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Republic vs.

Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:
Orbecido and Villanueva were married ad had two children. Wife went to US to work and later
became a US citizen. Thereafter he learned from his son that his wife obtained divorce and
married another man. Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of
the Family Code. RTC Zamboanga del Sur granted his petition. The SolGen's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of
the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 (2).

RULING:
Yes. Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating
him/her to remarry.

However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and
on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio


CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian
family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and
Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March
3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha
Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence
to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid
and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However,
there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner
though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was
inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to
receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Responsdent

G.R. No. 221029

Promulgated: April 24, 2018

STATEMENT OF FACTS:

Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese


national named Yoshino Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by the petitioner Manalo in Japan
and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
Japanese Court.

Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the civil registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a japanese court and that
she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, Manalo.

Ruling of the RTC

RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the divorce obtained by Manalo in
Japan should not be recognized based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code which does not
afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad,
whether married to a filipino or to foreigners or if they celebrated they marriage in the
Philippines or in another country and that unless Filipinos are naturalized citizens of another
country, Philippine laws shall have conrol over issues related to Filipinos’ family rights and
duties, together with the determination of the condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts
and civil relations including marriages.

Ruling of the CA

The Court of Appeals overturned the RTC decision and held that Article 26 of the Family
code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for Divorce against her
Japanese husband because the Decree they obtained makes the latter no longer maried to the
former, capacitating him to remarry; that the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequetial. CA ruled that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be the height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese National, who in turn is no longer
married to her.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE


PHILIPPINES A FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY AFTER INITIATING
A DIVORCE PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT
AGAINST HIS OR HER ALIEN SPOUSE.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

Yes, the filipina spouse who initiated the divorce and has succesfully obtained a divorce decree
against an alien spouse may remarry under Art. 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Laws should be construed as not to defeat

but to carry out its intent and purposes

The Purpose of Article 26 (2) of the Family code of the Philippines is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.

Even if the word obtained should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still the court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.

Indeed, where the interpretion of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may, therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirt or intent.

Whether the filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable
decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result. Therefore, the subject provision shall not make a distinction.

The Nationality Principle is not

absolute and unbending rule

The existence of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code of the Philippines is a testament that
the state may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality
principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain
classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.

Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates one of

The essential requisitesof the equal protection

The limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien
spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary and whimsical classification.

There is no real and substantial difference between a filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. To make a distinction between them based merely on superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment
gives undue favor to one and unjustly discrimate against the other. Further, the differentiation is
arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated
and obtained by a filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if
based on grounds similar to Articles 35,36, 37 and 38 of the family court.

A prohibited view of Article 26(2) would

do more harm than good

The state cannot effectively enforce its obligation to protect and defend among others the right
of the children from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development if the court will limit the application of the subject provision only
to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. Moreover, the court must not lose sight of
the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for
human rights and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Case Title: SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, Date: January 30, 2013

vs. G.R. No.: 183896

GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent. Nature of Action:

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

Topic: Formal Requisites: Marriage License

Facts:

Petitioner, Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) a Pakistani citizen, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license as
the ground for annulment under the Family Code.

In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. Syed argues that this
information is false, as he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had
never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract
wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil Registrar issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage
contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. No Marriage License appears to have been
issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

In her defense, Gloria presented in court the marriage contract, as well as witnesses to the wedding for
their testimonies to prove their marriage.

The RTC held in favor of Syed and annulled the marriage. However, The CA gave credence to Gloria’s
arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed
to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Hence, the petition for certiorari of
Syed with the Supreme Court.

Issue: W/N there was a valid marriage license obtained to fulfill one of the formal requisites of
marriage.

Ruling: No, there was no valid marriage license obtained; therefore, there is a ground for
annulment under the Family Code.

Ratio:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the
marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To
prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification
that no such license was issued.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was
allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed
was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not
appear in the document.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed
to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly,
neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify
to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to
how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as
well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the
marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage
license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued
for her and Syed.

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage
contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34 of the Family Code. Again, this marriage cannot
be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage
license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are
less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for
the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it
was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.

Topic: Marriage License; Marriage Exempt from License


DOCTRINE: A marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship is not void ab initio
on the ground of lack of consent.
FACTS:
1. Oct 22, 2004 - Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage.
2. Dec 6, 2006 - Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer,
alleging that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations.
3. Fringer did not file his answer.
4. Sept 13, 2007 - Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. After the pre-
trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule.
5. RTC - declared the marriage void ab initio.
a. opined that the parties married each other for convenience only.
b. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship and that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because the latter never processed her
petition for citizenship
6. CA - affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking.
ISSUE: WON the marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent?
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1. Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (1975) - established the principal test for determining
the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws
of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to
determining the intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this standard is used
purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a
marriage.
2. Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines (1969) - declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided merely because the marriage
was entered into for a limited purpose. The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, further recognized
that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non-subsisting one.
3. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A freely given consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of
their act.
4. Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent
because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious
and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
DISPOSITION: GRANTED.
CASE NAME: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO RANADA, Respondent.

CASE NUMBER/ DATE:G.R. No. 187512 dated June 13, 2012

PONENTE: SERENO, J.

NATURE OF THE ACTION: Petition to have Cyrus (husband) declared presumptively dead.
FACTS:

1. In May 1991, Yolanda Granada (respondent) met Cyrus Granada at Sumida Electric Philippines
where both were then working.
2. They got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993 and they begotten a son, Cyborg Dean
Cadacio Granada.
3. Three years after they met (May 1994), Sumida Electric Philippines closed down. Cyrus went to
Taiwan to seek employment.
4. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
5. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead.
The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City.
6. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
7. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
a. Petitioner argued: Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus
failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
b. RTC denied the motion.
8. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section
2(a) of the Rules of Court.
a. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the
appeal.
She argued: her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final
and executory and, thus, not appealable.

b. Ruling of the appellate court: granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
i. Ground for dismissal: Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino
[A] petition for declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties.

c. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The motion was denied.


9. The case is elevated on with the supreme Court based on Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the
Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a ruling on the presumption of death is indeed a summary proceeding, hence
“immediately final and executory”; and 2. Whether or not the CA, in affirming the decision of the RTC, erred in
ruling for the declaration of Cyrus Granda’s presumptive death.
RULING: YES/ YES.

1. [A] petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for"
under the Family Code.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall
be immediately final and executory.

2. The Republic’s arguments are well-taken (see point highlighted in the facts). Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively
dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in
law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."
RATIO:

1. By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file
a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction
are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in
rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the
ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s
spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive;
or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present,
or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code
provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:

a. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
b. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
c. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
d. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

xxx

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1âwphi1 It may be
proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to
elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance
relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or
characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the
ultimate question of his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken (see point highlighted in the facts). Nevertheless, we are
constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively
dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in
law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what
is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
Case Title: Date: December 10, 2013

G.R. No.: No. 184621

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Ponente: BRION, J., En Banc


petitioner,
Nature of Action:Petition for review on
vs. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, certiorari
respondent.
Topic:Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages;
Article 41.

Facts:

 The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, SouthCotabato.
 Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by:
(1) the respondent's inability to reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would
have intimate moments; and
(2) Jerry's expression of animosity toward the respondent's father.

 After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything
from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
 On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry's disappearance, the
respondent filed a petition for her husband's declaration of presumptive death. She claimed
that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead.
 She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-
law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients' directory whenever she went to a
hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file
the petition in court.

RTC: After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent's petition and
declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief
that her husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the
former receiving any news about the latter or his whereabouts.

CA: The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari 6 filed by the petitioner, Republic
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008
decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner's petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
RTC's part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed the latter's order. The petitioner brought the matter
via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.

Issue: W/N the respondent had a well-founded belief that her spouse is already dead

Ruling: No. The Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a "passive search"
where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and friends. She failed
to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded
belief that her husband was already dead.

Ratio:

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code,
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.

The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41
of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration
of presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that
the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
mere allegation is not evidence.

The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. To be able to comply with this requirement, the present
spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she
believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort (not a mere passive one).
In the case at bar, the respondent's "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:

(1) She made inquiries about Jerry's whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends; and

(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients'
directory, hoping to find Jerry.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:

First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these attempts insufficient to engender a
belief that her husband is dead.

Second, she did not report Jerry's absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the
authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the
situation in which the present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and
prudent for a present spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, report his/her absence to the police.

Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry's relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named.

Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent's claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about
her husband's whereabouts.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:


The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently,
the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It
is intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry
sans the court's declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead,
the present spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively
established. The decision of the competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good
faith and his/her criminal intent in case of remarriage is effectively negated. 28 Thus, for
purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have
the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.

Case Title: Republic v. Cesar Encelan Date: January 9, 2013

G.R. No.: 170022

Nature of Action: Petition for review on


Certiorari

Nature of Action:

Topic: Psychological Incapacity

Facts:

Cesar and Lolita Encelan married each other on August 25, 1979. Out of their union, two children were
born, Maricar and Manny. To support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia. While there, he
learned that Lolita had been having an affair with a certain Alvin. Lolita eventually left the conjugal
home and went to live with Alvin. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity. During trial, Cesar testified on Lolita’s
alleged psychological incapacity and abandonment; and narrated that he continued to support Lolita
and their children even after he learned of her infidelity. Lolita denied begin psychologically
incapacitated, and averred that her break up with Cesar was due to irreconcilable differences. To
support his allegation of psychological incapacity on the part of Lolita, Cesar presented Dr. Fareda
Fatima Flores of the National Center for Mental Health who testified that “Lolita was “not suffering from
any form of major psychiatric illness[,]” but had been “unable to provide the expectations expected of
her for a good and lasting marital relationship”; her “transferring from one job to the other depicts
some interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions”;
and “her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good marital and
family relationship.”

After trial, the RTC granted Cesar’s petition and declared the marriage between them null and void on
the basis of Lolita’s psychological incapacity. The Office of the Solicitor General seasonably appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which initially granted OSG’s appeal, but later on reversed itself and affirmed the
RTC ruling, on the basis of two circumstances:(1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her marital
obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita’s wilfull and deliberate act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.

The OSG appealed to the Supreme Court. It argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did
not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological
incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.
Issue: Whether or not sufficient basis exists to nullify Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity

Ruling: (Direct Answer to Issue)

NO.

Ratio:

Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that “[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.”

In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
“downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations”;⁠ not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.⁠ The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the
time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. ⁠

In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified
on the dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their
home, as well as his continued financial support to her and their children even after he learned of the
affair, but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling.

In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To
constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations. No evidence on record exists to support Cesar’s allegation
that Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.

Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer
from any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores’ observation on Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-
workers, to our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was — at the time
of her marriage — psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from
the time element involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her
professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart from their
marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to
one another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of
comparison with one another. To be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted
cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship is a mere generalization unsupported by
facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

CASE NO. 1 G.R. No. 201988 October 11, 2017

SUBJECT: PERSONS AND CASE TOPIC: FIRST DIVISION


FAMILY RELATIONS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J CASE: MARIA VICTORIA NATURE OF


SOCORRO LONTOC CRUZ VS. ACTION:PETITION FOR
NILO CRUZ REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

FACTS:

On October 21, 1986 Nilo and Marivi was Married to each other and produced two sons. On July 7, 2005
Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from
"inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal
complex," while she herself was found to be suffering from a "personality disorder of the mixed type,
histrionic, narcissistic with immaturity. In his answer, Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi;
that at the start of their relationship, both he and Mari vi would exhibit negative personality traits which
they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi were suffering from psychological incapacity;
and that he was not singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that Marivi
also contributed to the deterioration of their union. In October 13, 2008 the RTC denied the petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double psychological incapacity to
Marivi's nature of being a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex."

The court noted that Marivi already disengaged herself from her father as her standard of an ideal
husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being already very focused
on his job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her
standard, was not by itself sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated.

As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the RTC held that prioritizing his
work over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of his psychological incapacity because
what he did was still for his family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case of
psychological incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off by Marivi's unabated naggings and
her revelations to her family of his sexual inadequacies. CA Affirmed.

ISSUE:

WHETHER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.

RULING:

No, Article 36 is not applicable in this case.

When is there a psychological incapacity? - We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying
this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia, we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals, "that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the
overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable,
or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved)."

The showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes


psychological incapacity. - The mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity." “Nor does failure
of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons" amount to psychological
incapacity. We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic that the psychological condition should render
the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

In Marcos v. Marcos, the actual medical examination of the one claimed to have psychological incapacity
is not a condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such
psychological incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings of psychology
experts as part of the evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its own independent
factual findings. "It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always
base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings."

With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did suffer from personality
disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find that the conclusions reached by these expert
witnesses do not irresistibly point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the spouses
antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that these
personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the parties psychologically incapacitated
to carry out and carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at
most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality disorder to be declared clinically or medically
incurable or permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her marital
duties is another.

Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More than that, too, the evidence
on record do not square with the existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and
jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo, what brought about the breakdown of his relationship with Marivi
was not necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological disorder" but can be imputed to his work
and marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.
G.R. No. 217993, August 09, 2017

MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III, Petitioner, v. NORA REYES BAKUNAWA, Respondent.

The Facts

Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the Philippines where they were students and
became sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel got married on July 26, 1975
at St. Ignatius Church, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.4

Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates at that time, they lived with
Manuel's parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his
father in the family's construction business. Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and came
home only during weekends. This setup continued even as Nora gave birth to their eldest child,
Moncho Manuel (Moncho). However, whenever Manuel came back from his provincial
assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends and girlfriends instead of his family.
Nora resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse, Manuel
depended on his father and on Nora for their family's needs.5

In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's parents. It was during this period that
Manuel first observed Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and mercurial. Their
house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus, Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their
verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.6

On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child. However, nothing changed in their
relationship. Manuel spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking sprees. In 1979,
he had an extramarital affair and seldom came home. He eventually left Nora and their children
in 1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered themselves separated.7

In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for her and their children. After Manuel
spent a few nights with them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and thereafter gave
birth to their third child.8

On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,9 on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), who testified that
Manuel has Intermittent Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive
behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative attitude and passive
resistance in her relationship with Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with
Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora did not participate in the
psychological assessment.10

Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with his common-law wife and has a son
with her, whereas, Nora lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their house and lot was
already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay a loan secured by a mortgage on the said
property.

RTC judgment is hereby-rendered declaring the marriage between MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III and
NORA REYES BAKUNAWA null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

CA, in its Decision14 dated March 27, 2014, granted Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision.

CA denied Manuel's motion for reconsideration

Issue: W/N Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder
and that Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code solely based on her interviews with Manuel
and the parties' eldest child is sufficient to establish psychological incapacity?

Ruling: CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his
testimony and that of Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is
insufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.

Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that
Nora has Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code,19 is solely based on her interviews with
Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not
according probative value to her psychological evaluation report and testimony.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,20 the Court held that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven
by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to
support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination
and report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et al.,22 the Court stated that:

Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately related to them,
such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on the
allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the time of marriage, or to subsequent
occurring events that trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.23
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses'
psychological evaluation was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to
establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family
Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.

The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on
Manuel despite having had the opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there
is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician,24 much less be subjected to psychological tests, this rule
finds application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have
been established by means of psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means
designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence, thinking, or personality

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and
Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED.

FUJIKI VS. MARINAY


GR No. 196049
June 26, 2013

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

 Fujiki was a Japanese national who married respondent in the Philippines.

 The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where
he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

 Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. Without the 1st marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara
were married in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

 Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.

 Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.

 Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage).” Fujiki prayed (among others) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to
endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
Office (NSO).

 The RTC dismissed the petition. It based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal
of the petition." Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara
or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

 Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary
civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact," and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."

 Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject
to cancellation or correction. The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the
Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

ISSUES:
(1) W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(2) W/N the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:
(1) YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in
a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life
which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public
consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording.

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.

(2) YES. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Case Title: Date: 31 July 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON G.R. No.: 189121


and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs. Nature of Action: Petition for review on
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA certiorari under Rule 45
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
Ponente: Perez, J.

Topic: Void Marriages - Who Can Invoke


Nullity?

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo),
filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was
opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia
was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Las Piñas City.3 In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation
to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo
left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth P2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment
as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
Decisionrendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC,
the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence in Las Pinas from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s
death in 1992.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in declaring that Amelia was not legally married to
Eliseo on the grounds of a preexisting marriage?

Ruling:

The

Ratio:

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting
themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous.That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law
renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia
and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’
findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial
court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s
marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus,
it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally.
A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect
was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable four-
square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file
a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death
of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the
source of rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.

Relevant Dissent-Concurring Opinion/Notes:

Case: Republic vs. Olaybar (February 10, 2014)

Topic: Procedure in action for declaration for nullity

Nature: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in
the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

FACTS:
Respondent Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24,
2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing
officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion. Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. The
RTC granted Olaybar’s petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the “wife”
portion of the alleged marriage contract. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the
cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this Petition for Review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, which, in effect, nullifies the marriage,
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding? /

HELD:

YES. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that
she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that
the only “evidence” of marriage, which is the marriage certificate, was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the
trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the
procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage, as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

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