Journalism Studies

ISSN: 1461-670X (Print) 1469-9699 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjos20

The Elective Affinitive between Elite Journalists

and Mainstream Economists in Brazil

Antonio Jose Pedroso Neto & Tomás Undurraga

To cite this article: Antonio Jose Pedroso Neto & Tomás Undurraga (2017): The Elective
Affinitive between Elite Journalists and Mainstream Economists in Brazil, Journalism Studies, DOI:
10.1080/1461670X.2017.1334572

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Published online: 16 Jun 2017.

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 THE ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN ELITE
JOURNALISTS AND MAINSTREAM
ECONOMISTS IN BRAZIL

Antonio Jose Pedroso Neto and Tomás Undurraga

This article explores the ties between elite economic journalists and mainstream economists in
Brazil. It does so by investigating the influence of mainstream economists on journalists’ careers,
and therewith, on Brazil’s public discussion. Using mixed methods, we study the main achievements
that help to explain economic journalists’ position. We present a multiple correspondence analysis
of 53 economic journalists, 30 who are in elite positions and 23 who are from the same cohort but
are not in elite positions. Elaborating on 58 interviews, we explore the field’s professional dynamic,
examining the sources that produce scoops, how journalists formed their economic perspectives
and how economic sources link to the press. We find that there are two elites of economic journal-
ists in Brazil with different career paths. Although careers among elite journalists might diverge,
there is a manifest elective affinity between them and financial elites. Key economic journalists
reached elite positions by sharing the doxa of mainstream economists. Journalists who worked
in the Central Bank, economic ministers or private banks tended to rise in their professional
careers. The familiarity with key financial agents of non-elite journalists, by contrast, is more
limited. The article concludes by discussing the implications of this elective affinity for the public
sphere in Brazil.

KEYWORDS Brazil; economic journalism; elective affinity; financialization; mainstream econ-

omists; multiple correspondence analysis; professional dynamic

Introduction
Economic journalism in Brazil (Lene 2013), as in other countries—e.g. Argentina (Ruiz
2005), the United States (Mata 2011) and the Nordic countries (Kjær and Slaatta 2007)—
experienced an unprecedented expansion from the 1970s onwards. New ways of
framing business issues and events were developed and the business press underwent
key professionalizing innovations. Specialized economic newspapers and magazines
were launched, as well as special economic sections in newspapers (Gussow 1984). Once
these apparatuses of the cultural industry developed, economic journalism as a practice
of symbolic reproduction became part of Brazilian economic life. As such, it became part
of the symbolic struggles that aim to give direction to the economy and the polity.
Economic news published by the Brazilian press, however, tends not to give equal
voice to all agents and framings. Particularly, it tends to marginalize some perspectives
on the economy (Soveral and Pedroso Neto 2016). For example, after assessing five years
of news and editorials from the main national newspapers between 1985 and 1989
(Folha de São Paulo, O Estado de São Paulo, O Globo and Jornal do Brasil), Fonseca (2005)
concluded that the mainstream press act as “a private apparatus of hegemony”, bolstering
Journalism Studies, 2017
https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2017.1334572
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

a neoliberal agenda. Similarly, by analysing the political and economic coverage of the main
press since 2014, scholars from Universidade Estadual de Rio de Janeiro arrived at an ana-
logous conclusion: Dilma Rousseff’s government (Workers Party, PT) received vastly nega-
tive coverage (www.manchetometro.com.br). This means that there is a hierarchy of
“cognitive principles” (Bourdieu 2000), principles that tend to affect journalists’ selection
and framing of news, helping to reproduce dominant views in economic reporting. This
research asks how that hierarchy is produced in the Brazilian press.
One factor to consider is Brazil’s media sphere and its contradictory features. On the
one hand, the media have been a fundamental driver in democratizing Brazilian society
since the 1980s, advancing social and political change (Waisbord 2000; Matos 2008). For
example, with the exception of Globo Organizations, the media channelled public pressure
for the return to democracy by bolstering the campaign directas ja!, leading to the elections
that ended the dictatorship; and it played an “investigative role” in scrutinizing corruption
scandals. On the other hand, legacies of the military dictatorship (1964–1985) remain
rooted in the Brazilian media. In 1964, the dominant newspapers—e.g. O Estado de São
Paulo, Gazeta Mercantil and O Globo—supported the military coup, and it was during
this period that the great information oligopolies emerged. Today, 10 or so familiar econ-
omic groups dominate the market of mass communication. As Reporters Without Frontiers
(2013) put it, Brazil is the country of “30 Berlusconi”.
Another factor to consider is the financialization of capitalism since the 1980s, that is,
the process by which financial institutions increased their size and influence on the
economy (Amato and Fantacci 2012; Van der Zwan 2014). The role of the mainstream
press has not been innocuous in this. Finance has become a “media event” (Clark, Thrift,
and Tickell 2004) that pays greater attention to market reactions about investment and
speculation and financial players’ views, e.g. about deregulation, competition and retrench-
ing state services (Grün 2013). These descriptions of the economy are not neutral; they have
a performative effect, that is, they help to provoke the economy that they describe
(Muniesa 2014).
This article explores the relationship between elite economic journalists—in terms of
trust, reciprocity and power—and what Bourdieu (2000) calls “efficient agents” from the
economic field—i.e. mainstream economists, bankers, business people and financial
players. We do so by investigating the influence of these efficient agents on journalists’
careers, and therewith, on the public economic discussion in Brazil. Our hypothesis is
that key economic journalists have reached the top of the journalistic field (Benson
2006) by sharing the doxa of mainstream economists, that is, by reporting the economy
within a mainstream framework. It is this “elective affinity” (Weber 1930) between elite jour-
nalists and mainstream economists that we aim to explore, that is, the process through
which two cultural forms—intellectual, political or economic—that have certain analogies,
enter into a relationship of reciprocal attraction and influence, mutual selection, conver-
gence and reinforcement (Löwy 2004).
Several theories help to explain how journalists’ ideological affinities and professional
dynamics affect the way in which they select and report news. Shoemaker, Vos, and Reese
(2009, 73) emphasize the role of journalists as “gatekeepers” who in the process of “select-
ing, writing, editing, positioning, scheduling, repeating and otherwise massaging infor-
mation to become news … provide a picture of the world for the rest of us”. Others
point to the way journalists set the news agenda by defining what counts as newsworthy
(McCombs and Shaw 1972). By helping to set the agenda, journalists contribute to
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 3

prioritizing topics of public concern and to shaping views on these topics. Others point to
journalists’ routines as well as their interactions with sources and editors as being funda-
mental to the production of news. Tuchman (1976, 1978), for instance, showed how the
principles of media organization underlie the selection and framing of news events.
Further, researchers showed how newsmaking was influenced by journalism’s professional
conventions and its dominant culture (Schudson 2005). The norms, values and tools of
interpretation that journalists share as a professional community (Zelizer 1993) influence
the way in which they select, frame and cover stories.
Complementing the theories mentioned above, we study the media from the notion
of “field” (Bourdieu 1991; Lindell 2015). Brazilian economic journalism is considered a “social
space” (Pedroso Neto 2015), a subfield of journalism, which produces particular symbolic
goods—such as texts, columns, editorials and news—that have influence on society
(Duval 2004). Economic journalists are individuals located in a social structure, who in
order to develop their professional careers, cultivate relationships with journalists and
agents from other fields, especially from the “field of economists” (Loureiro 1997) and
the economic and political fields (Bourdieu 2005). We investigate the main achievements
that help to explain the position of elite economic journalists and we analyse the role
played by economic agents—taking into account their values, perspectives and views—
in journalists’ professional achievements.
We also examine journalists’ professional dynamic by studying Bourdieu’s notion of
illusion, that is, journalists’ engagement, enchantment and belief in the “field rules” (Bour-
dieu 1994; Costey 2005). In particular, we explore how journalists engage with certain
beliefs and practices that guide decision-making in the field, in which their personal
views and the field structure tend to coincide. We explore this illusion, analysing the
notion of “scoop” (Schudson 1995; Starkman 2014), that is, the types of exclusives that
are most valued in Brazilian economic journalism—as something that is recognized both
in the journalistic space and in journalists’ own views. This analysis considers that elite jour-
nalists, those most read and cited, are influential in reproducing the principles of selection
and guidance of the field, reinforcing the hierarchy of economic frameworks. By publishing
selectively, by stressing some views over others, journalists end up promulgating, however
indirectly, certain sorts of economic norms and prescriptions over others.
We use mixed methods. First, we present a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA)
of prosopographic data from two sets of economic journalists: 30 who are at the top of the
field (elite) and 23 who are from the same cohort—in terms of age and training—but are
not part of the elite in economic journalism. By elite we consider those journalists who are
at the top of institutions (Combessie 2001), which, in Brazilian economic journalism, means
executive editors, columnists, newsroom and desk directors of specialized economic pub-
lications (Gazeta Mercantil, Valor Econômico) and of the main national generalists newspa-
pers (O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de São Paulo, O Globo, Jornal do Brasil). This MCA provides
structural data on the space in which the Brazilian economic journalist elite is located.1
Then, for understanding journalists’ dynamic, we analyse 58 interviews with economic jour-
nalists from these two groups, elite and non-elite.
The article is organized as following. First, from the MCA, we compare elite and non-
elite economic journalists of the same age cohorts, describing the social origin, educational
background and professional trajectories of these two groups. Second, we explore journal-
ists’ professional dynamic, examining the most fertile topics and sources that produce
scoops, and how journalists relate to them. Then, we examine how elite journalists in
4 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

Brazil formed their perspectives on the economy. Fourth, we analyse the features of the
main economic sources and their links with the press. The article concludes by discussing
the implications of the elective affinity between elite journalists and efficient economic
agents for the public economic discussion in Brazil.

Structural Features of Brazilian Economic Journalism Elite

In order to investigate the field of economic journalism, we implemented a MCA
comparing elite and non-elite journalists. We obtained data from various sources: 120 ques-
tionnaires and 58 in-depth interviews, and also queried sites and books in an effort to fill
out journalists’ biographies.2 From this database with 120 prosopographies of economic
journalists, we identified 30 with elite features, all of whom are older than 40 years old.
We then selected all other journalists from the same age cohort in the database to comprise
the non-elite group: 23 reporters, special reporters and editors. While there are many other
non-elite economic journalists younger than 40 years old (57 in our database), we left them
out of the analysis. It is only by comparing elite and non-elite journalists from the same
cohort that we are able to identify the structural features of the field.3
The position of journalists in the journalistic space is due to social and professional
features, from family background to institutional position, through to education and
prior experience. The two axes separate journalists by age and other social attributes. We
gathered journalists according to four age cohorts in 2015: young (40–49), intermediate
(50–59), consolidated (60–69) and veteran (70–79).

Space of Elite and Non-elite Economic Journalists

Overall, 13 categories contributed to the formation of the first axis; of them, 6 charac-
terize those on the left4 and 7 categories characterize those on the right.5 On the left are
located most journalists of the intermediate (85.7 per cent) and young (50 per cent)
cohorts. On the right axis are located most journalists of the veteran (87.5 per cent) and
consolidated cohorts (53.9 per cent). The birthplace and current workplace of journalists
(São Paulo and other cities) as well as their professional trajectories6 also contribute to
the formation of the first axis. While journalists from the veteran and consolidated
cohort began in journalism between 1960 and 1970, they generally started in economic
journalism at generalist vehicles and news agencies and, during their careers, spent time
working at all dominant vehicles. Journalists from the intermediate cohort tended to
start working in the 1980s in specialized vehicles—especially Gazeta Mercantil.
Fourteen categories contributed to the formation of the second axis; of them, 6
characterize those on the upper side7 and 8 categories characterize those on the lower
side.8 The second axis also separates journalists by cohorts, but in this case, the intermedi-
ate (50–59) from the consolidated (60–69). Social background as well as educational and
professional trajectories also contribute to the formation of the axes. Whereas intermediate
journalists (50–59) tend to have more modest social origins (e.g. working-class parents with
minimal levels of educational achievement—father with primary school, manual job and
went to private university), the proportion of journalists whose parents performed intellec-
tual work (69.2 per cent) and attended public universities (84.6 per cent) is higher among
consolidated journalists.
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 5

FIGURE 1
The space of economic journalists

The distribution of economic journalists in the factorial plan shows that elites are con-
centrated in the upper quadrants, especially in the upper right quadrant (URQ), and part of
the non-elite is concentrated in the left quadrant, especially the lower left quadrant (LLQ).
Following the MCA field principles, we compared differences and distances between elite
journalists who are in the URQ and non-elite journalists located in the LLQ (Figure 1).
We chose to analyse those categories that had contributed above average to the dis-
tribution in the space, and, among them, those that were located in the URQ—which have
positive coordinates in both axes,9 and those who were in the LLQ—negative coordinates
on two axes.10 As support, we consider all supplementary variables that were in the URQ11
and all who were in the LLQ.12 What are the findings?

Active Categories
First, there is a clear generational difference that can be seen from all available indi-
cators: elites tended to be over 60 years old while non-elites are younger than 60; elites
tended to have graduated in the 1960s and 1970s while non-elites tended to have gradu-
ated in the 1980s. Second, regarding higher education, most elite economic journalists
attended public universities such as Universidades de São Paulo, Federal do Rio and Nacio-
nal de Brasilia—Brazil’s most prestigious institutions—and non-elite economic journalists
tended to study at private universities such as Metodista, Faculdade Anhembi Morumbi,
Unisinos, Cásper Líbero, Instituto Metodista de Ensino Superior, Gama Filho and Pontifícia
Católica de São Paulo. Third, elite journalists tended to begin in economic reporting in main
generalist newspapers and in news agencies. Non-elites, by contrast, tended to start in
small generalist newspapers and in specialized media. Interestingly, elite journalists did
not necessarily work at all dominant vehicles. Fourth, whereas elite economic journalists
tended to make their careers in the press, radio and television, non-elite ones, from the
same generation, tended to maintain their journalistic careers only in the printed press
(Figure 2).
6 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

FIGURE 2
The space of categories

In sum, there are generational differences between elites and non-elites, evincing the
weight of seniority in the journalistic field. Second, elite economic journalists have higher
social origin than non-elite ones, either by education and occupation of parents, or by the
type of university they attended. Third, elite and non-elite journalists differ in their career
paths within the media. While older journalists (upper right quadrant) made their careers
in major national general vehicles and also on radio and television, the younger ones
(upper left quadrant) made their careers mostly in specialized vehicles, namely Gazeta Mer-
cantil and Valor Econômico. Knowing the structure of the economic journalistic field gives us
some clues about elite and non-elite positioning—i.e. how the field structure affects jour-
nalists’ career, e.g. in order to climb the ladder economic journalists have to work either on
large national newspapers, radio and television (reaching large audiences) or reach top pos-
itions at specialized newspapers—Gazeta Mercantil until 2008, Valor Econômico today. For
understanding the field’s dynamic, we explore the most fertile topics and sources, and how
journalists relate to them.

The Dynamic of Economic Journalism in Brazil: “Moving the Market” and

Cultivating Strategic Relationships
Competition within journalism is fierce, and takes multiple forms: accessing key
sources, identifying controversial topics, dominating headlines and writing significant
columns. Here nothing is so determinant as front-page visibility, in other words, having a
powerful scoop. The greater this visibility over time, the greater a journalist’s impact, and
usually—therewith—the journalist’s career. Having an “exclusive” is a major motivation
for journalists, as the literature (Schudson 1995; Duval 2004; Neveu 2006) and our intervie-
wees reveal: it fulfils them professionally.
There are different ways of producing scoops about the economy, e.g. long-term
investigations, exclusive interviews or financial revelations. An important distinction here
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 7

is between access and accountability reporting. While access-focused reporting seeks to

obtain inside information about the intentions of powerful actors, accountability-focused
reporting seeks to gather information not from powerful actors, but rather about them,
thus playing a media watchdog role (Starkman 2014, 10). Brazilian journalists ideally aim
to produce reporting that satisfies both access and accessibility criteria, but they struggle
to produce accountability reporting while maintaining access to their sources. A special
reporter explains:
If last week I published a piece that irritated the Minister of Transport, and the spokesman
of the Minister asks me to help spread particular information, I will probably attend to his
demand. I can be critical of the Minister, but I cannot lose my access to him. (Non-elite, 30–
39, Valor Econômico)13
What kinds of scoops are dominant in Brazilian economic journalism: those of access
or accountability? Access scoops are undoubtedly the predominant ones, particularly those
related to financial markets, their agents, institutions and prospects. For instance, the major
economic scandals in Brazil in recent years—e.g. corrupt political campaign financing, the
Petrobras scandal—have not been revealed by journalists’ investigations, but by police
inquests or plea-bargains that then become public. By having an influential scoop,
journalists feel recognized by peers, authorities and audiences. A renowned journalist
comments:
The best thing for a journalist is to have a scoop at hand. It is a wonderful feeling of adre-
naline; to have something that no one knows. When a company is going to buy another
and there are billions involved, you have the news that will “move the market” that will
move everybody. (Elite, 60–69, former Gazeta Mercantil and Valor Econômico)
The idea of moving the market (mexer com o mercado) excites most economic journal-
ists today. But that was not always the case. According to the literature (Abreu 2003; Lene
2013), during the 1970s and 1980s the main scoops in Brazilian economic journalism, those
that partly realized this dimension of illusion, depended mainly on gaining access to gov-
ernment authorities, e.g. ministers of planning and economy.
This was particularly the case during the military government (1964–1985), where
information was restricted. Since the mid-1980s, access reporting has continued to be
central for producing scoops, but the sources consulted were diversified, including
government authorities, industrial associations, labour representatives and scholars (Lene
2013). With the financialization of economic reporting in Brazil and the growing influence
of real-time news agencies since the 1990s, however, financial agents—e.g. banking econ-
omists, market operators, consultants—have become principal media informants (Puliti
2013). For instance, with the introduction of real-time news in 2013 at Valor Econômico,
banking economist and market operators increased their media presence (Undurraga
2016), and therewith, news related to financial activities that move the market:
Fifteen, 20 years ago you still had academic economists as the main sources of infor-
mation. The speed of economic journalism today, however, means that our sources are
increasingly market analysts or consultants that sell economic analysis. They are produ-
cing information at very high speed, and are always available to comment. So we end
up listening much more to the market, contaminating our reporting. (Non-elite, 50–59,
Valor Econômico)
8 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

The growing media presence of banking economists and financial agents has
allowed them to put increasing pressure on the public economic discussion in Brazil.
This pressure affects economic reporting for both elite and non-elite journalists. The differ-
ence, however, is that this pressure has favoured those elite journalists who have closer
access to financial agents and economic authorities. That difference is manifested in how
journalists describe their relationships with sources—and who those sources are.
Whereas non-elite journalists tend to mention press officers, banking agents and market
analysts as their main sources, elite journalists stress their relationships with prestigious
economists that were ministers and now lead investment firms or banks. Similarly,
whereas non-elite journalists tend not to name people directly, but simply say “my
sources”, an “influential company”, a “market source”, elite journalists tend to display the
names and trajectories of their top sources, stressing their intimate relationships. The differ-
ent types of ties and proximities with sources are explicit. A non-elite journalist comments:
For good coverage of firms in Brazil you need sources at the banks and law offices. They
produce scoops. We complement the picture with analysts and PR [public relations] advi-
sors’ views. But PR advisors are exhausting. They send press releases and telephone us per-
sistently. But when there is a controversy, they offer us a compensation for not reporting,
such as the promise of a future exclusive with the firm’s president. (Non-elite, 50–59, Valor
Econômico)
By contrast, when elite journalists report a scoop or a major interview that “gives
them the front page”, they tend to stress their familiarity with their sources and their
shared trajectories.
I knew Edmar Bacha long before he was President of BNDES [(Brazilian Development
Bank) during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s government], he was my friend. We had an
agreement: “while you are in government we are no longer friends. You are a source of
information and I’m a journalist”…When Arminio Fraga (President of Central Bank 1999-
2003, during Cardoso’s government) calls me to give an interview it is because he
trusts my work. It’s an interview. I ask things that he does not like to answer. (Elite, 70–
79, Estado de São Paulo)
While the types of relationships that non-elite and elite journalists build with sources
are different, what both of them have in common is that access, rather than accountability,
is the main feature of Brazilian economic reporting. Journalists invest in multiple ways to
build trusting relationships with sources, e.g. meetings, lunches, seminars, phone calls
and events. Cultivating access to sources is so vital, then, that newspapers have institutio-
nalized the nurturing of those relationships. The main publications have regular meetings
with key sources such as government officials, businessmen and banking economists, who
use those meetings to both search for newsroom information and send messages to other
actors.

Elite Journalists and Mainstream Economists: Elective Affinity or

Professional Illusion?
When we observe the institutions and economists cited by elite economic journalists,
those most celebrated—e.g. called “bright”, “genius” or “great masters”—tend to be
sources located at the intersection of the economists’ field (Loureiro 1997) and the
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 9

economic field, particularly those specialized in finance. There seems to be an elective affi-
nity between elite economic journalists and top economists with financial links. This is not
to say that all elite economic journalists in Brazil conform to liberal ideas—there are differ-
ent styles, priorities and values within the field (Abreu and Rocha 2006; Undurraga 2016,
2017)—but the most successful ones tend to echo mainstream economic views.
Noticeably, these top economists have common academic and professional paths.
Most of them were educated and teach at Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Rio de
Janeiro (PUC-RJ) and Fundação Getulio Vargas Rio de Janeiro (FGV-RJ). Most then worked
in Cardoso’s governments (1994–2002)—at ministries, on public boards or at the Central
Bank—and gained their prestige for engineering the Real Plan, the new currency that
helped to tame decades of inflation crises. Afterwards, many became consultants, fund
managers and/or partners of investment banks. During the last 30 years, these economists
have been the most “efficient economic agents”, more or less pulling the strings of the
country. Having access to these top economists is fundamental for economic reporting.
An influential columnist displays his connections with this group:
I talk weekly with several economists, including the ones that I do not agree with. Last
week I had lunch with Jose Francisco Lima Gonçalves, the chief economist of Banco
Factor. I regularly talk to Mario Mezquita, Affonso Celso Pastore, Mario Toros, Swartzer
Arnold, all former directors of the Central Bank, and now working in investment banks;
with Rodrigo Acevedo, of another investment firm, with Fabio Giambiagi, from BNDS.
Sergio Lucena, researcher of FGV/RJ and partner of MSM consulting. Monica de Baulle,
from Galante investments and PUC/RJ. I talk to Andre Lara Resende, Percio Arida,
Eduardo Acevedo, Arminio Fraga [economic team of Cardoso’s government]. I also talk
with the government’s economists, the developmentalists: with Alexandre Tombini, pre-
sident of the Central Bank, with Luciano Coutinho, president of BNDS. (Elite, 40–49,
Valor Econômico)

As the above quote evinces, elite journalists tend to express a subtle hierarchy of
respect among economists. Most of the economists mentioned above are linked with
finance and mainstream economics; they are the most respected sources in economic jour-
nalism in Brazil. Having access to these economists strengthens journalists’ chances of
having invitations to breakfasts, exclusive interviews and scoops, even becoming sources
themselves.
To put things in context, the economists’ field in Brazil has changed since the 1970s—
i.e. economics courses were modernized, scholars were trained abroad—and economists
rose to elite positions in the state apparatus, claiming jurisdictional expertise to steer the
economy (Loureiro 1997, 61–70). These changes reinforced the polarization among econ-
omists, between ECLAC/CEPAL or heterodox approaches, on the one hand, and monetarist
or orthodox approaches, on the other. Currently, this polarization is institutionally struc-
tured as follows: heterodox economists from Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
(UFRJ) and Universidade de Campinas (Unicamp) versus orthodox economists from PUC/
RJ and FGV/RJ, with economists from Universidade do São Paulo (FEA/SP) and Fundação
Getulio Vargas São Paulo (FGV/SP) in the middle. Whereas heterodox economists tend to
have careers in public universities, in government or public enterprises, orthodox econom-
ists tend to have careers at the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, consultancies or
investment banks (Loureiro 1997, 70–84).
10 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

During the last decades, the narratives favoured by each sector describe parallel rea-
lities. While heterodox economists celebrate the best social indicators in Brazil’s history with
respect to poverty alleviation, reduction of inequality and employment (Lavinas 2013),
orthodox economists point to the country’s low growth, stagnation and a corrupt state
apparatus (Giambiagi 2016). These clashing narratives of Brazil reflect a larger “cultural
war” (Grün 2010) between two societal projects in dispute, which in the public discussion
are identified as neoliberalism and state-interventionism. Whereas advocates of the former
defend the privatization of state firms, trade liberalization and the macro-economic stability
engineered by Cardoso’s (PSDB) governments (1994–2002) (Bacha 2012), champions of the
latter defend the PT policies of the governments of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and Dilma
Rousseff (2003–2016), in which the state actively promoted domestic markets, raised the
minimum wage and implemented successful social programmes (Singer 2012). Controver-
sies regarding the role of Brazil’s Development Bank, the independence of the Central Bank,
workers’ rights and the administration of state-owned firms divide economists along het-
erodox and orthodox lines.
Due to their interstitial position (Lewis 2012), elite journalists have the ability to cross
professional boundaries (Revers 2014; Undurraga 2017), connecting different sources and
types of knowledges between the political and economic fields. Elite journalists operate
as nodes of cutting-edge information between government officials, businessmen and
financial players, articulating messages in both directions. “Some of these columnists are
said by their colleagues to ‘make prices’, that is, their opinions are seen to affect market
movements directly, as well as governmental decisions relating to those movements”
(Undurraga 2016, 16). In their mediating role, elite journalists enter into reciprocal relation-
ships with these “efficient agents”.
Claudia Safatle, our director in Brasilia, and I are very much in demand, since we follow
very closely the government and the markets. I am not sought out by economists to
advance their agendas. Rather, they seek me out to know where the government is
going, what is happening backstage: “What do you think that Tombini [the director of
the Central Bank] will do at the next COPOM [interest rate meeting]? Do you think that
Dilma will intervene in the economy? (Elite, 40–49, Valor Econômico)

It is important to stress that journalists have different relationships with economists,

and use different professional adjectives to describe them, e.g. capable, trustworthy,
serious. On the one hand, journalists tend not to express their views on economists’ think-
ing, mobilizing professional principles to explain their relationships with them, such as that
of trust and respect. These adjectives are very often deployed by journalists in reference to
mainstream economists. On the other hand, these professional adjectives are more often
left aside when referring to developmentalists, interventionists or “economists from
Campinas”.
The team that implemented the Real Plan were very capable people: Persio Arida, André
Lara Resende, Edmar Bacha. With their policies I began to understand: you have to open
up the country, there has to be a competitive shock. (Elite, 70–79, O Globo)
The economists associated with Cardoso’s government, PUC and FGV/RJ are
hugely respected figures among economic journalists, particularly among those who
champion the pro-business policies promoted by these economists. Journalists tend to
justify their respect for them by arguing that they embody professional principles
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 11

such as that of “seriousness”, “competence” and “trust”. There is an interesting differ-

ence, however, in the way elite journalists tend to refer to former PT ministers and het-
erodox economists. For those agents, criticism and negative evaluations are explicitly
manifested.
Things got worse since Dilma entered Lula’s second government. She likes a centralist
state. Once president, she put Mantega [a heterodox economist] in charge of the
economy, who is simply a shit. No one respects Mantega. He has no presence or intellec-
tual weight. He does what Dilma tells him to do. So Dilma is responsible for our mediocre
situation. (Elite, 70–79, O Globo)

It would be interesting to assess the quality of analysis made by economists from Unicamp
or UFRJ versus those from PUC or FGV. [What is your impression?] I do not know those
from Campinas very well. But they are very ideological, backward looking. Not all. I
think PUC staff does the most intelligent analysis. (Elite, 70–79, O Estado de São Paulo)
Acknowledging this tendency, however, does not mean that all elite economic jour-
nalists coincide with mainstream economic positions. At Valor Econômico, for instance, the
leading economic newspaper in Brazil, dissonant economic positions among journalists
and executive editors coexist in the newsroom (Undurraga 2016, 7–10). Disputes
between top journalists reveal not only their different views on the economy but also
the different recognition that they attribute to orthodox economists and financial
agents. Due to their prestige and influence, maintaining access to these figures is funda-
mental for journalists. But maintaining access to them has implications for journalists’ cov-
erage, generating tensions between neutrality and self-expression (Undurraga 2017, 9).
Journalists’ attribution of authority to orthodox economists—e.g. trustworthiness, serious-
ness and respect—evinces a subtle submission to the financial doxa, putting in tension the
search for neutral reporting with access to these sources. Further, many elite journalists in
Brazil explicitly adhere to this doxa since these economists were their main economic
mentors.

Orthodox Economists’ Ascendancy on Elite Economic Journalists

In exploring elite journalists’ training in economics, a clear relationship of ascendancy
with orthodox economists emerges. Top economic journalists in Brazil were not taught
economics during their journalism degree. They generally started covering economic
issues more by chance than by specialization. A recurrent narrative among elite journalists
goes as follows:
I started in 1970 at Jornal do Brasil. It is not that I wanted to be an economic journalist. I was
assigned to the economy desk; I liked it and stayed there. So, I learnt [economics] reading a
lot of bank reports and following the Central Bank discussion. (Elite, 70–79, O Globo)

Elite journalists tend to be self-educated in economics through journalistic reporting

and newsroom conversations. Gazeta Mercantil was the “main school” for many. Interview-
ing economists and ministers, and having to explain economic phenomena to readers,
were also cited as quick ways to learn. This trajectory is recorded in the literature (Abreu
2003; Resende 2005; Abreu and Rocha 2006), and confirmed in our interviews. The excep-
tions are journalists under 40 years old who have studied post-graduate degrees in
12 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

economics while acting as journalists. In looking at prevalent learning experiences that dis-
tinguish elite journalists, working at governmental bodies and relating to financial agents
are salient. Many elite journalists describe how they learnt the skills of economic coverage
as press officers in ministries and governmental banks.
During the 2008 crisis, I was at the Central Bank. It was a phenomenal learning experience.
The Bank had to do complex operations of taking cash reserves, making dollar auctions,
things that we were not used to in Brazil. We had to explain these operations in the
press. We discussed the crisis with the Bank directors, who are great economists. All
studied abroad, all are doctors! (Elite, 50–59, Valor Econômico)
While “learning [economics] by doing” is the predominant narrative among elite jour-
nalists, another way in which many of them learnt to cover economic issues was by direct
instruction by economists from the space of finance. The example of Miriam Leitão (elite,
60–69), a hugely influential journalist from O Globo, is emblematic:
I’ve never done any course, but the number of economists who I’ve interviewed, asking
them to explain to me this and that, is equivalent to a full course … When I took over
the economic desk of Jornal do Brasil, the executive editor made a contract with two “bril-
liant economists” from PUC, Rogério Werneck and Dionisio Dias Carneiro, for them to have
lunch with me once a week to clarify doubts and alert us to new facts. Those were mag-
nificent meetings, where I learned a lot. (Abreu and Rocha 2006, 86)
Another fundamental way journalists learnt their economics, which was mentioned again
and again in the interviews, was through covering the economic plans of the 1980s and
1990s, from the Cruzado Plan (1986) to the Real Plan (1994). This is what Nassif (2003,
13) calls “journalism of service”, that is, the effort to explain economic phenomena to the
lay people, helping Brazilians to navigate turbulent times. Elite journalists, in particular,
point out that they had to study and explain these economic plans, and that that was a
“big test for the editors”:

I started working at Agencia Brasil. In 1990 Collor de Mello launched the Collor Plan, which
was terrible. The Collor plan quickly failed and soon Collor Plan 2 was released, which also
failed quickly. I then went to work at Jornal do Brasil. There I consolidated my career as an
economic reporter. I covered the making of the whole Real Plan. (Elite, 40–49, Valor
Econômico)

It was in the context of inflation crises, economic instability, and the trial and error of
economic plans that many journalists formed their economic views. Two aspects are salient
here. First, when journalists talk about the acquisition of their economic knowledge, the
actors and institutions they name tend to be orthodox economists from the financial
space. Among elite journalists, there is no single mentoring reference to heterodox or
developmentalist economists. Second, professional advances in the journalistic field are
facilitated by learning the skills to explain the economy, and by sharing the worldviews
and relations of dominant players. In Brazil, elite journalists that worked with “efficient
agents” at the Central Bank, or in economic ministries or in private banks, tended to rise
in their professional careers, e.g. getting editorial positions, becoming sources, and
having access to television and radio. There is a manifest elective affinity between these
two groups. Non-elite journalists, by contrast, did not work in governmental banks or
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 13

ministerial departments and made their careers mostly in specialized titles. Their familiarity
and socialization with efficient agents of the economic field is more limited, and so is their
advancement in the journalistic field.

Discussion
This article examined the relationship between elite economic journalists and main-
stream economists in Brazil, investigating the influence of the latter on journalists’ careers,
and therewith, on the public economic discussion. Structurally, the data show that there are
two main routes for accessing and maintaining elite positions, which mark two generations
of economic journalists. One is for a journalist to make his or her career at the big generalist
newspapers and then go on to radio and television, reaching larger audiences. This tends to
be the case for journalists above 60 years old. The other elite career type is through a
specialized newspaper, such as Valor Econômico, where journalists strengthen their capacity
to connect sources from different fields and broker messages between them. This tends to
be the case of elite journalists between 40 and 59 years old. Although professional career
types among elite journalists diverge in this way, a common feature across generations is
the importance of gaining access to “efficient agents”, e.g. Central Bank directors, main-
stream economists and financial players. There seems to be an elective affinity between
“efficient agents” of this kind and elite journalists. Both groups need each other: the
former to convince people and investors of their economic views, the latter to explain
the economy and to produce scoops. Since a “journalism of access” prevails in Brazil,
access to these efficient agents is fundamental for journalists’ success.
There is, however, an interesting shift between these generations. Particularly among
veteran journalists, contacts and sources with government officials were fundamental for
their careers. Accessing government corridors and ministerial meetings was key for their
economic reporting. While government sources are still relevant, journalists today must
enlarge their access to include financial sources; especially relevant are staff who circulate
between government and financial institutions. It is no surprise then that elite journalists
who worked at the Central Bank, at economic ministries or at private banks linked with
top economists tended to rise in their professional careers. Considering the increasing influ-
ence of financial players in the Brazilian economy, the prestige of mainstream economists
in the public sphere helps us to understand why elite journalists have incentives to perform
the professional illusion of scoops related to financial markets, their agents and institutions.
One consequence of this influence is that financial players have greater visibility and plat-
form for expressing their views in the mainstream media, e.g. as columnists, sources,
opinion makers and interviewees. Another consequence is that elite journalists tend to
reproduce the economic worldview of dominant agents. This helps to explain why elite
journalists tend to treat mainstream economists with admiration and professional
respect, citing them as “brilliant economists”, “friendly people” or “extremely capable”. By
contrast, when references are made to heterodox economists, elite journalists tend to
refer to them as “out-dated”, “backward looking” and “ideologically driven”. These distinc-
tions are certainly not unequivocal, but nevertheless an asymmetrical pattern emerges.
Revealing the elective affinity between elite economic journalists and mainstream
economists in Brazil helps us to understand the relationship between government officials,
economic agents and lay people, for instance, how the political conflict over resource dis-
tribution is affected by the public discussion. The influence of mainstream economic
14 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

sources on the framing used by elite journalists helps to promulgate economic policy
aligned to the interests of the financial sector. According to Grün (2010), the ascendancy
of mainstream economists on journalists in Brazil has helped to spread a narrative of “finan-
cial domination”, one that celebrates one “correct” way in which the economy should work
—and stigmatizes bureaucracy as an inefficient form of “dishonest expenditure”. This nar-
rative has led society and the state to accept the transfer of income to financiers and renters
via bank spreads and very high basic interest rates (SELIC)—instead of transferring those
resources to other sectors such as infrastructure, social programmes or education (Grün
2013). This financial narrative also helped to justify the parliamentary coup against Dilma
Rousseff in 2016—supporting the view that the PT government was corrupt, stagnated
the economy and threatened the country’s future.
Having described these findings, it is important also to stress the limits of the mixed-
method employed. This MCA helps to explain the structural dynamic of the journalistic
field, particularly the incentives and constraints that economic journalists face in seeking
to advance their careers, while the interviews bring texture to our claim that they have
an elective affinity with mainstream economists. Our methodological design, however,
does not produce data to explain how the structural relation between journalists and econ-
omists is expressed or played out in each media outlet. Ownership and control of news
organizations in Brazil frequently dictate the way a topic is supposed to be covered,
leaving little room for journalists to act independently (Nassif 2003; Fonseca 2005; Puliti
2013). The main presses in Brazil are dominated by a few “media barons” with huge political
and economic power (Reporters Without Frontiers 2013). Despite these structural imbal-
ances, the relationship between journalists, editors and owners is different in each news-
room, e.g. journalists at Valor Econômico have more independence than at O Globo, since
they do not have the pressure or temptation to please one single owner (Undurraga
2016, 2017). Further ethnographies of newsrooms that explore the dynamic between
editors and owners, as well as frame analysis of the way in which journalists cover economic
events (Soveral and Pedroso Neto 2016), would bring more light to this issue.
Another limitation to consider is the extent to which economic journalists in Brazil—
and elsewhere—maintain a monopoly on news production and therewith a traditional
gatekeeping role. The expansion of the internet, the increasing sophistication of the blogo-
sphere and the viral news-spreading capacity that social networks have to spread “news”—
well or badly investigated, real or fake—enable alternative sources to bypass journalists in
their traditional gatekeeping role. The boundaries of the journalistic profession, in this
regard, are even blurrier. While mainstream economic sources maintain an upper hand
in influencing economic journalists, other sources have increasing capacity to express
their voices in the media sphere. Having said that, non-professional bloggers often lack
the competence and resources to report and investigate news properly. Whether or not
these alternative sources spread their voices, the reputation and authority that mainstream
economists maintain in Brazil is reproduced by elite journalists, helping to spread their
views—and interests—in the public economic debate.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are very thankful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article from Tiago Mata,
Sasha Mudd, John Morris and the participants of the workshop “Brazilian Media and the Journal-
istic Field”, at University College London on July 2015. Likewise, we appreciate the suggestions
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 15

offered by the anonymous reviewers and editors of Journalism Studies. We are especially grateful
for the generosity of the many journalists who shared their working experience and professional
trajectories with us. Without their openness, this research would not have been possible.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

FUNDING
This research has received funding from the European Research Council under the
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme [(FP7/2007–2013)/ERC Grant Agree-
ment No. 283754], and from the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tec-
nológico (CNPq), Brazil, http://cnpq.br/. In it latest stages, it also received funding from
Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (CONICYT) [FONDAP/
15130009], http://www.conicyt.cl/.

NOTES
1. The main axes resulting from the MCA are the ones that concentrate the largest disper-
sions (Lebaron 2006). The social space is built by the distances between “statistical indi-
viduals” from active variables. The distances between them reflect their dissimilarities:
the more different, more distant, and vice versa. These distances reflect the interaction
of all variables that together indicate the position of individuals—cloud points—in a mul-
tidimensional social space (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010). Supplementary variables then are
projected on the space created by the active variables, and thus help to explain them. See
Appendix B.
2. Who’s who in journalism, Centro Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea
do Brasil (CPDOC), Maxpress, Centro Cultura e Memória do Jornalismo, Portal dos Jorna-
listas, Memória Globo.
3. Appendix A shows the list of elite and non-elite journalists analysed.
4. Working experience in São Paulo; intermediate age (50–59); started in economic news-
papers and magazines; started in economic journalism 1980–1989; worked at Gazeta
Mercantil or Valor Econômico; not received award.
5. Working experience in other cities; birthplace in other state capital; started in economic
journalism between 1970 and 1979; started economic journalism in generalist and large
newspapers and magazines; started journalism between 1960 and 1969; not having
worked at Gazeta Mercantil or Valor Econômico; not having worked at dominant vehicles.
6. Started in journalism 1960–1969 or 1980–1989; vehicle that started in economic journal-
ism; have worked (or not) in main specialized economic newspaper; in dominant vehicles;
have received (or not) journalistic awards.
7. Worked in dominant titles; consolidated cohort (60–69); parents with intellectual pro-
fessions; educated in public universities; entered economic journalism by generalist
national newspaper and magazines; entered economic journalism through a news
agency.
8. Did not work in dominant vehicle; are 50–59 years old; father with primary education
only; father that work manually; went to private university; entered economic journalism
16 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

through large generalist newspaper or magazine; entered economic journalism through

small generalist newspaper; started working in journalism between 1980 and 1989.
9. Consolidated cohort; public university; started journalism between 1960 and 1969;
started journalism in national generalist newspapers or news agencies and was never
in main titles.
10. Age 50–59; private university; started journalism between 1980 and 1989; started in gen-
eralist and small newspapers and magazines or in newspapers and magazines special-
ized in the economy.
11. Finished university education between 1960 and 1969; finished university education
between 1970 and 1979; started in generalist and national newspapers and magazines
– small or medium; started journalism in radio or television; 60–69 years old; 70–79
years old; elite; went through radio and television.
12. Finished university education between 1980–1989; started journalism in generalist and
small newspapers and magazines or in specialized publications; started journalism
between 1980 and 1989; did not worked at the elite generalist newspapers nor at
radio or television.
13. Since some journalists interviewed preferred to maintain their anonymity, we do not
reveal journalists’ names in the quotes, but distinguish between elite and non-elite
and workplace.

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Antonio Jose Pedroso Neto, Postgraduate Program in Communication and Society,

Federal University of Tocantins (Universidad federal de Tocantins), Brazil. E-mail:
ajpedrosoneto@uol.com.br
Tomás Undurraga (author to whom correspondence should be addressed), Department
of Sociology, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile and Research Associate,
Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London, UK.
E-mail: t.undurraga@ucl.ac.uk
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 19

Appendix A
Journalists with Elite Features (30)
Affonso Ritter, Bela Hammes, Denise Juliani, Denise Toledo, Fátima Turci, Fernando
Castilho, Joseph Kupfer, Milton Gamez, Sergio Leo, Sonia Racy, Carlos Sardenberg, Celso
Ming, Joelmir Beting, Miriam Leitão, Aluizio Maranhão, Angela Bittencourt, Celia Gouvea,
Claudia Safatle, Cristiano Romero, Flavia Oliveira, Humberto Saccomandi, Jose Campos,
Luis Nassif, Maria Cristina Fernandes, Matias Molina, Pedro Cafardo, Raquel Balarin, Suely
Caldas, Vera Brandimarte and Vera Durão.

Non-elite Journalists from the Same Age Cohort (Above 40 Years Old) (23)
Arturo Pereira, Cecilia Zioni, Cleide Silva, Cley Scholz, Cynthia Malta, Denise Zando-
nadi, Eduardo Belo, Eugenio Esber, Eugenio Melloni, Gilberto Leal, Isabel Aguiar, Liliana
Lavoratti, Marli Olmos, Nair Suzuki, Nelson Rocco, Vicente Nunes, Victor Paolozzi, Vivaldo
Sousa, Vladimir Goitia, Daniela Chiaretti, Denise Neumann, Ivo Ribeiro and Nelson Niero.

Appendix B: MCA
The Variables and Their Categories
Journalists’ position is due to a set of social features data, from family background to
the current professional position, through education and experience. These features were
objectified in 23 variables and 74 categories. Among them, 15 variables with 44 categories
are “active” and 8 variables with 30 categories are “supplementary”.
Variables on journalists’ social properties
1. Age in 2015 (active): 40–49 (young), 50–59 (intermediate), 60–69 (consolidated),
70–79 (veteran).
2. Gender (active): male, female.
3. Birthplace (active): interior, other state capital, São Paulo.
4. Father’s education (active): completed primary, completed secondary, completed
medium, completed higher education.
5. Father’s occupation (active): manual, technical, intellectual, employer.
Variables on journalist’ school career
6. Year of graduation in higher education (active): 1960–1969, 1970–1979, 1980–
1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2009.
7. University graduated (active): private university, public university.
Variables on journalist’ occupational trajectory
8. Year that started in journalism (active): 1960–1969, 1970–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–
1999.
9. Vehicle in which started in journalism (supplementary): (a) general and small news-
papers and magazines such as A Gazeta Esportiva, Diário Popular, Jornal da Tarde, Diário da
Grande ABC, O Paraná, Jornal Passo a Passo, Jornal do Povo, Jornal do Commercio (Recife,
Pernambuco), trade unions newspapers and others. Also Revista Rua Grande, Direção,
Fatos & Fotos and technical magazines; (b) generalist and medium newspapers and maga-
zines such as Correio Brasiliense and Tribuna; (c) generalist and large newspapers and maga-
zines such Correio do Povo and Zero Hora; (d) generalist and national newspapers and
magazines such as O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de São Paulo, O Globo, Jornal do Brasil
20 ANTONIO JOSE PEDROSO NETO AND TOMÁS UNDURRAGA

(until 1980) and magazine Veja; (e) newspapers and magazines specialized in the economy
such as A Gazeta, Diário Comércio e Indústria, Jornal do Commercio (Rio de Janeiro), RJ,
Gazeta Mercantil and Globo Rural; (f) television and radio, such as TV Gaúcha and Rádio
Jornal do Brasil; and (g) news agencies such as Agência Telenotícia da Revista Visão and
others.
10. Year in which started in economic journalism (supplementary): 1960–1969, 1970–
1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, 2000–2009.
11. Vehicle in which started economic journalism (active): (a) generalist and small
newspapers and magazines such as Jornal da Tarde and Diário da Grande ABC; (b) generalist
and large newspapers and magazines such as Correio do Povo and Zero Hora; (c) generalist
and national newspapers and magazines such as O Estado de São Paulo, Folha de São Paulo,
O Globo, Jornal do Brasil (until 1980) and magazines Veja and Isto E; (d) newspapers and
magazines specialized in the economy such as A Gazeta, Diário Comércio e Indústria,
Jornal do Commercio (Rio de Janeiro), Gazeta Mercantil, Valor Econômico and magazines
Exame, Globo Rural and others; and (e) news agencies such as Agencia Brasil/Radiobrás,
Agência Telenotícia da Revista Visão and others.
12. Initial role in economic journalism (active): editor or writer, reporter or freelance.
13. Current role in economic journalism (active): (a) columnist, executive editor, news-
room director, edition director; (b) desk editor, newsroom editor, special reporter; (c) repor-
ter and freelance.
14. City in which works (active): Brasilia, São Paulo, others.
15. Working experience in the state (supplementary): unknown, federal government,
regional government.
16. Working experience abroad (supplementary): do not know, study abroad, work
abroad.
17. Working experience in dominant vehicles (active): unknown, yes, no (including O
Estado de São Paulo, Folha de São Paulo, O Globo, Jornal do Brasil, Gazeta Mercantil and Valor
Econômico).
18. Working experience in Gazeta Mercantil or Valor Econômico (active): unknown, yes,
no.
19. Working experience in radio and/or television (supplementary): we do not know,
yes (at least one of them), no.
20. Working experience in at least two of the great cities of journalism—Sao Paulo,
Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia (supplementary): we do not know, yes (at least in two of
them), no.
Variables on social recognition and journalistic reputation
21. Journalistic awards/prizes received during the career (active): yes, no.
22. Published books (active): yes, no.
Variable position on the elite
23. Belonging or not to the elite of Brazilian economic journalism (supplementary):
yes, no.

Factorial Axes
We did a MCA with the SPAD software (Coheris Spad Analytics). According to the
principles of geometric data analysis (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010), the MCA presented 12
axes after the Benzécri correction of the eigenvalues but retained for analysis only the
 ELECTIVE AFFINITIVE BETWEEN JOURNALISTS AND ECONOMISTS 21

first two, with “accumulated modified rate” of 63.19–35.79 per cent from the first and 27.4
per cent from the second. We used the “contributions method” to separate categories that
were analysed, i.e. we retained for analysis only those that contributed to the axis and have
overall contribution to the inertia above the average; 100/44 = 2.3 (Bonnet, Lebaron, and Le
Roux 2015, 104).