Mens Legislatoris
Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year,
The mischief rule[1] is one of three rules of statutory interpretation
traditionally applied by English courts.[2] The other two are the "plain
meaning rule" (also known as the "literal rule") and the "golden rule".
The main aim of the rule is to determine the "mischief and defect" that the
statute in question has set out to remedy, and what ruling would effectively
implement this remedy. In applying the mischief rule, the court is essentially
asking what part of the law did the law not cover, but was meant to be
rectified by Parliament in passing the bill.
The mischief rule is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain
meaning rule, in that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly
speaking, only when the statute was passed to remedy a defect in the
common law.
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION
AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE;
APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the
Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the
marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura
v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil
Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the
opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations
in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply
rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al
otro por amor que han de consuno,’ [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit.
Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem);
then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not
to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years
bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger
that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not
be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who
incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the
disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE;
RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The lack of
validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to
the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship
between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March
28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister
to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are
called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now
appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena,
maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit
of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was
made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the
latter’s stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in
character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling on it. A
1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the
then Justice J. B. L.
is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The
conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law
spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public
policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision
must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in
plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by
Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under
the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand
did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956
and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant
assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That
the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said
Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3)
That the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately
was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife
between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said
donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased
Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff
claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate
and inheritance taxes thereon’" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff.
It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil
Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the
donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on
February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet
married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only
when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers
as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals
decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the
old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the
language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because
of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; ‘porque no se engañen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to]
the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale ‘Ne mutuato
amore invicem spoliarentur’ of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection
for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so
that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1),
‘it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of
those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better.’ So long as marriage
remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above
pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It
would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is
as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever
omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language
used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the
language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que
ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.’’ 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant
Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the
relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in
the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff,
as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing
the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared
void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the
property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court
for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of
illegal possesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus
Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C.
Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for
equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol
Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise
issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an
accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said
Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as
special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in
the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On
October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession
of the above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25,
without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and
thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The
case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime
charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to
US and the accused assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial
court in disposing of this case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the
present subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal
court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the
appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87
of Republic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice
over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over
the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296,
Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which
the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months,
or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense
charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not
less than one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both
such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts
over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment
for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred
(P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and
original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession
of firearms with which the appellant was charged is penalized by
imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or
more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less
than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand
(P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of
First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant
was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess
firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his
official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant
was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for
a license or to register the said firearm because it was government property
and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's
name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm
also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary
"because you are already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that
the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs.
Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30,
1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus
Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional
release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35376 September 11, 1980
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines and The Director of Lands seek the
review of the decision dated July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge in Cad.
Case No. 27, GLRO Rec. No. 1714, Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre
entitled, "The Director of Lands, petitioner, versus Tiburcio, Florencia,
Fabian and Gonzala, all surnamed Aotes, claimants-movants", the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 28,
1940, declaring Lot No. 4273 Public Land is set aside and said
Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre is hereby adjudicated in favor
of herein movants in undivided interests and in equal share of ¼
each to GONZALA AOTES, married to Victorino Gormanes;
TIBURCIO AOTES, married to Epefania Maglasang;
 FLORENCIA AOTES, married to Basilio Barabad; and FABIAN
AOTES, married to Dulcisima Barabad; all adjudicatees are
Filipinos, of legal ages, the first named is residing in Can-adiong,
Ormoc City, Philippines; and as soon as this decision shall have
become final, let the Commissioner of Land Registration
Commission, Quezon City, issue the corresponding decree of
aforesaid parcel of land in the names of herein adjudicatees,
subject to the liability and claims of creditors, Hens, or other
persons for the full period of two (2) years after their distribution
as imposed by Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. 1
The following facts are undisputed in the instant case:
In a decision dated September 28, 1940 by the Cadastral Court, Lot No.
4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre was declared public land.
On February 23, 1972, private respondents Aotes filed with the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch V, Ormoc City, presided by the respondent Judge
a petition to reopen the aforesaid decision dated September 28, 1940 under
Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep. Act 6236 claiming to be the owners and
possessors of Lot No. 4273 of the Ormoc Cadastre by virtue of hereditary
succession but, due to their non-appearance on the date of the hearing of
the Cadastral Case because of ignorance and excusable neglect, said land
was declared public land and that they had been in adverse, peaceful and
notorious possession of the said parcel of land since the time immemorial,
paying all the taxes, interests and penalties. They pray that the decision of
the Cadastral Court affecting Lot No. 4273, Ormoc Cadastre be reopened,
and that they be allowed to file their cadastral answer.
On March 16, 1972, petitioners filed an opposition to the aforesaid petition
on the ground that such petition is barred by the expiration of the period for
reopening cadastral proceedings under Rep. Act 931 which expired on
December 31, 1968 and this period has not been extended under the
provisions of Rep. Act 6236 because the latter applies only to the extensions
of time limit for the filing of applications for free patent and for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
Respondent Judge in its order dated May 9, 1972, denied the opposition for
lack of sufficient merit and set the case for hearing on June 24, 1972.
On July 22, 1972, respondent judge rendered decision setting aside the
decision of the cadastral court dated September 28, 1940 declaring Lot No.
4273 public land and adjudicating said lot in favor of the private respondents
in undivided interest in equal share of one-fourth (1/4) each.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the lower court, petitioners filed this instant
petition assigning only one error to writ: The trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the petition for reopening of Cadastral Proceedings.
In the Brief, 2 petitioners argue that the lower court has no jurisdiction over
the proceedings for reopening of the cadastral case because under the
provision of Rep. Act 931, the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings
expired on December 31, 1968, and that period has not been extended by
Rep. Act 6236 which applies only to the extension of the time limit for the
filing of applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles and not to reopening of cadastral proceedings. In the
Manifestation and Motion, 3 respondents Aotes claim that considering the
time limit for firing applications for free patents and for judicial confirmation
of incomplete and imperfect titles has been extended up to December 31,
1980, the reopening of cadastral cases should also be extended until
December 31, 1980 in fairness and justice to them.
The sole issue to be resolved, considering the above facts, is whether or not
Rep. Act 6236 which provides for the extension of the time limit to file
applications for free patent and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles to December 31, 1976 applies also to the reopening of
cadastral proceedings on certain lands which were declared public lands.
There is merit in the petition.
By way of background, Rep. Act 931, which was approved on June 20, 1953,
is an act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions,
of certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public
land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this act. Under this aforesaid act, all persons
claiming title to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings, who at the time of the survey were in actual possession of the
same but for some justifiable reason had been unable to file their claim in
the proper court during the time limit established by law, in case such parcels
of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or are about
to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this act, are
granted the right within five years after the date on which this act shall take
effect, to petition for a reopening of the judicial proceedings under the
provisions of Act 2259. Rep. Act 2061, which took effect on June 13, 1958,
refers to an act setting a new time limit for the filing of applications for free
patents, for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and for
the reopening of judicial proceedings on certain lands which were declared
public lands. Under this act the time for filing applications shall not extend
beyond December 31, 1968. Rep. Act 6236, approved on June 19, 1971,
however, extended the time limit for the filing of applications for free patents
and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles not to extend
beyond December 31, 1976. In resume, Rep. Act 931 granted a right within
5 years from June 20, 1953 to petition for a reopening of cadastral
proceedings. Rep. Act 2061 fixed a new time limit which is up to December
31, 1968 to file applications for free patents, for the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles and for the reopening of judicial proceedings
on certain lands which were declared public land. Rep. Act 6236 extended
the time limit which is up to December 31, 1976 for the filing of applications
for free patents and for the judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles.
Respondent Aotes filed on February 23, 1972 a petition to reopen the
decision of the Cadastral Court under Rep. Act 931 as amended by Rep.
Act 6236. Respondents Aotes claim that since the time limit for filing
applications for free patents and applications for judicial confirmation of
incomplete and imperfect titles have been extended up to December 31,
1980, the reopening of cadastral cases is also extended until December 31,
1980. Rep. Act 6236, the very law on which respondents Aotes bases his
petition to reopen the cadastral proceedings fails to supply any basis for
respondents' contention. It will be noted that while Rep. Act 2061 fixed the
time to reopen cadastral cases which shall not extend beyond December
31, 1968, no similar provision is found in Rep. Act 6236 expressly 'extending
the time limit for the reopening of cadastral proceedings on parcels of land
declared public land. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the extension
as provided for by the Rep. Act 6236 makes no reference to reopening of
cadastral cases as the earlier law, Rep. Act 2061, expressly did. Under the
legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (Express Mention is Implied Exclusion), the express mention of one
thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly
mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon
the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. 4 If Rep. Act
6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to
reopening of cadastral cases, it would have so provided in the same way
that it provided the extension of time to file applications for free patent and
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. The intention to
exclude the reopening of cadastral proceedings or certain lands which were
declared public land in Rep. Act 6236 is made clearer by reference to Rep.
Act 2061 which includes the reopening of cadastral cases, but not so
included in Rep. Act 6236.
We hold, therefore, that the extension provided for by Rep. Act 6236 which
is the sole basis for filing the respondents Aotes' petition to reopen the
cadastral proceedings applies only to the filing of applications for free patent
and for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles and not to
reopening of cadastral proceedings like the instant case, a proceeding
entirely different from "filing an application for a free patent or for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles."
Parenthetically, in setting aside the decision dated September 28, 1940, the
respondent Judge has concluded that Rep. Act 6236 is applicable also to
reopening of cadastral proceedings, thereby, altering Rep. Act 6236. That
cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly pertains to
the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga vs. Court of
Appeals: 5 "It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory
norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to
apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be
obeyed. Our decisions have consistently been to that effect. 6 Likewise, it is
a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the terms of the statute
are clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is called for, and the law is
applied as written, 7 for application is the first duty of courts, and
interpretation, only were literal application is impossible or inadequate. 8
More importantly, the lower court has no longer jurisdiction to entertain the
petition filed by respondents for reopening the cadastral proceedings
because the latter, as we have noted, did not file the aforesaid petition within
the period fixed by the applicable laws to wit: Rep. Act 931 and 2061.
Consequently, the decision dated September 30, 1940 of the Cadastral
Court declaring the land in question a public land has become final and
conclusive. It has also acquired the status of res judicata. It must be
remembered that generally, the fundamental principle of res judicata applies
to all cases and proceedings, including land registration or cadastral
proceedings. 9 The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties from
relitigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment. It is well-settled that a prior judgment is conclusive in a
subsequent suit between the same parties on the subject matter, and on the
same cause of action, not only as to matters which were decided in the first
action, but also as to every other matter which the parties could have
properly set up in the prior suit. 10 Indeed, settled is the rule that a cadastral
case is a judicial proceeding in rem, which, as such binds the whole
world. 11 The final judgment rendered therein is deemed to have settled the
status of the land subject thereof, if not noted thereon, like those of the
petitioner, are deemed barred under the principle of res judicata. 12 In the
case of Cano vs. De Camacho, this Court held:
Although the title of Jesus Vaño over said Lot 1-B is not as yet
indefeasible, no decree having been issued in his favor, all rights,
interests or claims existing before said date are deemed barred
by said decision, under the principle of res judicata, once the
decision become final, upon expiration of the thirty-day period to
appeal therefrom. 13
By reiterating its ruling, this Court once more stresses and emphasizes that
Rep. Act 6236 does not apply to the reopening of cadastral proceedings and
as a consequence, the respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the
petition of the respondents Aotes to reopen the cadastral proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the decisions
dated July 22, 1972 of the respondent Judge and reiterating that of the
Cadastral Court dated September 28, 1940. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then
a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil
action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent
Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence
of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional
Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from
any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a
statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which
accords the utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when
utilized for electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day
the case was orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely
a week away, we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition
prayed for. This opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner,
after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him
five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given
due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is
"violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech."1 There being
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would
seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary
injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than
November 2, 1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday
November 3, 1970. No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no
denial in the answer filed by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual
allegations set forth in the petition, but the justification for the prohibition was
premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made
it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute
sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans
(of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin."3 It was its contention that the jingle proposed to
be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore
a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. It prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case
was argued, on November 3, 1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf
and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency,
the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same
day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the
absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a
ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle
that the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on
Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion
was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on
Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or
implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the
use of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory."4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before
us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called
upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such
authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend,
however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful the
distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and
the like."5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to
justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot
merit our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the
general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of
the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent
that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the
kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent
Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of
construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription.7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a
"construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the
fundamental law."8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of
constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended
itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert
any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution
requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from
constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also
grave doubts upon that score.9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor
obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the
above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to
the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the
challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in
unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free
speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred
freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed
is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose
censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is
directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion
that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by
himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the
constitutional guarantee is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker
having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or
other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent
Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous
restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the
Constitution in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law,
setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding
from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our
system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with
priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to
its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in
the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in
the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its
task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary
is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law.
Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this
basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is
a recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission
was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the
branch of the executive department — although independent of the
President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of
the 'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court,
as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no
higher law than the Constitution. 12Our decisions which liberally construe its
powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its
responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest
elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission,
the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood
on solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970,
respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order
banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in
the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is,
consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in
the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo
Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said
court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime
charged as committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started
upon defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss
the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the
defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to
dismiss holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview
Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who
cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp.
1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the
prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the
prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single
question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section
54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province,
no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert
any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if
he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended
among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal
or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than
exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words
"justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature
to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that
under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section
54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words,
justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e.,
judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however,
there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic
and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase
and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts
of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the
courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as
"judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a
judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with
judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier
Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide
litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term
includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in
that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who
are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and
clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the
Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos.
1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act
No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be
shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later
on incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine
Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage of Acts
Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act
No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the
time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the
law enforced until June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was
approved. Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of
Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was
further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during
the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and
3038. In the history of our election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections,
nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public
office to election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election,
except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and
no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial
fiscal, or officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of
the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in
any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly
election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being
disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5
year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be
construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to
vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on
January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial
fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of
the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in
any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or Assembly
election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall
be deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified
to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term of 5
years, Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not
be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right
to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect
on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the
Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal
or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than
exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No.
3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election.
— Any judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer,
fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the
Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any
officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service,
who aids any candidate or violated in any manner the provisions
of this section or takes part in any election otherwise by exercising
the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less
than 2 months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by
disqualification from public office and deprivation of the right of
suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on
August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees.
— No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province,
no officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the
national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert
influence in any manner in any election nor take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if
he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative
development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the
first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep.
Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words
"justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge,"
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to
justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of
the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer
from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed
congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the
discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications
from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from
the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word
"judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last
mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the
peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the
phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the
enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial
officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme
Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there
be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals
are not included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical
interpretation of the said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and
assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by
the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of
the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately
exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that
the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law,
or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just
called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,
defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being
restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should
be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly
construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal
in nature and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be
strictly interpreted against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal
statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process
demand such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law
intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed.
816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a
substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
p. 56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the
intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to
be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the
policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159).
The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular
instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S.
has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such
construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal
statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes
with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53,
56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of
criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes
situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354;
See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale
L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that
the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview.
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges,
such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under
the old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident
purpose, can the legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace
within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the
Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases
"Judge of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in
Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge"
in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the scope
of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of
first Instance justices of the peace or special courts, such as
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace
court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to
engage in partisan political activities would weaken rather than
strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent
reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of
the peace should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with
Justices of the appellate courts and judges of the Court of First
Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over certain
election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the
peace are authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion
cases, and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for an
elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases
would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the
legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code,
intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708,
Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that
the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the
peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Justice, etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No.
237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing
the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note
that one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that
he was found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions
of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676,
which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under
Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the
officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with
the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that
existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political
activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a
proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to
section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676
was a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that
it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law,
cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the
motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of
the legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration
in ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction,
Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of
a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that
justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must
be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and
emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from
participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election
Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so
enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the
prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied
the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said
the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise
known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond
reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the
peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a
justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court
nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule
of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included, and manifest
injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio
unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked. (Blevins v.
Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial
court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.

Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est Law and Legal Definition
Casus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est is a Latin maxim which means
that “A case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.”
It is a rule of statutory construction. If a person, object, or thing is omitted
from being enumerated in a statute, it must be held or considered to have
been omitted intentionally.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9274 February 1, 1957
RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Petitioner appellant Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. is appealing from a resolution
of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing its appeal from a decision of the
Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, assessing additional fees on
petitioner for a certain importation of wire netting. The facts are simple and
undisputed. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg,
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding
customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplies
invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released.
Subsequently, however, and freight of said wire netting and as a result of
the reassessment, additional customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59
were levied and imposed upon petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration
of the reassessment and levy of additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons
appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the
appeal, filed by the Solicitor General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the
Tax Court, by its resolution of May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the Collector of
Customs of Manila, citing section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said
tax court. From said resolution of dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us,
seeking a reversal of said resolution of dismissal.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 7 of Republic Act No.
1125 relied upon by the Tax Court and the Solicitor General, as well as
Section 11 of the same Act invoked by the petitioner:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided —
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto,
or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving
liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure,
detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered
by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals
in case involving the assessment and taxation of real property or
other matters arising under the assessment Law, including rules
and regulations relative thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person,
association or corporation adversely by a decision or ruling of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any
provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal
in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of
such decision or ruling.
No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of
the Collector of Internal Revenue or the Collector of the Customs
shall suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any
property of the taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as
provided by existing law: Provided, however, that when in the
opinion of the Court the collection by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Commissioner of Customs may jeopardize the
interests of the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any
stage of the proceeding may suspend the said collection and
require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file
a surety bond for not more than double the amount with the Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is really a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11 above reproduced.
Section 7 provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs and decisions of
provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals on cases mentioned in said
section. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Republic Act in listing
and enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal as well as the
effect of said appeal, mentions those affected by a decision or ruling of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or
City Board of Assessment Appeals, and fails to mention the Commissioner
of Customs. Taken literally, a person affected by a decision of the Collector
of Customs may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals; and since no mention
is made about decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, a person affected
by said decision may not appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. However,
section 7 of the Act above reproduced specially provides that the Court of
Tax Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of
the Commissioner of Customs. That legal provision conferring appellate
jurisdiction on the Court of Tax Appeals to review decisions of the
Commissioner of Customs would be empty, meaningless, and
unenforceable because under Section 11, no person affected by the
decision of the Commissioner of customs may appeal to the Tax Court.
These two meaningless, and unenforceable because under Section 11,
should be harmonized and reconciled if possible, in order to give effect to
the whole Act.
We are in entire accord with the Tax Court and the Solicitor General that a
clerical error was committed in section 11, mentioning therein the Collector
of Customs. It should be, as it was meant to be, the Commissioner of
Customs. There are several reasons in support of this view. Under the
Customs Law, found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the Commissioner of Customs (Insular Collector of Customs) is the
Chief of the Bureau of Customs and has jurisdiction over the whole country
as regards the enforcement of the Customs Law, whereas, there are about
sixteen Collectors of Customs for the sixteen collection districts and principal
parts of entry into which the Philippines has been divided. These Collectors
of Customs are subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom
he has supervision and control (section 1152, Revised Administrative
Code). Pursuant to said supervision and control, under section 1405 of the
Revised Administrative Code, when any new or unsettled question shall be
determined by the Collector of Customs, he shall, if matter is not otherwise
carried upon for review in ordinary course, notify the Commissioner of his
decision, submitting an adequate statement of acts involved. What is more
important is the provision of section 1380, which reproduce below:
SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved
by the decision of the Collector of Customs in any matter
presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure
may, within fifteen days after notification in writing by the collector
of his action or decision, give written notice to the collector
signifying his desore to have the matter reviewed by the
Commissioner.
Thereupon, the Collector of Customs shall forthwith transmit all
the papers in the cause to the Commissioner, who shall approve,
modify, or reverse the action of his subordinate and shall take
such steps and make such order or orders as may be necessary
to give effect to his decision.
Under this section, any person affected or aggrieved by the decision of the
Collector of Customs may appeal the decision to the Commissioner of
Customs. From all this, it is clear if we followed the literal meaning and refuse to entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the
wording of section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, in the sense that persons ground that under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction
affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly tot to review a decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its
he Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.
Commissioner of Customs over his Collector of Customs, and his right to
review their decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said
In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law, particularly, the
decision would, not only be gravely affected, but even destroyed. We cannot
Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no
believe that was the intention of the Legislature in passing Republic Act No.
jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The
1125. It is more reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act,
appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs.
the Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs,
instead of Collector of Customs in the first paragraph and the first part of the
second paragraph of said section. In thus holding, the Court are not exactly
indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify and
correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due
course and carry out the evident intention of the Legislature. This the Courts Republic of the Philippines
should and can validly do. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not SUPREME COURT
the letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that Manila
is important and which matters. When the interpretation of a statute
according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or
EN BANC
mischievous results, or would contravene the clear purposes of the
Legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary, the latter of the law. Statutes may be G.R. No. L-68709 July 19, 1985
extended to cover cases not within the literal meaning of the terms, for that
which is clearly within the intention of the Legislature in enacting the law is
NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO, petitioner,
as much within the statute as if it were within the latter. Here the error
vs.
(clerical and misprint) is plain and obvious. It is within the province of the
THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROÑO Minister, Ministry of Local
courts to correct said error. This is not to correct the act of the Legislature,
Government; THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY;
but rather to carry out and give due course to the true intention of said
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. FUENTES, Vice Mayor of Ozamiz
Legislature. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp. 66-67; 157-
City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz
158.).
City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO, JESUS S.
ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES, IRENE S. LUANSING, REMEDIOS J.
Furthermore, section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may well be regarded as a RAMIRO, DOMINADOR B. BORJE, FILOMENO L. ROMERO,
mere complement or implementation of section 7. Since section 7 provides FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and HARRY S. OAMINAL Members,
that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, respondents.
Collector of Internal Revenue. decisions of the Commissioner of Customs,
and decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, so section
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
11 naturally provides that persons adversely affected by said decisions may
appeal to the Tax Court. However, in enumerating the governmental bodies
or agencies rendering said decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously The sole issue for determination in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
listed the Collector instead of the Commissioner, of Customs. The error is mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order is whether
plain. or not an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, who ran for
the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984,
should be considered as resigned or on forced leave of absence upon the
As a matter of fact, the Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of dismissal of
filing of his Certificate of Candidacy. The resolution of the controversy
May 23, 1955 cites in support thereof a resolution promulgated by it on
hinges on the construction to be given to Section 13 of Batas Pambansa
January 22, 1955 in C.T.A. Case No. 17, entitled "Acting Collector of
Blg, 697, which provides as follows:
Customs vs.Acting Commissioner of Customs", wherein it said:

Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.

The phrase "Collector of Customs" appearing in the above-
mentioned provision (section 11) of Republic Act No. 1125 is
clearly an oversight on the part of Congress. It should read (1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position,
"Commissioner of Customs" to make the provision conform with including active officers and members of the Armed Forces of the
section 7 of the said Republic Act section 1380 of the Revised Philippines and the Integrated National Police, as well as officials
Administrative Code. and employees of government-owned and government-controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office
or position as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of Republic Act
Provided, however, that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime
No. 1125 should be adopted in the sense that the Court of Tax Appeals has
Minister, the Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers
concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over Appeals
shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding
from decisions of Collectors of Customs, so that a person adversely affected
the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
by a decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice of appealing the
said decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax
Appeals. We find contention unteable. In the first place, the two remedies (2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or
suggested are entirely different, one from the other; an appeal to the barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy
Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the be considered on forced leave of absence from office. (Emphasis
Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before supplied)
one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should
first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz
petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by
City, in the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected
a decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the
President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by
remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax
the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the
Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because, if he took
Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as
the appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy
a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court
of Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said decision to the
Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May
officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the
person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election.
the Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he
may yet appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place,
even if the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 (supra),
took his appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for petitioner informed respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding
the petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as
member of that body. The matter was elevated to respondent Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Rono who ruled that since petitioner is an
appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive
position upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2) of
Batasan Pambansa Blg. 697 makes no distinction between elective and
appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear that even appointive
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.
There is no question that petitioner holds a public appointive position. He
was appointed by the President as a member of the City's Sangguniang
Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association
of Barangay Councils. This was pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the elective or Appointive Positions
in Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes), which provides that:
Sec. 3. Cities. —There shall be in each city such elective local
officials as provided in their respective charters, including the city
mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective members of the
sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom shall be elected by the
qualified voters in the city. In addition thereto, there shall
be appointive sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of
the president of the city association of barangay councils, the
president of the city federation of the kabataang barangay, and
one representative each from the agricultural and industrial labor
sectors who shall be appointed by, the president (Prime Minister)
whenever, as determined by the sangguniang panglungsod, said
sectors are of sufficient number in the city to warrant
representation. (emphasis supplied)
The appointive character of petitioner's position was reiterated in Section
173 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), reading as follows:
Sec 173. Composition and Compensation. — (1) the sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall be composed
of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected sangguniang
panlungsod members, and the members who may be appointed
by the President of the Philippines consisting of the presidents of
the Katipunan panglungsod ng mga barangay and the Kabataang
barangay, city federation. (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso
facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy
for the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
Petitioner avers, however, that the fact that he is merely an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City "is really of no
moment since subsection 2, Section 13. B.P. 697, makes no distinction
between elective and appointive officials, and at any rate, legislative intent
makes clear that appointive officials are deemed covered by the provision.
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of more than
one construction, taking into consideration the nature of the positions of the
officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the
various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to
distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to
appointive positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause
reading "any person holding public appointive office or position," is clear. It
is a rule of statutory construction that "when the language of a particular
section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction
which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained
by the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed." 1
A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. 2
The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1),
and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer
to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the
Batasan Pambansa recorded as follows:
Mr. Valdez: ... May I go to paragraph 2 of Sec. 16, Mr. Speaker
which says:
Any local elective officials, including an elected barangay official
shall ipso facto cease in his office or position as at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy, unless otherwise provided by
law. (later amended and is now Subsection 2 of sec. 13)
Now, do the words 'local elective official' refer to the
office or to an incumbent who has been elected, not
appointed?
Mr. Albano. Paragraph 2 covers elective official; paragraph I
covers appointive officials. So, if he is an appointive local official
he would fall under paragraph (1) because it says: 'Any person
holding appointive office or position.' It does not distinguish if it is
appointive or elective position.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, Mr. Speaker, do I get the distinguished
sponsor correctly that an appointed mayor but holding an elective
position is not within the comprehension of this section or this
paragraph?
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker, that would refer to paragraph 2.
What maybe the Gentleman's contemplation is: Suppose a
person is appointed to the position of a mayor, will he be covered
under paragraph 1 and should be cease to hold office upon filing
his Certificate of Candidacy?
Mr. Valdez. Yes.
Mr. Albano. I would say, yes, he would fall under paragraph 1. But
if he is an elective local official he would fall under paragraph 2.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, this is a description of the mode and
manner by which the occupant is brought to the office.
Mr. Albano. Yes.
Mr. Valdez. ... not the description of the office itself.
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Valdez. I see. Now we come to the other portion which refers
to elected barangay official. Why is it that the provision isolates
the nature of the official of the barangay who had been elected,
not appointed, is he supposed to be within the purview of
paragraph 2?
Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker, I will call the Gentleman's attention
to paragraph 1: Any person holding a public appointive office or
position ... I presume and I assume that the office in the barangay
council is still contemplated in the words 'appointive office.'
Mr. Valdez. Under paragraph l?
Mr. Albano. Yes, Mr. Speaker. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Nor do we perceive any violation of the equal protection clause, as petitioner
contends, since Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all persons
subject to such legislation under like circumstances and conditions. Neither
can petitioner justifiably contend that he was removed from office without
due process of law since it was of his own choice that he ran for a seat in
the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that followed his unsuccessful
attempt at the elections arose from law.
It goes without saying that although petitioner, by filing his certificate of
candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an
appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective
Barangay Captain from which position he may be considered as having
been on "forced leave of absence." He also continues as President of the
Association of Barangay Councils but will need a reappointment by the
President, as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as
the law speaks of "members who may be appointed by the President."
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent officials, the Writs prayed for are denied, and this Petition is
hereby ordered dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez,
Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., took no part.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
There is no question petitioner is an elected baranggay official. He was
elected barangay captain of his barangay. He was furthermore elected
President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamis City,
and as such, he was entitled to be appointed, ex-oficio, as he was in fact
appointed by the President as member of the sangguniang panglunsod. The
appointment became functus oficio upon its exercise and petitioner's
assumption of the office.
Under Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 697 governing the 1984 election for the
Batasan Pambansa, petitioner as member of the said sanggunian should be
considered as having gone "on forced leave of absence from office" upon
his filing of his certificate of candidacy and running (unsuccessfully) for a
seat to the Batasan Pambansa, like similarly situated governors and
mayors. The letter and spirit of the Act support petitioner's position. As the
decision itself points out, he rightfully remains as barangay captain and
president of the ABC. As president of the ABC, petitioner should be held as
merely having been on forced leave of absence from the ex oficio position
of sangguniang member to which he held an appointment. He has correctly
submitted that the law makes no distinction between elective or
appointive sanggunian members. The basic position of barangay captain
and ABC president held by him are essentially elective. He cannot fall under
Section 13(l) of the Act which refers to purely appointive officials, including
active officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
officials and employees of government-owned and controlled corporations,
under the statutory construction rule of noscitur a sociis.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28742 April 30, 1982
VIRGILIO CAPATI, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DR. JESUS P. OCAMPO, defendant-appellee.
ESCOLIN, J.:
We set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in Civil
Case No. 3188 which dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on ground of
improper venue.
Plaintiff Virgilio Capati a resident of Bacolor, Pampanga, was the contractor
of the Feati Bank for the construction of its building in Iriga, Camarines Sur.
On May 23, 1967, plaintiff entered into a sub-contract with the defendant Dr.
Jesus Ocampo, a resident of Naga City, whereby the latter, in consideration
of the amount of P2,200.00, undertook to construct the vault walls, exterior
walls and columns of the said Feati building in accordance with the
specifications indicated therein. Defendant further bound himself to
complete said construction on or before June 5, 1967 and, to emphasize
this time frame for the completion of the construction job, defendant affixed
his signature below the following stipulation written in bold letters in the sub-
contract: "TIME IS ESSENTIAL, TO BE FINISHED 5 JUNE' 67."
Claiming that defendant finished the construction in question only on June
20, 1967, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga an action
for recovery of consequential damages in the sum of P85,000.00 with
interest, plus attorney's fees and costs. The complaint alleged inter alia that
"due to the long unjustified delay committed by defendant, in open violation
of his express written agreement with plaintiff, the latter has suffered great
irreparable loss and damage ... "
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue
of action was improperly laid. The motion was premised on the stipulation
printed at the back of the contract which reads:
14. That all actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be
instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Naga.
Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion, claiming that their agreement to
hold the venue in the Court of First Instance of Naga City was merely
optional to both contracting parties. In support thereof, plaintiff cited the use
of the word "may " in relation with the institution of any action arising out of
the contract.
The lower court, in resolving the motion to dismiss, ruled that "there was no
sense in providing the aforequoted stipulation, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 4
of the Revised Rules of Court, if after all, the parties are given the discretion
or option of filing the action in their respective residences," and thereby
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Hence, this appeal.
The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the courts of first
instance is found in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff." The
said section is qualified by the following provisions of Section 3 of the same
rule:
By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may
be changed or transferred from one province to another.
Defendant stands firm on his contention that because of the
aforequoted covenant contained in par. 14 of the contract, he
cannot be sued in any court except the Court of First Instance of
Naga City. We are thus called upon to rule on the issue as to
whether the stipulation of the parties on venue is restrictive in the
sense that any litigation arising from the contract can be filed only
in the court of Naga City, or merely permissive in that the parties
may submit their disputes not only in Naga City but also in the
court where the defendant or the plaintiff resides, at the election
of the plaintiff, as provided for by Section 2 (b) Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court.
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely permissive and
operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary
circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility; it does not
connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty,
opportunity, permission or possibility. 1
In Nicolas vs. Reparations Commission 2, a case involving the interpretation
of a stipulation as to venue along lines similar to the present one, it was held
that the agreement of the parties which provided that "all legal actions
arising out of this contract ... may be brought in and submitted to the
jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of Manila," is not mandatory.
We hold that the stipulation as to venue in the contract in question is simply
permissive. By the said stipulation, the parties did not agree to file their suits
solely and exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga. They merely
agreed to submit their disputes to the said court, without waiving their right
to seek recourse in the court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court.
Since the complaint has been filed in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, where the plaintiff resides, the venue of action is properly laid in
accordance with Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. Let the records
be returned to the court of origin for further proceedings. Costs against
defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 126496. April 30, 1997]
GMCR, INC.; SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS CORP.; ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO.,
INC., petitioners, vs. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION
PHILIPPINES, INC.; THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and HON. SIMEON L.
KINTANAR in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
National Telecommunications, respondents.
[G. R. No. 126526. April 30, 1997]
COMMISSIONER SIMEON L. KINTANAR, NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. BELL
TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal
of the decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals[2] declaring the National
Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC) to be a collegial body
under Executive Order No. 546[3] and ordering the NTC to heretofore sit and
act en banc, i.e., with the concurrence of at least two commissioners, for a
valid dispensation of its quasi-judicial functions.
Established by evidence are the following facts:
On October 19, 1993, private respondent Bell Telecommunication
Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, BellTel) filed with the NTC an Application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity to Procure, Install, Operate
and Maintain Nationwide Integrated Telecommunications Services and to
Charge Rates Therefor and with Further Request for the Issuance of
Provisional Authority. This application was docketed as NTC Case No. 93-
481. At the time of the filing of this application, private respondent BellTel
had not been granted a legislative franchise to engage in the business of
telecommunications service.
Since private respondent BellTel was, at that time, an unenfranchised
applicant, it was excluded in the deliberations for service area assignments
for local exchange carrier service[4]. Thus, only petitioners GMCR, Inc.,
Smart Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and
International Communications Corporation, among others, were
beneficiaries of formal awards of service area assignments in April and May,
1994.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting
private respondent BellTel a congressional franchise which gave private
respondent BellTel the right, privilege and authority to
carry on the business of providing telecommunications services in and
between provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Philippines and for this
purpose, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications systems, including mobile, cellular and wired or
wireless telecommunications systems, fiber optics, satellite transmit and
receive systems, and other telecommunications systems and their value-
added services such as, but not limited to, transmission of voice, data,
facsimile, control signals, audio and video, information service bureau, and
all other telecommunications systems technologies as are at present
available or be made available through technical advances or innovations in
the future, or construct, acquire, lease and operate or manage transmitting
and receiving stations and switching stations, both for local and international
services, lines, cables or systems, as is, or are convenient or essential to
efficiently carry out the purposes of this franchise. [5]
On July 12, 1994, private respondent BellTel filed with the NTC a
second Application[6] praying for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation and maintenance
of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and international) and tandem
telephone exchanges and facilities using wire, wireless, microwave radio,
satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling Offices (PCOs) and very
small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated system. This second
application was docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229. In this second
application, BellTel proposed to install 2,600,000 telephone lines in ten (10)
years using the most modern and latest state-of-the-art facilities and
equipment and to provide a 100% digital local exchange telephone network.
Private respondent BellTel moved to withdraw its earlier application
docketed as NTC Case No. 93-481. In an Order dated July 11, 1994, this
earlier application was ordered withdrawn, without prejudice.
The second application of private respondent BellTel which was
docketed as NTC Case No. 94-229 was assigned to a Hearing Officer for
reception of private respondent BellTels evidence. Written opposition and
other pertinent pleadings were filed by petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart
Communications, Inc., Isla Communications Co., Inc. and International
Communications Corporation as oppositors. Other oppositors to private
respondent BellTels application were Capitol Wireless, Inc., Eastern
Misamis Oriental Telephone Cooperative, Liberty Broadcasting Network,
Inc., Midsayap Communication, Northern Telephone, PAPTELCO, Pilipino
Telephone Corporation, Philippine Global Communications, Inc., Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation, Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. and Extelcom
and Telecommunications Office.
On December 20, 1994, private respondent BellTel completed the
presentation of its evidence-in-chief. In the course of the proceedings, the
witnesses of BellTel were cross-examined by the aforementioned
oppositors. On December 21, 1994, BellTel filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence together with all the technical, financial and legal documents in
support of its application. Pursuant to its rules, the application was referred
to the Common Carriers Authorization Department (CCAD) for study and
recommendation.
On February 6, 1995, the CCAD, through Engr. Marle Rabena,
submitted to Deputy Commissioner Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a Memorandum
dated February 6, 1995[7] manifesting his findings and recommending that
based on technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically
feasible.[8]
Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and
Regulatory Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project
proposal of private respondent BellTel. On March 29, 1995, Mr. Suarez
made the finding that BellTel has the financial capability to support its
proposed project at least for the initial two (2) years.
Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC
Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the
same and expressly signified their approval thereto by making the following
notation on the aforestated Memorandum of the CCAD dated February 6,
1995:
With the finding of financial capability and technical feasibility, the
application merits due/favorable consideration.[9]
Below this notation, Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo
Perez affixed their signatures and the date, 4/6/95.
In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two
members of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working
[10]
draft of the order granting provisional authority to private respondent
BellTel. The said working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners
Fidelo Q. Dumlao and Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar.
 While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three
members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation,
petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding
procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate
and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is
lodged in the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and,
thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC
Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and
decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which
actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of
Commissioner Kintanar.
Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition
praying for the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent
BellTel filed on May 5, 1995 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve
Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional Authority[11]. Reference
was explicitly made to the findings of the CCAD and recommendations of
Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez that were all favorable to private
respondent BellTel. Mention was also made of the aforementioned working
draft of the order granting a provisional authority to BellTel, which draft was
made by the Legal Department of the NTC and initialed by the said deputy
commissioners.
No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, on
May 12, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion[12] reiterating its earlier prayer.
Petitioners-oppositors filed an Opposition[13] to the aforestated two
motions of private respondent BellTel.
In an Order dated May 16, 1995, signed solely by Commissioner
Simeon Kintanar, the NTC, instead of resolving the two pending motions of
private respondent BellTel, set the said motions for a hearing on May 29,
1995. On May 29, 1995, however, no hearing was conducted as the same
was reset on June 13, 1995.
On June 13, 1995, the day of the hearing, private respondent BellTel
filed a Motion to Promulgate (Amending the Motion to Resolve)[14] In said
motion, private respondent prayed for the promulgation of the working draft
of the order granting a provisional authority to private respondent BellTel,
on the ground that the said working draft had already been signed or initialed
by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and Perez who, together, constitute a
majority out of the three commissioners composing the NTC. To support its
prayer, private respondent BellTel asserted that the NTC was a collegial
body and that as such, two favorable votes out of a maximum three votes
by the members of the commission, are enough to validly promulgate an
NTC decision.
On June 23, 1995, petitioners-oppositors filed their Joint
Opposition[15] to the aforecited motion.
On July 4, 1995, the NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely
signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
On July 17, 1995, private respondent BellTel filed with this court a
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition seeking the nullification of
the aforestated Order dated July 4, 1995 denying the Motion to Promulgate.
On July 26, 1995, we issued a Resolution referring said petition to the
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and resolution
pursuant to Section 9, par. 1 of B.P. Blg. 129.
In the interim, the Solicitor General filed with the respondent appellate
court a Manifestation In Lieu of Comment[16] in which the Solicitor General
took a legal position adverse to that of the NTC. The Solicitor General, after
a close examination of the laws creating the NTC and its predecessors and
a studious analysis of certain Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) orders, NTC circulars, and Department of Justice
(DOJ) legal opinions pertinent to the issue of collegiality of the NTC, made
the following recommendations:
WHEREFORE, the Solicitor General respectfully prays that this Honorable
Court:
(a) declare respondent National Telecommunications Commission as a
collegial body;
(b) restrain respondent Commissioner Simeon Kintanar from arrogating
unto himself alone the powers of the said agency;
(c) order NTC, acting as a collegial body, to resolve petitioner Bell Telecoms
application under NTC-94-229;
(d) declare NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 as void; [and]
(e) uphold the legality of DOTC Department Order 92-614.[17]
On September 23, 1996, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
the herein assailed decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Petitioners petition for a writ of Certiorari and Prohibition is
hereby granted. Accordingly, NTC Memorandum Circular
No. 1-1-93, Annex J of the Petition, Memorandum Circular
No. 3-1-93, Annex K of the Petition and the Order of
Kintanar, Annex L of the Petition, are hereby SET
ASIDE for being contrary to law. The Respondents and all
those acting for and in their behalf are hereby enjoined and
prohibited from implementing or enforcing the same; [and]
2. Petitioners petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED in
that the Respondent NTC, composed of Kintanar and
deputy commissioners Perez and Dumlao, are hereby
directed to meet en banc and to consider and act on the
draft Order, Annex B of the Petition, within fifteen (15) days
from the finality of this Decision. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The herein assailed decision being unacceptable to petitioner Simeon
Kintanar and petitioners GMCR, Inc., Smart Communications, Inc., Isla
Communications Co., Inc. and International Communications Corporation
as oppositors in the application of private respondent BellTel for a
provisional authority, they filed with this court separate petitions for review.
Commissioner Kintanars petition, docketed as G.R. No. 126526,
ascribes to the respondent appellate court the following assignment of
errors:
1. The Court of Appeals, in setting aside NTC MC 1-1-93 and MC 3-1-93
and the Order of the Commission dated July 4, 1995, made a collateral
attack on a law which was nowhere called for in the pleadings of the parties
nor is authorized by the Rules of Court.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in assuming and imposing that the
Commission is a collegial body simply by reason of the fact that other bodies
which were a spin off from the defunct Public Service Commission were
created as a collegial body. The law that created EO 546 erased the collegial
character of the proceedings before the NTC.
3. The Court of Appeals decision contains serious contradiction; worse, it
considered evidence not formally offered or incorporated into the records of
the case; yet failed to consider evidence submitted by petitioner-appellant
nor on the prejudicial issue on non-joinder of indispensable parties-
3.1 CA erred in assuming that the NTC is collegial by the fact that Charters
of other regulatory agencies expressly made them collegial while this
express provision was absent in NTCs charter.
3.2 CA contradicts itself by holding that DOTC MC 92-614 prevails and
[requires] collegiality.
3.3 The decisions by Undersecretary Lichauco signed by her and her 2
deputies are in no way indicative of collegiality and should not be considered
as having any persuasive effect xxx.
3.4 The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Board of Communications
Rules of Practice and Procedures.
4. The Court of Appeals erred when it granted mandamus, directing and in
effect controlling Commissioner Kintanar and deputy Commissioners
Dumlao and Perez, to meet en banc to consider and act on a draft Order
only which the Court itself recognized no longer had the approval of two (2)
Commissioners while in the same token the Court of Appeals had set aside
a duly promulgated Order of July 4, 1995 allegedly because it did not carry
the approval of 2 commissioners.[19]
On the other hand, petitioners-oppositors, in their petition docketed as
G.R. No. 126496, assail the decision of respondent appellate court on the
following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the instant
Petition outright for its failure to implead indispensable
parties, in violation of Section 5, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule
7 of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The Court of Appeals seriously erred in taking cognizance of
and passing upon BellTels Petition, which on its face is
premature since the Order of July 4, 1996 assailed was not
a final decision of the Commission;
3. Even assuming arguendo that the Court of Appeals can take
cognizance of the Petition, the disposition in Decision
therein which nullifies NTC Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93
and 3-1-93 itself constitutes a collateral attack on the said
laws, the validity of which were never put in issue by any of
the parties, contrary to the clear legal requirement that the
validity of laws can be attacked only in direct proceedings
instituted for that purpose;
4. It was in fact improper for the Court of Appeals to pass on the
validity of NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 and Memorandum
Circular No. 3-1-93 since the same was absolutely
unnecessary for the resolution of the Petition;
5. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals correctly defined
the prime issues as being that of collegiality, nonetheless
the Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law in
declaring the NTC as a collegial body despite the clear
intent of E.O. No. 546 and the provisions of DOTC MC 95-
640, and the obvious implications of pending bills in
Congress on the reorganization of the NTC;
6. The Decision, in mandating that the NTC Commissioner and
Deputy Commissioners sit to consider the draft-and only the
draft-in rendering its Decision in BellTels application
constitutes an unwarranted, unauthorized and unlawful
interference in and canalization of the discretionary
functions of the Commission as a quasi-judicial entity; and
7. The Decision condones the illegal and unethical act of BellTel
of surreptitiously securing a draft decision, and encourages
and places premium on future similar illegal acts-all in
violation of the ruling and the mandate of the Supreme
Court in In Re Jurado: Adm. Matter No. 90-5-383 (July 12,
1990).[20]
On December 16, 1996, private respondent BellTel filed an Omnibus
Motion[21] praying for, among others, the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 126496
and 126526.
On December 18, 1996, respondent BellTel filed its Comment.[22] On
the same day, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion[23] echoing the prayer for the consolidation of the G.R.
Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On December 19, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation/Motion[24] reiterating that its legal stance in this case is
adverse to that of the NTC and praying that it be excluded from filing any
comment in behalf of the NTC.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1997, we resolved, among others,
to excuse the Solicitor General from filing any comment in behalf of the NTC,
require the NTC to file its own comment in G.R. No. 126496 and to
consolidate G.R. Nos. 126496 and 126526.
On March 6, 1997, the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar filed a
Manifestation/Motion[25] praying that the latters petition in G.R. No. 126526
be adopted as their comment in the consolidated cases.
Upon the joinder of issues in these consolidated cases, we perceive
the fundamental issue to be that of the collegiality of the NTC as a quasi-
judicial agency.
We find the consolidated petitions wanting of merit.
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a
majority vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly
decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the
chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner
Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the
membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is
not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak for and in
behalf of the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body, and the three
members of the commission each has one vote to cast in every deliberation
concerning a case or any incident therein that is subject to the jurisdiction of
the NTC. When we consider the historical milieu in which the NTC evolved
into the quasi-judicial agency it is now under Executive Order No. 146 which
organized the NTC as a three-man commission and expose the illegality of
all memorandum circulars negating the collegial nature of the NTC under
Executive Order No. 146, we are left with only one logical conclusion: the
NTC is a collegial body and was a collegial body even during the time when
it was acting as a one-man regime.
We thus quote with approval the encompassing legal ruminations of
the respondent Court of Appeals in disposing of the issue of the collegiality
of the NTC:
In resolving the issue, We recall that, on November 17, 1936, the National
Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 146 which created the Public
Service Commission (PSC). While providing that the PSC shall consist of a
Public Service Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, the law made it
clear that the PSC was not a collegial body by stating that the Deputy
Commissioner could act only on matters delegated to him by the Public
Service Commissioner. As amended by RA 2677, the Public Service
Commission was transformed into and emerged as a collegial body,
composed of one Public Service Commissioner and five (5) Associate
Commissioners. The amendment provided that contested cases and all
cases involving the fixing of rates shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.
On September 24, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed, into
law, Presidential Decree No. 1 adopting and approving the Integrated
Reorganization Plan which, in turn, created the Board of Communications
(BOC) in place of the PSC. This time, the new regulatory board was
composed of three (3) officers exercising quasi-judicial functions:
x x x The Board of Communications shall be composed of a full time
Chairman who shall be of unquestioned integrity and recognized
prominence in previous public and/or private employment; two full-time
members who shall be competent on all aspects of communications,
preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and the other an economist x x x
On January 25, 1978, the BOC promulgated its Rules of Procedure and
Practice in connection with applications and proceedings before it.
On July 23, 1979, President Marcos issued Executive Order No. 546,
creating the Ministries of Public Works, and of Transportation and
Communications, merged the defunct Board of Communications and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau into a single entity, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC). The said law was issued by then
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers. Sec. 16 of E.O.
546 provides that --
x x x The Commission shall be composed of a Commissioner and two
Deputy Commissioners, preferably one of whom shall be a lawyer and
another an economist. x x x
The aforementioned Executive Order took effect on September 24, 1979 x
x x. However, the NTC did not promulgate any Rules of Procedure and
Practice. Consequently, the then existing Rules of Procedure and Practice
promulgated by the BOC was applied to proceedings in the NTC. In the
meantime, the Decisions of the NTC were signed by the Chairman alone of
the NTC which rendered the two (2) deputy Commissioners non-
participative in the task of decision-making. This prompted the then Minister
of Transportation and Communication Jose P. Dans, Jr. to seek the legal
opinion of the then Minister of Justice Ricardo C. Puno, as to whether the
NTC was a collegial body or not. On January 11, 1984, Minister Puno sent
a letter-opinion x x x to the effect that the NTC was not a collegial body but
a single entity and thus the then practice of only the Chairman of the NTC
signing the Decisions of the NTC was authorized by law. x x x
Admittedly, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is entitled to great weight
x x x. However, the same is not controlling or conclusive on the courts x x
x. We find and declare, in the present recourse, that the Puno Opinion is not
correct. Admittedly, EO 546 does not specifically state that the NTC was a
collegial body. Neither does it provide that the NTC should meet En Banc in
deciding a case or in exercising its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions. But the absence of such provisions does not militate against the
collegial nature of the NTC under the context of Section 16 of EO 546 and
under the Rules of Procedure and Practice applied by the NTC in its
proceedings. Under [Rule 15] of said Rules, the BOC (now the NTC) sits En
Banc:
x x x In every case heard by the Board en banc, the orders, rulings, decisions
and resolutions disposing of the merits of the matter within its jurisdiction
shall be reached with the concurrence of at least two regular members after
deliberation and consultation and thereafter assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion. Any member dissenting from the order, ruling,
decision or resolution shall state in writing the reason for his dissent.
In all other cases, a duly assigned Member shall issue all orders, rulings,
decisions and resolutions pertinent to the case assigned to him. Copy of the
decision on the merit of the case so assigned shall be furnished the
Chairman of the Board.
xxx
Inscrutably, a case before the BOC may be assigned to and heard by only
a member thereof who is tasked to prepare and promulgate his Decision
thereon, or heard, En Banc, by the full membership of the BOC in which
case the concurrence of at least two (2) of the membership of the BOC is
necessary for a valid Decision x x x. While it may be true that the aforesaid
Rules of Procedure was promulgated before the effectivity of Executive
Order No. 546, however, the Rules of Procedure of BOC governed the rules
of practice and procedure before the NTC when it was established under
Executive Order No. 546. This was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. versus National
Telecommunications Commission, 131 SCRA 200 when it declared that:
The Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated on January 25, 1978 by
the Board of Communications, the immediate predecessor of respondent
NTC x x x govern the rules of practice and procedure before the BOC then,
now respondent NTC. x x x
In the case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company versus
National Telecommunications, et al., 190 SCRA 717, the Supreme Court
applied and cited Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Practice of BOC x
x x.
Hence, under its Rules of Procedure and Practice, the Respondent NTC, as
its predecessor, the BOC, had consistently been and remains a collegial
body.
Respondents Kintanars and NTCs pose that Respondent Kintanar, alone, is
vested with authority to sign and promulgate a Decision of the NTC is
antithetical to the nature of a commission as envisaged in Executive Order
No. 546. It must be borne in mind that a Commission is defined as:
[a] body composed of several persons acting under lawful authority to
perform some public service. (City of Louisville Municipal Housing
Commission versus Public Housing Administration, 261 Southwestern
Reporter, 2nd, page 286).
A Commission is also defined as a board or committee of officials appointed
and empowered to perform certain acts or exercise certain jurisdiction of a
public nature or service x x x (Black, Law Dictionary, page 246). There is
persuasive authority that a commission is synonymous with board (State Ex.
Rel. Johnson versus Independent School District No. 810, Wabash County,
109 Northwestern Reporter 2nd, page 596). Indeed, as can be easily
discerned from the context of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 546, the
Commission is composed of a Commissioner and two (2) deputy
commissioners x x x not the commissioner, alone, as pontificated by
Kintanar. The conjunctive word and is not without any legal significance. It
is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the law. It means in addition to
(McCaull Webster Elevator Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern
Reporter, 330, page 332). The word and, whether it is used to connect
words, phrases or full sentence[s], must be accepted as binding together
and as relating to one another x x x.
In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on the
theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed x x x. If it was the intention of President Marcos to
constitute merely a single entity, a one-man governmental body, instead of
a commission or a three-man collegial body, he would not have constituted
a commission and would not have specifically decreed that the Commission
is composed of, not the commissioner alone, but of the commissioner and
the two (2) deputy commissioners. Irrefragably, then, the NTC is a
commission composed not only of Kintanar, but Perez and Dumlao as well,
acting together in the performance of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
functions, conformably with the Rules of Procedure and Practice
promulgated by the BOC and applicable to the NTC.
The barefaced fact that x x x of Executive Order 546 used the word deputy
to designate the two (2) other members of the Commission does not militate
against the collegiality of the NTC. x x xThe collegiality of the NTC cannot
be disparaged by the mere nominal designation of the membership
thereof. Indeed, We are convinced that such nominal designations are
without functional implications and are designed merely for the purpose of
administrative structure or hierarchy of the personnel of the NTC. x x x
In hindsight, even Secretary Garcia was in accord with the collegiality of the
NTC when he promulgated and issued Department Order No. 92-614 x x
x. Even then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto openly expressed his
vehement opposition to the Department Order of Secretary Garcia and
opted to seek refuge in the opinion of the then Minister of Justice Puno x x
x. It was only when Commissioner Benedicto resigned and Respondent
Kintanar was designated to replace Commissioner Benedicto that Secretary
Garcia flip-flapped [sic], and suddenly found it expedient to recall his
Department Order No. 92-614 and authorize Kintanar to decide, all by
himself, all cases pending with the NTC in frontal violation of the Rules of
Procedure and Practice before the NTC, more specifically Rule 15 thereof x
x x.
xxx
The Respondents cannot find solace in House Bill No. 10558 to buttress
their argument x x x because under the House Bill, the NTC is transformed
into a collegial body. Indeed, We find Respondents pose tenuous. For, it can
likewise be argued, with justification, that House Bill No. 10558 indeed
confirms the existing collegial nature of the NTC by so expressly reaffirming
the same.
xxx
In sum, then, We find and so declare that NTC Circular No. 1-1-93 x x x
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 x x x and the Order of Kintanar x x x
declaring the NTC as a single entity or non-collegial entity, are contrary to
law and thus null and void and should be, as they are hereby, set aside. [26]
Second. Petitioners take us to task with their vigorous contention that
respondent appellate courts act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No.
1-1-93 issued by then Commissioner Mariano Benedicto, Jr. and NTC
Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 issued also by then Commissioner
Benedicto on January 6, 1993, was a collateral attack against the aforecited
circulars and an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the courts power to
nullify administrative regulations.
It must be remembered by petitioners, however, that administrative
regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were, in the first
place, intended to implement.Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are
on their face null and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to
law. They were nullified by respondent Court of Appeals because they are
absolutely illegal and, as such, are without any force and effect. The fact
that implementation of these illegal regulations has resulted in the
institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be
a ratification of such an illegal practice. At the least, these illegal regulations
are an erroneous interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its
predecessor laws. At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to
validate the one-man rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish
interest of maintaining their illusory hold of power.
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and
patently null and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O.
No. 546 that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk
from its duty of striking down such illegal regulations.
Third. In its certiorari action before the respondent Court of Appeals,
private respondent BellTel was proceeding against the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar for the formersadherence and defense of its one-
man rule as enforced by the latter. Thus, only the NTC and Commissioner
Kintanar may be considered as indispensable parties. After all, it is they
whom private respondent BellTel seek to be chastised and corrected by the
court for having acted in grave abuse of their discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
The oppositors in NTC Case No. 94-229 are not absolutely necessary
for the final determination of the issue of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NTC and of Commissioner Kintanar in his capacity as chairman
of NTC because the task of defending them primarily lies in the Office of the
Solicitor General. Furthermore, were the court to find that certiorari lies
against the NTC and Commissioner Kintanar, the oppositors cause could
not be significantly affected by such ruling because the issue of grave abuse
of discretion goes not into the merits of the case in which the oppositors are
interested but into the issue of collegiality that requires, regardless of the
merits of a case, that the same be decided on the basis of a majority vote of
at least two members of the commission.
The issue in this case is, it bears repeating, not the merits of the
application of private respondent BellTel for a provisional authority to
operate what promises to be the most technologically advanced telephone
service in the country. This court is not in any way concerned with whether
or not private respondent BellTels project proposal is technically feasible or
financially viable, and this court should not, in fact, delve into these matters
which are patently outside of its review jurisdiction. All that respondent Court
of Appeals passed upon was the question of whether or not the NTC and
Commissioner Kintanar committed grave abuse of discretion, and so we
must review and ascertain the correctness of the findings of the respondent
appellate court on this score, and this score alone.
Thus, the claim of petitioners that there is here a case of non-joinder
of indispensable parties in the persons of all of the oppositors in NTC Case
No. 94-229, is untenable.
Fourth. Petitioners, in apparent paranoia, argue that what the
respondent appellate court has actually ordered, was that the NTC sit and
meet en banc and forthwith grant private respondent BellTels application for
a provisional authority. Petitioners, however, have obviously over-read the
second part of the dispositive portion of the herein assailed decision
rendered by respondent Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that jurisprudence is settled as to the propriety
of mandamus in causing a quasi-judicial agency to exercise its discretion in
a case already ripe for adjudication and long-awaiting the proper
disposition. As to how this discretion is to be exercised, however, is a realm
outside the office of the special civil action of mandamus.It is elementary
legal knowledge, after all, that mandamus does not lie to control discretion.
When the respondent Court of Appeals directed Commissioners
Kintanar, Dumlao and Perez to meet en banc and to consider and act on the
working draft of the order granting provisional authority to BellTel, said court
was simply ordering the NTC to sit and meet en banc as a collegial body,
and the subject of the deliberation of the three-man commission would be
the said working draft which embodies one course of action that may be
taken on private respondent BellTels application for a provisional
authority. The respondent Court of Appeals, however, did not order the NTC
to forthwith grant said application. This is understandable since every
commissioner of the three-man NTC has a vote each to cast in disposing of
private respondent BellTels application and the respondent appellate court
would not pre-empt the exercise by the members of the commission of their
individual discretion in private respondent BellTels case.
Respondent appellate court intends, however, for the NTC to promptly
proceed with the consideration of private respondent BellTels application for
provisional authority, for the same has been ripe for decision since
December, 1994. With the marked propensity of Commissioner Kintanar to
delay action on the said application and his insistent arrogation of sole
power to promulgate any and all NTC decisions, respondent Court of
Appeals order for the NTC to sit and meet en banc to consider private
respondent BellTels application for a provisional authority, attains deep
significance.
Fifth. The accusation of petitioners that the working draft of the order
granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel, was obtained by
the latter through illegal means, is a serious charge. However, not a single
piece of evidence has been proffered by petitioners to prove this charge.
Private respondent BellTel makes no secret of the source of the said
working draft. In private respondent BellTels Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Resolve Application and For Issuance of Provisional Authority, it is alleged
that said working draft was prepared by Atty. Basilio Bolante of the Legal
Department of the NTC.[27] Said working draft was initialed by the CCAD
Head, Engr. Edgardo Cabarios and by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao and
Perez.[28] The working draft is attached to the records of NTC Case No. 94-
229 which may be borrowed by any person for any stated purpose. [29]
Significantly, no one among the aforementioned persons has
renounced the working draft or declared it to be spurious. More importantly,
petitioners have utterly failed to offer proof of any illegality in the preparation
or procurement of said working draft.
The more critical point that matters most, however, is that we cannot
be diverted from the principal issue in this case concerning the collegiality
of the NTC. In the ultimate, the issue of the procurement of the working draft
is more apropos for a criminal or administrative investigation than in the
instant proceedings largely addressed to the resolution of a purely legal
question.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant consolidated
petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-51201 May 29, 1980
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF
MARIA ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE, ESTRELLA S.
ALFON, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition filed pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440 to review an Order
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, dated December 29,
1978, which partially denied petitioner's prayer for a change of name. Only
a question of law is involved and there is no controversy over the facts which
are well-stated in the questioned Order as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is verified petition filed on April 28, 1978 by petitioner Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte through her counsel, Atty.
Rosauro Alvarez, praying that her name be changed from Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on December 14, 1978
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning was published in the Times Journal
in its issues of July 28, August 5 and 11, 1978 and a copy thereof
together with a copy of the petition was furnished the Office of the
Solicitor General (Exhibits C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on December 14, 1978, Atty.
Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the petitioner and Fiscal Donato
Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented the office of the Solicitor General,
Upon motion of counsel for the petitioner, without objection on the
part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed
commissioner to receive the evidence and to submit the same for
resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence presented, it
appears that petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exhibit A). She
was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office as Maria
Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was
baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St.
Anthony de Padua Church Singalong, Manila (Exhibit B). Her
parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon.
Petitioner and her uncle, Hector Alfon, have been residing at 728
J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
for twenty-three (23) years. When petitioner started schooling,
she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended her first grade
up to fourth year high school at Stella Maris College using the
name Estrella S. Alfon (Exhibits E, E-1, E-2 and E-3). After
 graduating from high school she enrolled at the Arellano
University and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Exhibit E-
4). Her scholastic records from elementary to college show that
she was registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Petitioner has
exercised her right of suffrage under the same name (Exhibit D).
She has not committed any felony or misdemeanor (Exhibits G,
G-1, G-2, G-3 and G-4).
Petitioner has advanced the following reasons for filing the
petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon since her
childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school and in college using
the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since her
infancy and all her friends and acquaintances know her by this
name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under the same name.
Section 5, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court provides:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order
that such order has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change of name from
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not
proper and reasonable with respect to the surname. The fact that
petitioner has been using a different surname and has become
known with such surname does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to legally authorize and change her surname to
Alfon. The birth certificate clearly shows that the father of
petitioner is Filomeno Duterte. Petitioner likewise admitted this
fact in her testimony. To allow petitioner to change her surname
from Duterte to Alfon is equivalent to allowing her to use her
mother's surname. Article 364 of the Civil Code provides:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
If another purpose of the petitioner is to carry the surname of Alfon
because her uncle who reared her since childhood has the
surname "Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for change of
name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first name is granted but
denied with respect to the surname. Petitioner is authorized to
change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to Section 3, Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court.
The lower court should have fully granted the petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change
her surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon
she should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the
Civil Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it
is equally entitled. Moreover, this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No.
L-21194. April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677, 679, said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The following may be considered, among others, as proper or
reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for
change of name; (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when
the request for change is a consequence of a change of' status,
such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and
(3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that petitioner has, since childhood,
borne the name Estrella S. Alfon although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in the schools from the grades
up to college under the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her by this
name; she finished her course in Nursing in college and was graduated and
given a diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage
likewise under this name. There is therefore ample justification to grant fully
her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid
and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby modified in that, the
petitioner is allowed to change not only her first name but also her surname
so as to be known as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-69810-14 June 19, 1985
TEODULO RURA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. GERVACIO A. LEOPENA, Presiding Judge of the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This case involves the application of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as
amended), more specifically Section 9 thereof which disqualifies from
probation those persons:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an
offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and
one day and or a fine of not less than Two Hundred Pesos.
Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts
of estafa committed on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol, denominated as Criminal Case Nos. 523,
524, 525, 526 and 527.
The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on
August 18, 1983. Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen
(17) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence
was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol but said court affirmed
the decision of the lower court. When the case was remanded to the court
of origin for execution of judgment, Rura applied for probation. The
application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the ground Chat
Rura is disqualified for probation under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation law
quoted above. The court denied the application for probation. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.
The question which is raised is whether or not the petitioner is disqualified
for probation.
In denying the application for probation, the respondent judge said:
 Though the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided by the
court convicting the accused thereof, yet the dates of commission
are different. Upon conviction he was guilty of said offenses as of
the dates of commission of the acts complained of. (Rollo, p, 58.)
Upon the other hand, the petitioner argues:
We beg to disagree. There is no previous conviction by final
judgment to speak of. The five (5) cases of Estafa were tried jointly
and there is only one decision rendered on the same date—
August 18. 1983. It could not be presumed that accused-petitioner
had been convicted one after the other for the five cases of Estafa
because the conviction in these cases took place within the same
day, August 18, 1983 by means of a Joint Decision, and not in a
separate decision.
Previous conviction, we submit, presupposes that there is a prior
sentence or that there was already a decision rendered which
convicted the accused. In this instant cases, however, there is
only one decision rendered on the five (5) counts of Estafa which
was promulgated on the same date. In other words the effects of
conviction does not retract to the date of the commission of the
offense as the trial court held. (Id., pp, 8-9.)
We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had
no previous conviction by final judgment. When he applied for probation the
only conviction against him was the judgment which was the subject of his
application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction, not to
the date of the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is directed
to give due course to the petitioner's application for probation. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985
NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
, JR., J.:
Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the
Labor Code or by laws and regulations governing the civil service?
The background facts of this case are stated in the respondent-appellee's
brief as follows:
The records reveal that private respondent (Benjamin C. Juco)
was a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation
(NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. For having been
implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds
involving 214 pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation
which was allegedly committed on March 5, 1975. Juco's services
were terminated by (NHC) effective as of the close of working
hours on May 14, 1975. On March 25, 1977 he filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against petitioner (NHC) with Regional Office
No. 4, Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and
Employment) docketed as R04-3-3309-77 (Annex A, Petition).
The said complaint was certified by Regional Branch No. IV of the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration where it was docketed as Case
No. RB-IV-12038-77 and assigned to Labor Arbiter Ernilo V.
Peñalosa. The latter conducted the hearing. By agreement of the
parties, the case was submitted for resolution upon submission of
their respective position papers. Private respondent (Juco)
submitted his position paper on July 15, 1977. He professed
innocence of the criminal acts imputed against him contending
"that he was dismissed based on purely fabricated charges
purposely to harass him because he stood as a witness in the
theft case filed against certain high officials of the respondent's
establishment" (NHC) and prayed for 'his immediate
reinstatement to his former position in the (NHC) without loss of
seniority rights and the consequent payment of his will back
wages plus all the benefits appertaining thereto. On July 28, 1977,
the NHC also filed its position paper alleging that the Regional
Office Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, "is without authority to entertain
the case for lack of jurisdiction, considering that the NHC is a
government owned and controlled corporation; that even
assuming that this case falls within the jurisdiction of this Office,
respondent firm (now petitioner) maintains that respondent
(Juco), now private respondent, was separated from the service
for valid and justified reasons, i.e., for having sold company
properties consisting of 214 pieces of scrap G.I. pipes at a junk
shop in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and thereafter
appropriating the proceeds thereof to his own benefit."
The pertinent portion of the decision of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reads:
The fact that in the early case of Fernandez v. Cedro (NLRC Case
No. 201165-74, May 19, 1975) the Commission, (Second
Division) ruled that the respondent National Housing Corporation
is a government-owned or controlled corporation does not
preclude us from later taking a contrary stand if by doing so the
ends of justice could better be served.
For although adherence to precedents (stare decisis) is a sum
formula for achieving uniformity of action and conducive to the
smooth operation of an office, Idolatrous reverence for precedents
which have outlived their validity and usefulness retards progress
and should therefore be avoided. In fact, even courts do reverse
themselves for reasons of justice and equity. This Commission as
an Administrative body performing quasi judicial function is no
exception.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is hereby, set aside. In view, however, of the fact that the
Labor Arbiter did not resolve the issue of illegal dismissal we have
opted to remand this case to the Labor Arbiter a quo for resolution
of the aforementioned issue.
The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation
organized in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, the Uniform Charter
of Government Corporations, dated January 5, 1951. Its shares of stock are
owned by the Government Service Insurance System the Social Security
System, the Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment
and Development Corporation, and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation. Pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 118, the capital stock of
NHC was increased from P100 million to P250 million with the five
government institutions above mentioned subscribing in equal proportion to
the increased capital stock. The NHC has never had any private
stockholders. The government has been the only stockholder from its
creation to the present.
There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil
service law and civil service rules and regulations.
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution specifically provides:
The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the Government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation. ...
The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I
which stated:
A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law.
The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the
embrace of the civil service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug
an earlier loophole which allowed government-owned or controlled
corporations to avoid the full consequences of the an encompassing
coverage of the civil service system. The same explicit intent is shown by
the addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions
of the Government. All offices and firms of the government are covered.
The amendments introduced in 1973 are not Idle exercises or a
meaningless gestures. They carry the strong message that t civil service
coverage is broad and an- embracing insofar as employment in the
government in any of its governmental or corporate arms is concerned.
The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute. Presidential
Decree No. 807 is unequivocal that personnel of government-owned or
controlled corporations belong to the civil service and are subject to civil
service requirements.
It provides:
SEC. 56. Government-owned or Controlled Corporations
Personnel. — All permanent personnel of government-owned or
controlled corporations whose positions are now embraced in the
civil service shall continue in the service until they have been
given a chance to qualify in an appropriate examination, but in the
meantime, those who do not possess the appropriate civil service
eligibility shag not be promoted until they qualify in an appropriate
civil service examination. Services of temporary personnel may
be terminated any time.
The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent
NLRC wants to apply in its entirety to the private respondent provides:
ART. 277. Government employees. — The terms and conditions
of employment of all government employees, including
employees of government-owned and controlled corporations
shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
Their salaries shall be standardized by the National Assembly as
provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be
reduction of existing wages, benefits and other terms and
conditions of employment being enjoyed by them at the time of
the adoption of the Code.
Our decision in Alliance of Government Workers, et al v. Honorable Minister
of Labor and Employment et all. (124 SCRA 1) gives the background of the
amendment which includes government-owned or controlled corporations in
the embrace of the civil service.
We stated:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the
deliberation held relative to what is now Section 1(1), Article XII-
B, supra, the issue of the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations figured prominently.
The late delegate Roberto S. Oca, a recognized labor leader,
vehemently objected to the inclusion of government-owned or
controlled corporations in the Civil Service. He argued that such
inclusion would put asunder the right of workers in government
corporations, recognized in jurisprudence under the 1935
Constitution, to form and join labor unions for purposes of
collective bargaining with their employers in the same manner as
in the private section (see: records of 1971 Constitutional
Convention).
In contrast, other labor experts and delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention enlightened the members of the
Committee on Labor on the divergent situation of government
workers under the 1935 Constitution, and called for its
rectification. Thus, in a Position Paper dated November 22, 197
1, submitted to the Committee on Labor, 1971 Constitutional
Convention, then Acting Commissioner of Civil Service Epi Rey
Pangramuyen declared:
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by
reason of the nature of the public employer and the
peculiar character of the public service, it must
necessary regard the right to strike given to unions in
private industry as not applying to public employees
and civil service employees. It has been stated that the
Government, in contrast to the private employer,
protects the interests of all people in the public service,
and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are
present in private labor relations could not exist in the
relations between government and those whom they
employ.
Moreover, determination of employment conditions as
well as supervision of the management of the public
service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is further
emphasized that government agencies in the
performance of their duties have a right to demand
undivided allegiance from their workers and must
always maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm
discipline among their staff members. It would be highly
incompatible with these requirements of the public
service, if personnel took orders from union leaders or
put solidarity with members of the working class above
solidarity with the Government. This would be inimical
to the public interest.
Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by
joining labor unions may be compelled to support
objectives which are political in nature and thus
jeopardize the fundamental principle that the
governmental machinery must be impartial and non-
political in the sense of party politics. (See: Records of
1971 Constitutional Convention).
Similar, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing for the inclusion
of government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil
Service, argued:
It is meretricious to contend that because Government-
owned or controlled corporations yield profits, their
employees are entitled to better wages and fringe
benefits than employees of Government other than
Government-owned and controlled corporations which
are not making profits. There is no gainsaying the fact
that the capital they use is the people's money. (see:
Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention).
Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on the inclusion of Government-owned or controlled
corporation Dean Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila
University Professional School of Law, stated that government-
owned corporations came under attack as g cows of a privileged
few enjoying salaries far higher than their counterparts in the
various branches of government, while the capital of these
corporations belongs to the Government and government money
is pumped into them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they
should therefore come under the strict surveillance of the Civil
Service System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes
and Cases, 1974 ed., p. 524).
Applying the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, the Labor Code as
amended, and the Civil Service Decree as amended and the precedent in
the Alliance of Government Workers decision, it is clear that the petitioner
National Housing Corporation comes under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission, not the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs
governmental functions and not proprietary ones.
The NHC was organized for the governmental objectives stated in its
amended articles of incorporation as follows:
SECOND: That the purpose for which the corporation is organized
is to assist and carry out the coordinated massive housing
program of the government, principally but not limited to low-cost
housing with the integration cooperation and assistance of all
governmental agencies concerned, through the carrying on of any
or all the following activities:
 l) The acquisition, development or reclamation of lands for the
purpose of construction and building therein preferably low-cost
housing so as to provide decent and durable dwelling for the
greatest number of inhabitants in the country;
2) The promotion and development of physical social and
economic community growth through the establishment of
general physical plans for urban, suburban and metropolitan
areas to be characterized by efficient land use patterns;
3) The coordination and implementation of all projects of the
government for the establishment of nationwide and massive low
cost housing;
4) The undertaking and conducting of research and technical
studies of the development and promotion of construction of
houses and buildings of sound standards of design liability,
durability, safety, comfort and size for improvement of the
architectural and engineering designs and utility of houses and
buildings with the utilization of new and/or native materials
economics in material and construction, distribution, assembly
and construction and of applying advanced housing and building
technology.
5) Construction and installation in these projects of low-cost
housing privately or cooperatively owned water and sewerage
system or waste disposal facilities, and the formulations of a
unified or officially coordinated urban transportation system as a
part of a comprehensive development plan in these areas.
The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the
government to accomplish governmental policies and objectives and extend
essential services to the people. It would be incongruous if employees
discharging essentially governmental functions are not covered by the same
law and rules which govern those performing other governmental functions.
If government corporations discharging proprietary functions now belong to
the civil service with more reason should those performing governmental
functions be governed by civil service law.
The respondent NLRC cites a 1976 opinion of the Secretary of Justice which
holds that the phrase "government-owned or controlled corporations" in
Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution contemplates only those
government-owned or controlled corporations created by special law. The
opinion states that since the Constitution provides for the organization or
regulation of private corporations only by "general law", expressly excluding
government-owned or controlled corporations, it follows that whenever the
Constitution mentions government-owned or controlled corporations, it must
refer to those created by special law. P.D. No. 868 which repeals all
charters, laws, decrees, rules, and provisions exempting any branch,
agency, subdivision, or instrumentality of the government, including
government- owned or controlled corporations from the civil service law and
rules is also cited to show that corporations not governed by special charters
or laws are not to be brought within civil service coverage. The discussions
in the Constitutional Convention are also mentioned. It appears that at the
time the Convention discussed government-owned or controlled
corporations, all such corporations were organized only under special laws
or charters.
The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government
may be created by special charter does not mean that such corporations not
created by special law are not covered by the civil service. Nor does the
decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption from the
civil service law imply that government corporations not created by special
law are exempt from civil service coverage. These charters and statutes are
the only laws granting such exemption and, therefore, they are the only ones
which could be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision in the
general law which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the
Constitutional Convention discussed only corporations created by special
law or charter cannot be an argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil
service coverage. As stated in the cited speech delivered during the
convention sessions of March 9, 1972, all government corporations then in
existence were organized under special laws or charters. The convention
delegates could not possibly discuss government-owned or controlled
corporations which were still non-existent or about whose existence they
were unaware.
Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the
phrase "government-owned or controlled corporation."
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible
and all taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a
corporation created as a government-owned or controlled entity. It does not
cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter
cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.
The infirmity of the respondents' position lies in its permitting a
circumvention or emasculation of Section 1, Article XII-B of the Constitution
It would be possible for a regular ministry of government to create a host of
subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code funded by a willing
legislature. A government-owned corporation could create several
subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporations would enjoy the best
of two worlds. Their officials and employees would be privileged individuals,
free from the strict accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and
the regulations of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be
subject to the competitive restraints of the open market nor to the terms and
conditions of civil service employment. Conceivably, all government-owned
or controlled corporations could be created, no longer by special charters,
but through incorporation under the general law. The constitutional
amendment including such corporations in the embrace of the civil service
would cease to have application. Certainly, such a situation cannot be
allowed to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision
of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is SET ASIDE. The
decision of the Labor Arbiter dismissing the case before it for lack of
jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28396 December 29, 1967
AGRIPINO DEMAFILES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE, in
its capacity as Board of Canvassers for the newly created
Municipality of Sebaste of the Province of Antique, and BENITO B.
GALIDO,respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
The new municipality of Sebaste1 in Antique province held its first election
of officers in the general elections of November 14, 1967, with the petitioner
Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the
mayoralty.
On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting
as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised
Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return
from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters
were registered (of whom 188 voted), when, according to a certificate of the
municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of
October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the
board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from
precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other
precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for
Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the
municipality of Sebaste.
On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting
the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the
subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board
members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, to sit, considering that they
were reelectionists. Acting on the protest, the COMELEC resolved on
November 28, 1967:
 To annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the
new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the
Provincial Board of Antique;
To constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the
substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the
Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of
the election for local offices of Sebaste, Antique, in accordance
with the Instructions to Boards of Canvassers contained in the
Resolution of the Commission No. RR-544, particularly No. 5-K
thereof, and thereafter to proclaim the winning candidates for local
offices of said municipality.
In turn, Galido asked for a reconsideration on the ground that the two
members of the provincial board who were reelectionists were disqualified
from sitting only when the board was acting as a provincial, but not as a
municipal, board of canvassers and that the COMELEC resolution annulling
the canvass and proclamation of officials was issued without giving him an
opportunity to be heard. In its resolution of December 4, 1967 the
respondent Commission reconsidered its previous order and held "that the
canvass and proclamation already made of the local officials . . . stands".
Failing to secure a reconsideration of this latter resolution, Demafiles filed
the present petition for mandamus and certiorari to set aside the aforesaid
resolution of the COMELEC, to annull the proclamation of Galido, and to
secure an order directing the COMELEC to appoint substitute members of
the provincial board and to order a new canvass of the returns, including
that from precinct 7.
The three principal issues tendered for resolution in this case are: (1)
whether the respondent board of canvassers was within the periphery of its
power in rejecting the return from precinct 7 on the strength of an election
registrar's certificate that a less number of voters than that shown in the
return had registered; (2) whether the provincial board members, who were
candidates for reelection, were disqualified from sitting in the board in its
capacity as a municipal board of canvassers; and (3) whether the
Commission on Elections can order the board of canvassers to count a
return from a given precinct.
These issues, together with the arguments of the parties, will be
discussed seriatim, but we must first proceed to dispose of the preliminary
question raised by the respondent Galido, namely, that this case is moot
because he had taken his oath and assumed office on November 22,
pursuant to Republic Act 4870.
Obviously, the frame of reference is section 2 of the statute which reads:
The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the Municipality of
Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local
officials and shall have qualified [sic].
In our view, the last portion of the provision — "and shall have qualified" —
is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and does
not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first
municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. It
is quite probable that that is what the legislature meant. But here is a clear
case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial
modesty forbids the courts from assuming and, consequently, from
supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King in Alice in
Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to
find any." Frankfurter, who himself was fond of quoting this passage,
admonishes that "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor
to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making
might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and
evisceration."2 Accordingly, we have to go by the general rule that the term
of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following
their election,3 and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in
no way affected the basic issues in this case, which we need not reach and
resolve.
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function — that of
compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to
it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections:4 "the canvassers are to be satisfied of the, genuineness of the
returns — namely, that the papers presented to them are not forged and
spurious, that they are returns, and that they are signed by the proper
officers. When so satisfied, . . . they may not reject any returns because of
informalities in them or because of illegal and fraudulent practices in the
elections."5 Thus, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return,
much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in
the precinct from whence it came are illegal. 6
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the
ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the
statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted,
the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had
registered on October 30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections7 is
cited in support of this view. In Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as
it was indeed statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one
party garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same
number, whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got
precisely nothing.itc-alf" In other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not
needed, as "the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa
loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and
give it prima facie value.
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face from
which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the truth. It is
only when it is compared in the certificate of the election registrar that a
discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters. The return
therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its
exclusion.
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than registered
voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although the
petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed
to register (making a total of 190, voters), and on the day of the election 5
voters erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7
because that was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that
this question should be threshed out in an election contest.itc-
alf Lagumbay itself explicitly says —
Of course we agree that fraud in the holding of the election should
be handled — and finally settled — by the corresponding courts
or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where testimonial
or documentary evidence is necessary. . . .
Consequently, the canvass made and proclamation had should be
annulled.8
Second, the canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of
the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting
in it, they being candidates for reelection. As this Court held in Salcedo v.
Commission on Elections:9
And added reason for the nullification of the actuation of the
Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro is the fact that its members
were disqualified to act it appearing that they were all candidates
for reelection. This is clear from Section 28 of the Revised
Election Code which provides that any member of the provincial
board who is a candidate for an elective office shall be
incompetent to act in said board in the performance of its duties
in connection with the election.
Branding the above statement as obiter dictum, the respondent Galido
argues that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified
under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of
canvassers, to prevent them fro canvassing their own votes, and not when
they sit as a municipal board of canvassers.
With respect to the canvass and proclamation made the provincial board of
Oriental Mindoro, three issues raised in Salcedo, in resolving which this
Court held (1) that a provincial board cannot act as a municipal board of
canvassers where a municipal council has been formed; (2) that provincial
board members who are candidates for reelection are disqualified to sit in
the board and (3) that a board of canvassers which excludes from canvass
the return from a precinct acts "in contravention of law."
At any rate the language of section 28 is all-inclusive Thus:
Any member of a provincial board or of a municipal council who
is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent to
act on said body in the performance of the duties the of relative to
said election . . . .
The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a
provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal
canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the
maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.
Third, it is now settled doctrine that the COMELEC has the power to annul
an illegal canvass and an illegal proclamation as when they are based on
incomplete returns, and order a new canvass to be made by counting the
returns wrongfully excluded.10 If it has power to direct that certain copies of
election returns be used in preference to other copies of the same
returns,11 there is no reason why it cannot direct canvassing bodies to count
all turns which are otherwise regular.itc-alf Indeed, it is its duty to do so,
failing which it may be compelled by mandamus. As earlier pointed out, it is
the ministerial function a board of canvassers to count the results as they
appeal in the returns which on their face do not reveal any irregularities or
falsities.
ACCORDINGLY, the resolutions dated December 4 and 8, 1967 of the
Commission on Elections are set aside, and the canvass of returns made
and the subsequent proclamation of the respondent Benito B. Galido are
annulled. The respondent Commission on Elections is hereby directed. (1)
to appoint new members of the board of canvassers in substitution of Julito
Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, and (2) immediately thereafter to order the
board of canvassers as reconstituted to convene, canvass all votes
including those appearing in the return from precinct 7, and, in accordance
with the results of such canvass, proclaim the winning candidates. Costs
against the private respondent Galido.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37684 September 10, 1975
ARABAY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE,
BRANCH II, THE CITY OF DIPOLOG and EMILIO L. TAGAILO, in his
capacity as City Treasurer of the City of Dipolog, et al., respondents.
Dominguez Law Office for petitioner.
Assistant City Fiscal Arquipo L. Adriatico for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Norte, Branch II, dismissing the complaint of the herein
petitioner Arabay, Inc., for annulment of a tax ordinance of the Municipal
Council of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, and for refund of the taxes it had
paid thereunder. On December 17, 1965 the Municipal Council of Dipolog
enacted Ordinance No. 19 amending Section I of Ordinance No. 53 series
of 1964. As thus amended the said Section I reads as follows:
Section 1. There shall be charged for the selling and distribution
of refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor and diesel fuels,
and petroleum based on the monthly allocation actually delivered
and distributed and intended for sale, in any manner whatsoever,
by the Company or supplier to any person, firm, entity, or
corporation, whether as dealer of such refined and manufactured
mineral oils, motor and diesel fuels, and petroleum or as operator
of any station thereof, the following tax payable monthly:
Gasoline — P0.01 per liter
Lubricating oils — P0.01 per liter
Diesel Fuel oils ¼ centavo per liter
Petroleum or P0.05 per gallon can
kerosene or
— P0.02 per half gallon tin
Provided, however, that retail seller of not more than 5 gallon cans
or its equivalent shall be exempted from the provisions of this
ordinance.
Section 2. This Ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1966.
On June 21, 1969 Republic Act No. 5520 was approved. It provided for the
creation of the City of Dipolog from the then of the Municipality of Dipolog,
to take effect on January 1, 1970.
On July 28, 1971 the Arabay, Inc., a distributor of gas, oil and other
petroleum products, filed with the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del
Norte a complaint against the City of Dipolog contesting the validity of the
above-mentioned Section 1 of Ordinance No. 53 on the ground that the
same imposed a sales tax which is beyond the power of a municipality to
levy under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959. Said Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2 Taxation — Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all chartered cities, municipalities and municipal
districts shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or
fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or
exercising privileges in chartered cities, municipalities or
municipal districts by requiring them to secure licenses at rates
fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city, the
municipal council of the municipality, or the municipal district
council of the municipal district; to collect fees and charges for
service rendered by the city, municipality or municipal district; to
regulate and impose reasonable fees for services rendered in
connection with any business, profession or occupation being
conducted within the city, municipality or municipal district and
otherwise to levy for public purposes, just and uniform taxes,
licenses or fees: Provided, That municipalities and municipal
districts shall, in no case, impose any percentage tax on sales or
other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on
articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue: Provided, however,
That no city, municipality or municipal district may levy or impose
any of the following: ... (emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1972 the Arabay, Inc. filed a supplemental complaint which
prayed, among others, for a refund of the taxes it had paid under the
ordinance in question.
On October 30, 1972 the parties entered into a stipulation of facts
which, inter alia, states:
2. That plaintiff, pursuant to the above ordinance, paid sales taxes
for the sale of Diesel fuel oils, lubricating oils, petroleum, kerosene
and other related petroleum products, to the defendant City of
Dipolog, from December, 1969 to July, 1972 in the total amount
of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P5,400.00). A
schedule of the payments made by plaintiff is hereto attached as
Annex "A" and is made an integral part hereof. However, the
payments made from April, 1972 to July, 1972, in the total amount
of P69.80 have been refunded by defendant City of Dipolog to
plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing stipulation of facts
and of the Memorandum of Arguments to be submitted by the
parties, the latter, through, their respective counsels, hereby
submit the case for the determination of this Honor.
On January 16, 1973 the court a quo rendered judgment upholding the
validity of the questioned provision of Ordinance No. 53, as amended,
essentially on the grounds that the Arabay, Inc. failed to present evidence
that the tax provision in question imposed a sales tax, and the tax prescribed
therein was, moreover, not a specific tax on the products themselves but on
the privilege of selling them.
The basic issues in the case at bar are: (1) whether or not the questioned
tax provision imposes a sales tax; and (2) if it imposes a sales tax, whether
the Arabay, Inc. is entitled to a tax refund, considering that Dipolog is now a
city.
1. It is settled rule in this jurisdiction that for purposes of Section 2 of the
Local Autonomy Act, supra, a municipal tax ordinance which prescribes a
set ratio between the amount of the tax and the volume of sales of the
taxpayer imposes a sales tax and is null and void for being beyond the power
of a municipality to enact.1
In our view, the questioned section of Ordinance No. 53 of the Municipal
Council of Dipolog levies a sales tax, not only because the character of the
ordinance as a sales tax ordinance was admitted by the parties below, but
as well because the phraseology of the said provision reveals in clear terms
the intention to impose a tax on the sale of oil, gasoline and other petroleum
products. Thus, the ordinance provides: "There shall be charged for the
selling and distribution of refined and manufactured oils ... based on the
monthly allocation actually delivered and distributed and intended for sale ...
by the Company or supplier to any person ... whether as dealer ... or as
operator of any station ... the following tax payable monthly: ..." It is quite
evident from these terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is
directly dependent upon or bears a direct relationship to the volume of sales
which the owner or supplier of the itemized products generates every month.
The ordinance in question therefore exacts a tax based on sales; it follows
that the Municipality of Dipolog was not authorized to enact such an
ordinance under the local Autonomy Act.
2. The obligation of the City of Dipolog to refund the sum collected under the
void provisions of an ordinance enacted while it was still a municipality, is
not open to doubt. In San Miguel Corporation vs. The Municipal Council of
Mandaue, Cebu, supra, the Court ordered, the return to the taxpayer of the
sums paid under an ordinance enacted under circumstances similar to the
case at bar, and rejected the argument that the municipality of Mandaue had
in the meantime been converted into a city. The Court said:
Respondent however claim that with the conversion of Mandaue
into a city pursuant to Republic Act No. 5519, which was approved
on June 21, 1969, the issue has already become moot, since the
prohibition contained in section 2 of Republic Act 2264 applies
only to municipalities and not to chartered cities. The same
contention has been rejected in City of Naga v. Court of Appeals,
and Laoag Producers' Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
vs. Municipality of Laoag, where We ruled that the legality of an
ordinance depends upon the power of the municipality at the time
of the enactment of the challenged ordinance. Since the
municipality of Mandaue had no authority to enact the said
ordinance, the subsequent approval of Republic Act No. 5519
which became effective on June 21, 1969, did not remove the
original infirmity of the ordinance. Indeed there is no provision in
the aforecited statute which invests a curative effect upon the
ordinances of the municipality which when enacted were beyond
its statutory authority.
The right of the Arabay, Inc. to a refund of the local sales taxes it had paid
under the questioned ordinance may not, however, include those levied on
its gasoline sales. The relevant proviso of Section 2 of the Local Autonomy
Act states:
... Provided, That municipalities and municipal districts shall, in no
case, impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes on
articles subject to specific tax, except gasoline, under the
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code:
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing proviso of Section 2 of R.A. 2264, two courses of action
in the exercise of their taxing powers are denied to municipalities and
municipal districts, to wit, (1) to levy any sales tax in whatever form; and (2)
to levy any tax on articles subject to specific tax under the National Internal
Revenue Code. It is not difficult to see that these two prohibitions overlap in
the sense that while the first clause of the said proviso forbids the levying of
sales taxes of whatever form or guise, the second clause of the
same proviso forbids the levying of "taxes" without any distinction as to the
kind of tax, i.e.' whether percentage tax, sales tax, specific tax or license tax,
although this latter prohibition applies only to a limited class of articles, viz.,
those subject to the specific tax under the Tax Code.
Such an overlap would probably carry or connote no legal significance but
for the exclusion of gasoline from the prohibition contained in the second
clause of the mentioned proviso. For, with the exemption of gasoline from
the coverage of the same, it becomes relevant to determine the effect which
such exclusion has on the previous prohibition against the levying of the
sales tax.
In our opinion, a reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of
the proviso in question results in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding
gasoline from the general disability imposed on municipalities and municipal
districts to exact any kind of taxes on articles subject to specified tax under
the Tax Code, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within the power
of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes the
latter may deem proper to levy on gasoline including a sales tax or one in
that form. There is after all no clearly demonstrable and convincing reason
why the law would allow municipal imposition of taxes on gasoline and yet
withhold such power if the imposition is in the form of a sales tax, when it
was a known fact at the time of the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act in
1959 — and this still is true to this day — that gasoline is of no profitable
use to the companies which own it unless turned over to the consuming
public which, perforce, must pay for the right to obtain that commodity.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is set aside. The City of Dipolog is
hereby ordered to refund to the Arabay, Inc. the taxes the latter has paid
under Section 1 of Ordinance No. 53, series of 1964, as amended,
deducting therefrom the amount representing the taxes paid by the Arabay,
Inc. on its gasoline sales. No costs.
[G.R. Nos. 118940-41. July 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GREGORIO
MEJIA y VILLAFANIA, EDWIN BENITO, PEDRO PARAAN, and
JOSEPH FABITO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay
Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger
jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger,
Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab
wounds. Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the
shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and
drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road when the
jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the
injuries he sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito,
Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex
Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and
Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the incident; Paraan,
the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead
three days after the incident in question, while the others have remained at
large. Three separate criminal complaints for murder,[1] frustrated
murder,[2] and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended)[3] were filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring submission of
counter-affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito did not submit
their counter-affidavits.
On 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an order[4] declaring
the accused to have waived their right to be heard in preliminary
investigation; finding a prima facie case against the accused;
recommending that they be charged with and prosecuted for the crimes of
murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No. 6539, as amended; and
ordering that the records of the cases be forwarded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for appropriate action.
After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Pangasinan filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City
three separate informations for murder, frustrated murder, and violation of
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, against the aforenamed
persons. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The first was later
amended. The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO LANDINGIN inflicting
upon him stab wounds which caused his instant death to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659.[5]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y
CASTAEDA inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds, the accused having
then performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due
to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Catugas
y Castaeda which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the expressway at
barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta. Barbara, province of Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused armed with knives by means of violence against person by
stabbing to death TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a passenger jeep
bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely and thereafter with intent to
gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away said
passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking Lovely owned and
driven by Teofilo Landingin without the latters consent, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended.[7]
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City
presided by Judge Crispin C. Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter
consolidated and jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the
said court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO
court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a
plea of innocence in each case.
I three other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the marking
THE CASES IN THE LARON COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-
00619-D (Frustrated Murder) in the LARON court, the prosecution
presented the following witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen Dominguillo
Gulen and Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and
Dr. Roberto Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as rebuttal witness. In
their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness
stand. They also presented as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley
Lomboy, Conrado Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente, and Felicidad
Fabito in their evidence in chief and Julia Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may be summarized
as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio Catugas was in front
of the CS1 Supermarket in Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take
him to his home at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger
jeepney plying the Dagupan City - Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo
Landingin arrived. He boarded it and occupied that portion of the
passengers' seat behind the drivers seat. There were already some
passengers inside the jeepney, but they disembarked before the jeepney
reached the boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving behind
Landingin, Catugas, and two other passengers.[8]
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in San Miguel,
Calasiao, nine persons flagged down the jeepney and boarded it. One of
them, whom Catugas identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the
driver; the rest took the passenger seats behind the drivers seat. Catugas
fully recognized Benito because there was light at the ceiling of the jeepney
and at the signboard portion of the jeepney and the latter sometimes turned
his face toward the back where Catugas was seated. Catugas had further
observed Benitos face, ears, and eyes.[9] He also recognized accused Mejia,
Fabito, and Paraan.[10]
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were bound for
Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI) in Bued, Calasiao. But when they reached PVI,
one of them said that his companions did not know where they were going,
and informed Landingin that he would take care of the fare upon reaching
Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan, one
of the nine passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther. Later, Mejia
asked Catugas whether he was Landingins companion; Catugas answered
in the affirmative. Mejia then announced: [T]his is a hold-up; while Benito
said: [N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic]. Another companion of
Mejia said:Proceed. All of the nine drew their daggers and stabbed
Landingin and Catugas.[11]
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito Garcia, who
conducted an autopsy on Landingins cadaver, found three stab wounds -
two of which were fatal. According to him, the cause of Landingins death
was cardiorespiratory arrest resulting from hypovolemic shock due to
internal hemorrhage.[12] Nora Landingin, wife of Teofilo Landingin,
spent P1,500 daily during the wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial;
and P16,000 for the tomb. Nora felt sad because of his death.[13]
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of the jeepney and
landed on the road, was brought by some people to the Villaflor Memorial
Hospital.[14] Dr. Roberto Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory
laparatomy debridement and found three multi-lacerations in the right upper
extremities and several others on the left upper extremities which could have
been caused by bladed instruments.[15] Catugas survived and was confined
for seven days. He spent more than P50,000 for his hospitalization and
medical expenses. The hospital billed him in the amount of P44,667.25.[16]
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while Policeman Dominguillo
Gulen of the Mabini Police Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching
his residence at the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on board a police patrol
car, he saw six men walking in front of his house. When he stopped the car,
the men ran away. He gave chase and caught two of them, namely, accused
Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to an akyat-bahay
gang. When asked what they were doing, the two answered that they were
not doing anything and that they were not robbers. They told Gulen that they
were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even showed his drivers license and told
Gulen that he did not commit any crime and that he was willing to go to the
police station. Gulen then brought the two and turned them over to the police
station in Sual, Pangasinan.[17]
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk officer at 1:00 a.m.
of 11 March 1994, entered in the police blotter this turn-over and talked to
the two. In the course of their conversation, Benito reported that they rode
on a jeepney, which was abandoned somewhere in Sual. Clemente decided
to make a follow-up of this report. With Benito as their guide, Clemente and
LOVELY in Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen, Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney
had bloodstains on the front and back seats. They brought it to the police
station and had the matter recorded in the police blotter. Clemente then
instructed the radio operator to call the police station of Sta. Barbara and
inform it of the turn-over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March 1994,
the PNP elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came and received the
two, as well as the passenger jeepney.[18]
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some concerned citizens of
Sual apprehended Joseph Fabito in Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder
suspect. He was turned over to the Sual Police Station. After having been
informed of this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station took him into its
custody. These facts were entered in the Sual Police Station blotter.[19]
 The accused admitted to having flagged down and boarded
Landingins jeepney that fateful evening of 10 March 1994, but denied having
committed the crimes. They claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim and his
companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and drove away the
jeepney. The following is a summary of their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan,
was the driver of the Elf truck of Lito Lomboy of Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan,
which was used in hauling sand and gravel. His co-accused Mejia, Paraan,
and Fabito were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they completed delivering
sand and gravel, the accused returned the truck and went to the house of
Fabitos brother-in-law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours of waiting in
vain for the brother-in-law, Paraan suggested that they go to the house of
his future brother-in-law in Bacayao Norte, Calasiao. After some snacks
they proceeded to the town proper and strolled for a while. Then, Benito
thought that it was time to go home to Sta. Barbara and suggested that they
should. They proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High School to
wait for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At the waiting shed, they saw
Romulo Calimquim with three other companions, who were also waiting for
a transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged down an
approaching passenger jeepney. He and his companions boarded it. So did
Benito and his companions. Calimquim sat beside the driver. The rest took
the back seat.[20]
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, the man with a huge body,
who sat beside the driver.[21]
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal Hall of Sta.
Barbara and that leading to the national highway, the man who sat beside
the driver (Calimquim, according to Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan)
ordered the driver to proceed to the national highway; the driver did. But
after reaching the highway, in Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the former ordered
the latter to stop, announced that this is a hold up, then stabbed the driver
several times, pulled his body out of the jeepney, took over the wheel, and
drove the jeepney.[22] In the meantime, at the back seat, one of the
companions of Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito; while the others told
Benitos companions to lie on their belly. It was when Catugas attempted to
fight back that he was stabbed.[23] Catugas was then thrown out of the
jeepney.[24]
Benito and his companions were prevented by the group of Calimquim
from alighting from the jeepney. Upon reaching a mountain in Sual,
Pangasinan,[25] the man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and
Fabito to alight from the jeepney. The group of Calimquim pointed
knives[26] and a gun[27] at them. Then suddenly there was a light coming from
below. They ran away from the group of Calimquim.[28]
Benito and Mejia were together.[29] Later, a policeman saw them. The
two told the policeman that they are not "troublesome persons. The
policeman brought them to the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported
what had happened and accompanied the policemen to the place where the
jeepney in question was located.[30] Afterwards, the two were detained at
Sta. Barbara Police Station. While in detention, they were informed that
Calimquim was killed and his body was found in Alaminos. [31]
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only on 14 March
1994 and went to the house of Roland, his brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte,
to ask him to request a barangay councilman to accompany him to the police
station. It was the barangay captain who accompanied him the following day
to the police station. There, the police authorities told him that he was among
the assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who stabbed Catugas
in the night of 10 March 1994 and one of the suspects in the carnapping of
the jeepney of Landingin.[32] Paraan was forthwith placed inside the jail.
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m. of 11 March
1994, he was by the seashore. He stayed there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired
from someone the location of the police station. He went to that station which
happened to be Sual Police Station. There, he narrated to the policemen
what had happened. When a policeman asked him whether he was the
killer, he answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was brought to
the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail, where he was detained for three
months. Then, he was committed to the Provincial Jail.[33]
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the hospital and was
already driving a tricycle, the parents of the accused met with him and
informed him that the accused told them that they (the accused) did not
commit any wrong. Catugas answered that he had suffered several wounds
and spent much for his hospitalization and that since the accused were the
ones apprehended, he would just tell a lie so he could recover the amounts
he spent. Catugas then asked P20,000 from each of the accused, or a total
of P80,000, and repeated this demand five to six times.[34]
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen Bernardo Clemente,
also proved that Romulo Calimquim died due to a gunshot wound on 13
March 1994 in BarangayPaitan West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced by
Entry No. 4338 of Page 260 of the Police Blotter.[35]
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who
stabbed Landingin and that accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the
ones who stabbed him. He further declared that it was the parents of the
accused who offered to pay him, but he refused because such an offer could
not be accepted by [his] conscience.[36]
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as surrebuttal witness. She
denounced as untrue the testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents
of accused were the ones who offered to pay him money. Julia declared that
they visited Catugas to ask him whether it was true that their children
committed the crime. On their first visit, Catugas told them that he could not
yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them that
they had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the
accused.[37]
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and
relied heavily on the identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence
of ulterior motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of the
accused to compromise the cases.
In its decision dated 17 November 1994,[38] the LARON court
convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the crime of murder
and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and
nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, it
sentenced the first three accused to suffer the penalty of death for the crime
of murder; and ten years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years,
four months, and one day of reclusion temporal for the crime of frustrated
murder. It credited Paraan with the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, he being only seventeen years old at the time of the commission
of the crimes charged; and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for murder,
and six years of prision correccional to ten years and one day of prision
mayor for frustrated murder. The Court also ordered the four accused to pay
the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the amounts of P50,000 as death
indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and P12,000 for funeral
expenses; and to pay Catugas the amount of P44,687.25 for hospital
expenses, plus costs.
II
THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the Anti-Carnapping
Act) in the CASTILLO Court, the prosecution presented as its witnesses
Virgilio Catugas and Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as rebuttal
witness. The accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito took the witness
stand and presented as additional witnesses Conrado Benito and Felicidad
Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially the same as those they made
in the murder and frustrated murder cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was
stabbed, he was thrown out of the jeepney to the shoulder of the road and
that one of the culprits took the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine,
and drove off.[39] He further declared that while he was confined at the
hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated him, showed him
pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspects names,[40] and took his
statement.[41] After he was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with
the father of accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization
expenses and asked P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the
parents of the accused on an agreed date; but before that date came, he
had already testified against the accused.[42]
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo Landingin,
further testified that her husband owned the passenger jeepney in question,
as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 19253856,[43] and Official
Receipt No. MVRR 91354948.[44] The jeepney was worth P140,000.[45]
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio
Catugas. It debunked the version of the defense on account of the following
inculpating evidence, which, according to it, bolstered its finding that the
accused were the authors of the crime charged:
1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and
Pedro Paraan speak of innocence and fear for their lives
during the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never
sustained any bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt
anybody, they could not have concentrated on the persons of
 Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they should
have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons
(accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did not
do anything except to passively stay at the back seat of
the jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing incident
in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual,
Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to
carnapp [sic] the passenger jeepney of Teofilo Landingin then
the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant situation is
for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all passengers
for that matter, including the four (4) accused to eliminate the
presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of
Mok in going to Sual, Pangasinan without offering any slight
resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is
that, Mok and company belonged to the group of the four (4)
accused who were responsible in perpetrating the offense
charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are the
real offenders, why is it that during the long span of travel
from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any attempt to
jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they show any
positive signs to invite the attention of PNP members
stationed along the long route starting in Dagupan City,
Binmaley, Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.
4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly claim
innocence of the crime charged. In fact, they averred that
upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the
responding peace officers what happened to them and that
their reports was recorded in the Police Blotter of Sual
Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with
absolute falsity and is debunked by the entry in the Police
Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject certification
negates accuseds statement of innocence. The subject entry
which is contained in the Book of Events of Sual Police Station
belies any complaint/report made by accused Edwin
Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were kidnapped or deprived of
their liberty with the use of guns and bladed weapons. Upon
the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks of the
incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at
Sual Police Station for they were suspected of having
carnapped the passenger jeepney involved in the above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan,
they likewise vehemently denied the accusation lodged
against them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of innocence
crumbled when they joined the group from the crime scene
starting in Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to their destination
in Sual, Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual,
Pangasinan they scampered and run away to different
directions to avoid apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making any report to
the nearest authority i.e. Barangay Captain of the place they decided to
escape which they did with impunity. The records in the Police Blotter of
Sual is negatived (sic) of any entry about the whereabouts of accused
Paraan and Fabito.[46]
The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito,
Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended. It sentenced the first three accused
to death; and Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on account of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority. It also ordered them to pay the costs.
III
THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
Although review in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
trial court is automatic pursuant to Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659, [47] the
convicted accused filed with this Court their notices of appeal from the
decision of the LARON court and of the CASTILLO court on 18 November
1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D were docketed in
this Court as G.R. Nos. 118940-41, and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was
docketed as G.R. No. 119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate Appellants Briefs in G.R.
Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No. 119407, the appellants filed a motion for
the consolidation of these cases, which we granted on 27 February 1996.
In their Appellants Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the appellants
impute upon the trial court the following errors: (a) in giving full faith and
credence to the unsubstantiated testimony of prosecution witness Virgilio
Catugas relative to the incident in question; (b) in holding them as the
persons who stabbed the jeepney driver and Virgilio Catugas in the evening
of 10 March 1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing evidence were
proffered to point at the real culprits, Romulo Calimquim and his
companions; (c) in rendering a verdict of conviction notwithstanding the
failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and
(d) in convicting them of the crimes charged instead of the crimes homicide
and frustrated homicide -- on the assumption that they are guilty.
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly these assigned
errors. They submit that:
(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the
identification of the appellants leaves much to be
desired. He should not be believed, for he could not even
remember who among the appellants were wearing short
pants, hat, and shoes at that time. If policeman Gulen could
not even identify in court appellant Mejia whom he
apprehended in the evening of 10 March 1994 and brought
to the Sual Police Station, it was with more reason that
Catugas could not have identified the assailants since it
was nighttime. The possibility that Catugas got confused, if
not mentally and physically drained, as a result of the
shocking incident is not far-fetched. There is then a very
strong and compelling reason to believe that Catugas
mistook the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their
children did not commit any wrong, but Catugas vacillated
and testified falsely against accused-appellants when they
were not able to produce the amount of P20,000.00 each
as earlier demanded from them. Catugas denial of their
testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome the positive
testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin Benito
augurs well with their claim of innocence, when they were
apprehended. Benito readily showed his drivers license,
answered questions propounded by policeman Clemente,
and without hesitation he helped or guided the policemen in
locating the jeepney at the place where it was
abandoned. He did not try to hide or conceal anything when
he was confronted about the incident. Moreover, when
Benito and Mejia were picked up by a policeman on that
fateful night, they were not tainted with blood.
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be
liable for homicide and frustrated homicide, since treachery
was not established.
In their Appellants Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they make the following
assignment of errors: (a) the facts charged in the information do not
constitute violation of the crime of Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended; (b) The court a quo erred in convicting them of the crime charged
on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c) the court a quoerred in
convicting them by relying fully on the evidence of the prosecution and
completely disregarding the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to gain, which is an
essential ingredient of the crime of carnapping, was not proved. They claim
that from the evidence adduced it is very clear that the incident was only a
hold-up and that the jeepney was taken to Sual as escape vehicle.
In support of the second and third assigned errors, which they
discussed jointly, the appellants submit that:
(1) The trial courts conclusion on their culpability was based on
mere surmises and conjectures and contradicted by the
evidence on the record. The fact that the group of
 Calimquim did not hurt any of the four appellants and that
the latter offered no resistance does not prove appellants
membership in Calimquims group. That they did not even
jump off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to
invite the attention of the PNP stationed along the route
from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of fear since
Calimquims group pointed knives at each of them and
ordered them to lie down in stooping position. The absence
of conspiracy was shown by the fact that in Sual, after they
were released as hostages, they ran in separate directions
and did not join the group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police blotter that Benito
and Mejia were suspected of having carnapped the
passenger jeepney does not bind them, for it was made by
a police officer and was contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan and Fabito
had escaped.
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the testimony of
Catugas whose identification of the appellants was based
only on the pictures and on the information of the
policemen. It was impossible for Catugas to narrate in detail
the participation of each accused, considering that the light
in the jeepney was dim and his principal attention was
concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellants reporting of the incident disproved their
membership in the group of Calimquim. If they were
members, their natural course would have been to hide
from the authorities.Their voluntary submission to the police
immediately after the incident should have been given
credence as part of the res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) urges us to affirm in toto the challenged decisions for failure of the
appellants to show that the trial court committed error in finding the
prosecution evidence clear, sufficient, and convincing to convict. Catugas,
who made an eyewitness account, had the opportunity to observe the
appellants during the commission of the crime and had no ill-motive to
implicate the appellants falsely. As to the charge that he perjured because
the appellants were not able to produce the amount of P80,000 which he
allegedly demanded from them, the same should not be believed. The truth
is, it was the parents of the appellants who approached Catugas and offered
him P80,000 in order that he would not testify against the
appellants. Catugas did not accept the offer, as it was against his principles
to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly proved and, hence,
the trial court was correct in convicting the appellants of murder for the death
of Teofilo Landingin and frustrated murder for stabbing Virgilio
Catugas. Their conviction for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act is also
proper, since their main purpose was to get the jeepney and they killed
Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented no evidence to
prove that they ran away with the jeepney for any lawful purpose.
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try to show that the
identification made by the prosecution witness Catugas cannot be
denominated as clear, positive, and convincing; for, while it may be true that
he could have taken glimpse or glance at the faces of all the accused-
appellants, this fact alone is not adequate and fell short of the required test
of positive identification. They strongly suggest that Catugas had ill-motive
to testify falsely against them in that he was not paid the P80,000 he
demanded.
IV
THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF
APPELLANTS
Before we go any further, remarks on some procedural matters are in
order. The crimes charged in the informations filed before the LARON court
and CASTILLO court are irretrievably linked with or related to one
another. They arose out of the same incident, are founded on the same
factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then should have been consolidated and jointly
tried in one branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were jointly tried were
only the cases for murder and frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. Charges for offenses
founded on the same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar
character may be tried jointly at the courts discretion.
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits,
guard against oppression or abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets,
simplify the work of the trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense;
in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties litigants.[48] In Raymundo v. Elipe,[49] we held that although
consolidation of several cases involving the same parties and the same
subject matter is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
joint hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before
the same judge, or even filed with the different branches of the same court,
provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON court or the
CASTILLO court nor any of the parties caused, or moved for, a consolidation
of the case for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act (which has the higher
docket number) with the cases for murder and frustrated murder in the
LARON court (which have lower docket numbers). It was only after the filing
of their separate Appellants Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R. No.
119407 that the appellants moved to consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial court level could
contribute some difficulty in the appreciation of the evidence. The principal
witnesses of the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment
of their testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not be influenced
by their testimonies in the case before the CASTILLO court, and vice
versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was unclear in
some details of the incident, but clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other
hand, there were details he disclosed in one of the courts which were not
given in the other court. The same observation may be had on the
testimonies of the appellants before both courts. As one reads the
transcripts of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it would be
quite difficult to avoid forming impressions in light of the totality of their
testimonies in both courts. Our minds and mental processes must be kept
away from the pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence and the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants dictate
that we resolve the appeals in the cases before the LARON court and the
case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence
presented before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether the crimes of
murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D and frustrated murder in Criminal
Case No. 94-00619-D are absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping
Act in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December 1993[50] is applicable
to these cases because the crimes were committed on 10 March
1994. Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of
R.A. No. 7659 and now imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed
or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. This Section, as amended, reads in full as follows:
SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. -- Any person who is found guilty of
carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things;
and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and
not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
(Underscoring supplied for emphasis).
In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last clause read as follows:
and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the
commission of the carnapping. (stress supplied).
Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty
of life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3)
the change of the phrase in the commission of the carnapping to in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The
latter makes clear the intention of the law to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of
carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known
as qualified carnappingor carnapping in an aggravated form. In short,
considering the phraseology of the amended Section 14,[51] the carnapping
and the killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible
crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not covered by Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words IS KILLED, no
distinction must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one
or the other which is committed "in the course of carnapping or on the
occasion thereof makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo Landingin -- whether
it be homicide or murder -- cannot be treated as a separate offense, but
should only be considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single offense of
qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form, the prosecution
had still to prove the essential requisites of the homicide or murder of
Landingin and that of carnapping. This should have been another reason for
the consolidation of the carnapping case in the CASTILLO court with the
cases before the LARON court.
But do the words "IS KILLED" in the last clause of Section 14 of R.A.
No. 6539, as amended, include the crime of frustrated murder or
homicide? Put a little differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated
stage also qualify carnapping if it is committed in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof? The answer must
be in the negative in light of the use in said Section 14 of the words IS
KILLED. The unmistakable import thereof is that it refers only to
the consummated felony of either murder or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, then
it must be deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14) when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person.
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond
reasonable doubt the carnapping of Teofilo Landingin's passenger jeepney,
which is a motor vehicle under the definition in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6539.[52] The passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of gain, from
Landingin by means of violence against him which caused his death and
against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral certainty the guilt of
the appellants? The LARON and the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. [53] To overcome the
presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution.[54] Save in certain circumstances as where,
for instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts alleged to
constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances, the burden is
never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of his
defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully discharges that
burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. [55]
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
freedom of the accused is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course, requires the most
careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and documentary,
independent of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Every
circumstance favoring the accuseds innocence must be duly taken into
account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason.
Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid the
responsibility for the offense charged.[56] If the prosecution fails to discharge
the burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be freed; it is, even more,
the court's constitutional duty to acquit him.[57]
After a painstaking review of the records and the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses in the cases before
the LARON court and the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced with moral
certainty that the appellants committed the crimes charged. Reasonable
doubt burdens our conscience; our minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of
conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the four appellants
and the five others, namely, Romulo Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain
Dennis, a certain Mondragon, and another described as John Doe. All nine
were forthwith charged with the crimes of murder, frustrated murder, and
carnapping in Criminal Cases Nos. 3310,[58]3313,[59] 3311,[60] respectively, of
the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and then in the
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D,[61] and 94-00619-D[62]of
the LARON court and Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D[63] of the CASTILLO
court, respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not members of the
group of Romulo Calimquim. The prosecution has no proof to prove
otherwise; but the LARON and the CASTILLO courts, through inferences
from certain facts, concluded that the appellants were. The conclusion is
rather tenuous. While the rigorous cross-examination of the appellants in all
these cases has established close relationship among the appellants by
reason of their residence and work, (Benito, as sand-and-gravel truck driver
and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as his keepers), it miserably failed to
establish any relationship between them and the five others headed by
Calimquim. What then looms large in our minds is that the appellants and
the five others happened to be passengers of Landingins jeepney by
accident, not by design. If the appellants were with the five others until Sual,
Pangasinan, it was because they were intimidated and made to lie down on
their bellies inside the jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the appellants did not
belong to the group of Calimquim. Upon arrival in the mountains of Sual,
they fled from the Calimquim group when the first opportunity to do so
came. We find to be absolutely without basis the statement of the
CASTILLO court that the appellants abandoned Landingins jeepney in Sitio
Nipa, Baquioen, Sual, Pangasinan, upon seeing the arrival of concerned
citizens and members of the Sual Police Station; the responding peace
officers effected the recovery of the subject jeepney sans the
accused/culprits. No prosecution witness so testified. In the CASTILLO
court, no policeman was presented as witness for the prosecution. The
evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense reveal that
after appellants Benito and Mejia were picked up by Policeman Gulen on
the latters suspicion that they were members of an akyat-bahay gang, they
voluntarily informed the police authorities of the Sual Police Station of what
had happened. It was this information that brought the policemen to where
the subject jeepney was located. Benito even accompanied the
policemen. This resulted in the recovery of the jeepney by the
policemen. Appellant Paraan also presented himself later to the Police
Station of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although apprehended by
concerned citizens of the place to where he had fled, voluntarily reported
what he knew to the police authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the entries in the
police blotters of the police stations of Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of
the entries on what the appellants had declared in court is not conclusive
evidence that they did not report the incident to the police authorities. They
had no participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or probative value, for they
are normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either partial
suggestion of for want of suggestion or inquiries. [64] The entries in question
are sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they only
recorded the impression that the appellants were suspects.
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the commission of
the crimes, the prosecution had to rely solely on the testimony of Virgilio
Catugas. The totality of his testimony in the cases before the LARON court
leaves much to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted the direct
examination was unable to propound sensible questions to elicit clear
answers bound to reconstruct faithfully the events surrounding the
commission of the alleged crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the trial
judge to ask more questions. Despite the latters participation, the testimony
of Catugas fails to convince us that the appellants indeed participated in the
commission of the crimes. On cross-examination in the LARON court,
Catugas categorically admitted that he did not know the names of the
appellants and that he could recognize only three of the nine accused.Thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and you
mentioned the names of the person and I will now read:
Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you know
them?
A In fact I do not know, however, based on the police
investigation of Sta. Barbara PNP, they were,
Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito,
Pedro Paraan, Mok Calimquim, alyas Dennis,
Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo alyas Mondragon
and one unidentified person.
can you tell this Court why these persons were written in your
statement?
 A Because of the police investigation.
Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you were not
able to identify the accused, is that correct?
A I can recognize the others, sir.
Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize?
A Three (3) of them, sir.
COURT:
Q What you do mean when you said that that you can recognize
three (3) of them?
A I can remember those persons who sat near me.
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?
A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of the four
accused.
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] person who is
[sic] wearing in [sic] red T-shirt?
A I saw his face, sir.
Q How were you able to recognize the last person (referring to
Edwin Benito)?
A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir.[65]
Further indicating the uncertainty of his identification, he made the
following admissions on cross-examination:
Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat besides
[sic] the driver, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him?
A He was wearing a dark color.
Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?
A I cannot tell, sir.
Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom you pointed
to this person wearing in red T-shirt?
A I can no longer remember, sir.
Q How about the person next to the one with red t-shirt, do you
remember his shirt?
A I dont know, sir.
Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his clothes?
A I cannot remember, sir.
A From the scar left of my body, there are 22 stabbed wounds,
sir.[66]
Yet, no further questions were asked for him to convincingly show that the
appellants inflicted any of the stab wounds on his body. Further
compounding the uncertainty and unreliability of Catugas testimony, he
candidly admitted on cross-examination that only one person stabbed
him. Thus:
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q How many times were you stabbed by them?
A Twice, sir.
Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed your?
A I can identify him, sir.
Q How many persons stabbed you then?
A Only one (1) person, sir.[67]
Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas declared that six of the
nine stabbed him:
COURT:
Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?
A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.
Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial stab
blows with respect to the other stab blow who delivered
this stab blow?
A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia are you
referring to the five (5) other persons as the companions
of Gregorio Mejia who participated in stabbing you?
A I think it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me, sir.[68]
He could not remember anymore the person who inflicted the last stab
wound, and then declined to point to anyone of the herein four appellants as
the person who did it. Thus:
COURT:
Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab you
anymore?
A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir. (Witness
showing his scar near the shoulder.)

Q You cant remember also whether one of these accused was Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder, who
wearing a hat at that time? stabbed you among these nine (9) persons?

A I cannot remember, sir. A I could not remember anymore, sir.

In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared that he was Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell this
stabbed by the nine persons. Thus: Court whether it was one among the four (4) accused in
this case who stabbed you on your right upper arm?
COURT:
A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing my
Q Who were involved in stabbing? shoulder because that is the last stab wound, sir.[69]

A All of them, sir. It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to conclude from
Catugas testimony in the CASTILLO court that the appellants had inflicted
Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed? any of the stab wounds on Catugas.
A The 9 persons, sir. Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the CASTILLO court,
Catugas categorically admitted that none of the appellants participated in
Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons who the stabbing of Landingin. Thus:
participated in the stabbing incident and who were the
victims? COURT:
A Me and the driver, sir. xxx
PROS. MARATA: Q These two persons who participated in stabbing Teofilo
Landingin, can you inform the Court if the four (4)
Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine persons, four accused now or these two persons are among the four
of whom were inside the courtroom? (4) accused now?
 A They are not here, sir.[70] ATTY. TAMINAYA:

Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in Q You said that there was the agreed date, what happened on
implicating the appellants. He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the the agreed date?
parents of the appellants, but before they could give the money on the
agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the LARON court. The A The date has not yet arrived but I have already testified, sir.
following exchanges between him and counsel for the defense before the
CASTILLO court are revealing: COURT:

ATTY. TAMINAYA: Q When you said you have already testified, you are referring
to your testimony in RTC Branch 44?
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you able to
talk with the father of Edwin Benito? A Yes, sir.[71]

A Yes, sir. In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion
the impact of Catugas demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of
Q And you told them about your expenses in the hospital, is that his exculpatory testimony. It wanted to prove that the parents of the
correct? appellants were in fact the ones who proposed. But the testimony of
Conrado Benito, which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that
A Yes, sir. the parents went to see him to verify whether their children had indeed
committed the crimes; but Catugas replied that since the appellants were
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is that the ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could recover
correct? what he had spent. He then demanded P80,000, which he equally
apportioned among the parents of the four appellants.Conrado Benito
A I was asking P80,000.00, sir. testified as follows:
COURT: Q What did you tell him?
Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?
A I told him that our children telling us that they did not commit
A Because he pleaded to me, sir. any wrong and I told them to tell the truth and we are not
consenting them to whatever they have done if they have
Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that you are done something wrong.
settling the case with Edwin Benito the amount
of P80,000.00? Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?

A Yes, sir. A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he spent so

much for his hospitalization, and he said also that they
COURT: were the persons who were apprehended and so, I will
just tell a lie for the same because how could I collect for
Proceed. the amount I spent if I will not tell a lie?
ATTY. TAMINAYA: COURT:
Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that P80,000.00 Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are not a liar?
because they are poor?
A Yes, sir.
A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have agreed
of another date for them to pay, sir. ATTY. TAMINAYA:

COURT: Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about that
expenses?
Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter offer?
A I said, then we can at least help you, because he is saying
A That is already their counter proposal, sir. that he suffered several wounds.
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that you agreed Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
to pay you P80,000.00 but he cannot pay you at that very
moment? A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give P20,000.00
each.
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
COURT:
Q How many times did he tell you?
Proceed.
A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him. [72]
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each was to pay, for
Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00? they could not afford it. Conrado so declared, thus:
COURT: ATTY. TAMINAYA:
That is the settlement money. Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00, can you
tell this court if he made mention to the wife of Teofilo
ATTY. TAMINAYA: Landingin?
Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00, you A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told us that
should not have testified in this case? we would not tell the same to Mrs. Landingin.
A PROSECUTOR MARATA: Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?
Improper, your honor. A No sir, not even a single centavo.
ATTY. TAMINAYA: Q Why?
As follow-up question, your Honor. A We cannot pay because even payment for attorneys fees, we
cannot afford.[73]
COURT:
The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even
Sustained. Hypothetical.
took the incident as offer of compromise, which may be considered an
implied admission of guilt.Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.[74] There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the
appellants authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter
of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the explanation of
Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred
for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not
admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last
paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the

participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal Case No. 94-

00617-D (for Murder) and Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated
Murder) of Branch 44 and in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin
Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground
that their guilt therefor has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt or with
moral certainty. Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered,
unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further detention exist.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.