Meanwhile, respondent filed its Answer[8] to the petition for the cancellation of its registration. It averred that the petition was filed
primarily to delay the conduct of the certification election, the respondents certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the supervisory employees, and the commencement of bargaining negotiations. Respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition for
the following reasons: (a) petitioner is estopped from questioning respondents status as a legitimate labor organization as it had
47
already recognized respondent as such during the preelection conferences; (b) petitioner is not the party-in-interest, as the union
members are the ones who would be disadvantaged by the non-submission of financial reports; (c) it has already complied with the
reportorial requirements, having submitted its financial statements for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, its updated list of officers, and its
list of members for the years 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999; (d) the petition is already moot and academic, considering that the
certification election had already been held, and the members had manifested their will to be represented by respondent.

Citing National Union of Bank Employees v. Minister of Labor, et al. [9] and Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Hon.
Laguesma,[10] the Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of registration is not a bar to the holding of a
certification election. Thus, in an Order [11] dated January 26, 2001, the Med-Arbiter dismissed petitioners protest, and certified
respondent as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory employees.

Petitioner subsequently appealed the said Order to the DOLE Secretary. [12] The appeal was later dismissed by DOLE Secretary Patricia
A. Sto. Tomas (DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas) in the Resolution of August 21, 2002. [13] Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the
motion was also denied.[14]

In the meantime, Regional Director Alex E. Maraan (Regional Director Maraan) of DOLE-NCR finally resolved the petition for
cancellation of registration. While finding that respondent had indeed failed to file financial reports and the list of its members for
several years, he, nonetheless, denied the petition, ratiocinating that freedom of association and the employees right to self-
organization are more substantive considerations. He took into account the fact that respondent won the certification election and that
it had already been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory employees. In view of the foregoing, Regional
Director Maraanwhile emphasizing that the non-compliance with the law is not viewed with favorconsidered the belated submission
of the annual financial reports and the list of members as sufficient compliance thereof and considered them as having been submitted
on time. The dispositive portion of the decision[15] dated December 29, 2001 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition to delist the National Union of Workers in the
Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter from the roll of legitimate labor
organizations is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[16]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision to the BLR. [17] BLR Director Hans Leo Cacdac inhibited himself from the case because he
had been a former counsel of respondent.

In view of Director Cacdacs inhibition, DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas took cognizance of the appeal. In a resolution [18] dated February
21, 2003, she dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to self-
organization outweighed respondents noncompliance with the statutory requirements to maintain its status as a legitimate labor
organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, [19] but the motion was likewise denied in a resolution [20] dated May 30, 2003.
DOLE Secretary Sto. Tomas admitted that it was the BLR which had jurisdiction over the appeal, but she pointed out that the BLR
Director had voluntarily inhibited himself from the case because he used to appear as counsel for respondent. In order to maintain the
integrity of the decision and of the BLR, she therefore accepted the motion to inhibit and took cognizance of the appeal.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, raising the issue of whether the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its petition for cancellation of respondents registration.

In a Decision dated May 30, 2005, the CA denied the petition. The CA opined that the DOLE Secretary may legally assume
jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the Regional Director in the event that the Director of the BLR inhibits himself from
the case. According to the CA, in the absence of the BLR Director, there is no person more competent to resolve the appeal than the

48
DOLE Secretary. The CA brushed aside the allegation of bias and partiality on the part of the DOLE Secretary, considering that such
allegation was not supported by any evidence.
The CA also found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave abuse of discretion when she affirmed the dismissal of the petition
for cancellation of respondents registration as a labor organization. Echoing the DOLE Secretary, the CA held that the requirements of
registration of labor organizations are an exercise of the overriding police power of the State, designed for the protection of workers
against potential abuse by the union that recruits them. These requirements, the CA opined, should not be exploited to work against the
workers constitutionally protected right to self-organization.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, invoking this Courts ruling in Abbott Labs. Phils., Inc. v. Abbott Labs. Employees Union,
[21]
which categorically declared that the DOLE Secretary has no authority to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition
for cancellation of union registration, and Section 4,[22] Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.

In its Resolution[23] dated June 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion, stating that the BLR Directors inhibition from the case was a
peculiarity not present in the Abbottcase, and that such inhibition justified the assumption of jurisdiction by the DOLE Secretary.
In this petition, petitioner argues that:

I.

The Court of Appeals seriously erred in ruling that the Labor Secretary properly assumed jurisdiction over
Petitioners appeal of the Regional Directors Decision in the Cancellation Petition x x x.

A. Jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The Labor Secretary had no jurisdiction to review the decision
of the Regional Director in a petition for cancellation. Such jurisdiction is conferred by law to the
BLR.

B. The unilateral inhibition by the BLR Director cannot justify the Labor Secretarys exercise of
jurisdiction over the Appeal.

C. The Labor Secretarys assumption of jurisdiction over the Appeal without notice violated Petitioners
right to due process.

II.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the dismissal of the Cancellation Petition despite the mandatory and
unequivocal provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. [24]

The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR. This is clearly provided in the Implementing Rules of
the Labor Code and enunciated by the Court in Abbott. But as pointed out by the CA, the present case involves a peculiar
circumstance that was not present or covered by the ruling in Abbott. In this case, the BLR Director inhibited himself from the case
because he was a former counsel of respondent. Who, then, shall resolve the case in his place?

In Abbott, the appeal from the Regional Directors decision was directly filed with the Office of the DOLE Secretary, and we
ruled that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal was filed by petitioner with the BLR, which,
undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it remains with it until the full termination
of the case.[25]

Thus, jurisdiction remained with the BLR despite the BLR Directors inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved the
appeal, she merely stepped into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that the latter could not himself perform. She
did so pursuant to her power of supervision and control over the BLR.[26]

Expounding on the extent of the power of control, the Court, in Araneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et al.,[27] pronounced that, if a
certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such power or authority may be exercised directly by
the President, who exercises supervision and control over the departments. This principle was incorporated in the Administrative Code

49
of 1987, which defines supervision and control as including the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by
law or regulation to a subordinate. [28] Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear that the DOLE Secretary, as the person
exercising the power of supervision and control over the BLR, has the authority to directly exercise the quasi-judicial function
entrusted by law to the BLR Director.
It is true that the power of control and supervision does not give the Department Secretary unbridled authority to take over the
functions of his or her subordinate. Such authority is subject to certain guidelines which are stated in Book IV, Chapter 8, Section
39(1)(a) of the Administrative Code of 1987. [29] However, in the present case, the DOLE Secretarys act of taking over the function of
the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latters inhibition from the case and the objective to maintain the integrity of
the decision, as well as the Bureau itself.[30]
Petitioner insists that the BLR Directors subordinates should have resolved the appeal, citing the provision under the Administrative
Code of 1987 which states, in case of the absence or disability of the head of a bureau or office, his duties shall be performed by the
assistant head.[31] The provision clearly does not apply considering that the BLR Director was neither absent nor suffering from any
disability; he remained as head of the BLR. Thus, to dispel any suspicion of bias, the DOLE Secretary opted to resolve the appeal
herself.

Petitioner was not denied the right to due process when it was not notified in advance of the BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE
Secretarys assumption of the case. Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[32] Petitioner had the opportunity to question the BLR Directors inhibition and the DOLE Secretarys taking
cognizance of the case when it filed a motion for reconsideration of the latters decision. It would be well to state that a critical
component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, for all the elements of due process, like notice
and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased judge. [33] It was precisely to ensure a
fair trial that moved the BLR Director to inhibit himself from the case and the DOLE Secretary to take over his function.
Petitioner also insists that respondents registration as a legitimate labor union should be cancelled. Petitioner posits that once it is
determined that a ground enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is present, cancellation of registration should follow; it
becomes the ministerial duty of the Regional Director to cancel the registration of the labor organization, hence, the use of the word
shall. Petitioner points out that the Regional Director has admitted in its decision that respondent failed to submit the required
documents for a number of years; therefore, cancellation of its registration should have followed as a matter of course.

We are not persuaded.

Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code read:

ART. 238. CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL
The certificate of registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local, shall be canceled by the
Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more
of the requirements herein prescribed.[34]

ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION.

The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:

xxxx
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the closing of every fiscal
year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;

xxxx
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau. [35]

These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a unions registration,
particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director
license to treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all, the law
requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and

50
financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With
the submission of the required documents by respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.

We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for cancellation of
respondents registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit should not be
deprived of a bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible for the submission of the
documents to the BLR.

Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of union registration, lest they be
accused of interfering with union activities. In resolving the petition, consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed
by Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear in mind that registration confers upon a union the status of legitimacy
and the concomitant right and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization, particularly the right to participate in or ask
for certification election in a bargaining unit.[36] Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out
the life of a labor organization. For without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code. [37]

It is worth mentioning that the Labor Codes provisions on cancellation of union registration and on reportorial requirements have been
recently amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act Strengthening the Workers Constitutional Right to Self-Organization,
Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines , which
lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became effective on June 14, 2007. The amendment sought to strengthen the workers right to
self-organization and enhance the Philippines compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87,[38]pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers organizations by administrative authority.
[39]
Thus, R.A. No. 9481 amended Article 239 to read:
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of
union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and
by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;

(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of
officers, and the list of voters;

(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.

R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which provides:

ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by the
legitimate labor organization concerned:

(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;

(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters within thirty (30) days from election;

(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and

(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.

Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but
shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate
penalty.

ILO Convention No. 87, which we have ratified in 1953, provides that workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be
dissolved or suspended by administrative authority. The ILO has expressed the opinion that the cancellation of union registration by
the registrar of labor unions, which in our case is the BLR, is tantamount to dissolution of the organization by administrative authority
when such measure would give rise to the loss of legal personality of the union or loss of advantages necessary for it to carry out its

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activities, which is true in our jurisdiction. Although the ILO has allowed such measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards
are in place, i.e., the right to appeal to a judicial body, it has nonetheless reminded its members that dissolution of a union, and
cancellation of registration for that matter, involve serious consequences for occupational representation. It has, therefore, deemed it
preferable if such actions were to be taken only as a last resort and after exhausting other possibilities with less serious effects on the
organization.[40]
The aforesaid amendments and the ILOs opinion on this matter serve to fortify our ruling in this case. We therefore quote with
approval the DOLE Secretarys rationale for denying the petition, thus:

It is undisputed that appellee failed to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual members in
accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code. However, the existence of this ground should not necessarily lead to
the cancellation of union registration. Article 239 recognizes the regulatory authority of the State to exact
compliance with reporting requirements. Yet there is more at stake in this case than merely monitoring union
activities and requiring periodic documentation thereof.

The more substantive considerations involve the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of
workers to self-organization. Also involved is the public policy to promote free trade unionism and collective
bargaining as instruments of industrial peace and democracy. An overly stringent interpretation of the statute
governing cancellation of union registration without regard to surrounding circumstances cannot be allowed.
Otherwise, it would lead to an unconstitutional application of the statute and emasculation of public policy
objectives. Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to labor and social justice clauses that pervades the
Constitution and the Labor Code.

Moreover, submission of the required documents is the duty of the officers of the union. It would be unreasonable
for this Office to order the cancellation of the union and penalize the entire union membership on the basis of the
negligence of its officers. In National Union of Bank Employees vs. Minister of Labor, L-53406, 14 December
1981, 110 SCRA 296, the Supreme Court ruled:
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: The rights of workers to
self-organization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. x x x Such constitutional
guarantees should not be lightly taken much less nullified. A healthy respect for the freedom of
association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital
punishments against the association itself.

At any rate, we note that on 19 May 2000, appellee had submitted its financial statement for the years 1996-1999.
With this submission, appellee has substantially complied with its duty to submit its financial report for the said
period. To rule differently would be to preclude the union, after having failed to meet its periodic obligations
promptly, from taking appropriate measures to correct its omissions. For the record, we do not view with favor
appellees late submission. Punctuality on the part of the union and its officers could have prevented this petition. [41]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 30, 2005 and Resolution dated June 4, 2007
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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