CASES TO READ FOR MIDTERM EXAMINATION (AUGUST 14, In the case at bar, petitioners complaint is for specific performance to

2015) IN PROVISIONAL REMEDIES: enforce their rights as purchasers of subdivision lots as regards rights
of way, water, open spaces, road and perimeter wall repairs, and
security. Indisputably then, the HLURB has jurisdiction over the
1. JESUS LIM ARRANZA, ET. AL. v. B.F. HOMES, INC., AND CA,
complaint.
G.R. NO. 131683, JUNE 19, 2000
The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest the
HLURB of that jurisdiction. A receiver is a person appointed by the
Facts: Respondent BF Homes, Inc. (BFHI), is a domestic corporation court, or in this instance, by a quasi~judicial administrative agency, in
engaged in developing subdivisions and selling residential lots. One of behalf of all the parties for the purpose of preserving and conserving
the subdivisions that respondent developed was the BF Homes the property and preventing its possible destruction or dissipation, if it
Paraaque Subdivision were left in the possession of any of the parties. It is the duty of the
receiver to administer the assets of the receivership estate; and in the
When the Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino, which
management and disposition of the property committed to his
had substantial investments in respondent BFHI, BFHI filed with the
possession, he acts in a fiduciary capacity and with impartiality towards
SEC a petition for rehabilitation and a declaration that it was in a
all interested persons. The appointment of a receiver does not
state of suspension of payments.
dissolve a corporation, nor does it interfere with the exercise of
On 18 March 1985, the SEC placed respondent under a management its corporate rights.
committee. Upon that committees dissolution on 2 February 1988, the
In this case where there appears to be no restraints imposed
SEC appointed Atty. Florencio B. Orendain as a Receiver,
upon respondent as it undergoes rehabilitation receivership,
As a Receiver, Orendain instituted a central security system and respondent continues to exist as a corporation and hence,
unified the sixty~five homeowners associations into an umbrella continues or should continue to perform its contractual and
homeowners association called United BF Homeowners Associations, statutory responsibilities to petitioners as homeowners.
Inc. (UBFHAI), which was thereafter incorporated with the Home
Receivership is aimed at the preservation of, and at making more
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
secure, existing rights; it cannot be used as an instrument for the
In 1989, respondent, through Orendain, turned over to UBFHAI control destruction of those rights.
and administration of security in the subdivision, the Clubhouse and
No violation of the SEC order suspending payments to creditors
the open spaces along Concha Cruz Drive. Through the Philippine
would result as far as petitioners complaint before the HLURB is
Waterworks and Construction Corporation (PWCC), respondents
concerned. To reiterate, what petitioners seek to enforce are
managing company for waterworks in the various BF Homes
respondents obligations as a subdivision developer. Such claims
subdivisions, respondent entered into an agreement with UBFHAI for
are basically not pecuniary in nature although it could incidentally
the annual collection of community assessment fund and for the
involve monetary considerations.
purchase of eight new pumps to replace the over~capacitated pumps
in the old wells.
On 7 November 1994, Orendain was relieved by the SEC of his duties
as a Receiver, and a new Board of Receivers consisting of eleven
members of respondents Board of Directors was appointed for the
implementation of Phases II and III of respondents rehabilitation.
The new Board, through its Chairman, Albert C. Aguirre, revoked the
authority given by Orendain to use the open spaces at Concha Cruz
Drive and to collect community assessment funds; deferred the
purchase of new pumps; recognized BF Paraaque Homeowners
Association, Inc., (BFPHAI) as the representative of all homeowners in
the subdivision; took over the management of the Clubhouse; and
deployed its own security guards in the subdivision.
Consequently, on 5 July 1995, herein petitioners filed with the
HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000
homeowners in the subdivision" against respondent BFHI, BF
Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C. Aguirre Management
Corporation "to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF
Homes Paranaque
Petitioners raised "issues" on the following basic needs of the
homeowners: rights~of~way; water; open spaces; road and perimeter
wall repairs; security; and the interlocking corporations that allegedly
made it convenient for respondent "to compartmentalize its obligations
as general developer, even if all of these are hooked into the water,
roads, drainage and sewer systems of the subdivision."
In its answer, respondent claimed that (a) it had complied with its
contractual obligations relative to the subdivisions development; (b)
respondent could not be compelled to abide by agreements resulting
from Orendains ultra vires acts; and (c) petitioners were precluded
from instituting the instant action on account of Section 6(c) of
P.D. No. 902~A providing for the suspension of all actions for
claims against a corporation under receivership.

Issue: may the proceedings therein be suspended pending the

outcome of the receivership before the SEC?"
HELD: NO.
The HLURB, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the complaint of lot
buyers for specific performance of alleged contractual and statutory
obligations of the defendants, to wit, the execution of contracts of sale
in favor of the plaintiffs and the introduction in the disputed property of
the necessary facilities such as asphalting and street lights.
2. SPS. CESAR A. LARROBIS, JR. AND VIRGINIA S. LARROBIS v.
PHIL VETERANS BANK, G.R. NO. 135706, OCT. 1, 2004
3. A.M. NO. RTJ- 03-1815, OCT. 25, 2004, MACTAN CEBU
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA) REPRESENTED
BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER, ANGELO C. VERDAN v. JUDGE
AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CEBU
CITY, BRANCH 16
Facts: This administrative case stems from the original case between
MCIAA and its employees. The employees filed a declaratory
relief and mandamus with writ of preliminary injunction for
several benefits in pursuant to Rep. Act. No. 6758, also known
as the Salary Standardization Law. The respondent judge
rendered a decision in favor of the employees.
Upon receipt of decision, MCIAA timely filed a notice of appeal to the
court of appeals on March 15 2002. On May 30, the employees filed a
motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal with the respondent
judge. A special order on July 8 2002 was issued by respondent judge
granting the order. A writ of execution was thereafter issued, with a
computation of the total benefits due to the employees. The complainant
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Special
Order dated July 8, 2002 be set aside on the following grounds: (1) the
trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case by reason of the perfection
of the appeal; and (2) the Special Order did not state any good reason to
justify the allowance of an execution pending appeal. The respondent
denied this motion in an Order dated August 22, 2002, but ordered the
suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution in view of the
appeal filed by the complainant.
On August 29, 2002, the employees filed a Motion for Reconsideration] of
the August 22, 2002 Order, and, thereafter, an Extremely Ex-Parte Urgent
Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration. Pairing Judge Fortunato
M. De Gracia, Jr., who took the place of the respondent while the latter
was on official leave of absence, issued an Order[15] dated September 27,
2002 affirming the previous Order of August 22, 2002, in effect sustaining
the suspension of the implementation of the writ of execution.
On October 30, 2002, the complainant filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 73628, primarily seeking
to set aside the Special Order of July 8, 2002.
Thereafter, in an Order[16] dated November 29, 2002, the respondent
resolved the August 29, 2002 Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
employees.
The complainant filed a motion for reconsideration[17] of the said order,
which motion, however, remained unresolved.
On March 18, 2003, the respondent, acting on a Motion for Clarification
filed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as depository bank of the
complainant, issued an Order[18] directing the latter to release the
garnished amount of P2,455,821.11 directly to Atty. Rolindo A. Navarro as
award for attorneys fees.
Thus, with all the foregoing, petitioner filed a Complaint against the
respondent judge dated April 11, 2003, alleging that he was guilty of
grave misconduct, dishonesty, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
and/or interlocutory orders, bias and partiality, when he issued four
patently irregular interlocutory orders, to wit:
1) Special Order, dated July 8, 2002, granting the employees
Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal;
2) Order, dated August 22, 2002, denying MCIAAs Motion for
Reconsideration of the July 8, 2002 Order;
3) Order, dated November 29, 2002 allowing the
implementation of the writ of execution; and
4) Order, dated March 18, 2003, ordering PNB to release the
amount of P2,455,821.11 directly to Atty. Rolindo A.
Navarro
According to the complainant, the petition of its employees was
essentially an action for declaratory relief, and as such, it is to be assumed
that their intention therein was mainly to put forth the question of
construction or the validity of Rep. Act. No. 6758, also known as the
Salary Standardization Law, and its implementing rules. The complainant
avers that there was no justifiable controversy to speak of in the said case,
and that the respondent judge should have confined his judgment only to
the question of law involved therein. Considering that in a proceeding for
declaratory judgment, the relief which may be sought is only limited to a
declaration of rights, and not a determination or trial of issues, the
respondent judge was in grave and patent error in awarding detailed
claims to the said employees.
The complainant also avers that a cursory perusal of the
respondents ratiocinations shows that his decision was grounded
on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures, and was based on
manifestly mistaken inferences. This resulted in erroneous
conclusions, constitutive of gross ignorance of the law and/or
incompetence on the part of the respondent judge. The
complainant also pointed out that there was no pending incident
subject for the courts resolution to speak of in the first place,
considering that it was incumbent upon the judge to have been
aware of the September 27, 2002 Order. As such, the respondent
judge could not profess good faith for issuing a clearly unjust
interlocutory order. The complainant also pointed out that the
respondent judge, likewise, erred in disregarding basic rules and
settled jurisprudence in directing it to retain ten (10) percent of
said allowances and benefits as attorneys fees for the handling
lawyer and to pay the same directly to him, as prayed for in the
Petition.
The respondent judge claims, that among others, The questioned
decision of respondent Judge is pending appeal before the
Honorable Court of Appeals and the questioned orders emanating
from the decision are likewise appealed to the Court of Appeals by
way of a petition for certiorari; That the judicial remedy of an
ordinary appeal and appeal by certiorari were availed of by the
complainant and said appeals are pending resolution by the
Appellate Court; hence, resort to an administrative remedy is pre-
mature;
Ruling: The judge was found guilty.
1. In the case at bar, the actuations of the respondent judge cast doubt as
to his impartiality and cold neutrality. In the Special Order of July 8, 2002,
the respondent granted the employees motion for execution of judgment
pending appeal, despite the fact that the court no longer had jurisdiction
over the case, in view of the perfection of the complainants appeal and
the belated filing of such motion for execution of judgment. Furthermore,
no good reasons were stated in the said order to justify the grant of the
motion. In his July 8, 2002 Special Order granting execution pending
appeal, the respondent appeared to be sympathetic to the employees
when he stated that The dictates of social justice cannot be ignored by the
Court. x x x. It is the sentiment of the Court that technical issues should be
resolved in the light of the paramount principles of equal protection of
the law and social justice.
The respondents sympathy for the employees, however, was indubitably
hollow. It was nothing but empty cant. His heart was never for them. His
ulterior motive surfaced when he issued the March 18, 2002 Order
directing PNB to release the amount of P2,455,821.11 directly to Atty.
Rolindo A. Navarro, the employees counsel.
2. The respondents order was highly suspicious as it was for the
benefit, not of the employees, but their counsel. It is elementary
that when attorneys fees are awarded, they are so adjudicated
because they are in the nature of actual damages suffered by the
client (Mirasol v. De La Cruz, 84 SCRA 337) as he was constrained
to engage the services of a counsel to represent him in a litigation
for the protection of his interest. Being in the nature of damages,
the award should have been given first to the employees, not to
their counsel. Moreover, as it was an implementation of a writ of
execution, PNB should not have been ordered to pay it directly to
Atty. Navarro. The respondent should have ordered the PNB to pay
it, at least, through the sheriff who is duly tasked to enforce such
orders. By bypassing the sheriff, the respondents directive was
highly irregular
4. The respondent judge, likewise, disregarded the order issued by
Pairing Judge Fortunato M. De Gracia, Jr. on September 27, 2002
which resolved the motion for reconsideration filed by the
employees by issuing an Order dated November 29, 2002,
effectively reversing and setting aside the same without the said
employees having filed a new motion therefor.
5. As a closing argument, let it be underscored at this juncture that in
granting the petition for certiorari of complainant MCIAA, the eighth
division of the Court of Appeals through Justice Gozo-Dadule (sic), did not
find that Respondent judge committed grave abuse of judicial discretion
in connection with his questioned Orders of July 8, 2002 and August 22,
2002. There is no finding even of simple abuse of discretion.

While with respect to the Order of March 18, 2003 directing the
PNB-Lapu-Lapu City branch to release direct(ly) to Atty. Rolindo
Navarro his partial attorneys fees in the amount of P2,455,821.11,
the Court of Appeals ruled that such Order was a misplaced
ratiocination which means that such an Order proceeded from an
illogical reasoning (sic). Thus, such an Order was a mere error of
judgment which could have been corrected had complainant
MCIAA made a timely objection or filed an appropriate motion to
block the release of its funds at the PNB Lapu-Lapu City branch
considering that it had seven days within which to make its move
4. FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SM
PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., G.R. NO. 197937, APRIL 3, 2013
Cinema house -> remit tax -> to FDCP? Or to Cebu City?
Declaratory relief filed. Sometime in May 2009, the City of Cebu filed in the
RTC of Cebu City (Cebu City RTC) a petition8 for DECLARATORY RELIEF WITH
APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AGAINST the
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529. The City of Cebu sought to
declare Section 14 of R.A. No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
FDCP filed an action against the respondent for the payment
of P76,836,807.08 representing the unpaid amusement tax incentive
reward.(Civil Case 72238)
On February 21, 2011, the Pasig City RTC issued the assailed order granting
the motion to dismiss, holding that the action before the Cebu City RTC (Civil
Case No. CEB-35529) is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
between the parties in Civil Case No. 72238. Moreover, said court found all
the elements of litis pendentia present and accordingly dismissed the
complaint.
Argument of FDCP
Petitioner submits that while there is identity of parties in Civil Case Nos.
CEB-35529 and 72238, the second and third requisites are absent. It points
out that in the former, it is not claiming any monetary award but merely
prayed for the dismissal of the declaratory relief petition. Moreover, since
the issues raised in the former case are purely legal, petitioner is not
necessarily called upon to present testimonial or documentary evidence to
prove factual matters. Petitioner thus concludes that the judgment in former
case would not amount to res judicata in the latter case. Petitioner further
notes that when a judgment dismissing the former case is appealed and the
assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9167 are declared constitutional by this Court,
petitioner will not be automatically awarded the unpaid amusement taxes it
is claiming against respondent in Civil Case No. 72238.
ISSUE
WON the dismissal of the 2nd action was proper.
RULING
Yes.
We do not subscribe to petitioner’s view that the dismissal of the complaint
in Civil Case No. 72238 amounts to an abdication of the Pasig City RTC’s
concurrent jurisdiction to settle constitutional questions involving a statute
or its implementing rules. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
provides for specific grounds for the dismissal of any complaint in civil cases
including those where the trial court has competence and authority to hear
and decide the issues raised and relief sought. One of these grounds is litis
pendentia.
[Interpleader action proper, SM Prime does not know to whom remittance
of the tax must be made]
In this case, what petitioner failed to take into account is that the Cebu City
RTC allowed respondent to intervene in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 by way of
an INTERPLEADER ACTION as to which government entity – whether FDCP or
the Cebu City Government – should have remitted the amusement taxes it
collected from the admission fees of graded films shown in respondent’s
cinemas in Cebu City. It must be noted that since 1993 when City Tax
Ordinance No. LXIX was enforced, respondent had been faithfully remitting
amusement taxes to the City of Cebu and because of the collection suit filed
by petitioner, such defense of prior payment and evidence to prove it which
respondent could have presented at the trial in Civil Case No. 72238 would
be the same defense and evidence necessary to sustain respondent’s
interpleader action in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 before the Cebu City RTC.
Also, in both cases, respondent had raised the matter of conflicting
provisions of R.A. No. 9167 and Local Government Code of 1991, while
petitioner pleaded and argued the constitutionality and validity of Sections
13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167.
[The second action (FDCP vs SM Prime) is dependent on the resolution of
the declaratory relief (Cebu City vs law creating FDCP)]
The interpleader action of respondent/intervenor, anchored on its defense of
prior payment, would be considered by the Cebu City RTC in its final
determination of the parties’ rights and interests as it resolves the legal
questions. The Pasig City RTC is likewise confronted with the legal and
constitutional issues in the collection suit, alongside with respondent’s
defense of prior payment. It is evident that petitioner’s claim against the
respondent hinges on the correct interpretation of the conflicting provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991 and R.A. No. 9167. There could be no
doubt that a judgment in either case would constitute res judicata to the
other. Sound practice thus dictates that the common factual and legal issues
be resolved in a single proceeding.
Litis pendentia present
Under the established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following
considerations predominate in the ascending order of importance in
determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether
the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later
action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3)
whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues
between the parties.29
Moreover, considering the predicament of respondent, we also find relevant
the criterion of the consideration of the interest of justice we enunciated in
Roa v. Magsaysay.30 In applying this standard, what was asked was which
court would be "in a better position to serve the interests of justice," taking
into account (a) the nature of the controversy, (b) the comparative
accessibility of the court to the parties and (c) other similar factors.31
In this case, all things considered, there can be no doubt Civil Case No. CEB-
35529 is the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of petitioner and
respondent. In that declaratory relief case instituted by the City of Cebu, to
which respondent had been remitting the subject amusement taxes being
claimed by petitioner in Civil Case No. 72238, the issue of validity or
constitutionality of Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. No. 9167 was directly pleaded
and argued between petitioner and the City of Cebu, with subsequent
inclusion of respondent as intervenor. Moreover, the presence of City of
Cebu as party plaintiff would afford proper relief to respondent in the event
the Cebu City RTC renders judgment sustaining the validity of the said
provisions. Respondent had vigorously asserted in both courts that it had
remitted the amusement taxes in good faith to the City of Cebu which had
threatened sanctions for non-compliance with City Tax Ordinance No. LXIX,
and that it should not be made to pay once again the same taxes to
petitioner. As equally dire consequences for non-compliance with the
demand for payment having been made by petitioner, such defense of good
faith is best ventilated in Civil Case No. CEB-35529 where the City of Cebu is a
party.
Reason for litis pendentia: to prevent the unnecessary burdening of our
courts and undue taxing of the manpower and financial resources of the
judiciary; to avoid the situation where co-equal courts issue conflicting
decisions over the same cause; and to preclude one party from harassing
the other party through the filing of an unnecessary or vexatious suit.32
5. GAN HUA UY FLORES, ET. AL. v. JOHNNY K.H. UY, G.R. NO.
121492, OCT. 26, 2001; JOHNNY K.H. UY v. CA, ET. AL., G.R. NO.
124325, OCT. 26, 2001
6. ARREZA v. DIAZ, JR., 364 SCRA 88
7. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE
PORT OF SUBIC, vs. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179579 February 1, 2012
A Petition for Review under Rule 45, assailing the Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), which nullified the Customs
Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 on the tariff classification of wheat
issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
Facts:
Petitioner issued CMO No. 27-2003 which classified wheat, for tariff
purposes, according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country
of origin; and (3) port of discharge. Furthermore, the regulation provided an
exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified
either as food grade or feed grade, with tariff rates at 3% and 7%
respectively.
Respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pinas City, in anticipation of the implementation
of said regulation on its imported and perishable Chinese milling wheat in
transit from China. He provided for the following contentions: (a) that CMO
27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center; (b) the
regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier without the
benefit of prior assessment and examination; (c) violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution by treating non-flour millers
differently from flour millers for no reason at all; and (d) the retroactive
application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for twenty (20)
days from notice.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC did not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because
respondent was asking for a judicial determination of the classification
of wheat, thus, action for declaratory relief is improper.
RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the subject matter, given that the issue
raised by respondent concerned the quasi-legislative powers of petitioners.
It likewise stated that a petition for declaratory relief was the proper remedy,
and that respondent was the proper party to file it. The court considered that
respondent was a regular importer, and that the latter would be subjected to
the application of the regulation in future transactions.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which dismissed the appeal and held that:
since the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and other
importers, petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice,
hearing and publication.
Issue(s):
(a) WoN an action for declaratory relief is proper.
(b) WoN RTC has jurisdiction.
(c) WoN CMO 27-2003 is in valid.
Ruling: Yes in all three issues.
(a) An action for declaratory relief is proper.
Rule 63, Section 1 provides:
Who may file petition. – Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.”
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows:
(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse;
(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination
The case at bar satisfies the following requirements in that:
(1) The subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-
2003, a governmental regulation, issued by petitioner
Commissioner of Customs;
(2) The controversy is between two parties that have adverse
interests. Petitioners are summarily imposing a tariff rate that
the respondent is refusing to pay;
(3) Respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the
implementation of CMO 27-2003. He has adequately shown that,
as a regular importer of wheat, upon arrival of its shipments, it
would be subjected to the regulation which calls for the
imposition of different tariff rates, depending on the factors
enumerated therein. Each and every importation will be
subjected to constant disputes, resulting in the delays of delivery
and expenses on the part of the respondent; and
(4) The issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination,
because litigation is inevitable for the simple and
uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in the
enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat
importers. Thus, it would have to file a protest case each time it
imports food grade wheat and be subjected to the 7% tariff.
(b) RTC has jurisdiction.
An action for declaratory relief is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC (Rule 63, Sec. 1 [1]. The determination of whether
a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency
contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of
the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is
within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of
the courts to determine the validity of the acts of the political
departments.
(c) CMO 27-2003 is invalid.
The Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in
the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements
under the Revised Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal
protection of laws when he provided for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation, and (3) went beyond his powers of delegated
authority when the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to
examine and assess imported articles. CMO 27-2003 was issued without
following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University
of the Philippines Law Center.
The classification of wheat according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge, is a violation of the
equal protection clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how
the quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or
which country it came from. Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers
excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product
would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them
to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-
2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3%
tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore,
does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
 Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that
the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of the
imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007
has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the
chance to examine it.

Finally, Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by

the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no
longer required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of
the proper classification of the wheat.
8. MALANA v. TAPPA, G.R. No. 181303, SEPTEMBER 17, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio, who died
intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo to build
on and occupy the subject property but would vacate the said land at any time
that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.

Respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the subject

property even after her death. Petitioners demanded that respondents vacate
the same. Respondents but they refused.

Petitioners referred their land dispute for conciliation. Respondents presented

documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. According to
petitioners, respondents documents were highly dubious, falsified, and
incapable of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property;
nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners title to the property.

Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting
of Title, and Damages. RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the
subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners action
to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing

petitioners Complaint for lack of jurisdiction?

Ruling: NO.

The use of the word may under Section 1, Rule 63 (which vests jurisdiction in
the RTC) denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a
mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the
second paragraph of, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve
title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not
exceed P20,000.00, thus:

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property is P410.00;
therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said
property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been
no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. In
the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was
filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the
subject property

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been
deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them
is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case
for declaratory relief. Given that the subject property herein is valued
only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an
action to recover the same.

RTC is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the MTC or the court
of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition.
9. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORP. v. COMELEC, 360 PHIL 780
10. REPOL v. COMELEC, 428 SCRA 321
11. MAGALLONA, ET. AL. v. ERMITA, ET. AL., G.R. NO. 187167,
AUG. 16, 2011