Case No. 61 - Bonifacio Ysip v.
Municipal Council of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, the Nacionalista Party has now split its forces between the
Nueva Ecija, et al GR No. L-18947 April 29, 1922
Topic: Construction of Election Law
FACTS:
At the last general election in 1919, two parties, namely: The Partido
Democrata and the Partido Nacionalista, contested for the supremacy in
the municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. The highest number of votes was
cast for Partido Nacionalista, and the second highest number of votes for
Partido Demcrata. Due to political changes, the Partido Nacionalista
divided into two parties: Partido Nacionalista and Partido Nacionalista
Collectivista.
Section 11 of Act No. 3030 provides:
“Should there be in such municipality one or more political parties or
branches or fractions thereof, or political groups, then two of said
inspectors and two substitutes for the same shall belong to the party
which polled the largest number of votes in said municipality at such
preceding election and the other inspector and his substitute shall belong
to the party, branch or fraction thereof, or political group which polled
the next largest number of votes at said election; and the inspectors so
appointed shall be persons proposed by the legitimate representative or
representatives of such political parties, branches or fractions thereof, or
political group.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Partido Nacionalista and Partido Nacionalista Collectivista
are entitled to one inspector and one substitute each.
HELD:
Yes, Partido Nacionalista and Partido Nacionalista Collectivista are entitled
to one inspector and one substitute each.
The Court held that a liberal construction of the law will permit the
Nacionalista Colectivitista Party to have representation on election boards
in all municipalities in which the Old Nacionalista Party polled the largest
number of votes at the last elections. Such interpretation and application
of the law will not do violence to it, in view of the notorious fact that the
party which won the election in many municipalities, such as Cabiao,
old party and a new party. Such interpretation and application of the law
would, moreover, be in accord with underlying purpose of the Election
Law, which is to provide as complete a method as possible to obtain a
clean election.
The Court held further that in municipalities where it is shown that
Partido Nacionalista polled the largest number of votes at the last election
and the Partido Democrata the next largest number of votes at said
election, and where in such municipalities, in addition to the Partido
Nacionalista there has been duly organized a new party known as the
Partido Nacionalista Colectivista, one election inspector and one substitute
shall belong each to the Partido Nacionalista, the Partdo Nacionalista
Colectivista and Partido Democrata.
DISSENTING OPINION:
In the case at bar two political parties, the Nacionalista and the
Democrata, went to the polls in the last election in the municipality of
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, and the Nacionalista party polled more votes than
the Democrata. In conformity with the express terms of the law there
cannot be any doubt that two of the inspectors must belong to the
Nacionalista Party and one to the Democrata. The fact that there
appeared in the field a new political party, called the Liberal Nacionalista
or Colectivista, though formed with Nacionalista elements but different
from the Nacionalista and Democrata parties, does not affect the matter.
The rights of the victorious political parties should never be affected
because of the future reduction of its strength, by the affiliation of its
members to other parties, by the withdrawal from the party or by the
formation of a new party. The law does not bother about the actual
number of members of a political party but only with the result of the
preceding election as determined by the amount of votes polled. Until a
political party has gone to the polls, there is no means by which to give it
the right to the appointment of an election inspector. To concede to a
new political party the right to be represented in the board of election
inspectors would be tantamount to presuming its victory in an election in
which it has never taken any part (as such political party) and this is not
what the law contemplates. The fact that the component elements of the
new party have come from the party that polled the largest number of
votes in the last election is not a sound argument to uphold the opinion
of the majority, because the law does not consider the source of the
political element with which the new party is organized, but only the
result of the last election which is self-evident fact that need no
discussion.
Case No. 62 – Salvador D. Violago, Sr v. Commission on Elections
and Joan V. Alarilla
Topic: Construction of Election Law
FACTS:
Violago and Alarilla ran for the position of mayor during the May 2010
elections in Meycauayan City, Bulacan, where Alarilla emerged as
victorious.
Violago filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the proclamation of
Alarilla on the following grounds: (1) massive vote-buying; (2)
intimidation and harassment; (3) election fraud; (4) non-appreciation by
the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines of valid votes cast
during the said election; and, (5) irregularities due to non-observance of
the guidelines set by the COMELEC.
On June 15, 2010, Alarilla filed her Answer with Motion to Set for Hearing
Affirmative Defenses in the Nature of a Motion to Dismiss for Being
Insufficient in Form and Substance.2
Thereafter, on July 16, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an
Order3 setting the preliminary conference on August 12, 2010 and
directing the parties to file their Preliminary Conference Briefs at least one
(1) day before the scheduled conference.
On August 11, 2010, Alarilla filed her Preliminary Conference Brief.
Violago, on the other hand, filed his Brief on the day of the scheduled
preliminary conference. He, likewise, filed an Urgent Motion to Reset
Preliminary Conference on the ground that he did not receive any notice
and only came to know of it when he inquired with the COMELEC a day
before the scheduled conference.
Violago also claimed that on the date set for the preliminary conference,
his counsel and his associate were scheduled to appear before different
tribunals in connection with other cases they were handling.
Subsequently, Violago and his counsel failed to appear during the actual
conference on August 12, 2010. On even date, Alarilla’s counsel moved
for the dismissal of the case.
In its assailed Order dated August 12, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd Division
dismissed Violago’s protest on the ground that the latter belatedly filed
his Brief in violation of the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.
On August 19, 2010, Violago filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc contending that it was only on August 16, 2010 that
he received a copy of the Order of the COMELEC which set the
preliminary conference on August 12, 2010.
In its second assailed Order dated September 21, 2010, the COMELEC en
banc denied Violago’s Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
Violago failed to file a verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELEC has legal basis to dismiss Violago’s
election protest for failure to timely file his Preliminary
Conference Brief.
2. Whether or not COMELEC can lawfully deny Violago’s motion for
reconsideration on the ground that it failed to file a verified
motion pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
HELD:
1. No, COMELEC has no legal basis to dismiss.
The COMELEC 2nd Division’s reason for dismissing Violago’s election
protest is the latter’s failure to timely file his Preliminary Conference Brief.
However, a perusal of the records of the instant case would show that
Violago was able to present a copy of the Certification issued by the
Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan, attesting to the fact that the
Order sent by the COMELEC to Violago’s counsel informing the latter of
the scheduled hearing set on August 12, 2010 and directing him to file his
Preliminary Conference Brief was received only on August 16, 2010.
Violago likewise submitted an advisory issued by the Chief of the
Operations Division of the TELECOM Office in Meycauayan that the
telegraph service in the said City, through which the COMELEC also
supposedly sent Violago a notice through telegram, has been terminated
and the office permanently closed and transferred to Sta. Maria, Bulacan
as of April 1, 2009.12Respondent did not question the authenticity of these
documents.
On the basis of the abovementioned documents, the Court finds no
justifiable reason why the COMELEC 2nd Division hastily dismissed
Violago’s election protest. There is no indication that the COMELEC 2nd
Division made prior verification from the proper or concerned COMELEC
department or official of Violago’s allegation that he did not receive a
copy of the subject Order.
In fact, it was only on the day following such dismissal that the Electoral
Contests Adjudication Department, through the 2nd Division Clerk, sent a
letter to the Postmaster of Meycauayan City, Bulacan requesting for a
certification as to the date of receipt of the said Order stating therein that
the "certification is urgently needed for the proper and appropriate
disposition" of Violago’s election protest.
Fairness and prudence dictate that the COMELEC 2nd Division should
have first waited for the requested certification before deciding whether
or not to dismiss Violago’s protest on technical grounds.
Violago should not be penalized for belatedly filing his Preliminary
Conference Brief. While it may be argued that Violago acquired actual
knowledge of the scheduled conference a day prior to the date set
through means other than the official notice sent by the COMELEC, the
fact remains that, unlike his opponent, he was not given sufficient time to
thoroughly prepare for the said conference. A one-day delay, as in this
case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the protest based on
technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the
rules on the part of Violago and the reason for the violation is justifiable.
2. NO, COMELEC cannot lawfully deny Violago’s MR for failure to file
a verified motion.
With respect to the COMELEC en banc’s denial of Violago’s Motion for
Reconsideration, it is true that Section 3, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure on Disputes in an Automated Election System, as well as
Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, clearly require
that a motion for reconsideration should be verified. However, the
settled rule is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject
to liberal construction.
In Quintos v. Commission on Elections,15 this Court held that "the
alleged lack of verification of petitioner’s Manifestation and
Motion for Partial Reconsideration is merely a technicality that
should not defeat the will of the electorate. The COMELEC may
liberally construe or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of
justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the COMELEC."
In Pacanan v. Commission on Elections ,18 this Court, in clarifying the
mandated liberal construction of election laws, held thus:
x x x An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action,
is clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an
election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers
is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is
the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the
basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the
adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep
public concern involved and the need of dispelling the
uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And
the court has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all
means within its command, who is the real candidate
elected by the people.
Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a
liberal construction. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the
objectives of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the Comelec.
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule
recognized by all courts, that statutes providing for election
contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated
by mere technical objections.
An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public
interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests
of rival candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate with respect
to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their gift.
This principle was reiterated in the more recent consolidated cases
of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections , and De Castro v. Commission on
Elections, where the Court held that in exercising its powers and
jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections,
the COMELEC "must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes."
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that Violago’s motion for
reconsideration was not verified, the COMELEC en banc should have
considered the merits of the said motion in light of petitioner’s
meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of the date set for
the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in
support of one’s claim or defense. It is the denial of this opportunity that
constitutes violation of due process of law. More particularly, procedural
due process demands prior notice and hearing. As discussed above, the
fact that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or information of the
date set for the preliminary conference by means other than the official
notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his protest,
because it cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice
and time to adequately prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely
the reason why Violago was only able to file his Preliminary Conference
Brief on the day of the conference itself. Petitioner’s counsel may not
likewise be blamed for failing to appear during the scheduled conference
because of prior commitments and for, instead, filing an Urgent Motion to
Reset Preliminary Conference.
Hence, by denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, without taking
into consideration the violation of his right to procedural due process, the
COMELEC en banc is also guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
Case No. 63 – US v. Elias Cueto
Topic: Main Feature of Election Law
FACTS:
Elias Cueto, an election inspector during the June 1916 elections at
Tiaong, Tayabas, where two candidates named Mayo and Magbiray vied
for the municipal president positions.
A disable voter named Toribio Briones belonged to the Mayor group. He
was assisted by Cueto to prepare his ballot. Instead of copying the name
of Mayo in the ballot based on the slip of paper brought by Briones,
Cueto inserted the name of Magbiray.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cueto was guilty of election offense.
HELD: Yes, Cueto was guilty of election offense.
The Philippine Bill and subsequent Acts of Congress conceded to qualified
persons the high prerogative of suffrage. To carry out this purpose, the
Election Law was carefully drafted and enacted, and then revised by the
Philippine Legislature. Its primal feature was to allow the citizen to vote
secretly for whom he pleased, free from improper influences.
As was well said in the instructive decision in Gardiner v. Romulo ([1914],
26 Phil., 521, 550):
"The purity of elections is one of the most important and
fundamental requisites of popular government. To banish the
spectre of revenge from the minds of the timid or defenseless, to
render precarious and uncertain the bartering of votes, and
lastly, to secure a fair and honest count of the ballots cast, is the
aim of the law. To accomplish these ends, Act No. 1582 was
enacted. This law requires that only qualified electors shall be
admitted to the polls; that they shall vote in absolute secrecy,
and that the returns shall be justly compiled and announced. In
its essential details, this law is a counterpart of the ballot laws
almost universally adopted within comparatively recent times in
the United States, and is generically called by textwriters the
Australian ballot law.
x x x

". . . The central idea of the Australian ballot law, as so often expressed
in the cases, is to shroud the marking of the ballots in absolute
secrecy. All the efforts to secure a free and untrammeled expression of
the elector’s will lead up to and depart from that point."
The accused, as already remarked, was an election inspector. To hold this
office it was necessary for him to have certain qualifications. He had to be
a qualified elector of his precinct, of good character, not convicted of an
offense involving moral turpitude, and able to read, write, and speak
either English, Spanish, or the local dialect understandingly. The accused
took an oath, honestly and justly to administer his duties according to the
Election Law without prejudice or favor toward any persons candidate,
party, society, or religious sect.
determines the complexion of the intent. In the investigation of human
affairs, whether connected with contract or crime, we are constrained to
infer the motive from the act. The intent to affect the result of the
election is properly presumed when unlawful acts, which naturally or
necessarily have that effect, are proved to have been intentionally
committed, or knowingly permitted, by those having charge of such
elections." (U. S. v. Carpenter [1889], 41 Fed., 330.) The election officer,
who scorns the law which he is sworn to enforce, undermines the entire
edifice of democratic institutions and is deserving of the severest
condemnation.

One of his functions was, in conjunction with another inspector (the

accused, however, violated this provision of the law by acting alone), to
prepare ballots for disabled persons. The law made it his duty and his
duty only, with another inspector, to ascertain the wishes of the disabled
voter and to prepare the ballot of the voter in proper form according to
his wishes. (See sections 417-424, 453, Administrative Code of 1917.)

The election inspector in giving assistance to a disabled voter has but one
function to perform, namely, the mechanical act of preparing the ballot.
The exercise of any discretion as to the selection of candidates for the
voter assisted is prohibited to the marker, and the substitution of his own
for the voter’s choice in such selection is a flagrant violation of an official
trust. (Patton v. Watkins [1901], 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. St. Rep., 43;
Board v. Dill [1910], 26 Okla., 104; Ann. Cas. [1912] B, 101; Re Prangley,
21 Ont. L. Rep., 54.) An inspector who fails to write upon the ballot the
name or names expressly indicated by the voter is guilty of a fraud
practiced against the voter and thus of a violation of the penal provisions
of the Election Law. (U. S. v. De la Serna and Callet [1909], 12 Phil.,
672.)

Of course, an election officer is not responsible for a mere mistake in

judgment but only for a willful disregard of duty. All that the law requires
of an election officer is the exercise of prudence, of intelligent
deliberation leading him to judgment; and when he does that, although
he does not live up to the law there is no crime, because there is no
criminal intent. (See 15 Cyc., p. 344, citing numerous cases.) But when,
as in the instant case, the election officer is given a specific duty to
perform and, notwithstanding this duty, deliberately disregards the
wishes of the voter, criminal intent exists. "The color of the act
Case No. 64 – Petronilla S. Rulloda v. Commission on Elections,
et al
Topic: Definition, Basis and Nature of Election
FACTS:
Romeo N. Rulloda and Remigio L. Placido were the contending candidates
for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. On June
22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and died.
Romeo’s widow, Petronilla, sought the COMELEC’s permission to replace
her husband’s candidacy.
On the day of the election, Petronilla got 516 votes while Placido received
290 votes.
COMELEC denied such request citing Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801
dated 23 May 2002, which states that: “There shall be no substitution of
candidates for barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Petronilla can validly substitute her late husband.
HELD: Yes, Petronilla can validly substitute her late husband.
COMELEC cites that substitution of candidates is not allowed in barangay
elections on Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal of another. – If after the last day of the filing of
certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with
the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the election. If
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between
the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in
the political subdivision where he is a candidate or, in the case of
candidates to be voted by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.
Placido also argues that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-
partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no political party
from which to designate the substitute. Such an interpretation, aside
from being non sequitur, ignores the purpose of election laws which
is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It
is a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the
people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must
be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate
freely expressed through the ballot.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the
sovereign power of the people. The winner is the candidate who has
obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. Sound
policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all
republican forms of government the basic idea is that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
The absence of a specific provision governing substitution of candidates
in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such a restrictive construction cannot be read into the law
where the same is not written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow
the substitution of candidates where no political parties are
involved than when political considerations or party affiliations
reign, a fact that must have been subsumed by law.
To reiterate, it was Petronilla who obtained the plurality of votes in the
contested election. Technicalities and procedural niceties in
election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the
true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests
must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural
barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of
the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. The
Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any
way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
but also the correct ascertainment of the results.