1.

URIARTE VS CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

ADVINCULA VS TEODORO

A. Uriarte vs Court of First Instance

Facts:
Juan Uriarte died in Spain and left reasonable properties in the Philippines. Vicente
Uriarte, who is claiming to be the son and sole heir of the deceased, filed a petition
for the intestate settlement of the estate of the deceased in the CFI of Negros
Occidental. However, said petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating that
there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain, a copy of which is being requested.
Then, the nephews filed a settlement of the estate in the Court of Manila on the
basis of the alleged will of the deceased.

Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of the estate in Manila stating that the
court of Negros Occidental has already acquired original jurisdiction over the case.
The opposition of Vicente was dismissed together with the intestate settlement in
the CFI of Negros.

Hence, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate
settlement in the CFI of Negros.

Held:
The SC held that the dismissal of the intestate proceeding is proper. Under the Rules
on the settlement of the estate of the deceased person, testate proceedings enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings. Therefore, in case intestate settlement was filed
prior to the finding of the will of the deceased, then the intestate proceeding shall be
dismissed to give priority to the testate proceeding.

B. Advincula vs. Teodoro

Facts:
Emilio Advincula was appointed special administrator, then later regular
administrator of his deceased wife’s estate. After he qualified as administrator,
brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the deceased will.

Emilio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the signature was not his
wife’s and even if it was, the same was procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-
law, Enrique Lacson, prayed that he (Enrique) be appointed administrator in lieu of
Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and
unsuitable to act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate”. The court
ruled in favor of Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed an MR but the same was denied so he
instituted the present action for certiorari to annul the lower court’s order.

HELD:
The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the
fact that Lacson was named executor of the deceased will. This provision, however
cannot be enforced until the said will is admitted to probate. The discovery of a will
of the deceased does not ipso facto
 nullify letters of administration already issued or even authorize the
revocation thereof until the alleged will is “proved and allowed by the court”.
Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed the argument of the
respondents that Emilio, being foreign to the
deceased’s estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable
because from the viewpoint of logic and experience, a stranger may be competent,
capable and fit to be administrator of the estate in the same way that a family
member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. Besides, Emilio as the
surviving spouse if a forced heir of the deceased. He is entitled to ½ of all property
apart from his share of the other half thereof as heir of the deceased since “all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership”

2. SAN DIEGO VS NOMBRE

CARO VS COURT OF APPEALS

A. San Diego vs Nombre

Facts:
Nombre was initially the appointed administrator of the estate. He entered into a
lease contract with Escanlar for a period of 3 years. This was done without
authorization of the court. Nombre was removed as an administrator and was
replaced. The court then sought the annulment of the contract for lack of
authorization for it being beyond the power of an administrator to lease the
administered property without court approval.

Held:
Rule 84, Section 3 of the Rules of Court authorizes a judicial administrator, among
other things to administer the estate of the deceased not disposed of by will. Under
this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the
estate of the deceased for purpose of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore,
exercise all acts of administration without authority of the court. For instance, he may
lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And
where the lease has been formally entered into, the court cannot, in the same
proceeding, annul the same to the prejudice of the lessee over whose person it had
no jurisdiction. The proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator
or the heirs to annul the lease.

B. Caro vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Mario Benito together with his siblings Alfredo and Benjamin co-owned a property in
Sorsogon. When Mario died, surviving wife Basilia and his father Saturnino were
appointed as joint administrators of Mario’s estate. Benjamin sold his 1/3 undivided
portion to Luz Caro, thereafter it was registered and subdivision title was issued to
Caro with consent from Alfredo and Saturnino Benito. After almost 6 years, Caro filed
a pleading in the Special Proceedings that she bought 1/3 of the property co-owned,
only then Basilia found out the sale. Basilia offered to redeem the said share but was
ignored. Basilia then filed an independent case for legal redemption, for no notice of
the sale given to her as administrator of the estate as required under Article 1623 of
the Civil Code. Affidavits of the other co-owners and deposition of her mother in law
 testified that indeed there was a written notice of the intended sale and Saturnino
expressed disinterest in buying property.

The lower court held that administratrix of the co-owner does not have the power to
exercise the right of legal redemption. Appealed to CA, CA held that Basilia can still
redeem the property, upon showing that there was no clear notice given to co-heirs
and notice to co-administrators does not bind the other. Thus Caro appealed the
herein case.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that redemption is not availing since the property sought to
be redeemed is not co-owned anymore on the theory that through the other co-
owner and one of the administrators of the estate of the other co-owner already
agreed to subdivide the property. The SC held further, that on the assumption that
there is still co-ownership and right of legal redemption still exists, ad administratrix,
she has no personality to exercise such right. As held in Butte vs Uy and Sons, while
in Rule 85, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal
estate of the deceased, such right to possession and administration do not include
right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-
owners.

3. DE GUZMAN VS DE GUZMAN-CARILLO
ANA LIM KALAW VS IAC

A. De Guzman vs De Guzman-Carillo

Facts:
The late Felix J. De Guzman was survived by 8 children, letters of administration were
issued to his son Dr. Victorino De Guzman. One of the properties left by the decedent
was a residential house located in the poblacion of which 8 children were given 1/8
proindiviso share in the project partition. The three heirs, Crispina De Guman-Carillo,
Honorata De Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio De Guzman interposed objections to the
administrators disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48 for the expenses among
others, includes: expense for the improvement and renovation of the decedent
residential house, living expenses of Librada De Guzman while occupying the family
home without paying rent. Other expenses: lawyers subsistence, gratuity pay in lieu of
medical fee, stenographic notes, decedents first death anniversary, representation
expenses and irrigation fee. The lower court allowed the expenses.

Held:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court findings with modifications. An executor or
administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management and
settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent’s real and
personal estate as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses
of administration. He is accountable for the whole decedent estate which has come into
his possession with all the interest, profit and income thereof and with the proceeds of
so much of such estate as is sold by him at the price at which it was sold. One of the
conditions of the bond is that he should render a true and a just account of his
administration to the court.

All of the reported administration expenses were allowed except the following: living
expenses of the Librada de Guzman, stenographic notes, decedent first death
anniversary, and representation expenses.

B. Ana Lim Kalaw vs IAC

Facts: Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970. Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an
amended petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration naming 4 other surviving
heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw. The trial court issued an order appointing petitioner
Ana Lim Kalaw as special administratrix. Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary
inventory of all the properties which came into her possession as special administratrix
of the estate of her late father.

The trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial administratrix of
said estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the petitioner after the latter
took her oath of office. Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to
render an accounting of her administration of said estate which was granted by
respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz.

Respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting of

her administration with the express instruction that said order be personally served
upon the petitioner since the order dated December 8, 1982 was returned to the Court
unserved. However, said order was also not received by the petitioner.

Private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw
filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their father’s estate and to
appoint instead private respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of
petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of her administration since
her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago in violation of Section 8 Rule
85 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion praying for her removal as administratrix
alleging that the delay in rendering said accounting was due to the fact that the Judge
Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was assigned, had
been promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a
considerable length of time, while newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac
arrest soon after his appointment to said vacancy, so much so that she did not know to
whom to render an accounting report.

Held:
Subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her
negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies
petitioner’s removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in her
place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

As correctly stated by the appellate court: “The settled rule is that the removal of an
administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court
 appointing him. As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala vs.
Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, ‘the sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus
be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any
act or omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in disregard of
the rules or the orders of the court.’

In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her
failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as administratrix to
render an accounting of her administration as required by Section 8 Rule 85 of the Rules
of Court.

4. UY TIOCO VS IMPERIAL
RODRIGUEZ VS YNZA

A. UY TIOCO VS IMPERIAL

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition by restrain the respondent judge from compelling
the petitioner to pay the sum of P11, 250 to the other respondent, Alejandro Panis, out of
the funds of the estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco, of which estate of which said
petitioner is the administrator. In the probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of a deceased the court allowed 15,000.00 for attorney’s fees. Some of the heirs of the
deceased objected to the allowance on the ground that it was excessive and filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied. They thereupon appealed. After the necessary bond
had been given and the appeal perfected, the court ordered the administrator of the estate
to make payment directly to the attorney of three fourths of the 15,000 within five days. The
administrator refused to pay and brought this suit to restrain the lower court from
compelling him to make payment before the amount of the fees finally determined on
appeal.

HELD:
The services for which fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to the
executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney can
therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the
executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the
executor or administrator but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he
is entitled to reimbursement from the estate. Such payments should be included in his
accounts and the reimbursement therefor settled upon the notice.

For the reasons stated the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the
payment of the attorney’s fees.

B. RODRIGUEZ VS. YNZA

FACTS:
Appeal from orders of the CFI of Ilo-Ilo, authorizing payment of Atty. Benjamin Tirol for
professional services. Appellant objects to said payment on the ground that Hugo
Rodriguez, trustee of the estate of Julia Ynza being member of the bar, he did not need the
assistance of Atty. Tirol, and that at any rate, the latter had rendered legal services not to
the estate of Julia Ynza, but to said Hugo Rodriguez in his individual capacity.

HELD:
The objection is untenable, Rodriguez was named trustee by reason of his qualifications,
not as a lawyer, but as administrator. It appears that Rodriguez was involved in eight cases,
not in his private capacity, but as trustee or administrator of the estate of Julia Ynza,
deceased and the properties constituting said estate were being claimed by appellant to
the exclusion of the estate of Julia Ynza. It is apparent, therefore, that as counsel for
Rodriguez in said cases, Atty. Tirol had rendered services for the benefit of the estate of
Julia Ynza, which obtained a favorable decision in every one of said cases. Orders affirmed.