25 Estipona v Lobrigo
No basic rights
constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or
the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, - Prohibition on Plea
Bargaining
SC: Granted the petition – contrary to constitutional right to equal protection
of the law
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of
the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural
rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former
should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that
part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law
which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain
redress for their invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition
of the case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential
losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain.
are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the offended party57and the prosecutor,
which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED.
Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being
contrary to the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
(30 UMALI v JBC Umali as chairman on house committee on justice)
SC: congress only entitled to 1 seat in JBC
Declared the said practice of having two representatives from Congress with
one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court enunciated that the
use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in
the aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other
construction or interpretation.
CAUSE OF ACTION:
both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month rotational representation in
the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent Congress from
January to June and the Senate from July to December.[5] This is now the
current practice in the JBC.
It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the
selection of nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court
Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez) and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not
counted by the JBC during its En Banc deliberations held last December 2
and 9, 2016. Instead, the petitioner's votes were simply placed in an
envelope and sealed subject to any further disposition as this Court may
direct in a proper proceeding.[6] This is the root of the present controversy
that prompted the petitioner to file the instant Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus
ISSUE:
whether the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in adopting the six-
month rotational scheme of both Houses of Congress resulting in the non-
counting of the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2
and 9, 2016; (4) whether the JBC can be compelled through mandamus to
count the petitioner's votes in its En Banc deliberations last December 2 and
9, 2016; and (4) whether this Court's ruling in Chavez applies as stare
decisis to the present case.
HELD:
JBC NO GADLEJ
With the foregoing, despite this Court's previous declaration that certiorari is
the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to petitioner, still the same
cannot prosper for the petitioner's failure to prove that the JBC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in adopting the rotational scheme
the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary may
only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its
rightful members and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not
considered a member during the En Banc deliberations
CHAVEZ case is stare decisis. Umali says decision tehre must be reversed –
here mere rehash of the case
Here, the facts are exactly the same as in Chavez, where this Court has
already settled the issue of interpretation of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution. Truly, such ruling may not be unanimous, but it is
undoubtedly a reflection of the wisdom of the majority of members of this
Court on that matter. Chavez cannot simply be regarded as an erroneous
application of the questioned constitutional provision for it merely applies the
clear mandate of the law, that is, Congress is entitled to only one
representative in the JBC in the same way that its co-equal branches are.
32 Aguinaldo v Aquino
Cause of action: (Court struck down process of clustering by JBC)
To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President Aquino's
appointment of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the
nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court
into six separate short lists.
The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's pronouncement that the
former's act of submitting six lists for six vacancies was unconstitutional.
Whether the President can cross-reach into the lists is not the primary
concern of the JBC in this particular case. At another time, perhaps, it may
take a position. But not in this particular situation involving the newly created
positions in the Sandiganbayan in view of the lack of agreement by the JBC
Members on that issue.
JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only
acting in accordance with the clear and unambiguous mandate of Article VIII,
Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for every
vacancy. Considering its independence as a constitutional body, the JBC has
the discretion and wisdom to perform its mandate in any manner
The JBC then claims that it had no choice but to submit two separate short
lists for said vacancies in the Court because there were two sets of
applicants for the same, i.e., there were 14 applicants for the seat vacated by
Justice Perez and 17 applicants for the seat vacated by Justice Brion.
SC:
Noteworthy is the fact that the Court unanimously voted that in this case of
six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC
acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the nominees into six
separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the said clustering.
Clustering can be used as a device to
favor or prejudice a qualified
nominee.
The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely
successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or
prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a
cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or
conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong
contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices cannot be determined until their actual
appointment by the President.
It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint
members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to
determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed
members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members'
appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical
order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order
of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before
their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a
vital part of the President's power of appointmen
WHEREFORE, premises considered, except for its motion/prayer for
intervention, which the Court has now granted, the Motion for
Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) and the
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (Of the Decision dated 29
November 2016) of the Judicial and Bar Council are DENIED for lack of
merit.