6

Oposa v. Factoran
GR No. 101083
July 30, 1993

FACTS

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
genarations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran,
Jr.. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents and representatives to
cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements in the Country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or appraising new TLAs. Plaintiffs alleged that thety have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its
capacity as parents patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA
holdrers to cut the remaining forests constitutes misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of herein petitioners and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the issues raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which pertains to the executive or legislative branches of the government
and that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him

ISSUE

Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action

RULING

Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right – the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16, Article II of the Constitution which explicitly
provides that “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of true nature.” Petitioners assert that they represent
their generation as well as the generations to come. The SC ruled that for that reason, they can file a
class suit. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s natural
resources to the end that their exploration and development be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.
Petition granted.
14

United States v. Toribio

Carson, J.

FACTS

Luis Toribio, a carabao owner residing in the town of Carmen, Bohol, was charged for violation of
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of a large
cattle. The trial court of Bohol found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human
consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasure of
the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the abovementioned provisions. Counsel for
defendant argues that the provision prohibits the killing of large cattle “at the municipal slaughter
house”, and that Toribio did not kill the carabao in a slaughter house but rather somewhere else. He
also contends that the said provision constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of the owners, or that it is an undue
and unauthorized exercise of the police power of the State.

ISSUE
Whether the prohibitions in Act No. 1147 is an undue exercise of the police power of the State

RULING

No. It is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. At that time, virulent contagious or infectious
disease had threatened the total extinction of carabaos in the country. Agriculture being the principal
occupation of the people, and the carabao being the work animal, the ravages of the disease which they
were infected struck an almost vital blow at the material welfare of the country. Under all the
circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting and penalizing the slaughter for human
consumption of carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in due and proper exercise of police
power, justified by the exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of the State to protedct
itself against the overwhelming disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for
agricultural work. The police power rests upon the necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever
the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified, the court finds that the reasonable
restriction placed upon the use of carabaos by provision of law under discussion must be held to be
authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power. It is clear that the enactment of the
provisions of the statute under consideration was required by the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class.
The appealed decision was affirmed.
31

Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation

GR No. 137569 June 23, 2000

Mendoza, J.

FACTS
On February 17, 1983, BP Blg. 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the
names of the defendants in this case, including a portion of the land consisting of 1,380 square meters
belonging to Milagros and Innocentes De la Rama covered by TCT No. The De la Ramas entered into a
contract with intervenor Alfredo Guerrero where they agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property
covered by TCT No. 16213. The De la Ramas received a partial payment, the balance thereof to be paid
upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans bank. Guerrero filed in the RTC of Pasay a complaint
for specific performance to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. The Republic of the
Philippines filed the present civil case for expropriation pursuant to BP 340. Guerrero filed a motion for
intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell him the entire lot and that a case for
specific performance had been laid by him. The trial court rendered a decision in the case of specific
performance in favor of Guerrero. The De la Ramas appealed to the CA but their appeal was dismissed.
Meanwhile, Guerrero filed with the CA a petition for mandamus, certiorari and injunction with
temporary restraining order to enjoin Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount
corresponding to the payment of the expropriated property and to compel the trial court to resolve his
two motions. CA granted the writ of mandamus. With the decision in the action for specific performance
having become final, an order of execution was issued by the Pasay City RTC, and as a result, a deed of
absolute sale was executed in favor of Guerrero. The entire amount was withdrawn and entirely
received by the De la Ramas. Thereafter, the De la Ramas sought the nullification of the trial court’s
decision by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the CA. The petition was however dismissed.
Finally, RTC Pasay declared Guerrero the rightful owner of the expropriated property and ordered
payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land. This decision was subsequently affitmed
by the CA. Thus, the De la Ramas filed a petition for review.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the right to receive just compensation
for the expropriated area became vested upon Guerrero through subrogation

RULING
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages. First is concerned with the determination of the authority
of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the property of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. The second is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation of the property sought to be taken. In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation
was completed when BP Blg. 340 was enacted. The second stage was however not completed because
of the intervention of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of ownership of the subject land. The De
la Ramas are mistaken in arguing that the two stages of expropriation cited above only apply to judicial,
and not to legislative expropriation. Although Congress has the power to determine what land to take, it
can not do so arbitrarily. Judicial determination of the propriety of the exercise of the power, for
instance, in view of the allegations of partiality and prejudice by those adversely affected, and the just
compensation for the subject property is provided in our constitutional system. The CA was corret in
saying that BP 340 did not effectively expropriate the land of the De la Ramas. It merely commenced the
expropriation of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners can no longer question a judgment which
has become final and executory.
The CA’s decision was affirmed.
33

Lumiqued v. Exevea
G.R. No. 117565
November 18, 1997

Romero J.

FACTS

Lumiqued was dismissed from his position as Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform –
Cordillera Autonomous Region pursuant to AO No. 52 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. The dismissal
was the aftermath of three complaints filed by the DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent
Jeanette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first complaint alleged Lumiqued of
falsification by padding gasoline receipts. The second complaint alleged petitioner of making
uniliquidated cash advances. The third charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment for unjustly
terminating Zamudio’s services as cashier. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted, but
Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. He then requested for the resetting of the second hearing to
enable him to employ the services of counsel. However, Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Lumiqued was then dismissed from his position.
Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that he was denied the constitutional right to
counsel during the hearing. Lumiqued died. His heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, questioning his dismissal.

ISSUE
Whether or not the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry

RULING
In the case at bar, the investigation conducted was for the purpose of determining if Lumiqued could be
held administratively liable under the law. As such, such hearing was not part of a criminal prosecution.
Under the existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. The
right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted
merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of the government service.
He instant petition is dismissed.
47

Bell v. Burson
402 US 535

FACTS

Petitioner is a clergyman whose ministry requires him to travel by car to cover three rural Georgia
Communities. One afternoon, he ws involved in an accident when 5-year-old Sherry Capes rode her
bicycle into the side of his automobile. The child’s parents filed an accident report with the Director of
Gerogia Department of Public Safety, indicating that their daughter had substantial injuries. Petitioner
was thereafter informed by the Director that unless he was covered by liability insurance policy, he must
file a bond plus proof of future financial responsibility or else, his driver’s license and vehicle registration
will be suspended. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing before the Director saying that he
was not liable because the accident was unavoidable. Petitioner was not permitted to present any
evidence that he was not at fault for the accident, or that his ministry would be severely handicapped if
he lost his license. Petitioner appealed to the Superior Court, which found him free from fault for the
accident and ordered that his license not be suspended. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed this
decision, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the State’s statutory scheme denied him of due process
of law.

ISSUE
Whether or not the revocation of petitioner’s license without affording him an opportunity to contest
liability violates due process of law

RULING
Yes. It is fundamental that, except for emergency situations, States afford notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of a case before terminating an interest. This case did not involve an
emergency situation and thus, due process was violated.
Once issued, licenses may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood, as in the petitioner’s case.
Suspension of issued licenses involves a state action that adjudicates important interests of licensees
and due process is required.
The judgment is reversed.