[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
PEOPLE V. ECHEGARAY
[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y
PILO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which
time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was
already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of
death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the
filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no
substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty.
Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the
Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The motion raises the following
grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon
by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted
as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-
appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was
the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of
death against him on this basis.
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of
counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per
se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the
death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of
Article III, Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1)
mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2)
alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal
question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I.
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings
nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on
appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution
in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[1]
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first
time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court."
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge xxx, the defense attempted
to prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of
the alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated
the alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in xxx during the time of the alleged rape.
In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the
accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
1
Page
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her
grandchild to file the rape case;
 b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not
have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-
appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our judgment of
conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration, the following matters:
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar
to the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense
in the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately
defending himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance
that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty
Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial
court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration,
the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which
touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the
prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any time, even during appeal.[2]
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the
accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the victim herself
in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless,
"strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused
because the latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women."[3] Thus, this is
one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch
as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape
charges against the accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,[4] that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also
cited by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create
doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial
and accepted by the judge."[5]
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of desistance,
which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no
bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the
trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel.[6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross incompetency in a way
that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having his day
in court to defend himself.[7]
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant
to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply exercised the required
ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of him relative
to his client's defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug,
from the time he was assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings
thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the
Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in
support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could
have resulted from a failure to present any argument or any witness to defend his
client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the
prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the
accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution. The alleged
errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel could not
have overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment
for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know
that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and their kin and that initially, the
criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family,
not to punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization
throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the institutionalization of
state power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an individual
person with inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen
with the duty to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society
against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of government
enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by its
own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the
causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws
2
have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the enforcement of the
Page
Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to
the death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under specific
circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal
system through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal
Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases
of Harden v. Director of Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9] People v. Camano,[10] People v.
Puda[11] and People v. Marcos,[12] In Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-
parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the punishment of death
is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.'"[13]
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the fora for
a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law
itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in
the 1951 case of Limacothat:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However,
as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our
criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions,"[14]
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.[15]
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly weapon
or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded
to the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added
espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law,
which carried the death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more
capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes
involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to
the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened
following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by
the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated
people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees
among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and
Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of
rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987
Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, or
the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted
to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus
among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be
abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate
on how the abolition was to be done -- whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitution or by the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition
of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death
penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition
should be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored by
the legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital
punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized
by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the
death penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed
just in the hope that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the
life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the
death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should
not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an
institution intended precisely to serve human life. So, basically, this is the
summary of the reasons which were presented in support of the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty".[16]
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the
debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never
in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at
its zenith during the last decade".[17] Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an
unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave
society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other similar
emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we
abolish the death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of
3
flexibility to future legislation,"[18] and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory
Page
remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla,
Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and
Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the following
exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the
church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital
punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right
even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of
view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under
certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is
needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether
or not under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular
stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever
under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine,
under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of
the death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not
believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days
or even a month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that
would prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the
most heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many
qualifying and aggravating circumstances."[19]
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered
provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from
Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo,
however, expressed reservations even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in
the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments
pro and con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we should leave this to
the discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in
effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing
this piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law
and that the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not
worthy of a constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the
death penalty to the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion
of the legislature, but let us not have this half-baked provision. We have
many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We
will now revoke or repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the
Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to the legislature to impose
this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I think
we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending
on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the
legislature composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that
we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the
legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust
it to the legislature 100 percent."[20]
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)
commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it,
followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of
the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter
provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty
provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws and the state of
the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be
capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,[21] we stated that "in view of the abolition of the
death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that
may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua"[22] thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. The
constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for murder
to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then,
in People v. Masangkay,[23] People v. Atencio[24] and People v. Intino[25] divided into
three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the
minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the Revised
Penal Code. In People v. Munoz,[26] however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases
and after extended discussion, we concluded that the doctrine announced therein did
not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not
4
Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the
Page
aforementioned new three-grade penalty should replace the old one where the death
penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from
said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet
be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total
inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to
the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should
now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade
scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III,
Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has
not, by reducing it toreclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the
Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain
enough".[27]
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-
imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact
legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step
process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death
penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing
the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and
against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy issue of
death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the
Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of
death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote
on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean
a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be
a vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties
in the Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide
the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and
thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the
compromise bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body
decides in favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the committee
would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be imposed. It
affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal voting would mean a vote in favor
of death penalty on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on how
the penalty would be imposed would be left to the discretion of the seven-
man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator
would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy
issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of
penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted
down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant
to the Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in
the caucus, is going to be appointed and whatever course it will take will
depend upon the mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will
be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised Penal
Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of death penalty, the
Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty
is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if
5
so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty,
Page
he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous."[28]
 With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no
abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a
penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person
committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said
vote. The mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main
debate in the committee would be the determination of the crimes to be considered
heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee
on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation
as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the
Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not
define or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the death
penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty
on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of
drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future
deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death
penalty was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death
penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that
penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code
that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty,
as provided in the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been
repealed -- all provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having
been repealed by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling
reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not
only one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were
actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision
that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in
making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed
draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific
provisions of the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or
amended or both. Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions
were totally repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions
could be retained. And some of them had to be amended because the
Committee thought that amendments were proper."[29]
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it
would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined
and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind
that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore,
when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending
the Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that
where the death penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried
out, then the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some
crimes that may be considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form
amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble
is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special bill
the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the
death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty
in the case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we
will do the same -- merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just
followed the simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as the
same and merely adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing
the death penalty in these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal
Code."[30]
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion
until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding
the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and every crime for
which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the
preamble of the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the
alarming upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics
showing that in the case of each and every crime in the death penalty bill, there was a
significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty
on February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the
Filipino people, than before such ratification.[31]Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could
not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the
alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the reimposition
of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling
reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason
required by the constitution was that "the State has done everything in its command
so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called death penalty".[32] The
problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists admit that there
were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must be put
in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not
in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling
reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator Tolentino
explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers to all the
crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may
not have the same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that the
public demand to impose the death penalty is enough compelling reason.[33]
6
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines were
Page
clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as
provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons
for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed
his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are
crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill or are
crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and malversation are
proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not
supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important
element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we should consider the relation
of the offense to society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of
these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves
connected with the effect upon society and the government have made them fall under
the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for imposing the death
penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so
serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for
the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does the
Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for the reimposition
of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime
so that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but
also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty
therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the
Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the compelling
reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute measure. That is
why in the preamble, general statements were made to show these compelling
reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be
sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in
providing the death penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with
the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the
sense of Congress that this preamble would be applicable to each and every offense
described or punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and
every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon
the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill
of Rights, particularly the one which says that no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be
so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts
and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is
sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will more or less be a matter
of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the Constitution with respect
to due process itself which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the
definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the
reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the
distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime,
as well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in
the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I
believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we
state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question
is raised in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be
controlling but what the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling
reason or as to the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The
accused can certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go
into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of Congress
to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be entirely
separate from the matter of due process." [34]
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill
violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of capital
punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified,
however, that in the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary session. He stressed
that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect
on signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably
bound by said covenant and protocol considering that these agreements have reached
only the committee level.[35]
7
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No.
Page
891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes,
and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on August
16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993
was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in the Eight
Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of
the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the
Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from
the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form
of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House
of Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill
Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632
authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably
essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the death
penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this
constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter
provide for it . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then Comm.
Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death
penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely
suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at the
propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo
Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some
future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative
and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely
possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today.
xxx xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition
of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are
now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the
law and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous
crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more,
and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because their lives, their
hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality
of a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner
in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows
a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace and order, or public morals. It
is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the epitome
of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business
executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high
school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the hands
of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the sensibilities of Christians
and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the
lovely and promising couple from the University of the Philippines, is eternally lodged
in the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx xxx
xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this
body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming clamor of
the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and
I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose
upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of
anarchy of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law
upon their hands and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to
8
our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness
Page
under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will
be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
 But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for
justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future
animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over and above that
of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that
we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."[36]
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the
House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting of
oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the
form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without
regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the perception
of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very heinousness involves the
compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their
occurrence. Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the
following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62
by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the
importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for other heinous
crimes such as reason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the
Revised Penal Code with or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as
defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as
defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking,
as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of
heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government,
committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the
'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to
the government under which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection
which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or her own
will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is
enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any person, even
scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being
punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of
the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and sees it merely as a form
of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the
culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other
personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over
the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic and
degrading incident which has shattered the victim's life and permanently destroyed her
reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of
police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility
of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and complement of the
vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be
able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker,
the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers in making
unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled
with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism." [37]
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11,
1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of
Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration
on third reading. [38] The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2
abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and
of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee
convened to incorporate and consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose
the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised
Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took
effect.[39]
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the present
time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein
accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of
death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated
to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death
sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of his
death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A.
7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per se
for having been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that
the death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation
of the constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.
9
Page
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
 Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's were crimes penalized by mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain
view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with the twin specified qualifying circumstances.
requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 death:
as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the
following analysis. (1) Treason (Sec. 2);

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the (2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for (3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty
entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that (5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or (6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the following four
designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three days; (b) it was
can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in court that committed simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description victim or threats to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when
set in the death penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that (8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or edifice; (b) a
building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public use; (d) a
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
concealing or destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two
just, civilized and ordered society."
or more persons (Sec. 10);
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, [40] traced the
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is committed
etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus",
with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more persons; and (c) the
meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton",
rape is attempted or frustrated and committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.

We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what (10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the
circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of commission of (11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs
afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing
(id.);
the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty
of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Taada
grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration (14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);

10
of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that make them heinous. They
were oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: (15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);

Page
first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and distribution of
regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs
confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of another
to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle
is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of
them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the heinous
elements in each of foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily
penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty
of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty
because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance
of certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the
person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of
significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society,
which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is
imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting
or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the
penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the
circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be
imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article,
death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children
or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
11
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
Page
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of
the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty
[of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim
is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum
of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is
administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such
place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the
same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to
the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of
regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim
of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this
Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
[of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim
is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum
penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated
drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in
such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same
in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on
the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary."
(Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers
including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9,
11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article
III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any
of the same offenses are government officials, employees or officers including members
of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory
death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)
in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter,
shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his
public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless
of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by
any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness
must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their
very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated
like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of
his or her growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to
live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or
her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own physical body,
and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and
social preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is
raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or
the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive
arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle
is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly
heinous by their very nature.
12
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
Page
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption,
dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence
of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in
this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified
bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause
further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory
penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily
penalized by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in contemplation
of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence
involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with
the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is
not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code
need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial
court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are
punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No.
7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to
be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No.
7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1)
aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative
the provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum
penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which
indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that
justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted
in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the commission of the crime
as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend the
commission of a crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is
capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and
every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides the
test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition
of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever
existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the
death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man
or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural
and substantive safeguards that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of
R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that
the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we
note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent
demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject crimes
are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-
political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes must be frustrated,
curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and
we cannot afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and
thrashing it to its demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and
implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such reforms prove
unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by the
constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to
resort to that could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by
unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling
reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant
change in the socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on
February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such
are, however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the
conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". The imposition of
the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality because of the
suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for
what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first proves itself
to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher
incidence of criminality during the time that the death penalty was suspended, that
would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years
before its suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not
require that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that
there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death
penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should
first be perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the death
penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to
13
as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
society. It is immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an
Page
"alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be
the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest
of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death
penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape is
violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman
v. Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically
ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading
and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by
the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so much on the
nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the
unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty. In
fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case
of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against
racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were
sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort
to divine what motives impelled these death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system
of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the
determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible 'caste'
aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in
imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding
prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised x x x.
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are
pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual'
punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death penalty
statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in the
trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention
of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges
and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted
their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were required by
the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new death
penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia,[42] Jurek v. Texas,[43] and Profitt v.
Florida.[44]
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder,
does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-appellant
largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.[45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric
or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate
to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital
punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the
Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to
invalidate the prior Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for
deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe punishment nor a
punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the Court reserved the question
of the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing
the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death
penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States that had not previously
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16
States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and
Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found
guilty, and those laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and
North Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital punishment
14
laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the seven
other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty
Page
statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and North
Carolina) that had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted
to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the crimes for which death
was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death
penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and the rapist an
adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because the death sentence
was mandatory. x x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape victim is
an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the
victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly
unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side
of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our
own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime
of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both
in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and
autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's privilege of choosing those with
whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate
violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the
threat of force or intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to
resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also
inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the community's
sense of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare with murder,
which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even
the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than
that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may
not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond
repair. We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its
severity and irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the
public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper punishment for the
crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to include rape in
their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape,
while concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual integrity,
physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge
of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the
circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling
of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We
have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the
forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the
death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the
death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses
from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined
and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and substantial
injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the
innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v.
Cristobal: [46]
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury
to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and physical and
moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave damage that can
mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency
and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at
the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death
question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over
death". But dealing with the fundamental question of death provides a context for
struggling with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death
is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights
are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially
repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting
zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that
seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are
to preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character
and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility may rule
comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a x x x necessary, if
limited factor in that maintenance of social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this
ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false
delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival." [47]
15
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED[48] for LACK OF
Page
MERIT.
SO ORDERED.

16
Page
PEOPLE v. MUNOZ other convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang, who all ask
for a reversal.
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur, San Carlos City,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Pangasinan. 3
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN MILLORA, TOMAS As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba,
TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE MISLANG, defendants-appellants. Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men went to the house of Mauro Bulatao
and asked for the address of his son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. rest surrounded the house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing
his horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under his house, he
was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length with a "long firearm," hitting
Manuel B. Millora for appellant Marvin Millora. him in the mouth and killing him as he fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and
Mislang were standing by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them
Abelardo P. Fermin for appellant Jose Mislang. made any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4

Aquilino D. Baniqued for appellant Tomas Tayaba. After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his sixteen year old son,
Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked him several times in the head as he lay
on the ground while the others looked on in silent approval or at least without objection.
They then took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target, Alejandro
Bulatao. 5
CRUZ, J.:

In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them and direct them
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and thus impliedly
to her husband. They found him tending to their cows with his son Pedro. Muñoz
accepted his sentence. The others have questioned their conviction and insist that they
ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his
are innocent. The prosecution did not think so, and neither does the Solicitor General
father's life, shot Alejandro twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and
now. The brief for the appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even
Mislang, along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was committed.
increase the penalty.
Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-year old boy made a desperate
run for his life as one of the accused fired at him and missed. 6
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation and instant
punishment meted out by what appear to be the members of a private army. Eleven
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then vented their
persons, most of them bodyguards of the town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest
violence on Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked as the others looked on.
of one of them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having
Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally, Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him
found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood
to death, hitting him in the head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the
without further ado and without mercy. One was shot in the mouth and died instantly
empty shells and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana with
as his son and daughter looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the
the two grisly corpses. 7
ground and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son. The
third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until he bled before he
too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the unfortunate victims were only The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia Bulatao, 8 Mauro's daughter
innocent farmers and not the dangerous criminals they were pronounced to be. and Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, 9 Mauro's son and Aquilino's brother; Juana
Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and Pedro Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was
corroborated by Dr. Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
victims.

17
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate informations,
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin Minora as the other
the four who stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other seven have yet to be identified
accused stood by and the mauling of their brother Aquilino before he was dragged

Page
and tried. The sentence of Feliciano Muñoz, who did not appeal, has long become final
away by the group. The trial court especially noted the straightforward account given
and executory and is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the
by Jose, who positively identified Minora as the killer and described the participation of
the others, including the savage kicking of his brother by Muñoz. 13 Melecia earlier
pointed to Mislang as the one who had shot her father but changed her mind later on
cross-examination and named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about
by confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange for the sum
of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually did not receive the
money. 14 For her part, Juana related how she was threatened with death unless she
accompanied the accused to where her husband was. She narrated in detail how
Alejandro was killed before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then
also shot to death, also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her testimony
was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had also thought of killing
because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot at when he successfully escaped after
his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the killings that it
occurred to these witnesses to denounce the accused and suggests that this delay
should impugn their credibility. As correctly pointed out by the trial judge, however,
these witnesses were naturally deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet
the same fate that befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity
did not allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio officials they knew,
more so since the higher authorities appeared to be indifferent and gave no attention,
much less encouragement, to their complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of these witnesses as
painstakingly pointed out by the appellants, 17 but these are minor flaws that do not
detract from the essential truthfulness of their accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the said witnesses
are emphasized by the medical reports 19 of the injuries sustained by the victims, as
follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper
lip left side around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle
of the back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye
practically lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead
practically opened with the brain tissue outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper
right jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at
the middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the
left clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court correctly rejected
as false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos were killed as a result of an
exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy group and each claimed he was not involved in
the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos and their
adversaries, Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included Tayaba, Mislang and five
others who fled from the scene in a jeep. 20 Graciano Muñoz, corroborating Bacani,
said he himself saw seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after
he had paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. 21 Another witness for
Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having seen the encounter between the
Bulataos and the other group and declared that the former were armed with carbines
and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared hesitant and
suspicious on the stand and did not give the impression that he was telling the
truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one year to report the alleged shooting encounter,
which he also did not mention that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to
condole with them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because they
had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were already dead in the
field. The alleged redemption made by Muñoz was described by the trial court as
preposterous, especially since no shred of evidence had been presented to show that
Mauro was a cattle rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no
firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos, including Mauro, who
was found not in the supposed battleground but under his house, as testified to by Dr.
De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of the killings,
having gone there in the evening of June 29, 1972. He claimed he had stayed there
overnight with a female companion after drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit
returning to San Carlos City only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or
18
June 30, 1972. 27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more credible than
Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively identified Millora as the person
Page
who actually shot their father in the face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic
experience could not have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father
murdered without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless killer have
been easily wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically declared that
Millora was with the group that she took to the field where her husband and Aquilino
were killed by Muñoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both claimed that Mislang
having complained of cattle rustlers, a group of policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in
the former's house the whole night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the
following morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them
breakfast. 30Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's house was located,
is only two kilometers from Balite Sur. 31Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony
given by Sgt. Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the gunfire
narrated by Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that Lomibao was mysteriously
absent when the police chief and Dr. de Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock
that morning to investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao
and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might have been among
the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz and the three appellants herein
when the Bulataos were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe
the witnesses at the trial and assess their credibility. As we said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge,
who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
and to assess their credibility. The written record will not show that
nuance of tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the
hesitant pause and the prompt reply, and the expression or color or
tilt of face that will affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All
these subtle factors could be considered by the trial judge in
weighing the conflicting declarations before him, and we do not find
that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their seven other
companions, participated in the killings of the three Bulataos in the manner described
by the witnesses for the prosecution. The defenses of the herein appellants should be,
as they properly were, rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more
convincing and telling evidence submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation assigned by the
court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the three offenses imputed to them.
In Criminal Case No. 0176, Millora was found guilty as principal and Muñoz and the
other two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case Nos. 0177 and
0178, Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the herein appellants only as
accomplices. 34 In support of this finding, the trial court said that there was no evidence
of conspiracy to justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start, when the eleven
men went out to look for the suspected cattle rustlers, there was already an agreement
among them to ferret out and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned
beforehand. They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for
them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When they reached
Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while the rest deployed themselves in
strategic positions. When Millora shot Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by
with guns at the ready. Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged
Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Muñoz kicked him in the head
while helpless on the ground. Together, they took him with them and then forced Juana
Bulatao to lead them to her husband. The rest stood by with their weapons as Muñoz
shot Alejandro in the head. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino.
There is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common design
previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a conspiracy. 35 As such, each
of them is liable in equal degree with the others for each of the three killings. Each
member of the conspiracy to commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal,
regardless of who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled
that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified by alevosia. There
was treachery because every one of the three victims was completely helpless and
defenseless when shot and killed by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro
was completely taken by surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying
down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was shot in the
head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section
19(l) of the 1987 Constitution providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already
imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty
whenever it was called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to
reclusion perpetua as mandated by the above provision. The maximum period of the
penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before,
19
where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance, with the minimum
period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in all other cases. The
Page
three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus maintained
except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the
prohibition. death penalty from those statutes-only the death
penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the penalty is abolished.
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about,
to reclusion perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, because the statutes, especially in the General
without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do
in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. not necessarily punish directly with death.
Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what
of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion would be the effect on the judges, for example, if
temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum. the range is reclusion temporal to death and he
can no longer impose the death penalty? He will
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to have difficulty in computing the degrees.
the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the
framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is Could the committee enlighten us on how the
not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, judge will look at the specific situation.
which was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of
the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have
as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question. difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be
equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death range, the range cannot go as far as death
penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, (Record, CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in
keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than
feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty death remain.
and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion
perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing consists of three periods. The maximum period
therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision of reclusion temporal under the present status is
merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons the minimum period for the penalty for murder.
involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still maximum period is death. If we now remove the
plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of
consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion
perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30
either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get
to abolish the death penalty, we are still not convinced from the debates in the the medium period now until such time that
Constitutional Commission that there was also a requirement to adjust the two Congress gets around to accommodate this

20
remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary amendment?
consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in

Page
favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question:
 FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which
lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are
saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p.
750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about."
Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we
are still not persuaded that it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the
maximum period but also the other periods of the original penalty. That is not
necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their task,"
especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we are
saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We
understand this to mean that they were not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death
penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we
should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding
modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in
Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and
unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to
state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One searches in
vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this opinion makes
the personal observation that this might be still another instance where the framers
meant one thing and said another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere
— did not say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases
represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two
members 42 at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second
look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change
in the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind
after reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might,
and can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are
not petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to
change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not
prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea
in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever
that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods
for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our
original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the
periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion
perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not
have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus,
a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable
with the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the
latter. True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That
is a question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in
the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although
he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount.
When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the householder, the latter
replied: "Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?'
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties
are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we
can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their
range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this
prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable
sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is
still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the accused-appellants for
each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The
award of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount
thereof is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers would have
remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of certain responsible officials,
especially the police and the prosecuting officer, who took up the cudgels for the
victims' families. The courage and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most
potent weapons against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the
law and frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the accused-appellants are
hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each
of them is sentenced to suffer three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, and to pay
solidarily to the heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each
of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.
21
SO ORDERED.
Page
PEOPLE v. BON lower than that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death
or reclusion perpetua.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 166401
Appellee, [Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67] First, the antecedent facts.

Present: I.
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO, Eight (8) Informations[2] were filed within the period from 21 August
- versus - QUISUMBING, 2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon
YNARES-SANTIAGO, against appellant, charging him with the rape of AAA[3] and BBB,[4] the daughters of
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, his older brother. Appellant was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G,
CARPIO, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.[5] All these cases were consolidated for
ALFREDO BON, CORONA, trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span
Appellant. CARPIO MORALES, of six (6) years.
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA, Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified
TINGA, him as the man who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and
CHICO-NAZARIO, the medical certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were
GARCIA, and entered as documentary evidence.
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
October 30, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should
affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and
two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score,
we affirm. As a consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront
a question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court had
previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty through the 1987 Constitution,[1] we now find it necessary to
determine whether the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 resulted in the
statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term
of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for
the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court
prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994
in the house appellant had shared with her grandmother.[6] She recounted that the
incident took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched
her thighs and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she
disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her
grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said
house, yet again she was sexually abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years
old.[7]
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant
for the third time, again at the house of her grandmother.[8] The following year, when
she was twelve (12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she
was raped in an outdoor clearing[9] after having been invited there by appellant to get
some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy
spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant
allegedly stopped.[10]

22
death penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his
penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees

Page
 It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother,
CCC,[11] the brutish acts appellant had done to her.[12] Her mother thus filed a complaint
against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary
evidence her birth certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.[13]
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when
she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother.
While alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and
inserted his penis in her vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant
as he was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of
appellants threat that he would kill her.[14] BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999,
she was raped again by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring under
threat of a bladed weapon, and regardless of the time of day.[15]
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.[16] On
that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother
when she felt appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled
her three (3) meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a
knife, BBB could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove
her clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed
himself on top of BBB and stayed there for three (3) minutes moving up and down.
Thereafter, she put on her clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added
that although it was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was
familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her grandmothers house again. [17]
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her
mother. Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had
underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to
the police station and her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the
hospital to be examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses
done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was
afraid of appellants threat of killing her and her family.[18]
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only
knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC
became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a
game, was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to
dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house.
Upon learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five
months after that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by
appellant. CCC lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and
AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it was confirmed that BBB was indeed
sexually molested.[19]
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their
daughters because she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It was only
after appellant was arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the
arrest of appellant, his relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided
talking to her since then.[20]
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita
T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was
the one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for
each child. These medical certificates were presented in court.[21]
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no
external sign of physical injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that
the labia majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was
admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at three
(3) oclock and eight (8) oclock which might have happened a long time before her
examination. Dr. Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration
caused by a male sex organ for several times.[22]
AAAs medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no
external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAAs labia majora and minora were
well coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said
that it could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration
with a person having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-
examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched
the labia of the pudendum of AAA.[23]
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He
averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which was
about thirty (30) arm stretches away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having
raped BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister,
two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred,
from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day.[24]
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He
claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the
institution of the criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces
and the only reason the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and
the mother of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would
call CCC lazy within earshot of other family members.[25]
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. [26] The RTC pronounced
appellants defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring
denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed
to controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further
considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship
23
of the victims and appellant, the latter being the formers relative by consanguinity
within the third degree.
Page
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case
were automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermath of the
pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo[27] the present case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in
regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant. [28] The
appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find
no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except
in at least two (2) cases. The prosecutions case which was anchored
mainly on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA],
deserve full faith and credit for being clear, precise and
straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve
the private complainants. It was established with certitude that the
accused on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The
perpetration of the crimes and its authorship were proved by the
victims candid and unwavering testimonies both of whom had the
misfortune of sharing the same fate in the hands of their own uncle.
The sincerity of [AAA] was made more evident when she cried on the
witness stand in obvious distress over what their uncle had done to
her and her sister.[29]
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908
to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA
in 1999 and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate court, it could
not find evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had
accomplished the slightest penetration of AAAs vagina to make him liable for
consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellants
penis ever touched the labia of the pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the
stenographic notes where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting
his penis into her vagina and she answered in the negative.[30] Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for
consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief[31] before this Court, assails the findings of the
Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really
transpired on 15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6
June 2001 as to her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been
sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she
stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their
parents house (and not at her grandmothers), the accused passed through a window,
entered their room and raped her again.[32] Appellant also latches on the
inconsistencies in BBBs testimony as to the length of the duration of her rape on that
day. In BBBs testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that appellant was atop her for three
(3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only
half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001.
Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not
consider material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our
observations in People v. Perez[33] on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the
testimony of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best,
only to trivial, minor, and insignificant details. They bear no
materiality to the commission of the crime of rape of which
accused-appellant was convicted.[[34]] As pointed out by the
Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies
were brought about by confusion and merely represent minor lapses
during the rape victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect
her credibility. Minor lapses are to be expected when a person is
recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall. The
rape victim was testifying in open court, in the presence of strangers,
on an extremely intimate matter, which, more often than not, is
talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[[35]]
"Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known
fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy of
testimony and the manner in which a witness answers
questions."[[36]][37]
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was
confused on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for
the People[38] filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the
inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to
her first testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on
January 15, 2000, as regards the place of commissionhouse of her
parents or house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her
top 3 minutes or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her
declaration that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into
her vagina, and he was moving while on her top then she felt
something came out from him. He was able to rape her because he
threatened her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she
took the witness stand on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the
last rape, the first rape and many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against
24
her. She was even confused about her age when she was first raped
by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for the
Page
separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to
 recall more clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened
in her own house. These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of
commission accuseds house or victims house is not an essential
element of the crime of rape and both houses are situated in Brgy.
Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x [39]
In addition, we share the lower courts disbelief of appellants proffered defenses of
denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative
defenses. Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the
positive testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the
defendant to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he
must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime at the time.[40]
In the case at bar, appellants alibi that he was at his sisters house barely two (2)
kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given
credence by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have
easily left his sisters house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to
his sisters house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an
accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on
the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[41] The defenses of denial and alibi deserve
scant consideration when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence
identifying appellant as the perpetrator.[42] In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and
relatives of appellant, positively identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower
courts found no issue detracting from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January
2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving
the seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know
anything about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering
the evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge
of CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother
will subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and
narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law
as lazy. In addition, CCCs father-in-law had died several years before the criminal
charges against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and
damage the reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when the latter
was still alive. No member of a rape victims family would dare encourage the victim to
publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against
a member of the family, unless the crime was in fact committed.[43]
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow
an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she
has not in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done
to her. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. [44] The weight of such
testimonies may be countered by physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof
that the accused could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such
countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly
appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their relationship with
appellant were aptly established
in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations
the ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the
birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they
were both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted
that that he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims father, and
thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity.
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is
understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them
and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time
and again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a
fabricated charge.[45] Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim
does not yield to the perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to
her at the moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.[46]
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but
only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences
its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.[47] In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there
was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of
the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in AAAs testimony at the hearing on 17
25
October 2001, to wit:
Page
 Q Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you Q When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
when you were eleven years old? A He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
A Yes, Mam. [sic]
xxxx
Q What was that?
A He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he
inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
Q Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina? Q And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A No, Mam. [sic] A No, Mam.[49] [sic]

Q Why?
A It was painful, Mam. [sic] In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the
CA declared:
xxxx
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate
rape. Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused
Q How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina? cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of
A Many times, Mam.[48] [sic] pain. It is well-settled that complete penetration of the penis into the
vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated rape since the
AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G. slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in
People v. Campuhan, the term slightest penetration was clarified to
mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis
Q I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female organ. Mere
No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the
sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle? victims vagina (the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon
A June 11, Mam. [sic] the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as
attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must be positive proof
Q What year? of even the slightest penetration, more accurately, the touching of
A June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic] the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated.
We, therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial court that
when the accused was trying to insert his penis into the childs vagina,
xxxx the act proved painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from
further executing the act. From the testimony of private complainant,
Q What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000? [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases, the prosecution failed to
A He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic] demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-appellants
penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAAs vagina. There is no
Q And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you? basis then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the
A He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic] aperture of the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the
pudendum) already consummates the case of rape. x x x [50]
xxxx
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt
Q And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
your vagina? does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
A Painful, Mam. [sic] of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of
rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there

26
Q And what did you do when you feel painful? to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating
A I cried, Mam. [sic] his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than

Page
his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.[51]

The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape
and two (2) counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the
appropriate penalties for both crimes should be amended.
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x[55]

II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six
(6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines. Section 2 of the law
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose
instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since
the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to effectuate such
reduction in recent cases such as People v. Tubongbanua[52] and People v.
Cabalquinto.[53]
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of
attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing the
Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of
attempted rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was
meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals
in an attempt to commit a felony.[54]
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been
under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees
lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.For the purpose of graduating
the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices
or accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed
in Article 71 of this Code.[56]
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as
it is to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. In the case in which the law prescribes a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in
graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale
in which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe
the following graduated scales:

What is the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for attempted SCALE NO. 1
rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments
introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes: 1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is 3. Reclusion temporal
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying 4. Prision mayor

27
circumstances: 5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor

Page
7. Destierro
 8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine[57]
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower
than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty
comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The purpose of
the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who have
served the minimum penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of
Indiscriminate Sentence.[58] Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-
imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or maximum periods.[59]
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for
attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and
a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If
Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence
without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem
concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term
within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With
the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be
sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant
would be sentenced to prision mayorin lieu of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted
rape will affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well. Before we
proceed with the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following
qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable
under two different frames of reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993
amendments to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death
Penalty Law. Under the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was
provided for in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for reclusion perpetua to
death, and death itself as an automatic and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic
penalty was mandated for the crimes of qualified bribery if it is the public officer who
asks or demands such gift or present;[60] kidnapping or detention for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;[61] destructive arson wherein
death results;[62] and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances enumerated
under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death was imposable
on several crimes, including murder,[63] qualified piracy,[64] and treason.[65] The
imposition of the death penalty for crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
depended on the appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
generally outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those
two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed
to reclusion perpetua to death.
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the
penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies.
Such situations do not relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2)
counts of attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior
to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not reclusion perpetua to
death.
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned
from reclusion perpetua to death differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of
death. For example, it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua to death is prision mayor.[66] In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for
qualified rape in the attempted stage, the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the
imposable penalty of death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion
temporal.[67] In People v. Tolentino,[68] we ruled that the accused, who had been
sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of
attempted rape. In explaining that reclusion temporal was the proper penalty, the
Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the
penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been
death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT[69]] was eight years old and
TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RTs] mother. The last
paragraph thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed
if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
28
following attendant circumstances:
Page
 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion
temporal, which is the penalty lower by two degrees than death.
However, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment
penalty whose minimum shall be within the range of prision
mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code.[70]
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal
Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of
two indivisible penalties the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death if consummated, the Court has consistently
held that penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor.
In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty
of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1)
of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty prescribed for the felony is single
and indivisible, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71. Thus,
the proper penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not
similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of
Congress. Generally, the highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion perpetua to death, a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a
result, the Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to
consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a single indivisible
penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in 1993, that some commonly
occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized
with the single indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such
as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the
imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the
sentencing of accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or
frustrated stage of felonies for which the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua to
death.
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the
penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties
for convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to
Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear
statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those
penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and
accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is
hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No.
7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death
penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,[71] among others, were deemed to have
been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under
the ambit of the repealing clause, which reads, all other laws, executive orders and
decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly. While this clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of
a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1
specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the
death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act
No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization
of the particular phrase insofar as they impose the death penalty. We can entertain
two schools of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist
interpretations. First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for
attempted rape of a minor (among many examples) does not impose the death penalty,
29
since none of the convicts concerned would face execution through the application of
the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining
Page
the penalty for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not
amended by Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for
attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal
imposition, of death as a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe impose
as to mean apply, then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep.
Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape
of a minor call for the actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as
a means of determining the proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is
enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No.
9346. It also can be understood if confronted with the option of employing either a
liberal or a conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the
conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed
by the Court in People v. Muoz,[72] a decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the
course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the imposition
of the death penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more
clarity. For example, had Section 1 read instead insofar as they sentence an accused
to death, there would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions
calling for actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of
Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the
question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No.
9346 to actual executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the
legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the
physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated
scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent,
the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to
the physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in
the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
kidnapping for ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the
crime. X was charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping.
Y was charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the
victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other
participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no
longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua.
Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in degree,
or reclusion temporal. Yet following the conservative interpretation of Rep. Act No.
9346, the graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new
law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within
the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua,
the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346,
by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the
penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We
do not doubt that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law
in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals
and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one
could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change would
have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of
course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions,
explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any
crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange
that the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not
in others. Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that
they were charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would
have resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable
by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for
simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as
the principal, while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an
accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for
ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the
crime of simple kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in
accord with the Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less
justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the
accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal
suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation
for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that Congress
has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to
frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable
by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would,
under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death,
or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty
30
of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated
felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that those
Page
felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in their
frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death,[73] such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death
are capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code
provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is a penalty lower by two degrees than
that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. The Court has thus consistently
imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the
maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted
the death penalty.[74]If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at
all the penalties for attempted felonies, then those found guilty of the subject
attempted felonies would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the
penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony
would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that
would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower
than the consummated crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with
the Revised Penal Code and established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that
the legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime
that foists a differential theoretical basis for the punishment of different attempted
felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the
least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most
cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but
from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the
penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results
in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should
we construe Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the
death penalty even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular,
the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks death at
the top of the scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word death as previously inscribed in Article
71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with
the rest of our penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted
accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion
temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion
perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal
Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to death. Moreover,
the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal, an
anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard
would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in
ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as
having eliminated the reference to death in Article 71 would run across the board in
our penal laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted
of attempted qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that
prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate,
this expansive interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute
should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with
other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible
systema uniform system of jurisprudence.[75] Interpreting and harmonizing laws with
laws is the best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would
provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure
the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-
legislative acts.[76] There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the
Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those
penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in
that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties
for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws
are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. [77] If the
language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the
defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial
justice.[78]The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual.[79] It is this philosophy
of caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of
the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed
innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not
have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all
laws imposing the death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of
penalties other than death, dependent as these are on death as a measure under the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent
of Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the
resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have
remained. If that were to be the case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly,
that such inequities and inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does not
speak well of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own
prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of
such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible to a reading that would harmonize
31
its effects with the precepts and practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in
a manner that does not defy the clear will of Congress.
Page
VIII.

One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would
most certainly invoke our ruling in People v. Muoz,[80] decided in 1989. Therein, a
divided Court ruled in that the constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty
did not enact a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties], there
being no expression of such a requirement in Article III, Section
19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication.[81] In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited
pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty.[82]
It is time to re-examine Muoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act
No. 9346. More precisely, would Muoz as precedent deter the Court from ruling that
Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muoz were found guilty of murder, which
under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying
circumstance, and thus penalized in the penaltys medium term. Jurisprudence previous
to Muozheld that the proper penalty in such instances should be the higher half
of reclusion temporal maximum, with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into two
halves for that purpose. Muoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court made the
above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of the death penalty,
and the charters effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling,
and as recently as 1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view
urging the reexamination of Muoz.[83]
It would be disingenuous to consider Muoz as directly settling the question
now befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muoz are different from those in this
case. Most pertinently, Muoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper
penalty for murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346
on the proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muoz may have pronounced
that the Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no
longer falls into consideration herein, the correct query now being whether
Congress has banned the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346.
Otherwise framed, Muoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that
with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty Congress
has unequivocally banned the same.
Muoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III,
which provided that [n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Muoz and its
progenies, have interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the
death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references
and applications of the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and
appreciated that at the time Muoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster
an unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the death
penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless
subsequently provide for the penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
as Congress very well did just four (4) years after Muoz. No such language exists in
Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power
to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit
Congress from reenacting the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Yet it was that express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court
from recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and there is no
similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as
evocative of intent similar to that of the Constitution.
The doctrine in Muoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of
the death penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is
similarly irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such
corresponding modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No.
9346, and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act
No. 9346 intended to delete the word death as expressly provided for in the graduated
scale of penalties under Article 71. Muoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in
relation to Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the
general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder. Herein,
at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which
the concept of death penalty bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article
71. Unlike the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the
amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty of
death.
The impression left by Muoz was that the use of the word imposition in the
Constitution evinced the framers intent to retain the operation of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of imposition
in Rep. Act No. 9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the death
penalty, as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of imposition was
implemented as a means of retaining death under Article 71, it would have been a most
curious, roundabout means indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the
deliberate vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process
demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on life or liberty are intended.
We have ruled, on due process grounds, as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on
a standard characterized as nothing but blather in search of meaning.[84] In the matter
of statutes that deprive a person of physical liberty, the demand for a clear standard
in sentencing is even more exacting.
32
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between imposition and
Page
application, for both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since
Article 71 denominates death as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there
is no question that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the
death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a persons liberty is to be
deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application of the death
penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends to its relevance to the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain
the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in
our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346
is not swaddled in the same restraints appreciated by Muoz on Section 19(1), Article
III. The very Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of
the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the
same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be
asserted that today, the legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the
Philippines has never been more secure than at any time in our political history as a
nation.
Following Muoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might
not have willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a
suspensive condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty
during the interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through
law as being in a state of hibernation.[85] No longer. It reawakened then it died;
because the sovereign people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty.
Only by an Act of Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death
as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a
means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty,
we do not acknowledge that Muoz lacked legal justification when it was decided; that
its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous
sentences imposed on convicts on the basis of Muoz were wrong. Muoz properly stood
as the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep.
Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its
footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in
the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as heinous, within
constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was
accompanied by certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty,
such as the increase in imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.[86] The
categorization of certain crimes as heinous, constituting as it does official recognition
that some crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this Court in
adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes.
Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on
accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep.
Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as
heinous. The amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application
of the death penalty but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the
penalties for heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law.
Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent
nature, constitute a special category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346
does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that
adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through
Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death
through that statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application
is immediate. Henceforth, death, as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code,
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example,
in the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be
reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion
perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion
temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by
the free-standing penalty of death, as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the
ranged penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, as often used in the Revised Penal Code
and other penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty,
hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did
earlier observe that both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under
Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, [w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime
is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall
be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective
graduated scale. Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to
this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if
consummated or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary
penalty of death. We see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of
33
the Revised Penal Code states that [p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[ [87]]
Page
x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Given that we have ruled that Rep. amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.
to apply, except as to those persons defined as habitual criminal[s]. Indeed, Rep. Act
No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906
effects, referring as it did to persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
perpetua by reason of this Act.[88] years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape.
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 In addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of
of the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral
sentences whose actual served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages.
understood that this decision does not make operative the release of such
convicts, especially as there may be other reasons that exist for their SO ORDERED.
continued detention. There are remedies under law that could be employed to
obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the Public Attorneys
Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees possess the
capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so
entitled by reason of this ruling.

XI.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of

Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding
reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two
(2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6)
counts of rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of
attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals. We hold that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we
impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00
as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted
rape, it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case
of People v. Miranda.[89]

Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence[90] in awarding to BBB and

AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts

34
of consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and
against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further

Page
ORDERED to indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the
PEOPLE v. SARCIA
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134,
finding herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against AAA,4 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA
modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing
the award of civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00, and awarding ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5)
year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA’s father filed a complaint 5 for acts of
lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the
evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge
to rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin;
her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay.
The defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied
committing the crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the
Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9 finding the accused-
appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed
by the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004, while the People,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee’s Brief12 on December 15,
2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct
appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial
court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated
September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred,
for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced
by the trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y
Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the
amount of (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
(3) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review,
pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental
Brief16 on April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
35
Page
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of
errors:
I approached [AAA] and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
[AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD
SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as
follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of
Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed
them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and underwear. He also
removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back.
Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant
made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside
her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them,
witnessed appellant’s dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA’s cousin] instinctively rushed to the
house of [AAA’s] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA’s]
mother answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to
be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on
her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA’s cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo
where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA’s cousin]
answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her
home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she
feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she
felt a grating sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin].
[AAA’s cousin] came to their house and told [AAA’s] mother again that appellant had
earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA’s mother], however
did not say anything. At that time, [AAA’s] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified
that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical
examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate
containing the result of [AAA]’s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already
resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can
interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]’s
medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars,
perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with
resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in
layman’s language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is
a complete perforation of the hymen which means that it could have been subjected
to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object
like a medical instrument or penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doña Tomasa,
Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAA’s] parents, because
sometimes they go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not
know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother
worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an
agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and
attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when
sometime in 1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from
barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doña Tomasa both of
Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an
agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he
was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they transferred
to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to 1998
he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00
o’clock in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play
basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa about 1 kilometer
36
away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father
took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting other girls ... and was
most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and
Page
the latter’s place which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed
Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7, 2000
was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was
filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAA’s] parents who are related to
Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA’s] rape charge against him to make the case
for Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on
May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he already in
detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his
sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited
him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did
not do such thing and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the
child examine to prove he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was
to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA’s] mother, is also related to his father,
[AAA mother’s] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is
not the lending of money by his father to the AAA’s family as the motive for the latter
to file the rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan,
Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay
against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal
of said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked
exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution
was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds:
(1) the testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the
victim was confused as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3)
there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they
filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused
in a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae
Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion
Bobier helped AAA’s father in filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant also
claimed that the prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or
intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the
medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao,
stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which means that there was no
showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA’s
and her cousin’s testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with
AAA at the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before
accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the
cousin testified that when she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion
while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAA’s testimony that
when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said
"aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latter’s mother what
accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that,
after putting on her clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin
testified that other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified
that there were only four of them who were playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only
to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is
no person with perfect faculties or senses.19 The alleged inconsistencies in this case
are too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that
the two prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA
was sexually abused by accused-appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence.
When the rape incident happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and
her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has
had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses
can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and that
even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and
inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be
overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to
accord them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA’s inability to recall the exact date when the
incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however,
is not an indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of
rapes are inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the
victim as a witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime
of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the
time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as
1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an
essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the
precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime
charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
37
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Page
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto
make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or
time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was
committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an
information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the
days thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
In this case, AAA’s declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996
was explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense
cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any
month and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA’s] sworn
statement mention the month and date but only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses’ credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case
against accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant’s claim
that the only reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier
get a conviction of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion
Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth
of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer
silence for fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of
having been sexually abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year
delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victim’s father as understandable and
not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the
absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and
impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to
defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was
sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father in the latter’s testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when
your wife told you that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to
file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason
that during that time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we
waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is
no proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of
AAA. Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is
whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is
unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive
presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of
twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as
follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman
language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently
ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not necessary to
prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical
report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.28 What is important is that AAA’s
testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we
have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to
concoct and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and
unequivocal identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants’ defense
of denial and alibi.29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he
was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces
this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
…True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s] parents finally decided to file the rape case
because after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu
that what previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had
continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough
that the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence.
It is improbable for a girl of complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to
herself and her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of
sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be
expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not
true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that,
38
and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not
motivated by an honest desire to have their daughter’s transgressor punished
Page
accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and
that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we
discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 32 was
the governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question.
Under the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a
child below seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years
old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven
during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth
as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We
cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a
minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal
Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was
24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial
court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the year
1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the
rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after
he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating
circumstance of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18
years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always
in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because
of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-
appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the
Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code
provides that "in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased
or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now
is whether the award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the
commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender
is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification,"
which is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as
follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. – Indemnification for consequential
damages shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered
by his family or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of ₱50,000.00 to the
offended party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained
in People v. Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability
ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial
policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages
thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue
unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The
Court believes that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect
should follow the same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of
rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim
shall be in the increased amount of not less than ₱75,000.00. This is not only a reaction
to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over
time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory
in nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of
an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a
wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered
by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of
39
minority of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing
on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly
Page
considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could
have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the
benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof
regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary
certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is
no justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages
in the case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v.
Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of
damages. At that time, the damages amounted to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was
lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis
for increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally
in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall ₱75,000.00 … Also, in rape cases, moral damages are
awarded without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that
the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial
court’s award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to ₱75,000
pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is
still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts; ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition
of the death penalty; ₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed
to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages
even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because,
following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
The Court declared that the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time
but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a
matter of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they
may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only
after the claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered
as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by
bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner. 42 Since
the compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are
increased when qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise
be increased in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral
damages should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of
exemplary damages be likewise increased to the amount of ₱30,000.00 based on the
latest jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly
awarded ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages is increased to ₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages
is likewise increased to ₱30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending
the outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA
decision were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The
promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the
RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance
with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
40
Code46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with
the Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously
detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid
Page
Prison, Muntinlupa City on October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act,
and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of
the offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who
have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said
Act, and who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by
the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions
of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child
in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time
he/she is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may
have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the
child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense
committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-
18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of
suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others,
he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the
basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor
who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic
suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of
a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension
of sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations50 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with,
or may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then
the child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed
Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or
primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s
restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can
still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years
of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same
law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum
age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the
law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had
been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application
of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and
academic.51 However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition
under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
41
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
Page
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the
appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.52

WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717
is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death
imposed on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as
moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in
the amount of ₱75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the
court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

SO ORDERED.

42
Page
ENRILE v. SALAZAR
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA
TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND
ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR,
JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs.
Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that
would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be
sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the
ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where season and
circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the
kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority
Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director
Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued
by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal
Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that
day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio
Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight
at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed
on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being,
or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the
statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no
complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for
hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return urged
that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is
putting it very simply-the information in Hernandezcharged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised
Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with
43
which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
Page
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which
the Court issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the
Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from
notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for
the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice
to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against
granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator
Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in
the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with
common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his
written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all
other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to
its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning
Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the
view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact
that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of
the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting
a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by
reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of
Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense
in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the
President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory
that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be
interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes
committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of the
Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real
thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made
clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article
48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years
of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose
of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more
severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed
by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez
Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso
de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75
del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en
el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
44
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
Page
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
 Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son
aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de
ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena
correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de
las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este
limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in
said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than
to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for
each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent
spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes
are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse
than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts.
Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the
other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more
serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum
total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court,
which is that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not
here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper
time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to
the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the
petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that
would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment
is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that
the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed
twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in
the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion
may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,
the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished
by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or
preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint
against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation
was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the
questioned information. 14There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in
filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged
in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the
preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest
without first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under
oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of
the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable
45
duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he
follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting
Page
documents submitted by the prosecutor.16Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest
issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over
the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said
respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which
to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and
necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now
be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from
which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original
jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail,
claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him.
Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of
this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the
information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis
that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice
of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion
to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has
founded the present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged
in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or
of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally
justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up
there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions
was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an
assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever
to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that would justify by
passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the
hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four
Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial
court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes
no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation
regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu
proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim
the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the
evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of
other parties in a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or
contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined.
The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may
have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present
petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds
would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now
decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly
the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of
proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of
Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will
give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process
and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of
the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of
the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that
of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same
principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants
of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No.
90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon
of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the
strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is
regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of
country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to
whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of
their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news
these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but
46
by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an
ongoing rebellion.
Page
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the
crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery.
There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of
illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies
beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing
the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and
the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by
said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

47
Page
NAPOLIS v. CA
G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972
NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Victor Arichea for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G.
Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:p
Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby
finds the accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario
Satimbre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in
band and sentences Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact
to suffer imprisonment of from six (6) months, arresto mayor, as
minimum to six (6) years, prision correccional, as maximum and to
indemnify the offended party, Ignacio Peñaflor in the sum of P80.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency but not to exceed
one-third (1/3)of the principal penalty and the accused Nicanor
Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from ten
(10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, reclusion
temporal, as maximum, both to indemnify the spouses Ignacio
Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and all three to pay the
proportionate part of the costs.
The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision of the Court
of Appeals, from which We quote:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs.
Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , 47-year old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the
owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after
answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog
nearby indicating the presence of strangers around the vicinity.
Acting on instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after
getting his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store
to take a look. As he approached the door of the store, it suddenly
gave way having been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of
them holding and pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril,
Ignacio Peñaflor fired his revolver but missed. Upon receiving from
someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he
pretended to be dead. He was hogtied by the men. The fact,
however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men
then went up the house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L.
Peñaflor for money saying that they are people from the mountain.
Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor , realizing the danger, took from under the
mat the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth
P350.00 and delivered them to the robber. Thereupon, that robber
opened and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied the hands of
Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and those of her two sons. After telling
them to lie down, the robbers covered them with blankets and left.
The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the
robbers. The spouses thereafter called for help and Councilor
Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peñaflor . The robbery
was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and to the Philippine
Constabulary.
Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises
upon receiving the report of Councilor Almario and found owner
Ignacio Peñaflor with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe
was ransacked and things scattered around. It appears that the
robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the ground floor of the store
and passed through it to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police
Delfin Lapid, "they removed the adobe stone and that is the place
where they passed through" (tsn. 24, I). In that same morning,
policeman Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing suspicious
characters passing through a nearby field and when the field was
inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5
bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of Chief of
Police)...
It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for robbery in band
was filed with the Justice of the Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants
in the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana,
Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia,
48
alias Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al.
Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro having waived their right to a preliminary
Page
investigation, the case, insofar as they are concerned, was forwarded to the Court of
First Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As
subsequently amended, by the inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia
alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose Escabel alias Pepe,
Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged in said information: .
That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1,
1956, in the Municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio
Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel, Alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias
Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre,
Carlito Veloso, Domingo Flores, Alias Eko and Paul Doe, by
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the intent
to gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols
and two (2) revolvers, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, entered the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR
and CASIMIRA L. PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole under the sidewall of
the ground floor of the house and once inside, attack, assault and
hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the handle of the Grease Gun causing him
to fall on the ground and rendering him unconscious, tied his hands
and feet and then leave him; that the same accused approached
Casimira L. Peñaflor , threatened her at gun point and demanded
money; that the same accused while inside the said house searched
and ransacked the place and take and carry away the following cash
money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and
Casimira L. Peñaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency,
One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at P350.00, One (1) licensed
Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight,
valued at P7.00, to the damage and prejudice of said spouses in the
total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-SEVEN PESOS,
(P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".
At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and
Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of the offended
parties, Ignacio Peñaflor and his wife Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , Provincial Fiscal Eleno
L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin
Lapid, the Chief of Police of Hermosa, Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the
Constabulary and the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis, Satimbre
and Malana, respectively, admitting their participation in the commission of the crime
charged.
Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the charge, whereas
Fiscal Kahayon narrated the circumstances under which the affidavit Exhibit A was
subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis; Police Chief Lapid and Lt.
Sacramento dwelt on the investigations conducted by them and the circumstances
under which said defendants made their aforementioned affidavits; and Clerk of Court
Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C. Mina explained how Exhibits B and
C were subscribed and sworn to before them by defendants Satimbre and Malana,
respectively.
Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his own defense,
he would have Us believe that on October 1, 1956, he was in his house in Olongapo,
Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr. Maginas.
Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of his wife Engracia
Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be innocent of the crime charged and said that, although
reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the advice of his wife
Engracia Mendoza — who sought to corroborate him — and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas
of Hermosa, in order that he may not be implicated in a robbery that took place in
Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to his hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed the
case as against defendants Flores, Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.
In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario
Satimbre, as above indicated. Said defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from
said decision of the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has erred
—.
I. In affirming in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the crime
charged based upon a lurking error of identity.
II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-
judicial confession extracted through duress.
III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the
evidence on record adduced during the trial.
IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of law
and jurisprudence on the matter.
Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not been sufficiently
identified as one of those who perpetrated the crime charged. In support of this
contention, it is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peñaflor was due to a
picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from the files of the police in Olongapo,
Zambales, and then shown to her, before he (appellant) was apprehended and then
brought to her presence for identification. It is thus implied that Mrs. Peñaflor identified
49
him in consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture she had seen before
he was taken to her for said purpose. The defense further alleges that she could not
Page
have recognized appellant herein, in the evening of the occurrence, because the same
was dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused downward.
Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record shows that the
authorities were notified immediately after the occurrence; that, soon after, peace
officers — Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento — repaired to the house of Mr.
and Mrs. Peñaflor and investigated them; that based upon the description given by
Mrs. Peñaflor , one individual was apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peñaflor ,
who said that he was not one of the thieves; that another person subsequently arrested
and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was, similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of the
investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought
Mrs. Peñaflor to the offices of the police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures
of police characters on file therein; that among those pictures, she noticed that of
appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of the culprits; and that appellant was,
therefore, arrested and brought to Mrs. Peñaflor , who positively identified him as one
of the malefactors.
In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peñaflor , through the
aforementioned picture of appellant, that he was one of the thieves. It was she who
told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves. Besides, the fact
that Mrs. Peñaflor readily exonerated the first two suspects, arrested by the authorities,
shows that appellant herein would not have been identified by her if she were not
reasonably certain about it.
Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein because it was
he who demanded money from her and to whom she delivered P2,000 in cash and two
(2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked her wardrobe; and it
was he who tied her hands and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed
in her presence, consumed sufficient time — from 10 to 20 minutes — to allow her
eyesight to be adjusted to existing conditions, and, hence, to recognize some of the
robbers. The night was dark; but, there were two flashlights switched on, namely, that
of her husband, and the one used by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times,
focused downward, it had to be aimed, sometimes, in another direction, particularly
when the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and when he opened
and ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor . Lastly, her testimony was confirmed by
other circumstances presently to be mentioned, in connection with the consideration
of the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.
The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise — that appellant's
conviction was based upon his extra-judicial confession and that the same had been
made under duress.
Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered by His Honor,
the trial Judge, and the Court of Appeals in concluding that the evidence for the defense
cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the prosecution had told the truth.
Besides, appellant's confession was not tainted with duress. In this connection, the
Court of Appeals had the following to say: .
Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor 's
identification, we have the extra-judicial confession of appellant
Nicanor Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said
accused on October 26, 1956, 25 days after the occurrence, before
Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-year old prosecutor who,
since July 18, 1946, was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the
present. His testimony shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to
said accused in the Tagalog dialect; asked him whether he
understood it to which appellant Napolis answered "yes"; inquired
whether he was coerced to which he replied "No"; and then, required
him to raise his hand in affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his (Fiscal's)
presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon further testified that he
saw no signs of physical violence on the person of the appellant who
appeared normal in his appearance (tsn. 15, I). In this confession,
Exh. A, appellant Napolis related that it was co-accused Antonio
Bededia (still-at-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband
Ignacio Peñaflor and who hit him (Peñaflor ) on the head and that it
was co-accused Ben de la Cruz (whose case was dismissed) who
wrested Peñaflor 's revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis admitted
that it was he who talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he
who got the money bag. The loot, according to him, was split from
which he received a share of P237.00 (Answer to Q. A, Exh. A).
Among others, he mentioned appellant Bonifacio Malana as the
owner of the greasegun and the one who got Peñaflor 's revolver
from the hands of co-accused Ben de la Cruz. ... .
It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision of the Court
of Appeals, the findings of fact made in said decision are final, except — .
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee. 2
and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.
The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the evidence for the
prosecution is contradictory and, hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel for the defense
50
alleges that, whereas Ignacio Peñaflor said that the thieves had entered his house by
forcing its door open, Mrs. Peñaflor testified that their entry was effected through an
excavation by the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that the
Page
malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe stone to get into said house.
No such contradictions, however, exist. The house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor consisted
of two (2) parts, one of which was a store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining
the store, which had a door leading thereto (to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor
testified that the culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a
wall thereof, and this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added that
the malefactors had, also, removed a piece of wood from said wall. Upon the other
hand, the testimony of Mr. Peñaflor referred to a door, inside the store, leading to the
dwelling proper, as distinguished from the store.
In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact made by the
Court of Appeals are supported by those of His Honor, the trial Judge, who had
observed the behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that the first
three (3) assignments of error are untenable.
The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime committed
and the proper penalty therefor. It should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of
robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been
made by breaking a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and,
accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in
accordance with said legal provision.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence
against Ignacio Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article
294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article,
which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299,
although, factually, the crime committed is more serious than that covered by the latter
provision. This Court had previously ruled — .
... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is
characterized by intimidation, this factor "supplies the controlling
qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article
299 of the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery
which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person
is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon
things, because where violence or intimidation against the person is
present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the
security of the individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs.
Baluyot, 40 Phil. 89.) And this view is followed even where, as in the
present case, the penalty to be applied under article 294 is lighter
than that which would result from the application of article 299. ...
.3
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view.
Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall, enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house
and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or intimidation upon
persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion
temporal.4 Pursuant to the above view, adhered to in previous decision,5 if, aside
from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person, without committing
any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4)
of Art. 294 of the same Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof --
shall be much lighter.6 To our mind, this result and the process of reasoning that has
brought it about, defy logic and reason.
The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies
the "controlling qualification," is far from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with
the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the person is
evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely,
for this reason, We cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above
cited — reductionof the penalty for the latter offense owing to the concurrence of
violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more
plausible to believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person takes place without entering an inhabited house, under the
conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements
of both provisions are present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for the
imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most serious
offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period --
from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime. In short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos7 and applied in U.S.
v. Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People v. Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People
v. Sebastian, 12 is hereby abandoned and appellant herein should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to
nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.
Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed
in all other respects, with costs against herein appellant, Nicanor Napolis. It is so
ordered.
51
Page
PEOPLE v. TOLING
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-
appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for
plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder,
sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1)
Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio
(5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of
P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-966). The
judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which
is about eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They
are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966.
Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However,
Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since
September, 1964. Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila
also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that
she would give him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and
sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order
to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left
Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog,
Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from
Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about
seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means
of a letter which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to
locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng
Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an
employee of the agency, they proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora
gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson, gave him thirty pesos.
Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the
agency where they ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the
twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their homeward
trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock
in the afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The
coach had one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats.
Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were
seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back
door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year
old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle.
That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred twenty
passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who
was sleeping with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-
passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were sitting,
there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet
who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and
Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The
brothers bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the
train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a
pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim
stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.
52
Page
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated
opposite him. She was not able to get up anymore.1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along
her seat, but before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand the railroad tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were
with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all
and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of
passengers scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A
everyone whom they encountered inside the coach.2 Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-
2).
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel,
a train escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died
children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee when from stab wounds, namely:
someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come
from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he (1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a distance of around nine
meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a knife
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward.
He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in
authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
or he would be shot.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his Norte.
palm and little finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed
himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near (5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors
(Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
pistol.

(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.

(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car
7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-
when he received the information that there were killings in the third coach. He
2)
immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who
was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl
and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from
was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the coach and on the the moving train to avoid being killed. They were:
aisle.
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the
scissors. When Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and (2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down.
Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away (3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows administered to him.
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).

53
twins from the train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police.
Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were

Page
turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon,
Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to
D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by
Jose Toling, she was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was
transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where
she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she was
not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an
expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with her child,
she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred
pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second
Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January
9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon,
Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that
date, the statements of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General Hospital.
Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person
"from the station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant.
He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that might not".
He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed
one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other
persons because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill
everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a
person "from Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his
assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding
money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he
commented that everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed
him in the back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the
scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the
scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the
municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage of
the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers
an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated murder (six
victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the
running train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty.
After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa rendered the judgment of conviction already
mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the
alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two homicides and for physical
injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants'
statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad
Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy
tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the
right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The two
brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were allegedly observing
them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected that the
four men harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the
twins. They were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing
the front door of the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being
to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions
towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves
behind them. Some old women were near them. When the train was already running,
the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed
a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and
who was holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket,
threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money. Antonio answered
that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt him,
adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or
small bolo (eight inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants
and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also
stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he
had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-
2 or 5-A and
54
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was
stabbing the second man, another person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the
Page
forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has two
scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was gone.
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who
had wounded his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the
back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen,
inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed
because he was already weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He identified
Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself
had used. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out
of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General
Hospital who treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified
that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches
each, mid-frontal (wound on the forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level
of 3rd ICS right, penetrating thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth
rib on the left, penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal
column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113
tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous
behavior, which resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the
following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run
amuck? It appears that the accused travelled long over land and sea
spending their hard earned money and suffering privations, even to
the extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as
recompense with respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his
daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to
receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could
not locate in Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a
fact which could easily invite some people to stare or gaze at them
and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons who
easily get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared
at by the persons in front of them, immediately suspected them as
having evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of
the accused coupled with their unfounded suspicion of evil intention
on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke the
limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged
rustic twins, whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice
but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory
perception the twins must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about
them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble
persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion or suspicion
that their male companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might
victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-
passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court
and the prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion
was unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very
identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato
Tamundong after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who was
Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they might be mistaken in making
such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would
be their sworn statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own
testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence
reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was
armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court
assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose was armed with
the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while
Jose declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the
Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the
latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the
person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the
platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be Antonio (not Jose).
That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested
that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued
55
after the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife)
was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965
Page
(p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa
does not detract from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses
confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in
the trial court's decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea
are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of
Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and
apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the
other twin, disabled him and prevented him from committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was
not corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the
platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of
belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not
compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the
train and it was nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give
identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-
140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no
doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not
observe the same events and their powers of perception and recollection are not the
same.
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one
corroborated her testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman
sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's
testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who
admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins,
could have inflicted the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And
there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and
their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the
CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were
caught in flagrante delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements
of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts
of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to
leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the
passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins consummated all
the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded
coach No. 9, which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have
held up the twins without being readily perceived by the other passengers. The twins
would have made an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries,
which they sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other passengers
inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they
admittedly killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries
because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that
view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant
behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without
coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban areas, we exercised
utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the record
conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial
court, because they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C.
Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably
due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley
A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died
due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and
fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to M-2 and S to
S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but
in so doing they met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge
them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of them, the information
charges that the accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge
for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports
been reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was
the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally
responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger
which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the
56
person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result"
(Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Page
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is
directed reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and
in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation,
the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus,
U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four
victims already named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the
appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge
of multiple frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna
Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by
the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did
not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of
murder and attempted murder qualified be treachery ( alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised
Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their
co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and
who were unable to defend themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons
on their persons) was a mode of execution that insured the consummation of the twins'
diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different
acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48
of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or
more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos
formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito
compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el
llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is
"acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias
las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga
de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974,
55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs.
Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons
and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated
murder and two attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan
massacre case, where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders;
People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who fired successively at six victims
was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four
murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs.
Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27;
People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali,
96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People
vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes committed by means of separate acts were
held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single criminal impulse
or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the
penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts.
64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was
not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No
modifying circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence.
Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals,
of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them is
sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas for the eight murders and to an
indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the attempted murder and to
pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven victims named
in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C.
Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda
Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate
paragraph of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against
the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
57
Page
PEOPLE v. VALDEZ
[G.R. No. 127663. March 11, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO
VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction
promulgated by Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region
stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, on October 24, 1996 sentencing him to death for
the complex crime of Multiple Murder with double Frustrated Murder, and likewise
separately sentencing him to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua for the crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No. 1866).
The information against accused-appellant, Bernard Castro, and one John Doe for
the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September 17, 1995, at Sitio
Cabaoangan, barangay Nalsian, municipality of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan, and
within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill, and each armed
with caliber .30 carbines did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, simultaneously
attacked and fired their caliber .30 carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia,
Willy Acosta, Sandra Montano, William Montano and Randy Tibule while they were on
board a tricycle, on their way to a dance party, hitting them in the different parts of
their bodies which caused the instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie
Garcia, Willy Acosta and Sandra Montano, to the damage and prejudice of their
respective heirs, and inflicting fatal injuries to William Montano and Randy Tibule, in
the different parts of their bodies, having thus performed all the acts which would have
produced the crime of murder with respect to both but which did not by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, namely, the able and timely medical
assistance given the said victims William Montano and Randy Tibule, which prevented
their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6 of the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions pertinently
averred:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September 17, 1995 at Sitio
Cabaoangan, Barangay Nalsian, Municipality of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and
within and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, custody and control, a
firearm, to wit: Caliber .30 carbine without first having secured the proper license
thereof from the authorities and which he used in committing the offense of multiple
murder and double frustrated murder.
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.
(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8749)
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are succinctly
summarized in the Peoples brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano (16 years
old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano
and Ramon Garcia, Jr., were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag,
Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding party of Jean Maries
cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to
Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car
with Sandra and William Montano (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN June 18,1996,
pp. 23-25).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan, they met
appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with guns. The tricycles
headlight flashed on their faces.Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at
Montanos group. Thereafter, after uttering the words, nataydan, mapan tayon (They
are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and companions left (TSN June 11,1996, pp. 11-
14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra Montano and Willie
Acosta dead (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 14-16). They sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
- gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the nipple right through and
58
through trajecting the middle lobe of the lungs, rt ventricle of the heart, middle lobe of
the lung, left with point of exit 1 inch in diameter 1 inch lateral of the nipple, left.
Page
(Exhibit B)
Ramon Garcia:
- gunshot wound, .5 cm. diameter point of entrance ear canal thru and thru trajecting
the skull brain substance with point of exit temporal area right.
- Another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance anterior axilliary line left
at the lable nipple trajecting the lung (left) heart ventricle and lung (right) with point
of exit 1 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral the nipple right.
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and
penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law,
the offense having been a complex crime the penalty of which is in the maximum, and
with the attendant aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength, hereby sentences him the ultimum supplicum of DEATH to be
executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal Injection Law, to pay
the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and
SANDRA MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as follows:
1). To the heirs of the deceased Ramon Garcia, jr.:

(Exhibit C)
a) P 50,000 as indemnity

Sandra Montano:
b) P 52,116.00 as actual damages

- gunshot wound .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the temporal area left,
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
penetrating the skin, skull minigas, brain substance (right) (tempral regis) where the
slug lodge.
2). To the heirs of the deceased WILLIE ACOSTA
(Exhibit D)
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
Willie Acosta:
b) P 26,358.00 as actual damages
- gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of entrance trajecting
the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and thru trajecting the upper third of the stomach of c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
thoracic vein with the point of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7 th thorasic
vertebrae. 3) To the heirs of the deceased JEMARIE GARCIA:

(Exhibit E) a) P 50,000 as indemnity

On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the attack. They b) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
suffered serious gunshot injuries that could have caused their death were it not for the
timely medical attention given them (TSN July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano sustained 4) To the heirs of the deceased Sandra Montano:
several gunshot wounds on the left arm, two on the left upper back, another on the
left shoulder and middle right finger (TSN June 25, 1996, p. 608). Tibule sustained two
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant (stomach) and the other at the left
periumbelical (TSN July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
b) P 48,269.80 as actual damages
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court rendered a judgment of

59
conviction in the two cases, finding and disposing: 5) To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO:

Page
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747: -- a) P 39,133.92 as actual damages
b) P 100,000.00 as moral damages
6) To the victim RANDY TIBULE:
a) P 36,233.65 as actual damages
b) P 100,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the costs.
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8749: --
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree
No. 1866) and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA
and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as: The law is harsh, but that is the law!
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 180-181, Rollo.)
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for reversal
on the following assigned errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATERIAL,
SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT, DISCREPANCIES IN
THE AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THEIR
TESTIMONIES IN COURT;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RECANTATIONS OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS
DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO VALDEZ AS THE
GUNMAN;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MOTIVE ON THE
PART OF BERNARDO CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT
THE OCCUPANTS OF MOTORIZED TRICYCLE;
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AGAINST THE
PROSECUTION ITS DELIBERATE FAILURE TO PRESENT THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE
DEFENSE WHICH PRESENTED SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED ROLANDO
VALDEZ DID NOT DENY THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM FOR
VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED
IT IN HIS MEMORANDUM.
(pp. 106-107, Rollo)
After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate consideration of the
arguments of accused-appellant, the Court does not find enough basis to reverse.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to consider what he
says are material, substantial, important and significant discrepancies between the
affidavits of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies in court. Accused-appellant
points to the Statement of William Montano, taken by SPO1 Mario Suratos on
September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1: p. 238, Record), and the Statement taken on
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan City
where William Montano specifically named Bernard Castro as the person who flagged
down the motorized tricycle he and the other victims were riding. This, he claims, is
inconsistent with his testimony during the trial where he stated:
ATTY. RANCHEZ:
Q. Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan, Nalsiam, Manaoag, Pangasinan?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at around ten to fifteen
meters, somebody plugged (sic) down the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down your tricycle?
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our motorcycle, sir.
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight was immediately
recognized by me, sir.
Q Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately recognized?
A. That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at the bench for the
accused, and when asked his name, he gave his name as Rolando Valdez.
60
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 11, 1996)
Page
We are not persuaded.
 In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and September 24, 1995
(Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed to Bernard Castro as the person who flagged
down the motorized tricycle ridden by the victims. On November 8, 1995, William and
his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a Pinagsamang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong
ng Demanda where they disclaimed having seen Bernard Castro at the scene of the
crime. They declared that after a more thorough consideration of what transpired, they
have realized that the filing of the complaint against Bernard Castro was a mistake and
the result of misunderstanding or misapprehension of what actually happened. In his
testimony in court, William, however, identified accused-appellant as the person
illuminated by the headlight of the tricycle, for which reason William readily recognized
him. We, therefore, find nothing inconsistent between his declarations during the
investigation and his testimony in court. The lack of precision with which he
distinguished between the person who flagged down the tricycle and the other person
who he recognized because of the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as
inconsistency at all. The same holds true with claimed discrepancies between the
statements of Randy Tibule during the investigation and his testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the withdrawal or retraction
of the accusation of several witnesses against Bernard Castro, these same witnesses
accusation against accused-appellant becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all the references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of his brief to the sworn
declarations of prosecution witnesses made during the investigation of the case,
Bernard Castro may have indeed been identified and named as one of the gunmen. It
may readily be noted in these very same references, however, that all these
prosecution witnesses referred to two other companions, then unidentified, of Bernard
Castro. Even in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7) referred to in page 11 of the brief, the
police investigators categorically referred to Bernard Castro y Nazareno, alias Toti as
one of the suspects or assailants involved in the shooting incident (p. 112, Rollo). The
logical conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that there is at least one other
assailant in addition to Bernard Castro, and as it developed, accused-appellant was
subsequently and positively named as such. Withal, we cannot subscribe to accused-
appellants ratiocination that if the witnesses pointed to Bernard Castro as one of the
perpetrators of the crime, then it follows that accused-appellant cannot be one other
and additional perpetrator anymore. Accused-appellants reasoning on this point is
absolutely flawed. It is totally unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious withdrawal of the
victims charges against Bernard Castro. He insinuates that such recantation should not
have been given any consideration.But, this is water under the bridge. Anyway, even
in the remotest possibility that the retraction of the accusation against Bernard Castro
may be reversed, it does not get accused-appellant off the hook.Considering that
accused-appellant had himself been positively identified, together with Bernard Castro,
as one of the other perpetrators of the crime, his conviction may still stand
independently and regardless of whether or not Castro is indicted or remains
unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro who had the motive
to shoot and fire at the occupants of the motorized tricycle, mistaking one of the
occupants thereof for Isidro Capistrano, Castros former classmate and with whom he
earlier had an altercation. It is very clear in his brief, however, that accused-appellant
predicates this argument on the mistaken premise that he was not positively identified
in the case at bar although he admits that it is established that he was at the scene of
the crime (p. 114, Rollo). This argument will not hold simply because it is settled that
accused-appellant had been positively identified by eyewitnesses and victims William
Montano and Randy Tibule. It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is
necessary for conviction only when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, not
when accused has been positively identified as in the present case ( People vs.
Caggaunan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 422 [1980]; People vs.
Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to be noted that lack of motive for
committing the crime does not preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a
matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious offense for
no reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecutions deliberate and
intentional failure to present the investigating police officers and their Joint Affidavit
(Exhibit 7) constitutes culpable suppression of evidence which, if duly taken into
account, will merit his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself was able to present
the police officers, and exhibit 7 (p. 116, Rollo). It is to be further noted that as earlier
pointed out, the declaration of SPO1 Suratos and SPO1 Carbonel did not categorically
rule out the possibility of convicting other persons as co-principals of Castro. On the
contrary, it is clear from such affidavit that there was more than just one perpetrator
of the crime. It even confirms and corroborates the eyewitness accounts of William
Montano and Randy Tibule pointing to accused-appellant as one of the other
companions of Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and every piece of evidence
on record, the Court finds no reason to depart from the trial courts accord of credence
to the eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule who positively
identified accused-appellant as one of the persons who shot and fired at them and their
companions that fateful night. We agree with the trial court that the evidence points
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was one of those principally
responsible for the deaths of the four victims in this case and the wounding of two
others. There is also sufficient evidence that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
attended the killings, thus, qualifying the same to murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the
victim might make (People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that
61
treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving
the victim no opportunity to repel it or depend himself against such attack. What is
Page
decisive is that the execution of the attack, without slightest provocation from the
victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to
retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise present. After
reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any showing of evident premeditation
on the part of accused-appellant. While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to
an altercation between Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano, it does sufficiently
prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. It is
not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent
must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must
not merely be premeditation; it must be evident premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43
SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the following have to be
prove: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow the offender to
reflect on the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the crime does not constitute
sufficient ground to consider the existence of evident premeditation. At best, it may
indicate the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime (the first
element). Their act of arming themselves with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter
waiting for their supposed victims at ambush positions may have also indicated that
they clung to their determination to commit the crime (the second element). More
important that these two elements is the proof that a sufficient period of time had
lapsed between the outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense
(the third element). There must have been enough opportunity for the initial impulse
to subside. This element is indispensable for circumstance of evident premeditation to
aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 134 [1972], this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only when there had been
a cold and deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the
criminal act. There must be an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate
on the meaning and the consequences of what they had planned to do, an interval
long enough for the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and
scheme.
(p. 649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court had stressed the
importance of sufficient time between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out
the criminal intent, affording such opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive
at a calm judgment. Obviously, this element is wanting in the case at bar. Right after
the supposed heated argument between Bernard Castro and Capistrano, Castro and
company went home to get the firearms and not long thereafter mounted the assault.
There was no chance for the anger to subside. The culprits in the case at bar had no
opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court is that of abuse
of superior strength. This contravenes the very basic and elementary doctrine in our
jurisdiction that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed
in treachery (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1
[1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating circumstances, if we were to
uphold the trial courts premises on the complex nature of the crime committed, the
death sentence, being the maximum penalty for murder, would still have been the
imposable penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court however,
finds compelling reasons to reduce the sentence from one death penalty (for the
complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder) and one reclusion
perpetua (for the complex crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions) to
four counts of reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate sentences
of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the 2 frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the Peoples brief that accused-
appellant should instead be convicted of four counts of murder and two counts of
frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the erroneous
Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the
complex crime of multiple murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1, Record: Crim.
Case No. U-8747). It may be noted that in his Resolution dated September 26, 1995,
the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found a prima
facie case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101- 102, Ibid.) Too, the same
investigating judge in his Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case
for two counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon reinvestigation by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime
of murder with double frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated
November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as
falling under the first. It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four
62
crimes of murder resulted not from a single act but from several individual and distinct
acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman
Page
involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It cannot be
said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also
several empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the
fact that several shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative positions of
the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself
while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible
for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by each
gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment
at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the
complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty,
not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death
of the four victims in this case. In the same manner, accused-appellant is likewise held
guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried
if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved (murder or
homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
detat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered
as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime
of Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty
for the four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold
death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not beneficial to
accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be
given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium
penalty is the lower indivisible penalty or reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty
should be four sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two
counts of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out an indeterminate
sentence ranging from a minimum of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum
of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal for each offense.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect to Criminal Case
No. U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of four counts of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four
sentences of reclusion perpetua. He is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of frustrated murder and hereby meted two indeterminate sentences, each,
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appealed
judgment relating to the civil liabilities of accused-appellant towards the six victims is
AFFIRMED.

Now, to the matter of accused-appellants conviction for illegal possession of Criminal Case No. U-8749 involving Presidential Decree No. 1866 is hereby
unlicensed firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866. It was recently held in the case dismissed.
entitled People vs. Molina (G.R.No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated in People
vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no separate No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294. SO ORDERED.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating
circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which in part, provides:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication
on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September
17, 1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will
generally have prospective application. In cases, however, where the new law will be
advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22,
Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from
a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No.
8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal
Possession of Firearm) subject of this present review.

63
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for illegal

Page
possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer
be any prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending
PEOPLE v. SANIDAD
G.R. No. 146099 April 30, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JIMMEL SANIDAD, PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG, JOHN DOE (at large)
and PETER DOE (at large),accused.
JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG, appellants.
PER CURIAM:
CONDEMNED TO DEATH by the trial court on 26 July 20001 for the complex crime of
murder and multiple attempted murder, accused-appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and
PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG now seek the reversal of their conviction as we review
automatically the judgment pursuant to Sec. 22, Rep. Act No. 7659, amending Art. 47
of The Revised Penal Code.
On 16 January 1999 at around five o'clock in the afternoon Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay,
Raymund Fontanilla, Rolando Tugadi, Pepito Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo,
Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis Balueg left Budac, Tagum, Abra, on board
a passenger jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo to attend a barangay fiesta in the
neighboring town of Lagangilang, Abra. When they arrived they joined the residents in
a drinking spree that lasted up to the wee hours the following morning. In the course
of their conviviality, accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel
alias Pambong and several other residents of Lagangilang joined them in
drinking.2 Marlon Tugadi and accused Jimmel Sanidad were drinking buddies and
members of the CAFGU before then.3
On 17 January 1999 at about four o'clock in the morning Jimmel Sanidad and his
companions finished drinking and left.4 Shortly after, the group of Marlon Tugadi also
stopped drinking and headed home for Budac, Tagum, Abra, boarding the same
jeepney driven by Delfin Tadeo. Seated next to Delfin in front were Ricardo Tadeo and
Rolando Tugadi, while on the left rear seat were Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay and
Raymund Fontanilla. Seated on the right rear seat were Bobby Velasquez, Dennis
Balueg, Edwin Tumalip and Pepito Tugadi.5
With Delfin Tadeo on the wheels the jeepney cruised the rough and gravelly dirt road
of Abra-Cervantes with its passengers completely unaware that danger lurked ahead
in the dark and dreary stretch of the road. The jeepney's headlights sharply ablaze and
glaring illuminated the path and radiated towards the lush vegetation of the
surrounding landscape. As the jeepney approached a plantation, its headlights beamed
at accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel and two (2) other unidentified
companions who were positioned next to a mango tree at the left side of the road
approximately fifteen (15) meters away. Accused-appellants were armed with an
armalite, a .45 caliber pistol and shotguns with buckshots.
As the jeepney moved closer, the accused in a classic case of ambuscade suddenly and
without warning unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney.6 Delfin stepped on the gas
in a vain effort to elude their assailants, but they continued firing at the hapless victims.
Bullets plowed the side of the vehicle and all the passengers sitting at the back
instinctively ducked on the floor to avoid being hit. The accused pursued the vehicle
on foot and fired at it incessantly until it finally stalled a few meters away.7
The jeepney was left in shambles. Its tires, headlights and taillights were shattered; its
windshield broken to pieces, and the front and left sides of the vehicle riddled with
bullets.8 Miraculously, almost all of its passengers, with the exception of Rolando
Tugadi, survived the ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Marlon Tugadi tried to
pull his brother Rolando Tugadi from the vehicle to safety only to realize that he was
not only too heavy, he was already dead. As the pursuing gunmen drew near, Marlon
decided to abandon Rolando and scampered away with the other victims until they
reached a bushy area about fifteen (15) meters away from the vehicle.9
Meanwhile, the accused caught up with the crippled jeepney. Moments later, fire
engulfed it. The radiant flames of the burning vehicle illuminated the malefactors who
stood nearby and watched the blaze. It could not be determined whether the accused
purposely set the vehicle on fire or the fuel tank was hit during the shooting that ignited
the fire. Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi later heard one of the unidentified
companions of accused-appellant Sanidad say to him: "My gosh, we were not able to
kill all of them."10 Thereafter, the accused left the scene, firing their guns
indiscriminately into the air as they walked away.11
Apparently shaken and dazed by their terrifying ordeal, the victims hid in a culvert on
the side of the road and did not come out until the police arrived at the scene. The
police doused the burning vehicle with water and found the charred remains of Rolando
Tugadi.12 Likewise retrieved at the crime scene were eighty-five (85) empty shells from
an armalite rifle, two (2) empty shells from a .45 caliber pistol, and a slug from another
.45 caliber pistol.13
Dr. Maria L. Dickenson, Medico-Legal Officer of Lagangilang, Abra, conducted an
autopsy on Rolando Tugadi immediately after the incident. Her postmortem findings
were: (a) carbonization of the body, (b) long bones of lower extremities still burning,
(c) presence of lower half portion of charred skull, (d) presence of left charred thigh,
(e) presence of right charred thigh, and (e) presence of upper third of charred right
leg. Cause of death: burns, generalized, 6th degree.14
An Information for murder with multiple attempted murder and malicious mischief was
filed against Jimmel Sanidad, Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, John Doe and Peter Doe.
The defense of the accused rested on bare denial and alibi. They disclaimed liability for
the ambush insisting that at about 4:00 to 4:30 in the morning of 17 January 1999
64
they were already at home sleeping when they heard the clatter of gunfire and an
explosion nearby. But the trial court disregarded the defense interposed by the accused
Page
and forthwith convicted them of the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted
murder, and sentenced them to death.
In this mandatory review, the legal questions raised essentially centered on: first, the
credibility of witnesses; and, second, the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
We affirm the conviction. We find that the prosecution succeeded overwhelmingly in
meeting the quantum of proof required to overturn the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The trial court properly convicted accused-appellants on the basis of the
credible and uncontroverted testimonies of the victims and other prosecution
witnesses.
It is axiomatic that the assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a function best
discharged by the trial court which is in a better position to determine conflicting
testimonies after having heard the witnesses, and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying. This Court will not interfere with the trial court's findings on the
credibility of witnesses unless those findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances
of weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied by the
judge which, if considered, would have affected the outcome of the case.15 None of
the exceptions have been shown to exist in the instant case.
Accused-appellants pointed out supposed inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and
Raymund Fontanilla, thus —
x x x x . ordinary human conduct is very predictable. When confronted with
danger, the first reaction is to avoid it. But not Jun Quipay, Marlon Tugadi,
Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla. While all claimed they have jumped
out of the jeep, they did not run away. Instead they still lingered at about 7–
50 meters away from the jeep. So that they saw the attackers when the jeep
exploded. How remarkable is their depiction of the accused as unafraid of an
exploding jeep! The testimonies of Jun Quipay and Marlon Tugadi cancel each
other out. Marlon said he saw the ambushers come out with guns blazing. Jun
said Marlon was lying down with eyes closed when that moment happened.
Again, back to human nature, Marlon Tugadi and Pepito Tugadi saw with the
morning light that their brother Rolando Tugadi is (sic) no more. A carbonized
cadaver he became. And yet they did not tell the police who did the dastardly
acts! How unnatural. And yet they claimed in court that they positively
identified the accused at the time of the ambush.16
After a cursory reading of the transcripts, however, we find that the supposed
inconsistent and inaccurate details are relatively trivial and do not affect the veracity
of the testimonies of Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund
Fontanilla. Indeed, inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of witnesses
which refer to minor and insignificant details do not destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies and inaccuracies even manifest truthfulness and candor, and erase any
suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.17
At any rate, the ineludible fact remains that Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi
and Raymund Fontanilla were all at the scene of the crime and almost got killed during
the ambush. They were eyewitnesses to the gruesome death of a family member in
the hands of accused-appellants. What is important is that they conveyed to the trial
court what they actually perceived, including those seeming improbabilities, on that
fateful day; and they categorically supplied all the facts necessary for accused-
appellants' conviction. Verily, victims of crimes cannot be expected to recall with exact
precision the minutiae of the incident. Human memory is not as unerring as a
photograph.18 Different persons having different reflexes produce varying reactions,
impressions, perceptions and recollections. Their physical, mental and emotional
conditions may have also affected the recall of the details of the incident.
Significantly, the victims positively identified accused-appellants Jimmel Sanidad and
Ponce Manuel in open court as among those who ambushed them in the early morning
of 17 January 1999 at the Abra-Cervantes Road, which led to the death of Rolando
Tugadi. Quoted hereunder is an excerpt from Marlon Tugadi's testimony —
Q: Mr. Witness, do you know one by the name of Jimmel Sanidad?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Will you please focus your eyes around and point to that person
Jimmel Sanidad?
A: (Witness pointed to a man seated at the accused bench and when
asked of his name he answered Jimmel Sanidad.)
Q: Why do you know this accused Jimmel Sanidad Mr. Witness?
A: We were in the same batch in the CAFGU sir.
Q: Aside from being a CAFGU batch member, what else do you know of
this accused Jimmel Sanidad?
A: We sometimes drink together when I go to their place, sir.
Q: How about the other accused Ponce Manuel alias Pambong, again I
ask you to focus your eyes around and point at him and identify him?
A: (Witness pointed to a man seated at the accused bench and when
asked of his name he answered Ponce Manuel).19
65
Victims Jun Quipay, Pepito Tugadi and Raymund Fontanilla were likewise asked during
Page
the trial to identify the malefactors who staged the ambush, and they all pointed to
Jimmel Sanidad and Ponce Manuel.
It must be stressed that the incidents prior to, during and after the attack provided the
victims with more than sufficient opportunity to identify accused-appellants as the
perpetrators of the dastardly acts. The victims had a drinking session with their
assailants that lasted for many hours. During the ambush itself, the headlights of the
victims' vehicle illuminated the assailants. Again, when the vehicle burst into flames
after the ambush, the surroundings were bathed in light including the assailants who
were standing nearby, thus enabling the victims to have a good look at their faces.
These circumstances, coupled with the victims' familiarity with accused-appellants,
rendered a mistaken identification very unlikely.
The general denial and alibi of the defense are too lame to be legally accepted as true,
especially when measured up against the positive identification of accused-appellants.
The doctrine is well settled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses as they
are easy to concoct and fabricate but difficult to disprove. Denial and alibi should be
rejected when the identities of accused-appellants are sufficiently and positively
established by eyewitnesses to the crime.
For alibi to be credible, the accused must not only prove his presence at another place
at the time of the commission of the offense but must also demonstrate that it would
be physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at that time. In the case at
bar, accused-appellants claimed that they were in their respective houses at the time
of the ambush. But the record shows that the house of accused-appellant Jimmel
Sanidad's sister where he was staying in Sitio Bio, San Isidro, Lagangilang, Abra, is but
a mere six (6) to seven (7)-minute walk, or about 700 meters, from the crime
scene.20 While accused-appellant Ponce Manuel lived "in the same place, (in) the same
community."21
Equally untenable is accused-appellants' assertion that the delay of the victims in
identifying their ambushers for more than four (4) weeks points to the conclusion that
"all the survivors of the ambush were really and timely clueless as to who the
perpetrators of the ambush (were)."22
Delay in reporting a crime to the authorities is not an uncommon phenomenon. The
rule is, delay by a witness in divulging what he or she knows about a crime is not by
itself a setback to the evidentiary value of such witness' testimony, where the delay is
sufficiently justified by any acceptable explanation. Thus, a well-founded fear of reprisal
or the individual manner by which individuals react when confronted by a gruesome
event as to place the viewer in a state of shock for sometime, is a valid excuse for the
temporary silence of witnesses. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General in the
present case —
x x x the victims in the instant case were survivors of an extremely violent
incident which inflicts severe concomitant psychological stress on them.
Considering also that the survivors were being investigated by the police from
another municipality where the perpetrators not only reside but one of them
was even a member of the CAFGU, it is a natural reaction for the victims not
to reveal that they know the identities of the perpetrators and induce them to
take action to prevent the victims from testifying x x x x Furthermore, Marlon
Tugadi insisted to the police during the investigation that he knew who
ambushed them but that he would talk only after his brother's interment. This
hardly qualifies as an unusual behavior.23
Conspiracy and treachery, as the trial court found, attended the commission of the
crime. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy
be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. Only rarely
would such an agreement be demonstrable because criminal undertakings, in the
nature of things, are rarely documented by written agreements. The concerted actions
of accused-appellants, however, clearly evinced conspiracy. Their simultaneous acts of
peppering the victims' jeepney with bullets, and thereafter chasing the vehicle to
prevent its escape, were undoubtedly in pursuance of a common felonious design. All
these sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt that they conspired to consummate
the killing of the victim.24
On treachery, the deadly successive shots of accused-appellants did not allow the
victims any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The victims were like a flock of
sheep waylaid and ferociously attacked by a pack of ravening wolves. While the victims
might have realized a possible danger to their persons when they saw accused-
appellants, all armed and positioned in a mango tree ahead of them, the attack was
executed in such a vicious manner as to make the defense, not to say a counter-attack,
virtually impossible.
Under the circumstances, it is plain to us that accused-appellants had murder in their
hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims. They must consequently be held liable
for their acts. Insofar as victims Marlon Tugadi, Jun Quipay, Raymund Fontanilla, Pepito
Tugadi, Delfin Tadeo, Ricardo Tadeo, Edwin Tumalip, Bobby Velasquez and Dennis
Balueg are concerned, although they barely escaped the ambush with superficial
injuries does not alter the nature of accused-appellants' participation in the crime of
murder except that not one of them having suffered fatal injuries which could have
resulted in their death, accused-appellants should only be held guilty of attempted
murder. Accused-appellants had commenced their criminal scheme to liquidate all the
victims directly by overt acts, but were unable to perform all the acts of execution that
would have brought about their death by reason of some cause other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the victims successfully dodged the hail of gunfire and
escaped.
We fully agree with the lower court that the instant case comes within the purview of
Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which, speaking of complex crimes, provides that
when "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed in its maximum period." In a complex crime, although two or
66
more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the
law as well as in the conscience of the offender.25
Page
Although several independent acts were performed by the accused in firing separate
shots from their individual firearms, it was not possible to determine who among them
actually killed victim Rolando Tugadi. Moreover, there is no evidence that accused-
appellants intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly
from each other. On the contrary, the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse
to kill Marlon Tugadi's group as a whole.26 Thus, one of accused-appellants exclaimed
in frustration after the ambush: "My gosh, we were not able to kill all of them."27 Where
a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done
in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a single complex offense.28

The penalty for the most serious offense of murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. It therefore
becomes our painful duty in the instant case to apply the maximum penalty in
accordance with law, and sentence accused-appellants to death.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 26 July 2000 finding accused-
appellants JIMMEL SANIDAD and PONCE MANUEL alias PAMBONG guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder and imposing upon them the
supreme penalty of DEATH is AFFIRMED.

Accused-appellants are likewise ordered jointly and severally to: (a) INDEMNIFY the
heirs of the deceased victim Rolando Tugadi in the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity as well as P50,000.00 as moral damages; and, (b) PAY victim Delfin Tadeo
the sum of P50,000.00 for the loss of his jeepney.

In accordance with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep.
Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to Her Excellency the President for the possible exercise of her pardoning
power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

67
Page
PEOPLE v. LAWAS
[ GR Nos. L-7618-20, Jun 30, 1955 ]
LABRADOR, J.:
In G.R. No. L-7618 (Crim, Case No. 180, Court of First Instance of Lanao), Crispin
Lawas, Agustin Osorio, Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Agapito
Gumisad have appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance finding each of
them guilty of the crime of robbery, and sentencing each to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three years,
eight months and one day of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the
offended party Manaronsong Lomangcolob, in the following manner; Crispin Lawas and
Agapito Gumisad, P50.00 each; Clemente Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio,
P266.00 each; and Agustin Osorio, P500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. The appeal of Agapito Gumisad has, however,
been dismissed for failure on his part to file a brief. This appeal in this Court, therefore,
only refers to the others.
In G.R. No. L-7613 (Crim. Case No. 444, Court of First Instance of Lanao), Crispin
Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio hava appealed from a judgment of tha
Court of First Instance of Lanao, finding them guilty of multiple murder and sentencing
each of them to suffer tha indeterminate penalty of from ten years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years four months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the
deceased in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
In G.R. No. L-7620 (Crim. Case No. 373, Court of First Instance of Lanao),
Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad, Generoso Osorio and Patricio
Pinos were also found guilty of tha crime of multiple murder and sentenced to the same
penalty imposed upon Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio in Criminal
Case No. 444. They have also appealed from the decision. But the appeals of Agapito
Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon have been dismissed for failure on their part to
file briefs. The case now proceeds on appeal only as to Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio
and Patrocinio Pinos.
The evidence shows that on July 3, 1042 various Moros (Maranaos) from Barrio Baris,
Municipality of Kolambugan, province of Lanao, raided the barrio of Malingao, killing
11 Christian residents including men and women, wounding two of them, and,
thereafter, robbing them of their belongings. This incident was reported to the home
guards, an organization composed of ex-Philippine Constabulary soldiers and civilians
whose duty it was to preserve peace and order among the inhabit ants, protect them,
and prevent the infiltration of the Japanese in their communities. The report was made
to appellant Crispin Lawas, head of the home guards in Balimbing and to Sgt. Benaojan,
also head of home guards in Salong. Upon learning of the incident, Lawas and Benaojan
and some home guards proceeded to the barrio of Malingao to check up the report.
There they found the asad bodies of the Christian Filipinos killed by the Maranaos and
learned that the Maranaos who had committed the act came from the barrio of Baris.
So they proceeded to the barrio of Baris in the afternoon of July 10. Upon reaching
Baris, they divided themselves into two groups, one headed by Sgt. Benaojan and the
other by Crispin Lawas. That headed by Sgt. Benaojan gathered the Maranaos around
the place of ex-Mayor Gunti, while that headed by Crispin Lawas, those that live around
the house of Datu Lomangcolob. Some seventy of them, including Manaronsong
Lomangcolob. school teacher, Datu Lomangcolob Sumala, his wife and children, Gunti
Ampaso, his wife and children, Pasintao, his wife and four children, Laito, his wife and
four children, Pacpac, his wife, niece and nephew, Mainanding Lomangcolob and two
children, Dibton and children, Garagabos and wife, Rutum, his wife and children, Aboli
and a child, Adki's children, and others were brought by the home guards to the barrio
of Salong, where they arrived in the evening of July 10th, between seven and eight
o'clock. When the home guards were in the barrio of Baris, they or some of them took
away three carabaos, two horses, and many personal belongings, especially of Datu
Lomangcolob. This is the basis of the charge of robbery.
The Maranaos were confined during the night of July 10 under guard in the house of
one Restituto Requino. The next morning, Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio began
investigating the principal Moros. Some 15 of them were brought down in groups of
five before Lawas and Osorio. A table was set up near the rice mill of Pedro Lacson and
there Lawas and Osorio questioned them. In the course of the investigation, and for
reasons which are disputed, the home guards then on duty and present at the
investigation fired at the Moros and most of them were killed. In the course of the
melee that followed, some of the home guards and others who could not be identified,
went up the house of Restituto Requino and fired at the woman and children who were
on the second floor of the house. Some of the women and children were stabbed. No
less than 35 women and children were killed and no less than 16 of the Moros down
below were also killed. Among the killed were Datu Lomangcolob Sumala, Gunti
Ampaso, Pasintao, Laito, Pacpac and Rutum. For this killing, two charges of multiple
murder were filed, one against Crispin Lawas, Agustin Osorio and Clemente Osorio,
and another against Hermenegildo Tabacon, Felipe Si-it, Agapito Gumisad, Generoso
Osorio and Patricio Pinos.
Insofar as the crime of robbery is concerned, principal witness Manaronsong
Lomangcolob, son of. Datu Lomangcolob. Sumala, declared that the Home guards who
gathered them in . the barrio of Baris and later brought them to the barrio . of. Salong
took from them (the Maranaos) 3 carabaos worth P800, 2 horses worth P100, and
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jewelry and other personal belongings worth P500. The animals were taken away by
the following home guards: Lawas, 1 horse; Agapito Gumisad, 1 horse; and Clemente
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Osorio, Felipe Si-it and Generoso Osorio, one carabao each. Of the accused, the
following were seen coming down from the houses of the Maranaos, bringing with Pedro Lacson, a resident of Barrio Salong, corroborated tha principal parts of the above
them malongs, bracelets and other personal belongings: Generoso Osorio, Felipe Si-it, testimony of Manaronsong Lomangcolob, declaring that he (Lacson) was under the
Hermenegildo Tabacon, Agustin Osorio, Clemente Osorio and Agapito Gumisad. eaves of his house observing the investigation that Lawas and Osorio were conducting;
that he noticed Lawas ordering the men to be brought down from the house of
Restituto Requino; that in the course of the investigation, Lawas said that the Moros
would be brought to Balimbing where Captain Morgan was and that the Moros were to
Of the above-named accused, only Lawas testified, but he made no denial of the taking
have their hands tied; that Datu Lomangoolob expressed willingness to go to Captain
by him of one of the horses. None of the briefs or memoranda filed on behalf of the
Morgan, but that he was not willing to have his hands tied; and that then a commotion
appellant claims or mentions grounds why appellants should not be held guilty of
ensued and then Crispin Lawas gave his men the order to fire. In connection with the
robbery, although certain discrepancies appear in Lomangcolob's testimony as to the
massacre of the women in the second floor of the house of Restituto Requino, it is very
manner in which the said horses and carabaos ware taken. Admitting that there are
clear that in the course of the shooting two persons, not companions of Lawas, went
discrepancies in tho said testimony as to the details of the taking, the evidence
up the house of Requino and, perhaps, helped in boloing the 15 women and children
conclusively shows that the accused designated above took the animals and properties
in said house.
in question. No denial of this fact was ever made. There is insinuation that some of the
animals may have been some of those taken at the raid of Malingao, but no satisfactory
evidence exists on which a finding to that effect can be predicated. The evidence also
shows that the accused were armed at the time of the taking of the animals and other A third witness corroborated the most important details of the above testimonies.
personal properties. The finding of the trial court that the accused are guilty of robbery Manking Aguam, claiming to be 11 years old when the incident took place, testified as
as above-indicated is fully supported by the evidence. There is no evidence, however, follows: That he was with the women and children in the upper floor of the house of
of the existence of any conspiracy among the accused in the commission of tha acts of Restituto Requino before the investigation began; that he saw some of the accused as
robbery and each one must respond for his own individual act. they brought down the male Maranaos for the purpose of investigation; that the firing
was caused by the refusal of the Maranaos to accede to have their hands tied as
ordered by Crispin Lawas: that in the course of the shooting, Agapito Gumisad, Felipe
Si-it, Clemente Osorio, Tito Requino and Patricio Pinos shot at the women and children
As to the charge of multiple murder, tha death of about fifty of the Maranaos, including
and stabbed them with boloes; and that Gumisad was trying to stab him and what he
fifteen men, twenty five women and ten children is not questioned; but the
did was to jump down and run away.
circumstances under which their death took place are the object of conflicting evidence.
The three witnesses for the prosecution claim that the Moros were fired at when Datu
Lomangcolob refused to be tied at the hands, while the defense claims that they were
fired at because they attempted to grab the arms of the home guards. The evidence Only two of the accused took the witness stand, namely, Crispin Lawas and Agustin
submitted by both sides on this issue may be summarized as follows: Osorio. Other witnesses testified for them, but their testimonies are of no material
value insofar as the main issue is concerned. Crispin Lawas testified that upon the
receipt of the report of the raid on the Christian Filipinos by the Maranaos on July 9,
he met with Captain Morgan, the head of the home guards and tha PC; that thereupon
Manaronsong Lomangcolob testified that while he and four of his companions namely,
Captain Morgan instructed him to accompany Sgt, Benaojan and proceed to Barrio
Gunti Ampaso, lacpac and Datu Lomangcolob ware in front of the table before which
Malingao to investigate the incident; that in pursuance of said order, he and Sgt.
Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio were making the investigation, Lawas first asked
Banaojan went to Barrio Malingao and saw the dead persons there; that he found out
them to sign blank papers, and that they, the Maranaos, refused; but they were beaten
after investigation that some of the Moros who made the raid came from Barrio Baris,
with rifles and boxed, so Datu Lomangcolob enjoined him and his companions to sign
so he and Sgt, Benaojan and their men proceeded to Baris; that the people of that
the blank papers as demanded by the investigators; that afterwards Crispin Lawas
place were gathered together in the afternoon of July 10 and that they took them along
informed the Maranaos that they would be brought to Captain Morgan at Balimbing
to Barrio Salong; that when they reached that place, Sgt. Benaojan ordered the Moros
and for this purpose their hands were to be tied; that for the purpose of tying their
to stay in the house of Restituto Requino and that this was done; that at dawn the
hands, Hermenegildo Tabacon, one of the home guards, brought some pieces of split
following day, Lawas went to Captain Morgan to make a report, and that Captain
rattan; that as Datu Lomangcolob was approached to have his hands tied, he refused
Morgan ordered him to investigate the leaders of the Moros and, afterwards, send the
and, thereupon, Crispin Lawas fired his revolver at him and ordered the guards to fire;
result of his investigation to him; that he returned to the barrio of Salong the following
that following instructions, the home guards fired at the Moros and many of them fell
morning; that at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day (July 11), he

69
down dead; that those Moros who tried to escape were also fired at; and that after a
ordered a table to be placed on the ground and that the investigation of the Moros be
short time Crispin Lawas ordered his men to "cease fire", and the firing stopped.;
conducted; that the investigation took place in the following order: first Mayor Gunti,

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Datu Lomangcolob, Datu Pacpac and Manaronsong Lomangcolob together; that as said
investigation proceeded, the Moros suddenly rushed at the home guards to grab their
guns and so a commotion arose; that he and Agustin Osorio did not know what had
happened and upon hearing gun fire he stood astounded; that because of the presence
of the women and children, he ordered his guards to cease fire, which was done; that
throughout the time of the firing, he could not do anything but stand up; that his
companion Agustin Osorio in the meanwhile lied flat on the ground; and that afterwards
he went to the middle of the place where the gathering was and found out that many
Moros were dead.
For his part, accused Agustin Osorio testified that on July 10, he was ordered by Sgt.
Benaojan to go to Camp 5 with 4 soldiers to investigate the maltreatment of a Christian
Filipino; that on their way back from the investigation, they heard shots coming from
Barrio Malingao and so they went to that barrio and upon arriving there they found 11
Christian Filipinos dead and 2 wounded; that he received information about the incident
from one, Piano Taborada, who said that the ones who made the raid were from Barrio
Baris; that when he returned to Barrio Salong, he reported the incident to Sgt.
Benaojan; that he accompanied Sgt. Benaojan and Crispin Lawas on July 10 to Barrio
Malingao where they saw 11 Christians dead and 2 wounded; that after the
investigation conducted in Barrio Malingao, they went to Barrio Baris where they arrived
at five o'clock in the afternoon; that upon reaching Barrio Baris, Mayor Gunti sounded
the "agong" and the people of the barrio swarmed around them; that they brought
some of the men to the barrio of Salong and there they were ordered to sleep in the
house of Restituto Requino; that after breakfast the following morning, July 11, an
investigation was to be made and after the male Moros were brought down he and
Lawas began investigating them; that after investigating 6 of the Moros, and while
investigating the 7th, he immediately noticed a commotion among the Moros and the
soldiers because of the fact that the former were grabbing the firearms of the latter;
that in the course of the struggle the guns of the soldiers were exploded; that because
of the noise Lawas could not give any order so he and Lawas laid themselves down flat
on the ground and after one minute in this position, Lawas ordered that the guards
cease firing and the firing stopped; that he could not tell where the firing started
because at the time when it began Lawas was dictating to him and he was writing
down what Lawas dictated; and that after the firing had ceased, ha looked around and
found many teoros. dead, while the soldiers (home guards) had run away.
There is no question that before Lawas fired at Datu Lomangcolob and the home guards
also fired at the other Monos, there was a sort of commotion, evidently produced by
the announcement made by Lawas that the Moros were to be brought to Captain
Morgan at Balimbing and that their hands were to be tied. The existence of this
commotion is admitted by Pedro Lacson, eye witness to the incident, who said "But
then the Moros refused that they will go there with the Christian and immediately a
commotion started and because of that, Crispin Lawas ordered them to be fired at."
The issue lies on the cause or origin of said commotion, for while the prosecution
contends that this was produced by the refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands
tied, the defense claims that the commotion was produced by the Moros suddenly
rushing at the soldiers to grab their firearms, arid so they were fired at. The theory of
the defense is not warranted by the facts and circumstances proved and admitted. Had
the Moros actually rushed at the soldiers to grapple with these for the possession of
the firearms, they would have mixed up with the soldiers in body struggles and it would
have been impossible for the soldiers to fire at them without hitting their own
companions. Had there been a free for all struggle for the arms of the soldiers, the
latter could not have fired at and hit the Moros without hitting others or their own
companions. But only one of the home guards was wounded by a stray bullet; no others
received any injury in the course of the commotion. Besides, a volley of shots appeared
to have been fired immediately when the commotion started, as a result of which many
Moros fell down dead. This would not have been the case had real grappling for the
possession of the guns taken place as claimed by the defense. If a struggle for the
possession df the firearms had taken place, the shots would have come intermittently.
If there were shots made after the first volley had been fired they were aimed at the
escaping Moros. All the above circumstances belie the claim of the defense that the
Moros tried to grab the firearms of the solders, and that the latter fired at them as a
consequence of the said attempt.
On the other hand, neither can the theory of the prosecution that upon refusal of Datu
Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, Lawas gave the order to fire at the Moros, be
admitted on its face value. Witness Pedro Lacson, who appears to be the most impartial
of the witnesses, admits that there was a commotion, although he did not specify the
nature and character thereof. If any commotion ever existed at all, it must have bean
caused by the announcement that the Moros were to be tied. This announcement must
have angered the Morors, who must have protested the act; theretofore, they had
submitted themselves to the arrest without protest or resistance. The most reasonable
inference is that upon hearing that their hands were to be tied and as the leader was
going to have his hands tied and he refused or resisted, the Maranaos must have
angrily protested, showing an attitude of hostility or resistance; and this attitude must
have been interpretted by Lawas and the soldiers as a determination to resist and even
to fight, Perhaps, this belief also must have produced the impression upon the mind of
Lawas that the Moros were bent on something like the use of force, such as the
grabbing of the firearms of the soldiers, and perhaps it may have been in an attempt
to forestall such a frantic and unexpected attack that Lawas gave the order to fire and
that he himself fired at Datu Lomangcolob. We think that this must have happened;
that Lawas believed that the Moros were about to resist and even attempt to fight for
the arms, so he gave the order to fire.
There can not, therefore, be any circumstance that would qualify the killing of the
Maranaos as murder; there was no evident premeditation; neither was there treachery
because the Moros were face to face with the soldiers; and neither could there be
abuse of superior strength because the soldiers did not expressly take advantage of
70
their arms to commit the offense.
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On the other hand, there is no circumstance present in the killing which may sufficiently
serve to mitigate the offense that has been committed. It is possible that an attitude
of hostility accompanied the refusal of Datu Lomangcolob to have his hands tied, which
attitude must have been shared by his companions; and it is also possible that the fear
of well-known Moro ferociousness could have made Lawas and his companions believe
that the Moros were bent on refusing to be tied. But there is no evidence that they
went beyond showing their refusal or hostility, or an apparent act on their part such as
would induce a reasonable belief that the Maranaos were about to begin an aggression
against their captors. Their peaceful conduct at the time of their arrest and before the
investigation showed that they were submissive and obedient. No circumstance,
therefore, can sufficiently justify a finding that the offense was committed with any
mitigating circumstance. The offense committed is plain, simple homicide, with respect
to Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio, as it is also with respect to thos3 soldiers who
fired at the Moros at the time the commotion arose.
But with respect to the killing of the women and children in the upper story of the
house of Restituto Requino, the killing is plainly attended by the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. The women and children were defenseless; there is no evidence
that they showed any act of defiance or hostility, and while the soldiers were given an
order to fire at the Moros then on the ground, said order could not imply or include an
order to go up the house and massacre the innocent and defenseless women and
children therein. Persons who participated in the killing of the women should be made
to suffer the penalty commensurate with the degree of perversity which attended this
act. While evident premeditation may not be assumed, because the massacre of the
women and children was part of the impulse that resulted in the killing of the Moros
on the ground, yet the women and children were defenseless and could offer no
resistance at all. Their defenseless condition should be considered as included in the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, not as an independent
circumstance of treachery. We find, therefore, that only one aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, or the killing of the women and children, and
that is tha abuse of superior strength, which aggravating circumstance raises the
offense to that of murder.
The question which still has to be considered is tha determination from among the
appellants of those who may be convicted of the murder of the women and children.in
the house of Restituto Requino. Witness Pedro Lacson declared that he saw two men
armed with bolos going up the house as the shooting of the Moros on the ground was
in progress, but he asserted that these did not belong to the group of home guards led
by Crispin Lawas. But Manking Aguam identified Agapito Gumisad, Felipa Si-it,
Clemente Osorio, Pedro Benaojan, Tito Requino and Patricio Pinos as among those who
went up and shot or stabbed the women and children in the house. The identification
is not contradicted nor denied by the defense, but except as to Gumisad, who was well
known to the witness before the incident, the identification is not as positive and certain
as to amount to proof of their identities beyond reasonable doubt. Thus witness
identified Tito Requino as one of the assailants; but Requino was never known before
that time by the witness. He also identified another as Benaojan, but the other evidence
submitted by the State itself shows that Benaojan was not present at the time of the
incident. In another part of his testimony, the witness said that Tabacon, Pinos and
Generoso Osorio were among those who brought down the Moros; while in tha same
testimony, he asserts it was one old man, Mauricio Macasarte, who also went up. There
was no corroboration offered by any more competent and disinterested witness. This
vacillating and doubtful identification, coupled with tha fact that the witness was only
eleven years of age at tha time of the incident and made tho identification seven years
later, and that he had an interest in the conviction of the accused, can not serve as
legal basis for a finding that the persons pointed out at tha trial were in fact the very
persons who committed the murder of the women and children, With the exeeption of
Agapito Gumisad and Hermenegildo Tabacon, whose appeals have been dismissed, the
other appellants Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos can not, therefore, be
found guilty of murder.
As to whether Crispin Lawas and .Agustin Osorio can be held responsible therefor, it is
true that the authors of the murder were home guards under their immediata
command. But the evidence submitted fails to disclose any previous common design to
massacre all the Moros under detention, including the women and children. The
evidence is to the effect that the women and the children were not arrested or taken
into custody, but that they only accompanied their husbands and relatives who were
brought for investigation. There was no evidence of a previous conspiracy by reason
of which Crispin Lawas and Agustin Osorio, as leaders, may be held for the murder of
the women and children.
May they be held guilty of murder by induction on the basis of the order given by Lawas
to fire at the Moros as the commotion started? It is true that Lawas was the leader of
the home guards in Balimbing among whom were Agapito Gumisad, Felipe Si-it,
Hermenegildo Tabacon and Patricio Pinos. But the order given was to fire at the Moros
(on the ground), and nothing else; the order was to fire at the Moros who showed
resistance or protest against his order that they be tied. The order could not have been
interpreted to mean that the women and children in the house, who did not appear to
have shown any resistance or hostility at all, should also be fired at. Lawas clearly did
not intend that the women and children inside the house should also be fired at. He
can not be held guilty of the crime committed, as it has been held that in order to make
the inducer responsible for the crime committed, it is necessary that the inducement is
material land precedes the commission of the act, and that such inducement was the
determining cause thereof.
"xxx, it may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by
71
the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that it become the determining
cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the intention of producing
Page
that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the
person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the
inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.
"The verb 'induce' is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there
exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent
effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the
person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which
are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them,
inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word spoken without
reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act,
may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for
some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or
performed the act having any expectation, that his suggestion would be followed or
any real intention that it produces a result. In such case, while the expression was
imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the
crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is
necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be
the determining cause of the crime." (U. S. vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, 218)
of the Revised Penal Code. It may be added that there is absolutely no evidence as to
the number of persons killed by each and every one of the appellants, so even if we
were induced to hold each appellant responsible for each and every death caused by
him, it is imposible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible to ascertain the
individual deaths caused by each and everyone. We are, therefore, forced to find the
appellants guilty of only one offense, that of multiple homicide for which the penalty
to be imposed should be in the maximum period.
Wherefore, in G.R. No. 7618, for robbery, the judgment of conviction appealed from is
hereby affirmed, but the maximum of the penalty imposed is hereby raised to 6 years
10 months and 1 day of prision mayor, in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength in the commission of the offense. The individual
liabilities of each of the persons sentenced for said crime are hereby also affirmed. In
G.R. Nos. 7619 and 7620, the appellants Crispin Lawas, Clemente Osorio, Agustin
Osorio, Felipe Si-it, Generoso Osorio and Patricio Pinos are each found guilty of the
crime of multiple homicide and each sentenced to suffer the penalty of not less than
15 years 6 months and 21 days nor more than 18 years 2 months and 21 days, both
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased, jointly and
severally, in the amount of P3,000.00, and to pay the costs proportionately.

Neither Crisipin Lawas nor Agustin Osorio may, therefore, be held responsible for the
crime of murder in connection with the massacre of the women and children by
inducement, and they must be acquitted of the charge of murder.

One last question involves the determination of the number or crimes for which each
of the appellants may be found guilty, whether each one should be considered as
having committed as many crimes as there were persons who were killed, or only for
one complex crime of multiple homicide. The information is for multiple murder, and
no inference can be made therefrom, that the accused are being charged of as many
offenses as there were victims. Then the evidence positively shows that the killing was
the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader to fire, and
continued with the intention to comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the
leader gave the order to that effect. There was no intent on the part of the apellants
either to fire at each and everyone of the victims as separately and distinctly from each
other. It has been held that if the act or acts complained of resulted from a single
criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense (Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code;
People vs. Acosta, 60 Phil. 158). So also it has been held that the act of taking two
roosters belonging to two different persons in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because
there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two
separate crimes (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 237, citing decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain of November 2, 1898 and October 4, 1905). And in the case of People vs.

72
Guillem, 47 0.G. No. 7, 3433, a single act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand
grenade at President Roxas, resulting in the death of one victim and in physical injuries

Page
on others was considered as a single act, also falling under the first part of Article 48
PEOPLE v. DE LEON
G.R. Nos. L-25375 and 25376 October 8, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTEDE LEON Y FLORA, defendant-appellant.
Modesto Reyes for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Early in the morning of December 21, 1925, Vicente de Leon y Flora entered the yard
of Vicente Magat's house on Domingo Santiago Street, Manila, and without violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things, took, with intent to gain, two game
roosters which were in the yard, one with colored plumage valued at P8 belonging to
Diego Magat, and the other with white plumage and black spots, valued at P10,
belonging to Ignacio Nicolas.
Vicente de Leon y Flora was prosecuted in the municipal court for two crimes of theft,
on the theft of Magat's rooster and the other that of Nicolas'. Upon being arraigned,
the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the municipal court in each to suffer
the penalty of three years, six months and one day presidio correcional, to return the
stolen roosters to their respective owners and to pay the costs in both cases. The
accused appealed from this judgment to the Court of First Instance, and, upon being
arraigned upon the same informations, pleaded not guilty in both cases, which were
tried jointly by agreement of the parties approved by the court.
In view of the evidence, the trial court found the accused guilty of one crime of theft,
holding that the theft of the two roosters constituted but one crime, and taking into
consideration the circumstance that the accused is an habitual delinquent sentenced
him in said two cases to the penalty of three years, six moths and one day presidio
correccional and to pay the costs in case R. G. No. 25375, declaring the costs in case
No. 25376, de oficio without the obligation to indemnify, as the roosters were returned
to their respective owners. The accused appealed to this court and his counsel alleges
that the trial court erred: (a) In holding that the guilt of the accused was proven by his
own admission; (b) in not giving him the benefit of reasonable doubt, and ( c) in
sentencing instead of acquitting the accused, with the costs de oficio.
We have reviewed the evidence and find no grounds to support the contention of the
appellant. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the guilt of the accused in the
present case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The case falls under the provisions
of paragraph 5 of article 518 of the Penal Code, amended by section 1 of Act No. 3244,
in connection with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code. The penalty provided
in the law is that ofpresidio correcional in its full extent, and there having been present
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the penalty must be imposed upon the
accused in its maximum degree, or four years, two moths and one day presidio
correcional. The accused being an habitual delinquent, under Act No. 3062 an
additional penalty must be imposed upon him consisting of half the penalty provided
or the crime committed, or 2 years and 1 month presidio correcional.
(People vs. Aguinaldo, 47 Phil., 728; People vs. Espiritu, R. G. No. 24753 1).
We could stop right here, but the Attorney-General raises a question in his brief which
we believe it is necessary for us to resolve now, due to the fact that it is not only
important to our jurisprudence, but also to the due prosecution of violators of the law.
The Attorney-General urges that the penalty for two crimes of theft be imposed upon
the accused for each of the stolen roosters. The question, then, to determine is whether
or not the fact that the accused, with intent to gain, on the same occasion and in the
same place, took the two roosters, one belonging to Vicente Magat and the other to
Ignacio Nicolas, constitutes two crimes of theft.
It will be remembered that article 517 of the Penal Code contains three paragraphs
enumerating the acts which constitute the crime of theft. The first defines theft in
general; the second declares a particular act to be theft which is not included in the
description in the first paragraph, and the third also considers theft a series of acts
with similar characteristics to the general type, with the exceptions therein noted.
Article 517 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 517. The following are guilty of theft: 1awph!l.net
1. Any person who, with intent to gain, but without the use of violence or
intimidation against any person or the use of force upon anything, shall take
anything which is the personal property of another without the latter's
consent.
2. Any person who, having found anything which has been lost, shall with
knowledge of its ownership appropriate the same with of gain.
3. Any person guilty of malicious damage who shall remove or make use of
the things damaged, subject to the exceptions established by paragraphs one
two, and three of article five hundred and ninety-two paragraph one of article
five hundred and ninety-three; paragraph one of article five hundred and
ninety-five, and articles five hundred and ninety-six, five hundred and ninety-
73
eight, and six hundred and three.
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As may be seen, the act taking another's property without violence or intimidation
against persons, not force upon things, with intent to gain and without the consent of
its owner, is what constitutes the crime of theft, as described in the first paragraph of
article 517.
The crime of theft is an offense against personal property and what is punished is the
alarm caused in the community by the perpetration of the act which is violative of the
individual rights guaranteed by the law, as well as the damage that said act may
occasion to the members of the community. Under sound principles, the act of taking
the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one
occasion, is not susceptible of being modified by the accidental circumstance that the
article unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is no series of acts here for
the accomplishment of different purposes, but only one of which was consummated,
and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters
in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations
nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of July 13, 1894, said:
The act of unlawfully taking two colts, two cows and two calves on one night,
belonging to four owners, which livestock was found in various adjacent and
open meadows, constitutes only one crime of theft, because the fact that the
persons injured by the taking of the cattle by the accused were several, said
accused knowing that the meadows in which this livestock was found were
open and adjacent, it being easy to pass from one to the other, does not
authorize the legal conception that the said accused committed four thefts on
said night, but only one as found by the lower court, which did not commit an
error of law by holding that the acts were committed on a single occasion.
It is not an element of the crime of theft that the culprit know the owner of the thing
stolen, the crime being consummated provided that being stolen belongs to another
and the same is taken with intent to gain. (Decision of the supreme Court of Spain of
November 22, 1898.) Neither is it necessary for the existence of the crime of theft that
it should appear in a specific manner who the owner is of the thing stolen, because the
law does not require it nor does it affect the criminal liability, but only the restitution
or indemnification of damages, which are merely of a civil nature. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain, October 4, 1905.) What constitutes the crime of theft is the
taking of another's property with intent to gain, without the consent of the owner, so
that after the unlawful act of taking another's property is proven, it is evident that all
the elements mentioned in the first paragraph of article 517 of the Penal Code exist.
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the unity of the intention to take a thing belonging
to another on one occasion and in the same place, constitutes the commission of only
one crime of theft; and fact that the things taken belong to different persons does not
produce a multiplicity of crimes, which must be punished separately.
In arriving at this conclusion, we have not lost sight of the doctrine laid down in United
States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), according to which, where the accused made no
objection to the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense, the
prosecution properly submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the
offenses charged; and the trial court also properly entered judgment of conviction of
each and all of these offenses which were established by the introduction of competent
evidence at the trial and should, therefore, have imposed the prescribed penalties for
each and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in accordance with
the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code. This doctrine, however, is not applicable
to the present case as two separate complaints have been filed herein against the
accused, but the trial court convicted the accused in the two cases, considering the
facts alleged in the said complaints as constituting but one crime.
In American cases the same doctrine is maintained as in Spanish decisions in regard to
the question which is here debated:
In Corpus Juris, vol. 36, page 799, it is said in regard to the taking of articles belonging
to two different owners at the same time and place: "In a few jurisdictions the rule
obtains that if two or more articles belonging to different are stolen at the same time
and place, the theft of the property of each owner is a separate crime and may be
prosecuted as such." (U. S. vs. Beerman, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,560; 5 Cranch C. C., 412;
State vs. Thurston 27 S. C. L., 382; Morton vs. State, 1 Lea [Tenn.], 498.) In other
jurisdiction it is held that such a theft may be prosecuted, at the pleasure of the State,
either as one offense or as several distinct offenses. (Bushman vs. Com., 138 Mass.,
507; Com. vs. Sullivan, 104 Mass., 552; State vs. Douglas, 26 Nev., 196; 65 Pac., 802;
99 Am. St., 688; State vs.Lambert, 9 Nev., 321.) But the prevailing rule is that if several
articles, stored in the same place, are taken by a single larcenous act, the mere fact
that some of them belonged to one person and some to another does not dissolve the
act into separate crimes. (Ala.-Clemm vs. State, 154 Ala., 12; 45 So., 212; Am. St., 17;
D. C.-Chanock vs. U. S., 50 App., 54; 267 Fed., 612; Holies vs. U. S., 10 D. C., 370; 36
Am. Rep., 106; Ga.-Lowe vs. State, 57 Ga., 171; Dean vs. State, 9 Ga. A., 571; 71
South East, 932; III.-Peo. vs. Israel, 269 III., 284; 109 North East, 969; Ind.-
Furnace vs. State, 153 Ind.-93; 54 North East, 441; Bell vs. State 42 Ins., 335; Iowa-
State vs. Sampson, 157 Iowa, 257; 138 North West, 473; 42 Law. Rep. An. [N. S.],
967; State vs. Congrove, 109 Iowa., 66; 80 North West, 227; State vs. Larson, 85
Iowa, 659; 52 North West, 539; Ky.-Nichols vs. Com., 78 Ky., 180; Md.-
State vs. Warren, 77 Md., 121; 26 Atl. Rep., 500; 39 Am. St., 401; Mich.-
Peo. vs. Johnson, 81 Mich., 573; 45 North West, 1119; Miss.-State vs. Quintini, 51 So.,
276; Dalton vs. State, 91 Miss., 162; 44 So., 802; 124 Am. St., 637; Ward vs. State, 90
Miss., 249; 43 So., 466; Mo.-State vs. Morphin, 37 Mo., 373; Lorton vs. State, 7 Mo.,
55; 37 Am. Dec., 179; Mont.-State vs. Mjelde, 29 Mont., 490; 75 Pac., 87; N. H.-
State vs. Merril, 44 N. H., 624; N. M.-State vs. Klasner, 19 N. M., 474; 145 Pac., 679;
Ann. Cas. 1917-D, 824; N. C.-State vs. Simons, 70 N. C., 336; Oh-State vs. Hennessey,
23 Oh. St., 339, 13 Am. Rep., 253; State vs. Smith, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint), 682; 23
74
Cinc- LBul., 85; Or.-State vs. Clark, 46 Or., 140; 80 Pac., 101; Pa.-Fulmer vs. Com., 97
Pa., 503; Com. vs. Lent, 15 Pa. Dist., 884; S. D.-State vs. Kieffer, 17 S. D., 67; 95 North
Page
West, 289; Tex.-Wilson vs. State, 45 Tex., 76; 23 Am. Rep., 602; Hudson vs. State, 9
Tex. A., 151, 35 Am. Rep., 732; Addison vs. State, 3 Tex. A., Utah-State vs. Mickel, 23
Utah, 507; 65 Pac., 484; Vt.-State vs.Blay, 77 Vt., 56; 58 Atl. Rep., 794;
State vs. Emery, 68 Vt., 109; 34 Atl. Rep., 432; 54 Am. St., 878; State vs.Newton, 42
Vt., 537; Va.-Alexander vs. Com., 90 Va., 809; 20 South East, 782; Wash.-
State vs. Laws, 61 Wash., 533; 112 Pac., 488; State vs. Butts, 42 Wash., 455; 85 Pac.,
33; Terr. vs. Heywood, 2 Wash., 180; 2 Pac., 189; Wyo.-Ackerman vs. State, 7 Wyo.,
504; 54 Pac., 228; Eng.-Reg. vs. Bleasdale, 2 C. & K., 765; 61 Eng. C. L., 765.)

For the foregoing, the judgment appealed from must be, as is hereby, modified and
the accused Vicente de Leon y Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six years and
three months presidio mayor, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the costs. So
ordered.

75
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UMIL v. RAMOS G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.

NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991 THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO
TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO,respondents.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs. The Solicitor General for the respondents.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.

DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO
and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
PER CURIAM:p
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO,
LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled
DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990
Quezon City, respondents. (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive
part:
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is
hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that
NESTOR MARIANO, respondents. the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that
one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest
without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing

76
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these
ESPIRITU, petitioner, laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the

Page
vs. elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents. modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned
arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of
Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such
arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not
comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules
The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
of Court. 3
persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal,
the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated
9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests
were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a
warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho
warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds
upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b)
of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it;
and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No.
81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation
of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because
Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion
is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
...
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed
struggle for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or
became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at
the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes
Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot
the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have
shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
77
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection)
is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses,
Page
i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the

repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting
officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause,"
as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of
the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without
warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense,
and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense.
Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on
"personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10
A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who
had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31
January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based
on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22)
years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being
treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and
supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts
supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in
Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as
"Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case
disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in
reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it
was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13
believe that the confidential
information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital
management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from
reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good
faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno
arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that
law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show
that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting
Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in
compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without
warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons
in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal
Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as
distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted
of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction
is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No.
83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant
to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught
in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec
5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few
davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said
petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore,
Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the
custody of the authorities.
78
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
Page

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a
former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that
a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being
used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was
placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a
search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted;
that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any
permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications
equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August
1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other
members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque;17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found
subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject
of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-
Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the
military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses
(one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations,
with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants
thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of
the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was
a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the
time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted
ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified
by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations
were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant
made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-
motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra,
Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have
acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action
against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial
authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and
secure the punishment therefor. 21
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the
requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming
public interest in peace and order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the
persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were
arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly
compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of
public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section
5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the
arresting officers are not liable. 24
But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the
arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on
the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where
he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
79
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November
Page
1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28
Espiritu was
arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers,
was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language
as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not
lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just
exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it
was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without
warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing.
In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest(not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for
Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and
academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-
investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this development, the
defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case.
Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed
and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December
1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala,
one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno
as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same
morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant,
for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the
police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be
made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent
possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts
and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno,
Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve
the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were
filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date (
CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial
admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30
that he was an NPA courier. On the other
hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest,
belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as
revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon
which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by
probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission
of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are
already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated.
80
The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is
not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the
Page
merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should
be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same,
particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are
still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is
important is that everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas
corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate
courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that
if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this
Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if
such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or
convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist
Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant
of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without
warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance
with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law,
and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers,
and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability
to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are
DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

81
Page
SANLAKAS v. REYES
[G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004]
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO
MAGTUBO petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN.
HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159103. February 3, 2004]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, SAMSON S.
ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.
SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners, vs. HON.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON. SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA,
JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 159185. February 3, 2004]
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L.
LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B.
MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R.
YUMUL-HERMIDA, petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 159196. February 3, 2004]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the
Senate, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et
al., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions
and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in
Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the
soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary
of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).[1]
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and
calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in
full:
PROCLAMATION NO. 427
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-
powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and
direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against
the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility,
for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives
which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being
supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and
plotters in the government service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it
82
becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
Page
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual and on-going rebellion,
compelling me to declare a state of rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and
measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed with high-
powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and command and
direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and took arms against
the duly constituted Government, and continue to rise publicly and show open hostility,
for the purpose of removing allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the President
of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives
which constitute the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are being
supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, conspirators and
plotters in the government service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever it
becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of
the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief of the
Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the necessary
and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due
regard to constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-
long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however,
did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August
1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435:
DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a state of rebellion
was declared;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was issued on
the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and pursuant to Article VII,
Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police have
effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of rebellion has
ceased to exist.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the
validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.),[2] party-list
organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to
call out the armed forces.[3] They further submit that, because of the cessation of the
Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by
the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.[4]
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS), Filipino
citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers.[5] Like Sanlakas and PM, they
claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration
of a state of rebellion.[6] They contend that the declaration is a constitutional anomaly
that confuses, confounds and misleads because [o]verzealous public officers, acting
pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional
right of private citizens.[7] Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a
83
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
Page
proclamation of martial law.[8] Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances
cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President.[9]
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and
Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of
the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions were allegedly
affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion.[10] Petitioners do not challenge the
power of the President to call out the Armed Forces.[11] They argue, however, that the
declaration of a state of rebellion is a superfluity, and is actually an exercise of
emergency powers.[12] Such exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the
power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.[13]
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator assails the
subject presidential issuances as an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a
martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution. [14] In the main, petitioner
fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests for the crime of rebellion.[15]
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been
rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.[16] In addition, the Solicitor General
questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit.[17]
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation No.
435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case
moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to
the determination of actual controversies.[18] Nevertheless, courts will decide a
question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[19] The case
at bar is one such case.
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and called
upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and
General Order No. 1. On that occasion, an angry and violent mob armed with
explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons
assaulted and attempted to break into Malacaang.[20] Petitions were filed before this
Court assailing the validity of the Presidents declaration. Five days after such
declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions
in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying cases[21] precluded this Court from addressing
the constitutionality of the declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to finally
lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the
Presidents calling out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress,
have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association
v. Enriquez, [22]this Court recognized that:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative
but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of
Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of rebellion by the
President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress emergency powers, thus impairing
the lawmakers legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a
subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the Presidents exercise of martial law
powers.
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing
or locus standi to bring suit. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[23]
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their programs,
petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and
sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert human
rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens.
3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and mobilizations in
the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and their freedom of
speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to
mobilize public opinion to support the same.[24] [Emphasis in the original.]
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez:
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to
the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to
be threatened by a warrantless arrest.Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has
been invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or
infringement.
84
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief,
petitioner claiming that it[]s right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly
Page
is affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion and that said proclamation is invalid
for being contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to
petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over such a
petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of
the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.[25]
Even assuming that petitioners are peoples organizations, this status would not
vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the presidential
issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato: [26]
The Constitution provides that the State shall respect the role of independent peoples
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful
and lawful means, that their right to effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. (Art. XIII, 15-
16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The
jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by
the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This requirement lies at the very
heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from
decisionmaking in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing
of suits by just any party.[27]
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not
necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.[28] No such illegal disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only
when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.[29] Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they
raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18,
Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of
graduated power[s].[30] From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power
to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion,
and that public safety requires the exercise of such power.[31] However, as we observed
in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,[32][t]hese conditions are not required in
85
the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
Page
violence, invasion or rebellion.
 Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution
vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost,
with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: The executive
power shall be vested in the President. As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same
Article provides: He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. The provisions
trace their history to the Constitution of the United States.
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. President
executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in their original simple form
since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part:
Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America . . . .
....
Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States. . . .
....
Section 3. he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed. [Article II Executive
Power]
Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the above-quoted
provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding action of the U.S. Supreme Court,
is instructive. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign
powers, which are drawn chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-in-Chief
provisions, as well as the presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of
State or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and
Chief of Public Opinion.[33]
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as the
protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of
a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the people by
driving the patricians from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first
President to champion the indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolinas
nullification effort.[34]
The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not pacify
the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State Legislature ordered an election for a
convention, whose members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The
Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens
from obeying them after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal
Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature then implemented the
Ordinance with bristling punitive laws aimed at any who sought to pay or collect
customs duties.[35]
Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy. Technically,
the President might send troops into a State only if the Governor called for help to
suppress an insurrection, which would not occur in the instance. The President could
also send troops to see to it that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully
executed. But these laws were aimed at individual citizens, and provided no
enforcement machinery against violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress
for a force bill.[36]
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He wrote: .
. . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a constitutional law of Congress, or to
destroy the Union, the balance of the people composing this Union have a perfect right
to coerce them to obedience. Then in a Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832,
he called upon South Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable
interference with the execution of the laws, and dared them, disunion by armed force
is treason. Are you ready to incur its guilt? [37]
The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope
walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of agreement, and the
President announced that the national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on
the south had declared nullification and accession confined to contempt and infamy.[38]
No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable, and
enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so daunting, as Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln believed the Presidents power broad and that of Congress explicit and
restricted, and sought some source of executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked
by sabotage. He seized upon the Presidents designation by the Constitution as
Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the executive power provision and joined them as
the war power which authorized him to do many things beyond the competence of
Congress.[39]
Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the Presidents independent power and
duty under his oath directly to represent and protect the people. In his Message of July
4, 1861, Lincoln declared that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power
in defense of the government forced upon him. He could not but perform the duty or
surrender the existence of the Government . . . . This concept began as a transition
device, to be validated by Congress when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew
into an independent power under which he felt authorized to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and restore reoccupied
States.[40]
Lincolns Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their first
service, according to the proclamation, would be to recapture forts, places and
property, taking care to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference with
86
property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens.[41]
Page
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincolns report to use
the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The decision was handed in the
celebrated Prize Cases[42] which involved suits attacking the Presidents right to legally
institute a blockade. Although his Proclamation was subsequently validated by
Congress, the claimants contended that under international law, a blockade could be
instituted only as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the State. Since
under the Constitution only Congress is exclusively empowered to declare war, it is
only that body that could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative
declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld Lincolns right to
act as he had.[43]
In the course of time, the U.S. Presidents power to call out armed forces and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior legislative approval, in
case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The
United States introduced the expanded presidential powers in the Philippines through
the Philippine Bill of 1902.[44] The use of the power was put to judicial test and this
Court held that the case raised a political question and said that it is beyond its province
to inquire into the exercise of the power.[45] Later, the grant of the power was
incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.[46]
Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to mean that
it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the maxim that Public office is a
public trust, which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops
to Illinois to quell striking railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction
banned all picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes and violating
the injunction, Debs, who was the union president, was convicted of contempt of
court. Brought to the Supreme Court, the principal issue was by what authority of the
Constitution or statute had the President to send troops without the request of the
Governor of the State.[47]
In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,[48] the Supreme Court upheld the contempt
conviction. It ruled that it is not the governments province to mix in merely individual
present controversies. Still, so it went on, whenever wrongs complained of are such as
affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution are
entrusted to the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to
all citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the
Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it
from the Courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those
constitutional duties.[49] Thus, Clevelands course had the Courts attest.
Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt launched what
political scientists dub the stewardship theory. Calling himself the steward of the
people, he felt that the executive power was limited only by the specific restrictions
and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its
constitutional powers.[50]
The most far-reaching extension of presidential power T.R. ever undertook to
employ was his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvanias coal mines under his
authority as Commander-in-Chief. In the issue, he found means other than force to
end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he had made detailed plans to use his power as
Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal
production would begin again.[51]
Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the
operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In the Philippines, this
led to the incorporation of Section 6,[52] Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was
later carried over with modifications in Section 7,[53] Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18,[54] Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so when taken
together with the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of
office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with
the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the very existence of
government or the integrity of the State.
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Justice
Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested with residual power
and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this
distinction to the unitary and highly centralized nature of the Philippine
government. She noted that, There is no counterpart of the several states of the
American union which have reserved powers under the United States
constitution. Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her argument, she wrote:
. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of the
government in this manner: The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. The judicial powers
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be provided
by law. These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division
but also confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the Supreme
Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, a grant of legislative power
means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a
grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. If this is
true of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested
in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply to the executive
power which is vested in one official the president. He personifies the executive
branch. There is a unity in the executive branch absent from the two other branches
of government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He
is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more immediate and
direct than the United States president because he is given by express provision of the
constitution control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.[55]
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935
Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a
strong Executive in the Philippines.[56] Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial
law, our most recent Charter has restricted the Presidents powers as Commander-in-
87
Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the Presidents powers as Chief Executive.
Page
 In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into
jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the Presidents power to
forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majoritys ruling rested
on the Presidents
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so,
notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of
the general grant of executive power.[57] [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.]
Thus, the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main
from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from her
Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out,
statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2
(Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation
of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated
in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a
declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity.[58] At most, it only gives notice
to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent
or suppress it.[59] Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the
perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Courts mandate is
to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such
a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is
deemed not written.
Should there be any confusion generated by the issuance of Proclamation No.
427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly
pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights.[60] Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus,[61] then it is with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
rebellion could not bring about these conditions.[62] At any rate, the presidential
issuances themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion with due regard to
constitutional rights.
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities may
resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra,
majority of the Court held that [i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,[63] if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a state
of rebellion.[64] In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for
the crime of rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so
long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the
Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in
a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by
way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis.[65]
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration
of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of
logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the
theater of war or that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short,
there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised
martial law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect
exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of Congress
pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) .
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted
to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-
in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
88
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Page
SO ORDERED.
Page
89
MEJORADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN Contrary to law.

June 30, 1987 Except for the date of the commission of the offense, the name of the aggrieved private
party, the PNB Check number, the amount involved and the number or John Does, the
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72 seven other informations are verbatim repetitions of the above.

ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner, The facts are found by the respondent Sandiganbayan are as follows:
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE Arturo A. Mejorada was a public officer who was first employed as a temporary skilled
PHILIPPINES, respondents. laborer in the Bureau of Public Works on March 16, 1947, and then as right-of-way
agent in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro Manila, from
February, 1974 up to December 31, 1978. As a right-of-way agent, his main duty was
to negotiate with property owners affected by highway constructions or improvements
for the purpose of compensating them for the damages incurred by said owners.
CORTES, J.:
Among those whose lots and improvements were affected by the widening of the
proposed Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. 2nd IBRD Project, at Binangonan, Rizal were
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the May 23, 1979 decision of the
Isagani de Leon, Isaac Carlos, Napoleon Maybituin, Dominga Villaroza, Florentino de la
Sandiganbayan finding the accused Arturo A. Mejorada in Criminal Cases Nos. 002-009
Cruz, Cipriano Aran, Celestina S. Mallari and Rodolfo Rivera, all residents of Mambog,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of Republic Act No. 3019,
Binangonan, Rizal.
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Sometime in October or November 1977, petitioner contacted the aforenamed persons

Eight informations were filed by the Provincial Fiscal against the petitioner and jointly
and informed them that he could work out their claims for payment of the values of
tried before the Sandiganbayan. The eight informations substantially allege the same
their lots and/or improvements affected by the widening of said highway. In the
set of circumstances constituting the offense charged, Criminal Case No. 002 reads as
process, Mejorada required the claimants to sign blank copies of the "Sworn Statement
follows:
on the Correct and Fair Market Value of Real Properties" and "Agreement to Demolish,
Remove and Reconstruct improvements" pertinent to their claims. The claimants
That in (sic) or about and during the period comprised from October 1977 to complied without bothering to find out what the documents were all about as they
February 1978, in the municipality of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and were only interested in the payment of damages.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being employed in the Office of the Highway District Engineer, Pasig, Metro
In said "Sworn Statements" and "Agreements to Demolish", the value of the respective
Manila, as Right-of-Way-Agent conspiring and confederating together with
properties of the claimants were made to appear very much higher than the actual
two (2) other John Does whose true Identities and present whereabouts are
value claimed by them. Likewise, the said "Agreements to Demolish" reflected the value
still unknown, with evident bad faith, and for personal gain, did then and there
of the improvements as per assessor" which on the average was only P2,000.00 lower
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, directly intervene, work for, and facilitate
than the value declared by the owners in their sworn statements. The value as per
the approval of one Isagani de Leon's claim for the payment in the removal
assessor was, in turn, supported by the Declarations of Real Property in the names of
and reconstruction of his house and a part of his land expropriated by the
the claimants containing an assessed value exactly the same as that stated in the
government having been affected by the proposed Pasig-Sta Cruz-Calamba
Agreements to Demolish "as per assessor", except the claims of De la Cruz and Aran
Road. 2nd IBRD Project at Binangonan, Rizal, while the accused, Arturo A.
where there is only a difference of P400.00 and P200.00, respectively. It turned out,
Mejorada is in the discharge of his official and/or administrative functions and
however, that said Declarations of Property are not really intended for the claimants as
after said claim was approved and the corresponding PNB Check No. SN
they were registered in the names of other persons, thus showing that they were all
5625748 was issued and encashed in the amount of P7,200.00 given only
falsified.
P1,000.00 to claimant (Isagani de Leon), appropriating, applying and

90
converting to themselves the amount of P6,200.00, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to Isagani de Leon and the government in the aforementioned A few months after processing the claims, accused accompanied the claimants to the
Office of the Highway District Engineer at the provincial capitol of Pasig, Metro Manila,

Page
amount of P6,200.00.
to receive payments and personally assisted the claimants in signing the vouchers and
encashing the checks by certifying as to their Identities and guaranteeing payment.
Right after the claimants had received the proceeds of their checks, accused
accompanied them to his car which was parked nearby where they were divested of
the amounts paid to them leaving only the sum of P1,000.00 to each, except Isaac
Carlos to whom P5,000.00 was left, explaining to them that there were many who
would share in said amounts. All the claimants were helpless to complaint because they
were afraid of the accused and his armed companion.
The claimants, through the assistance of counsel, filed their complaints with the
Provincial Fiscal's Office of Pasig, Metro Manila, narrating in their supporting sworn
statements what they later testified to in court.
Five issues are raised in this petition to review the decision of the Sandiganbayan:
I. Whether or not the essential elements constituting the offense penalized by section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act have been clearly and convincingly proven by the prosecution;
II. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is a court of competent jurisdiction duly
constituted in accordance with Pres. Dec. No. 1606;
III. Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner is excessive and contrary
to the three-fold rule as provided for by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code;
IV. Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information
and the offense proved;
V. Whether or not the conclusion drawn from the record of the Sandiganbayan in
arriving at a verdict of conviction of petitioner is correct is a question of law which this
Honorable Court is authorized to pass upon.
I. Petitioner contends that the eight informations filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan are fatally defective in that it failed to allege the essential ingredients
or elements constituting the offense penalized by Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The section under which the accused-petitioner was charged provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner enumerated three elements which, in his opinion, constitute a violation of
Section 3(e).
First, that the accused must be a public officer charged with the duty of granting
licenses or permits or other concessions. Petitioner contends that inasmuch as he is
not charged with the duty of granting licenses, permits or other concessions, then he
is not the officer contemplated by Section 3 (e).
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with
the view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph (e) is
intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may
not come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions.
The first element, therefore, of Section 3 (e) is that the accused must be a public
officer. This, the informations did not fail to allege.
Second, that such public officer caused undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions.
Petitioner denies that there was injury or damage caused the Government because the
payments were allegedly made on the basis of a document solely made by the Highway
District Engineer to which petitioner had no hand in preparing. The fact, however, is
that the government suffered undue injury as a result of the petitioner's having inflated
the true claims of complainants which became the basis of the report submitted by the
Highway District Engineer to the Regional Director of the Department of Highways and
which eventually became the basis of payment. His contention that he had no
participation is belied by the fact that as a right-of-way-agent, his duty was precisely
to negotiate with property owners who are affected by highway constructions for the
purpose of compensating them.
91
On the part of the complainants, the injury caused to them consists in their being
divested of a large proportion of their claims and receiving payment in an amount even
Page
lower than the actual damage they incurred. They were deprived of the just
compensation to which they are entitled.
Third, the injury to any party, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference was done through manifest, partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner argues that for the third element to be present, the alleged injury or damage
to the complainants and the government must have been caused by the public officer
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions and inasmuch as
when the damage was caused to the complainants, he was no longer discharging his
official administrative functions, therefore, he is not liable for the offense charged.
The argument is devoid of merit. The Sandiganbayan established the fact that the
petitioner took advantage of his position as a right-of-way-agent by making the
claimants sign the aforementioned agreements to demolish and sworn statements
which contained falsified declarations of the value of the improvements and lots. There
was evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner when he inflated the values of the
true claims and when he divested the claimants of a large share of the amounts due
them.
In view of the above holding. We also dispose of the fourth issue which relates to the
allegation that petitioner cannot be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Graft Law
because the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not the violation of Section 3 (e)
but the crime of robbery. Contrary to the petitioner averment. We find no variance
between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved. The
prosecution was able to establish through the corroborating testimonies of the
witnesses presented how through evident bad faith, petitioner caused damage to the
claimants and the Government. The manner by which the petitioner divested the
private parties of the compensation they received was part of' the scheme which
commenced when the petitioner approached the claimants and informed them that he
could work out their claims for payment of the values of their lots and/or improvements
affected by the widening of the Pasig-Sta. Cruz-Calamba Road. The evidence presented
by the prosecution clearly establish a violation of Section 3(e).
II. The petitioner also assails the competency of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide
this case. He argues that before the Sandiganbayan could legally function as a judicial
body, at least two (2) divisions, or majority of the justices shall have been duly
constituted and appointed.
We previously ruled on this matter in the case of De Guzman v. People (G.R. No. 54288,
December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 337). In that case, the petitioner De Guzman questioned
the authority of the Sandiganbayan to hear and decide his case on the same ground
that herein petitioner assails its jurisdiction. The Court upheld the authority of the
Sandiganbayan saying that:
Although the Sandiganbayan is composed of a Presiding Justice, and eight
Associate Justices, it does not mean that it cannot validly function without all
of the Divisions constituted. Section 3 of P.D. 1606 provides that the
"Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three justices each" while Section
5 thereof provides that the unanimous vote of three justices of a division shall
be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment.
Thus the Sandiganbayan functions in Divisions of three Justices each and each
Division functions independently of the other. As long as a division has been
duly constituted it is a judicial body whose pronouncements are binding as
judgments of the Sandiganbayan.
The judgment convicting petitioner was a unanimous Decision of the First
Division duly constituted. It thus met the requirement for the pronouncement
of a judgment as required by Section 5 of P.D. 1606 supra.
III. The third issue raised by the petitioner concerns the penalty imposed by the
Sandiganbayan which totals fifty-six (56) years and eight (8) days of imprisonment.
Petitioner impugns this as contrary to the three-fold rule and insists that the duration
of the aggregate penalties should not exceed forty (40) years.
Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70
of the Revised Penal Code. This article is to be taken into account not in the imposition
of the penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People v.
Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence, "duration"
of penalty and penalty "to be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned
about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made
to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum of
which is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in imposing eight penalties
for the eight informations filed against the accused-petitioner. As We pointed out in
the case of People v. Peralta, (No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759, 783-784):
... Even without the authority provided by Article 70, courts can still impose
as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed,
since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is
prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which
the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate
penal sanctions.
In the light of the above reasons, petitioner cannot assail the penalty imposed upon
him as harsh, cruel and unusual (See Veniegas v. People, G.R. No. 57601-06 July 20,
92
1982, 115 SCRA 790, 792).
Page
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the fifth issue raised in view of the foregoing
discussion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

93
Page
PEOPLE v. SIMON
[G.R. No. 930280. July 29, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARTIN SIMON y
SUNGA, ** Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESS; WHEN MADE POSITIVELY,
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CORROBORATED, DESERVES GREATER WEIGHT; CASE AT
BAR. — After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both
parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging
in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a
scintilla of doubt that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana
dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale
took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between
the straightforward, positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials
and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight
and is more entitled to credence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCREPANCY ON MINOR MATTER; NEITHER AFFECTS INTEGRITY
OF THE EVIDENCE NOT THAT OF THE WITNESS. — Appellant would want to make a
capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really
confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that
he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned
"Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same.
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana
will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant
is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the
possession of appellant. even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy
refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses’ honesty. Besides, there
was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he did
not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he
participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ENTRAPMENT; WHEN MAY BE RELIED UPON BY THE
COURT. — The Court is aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through
the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and
abuse. Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in
the case at bar. Appellant’s entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard
way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was
effected. No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they
are presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. Such lack of dubious
motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,
as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail
over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed,
erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was
caught red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance
for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
4. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE, WHEN VALID; CASE AT BAR. —
Appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or
civilian to witness the seizure. He descries the lack of pictures taken before, during and
after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of any
barangay official or police authorities. These are absurd disputations. No law or
jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative,
a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures.
On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they
were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a warrantless
arrest and seizure.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; WHEN OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF A PERSON
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; INADMISSIBLE; CASE AT BAR. — Contrary to
appellant’s contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection
with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report states, inter alia, that
"suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves and
the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below
these remarks was affixed appellant’s signature. In the same manner, the receipt for
the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he
acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him. However, we find and
hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant’s
conformance to these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions
of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a person under
custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel. Although appellant manifested during
the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not made
in writing and in the presence of counsel, hence whatever incriminatory admission or
confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in
evidence. Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.
6. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; RULE; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The
doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be
believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. The evidence on record is bereft of any
support for appellants allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution
94
and the other for the defense, testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication
of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is
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that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had been
suffering even before his arrest. His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying
that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer. Furthermore, if it is true that
appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not
divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and
during his detention there. Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to the
authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the
opportunity to do so and with the legal services of counsel being available to him. Such
omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant’s story is a pure fabrication.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; ELEMENT; PRESENT IN
CASE AR BAR. — Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits,
appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament from his predicament
since his criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently
proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires
merely the consummation of the selling transaction which happens the moment the
buyer receives the drug from the seller. In the present case, and in light of the
preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure of
doubt. Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to
a total stranger. We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. It is not contrary to human
experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, for what matters is not an
existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. While there may be instances
where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused
supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars
are not present in this case.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO.
7659; PENALTY; CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — Probably through oversight, an error
on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting
of the aforesaid law, thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and
craftsmanship. As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully
sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law,
shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity. In other words, there
is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the
marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with
respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To
harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, we
hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved
is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant
with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused. 3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the
dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties
under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the
penalty shall be taken from said range "depending upon the quantity" of the drugs
involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and
reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall form a
period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the
most severe as the maximum period. Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code,
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such complex
penalty shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of
Section 20, however, is its specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall
instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction.
Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose
of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall
be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded.
Since each component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed
separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall
hereafter be explained. It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20
in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling
reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph
be divided into three, with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be
respectively quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for
allocating the penalty proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to
the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty
to be imposed shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and
500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjuncture
penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Now, considering the minimal
quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional
is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to
be resolved.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FOR GRADUATING PENALTIES; APPLICATION IN SPECIAL LAWS,
WHEN ALLOWED; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR. — Prision correccional has a duration of
6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods
as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code.
The question is whether or not in determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here
to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of
mitigating, aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be
taken into account. The Court is not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held
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that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or
aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be
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applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the
reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken
from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then
provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty
in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code. This is also the rationale for the
holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties
by degrees could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the
penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there
is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such
supplementary application. The situation, however, is different where although the
offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under special law, the penalty therefor is
actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties
native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both
illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this later. For the nonce, we hold that
in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no attendant
mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
10. ID.; MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; APPLICATION IN SPECIAL LAW, CONSTRUED;
CASE AT BAR. — While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is
involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to
lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied
only if they affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine
the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime
and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of
Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can
reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty
under the aforestated second paragraph of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to
avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in
some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the
courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the
crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty
next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former
in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty
in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be
arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further
reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale. The
Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be
prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficiency rather than fail. A perfect
judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be
the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
11. ID.; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; WHEN APPLICABLE. — The final query is
whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before
us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant
committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the
penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of
course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.
The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained. It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate
sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same"
We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under
a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference
to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may
be said that the "offense is punished" under that law. There can be no sensible debate
that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws
was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws
which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the
Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In
the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule
applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore,
considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an
application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. Republic Act No.
6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their
technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum
of said sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said
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law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in
the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in the
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effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense." (Emphasis ours.) A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of
context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret
in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of
Act No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the
phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is
considered is the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty imposable under the
law, and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law
states is "life imprisonment." What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition,
therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which
have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical
interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents of the law and related to
contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the
interrelation of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an
integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense.
Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103
in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of interpretation.
12. ID.; ID.; CONSTRUED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — The Indeterminate
Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally
interpreted in favor of the accused. The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at
which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may merely
be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. It does not
constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to continue serving the
rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict’s eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may
readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be ordered
on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence. It is thus both amusing
and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a
minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the application of
Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may
set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1
day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only one
day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CRIMINAL LAW; INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW; CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. —
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A. No. 7659 unqualifiedly adopted
the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence also their
technical signification and effects, then what should govern is the first part of Section
1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that: "in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall
be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under
the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." Elsewise stated, by
the adoption of the penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses
penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, the latter
offenses would now be considered as punished under the Revised Penal code for
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203) also provides that:
"if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by
the same." (Emphasis supplied). There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which
should be taken into account in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1)
offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by other laws
(or special laws). The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are those defined
and penalized in Book II thereof, which is thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND
PENALTIES. To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under the Revised Penal
Code if it is defined by it, and none other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty
which is included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II, Title III of Book I
thereof. On the other hand, an offense is considered punished under any other law (or
special law) if it is not defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such
other law. It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code if both
its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed
punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are found in the
special law. That the latter imports or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its
nomenclature of penalties does not make an offense in the special law punished by or
punishable under the Revised Penal Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the
special law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor, although it adopts
the Code’s nomenclature of penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense thereunder
an offense "punished or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
2. ID.; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; IMPOSABLE PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. — The majority
opinion holds the view that while the penalty provided for the Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, viz., prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of
the Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet,
considering that under the said second paragraph of Section 20 the penalty depends
on the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of exception
to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20, as
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amended, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal
penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Thereafter, applying the
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modifying circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper
period of the component penalty shall then be fixed. To illustrate, if by the quantity of
the drugs involved (e.g., marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty
should be prision correccional, but there is one mitigating and no aggravating
circumstance, then the penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional in its
minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a limit to such a rule. It declares: "The
Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be
prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses." Simply
put, this rule would allow the reduction from reclusion temporal — if it is the penalty
to be imposed on the basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two degrees, or
to prision correccional, if there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64, Revised Penal code) or if
there is a privileged mitigating circumstance of, say, minority (Article 68, Revised Penal
Code), or under circumstances covered by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if
the proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor, regardless of the fact that a
reduction by two degrees is proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because
the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision correccional. Finally, if the proper
penalty to be imposed is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be allowed. I
find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and unfair. It is arbitrary because within
the same second paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we both allow and
disallow the application of Article 64(5), Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal
Code. The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to depreciate the seriousness
of drug offenses, is unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous Drug Act, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of drug offenses
by providing quantity as basis for the determination of the proper penalty and limiting
fine only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. It is unfair because an
accused who is found guilty of possessing MORE dangerous drugs — say 500 to 749
grams of marijuana, in which case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion
temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an accused
who is found guilty of possession of only one (1) gram of marijuana — in which case
the penalty to be imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled to a reduction
thereof even if he has the same number of privileged mitigating circumstances as the
former has. Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens to be the minority
of the accused, then he is entitled to the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: "ART. 68. Penalty to be
imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor
under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph
next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon
a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from Liability
by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always Lower by two degrees at Least than that
prescribed by Law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen
and under eighteen years of age the penalty next Lower than that prescribed by law
shall be imposed, but always in the proper period." I do not think that as to the second
paragraph of Section 20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the Revised Penal Code in one aspect and
not to apply it in another.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988
with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or
about October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea
bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration
of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were
found positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest
following his escape from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he was
voluntarily detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-
trial conference, 3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly
concluded.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
I
The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as NARCOM
operative, informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the
illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt.
Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the
camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio
Villaruz and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked
money from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto.
Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities and barangay officers
thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant
to Lopez who consequently approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana.
Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags. Appellant
then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea
bags and Lopez gave him the marked money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez
then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal to his companions who were stationed
around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon,
Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The latter was
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then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board
a jeep and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the
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investigator. 4

Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez’ testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that
transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who
confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust
team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of the other members, that is, around
two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that
transpired between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant
after the latter’s arrest. He was likewise the one who conducted the custodial
investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent,
to information and to counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel.
6 appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation of four
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court
below that, originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf
was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his
entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20." He agreed
to the correction since they were the ones who were personally and directly involved
in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of the appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 P.M.
of the day after the latter’s apprehension, and the results were practically normal
except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of
physical injury on the person of the appellant. The next day, he again examined
appellant due to the latter’s complaint of gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the
examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which
causes him to experience abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the
afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for the gastro-
intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal. 8 possession, 14 the latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the information
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming
that on the day in question, at around 4:30 P.M., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met
before suddenly arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about
something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was
told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a
different route. While on board, he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature
and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the
P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from
the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the
blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the
NARCOM office but claimed that he did so since he could no longer endure the
maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the
house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at
around 6:30 or 7:30 P.M. There, he consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was
accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca,
Pampanga where he was confined for three days. 9
Appellant’s brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized
at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and vomiting of blood.
He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before
the latter’s arrest. 10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana
Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the caused for this ailment was
abrasion or contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered
judgment convicting appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor of the Government.
12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower
court, contending in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not upholding
his defense of "frame-up," (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated) inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People’s real theory and evidence is to
the effect that appellant actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves,
while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his
alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view
thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the
two tea gabs allegedly committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and
distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which separate offense is
not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. 17 To sell means to give, whether for money or any other
material consideration. 18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that
appellant actually sold and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt.
Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.chanrobles law library : red
99
After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we
are morally certain that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal
Page
sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt
that appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to
Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his
testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward,
positive and corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater weight and is more
entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of
poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse. 19
Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case
at bar. Appellant’s entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a
surveillance was conducted by the team before the buy-bust operation was effected.
20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are
presumed to have regularly performed their official duty. 21 Such lack of dubious
motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,
as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail
over the self-serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, 22
erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was
caught red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance
for him to controvert the charge, he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for
examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein, 23 confirmed in her
Technical Report No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from
appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus,
the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and
conclusiveness.25cralaw:red
Appellant would want to make a capital of the alleged inconsistencies and
improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to
him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in
open court, Pejoro asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the
marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated," he
signed it as the one who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana
will not really matter since such is not an element of the offense with which appellant
is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the
possession of appellant. even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an
error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such an error or discrepancy
refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the
prosecution evidence as a whole nor reflects on the witnesses’ honesty. 27 Besides,
there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously meant that he
did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but
he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation thereof as the investigator of their
unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated
from him were not powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the normal
procedure in buy-bust operation. 28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by
Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such
operation you do not anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine
the thumbmark or identity of the persons taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking
that kind of material in our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and
only few are producing that, sir.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
x x x
Q: It is not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as
the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that
powder because they themselves, are using that in their own work, sir." 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark that money bills
used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to the case
of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions." 30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent power is only an
evidentiary technique for identification purposes, which identification can be supplied
by other species of evidence.
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay
official or civilian to witness the seizure. He descries the lack of pictures taken before,
during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody
of any barangay official or police authorities. 31 These are absurd disputations. No law
or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a
relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of
pictures. On the contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante
delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the obligation to effect a
warrantless arrest and seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant’s contention, there was an arrest report prepared by
the police in connection with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest Report
100
32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected
marijuana dried leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected
marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant’s signature. In the
same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed
Page
by appellant wherein he acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him.
33
However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in
evidence. Appellant’s conformance to these documents are declarations against
interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of
his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense,
there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel. 34 Although
appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to
counsel, the waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel, 35 hence
whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him, either
verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report is self-
serving and hearsay and can easily be concocted to implicate a suspect.
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby
be extricated from his predicament from his predicament since his criminal participation
in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the
offense of illegal sale of prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the
selling transaction 37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the
seller. 38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has
been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total
stranger. 39 We take this opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of
crimes that may be committed at any time and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to
human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, 41 for what matters is
not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be
instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the diverse
circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused
supposedly acted on that occasion, we can safely say that those exceptional particulars
are not present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he as subjected to physical and mental torture by the
arresting officers which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night he was
placed under custody. 43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his
signatures on the documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and
coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be
believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. 44 The evidence on record is bereft of
any support for appellants allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the
prosecution 45 and the other for the defense, 46 testified on the absence of any tell-
tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions or contusions on the person of
appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was hi peptic ulcer
from which he had been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His own brother even
corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding peptic ulcer.
48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no
reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at
the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. 49 Significantly, he also did
not even report the matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the
alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the legal services of
counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that
appellant’s story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest
was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined to arrest him
at all costs. 51 Premeditated or not, appellant’s arrest was only the culmination, the
final act needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about
after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this
opinion cold have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
However, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the
original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall
now resolve.
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the
case at bar, are to this effect:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
‘SECTION 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions.’
x x x
"SECTION 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended as the
101
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Page
‘SECTION 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
Instrument of the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9
of Article Ii and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied
if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
x x x 2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana.
x x x amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
‘Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.’"
1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags
of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands to be convicted
for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the
patently favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive
effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant to Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally
amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal
Code, 53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficent
provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to
crimes punished by special laws. 54 The exception in said article would not apply to
those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for
the third time or more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification. 55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have
then been involved nor invoked in the present case, a corollary question would be
whether this court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions of said
Article 22 to reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise
been resolved in the cited case of People v. Moran, Et Al., ante.,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the
retroactivity of penal laws in so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a felony,
would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not under obligation to
fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as
would also all provisions relating to the prescriptive of the crime and the
penalty."cralaw virtua1aw library
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties
provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become final and executory or the
accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic
considerations would warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial
authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus. 56
to have been committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law, thereby calling for and
necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That
penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what
is involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity
involved is less, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty
of reclusion perpetuaby reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the
penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the
penalty where the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said
Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole
law, 57 we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs
involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant
with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed in a
manner favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence
covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section
20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range
"depending upon the quantity" of the drugs involved in the case. The penalty in said
second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances determine which period of such complex penalty shall be imposed on
the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its
specific mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the
quantity of the drug subject of the criminal transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of
102
Republic Act No. 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered
as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved.
Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each
Page
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can
be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be
explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our
aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a deviation,
the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three,
with the resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively quotient,
and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
proportionately among the three aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof.
Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be
prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams,
reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is imposed as a conjuncture penalty only if the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the
penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated but, again, another preliminary
and cognate issue has first to be resolved.
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a
divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as provided in the text of and illustrated
in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in
determining the penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of
prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating, aggravating or other
circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The Court is not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the
penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A
review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties
for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with
reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the
special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods,
it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying
circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in
accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the
Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary
application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or
contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10
of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or
a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
ostensibly punished under special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration,
correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When,
as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense
under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken
from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there
being no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the
penalties imposed for offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States
but differently from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish
origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive
durations, such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without
division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law
61 were passed during the American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an
offense thereunder shall be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the same
manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62
penalizing non-payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein,
provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by
section one of this act, shall prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such
employer against his employee or laborer by means of false pretenses similar to those
mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a)
of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein
provided." 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were
specifically punished by the penalties as technically named and understood in the
Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion
Act) where the penalties ranged from arresto mayor to death; 64 Presidential Decree
No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to prision
mayor; and Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts
involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion
temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.
103
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months and
Page
not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation
of persons or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more
than 30 years, when committed with violence against or intimidation of any person, or
force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped vehicle is killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are
different from and are without reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal
Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties
under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only
to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law, the legislative
intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No.
5639. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4
months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty
for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the qualifying
circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539
and special laws of the same formulation.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects
thereof under the Revised penal Code, as well as other statutory enactments founded
upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the
penalties under the former Republic act No. 1700 and those now provided under
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special laws, the fact that
the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal Code
lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies
under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the absence of
any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be
to sanction an indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system of penalties
under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment
of Congress.
In People v. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No.
533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by
the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not
apply to said special law. We said therein that — reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles
"We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely
distinct from and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty
imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed
in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special
laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the
Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or
otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, applicable, . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the
Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article 63(2) of the
Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
shall be ‘supplementary’ to special laws, this Court held that where the special law
expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the
offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions of the Code. . .
"The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit
grant of discretion to the Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law.
In such case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the ‘deep legal though and
centuries of experience in the administration of criminal laws.’" (Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein of the
technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of
penalties in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code
on the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying circumstances apply in fixing
the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for
graduating such penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic
Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the
discussion on the role of modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down the
caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they
affect the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine
the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as
applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime
and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of
Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the
presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can
64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty
under the aforestated second paragraph of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to
avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in
some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the
104
courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the
crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty
next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former
Page
in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty
in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be
arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further
reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the
scale.cralawnad
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be
prision correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be
adopted so that the law may continue to have efficiency rather than fail. A perfect
judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be
the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to
the case now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses are not included in nor
has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law
and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided,
of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of imprisonment.
68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be
ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an
offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same" We hold
that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special
law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken from and is without reference to the
Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the "offense is punished" under that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence
for offenses under special laws was necessary because of the nature of the former type
of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of
penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule
for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore
provided, this rule applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples.
Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is
but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical
terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, we have applied the provisions of the
amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the
Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for
in a special law, is now in the effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code.
Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid
Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission
of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court
has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act No. 4103 by a mere literal
appreciation of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof
excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty
or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually
imposed and not the penalty imposable under the law, 70 and that reclusion
perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment."cralaw virtua1aw library
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the
concurrence of the principles of literal interpretation, which have been rationalized by
comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the
antecedents of the law and related to contemporaneous legislation; and of structural
interpretation, considering the interrelation of the penalties in the Code as
supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to
that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws,
which is the best mode of interpretation. 71
The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and
should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused. 72 The "minimum" sentence is
merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the
prisoner may merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his
confinement. 73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty since thereafter he
still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum
is only the period when the convict’s eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact,
his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or his
reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum
105
sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be
Page
begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor, the
penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed
through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty
to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor,
instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference, which could
thereby even involve only one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest
in the judicial teapot.

ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered
by the court a quo against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but
with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as
the maximum thereof.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

SO ORDERED.

106
Page
ROSA LIM v. PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000]
ROSA LIM, petitioner, vs., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming in
toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City.[2] Both courts found petitioner Rosa
Lim guilty of twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22[3] and imposing on her two one-
year imprisonment for each of the two violations and ordered her to pay two fines,
each amounting to two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial court also
ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the jewelry received or its value
with interest, to pay moral damages, attorney's fees and costs.[4]
We state the relevant facts.[5]
On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan by phone. Petitioner
thereafter went to Seguan's store. She bought various kinds of jewelry -- Singaporean
necklaces, bracelets and rings worth P300,000.00. She wrote out a check dated August
25, 1990, payable to "cash" drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000.00[6] and
gave the check to Seguan.
On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan's store and purchased
jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to "cash" dated
August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.00[7] and sent the
check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with
a notice of dishonor. Petitioner's account in the bank from which the checks were drawn
was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two
dishonored checks. She never did.
On June 5, 1991,[8] an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 23 two informations against petitioner. Both informations
were similarly worded. The difference is that in Criminal Case No. 22128, the bouncing
checks is Metro Bank Check No. CLN 094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount
of P241,668.00. The informations read:[9]
Criminal Case No. 22127-
"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 committed as follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime subsequent thereto,
in the City of Cebu Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient
funds in the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there
issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check NO. 1 CLN 094244391 dated August 25, 1990
in the amount of P300,000.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was issued
in payment of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented
with the bank the same was dishonored for reason "Account Closed" and despite notice
and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said accused failed and
refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P300,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. 22128-
"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION
OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22, COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:
"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime subsequent thereto,
in this City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did
then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check No. CLN-094244392 dated
August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which
check was issued in payment of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check
was presented with the bank, the same was dishonored for reason "Account Closed"
and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said
accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of said Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of
P241,668.00, Philippine Currency.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991."[10]
107
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" in both cases.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the
Page
two cases convicting petitioner, to wit:[11]
"WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused, Rosa Lim and
sentencing her in Criminal Case No. CBU-22127, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and a fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00)
PESOS and in Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the same penalty of imprisonment for
ONE YEAR and fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is likewise imposed.
"The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Maria Antonia Seguan, the
sum of P541,668.00 which is the value of the jewelries bought by the accused from
the latter with interest based on the legal rate to be counted from June 5, 1991, the
date of the filing of the informations, or return the subject jewelries; and further to pay
private complainant:
"(a) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in compensation for the latter's worries
with the freezing of her business capital involved in these litigated transactions;
"(b) The sum of P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs.
"SO ORDERED."[12]
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.[13]
On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, dismissing the
appeal in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED in toto.
"SO ORDERED."[14]
Hence, this appeal.[15]
In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much more,
had any "transaction" with her. According to petitioner, she issued the two checks and
gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She gave the two checks to Aurelia
Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a "security arrangement" or
"guarantee" that she would return the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell
them.[16]
The appeal has no merit.
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:[17]
"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."
Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that the checks were
not issued to Seguan and that they had no pre-existing transaction. The checks were
issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement to cover
the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis. [18] These defenses cannot
save the day for her. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly
present. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element was absent, that
is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank
account were insufficient. She did not prove this.
B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are
present.[19] If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.[20]
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check
or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And the accused failed to
satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment within five (5)
banking days from notice of dishonor.[21] The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare.[22]Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide
and prevent against an evil or mischief.[23] Why and to whom the check was issued is
irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the
issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.[24]
Unlike in estafa,[25] under B. P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was
issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage. The damage done is to
the banking system.[26]
In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry
is, "has the law been violated?" When dealing with acts mala prohibita[27]--
" it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with criminal intent. In many
crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits
the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a
deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of
execution. In many cases, the act complained of is itself that which produces the
pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is
produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person
108
performing the act is good or bad."
This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. Petitioner issued two
Page
checks. They were dishonored upon presentment for payment due to the fact that the
account was closed.Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she knew her funds
were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks. And she failed to pay the amount
of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from
receipt of notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam
durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is
written.

However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. B.P. No. 22

provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one
year or a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the Court."[28]

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held that in determining the penalty to be

imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to
prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due
regard to the protection of the social order.There, we deleted the prison sentence
imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the
check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in
good faith, that no violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would
have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade
prison term."[30] We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of
criminal justice.

Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner. The two

fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and
sufficient.

The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney's fees are deleted for lack
of sufficient basis.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the Court of

Appeals.[31] We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts
of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of imprisonment
and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6)
months.[32] We DELETE the award of moral damages and attorney's fees. The rest of
the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

109
Page
PEOPLE v. GABRES
[G.R. Nos. 118950-54. February 6, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUCRECIA
GABRES, also known as MONA GABRES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Five counts of estafa were filed against the spouses Perlito (Lito) and Lucrecia (Mona)
Gabres and, except for the names of the private complainants and the amounts
involved, the text in each of the corresponding informations is substantially the same
in all; viz:[1]
"The undersigned accuses SPOUSES LITO and LUCRECIA GABRES also known as MONA
GABRES of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about the months of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and sometime subsequent
thereto, at Acop, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
defraud and by means of deceit through false representations and pretenses made by
them prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there
willfully unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOEL PANIDA, by then and there
representing themselves as a duly authorized or licensed recruiters for overseas
employment, when in truth and in fact they were not, thereby inducing the said person
to give to them the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000), Philippine
Currency, for placement abroad, which amount they misappropriated for their own use
and benefit and then either fail or refuse and continue to fail or refuse to return the
same despite repeated demands, all to the damage and prejudice of said person in the
total sum aforesaid and other consequential damages.
"Contrary to Law."[2]
In addition, the spouses were charged with having engaged in large scale illegal
recruitment; thus:
"The undersigned accuses Lito Gabres and Lucrecia Gabres also known as Mona Gabres
of Illegal Recruitment, defined under par. 1, Art. 38 of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as The Labor Code of the Philippines, and penalized under Art. 39(b) of the
same Code, as amended by P.D. 2018, committed as follows:
"That on or about the month of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and sometime subsequent
thereto, at the Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly recruit ORETA NISPEROS, TARCISO DACSIG, JULIUS AOAY, JOEL
PANIDA and RONALD MIRABUENO for overseas employment, by then and there
misrepresenting themselves as a duly authorized or licensed recruiters when in truth
and in fact they were not and by reason of said misrepresentations, they were able to
obtain from the said complainants the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P185,000.00) Philippine Currency, all to the damage and prejudice
of the above-named complainants in the total sum aforesaid sum and other
consequential damages.
"That such illegal recruitment having been committed by in large scale, it
constitutes economic sabotage.
"Contrary to Law."[3]
The six cases were tried, preceded by the arraignment of the accused, jointly.
The following version of the case is culled from the evidence given by the
prosecution.
Some time in March of 1992, Oreta Nisperos heard that the accused couple were
recruiting factory workers for abroad. With great anticipation, Nisperos, accompanied
by her son, Ramil, and her neighbors, Joel Panida and Julius Aoay, [4] went to the
residence of the Gabreses in Bauang, La Union. After the group was introduced by
Nisperos' cousin, Rosario Zapanta, the spouses confirmed their being engaged in the
recruitment of factory workers for Korea. A "package deal" was reached. Each applicant
was to be charged a placement fee of P45,000.00. The parties agreed to meet again
on 12 April 1992 at the Dr. Yares Clinic in Baguio City. On the appointed date and time,
Mona Gabres alone showed up to meet with the applicants. The latter were joined, in
this meeting, by Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno, who all
promised to also come up with the required "placement fees."
At the respective dates stated below, the accused spouses received the following
amounts from each of the applicants; thus:
"DATE OF NAME OF PAYOR AMOUNT
PAYMENT
110
1. April 26, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil - P5,000.00(No receipt)
Nisperos)
Page
-
 Joel Panida - P5,000.00 (Exh. `A' - CR they could expect within a few days their departure for abroad. The promise was not
No. 1800) fulfilled. Then, in order to appease the applicants, the spouses explained that it was
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. only the call of the Korean employer, Mr. Kim, that was being awaited so as to firm up
P5,000.00 (Exh. 'A' - CR the flight schedule. The call never came. After a series of follow-ups, the applicants
No. 1803) were directed by the spouses to confer with the latter's supposed associate in Manila,
one Rebecca (Vicky) Naval, who was said to be managing the Bachs and Cochs Travel
2. May 1, 1992 - Julius Aoay - P5,000.00 (Exh. `A' - CR Agency. Naval initially denied any association with the Gabreses; she later, however,
No. 1802) told the group that she had been engaged by the spouses to process the travel
documents, plane tickets and flight bookings of the applicants, and that the required
3. May 5, 1992 - Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR visas were already being applied for.
No. 1803) After several more months of waiting and still getting nowhere, the applicants
Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil -
Nisperos) P5,000.00 (No receipt) finally demanded the return of their money from the spouses. Each applicant was
issued four checks, each for P10,000.00, but which, when presented for payment, all
bounced.[6]
4. June 7, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR
Nisperos) No. 1800) The would-be overseas workers sought the assistance of the Philippine Overseas
- Employment Administration-Cordillera Administrative Region ("POEA-CAR") which
Joel Panida P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR certified, through Atty. Justinian O. Lichnachan, that the accused spouses were "not
No. 1800) licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment within the City of
- P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR Baguio or any part of the region."
Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. No. 1800)
-
Julius Aoay P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR Lito Gabres managed to elude arrest, and the trial proceeded only against his
No. 1800) wife. Mona Gabres pleaded "not guilty" to each of the accusations. She denied any
involvement in her husband's activities.
5. June 10, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil - P30,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR
Nisperos) No. 1801) The defense sought to establish that Mona was a mere fish vendor in Bauang, La
Union, and that this work demanded her full attention. Her husband used to be an
overseas contract worker himself and, thereafter, a liaison officer for Caro Fran
6. June 17, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Joan - P5,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR Recruitment Agency, whose job included the processing and following-up of travel
Nisperos) No. 1801) papers with the Department of Foreign Affairs. In July, 1992, her husband introduced
her to Vicky Naval who requested Mona to safekeep the collection of placement fees
7. June 18, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Jonard - P5,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR from the applicants. She admitted having joined her husband, but only once, in
Dulay) No. 1801) collecting the payments made by private complainants on 03 July 1992 at Acop, Tublay,
Benguet, which was duly remitted to Naval.
8. July 3, 1992 - Joel Panida - P35,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR
No. 1800)
In a decision, dated 14 December 1994, Judge Romeo A. Brawner [9] (now
- Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P25,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) rendered judgment that concluded:
No. 1803)
"WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
- Julius Aoay - P30,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR

111
No. 1802)"[5] "1. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona'
Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
On 03 July 1992, the accused spouses assured Ramil Nisperos, Joan Nisperos, imprisonment of five (5) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision

Page
Joel Panida, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Julius Aoay, Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno that correccional as MINIMUM to nine (9) years and ten (10) months of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM;
"3. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona'
Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby
sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM to seven (7)
years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
"4. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona'
Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and hereby
sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of Prision correccional as MINIMUM to seven (7)
years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;
"5. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1804, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona'
Gabres NOT GUILTY of the offense charged due to insufficiency of evidence and
hereby acquits her with proportionate costs de oficio;
"6. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1805, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona'
Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).
"On the civil liability in the estafa cases, accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres is hereby
ordered to pay to Joel Panida, Oreta Nisperos, Julius Aoay and Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. the
amounts of P45,000.00, P55,000.00, P40,000.00 and P40,000.00, respectively, as
actual damages.
"Proportionate costs against the accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres.
"In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be credited to the full term of her
preventive imprisonment as provided for by Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
provided the conditions set forth therein for the enjoyment of the same have been met.
"With respect to accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres, let these cases be sent to the files
without prejudice to their revival as soon as he shall have been arrested and brought
to the jurisdiction of this Court.
"In order that he may not escape the clutches of the law, let Warrants of Arrest issue
addressed to the PNP Station Commander, Bauang, La Union and the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), Manila.Further, the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID), Manila is ordered to include the name of accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres in its Hold
Departure List.
"SO ORDERED."[10]
Mona Gabres appealed the decision to this Court. Appellant, in main, would wish
to sway the Court into thinking that the real culprit was Lito Gabres and that the
complaining witnesses gave stress over her participation only because her husband
could not be apprehended.
The Court, regrettably, must sustain the conviction.
The testimony given by each of the private complainants unquestionably would
point to both the spouses to be the culprits in an elaborate scheme to defraud the
hopeful applicants for overseas work. The Court quotes from the transcript of the
proceedings.
Testimony of Oreta Nisperos:
"ATTY. PAOAD:
"Now, Madam witness, you said a while ago that it was the later part of
March, 1992 that you and your cousin went to see the two accused in
Bauang, what transpired then?
"A They told us that they were recruiting factory workers for Korea.
"Q What else happened?
"A They told us that if my children are interested we will see each other in
Baguio City on April 12.
"Q What was your agreement as to where shall you meet each other and
the date.
"A I suggested that we will see each other at the clinic of Dr. Yares.
"Q Where is the clinic of Dr. Yares located?
"A It is located at Harrison Road, Baguio City.
"Q On that particular of April 12, 1992 were you able to meet each other?
"A Yes, ma'am.
"Q Who were your companions?
"A My companions were Julius Aoay, Joel Panida and my son Ramil Nisperos.
"Q Who from the side of the accused came to see you on April 12, 1992.
112
"A Mrs. Mona Gabres, ma'am.
"Q How about the other accused, Lito Gabres.
Page
"A He was not there, ma'am.
 "Q Now, what transpired on April 12, 1992? "Q You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on April 26 you paid
P5,000.00 for your son, what is your basis in saying that you paid
"A They told us that if we are interested we will pay an advance payment P5,000.00 on that day?
of P5,000.00 each.
"A They issued us a receipt, ma'am.
"Q For each applicant?
"Q Who received the payment?
"A Yes, ma'am.
"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.
"Q What else did you talk about?
"Q Who issued the receipt?
"A They told us that if we have money we will see each other on April 26.
"A It was Lito Gabres who was making the receipt, ma'am.
"Q Where will you see each other on April 26?
"x x x x x x x x x.
"A I told her that we will see at Acop, Tublay because they knew where we
are. "Q Now, after April 26, 1992 what happened?

"Q What particular place in Acop? "A They told us that they will go back at our residence on May 1 and if the other
applicants will have their money at that time they will process their
"A At our residence, sir. papers.
"ATTY. PAOAD: "Q Who paid on May 1, 1992?
"Now, how much all in all are the two accused asking you to pay in "A Julius Aoay, ma'am.
consideration of the same in Korea?
"ATTY. PAOAD:
"A They were asking P45,000.00.
"Who received the payment?
"Q Now, you said that you agreed to meet each other again on April 26, 1992,
what happened on that date? "A Both the two accused, ma'am. One will receive the amount and the other
will issue the receipt."[11]
"A They came at our residence, both of them.

"Q The two accused?

"A Yes, ma'am. Testimony of Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.:

"Q Now, when the two accused came to your residence on April 26, what
happened? "Q Now, to whom did you give this P5,000.00?

"A My son paid an amount of P5,000.00. "A I handed it to Aunt Oreta who gave it to Mona Gabres, Ma'am.

"Q Who particularly paid for your son? "Q Now, who issued you a receipt?

"A I paid for my son, ma'am. "A Mona Gabres.

"Q Aside from you and your son who else were present? "Q What about her husband Lito Gabres?

"A Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig. "A Aunt Oreta gave the P5,000.00 to Mona Gabres who counted the money,
after counting the money Lito Gabres gave it to Mona Gabres.

113
"Q How about Julius Aoay?
"x x x x x x x x x.
"A He was also present, ma'am.
"Q I would like to show to you this receipt dated July 31, 1992 previously

Page
marked as Exhibit `B-1' for Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1803 and Exhibit `I-
 1' in Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1805, is this the receipt you are referring
to?
"A Yes, Ma'am.
"Q Now, who issued you this receipt?
"A Lito Gabres, Ma'am.
"Q Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres what was the participation of
Mona Gabres?
"A I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he counted it and then handed it
to Mona Gabres, Ma'am."[12]
Testimony of Julius Aoay:
"Q I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7, 1992 which has been
previously marked as Exhibit `A' in Criminal Case 1801, as Exhibit `B'
in Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit
`C' in Criminal Case 1803 and as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1802, is
this the receipt issued to you?
"A Yes, it is.
"Q Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?
"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.
"Q How about Lito Gabres what was his participation?
"A He was the one counting the money."[13]
In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only accused-appellant who,
in fact, showed up to meet with the applicants for overseas work. Joel Panida testified:
"Q On April 12, 1992 were you present in that meeting?
"A Yes, I was also there, ma'am.
"Q Who else were present on that day, April 12, 1992?
"A Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and Julius Aoay.
"Q Who from the side of the accused came to see you?
"A It was Mona Gabres only, ma'am.
"Q How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?
"A He was not there, ma'am.
"Q On April 12, 1992 what transpired in that meeting?
"A She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers going to Korea. She also
asked us that if we are interested then we will give P5,000.00 each as
down payment." [14]
The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private complainants have
prevaricated the evidence to implicate Mona Gabres only because the authorities have
yet to succeed in arresting her husband. It is, of course, unfortunate that the husband,
at least momentarily, is able to ward off the long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should,
in the end, still catch up with him.
Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by means of deceit punishable
under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.[15] The trial court's brief
ratiocination is well taken; viz:
"There is no dispute that damages have been incurred by the complainants. They
parted with their money in consideration of deployment for work in a foreign country,
but which unfortunately remains unrestituted despite the failure in that regard of the
person or persons who promised that they will be sent off to work abroad."[16]
Accused-appellant is likewise guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, an offense
under Article 38(b), in relation to Article 39, of the Labor Code which provides:
"ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees
or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of
this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may
initiate complaints under this Article.
"(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
"Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first
paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group."
"x x x x x x x x x.
"ART. 39. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred
114
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein."
Page
Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:
"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal recruitment), namely: (1) that the
offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any of the
recruitment activities defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or
any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the same code.(PEOPLE vs.
CORAL, G.R. Nos. 97849-54, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 499). Without any doubt, this
Court finds the two elements of the crime present in the case at bar. That the accused
are non-licensees or non-holders of authority to lawfully recruit is evident in the
certification issued by Atty. Justinian Lichnachan of the POEA-CAR Regional Extension
Office of Baguio City (Exhibit `D,' 93-CR-1800). Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines
recruitment and placement as `any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises
for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.' The act of the accused in holding out a placement fee of P45,000.00
per applicant in exchange for an employment abroad; the several collections made by
them; and their promise to send off the applicants for work in Korea were just some of
the circumstances that would qualify the acts of the accused under the definition of
recruitment and placement."[17]
The Court, however, would have to reduce the award of actual damages to Oreta
Nisperos from P55,000.00 to P50,000.00. Oreta concededly could not present any
receipt for the supposed payments she allegedly made on 26 April 1992 and on 05 May
1992, for P5,000.00 each, on behalf of Ramil Nisperos. Joel Panida, in his testimony,
attested to the payment made on 26 April 1992[18] but no similar evidence was
presented to prove the payment made on 05 May 1992.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"ART 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;
"2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos;
and
"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not
exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed
by any of the following means."
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall
be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed"
under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense.[19] The penalty next lower should
be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime.[20] The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound
discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. [21] The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence.[22]
The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should
not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the
matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition
of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since
the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved
exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court thus finds some need to modify in part the penalties
imposed by the trial court; viz:
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, the amount involved is P45,000.00. Hence, the
minimum penalty should be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, which is the maximum of the allowable minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence. The maximum penalty imposed by the court a quo is within
lawful range.
In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, the amount involved, as so modified by this Court,
115
is P50,000.00. The minimum penalty should then be reduced to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional (the maximum of the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence). The maximum penalty should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day
Page
of prision mayor plus a period of two (2) years (one [1] year for each
additional P10,000.00) for a total maximum period of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802 and No. 93-CR-1803, the amounts involved in each
total P40,000.00. The minimum penalty of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the
court a quo of two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional is
within lawful range. The maximum penalty, however, should at least be six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor plus a period of one (1) year for a total maximum
period of seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification only

insofar as the penalties therein imposed are concerned; thus -

(1) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, accused-appellant is sentenced to an

indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of from four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and ten (10) months of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, accused-appellant is sentenced to an

indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of from four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM, the actual damages being reduced to P50,000.00.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, accused-appellant is sentenced to an

indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.

(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate

sentence of from two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM.

All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from are
AFFIRMED.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

116
Page
PEOPLE v. LAMPAZA
[G.R. No. 138876. November 24, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EGMEDIO
LAMPAZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The medical examination of a victim is not a requisite for the successful
prosecution of rape. Even without a medical report, a court may convict an accused
based on the offended party's credible testimony. The "sweetheart" defense cannot be
given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos,
pictures or tokens. Love is not a license to rape.
The Case
Egmedio Lampaza appeals the March 14, 1994 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique (Branch 10)[2] in Criminal Case No. 3692, finding him
guilty of rape.
In an Information dated May 25, 1988 and "at the instance of the offended party,"
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juan C. Mission Jr. charged appellant as follows:[3]
"That on or about the 20th day of March, 1988, in the Municipality of Tobias Fornier,
Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, through intimidation,
violence and force and with the use of a deadly weapon, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Teodora Wacay without and
against the consent of the offended party."
With the assistance of Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, appellant entered a plea of not guilty
when arraigned on June 9, 1988.[4] Trial proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the trial
court promulgated its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:[5]
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and jurisprudence, after the
prosecution has presented thorough and convincing evidence, the Court finds accused
EGMEDIO LAMPAZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for the period of Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day to Fourteen (14)
Years and Eight (8) Months as minimum to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months
and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years as maximum and to indemnify Teodora Wacay
[in] the amount of P30,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
On June 1, 1994, appellant, through Counsel Cezar C. Tajanlangit, filed a Notice
of Appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).[6] After the defense and the prosecution filed
their respective Briefs, the appellate court[7] rendered a Decision affirming the
conviction of appellant, but modifying the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:[8]
"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant EGMEDIO LAMPAZA is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay complainant Teodora Wacay the amount
of P50,000.00 for moral damages.
In the light of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court,[9] the CA "recalled" the
entry of the above judgment, certified the case to this Court and elevated the
records.[10]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,[11] the Office of the Solicitor General adopted the following facts as
summarized by the trial court:[12]
"The first witness presented was a college student who is the nephew of the private
offended party, who went to the house of the latter on March 20, 1988, without finding
her there. Witness looked for Teodora, proceeding to the place where farm animals are
grazed, which was two hills away. (pp. 2-4 TSN, September 27, 1989)
"Witness saw [his] aunt running out [of] one of the nipa huts in the farm. When [his]
aunt reached him, she was sobbing and very pale. She immediately asked him to
accompany her back to her house. His aunt explained to him that she ha[d] to leave
that place immediately because she was afraid of somebody and therefore could not
stay in Sitio Namontonan, Brgy. Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. (pp. 5-7,
TSN, Ibid.)
117
"During cross examination, defense counsel verified the details regarding the testimony
under direct-examination of this witness, as to the reason witness was in that sitio (p.
Page
8, TSN, id.), the distance between the house and the grazing area of the farm animals,
the location of the nipa hut and other details. (p. 9, TSN, id.)
Witness repeated to the Court that [his] aunt was very afraid when he met her running
out of the nipa hut although she did not tell him yet what happened. That [his] aunt
was trembling, very pale and looking very weak. (p. 10, TSN, id.)
The private offended party herself testified, and positively identified accused in open
court. (p. 18, TSN, id.) That in the morning of March 20, 1988 she was in her farm lot
in Sitio Namontonan, Barangay Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. When she was
about to graze their animals, all of a sudden accused came from behind her and twisted
both her arms. Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut which was
uninhabited. Victim struggled to set herself free, to no avail despite kicking, shouting
and struggling to be free from the hold of the accused. (pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)
Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut; pinned both her legs including
her right hand with [his] knees [and took] off his pants. The accused ha[d] his bolo
beside him with which he threatened the victim. Victim testified that accused raped her
then, explaining in detail the commission of the said act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)
Witness informed her husband and her mother about the rape that evening. (pp. 31-
32, TSN, id.)
During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach the testimony of the
witness by eliciting the information that accused and victim were close neighbors; that
during the incident private offended party passed by accused who was cutting bamboo
poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot. (pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7,
1989). She described again the force and intimidation emanating from the accused in
committing the act complained of. Private offended party informed the Court of the
great fear she felt that she was trembling and almost speechless when the incident
happened. (pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)
Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified on cross[-]examination. (p.
19, TSN, id.)
When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual intercourse she stated that it
lasted only three minutes, although the acts of force, intimidation and the struggle
lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.)
During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution presented another witness in the
person of the husband of the offended party (p. 32), who testified that the latter
informed him about her being raped by the accused; that [he] wanted to kill the
accused but he was prevailed upon by his wife and decided to file a case in Court,
hence the criminal complaint (p. 34). Witness was in another town during the
incident:that he returned to his house in the afternoon of the following day, when his
wife informed him of the incident. (p. 32-34)
"They went to the police authorities the following day and filed their formal complaint,
contained in a sworn statement. (pp. 34-38, TSN, id.)
Version of the Defense
Insisting that appellant and complainant were sweethearts, the defense presents
the following version of the facts:[13]
"The defense's version of the case is as follows: Accused Egmedio Lampaza and
complainant Teodora Wacay are neighbors. They have known each other since
childhood. Accused courted complainant who later became his girlfriend. However,
they married different persons, but that notwithstanding, they have had intimate
relations.
"In the morning of 20 March 1988, accused heard a signal from complainant. The latter
informed him that her husband was in another town, and when he asked her "what
now because your husband is not there," complainant just laughed. Complainant told
accused that she was going to fetch her carabao, so he followed her. When he reached
the place where she was, he put his arms around her, but she brushed them aside,
apprehensive that they might be seen. Complainant went up the nipa hut, the same
place where they had had sexual intercourse, and made love again, with complainant
taking off her clothes first, followed by accused taking off his pants and shirt. They
made love consensually. He did not threaten complainant; neither did he use force [or]
violence in consummating the sexual act because the same was with the consent of
complainant (t.s.n., August 6, 1991.)
"Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused, testified that
complainant is the mistress of her husband, the accused. Because of her husband's
extra-marital relationship, they were always quarreling. To avoid further trouble she
went to Iloilo to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del Rosario (pp. 49-50,
t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter testified that Filomena had worked for her family as
a housemaid, and during the course of her employment she had confided to her
employer that her (Filomena's) husband was maltreating her and ha[d] a querida
(t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992)."
Ruling of the RTC and the CA
118
Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was consensual, the trial court
held that appellant used force against the victim by twisting her arm and bodily lifting
her from the farm lot to the nipa hut.He also threatened and intimidated her by placing
a bolo beside her during the actual rape. The trial court ruled:[14]
Page
"Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show that there was force
committed on the victim when her arms were twisted and she was bodily lifted from
the farm lot to the nipa hut. She was intimidated or there was a threat to intimidate
her, when the bolo was placed beside her during the rape.
"This court finds that the incident complained of which occurred on March 20, 1988
was x x x done without the consent [or] approval of the victim.
"We do not see any reason why Teodora Wacay related the incident to her husband
the following evening, if indeed the rape was not committed because the husband was
out of town then. Much more, that she went to court. In People vs. Estolano, 193 SCRA
383, the Supreme Court held that complainant would not have made the offense
subject and endured the ordeal of testifying to all its gory detail if she had not in fact
been raped."
Affirming appellants conviction, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty
to reclusion perpetua and increased the moral damages to P50,000.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant contends that the trial court committed the following errors:[15]
I
x x x [I]n holding that accused-appellant used force and intimidation on complainant
in order to consummate the sexual act
II
x x x [I]n holding that the sexual intercourse herein complained of was done without
the consent [or] approval of the victim
III
x x x [I]n finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape based on
the inconsistencies, contradictions, and incredibilities palpably apparent in
complainants testimony and in [the testimonies] of her witnesses
In resolving this appeal, we shall address seriatim the three grounds raised by
appellant.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Force and Intimidation
Appellant contends that rape was not proven because force and intimidation were
not established beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, he argues that the testimony of
the victim on this point should be rejected, because it conflicted with her Sworn
Statement given during the preliminary investigation. First, in her statement she
averred that he pressed [her] forward towards the nipa hut; but she testified that he
lifted her. Second, she declared in her statement that he forcibly made [her] lie down,
but she testified that he dump[ed] [her] on the floor. Third, she also stated that
appellants bolo was tucked to his side, but she testified that it was placed beside her.[16]
We are not convinced. The "conflicts" cited by appellant are largely semantical,
not factual, in character. Whether appellant forcibly made her lie down on the floor or
whether he dumped her makes no substantial difference in appreciating the fact of the
crime: that she was down on the floor against her will. Likewise, appellant makes too
much ado about the discrepancy between her being pressed forward and her being
lifted; the allegedly conflicting statements equally mean that he forced her to go to the
nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled rule is that inconsistencies between an affidavit
and a testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness, for affidavits are generally
incomplete[17] and are not considered final repositories of truth.[18]
In any event, we agree with the trial court that appellant used force and
intimidation in ravaging complainant. Although its factual findings are not absolutely
binding on this Court because it was not the ponente who heard the prosecution
witnesses,[19] we believe and so hold that the totality of the evidence presented
indubitably demonstrates that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant
against her will. He twisted the arms of the terrified victim, forced her to go inside the
uninhabited nipa hut, placed the bolo beside her, and threatened to kill her in order to
sate his lust. The victim testified as follows:[20]
Q. Now, while you were untying the rope of your carabao, do you recall of any
unusual incident that happened?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What was that incident?
A. All of a sudden, a person came from behind me and twisted both my
119
hands. (Witness demonstrated with her right hand twisted towards the left
side of her body while the left hand was also twisted towards the right side of
her body, both hands in front).
Page
xxxxxxxxx
 Q. Now, after the accused Egmedio Lampaza twisted your arms, what else A. I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a movement as if she were
happened? pedalling an unseen bicycle).

A. He lifted me. Q. Did you make any statement while you were trying to struggle from the hold of
the accused?
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you were lifted by
Egmedio Lampaza? A. I did not say anything. I only struggled.

A. (With Julie Magbanua acting in place of the victim and the witness in place of Q. Why did you not say anything?
the accused, the accused stands behind the victim and place[s] both arms
around the victim while the arms of the victim are twisted with the right arms xxxxxxxxx
towards the left and the left arms towards the right side of her body and from A. Because I was afraid, Sir.
that position the accused lifts the victim upward, raising the victim about three
inches from the ground.) PROSECUTOR CASALAN:

Q. Now, Madam Witness, while you were being lifted by the accused in the position Q. Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with you?
you have just mentioned, what else did he do?
A. Yes, Sir.
A. Egmedio Lampaza told me, Come, lets have sexual intercourse.
Q. While you were already at the nipa hut, what did the accused do, if any?
Q. While saying that and while lifting you, what else did Egmedio Lampaza do, if
any? A He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut.

A. He brought me to the nipa hut, Sir. xxxxxxxxx

Q. How far is that nipa hut from where you were at that time? Q After the accused dumped you on the floor of the nipa hut, what happened to
you?
A. About five arms stretch away, Sir.
A The accused pinned both my legs as well as my right hand, Sir, with both of his
Q. Was that hut inhabited? knees.

A. No one lives there. xxxxxxxxx

xxxxxxxxx PROSECUTOR CASALAN:

Q. While you were being lifted by the accused and being carried to the nipa hut, Q Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what next did the accused do?
what did you do if you did anything?
A The accused took off his pants.
A. I struggled to set myself free.
Q While the accused was doing that, was the accused saying anything?
Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you struggled?
A Yes, Sir.
A. (At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place of the accused while the
witness takes the place of the victim and from the position previously Q What did he say?
described, with the xxx arms [of the accused] around the victim, the victim A If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse with you, I am going to kill
struggle[s] to set herself free by moving her body towards the left and right you.
and trie[s] to push her head downward away from the arms of the accused
[who is] embracing her. The witness further states that since her feet were Q Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by the accused with him?
off the ground, it [was] hard to set herself free).

120
A Yes, Sir.
Q. Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself from the clutches of the
accused, what else did you do if any? Q What was he carrying?

Page
A He was carrying a bolo, Sir.
 Q Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?
A It was beside me, Sir.
Appellant further argues that if there was any resistance [by the victim], it was
couched in general terms.[21] The argument is bereft of merit. We must stress that the
law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. [22] Indeed,
physical resistance need not be established when the culprit employed
intimidation,[23] which, insofar as it was directed at the mind of the victim, must be
viewed in the light of the latter's perception and judgment at the time.[24] In the present
case, the victim was terrified because the threat of the appellant to kill her was
substantiated by the bolo he placed beside her. Furthermore, she could not have
successfully resisted because, according to her, he was husky and strong.
Neither are we persuaded by his contention that complainant did not undergo
medical examination to show signs of physical struggle or assault.[25] The fact that the
victim had no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove rape.[26] We reiterate that
she was too intimidated to offer serious resistance to the advances of appellant.
More important, no law requires a medical examination for the successful
prosecution of rape.[27] Even without a medical report, the rape victims credible
testimony, standing alone, is a sufficient basis for conviction. [28] In the present case,
we find no reason to disbelieve her testimony. Time and time again, the Court has held
that no woman in her right mind would declare to the whole world that she was raped
and subject herself to the concomitant strain and stigma, unless she is telling the
truth.[29] For his part, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to show that the victim's
testimony was false.
Second Issue: Sweetheart Theory
Appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant that fateful
day, but argues that they were lovers and the act was consensual. [30] He adds that
their respective marriages to different persons had not prevented them from engaging
in sexual dalliances with each other.
We are not persuaded. Other than his bare assertions, appellant adduced no
independent proof that he was the sweetheart of the victim. His defense was neither
corroborated by any other witness nor substantiated by any memento, love note,
picture or token.[31] Furthermore, even assuming that the two were lovers, their
relationship did not give him a license to sexually assault her.[32]
Appellants defense is further negated by the behavior of the victim who,
according to Rogelio Sumbilon, was running out of the crime scene sobbing and very
pale[33] immediately after the commission of the crime. Elaborating during cross-
examination, he said that the victim was in a hurry, as if she was afraid of something
and as if somebody was running after her.[34] When they reached her house, she told
him that she was afraid and that they should hurry to her mothers house about three
or four kilometers away. Her conduct clearly belied appellants claim that the sexual act
was consensual.
Third Issue: Alleged Inconsistencies and Incredibilities
Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses should not be accorded
credence because their testimonies were replete with inconsistencies and incredibilities.
In addition to the instances alluded to earlier, appellant cites the following: the victim
testified that she shouted, although she said in her Sworn Statement that she had not
done so; she allegedly told her husband of the rape on the evening of the fateful day,
but her husband testified that he did not return home until the afternoon of the
following day.[35]
We are not persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies are minor in character and,
as such, do not impugn the credibility of the complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed
testimony, the slight contradictions even serve to strengthen her credibility.[36] Indeed,
the Court cannot expect a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of the sexual
assault.[37]
Equally unconvincing is the alleged physical impossibility of the victims narration
that he was allegedly pinning her down with both his hands while taking off his shirt at
the same time.[38] The alleged impossibility does not imply the falsity of her testimony;
it only means that it was impossible for her to remember the minutiae of appellants
act.
Appellant also challenges the plausibility of the following assertions of the
victim: (a) she made no mention of the rape to her nephew when she saw him right
after the incident;[39] (b) she did not immediately tell her husband that she had been
raped;[40] (c) she did not report the outrage to the police or to the barangay officials. [41]
These arguments are puerile. Complainants testimony was not weakened by her
failure to immediately narrate the incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is
no code of conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to the sexual
assault. When placed under a great deal of emotional stress, the workings of the
human mind are unpredictable.[42] Some may immediately relay the incident to
authorities and close relatives, but others need time to compose themselves before
deciding on a course of action.[43] Although she did not immediately inform her nephew
about the incident, she told her husband about it after he arrived from another town,
when they were about to sleep. That same night, she and her husband decided to
report the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account is far from
incredible. Even assuming that there was a delay in reporting the incident to the police,
this fact is not necessarily an indication of fabrication.[44]
121
Crime and Punishment
Page
 Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed when carnal
knowledge of a woman is obtained under any of the following circumstances: (1) force
or intimidation is used (2) thewoman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious,
or (3) the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Herein appellant does
not deny that he had carnal knowledge of the victim. Moreover, the totality of the
evidence presented shows that he employed force and intimidation against her. Clearly,
his conviction of rape should be affirmed.

Under the law in effect when the crime was committed, the penalty for simple
rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a lower indeterminate penalty, the trial court
erred, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the offense
involved is punishable with reclusion perpetua.

Likewise, appellant should be ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as indemnity ex

delicto, in line with existing jurisprudence.[45] We agree with the Court of Appeals that
he should also be ordered to pay P50,000 as moral damages. The Court has held that
the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still require
the victims recital thereof at the trial x x x.[46]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with

the MODIFICATION that the appellant shall pay the victim P50,000 as indemnity ex
delicto in addition to the P50,000 awarded as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

122
Page
PEOPLE v. OYANIB
G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANOLITO OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision1 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide and parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty2 of six (6)
months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years
one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,3 and to pay P50,000.00
civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo, and to reclusion
perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib.4
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib
y Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having
conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation,
attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of said attack, the said
Tita Oyanib died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code."6
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities7 and
was immediately detained at the Iligan City Jail.8
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by
reading the informations against him and translating them into the Visayan dialect.9 He
pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint
trial.

Criminal Case No. 6012</P> Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter
Tita) were married on February 3, 1979 10 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius.
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with
a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping
to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and custody of their two (2) children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where her family lived.
Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to
wit: At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were
watching TV at the salalocated at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A,
Cardiorespiratory arrest Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented
Hypovolemic shock irreversible by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down,
Multiple organ injury Edgardo went upstairs to check.11
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died. saw Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter's
stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.
aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident premeditation."5

123
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors
Criminal Case No. 6018 brought Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the hospital.12

Page
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City Police
Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of
September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an information regarding a
stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.13
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with several
stab wounds in different parts of the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants.
From the crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to
check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the
killing of Jesus and Tita.14 The incident was recorded in the police blotter as Entry No.
137138.15
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City
examined the bodies of Jesus and Tita.16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and
those inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were fatal.17 The cause of death
was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and
multiple stab wound chest and abdomen."18
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the left
chest and right side of the abdomen. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound."19
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita
decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2) children.
Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn's house for two (2)
months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G.
Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.20 The rented space consisted
mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that if one
enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from the sala,
directly to the door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards
reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile
with Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other men and
would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan,
Iligan City.22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured his wife and
reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened
to kill him.23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed
Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that
his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the
school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the
next day, Manolito went to Tita's house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his
behalf.24
Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from
the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita
and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down
to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed
Jesus. Though Jesus was 5'9" in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of
the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of
this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing
Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head,
while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake." 25
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down
and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the
broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast.
He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the
lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house
Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had
happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with
it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan
City and stayed at the wake of his friend's neighbor. He threw away the knife he used
in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following
day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga.
While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender.
He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan,
Iligan City.26
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife's place, Manolito
said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from
his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together.27
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and
having carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby
declares accused MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim.
Case No. II-6018) and and appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances
of passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender without any aggravating
124
circumstances to consider, this Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
Page
"1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
 To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1)
DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to
EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
2.) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to
indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay
the costs.
"It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty
(40) years limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
"SO ORDERED.
"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge"28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from the
joint decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court.29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several
errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the basic issue of
whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. 30 He questioned the trial court's appreciation of the facts and the
evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence
material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus.
Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide
open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear,
lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-
appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article. 31
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An
absolutory cause is present 'where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of
public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed."'32
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal
liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential
elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has
not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.33 Accused must prove these
elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable.
"The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing
by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant adultery."34
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact
that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the
witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife
and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon
Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual
intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off
and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in
defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several
times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for
him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the
opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it
in People v. Wagas:35
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an
unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man
to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification
125
is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is
caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution
so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual
Page
intercourse or immediately thereafter."
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of
destierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one
hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan city.37

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

126
Page
PEOPLE v. DUCOSIN already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
provided in section five hereof.
G.R. No. L-38332 December 14, 1933
Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate Sentence" to be composed
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. VALERIANO of the Secretary of Justice as chairman and four members to be appointed by the
DUCOSIN, Defendant-Appellant. Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine Senate. This section
describes the qualifications of the members. Section 4 gives the board authority to
adopt rules of procedures and provides for the compensation of the
Alejandra F. Antonio for appellant. members.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the physical, mental and moral record
BUTTE, J.:
of the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and authorizes the board to determine
the proper time for the release of such prisoners. After a prisoner has served the
This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the "minimum penalty" imposed upon on him and the board is satisfied that such prisoner
appellant of the crime of frustrated murder was referred by the first division to the is fitted by the training for release and that there is a reasonable probability that he
court in banc for the proper interpretation and application of Act No. 4103 of the will not violate the law again and that his release "will not be incompatible with the
Philippine Legislature approved on December 5, 1933, commonly known as the welfare of society", the board may in its discretion authorize the release of such
"Indeterminate Sentence Law". As this is the first case which has come before us prisoner on parole. The board may also recommend the release on parole of other
involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be convenient to set out here some prisoners previously convicted of any offense than those named in section
of its provisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 2.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 1 of Act No. 4103 is as follows: Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released on parole for a period
"equivalent to the remaining portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or
Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by acts of the until final release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence." Section 7
Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal Code, the court shall order provides that a certified copy of the board's order of conditional or final release shall
the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be less than the be filed with the court and with the Chief of
minimum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum Constabulary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
term which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law; and where the offense is
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the court shall sentence Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the conditions of his parole,
the accused to such maximum as may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly who violates any law during the period of surveillance for which he has been convicted,
imposed under the present rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall not shall be subject to re-arrest and confinement and "shall serve the remaining unexpired
be less than the minimum imprisonment period by said Code for the offense. Except portion of the maximum sentence for which he was originally committed to prison"
as provided in section two hereof, any person who shall have been so convicted and unless the board grants a new parole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
sentenced and shall have served the minimum sentence imposed hereunder, may be library
released on parole in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall not be
Section 2 is as follows: construed to impair the powers given to the Governor-General under section 64 of the
Administrative Code of the Organic Act of the Philippine
This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
or life imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, sedition or espionage; to those By its terms, Act No. 4103 became the law upon its approval, that is to say, on
convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have December 5, 1933.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

127
escape from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to
In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30, 1932, for the
those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those
crime of frustrated murder upon the following information:chanrobles virtual law library

Page
That on or about the 23rd day of September, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and
with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and wound one Rafael Yanguas by then
and there suddenly and without any warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby
inflicting upon him several wounds in different parts of the body, some of which are
necessarily mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the
death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the
timely intervention of medical assistance.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years and one
day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the
costs. The penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
is reclusion temporalin its maximum period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for
a frustrated felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for the
consummated felony, which in the present case is prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen
years and four months. The accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating
circumstances, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, fixes the penalty within
the minimum period, that is to say, from ten years and one day to twelve years, leaving
to the discretion of the court the precise time to be served within said range, i.e., not
less than years and one day nor more than twelve years. The penalty imposed by the
trial judge being within its range is correct and therefore is the penalty prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the offense which this accused has
committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was enacted after this appeal was
lodged in this court, we are now required to revise the sentence imposed upon the
appellant and to bring the same into conformity with Act No.
4103.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must now, instead of a
single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence
Act as the "maximum" and "minimum". The prisoner must serve the minimum penalty
before he is eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the
period between the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that
he may, under the condition set out in said Act, be released from serving said period
in whole or in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period
which is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as these terms
are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This leads up to the important question: How shall the "maximum" and the "minimum"
penalty be determined?chanrobles virtual law library
The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by the Revised
Penal Code, in accordance with the rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act
No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been passed. We think it is clear
from a reading of Act No. 4103 that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act
indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal or amend any of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The legislative history of the Act further shows
that attention was called to the necessity for taking care "so as not to bring the
provisions of this bill in conflict with the provisions of our penal laws, especially with
those treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House of Representatives, H-3321,
Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)chanrobles virtual law library
The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code:
Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public funds in the amount of
P10,000. No mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present. Under this law the
court may impose on him a maximum sentence not exceeding ten years and eight
months but not less than nine years, four months and one day ( see art. 217, No. 3,
Revised Penal Code), and a minimum which shall not be less than four years, two
months and one day (the minimum imprisonment period of prision correccional in its
maximum to prision mayor in its minimum. See article 61, Revised Penal Code). The
court, therefore, may sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not less than five
years nor more than ten years or for not less than seven years nor more than ten years
and eight months, etc.
It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. In the example given
reference is made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and
maximum period. The penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the absence
of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to say, anywhere between nine years,
four months and one day and ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court.
In the case on appeal here the penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper
penalty under the Revised Penal Code because of the plea of guilty, that is to say,
between ten years and one day and twelve years in the discretion of the court. This
discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in conformity
with the discretion conferred upon it by the Revised Penal Code, might have assessed
the penalty at, let us say, eleven years. We wish to make it clear that Act No. 4103
does not require this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is the longest
time of imprisonment within the minimum
degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
128
We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of imprisonment conforms to the
provisions and rules of the Revised Penal Code and is therefore fixed and established
as the maximum of the sentence which shall be imposed upon the
Page
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in Act No.
4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not be less than
the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said
Code for the offense." We are here upon new ground. It is in determining the
"minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties
the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the
"minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical
determination of the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second,
the broad question of the factors and circumstances that should guide the discretion
of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained
limits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
said Code for the offense "to mean the penalty next lower to that determined by the
court in the case before it as the maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by
the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion above). In the example which the
Legislature had before it in the Committee Report above mentioned, the maximum of
the sentence was correctly stated to be the medium degree of prision mayor in its
medium and maximum period. The penalty next lower is prision correccional in its
maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum degree (article 61, paragraph 4,
Revised Penal Code), that is to say, anywhere from four years, two months and one
day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply provides
that the "minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the
penalty next lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the court
to fix the minimum of the penalty anywhere between four years, two months and one
day and eight years. In the example given by the committee they stated that the court
might fix the minimum penalty at five years or seven
years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the maximum already
determined as aforesaid, is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months and one day
to ten years. As stated, it is in the discretion of the court to fix the time of imprisonment
within the said range without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum
degree, medium degree and minimum degree, and in this particular the courts are
vested as stated with a wider discretion than they ever had
before.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty,
namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or duration
of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI,
August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and,
second, as a member of society. This opens up an almost limitless field of investigation
and study which it is the duty of the court to explore in each case as far as is humanly
possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far
as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting
the social order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be considered
are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general
health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and personal habits; (4) his
previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his
previous education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for
usefulness or injury to society; (7) his demeanor during trial and his attitude with
regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the crime
was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103
excepts certain grave crimes - this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum
penalties for analogous crimes).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his
dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and second, his
relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors. The State is
concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization
against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual
for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not
heretofore known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the
courts can give full effect to the beneficent intention of the
Legislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act No. 4103 in
the case before us on this appeal. Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted
before Act No. 4103 became effective, and as we know nothing of his antecedents
because his plea of guilty rendered it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are
confined to the record before us. He plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the
crime of murder and only the timely intervention of medical assistance prevented the
death of his victim and the prosecution of the appellant for murder. He was given the
full benefit of the plea of guilty in the fixing of the maximum of the sentence. With
such light as we have received from the record in this case, we have concluded that a
reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment should be seven years, which
is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the maximum, that is to say,
within the range from four years, two months and one day to ten years of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. We repeat
that Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment
in the minimum period of the degree next lower to the maximum
penalty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
129
The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the defendant-
appellant is hereby sentenced to a maximum penalty of ten years and one day
Page
of prision mayor in its maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment period of
seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. With
costs de oficio.

130
Page
PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
Luis Contreras for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for
appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
finding the appellant guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs.
The following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on
his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife,
Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in the house of his
half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality
of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or
rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the
stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the
back, the blade penetrating the right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting
in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down the stairs to the
ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms,
carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the
shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and
testified to the stabbing of her mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement,
Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy
because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for the
reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected
that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his had become
indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot,
the accused pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court
of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His
counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo
was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he
behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go
stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent
and indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his
clothes until forced by the prison authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in
chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being asked; and
that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into
the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore
exempt from criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court
rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According
to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was
his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility
and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article
12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of
committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied
from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently,
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions
are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries
on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a
complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own
acts; that he acts without the least discernment;1 that there be a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity
at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person
of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be
equaled to imbecility or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive
evidence that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented,
a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be
131
presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always
reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
Page
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it
was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being
feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at
having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we
quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to
indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of
anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement
awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to
establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in
confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced
by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an
imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not
done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was
or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and
supported his family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the
fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who could
feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom
he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating
his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were
justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a
mere product of hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile
or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the observations
made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his
wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter
was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the family
of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also
used to sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the
suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of thinking.
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those
unfortunate beings, simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been
fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell down to the
ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for
hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought
that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities,
still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him.
In his written statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he
made no effort to deny or repudiate said written statement, thus saving the
government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the
aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems
that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance
was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court
of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore
declined to find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other hand, the
fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code, namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which
thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings,"
or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add
the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted
upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The
accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating
circumstance to offset them, at first we thought of the possible applicability of the
provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose of
imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which
is reclusion perpetuato death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the
application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible
penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in
accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present
case where the penalty applicable for parricide is composed only of two indivisible
penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of
indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties
like that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one
applicable in the present case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance,
the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme
Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of
parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which
corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru
Chief Justice Arellano said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two
mitigating circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to
overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to
the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the
court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar
to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the Rev. Penal
132
Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which
Page
is inevitable and which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now
 resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the
Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby
order that a proper petition be filed with the executive branch of the
Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of
the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty
to that of the next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the
Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant
to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating
circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article
246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must
be applied. The Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has
exhibited such moral turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore
under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we respectfully
invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive
clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the
judgment of the lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited
with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay
costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases
above cited, and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case
should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may
reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply
executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
FRANCISCO v. CA
G.R. No. 108747 April 6, 1995
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO C.
CONTRERAS, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It
essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately
admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal.
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part
of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of
his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently,
probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of P.D. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990?
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC Trans.
Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted —
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches (sic),
bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng puta . . .
. Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all.
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral defamation
in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his employees, each
Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four different days, i.e., from
9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati,
Br. 61, found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation in four (4) of the five (5) cases
filed against him, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 105206, 105207, 105209 and 105210,
sentenced him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each
case, as alleqed in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended
parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis,
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of
suit.1 He was however acquitted in Crim. Case No. 105208 for persistent failure of the
offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and testify.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence, petitioner
elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
133
On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his conviction
Page
but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous to passion or
obfuscation. Thus —
 . . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the defamatory
words complained of . . . . he must have been angry and worried
"about some missing documents . . . as well as the letter of the
Department of Tourism advising ASPAC about its delinquent tax of
P1.2 million . . . . " the said defamatory words must have been
uttered in the heat of anger which is a mitigating circumstance
analogous to passion or obfuscation.2
Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT
(8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an appeal therefrom the
decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then set for execution of judgment by
the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be
arrested petitioner filed an application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the
light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850,
29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992 dismissed
his petition on the following grounds —
Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to comply with
the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 of September 4,
1991. Violation of the circular is sufficient cause for dismissal of the
petition.
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the petition that
he had asked the respondent court to reconsider its above order; in
fact, he had failed to give the court an.opportunity to correct itself if
it had, in fact, committed any error on the matter. He is, however,
required to move for reconsideration of the questioned
order before filing a petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA
436). This failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of
his petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao v.
Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 31-SCRA 372).
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit any
capricious, arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of power in
denying the petitioner's application for probation . . . .
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of
time . . . .
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant probation
after conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the period of appeal,
upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each case, but expressly rules
out probation where an appeal has been taken . . . . 5
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this Court's
compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may militate against his
petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet lost his right to avail of
probation notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC to the RTC since "[t]he reason for
his appeal was precisely to enable him to avail himself of the benefits of the Probation
Law because the original Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he
would not then be entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the
judgment of the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed
upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of probation
even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with
regard to the duration of the penalties imposed.
Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to those
not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace
and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the court
to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the
penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special
prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or
by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court
which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law should not therefore
be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter's prerogatives,
rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly
expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly
within them.
Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates that "no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction," nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which
interprets the quoted provision, offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the
application of the law should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner.
While the proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the probationable limit
may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this interpretation under existing
law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the
Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of Appeals—
134
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal statute.
We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be really that any
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statutory language that appears to favor the accused in acriminal
case should be given.a "liberal interpretation." Courts . . . have no
authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law"
where the words of the statute themselves, and·as illuminated by
the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation.
We do not believe that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be
invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite
meaning imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true
legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and all
others who are charged with the application and implementation of
a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however, that
the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are
derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from
some external, mystical or metajuridical source independent of and
transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict
interpretation" rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and
"liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and
principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority
projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply.
That meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and
unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Courtis
simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need for
the involved process of construction that petitioner invites us to
engage in, a process made necessary only because petitioner rejects
the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the
statute. The first duty of the judge is to take and apply a statute as
he finds it, not as he would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court
in Yangco v. Court of First Instance warned, confusion and
uncertainty will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and
continuity in the law much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary
but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so
much confusion in the law, which has made it so
difficult for the public to understand and know
what the law is with respect to a given matter, is
in considerable measure the unwarranted
interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts,
cutting the words here and inserting them there,
making them fit personal ideas of what the
legislature ought to have done or what parties
should have agreed upon, giving them meanings
which they do not ordinarily have cutting,
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until
lawyers themselves are unable to advise their
clients as to the meaning of a given statute or
contract until it has been submitted to some court
for its interpretation and construction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our
people's grasp of English is steadily attenuated. 12
Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for probation if
the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary to the clear and
express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which opens with a
negativeclause, "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v.
Salvador, 13 we said —
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of
statutory construction. negative words and phrases are to be
regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely
directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its
mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced.
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish; where the
law does not make exception the court should not except.
Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already probationable.
Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty
of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum
of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative
of his eligibility for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms
are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the
Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless
he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses is immaterial as long
as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For,
Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says
that "[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to
serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law
does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately
and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was supposed to have
135
served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional sixteen (16) times as he was sentenced to serve the
prison term for "each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
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information(s)," and in each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having
defamed the four (4) private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was
still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was
probationable.
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation
is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a
risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for serious wrong
doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the offense they might
further commit. 14 The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have
been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The Revised
Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses
in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of the
disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant
degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6)
years are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of
probation.
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a single
decision of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed
thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of
thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found guilty of mutilation and sentenced
to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the
latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation.
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Decision he
could not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he could have, although he
did not, his appeal now precludes him from applying for probation.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it may be,
that the penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still he would not have
qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if the "STRAIGHT penalty of
EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16)
times, the total imposable penalty would be ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which
is still way beyond the limit of not more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation
Law, as amended. To illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128
months divided by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following
his argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his penalties
exceeds six (6) years.
The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times
since there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to qualify for
probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to understand. The penalties
imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer — "one (1) year and one (1) day to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, in each crime committed on each
date of each case, as alleged in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the
imposed penalties sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the
judgment of conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by
the MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment"
on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count or incident of grave oral
defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why the penalties imposed by the RTC
should be multiplied only four (4) times, and not sixteen (16) times, considering that
the RTC merely affirmed the MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of
the sixteen (16) cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein.
Thus —
Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases
and appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance which is
analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the
said accused in each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and
to pay the costs. 16
Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused was
acquitted or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four (4)
Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment of conviction was reversed, or that any
of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we will have to account for
the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC. Can we? What is clear is that
the judgment of conviction rendered by the was affirmed with the sole modification on
the duration of the penalties.
In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up but taken
separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test, petitioner should have
immediately filed an application for probation as he was already qualified after being
convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter he felt humbled, was ready to
unconditionally accept the verdict of the court and admit his liability. Consequently, in
appealing the Decision of the MeTC to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation.
For, plainly, the law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the penalties
imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. The cold fact is that
petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the sole purpose of reducing his
penalties to make him eligible for probation — since he was already qualified under the
MeTC Decision — but rather to insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting
of any other purpose. Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three
(3) statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his acquittal:
136
(a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established because of his positive
identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in giving full faith and credence to
the bare statements of the private complainants despite the absence of corroborating
Page
testimonies; and, (c)in not acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner
insisted that the trial court committed an error in relying on his positive identification
considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him who was
their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a good number of
years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged defamatory words were
uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly private complainants, co-employees
and clients, not one of them was presented as a witness. Hence, according to
petitioner, the trial court could not have convicted him on the basis of the
uncorroborative testimony of private complainants. 19
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness, if not
complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the penalties
imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he was appealing only for the
purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within the probationable range.
Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so after asserting his innocence therein,
petitioner should be precluded from seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal,
petitioner ipso facto relinquished his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation
Law the purpose of which is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part
of an accused who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but
doing so only after failing in his appeal.
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the RTC to
the Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to the RTC was solely
to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that the Court of Appeals would
increase his penalties, which could be worse for him. Besides, the RTC Decision had
already become final and executory because of the negligence, according to him, of
his former counsel who failed to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by
law.
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance with Sec 3,
par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to quash as each of the
four (4) Informations filed against him charged four (4) separate crimes of grave oral
defamation, committed on four (4) separate days. His failure to do so however may
now be deemed a waiver under Sec. 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly
convicted, as in the instant case, of as many crimes charged in the Information.
Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period allowed by law.
This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and crucial. From the records it is
clear that the application for probation was filed "only after a warrant for the arrest of
petitioner had been issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt of the
Decision" 22of the RTC. This is a significant fact which militates against the instant
petition. We quote with affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific
issue —
. . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of time.
The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended, provides thus:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after
it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant,
and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal. . . . place the
defendant on probation . . . .
Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for probation
from one who had appealed the trial court's judgment is allowed by
law, the petitioner's plea for probation was filed out of time. In the
petition is a clear statement that the petitioner was up for execution
of judgment before he filed his application for probation. P.D. No.
968 says that the application for probation must be filed "within the
period for perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial Court's
decision had attained finality, and no appeal therefrom was possible
under the law. Even granting that an appeal from
the appellate court's judgment is contemplated by P.D. 968, in
addition to the judgment rendered by the trial court, that appellate
judgment had become final and was, in fact, up for actual execution
before the application for probation was attempted by the petitioner.
The petitioner did not file his application for probation before the
finality of the said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at
probation was filed too late.
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for probation
may yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has become final, the
conviction already set for execution and a warrant of arrest issued for service of
sentence.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to file the
application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond
comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the MeTC
although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal, he
asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of the
penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation outside the
period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the
137
instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Page
Page
138
YUSI v. MORALES
G.R. No. L-61958 April 28, 1983
PLUTARCO YUSI and DAISY YUSI, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE LETICIA P. MORALES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent.
Antero B. Tomas for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law withdraw their application
during the period for filing an appeal and ask that their appeal from the judgment of
conviction be given due course?
The petitioners are spouses who were convicted for estafa in Criminal Case No. 2260
in a decision of the respondent court dated May 20, 1982. The court sentenced the
petitioners "... to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto
mayor as minimum to ONE (1) YEAR and SIX (6) MONTHS of prision correccional as
maximum, to pay P5,400.00 to Naty V. Pagdanganan for the value of the piano, and
to pay the costs of the suit."
On June 22, 1982, when the decision dated May 20, 1982 was promulgated, the
petitioners appeared in court without their counsel of record. The respondent court
appointed a certain Cesar Villar who happened to be in court to act as petitioners'
counsel de oficio during the promulgation. On that occasion, the petitioners through
their counsel de oficio manifested that "... they are going to avail of the benefits of the
Probation Law and prayed that they be released under the same bond." (Annex "B",
Reno p. 14) The court immediately granted the petitioners' prayer "... with a condition
that the accused will submit within this day a certification from the bonding company
that it is willing to accommodate the accused under the same bond for a period of five
(5) days beginning today."
On June 23, 1982, the petitioners filed with the respondent court an application for
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1257 (Annex "C", Rollo, P. 15).
Acting on the petitioners' application for probation, the respondent court on the same
day, June 23, 1982, issued an Order directing the probation officer of Cabanatuan City
to conduct an investigation on the application for probation and to submit his report
on the matter within sixty (60) days from receipt in accordance with Sections 5 and 7
of Presidential Decree No. 968 as amended. (Annex "A", Rollo, P. 18).
On June 28, 1982, or seven (7) days from the date of promulgation of the decision and
within the reglementary period to file an appeal, the petitioners filed with the
respondent court their Notice of Appeal (Annex "E ", Rollo, p. 19).
On July 6, 1982, the respondent court issued an Order denying the notice of appeal on
the ground that the petitioners waived their right to appeal the decision when they filed
their application for probation (Annex " F ", Rollo, p. 20).
On July 16, 1982, Atty. Antero Torres filed with the court an appearance as counsel in
collaboration with the petitioners' counsel of record, and on behalf of the petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 6, 1982 order. On July 24, 1982, the
petitioners filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration. (Annexes "G" and "H",
Rollo, pp. 21-24).
On August 19, 1982, the respondent court issued an order denying both the motion for
reconsideration and the supplemental motion for reconsideration (Annex "J", Rollo, p.
28).
Hence, this petition was filed to set aside the above orders.
In a resolution dated October 11, 1982, we considered the People of the Philippines
impleaded and required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
Upon the filing of the Solicitor General's comments, which we treated internally as an
anwer, and dispensing with the filing of briefs or memoranda, we resolved to declare
the case submitted for decision.
The only issue is whether or not the petitioners whose application for probation was
granted after conviction of the crime of estafa may still withdraw such application for
probation and within the reglementary period appeal the judgment of conviction.
In not giving due course to the petitioners' notice of appeal the respondent court relied
on paragraph 3, Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (ESTABLISHING A
PROBATION SYSTEM, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES) as amended which considers an application for probation of a convicted
accused to be a waiver of his right to appeal or an automatic withdrawal of a pending
appeal.
139
And now, the question before us is whether or not such a waiver or withdrawal is
irrevocable.
Page
We rule that it is not. We find the strict and unyielding application of the "waiver rule"
under the Probation Law unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent court in granting
the application for probation and denying the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into
account the fact that the petitioners' counsel of record was not present when the
petitioners applied for probation. True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio
appointed by the court on the spot but the counsel de oficio was not fully acquainted
with their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible appeal
when he advised them about the effects of the application for probation. More so when
we consider the thin line that divides a criminal case for estafa and a civil case for
collection of a debt.
And this fact surfaced when, on June 28, 1982 after the petitioner discussed their case
with a brother-in-law, Judge Eladio C. Sequi of the Municipal Court of Carranglaan,
Nueva Ecija, the petitioners filed their notice of appeal upon the Judge's advice. It must
be noted that the notice of appeal was filed just seven (7) days after the promulgation
of the decision.
Considering that the application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction and that the application
for probation is considered a waiver upon his part to file an appeal, it is in the best
interests of justice that the court should take the necessary steps to insure that the
accused has been fully apprised of the full import of his application before the court
acts on it.
In the case at bar, the respondent court hastily granted the manifestation and
application for probation on June 22, 1982, the same day that the decision was
promulgated and approved the formal application the following day without taking
steps to be informed that the petitioners were aware of the full import of their
application.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree No. 968 which established the Probation System was
envisioned among other things, "to provide an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence" (Section 2(b), Presidential Decree No. 968).
Under the facts of this case, the petitioners cannot be considered "penitent offenders."
They appeared to have improvidently filed their application for probation and should
be allowed to withdraw it and to appeal the decision.
We agree with the Solicitor General when he observes that:
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no real reformation of a wrongdoer which is the reason
for probation unless there is a willingness on his part to right the
wrong he has committed. Probation is envisioned for the accused.
He may or may not avail of its benefits. Although probation is
founded on consent, waiver and/or contract, public policy requires
that interpretational objectives set forth in Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 968 be given full effect. Probation cannot therefore be
forced or compelled on a convict. To permit this would only serve to
invite its violation. Instead, a greater emphasis should be exerted in
securing the probationer's effective participation in society's major
social institution.
Since 'probation is an island of technicalities surrounded by sea of
discretion' (Carl H. Imlay & Charles R. Galsheen, 'See What Condition
Your Condition Are In,' Federal Probation, XXXV (June 1971)', it
should, therefore, be liberally construed in favor of the accused
(herein petitioners). Having opted to discontinue with the application
for probation in its initial stages and prior to the submission of a post
sentence investigation report and within the period interposed an
appeal from the adverse decision, petitioners should be allowed to
withdraw their application for probation and pursue their right to
appeal therefrom.
The underlying philosophy of probation is indeed one of liberality towards the accused.
It is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.
Probation is a major step taken by our Government towards the deterrence and
minimizing of crime and the humanization of criminal justice. In fine with the public
policy behind probation, the right of appeal should not be irrevocably lost from the
moment a convicted accused files an application for probation. Appeal and probation
spring from the same policy considerations of justice, humanity, and compassion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED. The Orders
dated June 23, 1982, July 6, 1982 and August 19, 1982 of the respondent court are
nullified and set aside. The respondent court is directed to give due course to the
petitioners' notice of appeal.
SO ORDERED.
140
Page
CAL v. CA
G.R. No. 114343 December 28, 1995
ANGELO CAL, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FE ALBANO MADRID, et al. and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
R E SO L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals1 dated November 11, 1993, denying petitioner's petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for restraining order, to challenge the orders
of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 21) of Santiago, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 0822,
entitled "People vs. Angelo Cal".
The facts of the case are as follows: After an information for illegal recruitment was
filed with the aforementioned trial court on September 5, 1990, petitioner posted bail
for his provisional liberty. On June 8, 1992, a decision was rendered in the aforesaid
criminal case wherein the petitioner herein was found guilty of violation of Article 36(a)
of the Labor Code as amended [illegal recruitment], and sentenced to, among other
things, suffer imprisonment of four years and pay a fine of P20,000. The decision was
promulgated on July 15, 1992, in the presence of the petitioner, after which he was
committed to jail by virtue of an order of commitment issued the same day. The
following day, July 16, petitioner, assisted by his counsel, filed with the court a quo an
application for probation, an affidavit of recognizance, and an application for release
on recognizance. Also on the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the
petitioner to report to the Provincial Probation and Parole Officer, and for the latter to
conduct an investigation of the applicant and submit his report and recommendation
within sixty days.
Almost two weeks later, on July 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the trial court a "Motion
to Withdraw Application for Probation and Notice of Appeal", alleging that he "hastily
filed his application 'because of the threats employed upon him by the authorities' and
that 'he was not able to intelligently consult with his lawyer and reflect on the legal
consequences and effects of his application for probation under the law' so that he may
not be considered to have waived his right to appeal the decision" (decision, p. 1; rollo,
p. 52). On account of the serious nature of said allegations, the lower court conducted
a full-blown hearing to verify the petitioner's allegations. However, the court denied
petitioner's motion to withdraw application, etc. on November 20, 1992, when it was
determined that the accusations were baseless, and that petitioner's counsel did in fact
properly advise him as to the effects and consequences of appeal and of probation,
and that, notwithstanding such advice, in the words of the trial court —
. . . (t)he accused chose the easy way out which was to apply for
probation in order that he will not be detained because he could not
post his bailbond. But later he went to talk to his employer Dindo
Vales in Manila. He was induced to appeal. Understandably so
because in the decision it was also found out that the recruitment
activities of Dindo Vales and his placement agency did not have any
license to recruit.
It is unfortunate that the accused in attempting to withdraw his
application for probation, would impute negligence, misconduct,
fraud and worst threats upon his lawyer and a personnel of the Court
whose only fault was to help him and accommodate his lawyer's
request. The accused would feign ignorance and stupidity in not
knowing what he was doing when in fact his mind was working in a
diabolical way by imputing fraud and wrongdoing in others. What
simply happened here was that the accused decided to apply for
probation because it was an easy way to avoid being detained in jail,
to avoid the trouble of putting up a bailbond; to avoid further
expenses of counsel and to end the case once and for all without
suffering incarceration. But after his employer induced him to appeal,
helped him to post his bail bond and perhaps even provided him with
another counsel, the accused changed his mind. He was fully aware
and he knew what he was doing. He was properly advised by his
lawyer who told him that if he will file his application for probation,
he would lost his right to appeal although of course he was given
contrary advice by his employer in Manila. It would be a dangerous
precedent to allow the accused to make a mockery of the Probation
Law. The case of Yusi vs. Morales2 cannot apply to him.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal
is DENIED. The convict Angelo Cal is directed to make manifest his
desire to pursue his application for probation by reporting to the
Probation and Parole Officer, Cauayan, Isabela, within 72 hours from
receipt of this order, otherwise he will be ordered to serve his
sentence.
141
SO ORDERED.
On December 14, 1992, petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal from the Order dated
Page
November 20, 1992", which was denied by the court a quo on January 4, 1993, on the
ground that petitioner had availed of the benefits of the Probation Law and therefore
cannot avail of the remedy of appeal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the last-
mentioned order was likewise denied through an order dated June 1, 1993.
Then petitioner filed on July 9, 1993 a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with prayer for restraining order, with the respondent Court of
Appeals, which denied due course to and dismissed the same in its Decision of
November 11, 1993. A motion for reconsideration thereof was also denied, for having
been filed out of time by 23 days. Hence this petition before us.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Court "gravely erred and abused its discretion" (a)
in affirming the trial court's order of July 15, 1992 for petitioner's immediate
confinement to jail after promulgation of judgment but before same became final and
executory, i.e., prior to the lapse of the period for filing appeal, notwithstanding that
petitioner had posted bail, and (b) in affirming the trial court's order of November 20,
1992 which denied petitioner's motion to withdraw his application for probation and
which did not give due course to his notice of appeal (petition, pp. 7, 11).
After deliberating on the petition, the public respondent's comment thereon filed by
the Solicitor General, and petitioner's reply to comment, this Court is convinced that
the petition is unmeritorious.
With respect to the first issue, there is no dispute that, as a rule, and unless the trial
court directs otherwise, the bail bond posted by an accused remains in force at all
stages of the case until its final determination. Now, in this case, since the trial court,
immediately after the promulgation of judgment (and without waiting for the finality
thereof), issued a commitment order despite petitioner's being out on bail, petitioner
should have challenged the legality of such commitment order. However, instead of
doing so, petitioner, after having been properly advised by counsel on the effects and
consequences of probation, voluntarily — and with the assistance of counsel — filed
an application for probation, along with an affidavit of recognizance and an application
for release on recognizance of his counsel. Petitioner's actuations thus foreclosed his
right to appeal.
Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, pertaining to the grant of probation, was amended by P.D.
1990 in order to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.3 Thus, Sec.
4 provides specifically that "(T)he filing of the application (for probation) shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal".
The purpose of the amendment [of Sec. 4 of P.D. 968 by P.D. 1990]
was, precisely, to prohibit an application for probation if the accused
has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction [and vice
versa].
xxx xxx xxx
P.D. No. 1990 [which took effect on January 15, 1986] was issued
when it was observed that even if a person's conviction was finally
affirmed after he had exhausted the appeal process (usually up to
this Court), he nevertheless could still apply for probation and thus
in effect undo such affirmance. To prevent loss of time, money, and
effort on the part of the State in this wasteful exercise, the law was
amended to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive
remedies. (Bernardo vs. Balagot, supra.)
And that is only right since the legal positions behind appeal and probation,
respectively, are diametrically opposed. This is because an accused applying for
probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment in fact, ". . . the application for
probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to
the judgment of conviction and . . . the application for probation is considered a waiver
upon his part to file an appeal, . . .4
Thus, in this case, the petitioner's application for probation had the effect of a final
determination of his case, and the cancellation of his bail bond. Therefore, the
respondent Court of Appeals could not have done otherwise than to affirm the trial
court's order of July 15, 1992 for petitioner's immediate confinement after promulgation
of judgment, in view of the subsequent application for probation which rendered the
said judgment final and immediately executory.
As for the second issue, although petitioner insists on faulting the courts a quo for
denying his motion to withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice of
appeal, his position is nonetheless untenable. The respondent Court of Appeals
correctly held that the trial court's order of November 20, 1992, denying the petitioner's
motion to withdraw his application for probation and rejecting his notice of appeal,
partook of the nature of an order granting probation, which is not appealable.
Inasmuch as "(P)robation is a mere privilege and its grant rests upon the discretion of
the court . . . (and) the grant of probation is . . . not automatic or ministerial" 5, and
considering further that "(a)n order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable"6, therefore, the appellate Court correctly affirmed the trial court's order of
November 20, 1992, and denied the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
etc.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, this Court Resolves to DENY the
instant petition, petitioner having failed to show any reversible error committed by the
respondent appellate Court. No costs.
142
Page
LLAMADO v. CA
G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LEON GAW, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together
with Jacinto N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was
prosecuted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check
payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the amount of P186,500.00, which check
was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner alone, since
jurisdiction over the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not
been obtained. Petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one (1) year
of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Petitioner was also required to reimburse respondent Gaw the
amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was read to him, petitioner
through counsel orally manifested that he was taking an appeal. Having been so
notified, the trial court on the same day ordered the forwarding of the records of the
case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987, petitioner through his counsel received
from the Court of Appeals a notice to file his Appellant's Brief within thirty (30) days.
Petitioner managed to secure several extensions of time within which to file his brief,
the last extension expiring on 18 November 1987. 1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by his then
counsel of record, sought advice from another counselor. On 30 November 1987,
petitioner, with the assistance of his new counsel, filed in the Regional Trial Court a
Petition for Probation invoking Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition
was not, however, accepted by the lower court, since the records of the case had
already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals Manifestation and Petition for Probation"
dated 16 November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for Probation that he had
submitted to the trial court. Petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition
for Probation or, in the alternative, to remand the Petition back to the trial court,
together with the records of the criminal case, for consideration and approval under
P.D. No. 968, as amended. At the same time, petitioner prayed that the running of the
period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be held in abeyance until after the Court of
Appeals shall have acted on his Petition for Probation.
In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988 and filed with the Court of Appeals,
petitioner formally withdrew his appeal conditioned, however, on the approval of his
Petition for Probation. 2
Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a Comment stating that it had no objection to petitioner Llamado's application for
probation. Private respondent-complainant, upon the other hand, sought and obtained
leave to file a Comment on petitioner Llamado's application for probation, to which
Comment, petitioner filed a Reply. Private respondent then filed his "Comment" on the
Office of the Solicitor General's Comment of 18 March 1988.
In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino,
denied the Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo
while Mr. Justice Santiago submitted a concurring opinion. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration which Motion was denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988,
with another, briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr. Justice Bellosillo.
Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the majority in the
Court of Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner's application for probation
which was filed after a notice of appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the
records of the case had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the Court of
Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellant's Brief, after several extensions of time
to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by the Court of Appeals but
before actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was promulgated on 24 July 1976.
Section 4 of this statute provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application at any time of said
defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.
143
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
Page
filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of
 the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal,
or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant an
application for probation "at any time" "after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant" and certainly after "an appeal has been taken from the sentence of
conviction." Thus, the filing of the application for probation was "deemed [to constitute]
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal."
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1257 so as
to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the court may, senteafter it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his
application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the
application for probation and he may submit his comment on such application within
ten days from receipt of the notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal
of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is
filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate court, said
application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the
judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had
established a prolonged but definite period during which an application for probation
may be granted by the trial court. That period was: 'After [the trial court] shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence."
Clearly, the cut-off time-commencement of service of sentence-takes place not only
after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even after
judgement has been rendered by the appellate court and after judgment has become
final. Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257 provides
that "the application [for probation] shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis
of the judgment of the appellate court"; for the appellate court might have increased
or reduced the original penalty imposed by the trial court. It would seem beyond
dispute then that had the present case arisen while Section 4 of the statute as amended
by P.D. No. 1257 was still in effect, petitioner Llamado's application for probation would
have had to be granted. Mr. Llamado's application for probation was filed well before
the cut-off time established by Section 4 as then amended by P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was once again
amended. This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so amended and in its present form, Section
4 reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree,
the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
(Emphasis supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form,
Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during which an application for probation
may be filed with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and — within the period for perfecting an appeal — ." As if to
provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph of Section 4 that
expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is worthy of note too that
Section 4 in its present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an
application for probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The
deletion is quite logical since an application for probation can no longer be filed once
an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that would have to
be withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the time petitioner Llamado
144
was convicted by the trial court), to the instant case, we must then inquire whether
petitioner Llamado had submitted his application for probation "within the period for
perfecting an appeal." Put a little differently, the question is whether by the time
Page
petitioner Llamado's application was filed, he had already "perfected an appeal" from
the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial
Court, under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and under the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, or more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the
judgment appealed from. It is also clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal
is taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court
which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
People of the Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado had manifested orally
and in open court his intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment
of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent to a written notice of appeal and
treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the
clause "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction"
found in Section 4 in its current form, should not be interpreted to refer to Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Court; and that the "whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D.
No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen (15) days for perfecting an appeal. 3 It is
also urged that "the true legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No. 1990) should
not apply to petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at the earliest
opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court
of Appeals. Petitioner then asks us to have recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory
construction" that "penal laws [should] be liberally construed in favor of the accused,"
and to avoid "a too literal and strict application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which
would "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for which the [probation law] was
enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's
counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable to persuade ourselves that Section
4 as it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to grant probation "upon application
by [the] defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the
proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as indicated above,
by B.P. Blg. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e.,
"the earliest opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses
invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day period. There was
absolutely no reason why they should have so referred to that period for the operative
words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day
period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not
part of the operative language of the statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be
helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or reason underlying a new
enactment, in the present case, an enactment which drastically but clearly changed the
substantive content of Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No.
1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the statute; in
the instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to control or
modify the terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon the other hand, the term "period for
perfecting an appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for the
loose language "first opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection
of an appeal" is, of course, a term of art but it is a term of art widely understood by
lawyers and judges and Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself essentially to
judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the
meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the law-making agency
could only have intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the context of
procedural law.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes, we note
at the outset that the Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however, understand
petitioner's argument to be really that any statutory language that appears to favor the
accused in a criminal case should be given a "liberal interpretation." Courts, however,
have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or "the spirit of the law" where the
words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave
no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of law" may
legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning
imparted to them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously
be given effect by judges and all others who are charged with the application and
implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to bear in mind, however, that
the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect are to be derived from the
words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some external, mystical or
metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation rather than a
"liberal" one to Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990.
"Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and
principled search for the meaning which the law-making authority projected when it
promulgated the language which we must apply. That meaning is clearly visible in the
text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Court is
simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need for the involved
process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made
necessary only because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines
145
through the words of the statute. The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute
as he finds it, not as he would like it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court
of First Instance of Manila warned, confusion and uncertainty in application will surely
Page
follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law much more difficult to The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of the
achieve: need for discipline in observing the limitations A judge must not
rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration He
only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so must not read in by way of creation. He must not read out except to
much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7
public to understand and know what the law is with respect to a
given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of Probation Law as amended has
interference by judicial tribunals with the English language as found vested in the trial court the authority to grant the application for probation, the Court
in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here and inserting them of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and should have (as he had prayed
there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought in the alternative) remanded instead the records to the lower court. Once more, we
to have done or what parties should have agreed upon, giving them are not persuaded. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when petitioner
meanings which they do not ordinarily have cutting, trimming, perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to remand
fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction
advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction
until it has been submitted to some court for its interpretation and when exercised adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the
construction. 6 conclusion that we have reached, that is, that petitioner's right to apply for probation
was lost when he perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp of
English is steadily attenuated. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge must read a statute as
the legislative authority wrote it, not as he would prefer it to have been written. The SO ORDERED.
words to be given meaning whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute,
define and therefore limit the authority and discretion of the judges who must apply
those words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true spirit" and "real intent"
of the law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will effectively
escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and discretion.
Once a judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of the legislative
authority, he is essentially on uncharted seas. In a polity like ours which enshrines the
fundamental notion of limiting power through the separation and distribution of
powers, judges have to be particularly careful lest they substitute their conceptions or
preferences of policy for that actually projected by the legislative agency. Where a
judge believes passionately that he knows what the legislative agency should have said
on the particular matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the
conclusion that therefore that was what the law-making authority was really saying or
trying to say, if somewhat ineptly As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:

Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are
confined by the nature and scope of the judicial function in its
particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the

146
constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic
society. As a matter of verbal recognition certainly, no one will
gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the
meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp

Page
a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature.
BACLAYON v. MUTIA
G.R. No. L-59298 April 30, 1984
FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of
Plaridel, Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Morlando J. Gonzaga for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition to review by certiorari the order dated December 21, 1981 of
respondent Pacito G. Mutia, 1 then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court (now
Municipal Trial Court) of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, which imposed as a condition in
granting probation to petitioner Florentina L. Baclayon that she refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by
the then Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent
Pacito G. Mutia for having quarrelled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words
against Remedios Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) and the appellate
court, taking into account the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due
the offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact that the crime was
committed in the office of the complainant in the public school building of Plaridel,
Misamis Occidental where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties
during office hours, increased the penalty imposed by respondent judge and sentenced
petitioner to one year, 8 months, 21 days of arresto mayor in its maximum period to 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional in its minimum period.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On the same date petitioner
applied for probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation
Officer. The Post-Sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting
of petitioner's probation for a period of three (3) years.
On December 21, 1981, respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner's
probation, but modified the Probation Officer's recommendation by increasing the
period of probation to five (5) years and by imposing the following
conditions: têñ.£îhqwâ£
(a) To present herself to the jprobation officer designated to
undertake her supervision at such place as may be specified in the
order within seventy- two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) To report to the Probation Office or any specified place
designated by the Probation Officer at least once a month in person;
(c) To reside at the premise approved by the Probation Officer and
not change her residence without prior written approval;
(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her house and place of
work or an authorized Social Worker;
(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to excess;
(f) To pay the cost;
(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the
defendant and not unduly restrictive of her liberty or incompatible
with her freedom of conscience; and
(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching profession.
Petitioner's plea for deletion of the last condition was rejected by respondent judge.
Hence, the petition at bar alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of the
said condition that petitioner should "refrain from continuing her teaching profession."
The petitioner submits that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her
rights but is also not in accordance with the purposes, objectives and benefits of the
probation law and prays that the said condition be deleted from the order granting her
probation. On petitioner's motion, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the said questioned condition.
The Court finds merit in the petition.
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may be classified into
general or mandatory and special or discretionary. The mandatory conditions,
enumerated in Section 10 of the Probation Law, require that the probationer should (a)
present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt of said order, and
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as
specified by said officer. Special or discretionary conditions are those additional
147
conditions, listed in the same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may
additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and rehabilitation outside
of prison. The enumeration, however, is not inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in
Page
character 2 and enable courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as
the probationer's constitutional rights are not jeopardized. 3 There are innumerable In view of all the foregoing, the Court grants the petition and hereby orders that
conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation of the probationer when viewed paragraph (h) of the questioned order granting probation which requires that petitioner
in their specific individual context. It should, however, be borne in mind that the special refrain from continuing with her teaching profession be deleted. The temporary
or discretionary conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to restraining order is hereby made permanent. No costs.
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual
Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case
should be judged on its own merits — on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity
of the probationer. 4 The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by
trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic terms.

Petitioner is a teacher and teaching is the only profession she knows and as such she
possesses special skills and qualifications. Thus, she was designated as District
Guidance Coordinator and always designated as District-in-Charge whenever the
District Supervisor is out of town. She is usually selected to represent her district in
seminars, meetings and conferences. She also excelled in her study of Child Study and
Development. It also appears that she is an outstanding member of the Misamis
Occidental Girl Scout Council, having served as Physical Education & Girl Scout Field
Advisor of the District, Adviser of the District Girl Scout Leaders Association, Adviser of
the Distinct Federated Girl Scout Barangay Troop Committee, acts as resource person
in District and Division Level Girl Scout encampments and re-elected Board Member of
the Misamis Occidental Girl Scout Council. To order the petitioner to refrain from
teaching would deprive the students and the school in general the benefits that may
be derived from her training and expertise. While it is true that probation is a mere
privilege and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this discretion is to
be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. 5 Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest
must be observed. 6 In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and
profession of petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and
occupation during probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would
practically prevent her from complying with the terms of the probation.

Respondents contend that petitioner's final conviction carries with it the accessory
penalties in addition to the principal penalty of imprisonment; and since petitioner was
sentenced to arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, she must likewise suffer the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. This cannot apply to petitioner,
however, because she was granted probation. The imposition of her sentence of
imprisonment was thereby suspended and necessarily, the imposition of the accessory
penalties was likewise thereby suspended.

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a

suspension of the imposition of sentence. 7 It is not a final judgment but is rather an

148
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by

Page
a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. 8
BALA v. MARTINEZ
[ GR No. 67301, Jan 29, 1990 ]
MANUEL V. BALA v. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ +
DECISION
260 Phil. 488
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984
of the then Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila,
Branch XX.[1] The decretal portion of the assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss and/or strike out
motion to revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru counsel, should be, as it is
hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria
Eloisa Criss Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport,
with that of Florencia Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document.
On January 3, 1978, the trial court adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case
No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The dispositive
portion of the judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Manuel Bala y
Valdellon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public or
official document defined and penalized under article 172 of the Revised Penal Code,
without any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of not less than
ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS
& TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correcional, to pay a fine of P1,800.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 for each day, and to
pay the cost. He shall be credited with the period of preventive imprisonment that he
may have undergone in accordance with law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980,
affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of
judgment,[2] the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent
judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under
probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated
therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation
officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life
Subdivision in Las Piñas, specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally
granted the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10,
1983,[3] one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final
discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet
submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge.
On December 8, 1983, respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City
Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner
before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the
respondent judge.[4] The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and
conditions of his probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that
he was no longer under probation,[5] his probation period having terminated on August
10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the
same, he contended.
149
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's
Page
probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to
terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on
supervision dated January 5, 1984.[6] The same motion, however, became the subject
of a "Manifestation," dated January 30, 1984, which stated that the probation officer
was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was
submitting a supplemental report[7] which recommended the revocation of probation
"in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to
revoke probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as
his probation period had already expired. Moreover, his change or residence
automatically transferred the venue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive
Judge or the RTC of Makati which latter court includes under its jurisdiction the
Municipality of Las Piñas, the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13,
P.D. No. 968, which provides:
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. x x x
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of
another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the Court
of First Instance of that place, and in such a case, a copy of the probation order, the
investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive
Judge. Thereafter, the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is
transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by
the court which granted the probation.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which amends section
4 of P.D. 968, clearly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990 which went in force
on January 15, 1985 can not be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial
to the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the motion to
dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the
issue of the petitioner's transfer of residence. The motion did not touch on the issue of
the timeliness to revoke probation. The respondent judge has not yet heard and
received evidence, much less acted on the matter. Accordingly, the Solicitor General
submits that the present petition is premature.
The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court,
contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968[8] is clear on this score:
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon consideration
of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the
final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate
probation. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions
of the probation law. Probation is not co-terminous with its period. There must first be
issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and
recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such issuance can the case of the
probationer be deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed
the period set in the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of
incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the
probationer. In the instant case, a review of the records compels a revocation or the
probation without the need of further proceedings in the trial court which, after all,
would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why should we allow the
petitioner to further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation an order to give him a chance to return to
the main stream, to give him hope hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately,
he has continued to shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance.
He has not reformed.
150
Page
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because
he (probation officer) is in the best position to report all information relative to the
conduct and mental and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and
the existing institutional and community resources that he may avail himself of when
necessary. Indeed, it is the probation officer who primarily undertakes the supervision
and reform of the probationer through a personalized, individualized, and community-
based rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On the basis of his final
report, the court can determine whether or not the probationer may be released from
probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had neglected to submit
his report and recommendation. For, as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial
court could not issue the order of final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order
of final discharge which would restore the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the
absence of the order of final discharge, the probation would still subsist, unless
otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are going to do. We are
revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be emancipated
from the yoke if not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the
conditions of his probation, among which are:
xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;
xxx
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation that will be
prescribed by the Probation Officer."[9]
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-compliance
has defeated the very purposes of the probation law, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be
less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.[10]
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the probation
program. Instead of utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate
himself as a productive, law abiding, and socially responsible member of society, he
continued in his wayward ways falsifying public or official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons,
Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and Efren Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public
and/or official documents (U.S. Passports), under Article 172, in relation to Article 171,
of the Revised Penal Code, in five separate informations, in Criminal Cases Nos. 29100,
29101, 29102, 29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each of them in all five
(5) cases a prison term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to four
(4) years also of prision correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the
accessory penalties thereof, and to pay the costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the RTC with modification by granting restitution of the
amounts they collected from the offended private parties. The judgment has since
become final. As a matter of fact, for failure of the petitioner to appear for execution
of judgment despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala on July
10, 1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 and this warrant
has not yet been implemented because Bala absconded. These facts are evident and
constitute violations of the conditions of his probation. Thus, the revocation of his
probation is compelling.
At any time during probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a
probationer for violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once
arrested and detained, shall immediately be brought before the court for a hearing
which may be informal and summary, of the violation charged. x x x If the violation is
established, the court may revoke or continue his probation and modify the conditions
thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the sentence
originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms
and conditions thereof shall not be appealable.[11]
(Emphasis supplied.)
151
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested
so that he can serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation
period of one year is of no moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as
Page
we stressed earlier. Neither can there be a deduction of the one year probation period
from the penalty of one year and one day to three years, six months, and twenty-one
days of imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on "probation" is not a
"sentence," but is in effect a suspensionof the imposition of the sentence.[12] It is not
a final judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order
placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation,
to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are
complied with, or by a final judgment if the conditions are violated."[13]
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity
conferred by law on a person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all;
special enjoyment of a good or exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative
granted by law to some persons.[14] Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely
upon the discretion of the court. This discretion is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.[15] If
the probationer has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the
State is not barred from revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the
offense is lessened if probation is not revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of residence
automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial
Court to the same court in his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction.[16] Such being the case, the
Manila RTC would not be deprived of its jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold
the petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to
grant probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-
accused applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Piñas,
as he is up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely
moved from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision, 33 Jingco Street, also in Las
Piñas.[17] On the other hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this score to the
limits of its logic would mean that his probation was null and void in the first place,
because then the Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was
a resident of Las Piñas.
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels
change of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge
of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, Las Piñas is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital
Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati.[18] Needless to say, the Regional
Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region.[19] Accordingly, the various branches of the
regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are
coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not
attach to the branch or judge.[20] Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila,
which granted the probation, has not lost control and supervision over the probation
of the petitioner.
The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer
residence from his probation officer. This would not suffice; the law is very explicit in
its requirement of a prior court approval in writing Section 10 of PD 968 categorically
decrees that the probationer must
***
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence without
its prior written approval;
***
Further, such written approval is required by the[21] probation order of August 11, 1982
as one of the conditions of probation, to wit:
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Piñas and not to change said address nor leave the
territorial jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first
securing prior written approval of his Probation Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of
justice, we revoke the probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his
probation, instead of remanding the case to the trial court and having the parties start
all over again in needless protracted proceedings.[22]
152
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is
hereby REVOKED. Further, the trial court is ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest
Page
of the petitioner and for him to serve the sentence originally imposed without any
deduction. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

153
Page
SALGADO v. CA
G.R. No. 89606 August 30, 1990
AGUSTIN SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Fourteenth Division) and HON. ANTONIO
SOLANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC-Quezon City (Branch
86) and FRANCISCO LUKBAN, respondents.
Ernesto L. Pineda for petitioner.
Lukban, Vega, Lozada & Associates for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15493 entitled, "Agustin Salgado v. Hon. Antonio P. Solano,
et al.," which affirmed the Order dated December 22, 1987 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 86) sustaining its previous order dated November 18, 1987
directing the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the civil liability of herein
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 0-33798.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No.
0-33798 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Agustin Salgado," before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 86). After trial, judgment was rendered on October
16, 1986 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision, states:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused AGUSTIN P. SALGADO,
JR., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical
injuries, defined and penalized under paragraph 3 Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code, and appreciating in his favor the following
mitigating circumstances:
1) voluntary surrender; and
2) No intention to commit so grave a wrong hereby sentence (sic)
said accused to suffer imprisonment for a period of four (4) months
and twenty (20) days, with the accessories provided for by law, and
to indemnify the victim, Francisco Lukban, Jr., in the sum of
P126,633.50 as actual or compensatory damages, and the sum of
P50,000.00 as damages for the incapacity of Francisco Lukban to
pursue and engage in his poultry business.
SO ORDERED. (p. 19, Rollo)
On October 17, 1986, petitioner filed an application for probation with the trial court.
The application was granted in an Order dated April 15, 1987. The order contained,
among others, the following condition:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Indemnify the victim FRANCISCO LUKBAN, JR., in a monthly
installment of P2,000.00 (TWO THOUSAND PESOS) every month
during the entire period of his probation. (p. 15, Rollo)
For the months of May, June, July, August, September and October, 1987, petitioner
complied with the above condition by paying in checks the said sum of P2,000.00
monthly, through the City Probation Officer, Perla Diaz Alonzo. Private respondent
Francisco Lukban, Jr. voluntarily accepted the checks and subsequently encashed them
(p. 19, Rollo).
On September 19, 1987, private respondent Francisco Lukban, Jr. filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement of the civil liability adjudged in
his favor in the criminal case. The motion was opposed by the petitioner.
On November 18, 1987, the trial court issued an order granting the motion for issuance
of a writ of execution. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was
denied on December 22, 1987. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the
petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for review of the trial court's order
granting the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. We referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals in a resolution dated April 13, 1988 (p. 18, Rollo).
On March 16, 1989, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the
order of the trial court granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but respondent Court of Appeals
denied the motion in a resolution dated August 3, 1989 (pp. 9-10, Rollo).
154
The petitioner went to this Court via a petition for review which was filed on September
26, 1989 and raised the following assignment of errors:
Page
 ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER
DATED APRIL 15, 1987 HAS NOT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF
OCTOBER 16, 1986 AS FAR AS THE CIVIL ASPECT IS CONCERNED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
CONDITION IN THE PROBATION ORDER MODIFYING OR ALTERING
THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE OFFENDER IS UNAUTHORIZED AND
NOT SANCTIONED BY LAW. (p. 10, Rollo)
In its decision affirming the order of the trial court granting private respondent's motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution, respondent Court of Appeals advanced three
(3) reasons: 1) that the decision dated October 16, 1986 had become final and
executory and the judge who rendered the decision cannot lawfully alter or modify it;
2) that it is clear that the probation law provides only for the suspension of sentence
imposed on the accused; that it has absolutely no beating on his civil liability and that
none of the conditions listed under Section 10 of the Probation Law relates to civil
liability; and 3) that private respondent is not estopped because he had nothing to do
with the filing and the granting of the probation.
There is no question that the decision of October 16, 1986 in Criminal Case No. Q-
33798 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of serious physical
injuries had become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an
application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal (See Section 4 of
P.D. 968). Likewise, the judgment finding petitioner liable to private respondent for
P126,633.50 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as consequential damages had also
become final because no appeal was taken therefrom. Hence, it is beyond the power
of the trial court to alter or modify. In the case of Samson v. Hon. Montejo, L-18605,
October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 419, 422-423 cited by respondent appellate court, it was
held:
. . . , once a decision becomes final, even the court which rendered
it cannot lawfully alter or modify the same (Rili, et al. v. Chunaco, et
al., G.R. No. L-6630, Feb. 29, 1956), especially, considering the fact
that, as in the instant case, the alteration or modification is material
and substantial (Ablaza v. Sycip, et al., L-12125, Nov. 23, 1960). In
the case of Behn, Meyer & Co., v. J. Mcmicking et al., 11 Phil. 276,
(cited by respondents), it was held that "where a final judgment of
an executory character had been rendered in a suit the mission of
the court is limited to the execution and enforcement of the said final
judgment in all of its parts and in accordance with its express
orders." The judgment in question is clear, and with the amended
writ of execution, the liability of petitioner is greatly augmented,
without the benefit of proper proceeding. (Emphasis ours)
We do not believe, however, that the order dated April 15, 1987 granting the
application for probation and imposing some conditions therein altered or modified the
decision dated October 16, 1986. The April 15, 1987 Order of the trial court granting
the application for probation and providing as one of the conditions therein that
petitioner indemnify private respondent P2,000.00 monthly during the period of
probation did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged against petitioner but
merely provided for the manner of payment by the accused of his civil liability during
the period of probation.
It is the submission of private respondent that in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok, No.
60151, June 24, 1983, 122 SCRA 935. We already ruled that "(T)he 'conviction and
sentence' clause of the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation affects only
the criminal aspect of the case."
The pronouncement in Apalisok that "probation affects only the criminal aspect of the
case" should not be given a literal meaning. Interpreting the phrase within the context
of that case, it means that although the execution of sentence is suspended by the
grant of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is
extinguished. This can be inferred from a reading of the text of the Apalisok case where
the issue that was involved therein was whether a grant of probation carries with it the
extinction of the civil liability of the offender. The reason for ruling that the grant of
probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender is clear, "(T)he extinction
or survival of civil liability are governed by Chapter III, Title V, Book I of the Revised
Penal Code where under Article 113 thereof provides that: '. . . , the offender shall
continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by
him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation
of liberty or other lights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.'" In the instant case,
the issue is not the survival or extinction of the civil liability of a probationer but,
whether or not the trial court may impose as a condition of probation the manner in
which a probationer may settle his civil liability against the offended party during the
period of probation.
Respondent appellate court ruled that Section 10 of the Probation Law enumerates
thirteen (13) conditions of probation not one of which relates to the civil liability of the
offender (p. 22, Rollo).
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) provides:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his
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application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.
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In the case of Florentino L. Baclayon v. Hon. Pacito G. Mutia, et al., G.R. No. 59298,
April 30, 1984, 129 SCRA 148, We ruled that the conditions listed under Section 10 of
the Probation Law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term
it chooses, the only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights
of the accused. Courts may impose conditions with the end that these conditions would
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding individual. Thus,
The conditions which trial courts may impose on a probationer may
be classified into general or mandatory and special or discretionary.
The mandatory conditions, enumerated in Section 10 of the
Probation Law, require that probationer should a) present himself to
the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within 72 hours from receipt
of said order, and b) report to the probation officer at least once a
month at such time and place as specified by said officer. Special or
discretionary conditions are those additional conditions, listed in the
same Section 10 of the Probation Law, which the courts may
additionally impose on the probationer towards his correction and
rehabilitation outside of prison. The enumeration, however, is not
inclusive. Probation statutes are liberal in character and enable
courts to designate practically any term it chooses as long as the
probationer's constitutional rights are not jeopardized. There are
innumerable conditions which may be relevant to the rehabilitation
of the probationer when viewed in their specific individual context. It
should, however, be borne in mind that the special or discretionary
conditions of probation should be realistic, purposive and geared to
help the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting
individual. Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their
application, and each case should be judged on its own merits — on
the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. . .
..
The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation of the probationer.
That is why, under the law, a post sentence investigation, which is mandatory, has to
be conducted before a person can be granted probation to help the court in determining
whether the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant
will be served by the granting of the probation (Alvin Lee Koenig, Post Sentence
Investigation, Its Importance and Utility, IBP Journal, Special Issue on Probation, Vol.
5, No. 5, pp. 381-387). In the case of People v. Lippner, 219 Cal. 395, 26 p. 2d, 457,
458 (1933), among those which has to be ascertained is the financial condition and
capacity of the offender to meet his obligations:
. . . there can be no real reformation of a wrong-doer unless there is
at least a willingness on his part to right the wrong committed, and
the effect of such an act upon the individual is of inestimable value,
and to a large extent, determines whether there has been any real
reformation. To be clearly consonant with such a purpose, the post
sentence investigation must include a financial examination of the
offender's capability in order to work out a system of payment which
can effectively accomplish reimbursement without interfering with
the defendant's family and other financial responsibilities, according
to U.S. Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute. . . . (Sec.
301.1 Comments (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1954; Also 2 U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures 38 (1939)
cited in The Period and Conditions of Probation by Sergio F. Go, IBP
Journal Special Issue on Probation, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 406-420).
(Emphasis ours)
The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the order granting
probation "as it may deem best." As already stated, it is not only limited to those listed
under Section 10 of the Probation Law. Thus, under Section 26, paragraph (d) of the
Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures, among the conditions which may be
imposed in the order granting probation is:
Sec. 26. Other conditions of Probation. The Probation Order may also
require the probationer in appropriate cases, to:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) comply with a program of payment of civil liability to the victim
or his heirs . . . .
However, this is not to say that the manner by which the probationer should satisfy
the payment of his civil liability in a criminal case during the probation period may be
demanded at will by him. It is necessary that the condition which provides for a
program of payment of his civil liability will address the offender's needs and capacity.
Such need may be ascertained from the findings and recommendations in the post-
sentence investigation report submitted by the Probation Officer after investigation of
the financial capacity of the offender and that such condition is to the end that the
interest of the state and the reformation of the probationer is best served.
In the instant case, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that
when the trial court issued the order of April 15, 1987, the condition that the petitioner
has to pay private respondent P2,000.00 a month for the satisfaction of the civil liability
adjudged against him was recommended by the probation officer who prepared the
post-sentence investigation and that such condition is, in the judgment of the trial
court, "deemed best" under the circumstances.
Counting from April 15, 1987, the date of issuance of the order granting probation
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which under the law is also the date of its effectivity (Sec. 11, P.D. 968), the probation
period must have lapsed by now. Hence, the order for petitioner to indemnify the
private respondent in the amount of P2,000.00 monthly during the period of
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probationmust have also lapsed. If such were the case, there would therefore, be no
more obstacle for the private respondent to enforce the execution of the balance of
the civil liability of the petitioner. However, the records are bereft of allegations to this
effect.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated March 16, 1989 of
respondent Court of Appeals affirming the order of the trial court granting the motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution as well as the resolution dated August 3, 1989
of the same court are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

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