VISION 2025

SOCIO ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES

Why does India’s economic growth need an inclusive agenda

Editors

Amir Ullah Khan

Abdul Azim Akhtar

With a Foreword by Amitabh Kundu

Institute of Objective Studies

New Delhi
 VISION 2025
SOCIO ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES
Why does India’s economic growth need an inclusive agenda

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 CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Editors i
Foreword Amitabh Kundu iii
Preface Amir Ullah Khan vii
Introduction Amir Ullah Khan and Abdul Azim Akhtar xi

Chapter 1 : Indian Muslims and the Political Landscape: Some Fears,

Some Hopes and Some Advice 1
Muqtedar Khan

Chapter 2 : Family Planning and Indian Muslims – Myths and Realities 9

S Y Quraishi

Chapter 3 : Policy Challenges: Have Development Schemes meant for Muslims

worked effectively? 37
Jawed Alam Khan

Chapter 4 : Politics, Violence and Production of ‘Fear’: Working of

Shiv Sena in Mumbai 53
Abdul Shaban

Chapter 5 : Muslims in Contemporary India: Issues of Security and Equity 71

Ram Punyani

Chapter 6 : Hindutva and Muslims 85

Irfan Engineer

Chapter 7 : Live-Reporting and Democracy: The Non-Publishable Crime

of the Televised anti-Muslim Violence in Gujarat 2002 91
Britta Ohm

Chapter 8 : Handling Communal Violence 101

Vibhuti Narayan Rai

Chapter 9 : Anchoring Behaviour in the Word of God 107

M D Nalapat

Chapter 10 : Muslim Representation in Parliament: A Case Study of

96 Muslim Concentrated Constituencies 109
Shafeeq Rahman

Chapter 11 : Muslim India: Brotherhood in Biradri 131

Abdul Azim Akhtar

Chapter 12 : Forgotten at the Margins - Muslim Manual Scavengers 157

Manjur Ali

Chapter 13 : Employment of Muslim Women Workers in the Indian

Labour Market 169
Rakhshandah Hani
Chapter 14 : Socio-economic Profile of Muslim Women in Maharashtra 183
Vibhuti Patel

Chapter 15 : Influence of Education in Enhancing Social Inclusion of Muslim

Women through Entrepreneurship: Implications and Challenges 199
Broto Rauth Bharadwaj

Chapter 16 : Imperatives of Personal Law Reform and Good Governance 211

Zafar Mahfooz Nomani

Chapter 17 : Stereotypes of Muslim Identity in India's Popular Media and

Entertainment Industry 221
Yousuf Saeed

Chapter 18 : Kashmir Issue: Prospects for Peaceful Resolution 233

Ghulam Nabi Fai

Chapter 19 : Educational Status of Muslims – Focus on Telangana 243

Amir Ullah Khan

Primary Sample Survey 263

National Consultations 301

Annexure : Interviews 315

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project was made possible with support from people across the country. We are thankful to
all people involved as part of the Vision 2025 Project for their support and help.

Dr. Rajiv Kumar chaired our first workshop and gave us the necessary encouragement to start
this ambitious journey.

For organising the Delhi workshop, we are thankful to Mr. Irshad-ul-Haq Khan and all the
participants. Our thanks to Maulana Farooq for organising the Mewat meeting in Hauz Rani area
of Delhi. We are grateful to Bihar Urdu Library staff and Bihar Chapter of IOS for helping us in
organising the meeting in Patna.

We are indebted to Mrs. Ayesha Parvez and Mr. Parvez Akhtar of Arsalan Group of Restaurant
(Kolkata) for supporting and sponsoring the participants at very short notice in an excellent
manner. We are also thankful to CPI-M MP Md. Saleem, SNAP and Mr. Amirul Alam and
others for helping us in organising the Kolkata meet. Our thanks to Mr. Shahjehan Talkudar,
Mr. Jehan , Shri Jyotimory Hazarika, Dr. Zakir Hussain of Law College for helping us in
organizing the meeting in Guwahati on a fine Sunday with full attendance.

We are thankful to Mr. Javed Anis, his wife Bhavna and all participants for coordinating the
Bhopal meeting at very short notice. Our thanks to SDPI Rajasthan chapter, Mr. Md. Shafi, Mr.
Anis Ansari, and Mr. Khalid for helping us in organising the Jaipur meet. We could not organise
Maharashtra and Gujarat meets due to various reasons, but we are thankful to Siasat Gujarat
editor Mr. Abdul Hafiz Lakhani and Begum Sayeed for providing us with feedback on Gujarat.
We are also thankful to former Maharashtra Minority Commission Chairman Mr. Munaf Hakim
and others for providing us with feedback. We are thankful to Mr. Ameen Mudassar for helping
us in reaching out to South Indian audience in Bangalore.

In the end we would like to thank Institute of Objective Studies and its office bearers for their
continuous support. Our thanks are due to all the authors and participants who took part in our
workshops. We are especially thankful to Dr. Saba Bashir for her editing and providing us with
feedback from time to time. Thank you. Without your support, it would not have been possible.

Prof. Amitabh Kundu readily agreed to write a fine foreword. His continuous support has been
invaluable.
 FOREWORD

Questions may be raised regarding the necessity and significance of focusing on the
development deficits of Muslims and exploring the strategies to mitigate that, while putting
forward a vision of Inclusive India for 2025. Members of Sachar and Post Sachar Committee,
too, have confronted similar questions: why the emphasis in the reports is on inequalities in the
socio-political system, keeping the Muslims in the centre rather than presenting the spectrum for
all sections of deprived population.

The purpose of a Committee or a Commission set up by the government with the intent of
initiating strategic interventions cannot be simply churning out data and discussing the highs and
lows for different groups with studied ‘objectivity’, maintaining equal distance with all, without
prioritising an action agenda. It will fail to make an input in policy making if it does not
endeavor to identify the areas of concern and propose the directions wherein the state actions
are required urgently. A vision of India 2025, for having relevance in policy domain, too, must
put forward a perspective of development interventions to mitigate the alarming inequalities in
the system and propose measures for ameliorating the conditions of the poor and vulnerable.
Any analysis of recent data would demonstrate that Muslims constitute the largest majority in
both the categories.

Muslim identity: From Continuum to Categories

Characteristics of individuals exist and evolve over time, measured generally in a continuous
scale, for the purpose of assessing their levels of deprivation. In general communication and for
decision making, however, these are often perceived and utilized for classifying people into
discreet categories. Classifying persons into categories, such as poor and non-poor, rural and
urban etc., based on the numerical value of the characteristics involves imposing boundary
conditions that are matters of discretion. Building these categories is important not only for
legal, administrative and resource allocation purposes but even for day to day communication.

The logical frame underlying the categories (the assumption being all members are equal within a
category) conflicts with the axiom of continuity. For example, one would not have any difficulty
in accepting the axiom that a transfer of money or asset from any person to another, the latter
being economically better-off, is socially undesirable. However, if we consider people only in
terms of categories such as poor and non poor, we would be ignoring the differences in their
actual income or property levels. Any transfer of money from a poor person to another, who is
better off, then would not be considered unwelcome or perverse if both remain in the category
of poor, even after the transfer. To minimize loss of information, Amartya Sen proposed a
measure of poverty or deprivation based not on the number of persons in these categories, but
their actual levels of income or assets since the variation in these within the identified categories
are often very high.

Sen in his sharply focused volume on Identity and Violence, written partly in response to Samuel P.
Huntington’s thesis of Clash of Civilizations, has argued that every person has several
characteristics that would give him an identity which has inherent multiplicity. This multiplicity
evolves and becomes complex over time as the person exercises choices in socio-economic and
political spheres that make her align with identities of other individuals or groups.

Unfortunately, instead of assessing the exact position of a person within the categories, and
without recognizing the multi-dimensionality of the identity, they are often recognized by one or
two categories such as, religion and nationality. Given that important decisions are to be made
by individuals, group leaders, company executives, government functionaries and political
leaders without spending much time (even the most important stories get only a few minutes of
media coverage), such over simplification of identities is considered a necessity. Unfortunately,
this leads to undermining of the complexities and richness of personalities of both individuals
and communities.

Viewing individuals in terms of their religious faiths has become common in social and political
discourses in recent years. This, unfortunately, is more common for Muslims than other
communities, which undermines their professional, cultural and social identities, creating ground
conditions for discrimination. Furthermore, a person being repeatedly recognized with such
narrow mirror-view leads to destroying their own perception of self which, in turn, can vitiate
the choices they makes. The uneasiness and distress of a person in being persistently seen in
such a narrow prism can indeed lead to behavioral aberrations on their part as well.

The clash of civilizations, predicted to take place in near future, posits religious faiths to be the
central characteristic of differing cultures. Taking that to be the overarching basis of social,
political, and cultural analysis would amount to overlooking all other associations and loyalties.
Besides the conceptual flaw in seeing human beings in terms of only one affiliation, these
civilizational theories are deficient in overlooking the degree and heterogeneity of the so called
‘religious identity’ which characterizes the individuals within the communities.

It is important to take note of the plural identities of people and their interactions with other
groups or people, for purposes of their characterization. Unfortunately, there is an increasing use
of religious identities/affiliations as the principle of classification which has led to much crudity
and vulgarity in social research. The loss of knowledge and information in the failure to
distinguish between individuals based on the degree of affiliation and loyalty to religious
principles or rituals is massive, resulting in absurd deductions. More importantly, oblivion to the
multiple roles and responsibilities performed by them, leads to perversity in policy making. The
Islamic identity, for example, can be one of the identities the person regards as important but
denying the importance of her other identities is a sad caricature of reality. Aside from the
conceptual crudity reflected in such classificatory algorithm, it overlooks the more obvious fact
that Muslims in India differ sharply not only in their political and social beliefs but also their
adherence to religious rituals. The exigencies of political leaders in India on both sides compel
them to underplay these differences to hasten the pace of polarization for electoral and other
political gains. They even tend to ignore simple distinction between a Shia and a Sunni, which is
so very important in the Arab world. The reluctance to go beyond this narrow frame by taking
note of the many professional social and cultural identities of Muslims that are nonreligious, and
ignoring sharp inequalities in their socio-economic conditions, cannot simply be an oversight or
a random error in social analysis.

Explaining the Development Scenario and Social Behaviour

For projecting a vision for 2025, it is important to understand the existing socio-economic
inequality, keeping the poor and vulnerable Muslims in the centre of the analysis. This identity is
critical to the explanatory framework for explaining disparities and discrimination in the country,
as brought out in the present report. The socio-economic correlates of religious identities in the
society, reflected in their poorer outcome from the development process, must be understood
and effectively modified and monitored to move towards the goal of inclusive India. The
categories such as "the Christian world," "the Muslim world," or "the Hindu world," largely
drawn from skewed perceptions of reality, as discussed above, can, however, misleading and
dangerous. Seeing a society as comprising just sets of different religious groups distorts the
understanding of the people, due to the "divisive power of classificatory priority". To see one's
religious or "civilizational" affiliation as an all-engulfing identity in development dynamics in a
country would be a problematic diagnosis. There have been fierce racists and war mongers as
well as great champions of peace, social justice and human rights among devoted members in
iv
each religion. Asking which is the position of a ‘believer" and which is that of an ‘impostor,"
implies acceptance that one's religious faith itself resolves all the decisions in life, including those
concerning her political and social choices. Even the current divisions around the events of beef
ban and triple talaq, have placed Muslims, Hindus and Christians on all sides of the dividing
lines. Instead of asking which is the right position as per a particular religion, we have to
recognize that everyone has the right to choose among several different positions on matters
involving political, moral, and social judgments without having anything to do with the religious
faith. This is very well substantiated in the papers in the volume pertaining to demography,
engagement in economic activities, political participation etc. of the Muslims. Persons of a
particular faith being on different sides of many cultural and political divides should not be an
exception but a normal phenomenon within the vision of Inclusive India 2025.

A couple of authors in the present volume have suggested implicitly that the political leaders on
all sides, using religion as an instrument of political mobilization, want religious responsibilities
of their followers to crowd out their commitments that ensue from their scientific interests,
professional obligations, literary involvements, or political affiliations. The day to day decision
making is systematically fed by an understanding that having a religion would imply alleviating
the need for reasoning, since judgment can then be "locked up" in religious faith. Importantly,
many of the papers in the volume bring out the sharp inequality in access to labour market,
social and political space and the domain of security, not merely across different religious groups
but even among Muslims. While the narrowly defined Islamic identity of the latter partially
explicates their ground conditions and trend of sharpening inequalities in certain spheres, it
provides limited explanation for their behavioral response. The report has done an excellent job
in focusing on these conditions and highlighting the critical explanatory factors behind disparity
and deprivation with empirical rigour. A development strategy envisioning a modern, vibrant
and inclusive India must address these issues with conviction and determination.

Amitabh Kundu
January, 2018

v
 PREFACE

This report started off with a realization after the 2014 elections that India was set to change.
The idea of India itself was transforming and there was a sense of apprehension among all
thinking individuals. The dominant political discourse, that had been one of inclusion earlier,
seemed to have dramatically altered and moved to the other extreme of majoritarianism and
exclusion. Even Aadhaar, a simple long awaited tool that would guarantee social security and
work towards bringing in those who were excluded, would go on to become an instrument used
for keeping people out.

The elections proved all pessimists right. India, smarting from corruption at high levels and an
economic downturn post the global crisis, elected an ultra nationalist government by a huge
margin. The only saving grace was that Prime Minister Modi, the chief architect of a polarised
polity in the new millennium, made promises of ‘sabka sath-sabka vikas’, an India that would
include everyone and work for each community’s growth. Elections over, there was a sense of
anticipation. What would the new governments do now?

The political economy and polarisation

Almost immediately the intentions of the government became clear. There was a definitive move
towards imposing a right wing ideology that came to be defined as Hindutva. The distinction
between a tolerant, inclusive Hinduism and a strident and muscular Hindutva became clearer by
the day. Muslim and Dalit youth were threatened, attacked and even lynched by mobs that then
were allowed to go free, in those few instances where they were even charged with violence.
Matters reached a head when religious mobilization resulted in big wins for the BJP in UP and in
Assam.

In Uttar Pradesh, the politics was unusually, even for the ruling party, aggressive. The Prime
Minister campaign harped on how Hindu graveyards had been neglected by the previous
government. The cow protection laws were made stricter, specialized police squads were formed
and private armies of cow protection volunteers were unleashed on the streets. In Assam, the
old issue of Bangladeshi migrants was raised. A bill was introduced that would allow non Muslim
asylum seekers to claim Indian citizenship. A national register is already underway that would
identify illegal migrants, a euphemism for Bengali Muslims.

A number of hostile moves have been initiated. Large changes in syllabi and in history text
books. The education board in Rajasthan took the lead in deleting Mughal history and removing
words that could be traced to Urdu or Persian roots from the language. Senior leaders demanded
making Sanskrit compulsory and announcing the ‘Gita’ as a National Book. The Prime Minister
himself led a campaign to popularize Yoga and others, then made to compel schools and offices
to practice Yoga. People were beaten up for not singing the National Anthem or standing up
when it was played. Similar violence was unleashed arguing for all Indians to chant Bharat Mata
Ki Jai and sing the controversial Vande Mataram in offices and institutions.

Opposition to liberal thought

Matters became serious when a number of liberal thinkers started getting killed. Activist
Narendra Dabholkar was the first to get killed after the elections for the Lok Sabha were
announced. Dabholkar wanted an anti-superstition and black magic bill passed, and he was shot
dead in August 2013 in Pune. Govind Pansare, a Senior Communist leader was shot dead in
February 2015. He had written extensively against right wing forces and also on Shivaji, showing
how the Maratha king was secular ruler. This was followed soon after by the killing of an
academic and former vice-chancellor of Hampi University, M. M. Kalburgi, a well-known
Kannada writer who had relentlessly continued his campaign against idol worship and
Brahminical rituals. And then came the merciless killing of another Kannada writer and activist,
Gauri Lankesh in similar fashion.

A number of such incidents have made India an unfamiliar place. The secular, inclusive republic
that celebrated its diversity now appears a monolith where the Union government wants to
create a monolith where one religion and one language would occupy centre stage. An emerging
economy where GDP growth and investments had become part of the common man’s
conversation has now seen an about turn in its political economy framework. Unemployment,
malnutrition and exclusion have been replaced by nationalistic pride in symbols like orange
robes and revenge for perceived historical wrongs.

A vulnerable group: The Indian Muslim

Where does this place the Indian Muslim? The Muslim population in India is already vulnerable,
placed at the lowest level among socio-religious groups on almost all indicators. The BJP had
historically brought up the appeasement issue in the 1980s and the 1990s. The often repeated
complaint was that the Congress and the left parties had disproportionately distributed subsidy
and welfare funds among the minorities, particularly the Muslims. This allegation was made
again and again without any evidence. The Manmohan Singh appointed Sachar Committee,
submitted its report in November 2006, and demolished this baseless slogan that Muslims are
favoured by political parties.

The data was remarkable and poignant. The literacy rate among Muslims at 59% was
substantially lower, than the national average of 64.8%. On the criticism that Muslim children
languish in Madarsas, the Committee found that only 3% of Muslim children go to there. Only
4% of Muslims are graduates or hold diplomas. Muslims constitute 3% of the IAS, 1.5% of the
IFS, 6% of all police constables and 4.5% of railway staff. Muslims are almost as poor as SCs
and STs. This should have finished all claims of appeasement.

This data was then collaborated by the Kundu Committee which showed in 2014 that nothing
much had changed even after 8 years of Sachar Committee recommendations. Several more
committees would show similar results. The Sudhir Commission for Telangana in 2016 also
presented that Muslim poverty is high and that their proportion in employment in Telangana
state is well below their population proportion. However, it is baffling that the same allegation
of appeasement is repeated by Hindutva forces when they say Muslims have been granted
special status in India.

Another recent study that says the same is by Rehnuma, an intervention anchored by the
National Foundation of India and the Centre for Social Justice, set up in 2013 to address
discrimination of vulnerable groups in India. In its new report titled Minority appeasement: Myth or
Reality? Rehnuma asks the same questions that have been asked by the various Commissions
mentioned in the previous paragraph. This report funded by the European Union and UN
Women was released last week. The report presents some interesting findings that are worth
noting.

The first major point that the report makes is that the spending on minorities by state
governments is woefully low. Not surprisingly the lowest is in Gujarat. The state of Gujarat
spends just 0.029% on minorities, while the share of minority population is the state is 11.3%.
The highest expenditure is in West Bengal where the state spends 1.9% of its total budget on
viii
28.18% of its population. Telangana spends 0.83% for nearly 16% of its total population that
constitutes the minorities. Also even with these trivial allocations, the only state were the
spending exceeds allocated budgets is Karnataka.

The second important observation made is on housing for the poor. Under the Pradhan Mantri
Awaas Yojana, only 30% of the targeted number of houses for minorities were constructed.
Gujarat again showed a miserable performance, with only 1380 houses constructed against the
target of 7437 for minorities. West Bengal did extremely well and constructed 132468 against a
target of 135074. The story is the same for expenditure under the Rural Livelihood mission.
Gujarat does the worst while West Bengal reaches nearly hundred percent of the target.

One major step taken by the Union government after the Sachar Committee submitted its report
was to provide scholarships to minority students. However, the money spent on these
scholarships has been steadily coming down since 2014. Except for the state of Telangana, there
is still very poor awareness of this scheme among students as well as among school teachers and
principals and district officers. In fact it is in scholarships that the state of stands out for having
given additional scholarships to students who don’t get central assistance. The procedure also is
much simpler and level of awareness is much higher in Telangana state.

The report also studies the impact of beef ban laws on minority populations. Again not
surprisingly it finds that the laws do not really impact beef traders in West Bengal where the ban
has not been imposed. However, it has particularity affected business in Jharkhand. The report
specifically mentions that the ban has hurt small traders in Ranga Reddy district of Telangana.
Large business houses owned by Hindus have not faced any problem. It is the small ones who
are harassed by the goon squads roaming freely and by the police. Animals seized from small
traders are sold again in the market in collusion with the large business houses who are able to
arm twist and bribe law agencies.

The report mentions that the special scheme to support Madarsas is not very efficient. However,
it makes special mention of how the Telangana State Minorities Residential Educational
Institutions scheme is transforming the state’s education sector and the educational levels among
Muslims. There are a few such innovations that can be replicated across the country. Overall the
picture seems bleak, and the irony comes through clearly when despite such widespread
discrimination and lack of access to services, Muslims are seen by some as being appeased.

It makes sense that the ruling party at the centre will try to approach this issue with trepidation.
Anything it does that is seen as supporting the minorities, can result in a number of votes going
away. However, given the relative deprivation where the Muslim neighbourhoods exist, the
question that is difficult to answer is whether this biased behaviour will work counter-productive
for the BJP. Other reports here pointed out to the level of discrimination and the apathy of the
government against Muslims. What are the solutions then? One that is often talked about is to
set aside seats in educational institutions and jobs in the public sector, like those reserved for
SCs and STs.

The case for reservations

Reservations are in the news now and will remain so for the next few years. In 2020, the
reservation clause under the 95th amendment will expire. For reservations to continue the clause
will have to be renewed and the present government will be only too glad to discontinue this
policy. As for granting reservations to Muslims, it is unlikely that the Modi government will give
in easily. At the moment, there are various demands being made. Some OBC groups and
forward castes want to be included, Muslims and Christians and Sikhs want to be included as
ix
religious groups and various states want to revoke the 50% cut off that was imposed by the
Supreme Court.

Let us quickly look at some issues that the reservation policy has thrown up. The price of all
reservation for OBCs has been paid by the Muslims. Surjit Bhalla, an eminent economist and
member of the PM’s Economic Advisory Council asserts that ours has become a Hindu
constitution that has worked for the Hindus and has blatantly given Reservations to Hindus at a
major cost to the Muslims. The draft constitution, produced by the Constituent Assembly’s
Drafting Committee headed by B.R. Ambedkar, included Muslims and Indian Christians among
the beneficiaries of reservations in legislatures. However, it was done away with subsequently.

Vision 2025

It was in this context that a team was set up to study the situation and look at what the
immediate future holds for Muslims in India. It was decided to take an in depth view of what
people perceive and what they think needs to be done to build a perspective and a vision for
Muslims in particular and the minorities in general. A large number of stakeholders were
interviewed and several experts asked to contribute background papers. All this and a
nationwide survey has gone into this report studying both the issues of deprivation and
discrimination.

This large piece of work tries to bring together various views and debates on the subject of
deprivation and discrimination of Muslims. Questions regarding access to education, healthcare,
housing, jobs and livelihood were asked to a large cross section of stakeholders and analysed.
While there was little that was left out in terms of concerns and challenges, what is missing is a
cogent set of solutions. That will probably require additional work and analysis and may be
another study.

Amir Ullah Khan

January, 2018

x
 INTRODUCTION
Amir Ullah Khan and Abdul Azim Akhtar

Need for an Agenda

Vision statement: We envision an India in 2025, where all Muslims are assured of, and have access to, equitable
and inclusive growth through public and private service delivery and are able to pursue their aspirations with the
optimal health, education, wellbeing and quality of life.

This vision will be realised by empowering all Muslims and minorities and their institutions, through building
leadership, capacity, accountability and diverse partnerships, and creating an enabling set of programs, polices and
regulatory environment.

Methodology adopted

Background papers: A large set of senior academics and intellectuals working on issues of inclusion were selected to
write papers on select topics and present them in our first seminar. These papers have been edited and published here
in the report.

National Sample Survey: A large survey was conducted by Bureau of Research on Industry and Economic
Fundamentals (BRIEF). Its entire report is presented in this report.

National Consultation and Workshops: A number of meetings were held across the country. Each of them has
been presented in this report.

Interviews: A broad spectrum of people were interviewed and their answers are also included in this report.

A Vision for 2025

Emerging from this study, is a series of steps that need to be taken to ensure that Muslims in
India are not only made to feel safe and secure, but also made a part of the inclusive growth
agenda. We present here a set of issues that emerge from our study across the country using
sample survey, expert group meetings, background papers and the literature survey.

The background

Incomes: Between 1999 and 2011, the least change in per capita incomes was seen among the
Muslims. This is half the rate for SCs, STs and OBCs. The most disturbing point is that while
the monthly per capita expenditure of Muslims has increased by 60% between 2004-05 and
2011-12 according to the National Sample Survey Office, it has increased by 69% for Hindu
STs, 73% for Hindu SCs, 89% for Hindu OBCs and 122% for upper caste Hindus. The gap is
broadening, especially in urban India, where the proportion below the poverty line is now higher
among Muslim OBCs than among Hindu SCs.

Reservation: The reservation policy was lopsided. While the constitution says that reservations
would only be for social and economically backward classes, Mandal recommendations were
based on caste. A large number of Hindu castes got included and a very complicated and non-
transparent procedure was adopted in a manner in which Hindu castes would get added to the
list.

Literacy: The Post Sachar Evaluation Committee headed by Prof. Amitabh Kundu. In 2014
highlighted that the literacy rate of Muslims (70%) was below that of Hindu OBCs (74%) and
“General Hindus” (86%). STs and Muslims, top the list of large populations that have never
attended any school. Literacy rate across SRCs reveals that Muslims are marginally better off
compared to other SRCs. But they are worse off in higher education. Drop-out ratio is very high
among Muslims and when it comes to higher education, Muslim proportions are abysmally
small.

Women: A majority of rural Muslim women are engaged in tailoring activities. Muslim female
populations are engaged in craft and related trade, skilled agriculture and fishery, and elementary
occupation. In the urban areas also craft and related trade works dominate the occupation for
Muslim females. Very little of the female workforces is engaged as professionals and technicians.
Access to housing, health facilities, to secondary and high schools and to institutions of higher
learning are what Muslim women always demand.

Health: Health outcomes among Muslim children are definitely better than other Socio-
religious groups. This is primarily because of the better treatment of the girl child which means
lower Infant Mortality Rates, lower Maternal Mortality Rates and better nutritional levels.
However, these early advantages get dissipated when adult health is analyzed. This is on account
of poor access to health facilities, poverty and slum like conditions of living. The study found
that Muslim women are more aware of family planning practices and contraception methods
than others. Among children the level of wasting, stunting and malnutrition are lower among
Muslims. Muslims prefer government hospitals over private healthcare providers.

Housing: A large percentage of Muslims live in rented accommodation. There is a strong

feeling of discrimination in the housing market and this is one policy aspect that needs to be
looked at strongly.

Credit: The problems with credit availability were reported by the most number of people. Lack
of access to formal institutions, apathetic banks, poorly staffed and inadequately funded
Minority Finance Corporations, lack of availability of start-up capital etc. were given as the
reasons.

The Vision for 2025

Education

• There is a special need to improve quality of education in schools. Successful interventions

like the Gyan Shala or the ENH Foundation’s initiatives can be brought in to help primary
schools achieve quality education.

• More schools to be set up and Urdu teachers appointed, with educational inspectors and
administrators, who know Urdu and can supervise the schools.

• Recognise Madarsas as schools by inducting them into the mainstream school systems
without interference in their core syllabi, in collaboration with Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan on a
voluntary basis.

• Mid-day meals schemes must be rigorously implemented and monitored. Mid-day meals
must be provided to all students, whether in recognized or non-recognized schools,
mainstream or community institutions.

xii
Higher Education

• Higher education must be incentivized through providing larger number of scholarships at

the MPhil and PhD levels.

• Both Public and Private Universities must recruit larger number of Muslims in their higher
education programs.

• The Government should establish primary, middle and high schools for girls in all areas with
high Muslim populations. Because a major disincentive for students to continue studies is
that secondary schools are far fewer than primary schools.

• Government need to set up a large number of high schools and junior colleges for girls
through English medium. Because, the percentage of Muslims girls in higher education is
distressing.

• The Government should establish new models of ITIs in order to train Muslim youths for
employment. However, before providing training, their requirements and skills etc. should
properly be studied and then accordingly training could be provided.

Health

• Improvement of public health facilities by setting up more hospitals in the Muslim

dominated localities is a necessity.

• Collect weight at birth and monitor the same through pre-school and high school.

• Recruit ASHAs, Anganwadi workers and Auxiliary Nurse Mid-wives in Muslim dominated
areas from Muslim community.

• Parks, playground and sidewalks are required for inculcating healthy lifestyle of the
population in urban areas.

• Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHA) should be hired from among Muslims and given
proper training.

• Interventions are required to reduce the incidence of anemia among the whole population
with particular attention to Muslims.

• Increase reach of Rashtriya Shram Bikas Yojana (RSBY) in both rural and urban areas.

• Proper monitoring of vaccination rates and programs in Muslim areas.

• In the current health insurance schemes, medication for blood pressure and sugar may be
added as this drug required recurring expenditure.

• Universalization of access to drinking water and toilet facilities has to be achieved by 2020.

• Local medical workers who are the lifeline for the poor inhabitants could be given special
training at periodic intervals so that they provide better services.

• The Government should establish primary, Middle and High schools for girls in all areas
with a high density of the Muslim community.

xiii
Entrepreneurship and employment

• Most Muslims are engaged in self-employment activities and their participation in

agricultural activity is very low. So, policies for employment generation within the Muslims
should target non-agricultural sectors.

• The consumption expenditure of the Muslims is high accompanied by low monthly income.
So policies should aim at increasing income through some measures like access to
institutional credit.

• Skill development programs for Muslim clusters with private sector participation must be
encouraged.

• The wage differential among the Muslims with other religious groups is high. The Muslims
have to be protected with minimum wage laws in the state being implemented.

• The manufacturing groups where Muslim groups are working should have insurance cover
paid for by the state.

• The enterprise should ensure fair wages as well as other benefits like health cover, provident
fund, educational allowance etc.

• Focus on poverty alleviation and economic empowerment of minorities with special

emphasis on Muslim women.

• Need to provide land for landless Minorities in rural areas.

• Promote Urdu libraries as coaching centers and reading rooms.

• Need for the setting up of a special commission to look into Waqf properties.

• Govt. should make provisions that the Startup program should provide proportional funds
for setting up industries promoted by Muslims.

• Similar provisions may be made to ensure that at least 15% of funds as incentives for
industries earmarked for the units set up by Muslims.

Housing

• Government should ensure equity in housing. So, 20% of houses in urban areas and 5% in
rural areas should be allocated to Muslims.

• We have witnessed a huge proportion of Muslims who live in rented houses in urban areas
and face discrimination in the housing market. There should be a proper mechanism to
monitor this, as there have been lapses in the past in this regard.

Credit and Financial Inclusion

• There shall be group lending approach to Muslims who mostly work in informal sectors and
seek petty loans.

• SHGs should be formed by small businessmen/entrepreneurs/artisans and promoted with

finance and productive skills also.

xiv
• Access to credit remains the biggest problem for Muslim households and entrepreneurs. The
distortion in priority sector lending must be corrected.

• Organize the intensive training programs for Muslims youth for imparting the productive
skills and financial awareness to increases the demand for credit from within the community.

Government employment

• To overcome the under-representation of Muslims in administrative services like IAS, IPS

and IFS, attempts should be made to fill the gap through promotion quota from cadres in
state service.

• Ensure adequate representation for Muslims in Government Services and educational

institutions, including admission in education.

• There is also a need to increase the share of Muslims women in government employment.
33% of the reservation for Muslims could be given to women.

• In selection panels, there should be adequate representations or at least one member from
Muslim community for direct employment. A senior academic person should be appointed
into that panel.

• Again, in the case of departmental promotion, Govt. may consider nominating one Muslim
member in the case of a promotion of Muslim employees.

• For all competitive exams, there should be a screening test for all including Muslims and the
meritorious minority students should be allowed to choose the coaching centers on their
own.

Background

Over the last ten years, the policy framework in India has repeatedly underscored the plight of
the Muslim population even as the economy soared to unprecedented heights. In the last decade,
GDP growth in India went up to almost 10 percent per annum during 2006 and 2009 and has
remained among the fastest growing economies in the world despite the global downturn.
However, even as the rising tide did lift all segments of the population in the country, the
Muslims remained at the bottom on almost every parameter. The Sachar Committee 1 report in
2006 and the Post Sachar Evaluation report in 2014 underscore this persistent backwardness
among Muslims.

In 2015, India has marginally improved its human development rankings and been placed at the
130th position from 135th last year. India stands behind Maldives, which stands at 103. Maldives
spends 7.2 percent of GDP on education, while India spends only 3.3 percent GDP on
education. India’s ranking in happiness index, transparency and honesty are also not to be proud
of. Credit agencies like Standard & Poor have downgraded Indian position as safe place for
investment, yet the Economic survey is bullish about the projected growth rate for India in next
few years. The survey says, ‘India has reached a sweet spot—rare in history of nations—in which

1 The Prime Minister’s High Level Committee on social, economic and educational status of Muslims, also
known as the Sachar Committee had presented its report in late 2006 and had startled everyone with its
findings on how abjectly poor Indian Muslims were. Let us see how things have changed since then, if at all
they have. findings on how abjectly poor Indian Muslims were. Let us see how things have changed since then,
if at all they have.
xv
it could finally be launched on a double-digit medium-term growth trajectory.2 This is the
fundamental question we are asking in this study, as we seek answers from experts, policy
makers, law makers, bureaucrats, researchers, academics, students, youth and common people.
Being a private initiative, our scope is limited and we are focusing on the last ten years, i.e. 2006-
2015. During this time, we had the Post Sachar Evaluation Committee also known as the Kundu
Committee, making its suggestions in the aftermath of the Sachar Committee Report. As was
expected, the BJP-NDA government, and Ministry of Minority Affairs under Najma Heptullah,
has put the Kundu Committee recommendations in cold storage.

In the recent past, there have been some serious investigations into the state of affairs of the
Indian Muslim community, of which the Justice Sachar Committee Report is considered the
foremost. What all these reports and studies highlight is the plight of the Muslim minorities in
India on all counts. These studies have put to rest, the appeasement narrative that marked most
political viewpoints over the last few decades. However, while the appeasement argument that
political parties used to their advantage in the late twentieth century, is no longer valid, what is
missing is any serious action that would enable the Muslim community in India to share the
economic growth. India has seen and aspires for.

The need for an Inclusive Agenda

The narrative on appeasement in India changed dramatically when the then Prime Minister set
up a high powered group under Justice Rajinder Sachar, asking it to study deprivation among
Muslims. Using government data, the Sachar Committee3 report in 2006 trounced the oft
repeated right wing refrain that Muslims were getting favoured from the state. On the contrary,
the report demolished this veneer of appeasement showing that Muslims were the worst off
among all socio-economic categories. And particularly in states where appeasement was allegedly
the most– West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Bihar and Maharashtra. The Post Sachar
Evaluation report in 20144 better known as the Kundu Committee, underlined this when it
looked at post Sachar data.

Over the last ten years, the India economy soared to unprecedented heights. In the last decade,
GDP growth in India went up by almost 10 percent per annum during 2006 and 2009 and the
country has remained among the fastest growing economies in the world despite the global
downturn. However, even as the rising tide did lift all segments of the population in the
country, the Muslims remained at the bottom on almost every parameter. And over the last two
years, there is an increasing feeling that the government, especially at the centre, does not really
care. A climate of subliminal hate bolstered by lynching, profiling, stereotyping and polarisation
seems all pervasive.

It is in this context that the Institute of Objective Studies, decided to take a proactive step to
envision the future for the Indian Muslim. What would it take to ameliorate the lot of this
deprived community in the next decade? What are the opportunities that exist? How do Muslims
leverage the strengths that Indian democracy and the constitution provide to all its citizens?
Amidst a global sense of insecurity and vulnerability, could there be a plan that would work in
India? The transformation needs to be total; at the social, economic, educational and political

2 Economic Survey 2014-2015, Ministry of Finance & Oxford University Press, N Delhi, 2015, p.1.
3 The Prime Minister’s High Level Committee on social, economic and educational status of Muslims, also
known as the Sachar Committee had presented its report in late 2006 and had startled everyone with its
findings on how abjectly poor Indian Muslims were.
4 The Post Sachar Evaluation Committee chaired by Prof. Amitabh Kundu submitted its report in 2014 and
evaluated the progress made by Muslims in the eight year period between 2006 and 2014. Not much had
changed….
xvi
level, just as the same is happening across the country. Would these two trends contradict each
other, are they in conflict?

Let us begin by defining the issues that face Muslims in India. Across the country, a
heterogeneous Muslim community that is by and large urban, illiterate and financially excluded,
faces the common problems of unemployment and the inability to access quality health care. It
is important to tackle these problems and a good beginning would be by way of understating the
extent and the nature of these concerns. There is no denying that overall there has been a
substantial increase in wages and incomes and standards of living have gone up too. Poverty
levels have reduced, but the disturbing trend has been the increase in inequalities. The data we
have, tells us that the rate of growth has been impressive indeed. But the growth rate has not
been comparable across communities and the slowest growth in rural India is among the Muslim
population. In large cities too, the worst rate of growth is among the Muslims.

This study seeks to bring up a vision for India for 2025. Inclusive India, will need to understand
how to tackle the problems that its largest religious minority faces today in the backdrop of what
the community sees as its aspirations in the next decade. The vision document focuses on the
social, educational, economic and political upliftment as well as the issue of security for the
Indian Muslim. This document, therefore, seeks to bring together a vision for India for its
Muslim population, focusing on the five critical areas of Education, Health, Political
Representation, Employment and Security.

Where we stand

In 2015, India has marginally improved its human development rankings and been placed at the
130th position from 135 in 2014. India stands behind Maldives, which stands at 103. Maldives
spends 7.2 percent of GDP while India spends only 3.3 percent GDP on education. India’s
ranking in happiness index, transparency and honesty are also not to be proud of. Credit
agencies like Standard & Poor have downgraded India’s position as safe place for investment, yet
the Economic survey is bullish about the projected growth rate for India in next few years. The
survey says, ‘India has reached a sweet spot—rare in history of nations—in which it could finally
be launched on a double-digit medium-term growth trajectory.5

The question a number of analysts have asked is - Can India achieve double-digit growth
without including Muslims—who according to the 2011 Census constitute 14.2 percent of
India’s population? This is the fundamental question we asked in this study, as we sought
answers from policy makers, law makers, bureaucrats, researchers, academics, students, youth
and common people. As former union minister Arif M Khan says, ‘Whether it is the Sachar
Committee or Ranganath Misra Commission, these are constituted on the eve of some political
event like state elections and then their reports remain confined in the official closet till some
resourceful newspaper publishes the document as a leak’.6 Foreign funds are tough to come by.
The Union Home Ministry estimated that Indian Muslims receive around only US $ 250 million
per year as donations from the Gulf and other Muslim countries.7

Others do not accept Khan’s view and believe that the situation demands such work. Former
Union Minister Salman Khurshid writes, ‘In notifying the Sachar Committee in March 2005, the
UPA government used the word ‘Muslim’ and not ‘minority’ for the first time in a government
document’.8 Salman Khurshid cautions, ‘….the well-wishers of the Muslims, must consider
carefully what sort of equality they wish to see Muslims aspire for: the equality of sufferance and

5 Economic Survey 2014-2015, Ministry of Finance & Oxford University Press, N Delhi, 2015, p.1
6 Arif Mohammad Khan, Text and Context, Rupa & Co., Delhi, 2010, p. 126
7 S S Gill, Islam and the Muslims of India Exploring History, Faith and Dogma, Penguin Books, 2008, p. 121
8 Salman Khurshid, At Home in India, Hay House, N Delhi, 2015, p. 36
xvii
patronage or the real equality of free expression and self-assertion’.9 Many agree that the
Muslims are facing difficult times post-September 11, 2001. Former minister K. Natwar Singh
said, ‘I believe, and I have said this even on the floor of the Parliament, that one of the major
challenges which the world faces today is, how to deal with the Muslim world. I deliberately do
not use the word ‘Islamic’....10

Our scope in this study is limited and we are focusing on the last ten years, i.e. 2006-2015 that
coincide with the period after the Sachar Committee had submitted its report. Let us begin by
defining the issues that Muslims face in India. While the list will be long and debatable, there are
some clear concerns that would emerge. The historical issues have been the marginalization of
the Muslim voter on the part of the state, the declining markets for handicrafts and handlooms
and a neglect of the Urdu language. New issues include a steep fall of numbers in the political
space, a polarization among voters that seems to be rising across the country, a persistently small
share in state employment, negligible share of employment in critical areas like policing and the
judiciary and the increasing segregation of housing seen across metropolitan India. Today, for
this heterogeneous Muslim community, it is important to address these problems and a good
beginning would be by way of understating the extent and the nature of these concerns.

Methodology

A detailed literature review was undertaken to bring together the various scholarly works
published in the recent past exploring the ways in which Muslim India has changed. This review
covers the educational, occupational, political and social changes that have been studied by
various experts. The study exploits several datasets in addition to the National University of
Education Planning and Administration (NUEPA) schools’ data, the NSS employment-
unemployment (and education) survey, and the Pratham Education Foundation’s schooling data.
The existing secondary literature on industry, exports, employment, skilling and technical
education was looked at closely. In addition, data on the political structure was analysed to look
for trends in representation and empowerment. Each was independently used to assess
separately the specific lessons on discrimination in various sectors.
The study then engaged a number of subject experts to write background papers on various
specific issues that would confront Indian Muslims in the next ten years. These papers bring up
certain disturbing issues and some happy news for a Vision 2025. These papers would be
published separately in an edited volume. Here we give a short abstract of what the papers and
the experts say. There seems to near consensus on the challenges that India Muslims face today
but there are some policy suggestions made that could help the government.
A large pan India survey was conducted to gather primary data on a set of issues that the
secondary data is silent on. While the data analysis enable a robust backgrounder to the situation
in the country, it was important to follow this up with a rigorous qualitative analysis. Towards
this, the study organised a series of roundtables, one to one interviews and focus group
discussions with experts from all walks of life. Each roundtable, spread across the country
brought together experts from various fields. While the focus was to be on education, health,
employment and political representation, it could also pick up various other concerns surfaces
during the course of the study. Using a mix of the primary qualitative data and secondary data
analysis, a vision for 2025 was written and discussed again with select groups.
Inclusive India will need to understand how to tackle the problems that its largest religious
minority faces today in the backdrop of what the community sees as its aspirations in the next
decade. This Vision 2025 document brings together the popular and the specialist viewpoints on

9 Salman Khurshid, At Home in India, Hay House, N Delhi, 2015, p.121,

10 K Natwar Singh, ‘India and Islam’, 12th Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture, Anil Shastri, Modern Thought
Leaders, McGraw hill Education, N Delhi, 2015, p. 74-86
xviii
what the Indian Muslim aspires for as the country seeks to regain its economic growth and its
geo-political significance. The vision document focuses on the educational, economic and
political upliftment as well as the issue of security for the Indian Muslim. This document,
therefore, seeks to bring together a vision for India for its Muslim population, focusing on the
five critical areas of Health, Education, Political Representation, Employment and Security.
Background papers
A part of the study, specialists and experts were invited to contribute special papers that are
being published in this edited volume. The topics are varied, though in no way do they cover all
issues that concern the Indian Muslims. Some are controversial, while some are straightforward.
Each paper carries the author’s view that has, in true spirit of freedom, not been edited or
tampered with. The views, of course, are not what the Institute of Objective Studies or the
editors stand for. However, these are some of the most respected voices who speak on social
issues in India and will therefore carry a lot of gravity in what they say.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan, explores the position of Muslims in Indian Political Landscape. He argues
that Muslim lands and Muslim communities are in a state of violent and intense political
transformations across the Muslim heartland.

Dr. S Y Quraishi, examined the issue of Muslims and Family Planning in India. In his paper, he
explores the myths and realities associated with the issue. His paper demolishes many existing
myths associated with population. For instance, the assertion that Muslims are predominantly
polygamous is a myth. The Status of Women in India Report, 1975, had revealed that all the
communities of India are polygamous and Muslims are indeed the least! Population explosion is
a matter of immense national concern. It must be addressed urgently yet sensitively. The paper
provides many answers.

Prof. Abdul Shaban, examines the role of infamous Shiv Sena in his paper ‘Politics, Violence
and Production of ‘Fear’: Working of Shiv Sena in Mumbai’. He examines how democracies remain
prone to negative exploitation of the diversities.

Prof. Ram Puniyani, activist, author and former professor of the IIT-Bombay, discusses the
all-important issues of security and equity for Muslims in contemporary India. He attempts to
outline the steps needed to strengthen the democratic rights of this biggest religious minority in
India.

Dr. Britta Ohm, in her paper ‘Majoritarian Public and Democracy: The Televised violence in
Gujarat 2002’ talks about the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat. This paper engages with the
relationship between the public and democracy in the context of a particularly violent event in
India.

Mr. Irfan Engineer writes on the issue of ‘Hindutva and Muslims’. He argues that the BJP
leaders appear to reach out to the Muslims during elections to confuse the Muslims and corner
some votes.

Prof. Madhav Das Nalapat is an academic, columnist, strategist and an advisor. He calls for
development of Muslims on modern lines in his paper, ‘Muslims in India: Anchoring Behavior in the
Word of God’. He calls on the Muslim community to emphasise the beneficence, mercy and
compassion which suffuses the Word of God and which are explicitly shown to be the defining
virtues of the Islamic faith.

xix
Dr. Broto Rauth Bhardwaj of Bharati Vidyapeeth University, New Delhi discusses the issue of
Muslim women. In her paper, she tries to find the role of education in improving the status of
Muslim women entrepreneurs.

Prof. Vibhuti Patel, Head, Department of Economics, SNDT Women's University, Mumbai
and an authority on gender issues, discusses issues of Muslim women and development in her
paper ‘Socioeconomic Profile of Muslim Women in Maharashtra’.

Ms. Rakhshandah Hani in her paper focuses on gender related issues of labour market. Her
paper titled ‘Employment of Muslim Women Workers in the Indian Labour Market’ argues that labour
force participation rate and work participation rate for Muslim women have shown a declining
trend.

Dr. Abdul Azim Akhtar, in his paper on ‘Caste Among Muslims’ discusses the nature of the
divide in the Muslim society and how caste shapes their life.

Dr. Manjur Ali in his paper, ‘Forgotten at the Margins’ talks about Muslim manual scavengers who
live an ‘undignified’ life.

Prof. Zafar Mahfooz Nomani, teaches Law at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, discusses
issue of personal law reform in his paper titled ‘Imperatives Of Personal Law Reform And Good
Governance.’ India’s continuation of trifocal legacy of recognition of traditional laws, development
of powerful norms and assumption of reform of personal laws by the state is not linked to the
imperatives of inclusive growth and good governance, he argues.

Dr. Shafeeq Rahman in his paper on Muslim Representation in Parliament does a case study of
96 Parliamentary Constituencies to conclude that Indian Muslim are largely underrepresented in
the electoral politics, as was the case during the 2009 and 2014 elections.

Prof. Vibhuti Narain Rai talks about the role of the police during communal riots. He
encountered some disturbing trends himself. According to him, in most parts of the country, the
relationship between the police and Muslims was inimical and community perception of the
police in situations of communal tension was that of an enemy.

Mr. Yousuf Saeed, a filmmaker, in his paper ‘Stereotypes of Muslim identity in India's popular media
and entertainment industry’ discusses the imagery of the Muslims in the popular media. He narrates
that media have been portraying the images Muslims, in somewhat stereotypical way.

Mr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, the US-based Kashmir activist in his paper shares ‘few possible
scenarios that will help settle the conflict through tripartite negotiations and peaceful
procedures.’

Mr. Jawed Alam Khan, in his paper ‘Policy challenges: Have development schemes meant for Muslims
worked effectively?’, highlights the impact of government schemes on Muslims.

Key Indicators

The Muslim population is sparsely distributed across the country, forming a minority in every
state except in Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in low political representation. There is yet no
Muslim constituency despite the community being plagued by persistent socio-economic issues
in the areas of education, health, livelihood generation and security among others.

xx
Muslims across the country have had lesser exposure and access than the average Indian to
primary education, healthcare and credit, and have often fallen prey to discrimination and ethnic
violence. Issues pertaining to inadequacy in education, lack of institutional support, weak
economic conditions, lack of employment and employability, cultural gap, inadequate
representation in administrative bodies, lack of security, lack of adequate reservations, etc. have
cropped up time and again in recent history.

The formulation of a vision statement for the next ten years beckons a detailed analysis of these
factors that have determined the fate of the community over the years. Such an exercise must be
deliberated upon with utmost care and should involve wide consultation. It has to reach out to a
wide constituency across the country to gather clarity on the exact status of and thought
processes related to the various issues faced by the Muslims, and possible remedial actions which
would help in laying a roadmap for their overall development in the next ten years.

Table 1: Population

State/UT Total Population Muslim Population

Lakshadweep 64,473 96.58%

Jammu and Kashmir 1,25,41,302 68.31%
Assam 3,12,05,576 34.22%
West Bengal 9,12,76,115 27.01%
Kerala 3,34,06,061 26.56%
Uttar Pradesh 19,98,12,341 19.26%
Bihar 10,40,99,452 16.87%
Jharkhand 3,29,88,134 14.53%
Uttarakhand 1,00,86,292 13.95%
Karnataka 6,10,95,297 12.92%
Delhi 1,67,87,941 12.86%
Telangana 3,52,86,757 12.68%
Maharashtra 11,23,74,333 11.54%
Gujarat 6,04,39,692 9.67%
Rajasthan 6,85,48,437 9.07%
Tripura 36,73,917 8.60%
Andhra Pradesh 8,46,65,533 8.53%
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 3,80,581 8.52%
Manipur 28,55,794 8.40%
Goa 14,58,545 8.33%
Daman and Diu 2,43,247 7.92%
Haryana 2,53,51,462 7.03%

xxi
 Madhya Pradesh 7,26,26,809 6.57%
Puducherry 12,47,953 6.05%
Tamil Nadu 7,21,47,030 5.86%
Chandigarh 10,55,450 4.87%
Meghalaya 29,66,889 4.40%
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 3,43,709 3.76%
Nagaland 19,78,502 2.47%
Himachal Pradesh 68,64,602 2.18%
Orissa 4,19,74,218 2.17%
Chhattisgarh 2,55,45,198 2.02%
Arunachal Pradesh 13,83,727 1.95%
Punjab 2,77,43,338 1.93%
Sikkim 6,10,577 1.62%
Mizoram 10,97,206 1.35%

India 1,21,08,54,977 14.23%

Source: Census 2011 Data, Media Reports11

An analysis of the shares of Muslim population in the total population figures of the states/UTs
showed that states/UTs such as Lakshadweep, Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, West Bengal, Uttar
Pradesh, Kerala, Bihar and Jharkhand have higher Muslim population shares as compared to the
share of Muslim population in the country, which stands at 14.23 percent. Share of Muslim
population in Uttarakhand, Karnataka, Delhi, Telangana and Maharashtra were also close to the
national figure.

Table 2: Literacy

State/UT Literacy Rate

Kerala 94.00%
Lakshadweep 91.85%
Mizoram 91.33%
Andhra Pradesh12 91.10%
Goa 88.70%
Tripura 87.22%
Daman and Diu 87.10%
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 86.63%

11 http://www.business-standard.com/content/general_pdf/082511_02.pdf,
http://www.deccanchronicle.com/150826/nation-current-affairs/article/muslim-population-telangana-and-
andhra-pradesh-grew-faster
12 Literacy Rate for residual Andhra Pradesh i.e. Seemandhra provided.
xxii
 Delhi 86.21%
Chandigarh 86.05%
Puducherry 85.85%
Himachal Pradesh 82.80%
Maharashtra 82.34%
Sikkim 81.42%
Tamil Nadu 80.09%
Nagaland 79.55%
Uttarakhand 78.82%
Gujarat 78.03%
Manipur 76.94%
West Bengal 76.26%
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 76.24%
Punjab 75.84%
Haryana 75.55%
Karnataka 75.36%
Meghalaya 74.43%
Orissa 72.87%
Assam 72.19%
Chhattisgarh 70.28%
Madhya Pradesh 69.32%
Uttar Pradesh 67.68%
Jammu and Kashmir 67.16%
Telangana 66.50%
Jharkhand 66.41%
Rajasthan 66.11%
Arunachal Pradesh 65.38%
Bihar 61.80%

India 74.04%
Source: Census 2011 Data, Media Reports13

Around two-thirds of the states/UTs have literacy rates higher than the national figure of 74.04
percent, with Kerala, Lakshadweep, Mizoram and Andhra Pradesh displaying very high literacy
rates of above 90 percent. The literacy rates of all the states/UTs have been summarized in the
table, and states beating the national literacy rate have been highlighted.
13 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/T-party-today-Indias-29th-state-Telangana-is-born/articleshow/359
12105.cms
xxiii
 Table 3: Poverty

State/UT Population below Poverty Line

Chhattisgarh 39.90%
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 39.31%
Jharkhand 37.00%
Manipur 36.90%
Arunachal Pradesh 34.70%
Bihar 33.70%
Orissa 32.60%
Assam 32.00%
Madhya Pradesh 31.70%
Uttar Pradesh 29.40%
Chandigarh 21.81%
Karnataka 20.90%
Mizoram 20.40%
West Bengal 20.00%
Nagaland 18.90%
Maharashtra 17.40%
Gujarat 16.60%
Rajasthan 14.70%
Tripura 14.10%
Meghalaya 11.90%
Tamil Nadu 11.35%
Uttarakhand 11.30%
Haryana 11.20%
Jammu and Kashmir 10.40%
Delhi 9.90%
Daman and Diu 9.86%
Puducherry 9.70%
Andhra Pradesh14 9.20%

14 Data for erstwhile undivided Andhra Pradesh provided

xxiv
 Punjab 8.30%
Sikkim 8.20%
Himachal Pradesh 8.10%
Kerala 7.10%
Goa 5.10%
Lakshadweep 2.77%
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 0.04%

India 21.90%
Source: PRS Legislative Research

Chhattisgarh is the poorest state in the country, with around 39.9 percent of the population
below poverty line as per 2011-12 estimates, which is far more than the national figure of 21.9
percent. The other states/UTs beating the national estimates are Dadra and Nagar Haveli,
Jharkhand, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh. States/UTs such as Delhi, Daman and Diu, Puducherry, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab,
Sikkim, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Goa, Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar Islands are on
the wealthier side, the population below poverty line being less than 10 percent for these
states/UTs.

Table 4: Fertility

State/UT Total Fertility Rate (TFR)15

Bihar 3.4
Uttar Pradesh 3.1
Madhya Pradesh 2.9
Rajasthan 2.8
Jharkhand 2.7
Chhattisgarh 2.6
Assam 2.3
Gujarat 2.3
Haryana 2.2
Orissa 2.1
Jammu and Kashmir 1.9
Karnataka 1.9
Andhra Pradesh16 1.8
Kerala 1.8
Maharashtra 1.8

15 TFR by residence for India and bigger states provided.

16 Data for erstwhile undivided Andhra Pradesh provided.
xxv
Delhi 1.7
Himachal Pradesh 1.7
Punjab 1.7
Tamil Nadu 1.7
West Bengal 1.6

India 2.3
Source: SRS Statistical Report, 2013

The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) figure of Bihar is the highest among the bigger states. The other
states with TFR above the national figure of 2.3 are Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. West Bengal has the lowest TFR among the bigger states. The
Total Fertility Rates of all the bigger states has been depicted in the table.

Table 5: Crime Rate

State/UT Rate of Total Cognizable Crimes 2013 Inmate Population 2013

Kerala 502.2 7395

Delhi 406.7 13552
Madhya Pradesh 303.8 34708
Tamil Nadu 297.6 14721
Rajasthan 279.2 19293
Assam 277.3 8263
Haryana 273.0 17644
Gujarat 258.8 12058
Chandigarh 254.0 661
Andhra Pradesh17 252.1 14313
Puducherry 244.9 280
Goa 228.8 523
Chhattisgarh 227.3 15840
Karnataka 224.7 18220
Arunachal Pradesh 217.9 92
Jammu and Kashmir 210.5 2352
Maharashtra 201.7 27400
Himachal Pradesh 198.2 1999
West Bengal 185.5 22778
Orissa 172.5 14473

17 Data for erstwhile undivided Andhra Pradesh provided

xxvi
 Tripura 167.2 901
Bihar 166.3 31259
Mizoram 165.6 870
Jharkhand 148.4 14243
Sikkim 135.3 230
Punjab 129.2 27449
Manipur 126.3 660
Meghalaya 121.1 850
Andaman and
Nicobar Islands 116.6 1149
Uttar Pradesh 108.4 83518
Uttarakhand 92.9 3845
Daman and Diu 82.8 56
Dadra and Nagar
Haveli 80.1 35
Nagaland 52.6 487
Lakshadweep 51.3 0

India 215.5 411992

Source: NCRB

The table summarises the rates of total cognizable crimes and inmate population figures for all
the states/UTs. As can be seen, the cognizable crime rates for states such as Kerala and Delhi
are much higher than the national rate of 215.5 per 100,000 persons. The other states/UTs with
cognizable crime rates above the national figure have been highlighted in the table. Inmate
population also forms a criterion for analysis, and the 2013 inmate figures for all the states/UTs
have been depicted in the table.

Table 6: Political Representation

State Name Members of Lok Sabha

Total Muslims

Lakshadweep 1 100%
Jammu and Kashmir 6 50%
West Bengal 42 19%
Assam 14 14%
Bihar 40 10%
Kerala 20 10%
Telangana 19 5%

xxvii
Tamil Nadu 39 3%
Andaman and Nicobar Islands 1 0%
Andhra Pradesh 25 0%
Arunachal Pradesh 2 0%
Chandigarh 1 0%
Chhattisgarh 11 0%
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 1 0%
Daman and Diu 1 0%
Delhi 7 0%
Goa 2 0%
Gujarat 29 0%
Haryana 10 0%
Himachal Pradesh 4 0%
Jharkhand 14 0%
Karnataka 28 0%
Madhya Pradesh 29 0%
Maharashtra 45 0%
Manipur 2 0%
Meghalaya 2 0%
Mizoram 1 0%
Nagaland 1 0%
Orissa 21 0%
Puducherry 7 0%
Punjab 13 0%
Rajasthan 25 0%
Sikkim 1 0%
Tripura 2 0%
Uttarakhand 5 0%
Uttar Pradesh 80 0%

India 551 4%
Source: Elections in Media Reports18

Except for Lakshadweep, Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal, Assam, Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu
and Telangana, all other states have no Muslim representation in the Lok Sabha.

18 http://www.elections.in/parliamentary-constituencies/member-of-parliament.html, http://indianexpress. Com

/article/india/politics/only-22-muslims-in-16th-lok-sabha/
xxviii
What the data says

By 2020, India is projected to be the youngest nation in the world.19 The average monthly per
capita expenditure (MPCE)20 has been going up in India in the last twenty years of economic
growth. There is no denying that overall there has been a substantial increase in wages and
incomes, and the standards of living have gone up too. Poverty levels have reduced, but the
disturbing trend has been the increase in inequalities. The data we have tells us that the rate of
growth has been impressive. But the growth rate has not been comparable across communities
and the slowest growth in rural India is among the Muslim population. In large cities too, the
worst rate of growth is among the Muslims.

The MPCE is what an individual spends on a monthly basis. We have figures for the years 1993-
4, 2004-5 and 2009-10. This data allows us to take a look at changes in economic status over
roughly 20 years of time. As per expenditure figures, in rural India, not much has changed.
Muslims are poorer than other communities and Upper-Caste Hindus and are only slightly better
than off than Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe populations. This is partially because the
Muslim workforce in rural India is less dependent on agriculture than the non-Muslim landless
population in villages. The increase in monthly expenditure too has been rather uniform across
all categories, each one of them now spending about 30 rupees more per month, than they did
twenty years ago.

Urbanisation and Indian Muslims

Urban India is a cause for worry: The disturbing trend is in urban India particularly in large cities
where the population is more than a million. That is where the Muslim population suffers the
most21. In 1993-94, the Muslim population in such cities was earning more than the scheduled
caste and the scheduled tribe populations. It was certainly poorer than upper caste and backward
caste Hindus, but the difference was not as alarming. Muslims are unable to extract any benefit
from the concentration of institutional and infrastructural facilities in urban areas. Data from the
NSSO's 50th and 55th round suggests that over 40 percent of Muslims in urban areas fall in the
poorest 'monthly per capita expenditure class' (MPCE) quintile compared with less than 22
percent of Hindus. The middle class is absent among Muslims as against the Indian middle class
that is growing at a faster pace during the last decade than ever before.

We have traditionally sees urbanisation as the only solution to all our problems. However, the
reality that emerges is quite shocking. 30 percent of populations in Kolkata and Chennai live in
slums that lack basic infrastructure. Also 25 percent of our total slum population lives in our five
big metro towns. What is alarming is that more than 41 percent of Mumbai’s population lives in
slums. Slums are areas that are overcrowded, unhygienic and polluted. They lack educational and
health facilities of any decent kind. It is difficult in most slums for any public service like fire
engines or water tanks to reach. There is an acute gender bias in our cities and that is getting
worse.

19 Economic Survey, 2014-15, p. 131.

20 One way of evaluating the levels of economic advancement of various social groups is to compare their
consumption expenditure. In India, we do not have data on how much people earn or what their incomes are.
That is why, the next best method is to see how much people spend (and therefore what they earn) as this data
is available to us at frequent intervals. The National Sample Survey organization provides the Monthly Per
Capita Expenditure or the MPCE, and allows us to compare across SC, ST, Hindu and Muslim populations in
urban and rural areas separately.
21 Over 60 percent of the Muslim population in India lives in five states — Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar,
Maharashtra and Assam. 36 percent of Muslims stay in urban India, while urban Hindus constitute 26 percent
of all Hindus.
xxix
Historically, minorities have played an important role in urbanisation. They have been the ones
who have accelerated the development to new cities with their enterprise and entrepreneurship.
However, what is a matter for concern in India today is the declining ratio of minority
engagement in urbanization. The trend that we see is that minority populations, particularly
Muslim minorities are urbanizing at far slower rates than upper caste communities.

Muslims have been more urban than rural. Their share in urban population was 17.3 percent
compared to their share of 12.5 percent in rural areas. 35 percent of Muslims lived in urban areas
compared to 28.6 percent of the general population in 2011. Also more than 10 percent of all
Muslims live in the 5 million plus big metro cities. Overall, urban India’s population has
increased from 23.7 percent in 1981 to 31 percent in 2011. However, Muslim population in
urban areas has in the same period gone up from 34 to 39 percent. What this means is that while
the general population’s urbanisation has been higher than 7.5 percent, the increase in Muslim
urbanisation has only been 5.9 percent.

How does one explain this phenomenon? While the agrarian crisis is responsible for pushing a
large chunk of the general population away from villages to cities, Muslim migration is not
explained through this. The reason is that Muslims do not own farm land except in very few
districts. In villages, the Muslim share of non-farm employment is much higher and with rural
economies underperforming, it is expected that larger numbers of Muslim families would
migrate to urban centres. Strangely, this is clearly not happening.

The obvious reason for this is that our urban centres are no longer welcoming of minorities. In
the period between 2004 and 2011, the increase in urban share of SC population has been 1.4
percent, STs and Muslims at 2.2 percent while it is 3.8 percent for Upper caste Hindus. In
smaller urban centres this tendency is even more stark. In class 3 and class 4 cities, there has
been a marginal increase in Muslim populations over the last decade, going up by only 0.2
percent, while the overall growth has been nearly ten times higher.

The other change that we see when we look at the nature of employment in cities is the decline
in self-employment. In the case of Muslims this decline is sharper than for other groups. What
has gone up is regular employment, but here there is a disturbing trend. Regular employment for
Muslims has gone up in rural areas at a fast pace, but in urban areas it lags behind all categories.
Casual employment however has gone up the highest and at the fastest pace in case of Muslim
populations in large cities.

Urbanisation now is becoming tough for the poor and is also getting exclusionary. Rents are
very high, ghettoes abound and living is more and more insecure with poor law and order
arrangements. The other problem is of course that urban employment now requires a skilled
workforce. Most migrants from marginalized communities like the SCs and STs and Muslims
come with no or irrelevant skills. Therefore, they get further alienated in the existing hostile
environment that characterizes our cities.

Opening up the economy benefited those sections of the society, who are educationally and
financially sound and whose values and norms promotes the risk taking commercial activities.22
Despite the constitutional and legal guarantees, some sections of the citizens are unable to assert
their citizenry due to socio-political and economic impediments. The Muslim community in
general constitutes one such excluded class.23 There is little progress in reforming the police; or
in improving healthcare, education and food security for the millions still struggling for
22 Rajeev Kumar Singh, ‘Citizenship, Exclusion & Indian Muslims’, in S N Tripathy (ed), Issues on Ethnicity,
Discrimination and Social Exclusion, Abhijeet Publications, Delhi, 2010, 110094, p. 292.
23 Rajeev Kumar Singh, ‘Citizenship, Exclusion & Indian Muslims’, in S N Tripathy (ed), Issues on Ethnicity,
Discrimination and Social Exclusion, Abhijeet Publications, Delhi, 2010, 110094, p.294.
xxx
subsistence. There is considerable lag in ending discrimination against Dalits, tribal groups, and
religious minorities and protecting the rights of women and children.24

One usual allegation is that Muslims stay away from the Indian mainstream. It is said that
Muslims in India live in their own shell and refuse to be integrated into the Indian mainstream.
There may be isolated cases but a majority of Muslims are very much part of Indian
mainstream.25 One serious hurdle for the Muslims of India is the antagonism of the Sangh
Parivar which forces a reaction from them. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, while some
members of the political leadership demanded the rebuilding of the mosque and communal
leaders used it as an opportunity to promote their political ambitions, the larger liberal Muslim
constituency abstained from violence and frustration.26

Muslims in India have made much greater progress towards modernization than Muslims in
most other Islamic countries and even the orthodoxy is loosening its grip. The All India Muslim
Personal Law Board has taken some steps to reform the personal law and the leaders have
decided to set up Darul Ifta, a body to check the misuse of fatwas. More importantly, following
in the footsteps of West Bengal and Maharashtra, most Madarsas are modernizing their syllabi,
as the parents of the wards themselves desire their children to study English and the science
subjects.27

Some key issues

Our Vice President is a most successful civil servant and a well-respected scholar. He is the only
one to have been nominated twice to this post. One primary responsibility of his is to run the
Rajya Sabha as Chairperson. In a house that has seen much acrimony and hostility among
members during the last year, there hasn’t been a single complaint against the Chair. The Lok
Sabha, where the ruling party is in a large majority, is often in disarray. There are numerous
complaints against the Chair, who is a long time MP and member of the BJP. Hamid Ansari runs
the RS with a calmness that is fair and firm.

It is not surprising that the lunatic right fringe keeps trying new reasons to run him down. One
such case was downright ridiculous. Ansari was speaking at a function of the Majlis-i-
Mushawarat. He was addressing a large gathering of Muslims and was simply and plainly
berating them for continuing to stay away from modernity and asking them to shun casteism. It
appeared, as if he would be severely criticised by the traditionalists among Muslims, for the
complaint was against their fixation on identity and dignity. He was telling them that they should
move away from self-defeating traditionalism. However, it was the right wing lunatics who
objected.

The Vice President was scathing in his comments on how Muslims have behaved. They are,
according to him “trapped in a vicious circle and in a culturally defensive posture that hinders
self-advancement.” He reminded the audience of Jadeediyat and the need to think of modernity
on positive lines, in the true Islamic tradition. Affirmation of faith is just as important as the
wellbeing of the community. He questioned the audience on what they had themselves done as
autonomous efforts with regard to their own identified short comings. His question was- What
has the Muslim community done to redress the backwardness and poverty arising out of socio-
economic and educational under-development?

24 Human Rights Watch, World Report, India, 2011, p. 315.

25 Asghar Ali Engineer, Muslims and India, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006, p. 14.
26 S S Gill, Islam and the Muslims of India Exploring History, Faith and Dogma, Penguin Books, 2008, p. 106.
27 S S Gill, Islam and the Muslims of India Exploring History, Faith and Dogma, Penguin Books, 2008, p. 195
xxxi
A the Shibli Academy at Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh, Ansari had said that the challenge is to
overcome the existing problems "within the framework of the law of the land and the
constitutional rights of life and dignity, equality, and affirmative action in favour of the socially
and educationally backward to ensure equality of opportunity." He has consistently made this
point. That there is legal framework that exists in India and a constitutional obligation to provide
amenities and access to public facilities to all. He made this point again.

Having done this rather plainly and bluntly, the Vice President then asked a similar set of
questions to the state. If the government believes in sabka saath and sabka vikaas, then it cannot
ignore the wellbeing of a large section of its citizenry. The same honesty with which he
questioned the Muslim community was evident, when the Vice President said that Muslims
unfairly carry the historical burden and responsibility for partition and political events and
compromises made early in the 20th century. The trauma of partition is played out even now and
the violence is disproportionate against the Muslims who are unfairly held as the perpetrators of
a political event nearly 70 years ago.
The Vice President then spoke quoting a number of government studies and reports. He quoted
abundantly from the Amitabh Kundu Committee report. The Kundu report uses government
statistics, publicly available data and studies done by various ministries to show that the
condition of the Muslims continues to be miserable. Even after nearly ten years of the Sachar
Committee, the same situation continues. And that is what the Vice President underscored. He
even pointed out that the government had accepted many of these suggestions made. It is the
implementation that is suffering. Hamid Ansari has retired now after an illustrious stint as Indian
Vice President.

The Kundu Committee had said that affirmative action for Muslims is urgently required. It
emphasised that Muslims still lag behind all Socio-religious communities in terms of access to
amenities, and this problem needs to be addressed, irrespective of their better child health
outcomes, due to community characteristics. The Committee proposed the setting up of a
Diversity Index and recommended the formulation and enactment of a comprehensive Anti-
Discrimination Legislation to prohibit discrimination based on disability, sex, caste, religion and
other criteria. Kundu Committee also highlighted a need to focus on specific areas of education,
economic empowerment, health and housing problems.

Health and Indian Muslims

In 17th century, colonial India made a small and selective beginning in public health care.28 The
patients were almost exclusively soldiers of Portugal or from other Christian nations. This is a
point that should be emphasized—at that time, these services were for Europeans only, and only
for certain Europeans. Women and non-Christian men were not allowed in the Royal Hospital.
In 19th century, Muslim Women rulers of Bhopal provided funds for healthcare. A Hospital for
women, where female doctors were employed, was established in Bhopal in the 1880s.29 In 1854,
Sikander Begum founded the Medical Department of Bhopal.30 Important medical reforms were
enacted during Shah Jehan’s (daughter of Sikander Begum) reign, such as vaccination campaigns

28 One traveller recalls, ‘Among the wonders and evils of the exotic places depicted in the Voyage of Pyrard de
Laval to the East Indies (1601-1611), the Royal Hospital of Goa stands in magnificence and grandeur. After a
long journey through the world, the French traveller, Francois Pyrard arrived in Goa in 1608 feeling ill.
Together with some of his shipmates, he was taken to the Royal Hospital’. Christiana Bastos, ‘Together And
Apart, Catholic Hospitals in Plural Goa’, in Fabrizio Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and India, 1500-1950s, Brill,
Leieden, 2012, p.133.
29 Native Christian men could enter the premises as secondary staff: they could serve there, but not be served. ..In
sum, to taken to in as a patient of the Royal Hospital one had to be a high status male and a Christian of old
Stock. Claudia Preckel, ‘Healings the People and the Princes: Hospitals, Hakims and Doctors in Bhopal’,
Fabrizio Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and India, 1500-1950s, Brill, Leieden, 2012, p 191.
30 ibid., p 192.
xxxii
and regulations for lepers. Shah Jehan supported both western medicine and native Unani
physicians and it was during her reign that the number of dispensaries (either Unani or
allopathic) in the Bhopal Agency rose to seven.

The Begums of Bhopal were among those Indian rulers who vigorously promoted vaccination
of their subjects. Sultan Jahan Begum wrote in the biography of her mother, ‘Nothing has
proved more efficacious in the prevention of small-pox than vaccination; and now the rich and
the poor alike have come to realize its usefulness. But thirty or more years ago, people were
more afraid of being vaccinated. Great difficulty used to be experienced everywhere in getting
vaccinated”. Shah Jehan was however convinced of its utility and forthwith opened a
Vaccination Department at Bhopal, and got her own grandson, Nawab Muhammad Nasrullah
Khan vaccinated first. As a further incentive, she also appointed a special reward for each child
that was vaccinated.31

The next and most important step concerning the establishment of hospital services in Bhopal
city was the construction of the Prince of Wales Hospital, inaugurated in 1878.32 In early 20th
century, the good work of Bhopal rulers found admiration from an American traveller,
Alexander Powell who was there in the late 1920s wrote about the Hospital, ‘I might mention
that the Prince of Wales Hospital in Bhopal, built and maintained by members of the reigning
family, is one of the finest institutions of this kind in India, as up-to-date in its methods and
equipment as any in the United States. I know, because I went there daily.33

Today, Muslim women are reluctant to visit hospitals over issues of seclusion and purdah. In
1880s, Shah Jehan opened a small zanana34 hospital in Bhopal, where veiled women could be
treated by women physicians and nurses. It was later expanded and inaugurated on 24 May, 1892
as Lady Lansdowne Hospital. It was partly funded by the Dufferin Fund, which was established
in 1885 to promote medical care of Indian women.35 Sultan Jehan ordered the staff of Lady
Lansdowne Hospital to visit the zanana apartments of the city regularly, to provide basic hygiene
training and medical care for women in purdah and for children living with them36.

Hamdard also played an important role in providing affordable health care. The first Hamdard
hospital (Shifa Khana) was located at Asaf Ali Road, near the Turkman Gate.37 One of the first
realizations of the new pharmacy, bound to become an overall and lasting success was a sharbat
called ‘Ruh-Afza’. Abdul Majid introduced Ruh-Afza in the first list of drugs of Hamdard, as a
drink whose qualities were mainly medicinal. Hakim Ustad Hasan Khan, the first processor of
Ruh-Afza was a resident of Saharanpur.38 Hamdard actuated a true modernization in the field of
medicine, by reorganizing existing institutions and adapting and justifying new ideas by drawing
on tradition.39

The present

31 ibid., p 193-194.
32 ibid., p.195.
33 ibid., p. 196.
34 All women.
35 Claudia Preckel, ‘Healing the People and the princes: Hospitals, Hakims and Doctors in Bhopal’, in Fabrizio
Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and India, 1500-1950s, Brill, Leieden, 2012, pp 200-201.
36 Claudia Preckel, ‘Healing the People and the Princes: Hospitals, Hakims and Doctors in Bhopal’, in Fabrizio
Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and India, 1500-1950s, Brill, Leieden, 2012, p.210.
37 Anna Vanzan, ‘Hamdard, How to Share Pain in a Muslim Way’, Fabrizio Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and
India, 1500-1950s, Brill, Leieden, 2012, p.217.
38 Anna Vanzan, ‘Hamdard, How to Share Pain in a Muslim Way’, Fabrizio Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and
India, 1500-1950s, Brill, Leieden, 2012, p. 219 .
39 Anna Vanzan, ‘Hamdard, How to Share Pain in a Muslim Way’, Fabrizio Speziale (ed), Hospitals in Iran and
India, 1500-1950s, Brill, Leieden, 2012, p.228.
xxxiii
Despite low spending on public healthcare, India has not done badly in terms of achieving
health goals. It is noteworthy that India’s total fertility rate (TFR) has been steadily declining and
is now at 2.3. India is set to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) with respect
to maternal and child survival.40 The decline in TFR means that all communities including
Muslims are experiencing this. The hype about rise in the Muslim population is not based on
facts but is part of the rhetoric meant for social and political gains. Compared to a number of
developing countries, Indian family planning programmes appear to have finally been reasonably
successful.

Health status among Muslims is better than among other communities, despite the lack of access
to healthcare facilities. This could be explained by the relatively large urban population among
Muslims and higher respect for the girl child. Some studies done on various socio-religious
categories highlight this point. For example, on study of Thyroid related diseases states that
these are being reported in larger proportion than before. It appears that thyrotoxicosis is more
common among Hindu women than Muslim. According to this field survey in Mirzapur, there
were 18 male Hindu (90 percent) and 52 female Hindu (94.5 percent) patients against zero
Muslim male patients and 3 female patients.41 It is concluded that illness may produce stress in
many ways as it hampers the capacity to perform physical and social functions. Also, it affects
the economy of the family by reducing the capacity of an individual to earn, and by causing the
continuous expenditure on the treatment of the sick person.42

Another study looks points out that Bengali Muslim and Meitei women have lower BMI than
overall BMI reported for Assamese. CED (Chronic Energy Deficiency) malnutrition is higher
among the Muslims while overweight women are more among the Meiteis. CED malnutrition is
higher among the Muslim. More than 40 percent of illiterate women of both the communities
have CED malnutrition. CED malnutrition is more among Muslim house wives compared to
their Meitei counterparts. CED malnutrition is higher among the women of both communities
who live in small and nuclear families.43

Education

The world of modern communication and interchange requires basic education and training.
While some poor countries in the world have made excellent progress in this area (countries in
East Asia and South-east Asia are good examples), others (such as those in South Asia and
Africa) have tended to lag behind. Equity in cultural as well as economic opportunities can be
profoundly important in a globalizing world. This is a shared challenge for the economic and
cultural world.44

Muslim students suffer from several disadvantages. Most would like to see education imparted in
Urdu, their mother tongue, but few schools accommodate this. In 1958, Dr. Zakir Hussain
presented over 10,000 signatures to the UP Education Minister requesting that children be
educated where the medium of instruction should be Urdu. In 1954, the Anjuman Taraqqi-e-
Urdu presented a memorandum, signed by 20, 50,000 adult citizens, demanding the recognition

40 Ibid., p.138.
41 Shashi Rani Agarwal, Social Stress and Thyrotoxicosis, Vishwavidyalaya Parkashan, Varanasi, 1983, p.32.
42 Shashi Rani Agarwal, Social Stress and Thyrotoxicosis, Vishwavidyalaya Parkashan, Varanasi, 1983, p.105.
43 A F Guelenur Islam Barbhuiya, ‘Nutritional Anthropometry with Reference to Bio-Social Aspects among Adult
Muslim and Meitei Women in Assam, Ulimiri V Somayajulu, S Siva Raju, T V Sekher, C P Prakasam, (ed),
Regional Disparities and Social Development, Serials Publications, N Delhi, 2013, pp.415-416.
44 ibid., p.241.
xxxiv
of Urdu. In 1956, a similar representation was made in Bihar. In 1965, 104 MPs demanded equal
and just treatment to Urdu as was given to other languages.45

The British had started promoting communal text books in schools, colleges and universities.
Premchand said about this, ‘That day will be auspicious when history will be excluded from
courses from educational institutions’.46 Similarly Gandhi said, ‘There cannot be amity among
Hindus and Muslims as long as those history books are not taken back from educational
institutions which are based on Hindu-Muslim communalism.47

Muslim households face the additional charge of having a bias against secular education and
being hostile to the idea of educating their daughters. One insightful study from Kolkata in 2014
shows that 94 percent of the respondents were interested in educating their children—
irrespective of gender. Only 1.81 percent said that education was important only for boys, and
4.07 percent held that education was unimportant.48 Low levels of education attained by slum
dwelling children are not expected to help their children to secure jobs. The respondents believe
that there is a bias against Muslims in the job market, both in the private and public sectors. The
ability to read and write helps them to read and sign agreements, understand monetary contracts,
perform simple calculations in the market, and undertake various similar activities that are
essential in daily life. Improved marriage prospect is also an important factor. 49

Contrary to common belief, this study pointed out that the common medium of instruction of
Muslim slum dwellers was not Urdu, but Bengali. A significant proportion of the households
also opt for English. The choice of medium of instruction was found to be primarily dependent
on the mother tongue.50 In the high income slum, parents felt that the quality of education in
government-aided schools was not good enough. Hence, respondents displayed a strong
preference for private schools. On the other hand, cheaper option of government schools
attracted students in medium and low-income slums.51

Children among the minorities often face harassment and ridicule, and rising religious tensions
lead to their alienation from school. Lower education attainment of Muslim students may also be
associated with Muslim concentration in self-employment.52 There is also the lack of quality
schools both in the private and the public sector. Another cause of concern has been the
doctored and biased history text books and propaganda, which glorifies regional players against
nation builders. The communal and sectarian twist given to history has become a major
contributory cause of mutual distrust between the Hindus and Muslims. The Saiyadain
committee on text books also observed that the text books are overweighed with Hindu
mythology while the prose and poetry selections are actually prayers to Hindu deities.53

The Indian higher education system is one of the largest in the world in terms of the number of
colleges and universities. From 350 universities and 16,982 colleges in 2005-06, the numbers
have gone up to 713 universities, 36,739 colleges and 11,343 diploma-level institutions in 2013-

45 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Prakashan, Aurangabad , 1974, p.30.
46 Sheikh Md. Ghyasuddin, Firq Wariyat Aur Urdu Hindi Afsane, Educational Publishing house, Delhi, 1999, p. 31.
47 Sheikh Md. Ghyasuddin, Firq Wariyat Aur Urdu Hindi Afsane, Educational Publishing house, Delhi, 1999, p. 32.
48 Zakir Husain, Primary Education among low income Muslims in Kolkata: Slum Dwellers of Park Circus, Institute of
Development Studies, Kolkata, July 2014, p. 8.
49 Zakir Husain, Primary Education among low income Muslims in Kolkata: Slum Dwellers of Park Circus, Institute of
Development Studies, Kolkata, July 2014, p. 8.
50 ibid., p. 13 .
51 ibid., p. 14 .
52 Sonalde Desai and Veena Kulkarni, Unequal Playing Field Socio-Religious Inequalities in Educational
Attainment,, in Rakesh Basant & Abusaleh Sharieff, Handbook of Muslims, Empirical and Policy, Oxford
University Press, 2010, p. 273.
53 ibid., p. 33.
xxxv
2014. There is need to match the supply with demand and to dovetail education policy to
employment opportunities.54 There has also been a rise in enrolment in higher education. From
4.9 million in 1990-91, the enrolment growth in higher education rose to 29.6 million in 2012-
2013 (provisional).55

Noting that the minority intake in minority institutions has been restricted to 50 percent, with a
view to encourage national integration, the Commission (Ranganath Misra Commission)
recommended 15 percent seats for minorities (10 percent for Muslims and 5 percent for other
minorities) in non-minority institutions.56 The data from the Ministry of Human Resource
Development says that enrolment in schools has gone up, and the enrolment of Muslim girls has
shown a significant increase. More than 2 crore scholarships for students from the first standard
to the PhD level have been given since 2007 to minority students and about 2 lakh classrooms
have been built in Muslim dominated districts. New colleges have been set up and new
universities been built.

However, there is still a large gap between access to secondary and tertiary education for upper
caste Hindus versus Muslims, SCs and STs. In Muslim Concentrated Districts, literacy and
education has not witnessed improvement. One such example is the Seemanchal region in Bihar
consisting of Araria, Kishanganj, Katihar, Purnea and Supaul. Akhtarul-Iman says, ‘Pothia Block
in Kishanganj has the highest number of illiterates in Asia. In 2011, the region fared worse in
education. And it did not improve in 2015, as is proved by the class 10 result of Bihar School
Examination Board (BSEB). At the state level, 75 percent students succeeded, while in the
Seemanchal region, the ratio of successful students is between 63-69 percent’57.

He adds that even in terms of schools, Seemanchal region fares worse. For instance Kishanganj
has only 17 High Schools compared to Munger (88) and Kaimur (46). Similarly, Katihar has only
46 High Schools, while Begusarai has 75 High Schools.58 What is not clear is whether the quality
of education has improved or not. In fact, data from other sources suggest that the quality of
education, particularly in government schools is remarkably poor and that learning levels among
school students are really bad.59 While this poor quality is secular in its prevalence, in Muslim
dominated areas, it is worse than the average.

Employment

While the global economy is expected to witness a shortage of young population of around 56
million by 2020, India will be the only country with a youth surplus of 47 million (Report on
Education, Skill Development and Labour Force (2013-2014) Vol. III, Labour Bureau, 2014).60
The main issue to address then is not just providing employment but increasing the
employability of the labour force in India...Thus, any solution to the problem lies in a well-
designed education and training regime that sets out to meet these objectives.61 Self-employment
continues to dominate, with a 52.2 percent share in total employment. What is critical is the
significant share of workers engaged in low-income generating activities.62

54 Economic Survey, 2014-2015, p. 134.

55 Ibid., p. 137.
56 Salman Khurshid, op.cit.,, 2015.
57 Akhtarul Iman, ‘Talimi Maidan mein Picharta Seemanchal..’, published in Urdu daily Pindar 28-06-2015
58 Ibid..
59 The Annual Survey of Education report that is carried out by PRATHAM for the last ten years gives definite
evidence to the poor quality of education in our schools.
60 Economic Survey, 2014-2015, pp. 131-132.
61 Ibid., p.132.
62 Economic Survey, 2014-2015, p. 135.
xxxvi
Over the recent years, it appears that more and more of urban Muslims have shifted to self -
employment as a major source of household income. During 2011-12, the percentage of rural
households living on self-employment among Muslims was 49 percent close to the national
average of 50 percent. However, about 25 percent of rural Muslim households lived from
earnings from self-employment in non-agriculture as against 14 percent for Hindu households.
In the urban areas, 50 percent of the Muslim households are self-employed against only 33
percent among the Hindus. The livelihood of Muslims is mostly dependent on self-employment
in informal sector63.

The Scheduled Tribe population in urban India now earns roughly 65 percent more than the
urban Muslim does. Other Hindus are way higher in terms of monthly earning and expenditure,
spending nearly twice as much as their Muslim counterparts do. The urban Muslim today spends
just as much money, or marginally more in some cases, than the urban scheduled caste
population which is historically the poorest section in the class hierarchy everywhere and for
centuries now. In comparison with the rest, the Muslim and the scheduled caste are at least 50
percent poorer that the scheduled tribe and are at levels that are 100 rupees lesser than the
average in terms of monthly expenditure.

Information Technology & The Digital divide - It is also important to look into one area that has been
relatively unexplored in the literature. The role that Information and Communication
Technology has played in providing access to public goods is well-known across the world. And
while it is true that the digital divide exists in India, it is particularly exacerbated where Muslims
are concerned. Scholars have documented a number of instances in far flung areas where
entrepreneurs, livestock owners, farmers, non-farm labour have all used the power of ICT to
mobilise self-help groups, create awareness, come together for information sharing and
collectively negotiate for better returns. In societies where marginalized groups find it difficult to
venture into markets, ICT applications offer the ability to transact with strangers and also enable
transactions to take place at convenient timings. In addition to all, this is the manner in which
suitable content can enable literacy.

Discontent and hope- Across the country today, there is discontent despite large fiscal deficits
outlays for rural development. Subsidies and handouts have gone up and all this has increased
the levels of corruption at the village level, a disease many thought was restricted to the urban
elite of the country. The second urban affliction is a cynicism towards the future. Aspirations
have risen because of wider exposure, but rural youth see negative returns in agriculture, forest
covers going down, water bodies disappearing; in all a preview to a dismal future. This, at times,
results in acute distress giving rise to self-inflicted violence or in violent attacks against the
establishment or whatever is seen as being parts of the entrenched system. There is enough
agreement from those watching rural life changes in recent times that the manner in which
youth, especially Muslims have slid towards negativity doesn’t augur well for the country.

In this gloomy picture, there is enough reason to celebrate too. The positives are many and
pervasive. Infrastructure has improved; roads reach places that were considered far too remote
by any standards. Access to information has become much easier, bandwidth has gone up and
more than 80 percent of India is connected by wireless. The Right to Information Act (RTI) and
has helped this trend grow considerably and has also resulted in an awareness of the need for
Good Governance, an understanding of rights and therefore a gradual shift towards a demand
for better delivery of services. Rising aspirations may cause negativity sometimes, but they have
helped articulate genuine demands from wider constituencies in rural India. Such demands have

63 This is also evident from the lower share of households living on earnings from regular wage employment (28
percent households for Muslims versus 43 percent households for Hindus and 42 percent for the overall urban
households).

xxxvii
put pressure on the polity resulting in large scale poverty alleviation programs like the Rural
Employment Guarantee Programme and Bharat Nirman. Forest policy and tribal rights have
been reviewed and access to health care has now received a thrust never seen before.

Low levels of education, low exposure to media, prevalence of the purdah system, poor
organization and lack of awareness about existing financial schemes are some of the factors
which account for the low work force participation rate of Muslim women.64 There is sufficient
evidence to indicate that caste disparities in economic outcomes, for instance, in occupational
attainment are neither mainly a hangover from the past, nor are they mainly a result of
educational or skill gaps.65 The only difference in the resumes were the easily identifiable names
of applicants and three categories were used: Hindu upper caste, Hindu Dalit and Muslims. So
for each job advertisement, several sets were sent and the idea was to see how many candidates
were called for an interview.66

The study revealed significant differences in call-backs between Hindu upper castes and the
other two categories. Dalit applicant’s chances of a call back were 0.67 that of Hindu upper
castes, whereas Muslims fared even worse with their chances of call back being 0.33 that of
Hindu upper castes. Siddique (2009) conducted a correspondence study in Chennai during 2006
for jobs posted online which has similar findings.67Both international evidence as well as
economic theory suggests that discrimination is compatible with a market economy. There are
studies of hiring practices which emphasize the role of networks and that of informal and
personalized recruitment, where ‘who you know’ is often more important than ‘what you know’
(Deshpande and Newman 2007; Royster 2003).68

In a conversation, Mulk Raj Anand asked Ambedkar about why the right to work had not been
made a fundamental right in the Indian Constitution to which Dr. Ambedkar laconically replied,
‘I was only one of the members of the drafting committee.’ The right to work ended up in the
Directive Principles of the Constitution, along with other economic and social rights as the right
to education and the right to health. The Directive Principles of State Policy were expected to be
fought for politically. Article 37 of the Constitution explicitly states that they ‘shall not be
enforced by any court’.69

To analyse the issue of unemployment and underemployment in the rural sector, one can study
an example from yet another state– Assam. The problem had a serious impact upon the
economy of Assam.70 The proportionate representation of Muslims in entrepreneurial activity in
Vishakhapatnam is almost as high as for the Vaishyas. Perhaps, Muslim representation can be
explained partly because of limited alternatives in the civil service, and the absence of traditional
barriers to occupations that are polluting to Hindus, such as shoemaking and rope
manufacturing.71

South Asian migrants in the Gulf, are preferred than Europeans and Americans since they do
not demand high wages, even for specialized jobs. They do not lead a costly way of life, speak
good English, have good health, and are generally bachelors. The Indian government would not
allow elsewhere the ill treatment meted to its citizens. But in the Gulf, it has a policy of tolerance
and encourages migration and entertains remittances. The policy is not to discourage the

64 M B Mistry, S Ahmed, M N Bari, ‘Socio Economic Exclusion of Muslim Women in India’, S N Tripathy (ed),
Issues on Ethnicity, Discrimination and Social Exclusion, Abhijeet Publications, Delhi, 2010, 110094, p 264-265.
65 Ashwini Deshpande, Oxford India Short Introductions, Affirmative Action in India, OUP, 2013., p.30.
66 ibid.., p. 35.
67 ibid., p.36.
68 Ashwini Deshpande, Oxford India Short Introductions, Affirmative Action in India, OUP, 2013., p. 36.
69 Reetika Khera (ed) , The Battle for Employment Guarantee, OUP, N Delhi, 2011, p. 3-4.
70 K Alam, The Development Experience in Assam, Dutta Baruah & Co., Gauhati, 1983, p. 267.
71 E Wayne Nafziger, Class, Caste and Entrepreneurship , University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1978, p. 78.
xxxviii
professionals either to migrate in addition to the skilled and the semi-skilled labour power
migrating from India.72

The Asians in the Gulf labour market started their predominant role in the third phase of Middle
East labour migration around 1975.73 The most common understanding of the employment
scenario among Muslims is that they are mainly engaged in self-employing activities, also pointed
in the Sachar Committee Report. The so-called upper caste Muslims were equally likely to be in
casual wage work in agriculture or non-agriculture.74

More than half, in fact 56 percent of the Muslim self-employed women working at home in
urban areas undertook work through a contractor or middleman…women employed in home-
based work were in the manufacturing sector and concentrated in specific industries like-
agarbatti75 making, bidi 76 rolling, and garment and kite making.77

There is a substantial difference in the incidence of poverty among them. While the overall
poverty ratio was 22 percent in 2004-05, that of the Muslim population was 27 percent…The
low level of decline in poverty among Muslims was, however, the most disappointing, it was
lower than the SC/ST population.

Muslim workers were least likely to be in the coveted high-paying public sector regular jobs. One
can surmise that in general Muslim men and women in both the formal public sector and the
private enterprises were in inferior jobs. Such jobs could be as clerical or Class IV employees,
compared to the Hindu men and women who were more likely to hold managerial or
professional posts…The consequence of lower salaries in private jobs, particularly among
Muslims, is clearly poverty for the households of these workers. Here we can see a clear link
between informal employment and poverty.78

Economic exclusion of the disadvantaged groups is driven primarily by three important factors:
i) skewed distribution of assets (land and capital), ii) unequal access to education and skill
endowment, and iii) discrimination in the labour market. These factors, taken together result in
unequal access to ‘good’ and ‘quality jobs’ in the labour market perpetuating a vicious circle of
deprivation.79

According to NSSO, 68th Round, upper caste Muslims comprised 5.9 percent of the share of the
workforce. Of this, 32 percent were engaged in agriculture, 24.5 percent in manufacturing, 16. 6
percent in trade, hotel and restaurant, and 12 percent in public administration, health, and
education (NSSO, 68th Round). Upper caste Muslims have high share because of their greater
presence in urban areas compared to other communities. This shows that socially excluded
groups are mainly occupied in sectors that are less productive, with poorer income streams.80

Among Muslims, there is high inequality in terms of income and access to education, but the
disparity is less than that among the upper caste Hindus and the category ‘others’.81 There has
been a decline in poverty across all socio-religious groups, with the largest decline observed

72 Afzal Sharieff, Indian Muslim Labour, Anmol Publicaions Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, p.37.
73 Afzal Sharieff, Indian Muslim Labour, Anmol Publicaions Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, p. 40.
74 Jeemol Unni, ‘Informality and Gender in the Labour Market for Muslims’, in Rakesh Basant loc. Cit, p. 222.
75 Incense sticks.
76 Hand made local cigarettes.
77 Jeemol Unni, _______, in Rakesh Basant loc. Cit., p. 225.
78 Rakesh Basant, loc. cit., p. 226-227.
79 Indian Labour and Employment Report 2014, Workers in the Era of Globalisation, Academic Foundation, 2014, p. 75.
80 ibid., p. 79.
81 ibid., p. 85.
xxxix
amongst the SCs, STs, OBCs, and upper caste Muslims.82 The attitude towards cattle ensures
that their commercial contribution is relatively small to the cost of maintaining them. The refusal
to slaughter cattle obviously reduces current food supply. It also affects disastrously the
prospects of improving the quality of livestock and agricultural methods generally. Selective
slaughter is impossible.83

Security

On 28 May 2015, Noorjahan and her daughter were raped and killed at Churamba village of
Dharuvar area in Bed District84. This could not make to the headlines of electronic media
operating from metros and Delhi-NCR region! In the heart of Delhi, Shahnawaz Chaudhary
died in Nand Nagri area of Delhi in custodial death on September 7, 2015. Justice Siddarth
Mirdul hearing the case expressed concern over rise of intolerance in the country and said,
‘custodial torture is naked violation of human dignity and degradation’85.

Conflict and sense of personal insecurity have pervasive adverse impacts on human
development and leave billions of people living in precarious conditions. Many countries in the
bottom tier of the Human Development Index are emerging from long periods of conflict or
still confront armed violence.86 Higher income alone are not enough to reduce vulnerability to
conflict and personal insecurity. Persistent vulnerability which generally can be allayed only over
long periods requires multiple policy interventions and norm shifts that build tolerance and
deepen social cohesion.87

In Kashmir, Muslim youth are targeted by the security agencies and armed force. The security
forces are using pellet guns and many youth are blinded88. From the RTI application filed by
Mannan Bukhari in 2013-14, it was revealed that more than 300 pellet-gun hit patients were
treated in the government hospitals of Srinagar during 2010-2014. Many of these patients lost
their sight completely89. It may be mentioned that the pellet guns were introduced in 2008-2010
in Jammu & Kashmir to quell insurgency. In the recent past, a number of Kashmiris have been
killed and pellet guns used by security forces have injured hundreds.

According to statistics of the Home Ministry from the year 1954 to 1992 (39 years) 13,356 anti-
Muslim communal riots took place. It means on the average one riot a day. In this context, J B
D Souza says that it is ironical that more people are killed in communal riots in India, than
during the oppressive rule of the British imperialism.90 The Indian Muslim at present carry a
double burden of being labelled as anti-national and being appeased at the same time. The
environment of insecurity and fear ridicule the very purpose of the formation of the state
(security). This also negates the assertion of basic civil rights which the constitution of India
guarantees.91

82 Indian Labour and Employment Report 2014, Workers in the Era of Globalisation, Academic Foundation,
2014, p.93.
83 P T Bauer, Indian Economic Policy Development, Vol. 27, Routledge Library Editions, P.24.
84 Siraj Arzu report, Bed, published in Pindar, dated June 10, 2015.
85 The Times of India, Delhi, dated October 21, 2015.
86 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2014, p.4.
87 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2014, p. 4.
88 Jammu Workshop 2/4/2015 & Abhishek Saha , The Silent Struggle, Hindustan Times, 23/12/15.
89 Ibid.,
90 Rajeev Kumar Singh, ‘Citizenship, Exclusion & Indian Muslims’, S N Tripathy (ed), Issues on Ethnicity,
Discrimination and Social Exclusion, Abhijeet Publications, Delhi, 2010, 110094, p. 293-295.
91 Rajeev Kumar Singh, ‘Citizenship, Exclusion & Indian Muslims’, in S N Tripathy (ed), Issues on Ethnicity,
Discrimination and Social Exclusion, Abhijeet Publications, Delhi, 2010, 110094, p.294.
xl
Last year, at least two reports on the exclusion of minorities were released. The Centre of Peace
Studies focused on the Muslim community in its report titled ‘Broken Promises’ and ‘how
nothing has changed since the Sachar Committee report’ was released. The Centre for Equity
Studies in its India Exclusion report, showed how all vulnerable minorities in India are kept out
of school education, urban housing, labour markets and legal justice in relation to anti-terror
legislations in India. Ever since the new government has taken over, there is a feeling that the
numbers of communal incidents have gone up and various issues that are taken up by the fringe
right wing groups go a long way in increasing the sense of insecurity within the minorities.

Last year, another report released was authored by three Director Generals of Police, based on a
survey done in South India, with key inputs from three states with sizeable Muslim populations,
and intelligence from state police chiefs in 2013. This study concludes that if the perception of a
bias against the Muslim community is not corrected immediately, it would affect the country’s
internal security. The report, prepared by the DGPs of Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil
Nadu, and a senior IB official, has been submitted to the central government.

The Sachar Committee in 2006 had pointed out to the poor representative of Muslims in the
police force. However, ironically the number has only reduced further. In 2007, there were 1.01
lakh Muslims in the police force across the country. This meant that the representation was at
7.55 percent. The total number of policemen at that time was a 13.4 lakhs strong force. In the
next six years, the force grew by 24 percent and is now at 16.7 lakh. However, the Muslim
representation had actually fallen by one percentage point to 6.5 percent.

Among the 326 lakh policemen added across all states since the Sachar Committee, only 7,132, or
2.18 per cent, were Muslim. The total number of Muslims in the police has therefore increased
marginally from 1.01 lakh to 1.08 lakh. What is surprising is that the worst performing states have
been Rajasthan and Assam, where the number of Muslim police personnel actually fell by 56
percent during 2007-12. Assam which has the largest proportion of Muslims in the country, with
nearly 31 percent of whose population now has only 2,388 Muslim police personnel, just about 4
percent of the force. And in Rajasthan there are only 871 Muslims in the entire state.

Gujarat and Chhattisgarh are not far behind. The decline in Gujarat was 32.74 percent, while
there were 4530 Muslim policemen in 2007, there were 3047 in 2012. The point however, is
really not whether there are enough Muslims in the police force. That by itself is no guarantee
for even handed behaviour by what is considered to be a most apathetic and corrupt institution
in the country. The recent report written by three DGPs, makes exactly this point, that the
police force is insensitive and untrained to handle India's diverse populations and often makes
the mistake of treating Muslims badly.

One of the most critical factors that make any country's economy grow is the law and order
situation. Countries that do well are those, where there is a sense of justice and stability, especially
among the more vulnerable populations. It is only when the state is able to provide a sense of
security to the population that economic activity improves. In most states in the country, women
feel extremely vulnerable and crimes against them have been increasing almost everywhere. Such
gender insensitivity actually discourages investment, particularly from foreign countries.

The same is true for other minority populations. The police report talks about how there is
widespread discrimination in societies. It mentions the disturbing situation where Muslim
tenants are not given houses in majority dominated areas, leading them to ghettoisation. It also
talks about how police stations that carry visible symbols of Hinduism through idols kept inside
the station and of policemen performing pujas within the office send, out unwelcome signals to
members of the minority community. The report also blames thoughtless comments that are
made by members of the police force who haven't been trained properly.
xli
Of the events that have shaped a persecution complex among Muslims are the Ram Janma
Bhoomi agitation and the Rath Yatra that spread terror for the first time in the south and east of
India too. The report makes a special mention of the Godhra incident and its role in making the
Muslim community fearful of the police and suspicious of its secular character. It also blames
the social media, the NGO sector and activists in spreading this suspicion among the Muslim
community against the police force. The interesting point the report makes is that wherever in
the country the Muslim population exceeds 15 percent, that locality is communally surcharged
and susceptible to riots.

It is for the first time that such a report has been publicly seen and reported on by mainstream
newspapers. Senior members of the force admit to the role that the police itself has played in
giving the Muslim minority a feeling of persecution. It is now the responsibility of the Home
Ministry indeed, to ensure that this is remedied. The easy way out is to go for mass recruitment
among Muslim neighbourhoods and get some more representation in police forces across the
country. But that will not be enough, for the numbers won't increase significantly just because
there is a targeted recruitment drive. Given the low literacy rates, it is often difficult for Muslim
youth to even meet the eligibility criteria.

What is required is rather for existing police forces to understand how their actions result in
persecution, real and perceived. It is also important for the police to realise that there is a strict
rule of law in the country and wrongful arrests and confinements carry harsh penalties. It is also
critical to simplify procedure so that those who are arrested could easily file bail petitions.
Relatives could easily ask why charge sheets are delayed and most importantly where both
information and forms are available online in all our languages. It is not easy for anyone, leave
alone a marginalised minority citizen, to walk into a police station. We must quickly move
towards online FIRs.

The politicians of our country, most importantly, must realise that the police is not an agent for
spreading one ideology or the other. The police cannot be partisan, it cannot be used to make
political statements or target opponents. If indeed good days are to come, it is important the law
and order situation improves and all citizens have equal confidence in the forces that maintain
peace. If this government is keen on attracting foreign investment in large measures, and wants
large multi-natural firms to divert their capital to India, it must convince them that this is a
democratic country that protects the rights of all citizens and treats each of them equally.

Violence and Human Right

There are independent reports about human right violations. The Human Right International in
its report says, ‘there were repeated allegations of unlawful detention, torture, and other ill-
treatment by Police to secure confessions in response to such attacks. In several cases, the police
themselves appear to have drafted the confessions. The suspects suffered further abuses, while
in jail awaiting trial and justice even in court’.92

Delivery of justice for mass violence against Muslims in Mumbai in 1992-1993 and in Gujarat in
2002, has been slow.93 The process of slow emergence of a tolerant and integrated Indian nation
which was gradually evolving over the centuries has received a rude shock with the demolition
of the mosque at Ayodhya at the hands of vandals, perhaps against the wishes of the leaders of
Kar Seva.94

92 Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2011, p.316.

93 Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2011, p. 317.
94 A M Khusro, Unfinished Agenda, Wiley Eastern Ltd., New Delhi, 1994, p.76.
xlii
Communalism is not primarily a problem of north India. It is also a serious issue for western
India. Gujarat and Maharashtra have not only a greater rate of deaths and incidents per million
of population, but also have a large number of total deaths in riots than Uttar Pradesh and
Bihar.95

Except for Godhra, all towns in the list are Class I cities, i.e. their populations are above
1,00,000. Communal violence at its most intense and persistent seems to be a phenomenon of
India’s larger towns. Communal tensions may exist in Class II towns (50,000 to 100,000) and
Class III towns ( 25,000 to 50, 000) but they do not lead to high levels of violence. It may be
that communal tensions flare up less in smaller towns, for they lack relative anonymity of India’s
largest towns, larger cities may produce greater incentives and opportunities for criminals who
stand to gain from fomenting riots.96

Figure 1: Riots reported in 2013, Source: NCRB 2013

As shown in Fig. 1, communal riots continue to take place across the country. Even then the
Communal Riots Bill was not allowed passage in the House, due to opposition from the BJP and
other parties, not even in West Bengal, which is ruled by the TMC, communal clashes have
increased over the last few years (see Fig. 2). In 2013, which was the year preceding the 2014
Parliamentary elections, the incidents of communal clashes almost doubled. This explains the
winning of very few seats of the BJP in West Bengal.

Figure 2: Communal Clashes in West Bengal, Source: West Bengal State Police

95 Ashuthosh Varshney & Steven / Wilkinsson, Hindu Muslim Riots 1960-93, RGICS, 1996. p. 16.
96 ibid., p. 28.
xliii
Crucial in the transformation of conflict had been the intervention of disgruntled sections within
the Congress who sought to gain a following in their struggle with the socialists. Religion
became a counter in the game of intra party politics. Aligning with the Congress became
indicative of aligning with a wider ‘Hindu’ identity. This was the natural outcome of a nationalist
politics which had come up against the problem of caste inequality in its attempts to create unity
and had seen the solution in a ‘Hindu’ politics of equality. Communalism in the form that it
emerged was an offshoot of nationalism.97

Terrorism and prisons

The political significance of terrorism has been vastly exaggerated in the view of Walter Laqueur.
The Chairman of the ‘Research Council of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’
examines and refutes a succession of what he calls ‘myths’ about terrorists - that they are a new
phenomenon, that they are left-wing and revolutionary, that they represent genuine and
legitimate grievance, that they are desperate people, and that their actions are effective. His
conclusion, ‘Terrorism is of course a danger, but magnifying its importance is even more
dangerous’.98 In India, particularly in states with hostile government towards Muslims, there has
been a rise in a number of Muslim youth being picked up by the security agencies and lodged in
prison. In many cases, there has been no charge against them and they are picked up on mere
apprehension. BJP, Shiv Sena and VHP people often come with their own version of terrorism
and talk of ‘various module’ and ‘sleeper cells’. Such rhetoric becomes common during elections
or some crisis. No wonder, the proportion of Muslim inside jails is more than their population.

Figure 3: States with High Muslim Detenu, Source: NCRB-2012

As shown above (Fig.3), Gujarat whose development model has always fascinated some
intellectuals tops the chart with 151 detenu (any person held in custody). This may explain the
theory behind the sacking of police officers and many fake encounters, which are still being
probed by various agencies. In most states, the number of Muslim under trials is also high and
more than their share of population. In Assam, Muslim population is 33 percent, while 37 percent
are under trials in jails. In Delhi, 22 percent Muslim are under trials against their population share
of 13 percent. In West Bengal, 47 percent Muslim are under trials against their population of 27
percent. In Gujarat, 23 percent Muslim are under trials against their population of 10 percent. In
Madhya Pradesh, Muslim under trials is 13 percent against their population of just 7 percent. In
Maharashtra, there are 26 percent Muslim under trials against the population share of around 12
percent. Kerala perhaps may be the only state where Muslim under trials (23 percent) are less than

97 Dilip M Menon, Becoming ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’: Identity and Conflict in Malabar, 1900-1936, Centre of Developing
Studies, Thiruvananthpuram, 1994, p. 27.
98 Walter Laqueur, The Futility of Terrorism, HarperCollins, 1976, p 99-105
xliv
their share of population (27 percent). With so many Muslim youth languishing in jails across the
country, it is matter of concern for their family members and the community.
At another level, it is found that the vulnerable sections of Indian society are the ones who are
languishing in jails. As shown in Fig. 5, Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis - who together are around 39
percent of the population, share 53 percent of the prison space among them. Is it because of their
poverty, or there is a caste and communal bias against the three most backward sections of the
society? We cannot say and it is for the officials to introspect over this alarming trend.

Figure 4: Muslim Under trials in Various States, Source: NCRB & Census 2011
It would be in the interest of the community at large, if it becomes a reason of worry for the
state, judiciary and the concerned officials. If that happens, campaign against terrorism will not
only be the job for the security officials, but every citizen will be a part of this.

Figure 5: Communities Share in Population and Prisons, Source: NCRB 2013, Census 2011

Neither property nor power is a legal excuse for crime notes. Greater temptation does not
excuse from responsibility or make punishment unjust.99 Machines able to perform simple
human tasks are now installed throughout the world.100 If the state government is determined to
prevent violence, no communal riot can occur and it does, it can be checked before it spells
disaster. The best examples of this are states of West Bengal and Bihar. In West Bengal, no
major communal riot has taken place for last 27 years since the Left Government is in power.

99 Ernest Van Den Haag, No Excuse for Crime, annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Plenum
Press, NY, 1976, p 133-141
100 James Albus and John Evans, Robot Systems, Jr. Scientific American, February 1976, pp 76-86
xlv
Similarly, ever since Lalu Yadav took over in Bihar, no riots have occurred, though Bihar was a
highly sensitive state. The last major riot in Bihar took place in Sitamarhi in 1993.101

What needs to be done it that unity has to be evolved from the womb of diversity? If an
endeavour is made to unite people on the basis of one religion, one language, one culture and
one civilization, the unity would be artificial and the nation would disintegrate as the USSR and
Pakistan.102 Another reason for the communal riots in cities like Kanpur, Meerut, Varanasi,
Aligarh and Moradabad have been analysed and discovered that they are due to economic
factors.103

The struggle against terrorism is a contest for the hearts and minds of the people. In this contest,
if the west is going to prevail, it cannot do so by dispensing with its most cherished values of
tolerance, individual freedom, and adherence to the rule of law. In our quest for victory, it seems
important for us to know what we are fighting against, it is important to keep in mind what we
are fighting for.104 Even a highly decorated officer like K F Rustamji was not spared. He recalled,
‘My own problems in the sub-division arose out of my circle inspector’s proximity to the DIG. I
suspected his integrity and his tendency to instigate the Hindus against me, stating that I was
pro-Muslim. I recommended him for punishment in a gambling case where he fudged the
figures of the amount seized, but the DIG wrote back, ‘I am not going to punish an experienced
Inspector on the recommendation of an ASP with three years’ service’.105

In his opinion, the strained relations between Hindu-Muslim began early. He explains, ‘To my
mind the relations between the two communities began to get strained after the 1937 elections,
to the provincial assemblies when the Congress came to power in the Central Provinces. Small,
insignificant incidents were given a communal colour. The Muslim Sub-Inspector, who was
punished on a Hindu Circle Inspector’s report, would always ascribe wild motives’. 106

Not only the administration has this tendency to be callous towards Muslims, even in hours of
tragedy, if the victims happen to be Muslims, the attitude is different, as was the case in Bhopal
Gas tragedy, when thousands of people perished and are struggling with their daily life. From
what happened on December 2-3, 1984, here are some first-hand accounts of such moments
drawn from the Bhopal Group of Information and Action (BGIA) newsletters. As described by
Bano Bi, ‘the night when the gas leaked, I was sewing clothes sitting next to the door. It was
around midnight. My husband had just returned from a poetry concert. He came in and asked
me, ‘what is it that you burning which is choking me?’107

Describing the moment, Bano Bi said, ‘So many years have gone by and yet my hair stands on
end, whenever I look back and remember those scenes! We left the door of our house open and
began to run. We joined the surging crowd. We ran blindly. Everybody was running. Those who
were weak and gasping for breath, fell down. We did not stop to pick them up.’ Hazra Bi is
more analytical, ‘the fact is that we were running without any sense of direction. If only
somebody had told us not to run in the direction of the gas. The children were groaning so

101 Asghar Ali Engineer, Muslims and India, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006, p. 283,
102 S Omprakash (ed), Roots of Riots , Essays in Community Psychology, Kanishka Publishers & Distributors, New
Delhi, p.25
103 ibid., p 26
104 Dipak K Gupta, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence, The life cycle of birth, growth, transformation, and demise,
Routledge, 2009, p. 206
105 P V Rajgopal (ed), From the Diaries and Articles of K F Rustamji, The British The Bandits and The Bordermen, Wisdom
Tree, Delhi, 2009, p. 53
106 P V Rajgopal (ed), From the Diaries and Articles of K F Rustamji, The British The Bandits and The Bordermen, Wisdom
Tree, Delhi, 2009, p.56
107 Suroopa Mukherjee, Surviving Bhopal, Dancing Bodies, written Texts, and Oral Testimonials of women in the wake of
Industrial Disaster, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, USA, p 44
xlvi
much that we just picked them up in our arms and joined the masses of people. Believe me, it
seemed like the end of the world.’108

Archival sources (BGIA newsletters) provide the most graphic descriptions with purely visual
attributes. Razia Bi narrates, ‘My three year old daughter Nazma, had swollen up so much like
she would burst. We took her to Hamidia Hospital. We stayed with her in hospital for fifteen
days and then the doctors said she would not survive. We were feeling so helpless because there
was no doctor around, who knew how my daughter could be saved. She died on the fifteenth
day.’ It is the fear and helplessness of witnessing the death of near and dear ones that gets
repeated in narrative after narrative. Zubeda Bi said, ‘My grandson was one year old then. I put
him on my chest to protect him as much as possible. But his face swelled to twice its size, his
eyes were puffed tight. We were really scared.109 Bhopal offers a unique example of a vision that
grows from community struggle, which has been scripted by people who are actively part of the
struggle. The vision is by no means complete. It will change and grow in the future. It is equally
significant that the vision is clearly defined in an open letter to the PM, which is collective
document drafted.110

The Violence around Conversion

Conversions are nothing new in India. It was in 6 B.C. that countless of Hindus converted to
Buddhism. The Shankaracharya set about purification of Hinduism and restored many souls to
Hinduism again. As a result of the Sankaracharya’s efforts, Buddhism remained alive only in
foreign countries where had been exported from India.111 The Janta government introduced the
Freedom of Religion Bill in Parliament in 1979. In February 1981, most of the Hindu Harijans—
oppressed more by social atrocities than economic subjugation embraced Islam en masse, in
Meenakshipuram, a Tamil Nadu village in South India and not out of any great fascination for
the principles of Islam. The upper caste abused them…Thimir Pidicha Pallan (you insolent low
caste).112 Observers have pointed out that H M Patel as Finance Minister, informed the Lok
Sabha that the RSS owed the Income Tax Authorities one crore and ten lakhs. Subsequently, the
Finance Minister let the RSS quietly off the hook. The tax arrears of the RSS shrunk suddenly
from over one crore to just about five thousand. It is speculated that this could not have been
done without the concurrence of the then Prime Minister, Morarji Desai. And this could be
done only after RSS was treated as a political organization.113

In the communal riots at Jamshedpur, the RSS Ministers and MLAs of Bihar were involved.
Their plan was to malign the former Chief Minister of Bihar, Karpoori Thakur. The riot took
place because Mr. Thakur was asked to seek a vote of confidence of the Janta MLAs. It was
planned in a systematic way, Shri Balasaheb Deoras, leader of the RSS held a rally in Jamshedpur
and made a speech that was full of communal venom. So the RSS is ‘Revivalist, communal and
obscurantist’.114 Home Minister, H M Patel was good enough to admit in Parliament in May
1979, that there had been a noticeable rise in communal riots over the last two years that the Jan
Sangh dominated Janta Party had been in power. Between April 1, 1977 and September 30,
1978, there were no less than 323 communal incidents, in which more than 250 people were
killed. Add to that the 100 odd persons who died in Aligarh and the estimated 300 deaths in

108 Suroopa Mukherjee, Surviving Bhopal, Dancing Bodies, written Texts, and Oral Testimonials of women in the wake of
Industrial Disaster, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, USA, p 47
109 Suroopa Mukherjee, Surviving Bhopal, Dancing Bodies, written Texts, and Oral Testimonials of women in the wake of
Industrial Disaster, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, USA, p 49-50.
110 Suroopa Mukherjee, Surviving Bhopal, Dancing Bodies, written Texts, and Oral Testimonials of women in the wake of
Industrial Disaster, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, USA, p. 182-183.
111 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, VII.
112 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p.62-63.
113 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p.133.
114 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p.136.
xlvii
Jamshedpur. What make the statistics more ominous is that over 95 percent of those killed were
Muslims. Most of the Hindus died were killed because of mistaken identities.115

A New York correspondent in New Delhi some years ago, observed, ‘If a Muslim leader makes
a speech about the plight of the untouchables, he may be congratulated for being a good
nationalist. But if he talks about the plight of his fellow Muslims, he is told he is being
communal and a Pakistani agent.’116 No wonder most Muslim leaders prefer to maintain silence
on issues concerning Muslims, although they win election from Muslim majority areas but serve
the interests of their respective parties and leaders. Government officials, Rajahs and Mahajans-
all threatened the missionaries and they simultaneously asked the Adivasi converts to re-embrace
Hinduism. Against this mass conversion, the first enactment came to be known as Rajgarh State
Conversion Act of 1936, and reasons given in the preamble to the Act were that of mass
conversion leading to communal riots. By this Act, the Hindu Rajah of Rajgarh banned the
preaching of Christianity and prohibited the entry of Christian missionaries into the former
Kingdom of Rajgarh, Jashpur, Surguja etc., of Chhotanagpur areas. A missionary was also
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the violation of the recent ban.117

The next Hindu kingdom to follow the anti-conversion bill was the state of Surguja. In 1945, it
enacted the Surguja State Hindu Apostacy Act of 1945, which gave no reason for enactment and
described all Adivasis belonging to the Hindu faith and identified Christianity as an alien
religion.118 The next Hindu princely state to enact anti-conversion law was Udaipur with the
enactment of the Udaipur State Conversion Act of 1946. The Act required all conversion from
Hinduism to Christianity to be registered officially.119

The Zamindari Association formed in Bengal in 1837 was the first organization with which
constitutional politics may be assumed to have begun. Educationally, economically and
politically, the Hindu upper classes were on the ascendant. They deplored the disloyalty of
Muslims to British rule.120 Similarly, the Hindi-Urdu controversy was very old. Hindus never
forgave Urdu, written in Persian characters, for keeping Hindu out of courts of law. Hindi
protagonists had fought many a losing battle for the promotion of Hindi to the status of Urdu. 121
Communal fraternity maybe of two kinds: Sentimental and intellectual. The former implies
religious fusion and the latter mutual love for the languages and literatures of each other. Both
these interrelated aspects of communal harmony became manifest during Muslim rule in India.122

Partition and after

The protagonists of the two–nation theory propagated for many years that religion was the basis
of nationality and adherence to a common homeland could not constitute the main basis. It was
on this issue that the country was partitioned. But it is now clear that there are virtually no
adherents to the theory of nationhood based on religion anywhere in the world, not even in
Pakistan. The Saudis will not give Saudi nationality to anyone just because he or she is a Muslim;
nor would the Pakistanis do so.123 The occurrence and intensity of communal riots have been a
subject of much public and academic discussion. On the basis of a study of communal violence
in India between 1950 and 1995, Ashutosh Varshney has argued that the perception of Hindu-

115 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, pp 153-154.
116 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p. 157.
117 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p.193.
118 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p.195.
119 Brojendra Nath Banerjee, Religious Conversions in India, Harnam Publications, 1982, New Delhi, p.199.
120 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, A Political History 1858-1947, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959, p.61.
121 Ram Gopal, Indian Muslims, A Political History 1858-1947, Asia Publishing House, New Delhi, 1959, p. 262.
122 Jatindra Bimal Chaudhary, Muslim Patronage to Sanskritic Learning, Idarah-i-Adbiyat, Delhi, 1981, p. Vii.
123 A M Khusro, Unfinished Agenda, Wiley Eastern Ltd., New Delhi, 1994, p. 69.
xlviii
Muslim violence as an essentially urban phenomenon is confirmed. Less than 4 percent of the
people who died during communal riots were from rural areas.124

Regimes committed to social reform in the Third World face the danger of alienating both the
lower and the upper classes—the upper classes because their interests are endangered, and the
lower ones because the reformists promises may not be fulfilled.125 Perhaps the first communal
riot which took place in Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh in 1961, after a decade of communal peace,
reflected this basic efficiency of the Indian polity at that stage rather than a mere aberration
caused by a local event. The fact that a Hindu girl of a bidi manufacturer eloped with a Muslim
boy of another bidi manufacturer could cause a sense of humiliation in the Hindu community
and that the two communities had developed business rivalry due to competition of two bidi
manufacturers merely indicated lack of trust between the two exclusive communal alignments. 126
Killings at Hashimpura, Maliana (1987) and Bhagalpur (1989), set a new record of riot toll in
independent India. In the last year of the decade, there were 18 major riots taking a toll of 1174
lives (as per written reply of then Union Home Minister, M M Jacob in Rajya Sabha on July 17,
1991).

In January 1987, a television serial based on the epic ‘Ramayana’ was aired on state-run channel,
Doordarshan at 9:30 on Sunday mornings. ‘Ramayana’ episodes became the most popular
programme ever shown, attracting millions of viewers. Sundays are now recalled as streets being
deserted throughout India. Even in villages, TV sets were installed outside some shops. Also, in
cities, shops with TV and TV stores windows and doors became the most popular spots for
rickshaw pullers and labourers to hang on. Ten months after the Ramayana series, the Vishwa
Hindu Parishad called on Hindus throughout India to make holy bricks, inscribed with Rama’s
name, to be used at Ayodhya, to be used for the Ram Mandir. The walls across the country were
painted with anti-Muslim provocative slogans. The Babri Masjid destruction and ensuing
violence tells us something about the making of ‘ancient hatreds: that they are being made in
Lebanon, Bosnia, the republics of the former soviet union, Iraq, Israel, South-Central Los
Angeles, and Crown Heights—all those places where neighbours and friends and have turned
into foreigners and enemies’.127 The doctrine of ancient hatreds may become the post-Cold
War’s most robust mystification, a way of having an enemy and knowing evil that deceives as it
satisfies. The hatred is modern, and may be closer than we think.128

Badauni also quotes an alleged saying of the Prophet showing disapprobation of cow slaughter.
After observing ironically that ‘among the ordinary people, their (Muslim) faith is not held to be
firm unless they eat beef’, he (Badauni) exclaims: ‘God be praised, where has the cause of Islam
come to be!’129 Syed Ahmed Khan in his Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hindustan (1859), admonished the
British for keeping Hindus and Muslims in the same military units, thereby fostering brotherly
feelings among Hindu and Muslim sepoys, that proved to be so effective in spreading mutiny
within the Bengal Army.130

124 Mukesh Williams & Rohit Wanchoo, Representing India , Literatures, Politics, and Identities, OUP, New Delhi, 2008,
p. 221.
125 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Development in India, From Socialism to Pro-Business, Oxford University Press, New Delhi,
2009, p. 249.
126 Balraj Puri, Indian Muslims since Partition, Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi, p.10.
127 Lloyd I Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Modern Hate, in ( How Ancient Animosities get invented,
Lloyd I Rudolph & Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Realm of the Public Sphere Identity and Policy, Vol III,
OUP, N Delhi, 2008, p. 404.
128 ibid., 405.
129 Quoted in Irfan Habib, ‘Indo-Islamic Thought and the Issue of Religious Co-existence’, in Rakesh Basant loc.
Cit., p. 31.
130 ibid., p. 33.
xlix
Armed conflicts impose enormous costs on individuals, communities and countries. In addition
to the loss of lives, they destroy livelihoods, generate insecurity and disrupt social services,
institutions and markets. Conflicts can also cause large population displacements. 131

The protagonists of the two–nation theory, for many years propagated that religion was the basis
of nationality and adherence to a common homeland could not constitute the main basis. It was
on this issue that the country was partitioned. But it is now clear that there are virtually no
adherents to the theory of nationhood based on religion anywhere in the world, not even in
Pakistan. The Saudis will not give Saudi nationality to anyone just because he or she is a Muslim;
nor would the Pakistanis do so.132

Political Representation

Ambedkar said on 26 January 1950, ‘In politics we will have equality and in social and economic
life we will have inequality. In politics, we will be recognising the principle of ‘one man one vote
and one vote one value’. If our social and economic structure continues to deny the principle of
one man one value, how long shall we continue to live this life of contradictions? This question
is more relevant to the Muslims, whose vote share declined because of delimitations and value
declined because of polarisation of majoritarian vote towards one political party. The scare of
naked majority was staring the minorities in the victory of a dispensation, which prided in its
anti-Muslim rhetoric and work. For the first time, Muslim could not make to the Lok Sabha
from Uttar Pradesh. Modi, in his election speech after winning from Vadodra called ‘Bharat is the
land of Gowalkar and Savarkar’ and took pride in his party not having any Muslim elected to the
Lok Sabha! Modi’s win from Varanasi proves the point that ‘elections are all about caste and
religious affinity.’

When power is the sole purpose for a political party to contest elections, it will attempt to
perpetuate the same and side with issues which will help it in winning and clinging to power. 133
The majority has might—unhappily—but right it has not. I and a few others are right. The
minority is always right!134 And talking of nationalist parties, they may say anything verbally but
promote communalism. During elections, they give tickets to Muslims, Sikhs and Christians
from seats where those communities are in large numbers. Thus, they encourage voters to cast
votes according to religious affinity.135 During these days no community is extending help to
country merely on the basis of religion. So, while it was wrong of Indian Muslims to have
political relations with Muslim countries and were expecting moral and financial support in
freedom struggle, the existing norm of severing ties is equally wrong.136

More than ever before, post-May 2014, Muslims and other minorities are feeling that democracy
is bringing the government to power, which is only concerned about the majority. The
nomination, selection and election of candidates from across the country present a trend which
is alarming for what has been called ‘vibrant democracy’ of the world. After a clean sweep of
2014 Parliamentary elections, Gujarat duo of Modi-Amit won Haryana, Maharashtra and
Jharkhand. The winning streak was stopped by Aam Admi Party in Delhi. Bihar Assembly
elections in 2015 were the talk of the nation and ‘secular forces’ succeeded in forging an alliance
to defeat BJP-led NDA. Muslims were expecting a better representation, but that did not
happen, as can be seen in Fig. 6. In the November 2015, Bihar Assembly elections, Muslims

131 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2014, p. 49.

132 A M Khusro, op.cit.,, p. 69.
133 Sugato Hazra, Influencing India, Bridging Borders, Kolkata, 2011, p. 225.
134 M Manuel , M S Samuel (ed), A Mirror of Modern Life, A Selection from Twentieth Century Prose, Carleton
Kemp Allen, The Majority Principle, p. 11.
135 Syed Abid Hussain, Musalman Aur Asri Masayil, Makhtaba Jamia, New Delhi, 2011, p.140.
136 Syed Abid Hussain, Hindustani Musalman Aiyana Aiyam Mein, Makthaba Jamia, New Delhi, 2012, p. 363.
l
with 17-19 percent population could only win 23 seats, while Yadavs with 12-15 percent
population went on to win 61 seats. This means that Yadav as a group, can itself be influential in
the Assembly.

Figure 6: Bihar Assembly-November 2015, Source- Authors Research

Even in selection of ministers, Yadavs played dominant role and grabbed the bulk of ministerial
berths and key positions in the cabinet (Fig.7). There are seven Yadavs, five SCs, and four from
the Muslim community. Interestingly, Kurmis-Koeris, also called Luv-Kush share between them
six cabinet births.

Figure 7: Key Position Holders in the Cabinet, Source- Bihar Cabinet November 2015.

As shown in Table 1, the representation of Muslims in most states has not been in proportion to
their population. Asghar Ali Engineer wrote, ‘Muslim representation in state legislative
assemblies and parliament is disproportionately low as compared with the size of their
population…in these fifty years it has never gone beyond 8 percent’.137 This may be due to
various factors, one of them being spread of bigotry among the Hindus. This has played an
important role in the rise of the BJP and Shiv Sena over the years. The 2004 Lok Sabha
elections, testify to the fact that bigotry has been shown its place. The people’s verdict is for
harmony and tolerance rather than discord and disunity.138 However, the trend is alarming, as
137 Asghar Ali Engineer, Violence Memories and Peace Building ; Citizen Report on Minorities in India and Pakistan, South
Asian & Research Centre, (2006), Islamabad, p. 233.
138 K Natwar Singh, India and Islam, 12th Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture, Anil Shastri, Modern Thought
Leaders, McGraw hill Education, N Delhi, 2015, P. 86.
li
former Sri Lankan minister said, ‘If we continue to live with the current mindset, where even
genuine people in desperation begin to feel that the only answer to extremism is more
extremism, democracy as we know today may surely be doomed to be confined to the pages of
history as yet another tried, tested and failed political system’.139 Election results should reflect
the cultural diversity and the decision of the vulnerable sections of the society.

Table: 7

State Year Total Assembly Muslims % Share of

Seats Elected Elected
Muslims
Assam 1962 105 15 14
1985 126 25 20
2001 126 24 19
Kerala 1960 114 17 15
1987 140 21 15
2001 140 22 16
West Bengal 1962 252 28 11
1987 294 39 13
2001 294 38 13
Uttar Pradesh 1962 430 29 7
1985 425 52 12
2002 403 45 11
Bihar 1962 318 21 7
1985 324 31 10
2000 324 35 11
2005 236 24 10
2010 243 19 8
Source: Election Commission of India, and other reports.

As the former Sri Lankan minister said, ‘The South Asian societies, their leaders and their
intellectual elites need to face these issues clearly, unravel their full implications and deal with
them, they have to find answers which can appropriately integrate religio-political dimension
into the democratic plural modern societies that must take shape’.140

In the Hindu view of political economy, what is of importance, is not the form of government
or who forms the Government but the quality of the ruling elite. As Atharva Veda (11-15-17)
points out, 'That nation is protected whose ruler (ruling class) is enlightened and abstemious.’ 141
Immediately after the Partition, the influential section of the Muslim leadership began to realize

139 Mangala Samaraweera, 14th Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture, Anil Shastri, Modern Thought Leaders,
McGraw hill Education, N Delhi, 2015, p. 64.
140 Godfrey Gunatilleke, 5th Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture, Anil Shastri, Modern Thought Leaders, McGraw
hill Education, New Delhi, 2015, p. 161.
141 N K P Sinha, Islam in India, Synthesis of Culture, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 70.
lii
the blunder of carrying on the separatist politics. Choudhary Khaliquzzaman held that the two-
nation theory proved positively injurious to the Muslim in India. The views of Shaheed
Suharwardy and Nawab Ismail Ali Khan were not very much different.142

An earlier survey done among Muslim showed no political party worked in the interest of the
Muslims. On the question whether guarantee for democracy is majority rule or independent
judiciary, 60 percent posed trust in majority rule, and 40 percent showed trust in independent
judiciary. On the question of participation of Muslim in politics, 88 percent believed that it was
in their interest. Almost 64 percent believed that there was no internal democracy in political
parties. On the question of separate party for Muslims to safeguard interest, 43.5 percent
responded in affirmative. A large proportion (72.6 percent) believed that no political party
worked in the interest of Muslims. On the question of how much security has been provided by
the government, the views are divided, with 52 percent saying ‘yes’ and 48 percent saying against.
The elite believed that there has been change in lifestyle over last ten years, 88 percent believed
that there has been development. But only 59 percent agreed that there was development of
Muslims as well.143

In recent years, Hindu nationalist leaders have cynically and occasionally successfully
manipulated religious mythology to mobilize political support, resulting in a substantial increase
in communal divisiveness.144 ‘The inability of the BJP to dent this bipolarity is both a result and
the close competition between two coalitions and contributing factor to it. It polled 6 percent of
the votes—not a negligible share of votes in a bipolar competition.145

What is the state of the party system on the eve of the bicentennial? Are new party alignments in
the offering? Is a party organization crucial to a candidate’s success in the age of the electronic
media? Schier argues that the party system has been regarded in profoundly ambiguous ways
throughout US history. He then reviews the wide range of explanation for the current weakening
of party loyalties and considers the implications not only for this election year but for the
future.146 Democracy is a form of government where everyone has the right to put forth his
point of view. In tune with this spirit of governance active participation of the Muslims should
be ensured at every level of representation. For this, election process and the system should be
suitably moulded to avoid the majority tyranny.147

The history of digital democracy is littered with great hopes, dashed expectations and broken
promises. We remain information rich, yet poor knowledge, which is a great shame because
digital democracy promised so much (but has delivered so little).148 ‘If a key indicator of the
health of a democracy is the state of its journalism and the standard of its media, I cannot help
but feel we are in trouble. There may be a problem of integrity in modern politics but I have no
doubt there is an even bigger problem of integrity within the modern media. Don’t let the media
fool you that they are the good guys who protect you from the predatory politicians.149

142 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Prakashan, Aurangabad , 1974, p. 2.
143 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl.), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 47-
52.
144 Pranab Bradhan, Scarcity, Conflicts and Cooperation, Essays in the political and Institutional Economics of Development, The
MIT Press, London, p. 181.
145 K M Sajad Ibrahim, ‘Kerala’s Electoral Pendulum Swings Back and Forth’, Yogendra Yadav, Suhas Palshikar,
K C Suri, (ed)., Party Competition in Indian States, OUP, New Delhi, 2014, p.512.
146 Richard Schier, Is the party over, Intellect, 1976, pp 290-292.
147 Rajeev Kumar Singh, ‘Citizenship, Exclusion & Indian Muslims’, S N Tripathy (ed), Issues on Ethnicity,
Discrimination and Social Exclusion, Abhijeet Publications, Delhi, 2010, 110094, p. 296-297.
148 Matther Flinders, Defending Politics, Why Democracy Matters in 21st Century, OUP, 2012, p. 160.
149 Matther Flinders, Defending Politics, Why Democracy Matters in 21st Century, OUP, 2012, p. 166.
liii
The media offers great potential for enhancing democratic mobilization, engagement and literacy
but it also has a destructive quality that must somehow be kept in check.150 ‘The stories
‘Tablighis’ can only be understood in the light of the stories they tell about Prophet Mohammad,
the Companions of the Prophet, and those who have followed them. The stories assert that the
high standard set in the Hadith is gone and that it is again the time of Jahiliya’s time of
ignorance.151

‘The perception that Muslims are becoming victims of the Indian states ‘politics of exclusion’
lacks empirical validity. Rather, affirmative policies by state and central governments have
benefited Muslims at the lower strata’.152 The emergence of the All India Backward Muslim
Morcha, must be seen as a product of the growing strength and influence of the Dalit
Movement in India as a whole in recent years. The AIBMM can be credited with the coining of
the term ‘Dalit Muslim’ seeking to bring all the previous ‘low caste groups’, who together form
vast majority of the Indian Muslim population, on to a common platform.153

The history of Muslim politics of the last one hundred years reveals that the Muslim leaders of
north India always imposed their politics over the country. This ignores the local problems and
situations. The problems of all the Muslims in all the states cannot be identical…there cannot be
any common language and common culture for all the Muslims in the country.154 The Muslim
communalists are keenly interested in the affairs of other Muslim countries. It is because of the
transnational character of Islam and not because of lack of patriotism.155

Among other issues, the debate over Uniform Civil Code, right of Muslims to pray in what has
been classified as ‘Protected monuments’ by the ASI, minority character of the AMU, Jamia
Millia Islamia, the state of Urdu in digital world are some of key issues. Recently, the apex court
asked the opinion of the Central Government on the issue of the UCC. In August-September
2015, Jain community protested against Gujarat High Court Order which declared ‘Sinthala’
suicide. The community forced the court to review the order with street protests, and was given
due coverage by the media. Nowhere, it was written that it was an issue of Personal Law of Jains.
On 23 April 1985, Chief Justice granted maintenance to the Muslim woman from her separated
husband under Section 125 of IPC, which is applicable to all communities. It was followed by
never ending rallies all over the country by Muslims.156

Prof. J. Duncan M. Derrat warned in 1968, ‘if there is frontal attack on the personal law in India,
it will survive with tenacity it has been unable to show in countries where the majority of the
population are and always have been Muslims.’157 As far as Muslim assertion is concerned, it was
pronounced on three main issues which emerged as symbols of the Muslim identity, namely
Aligarh Muslim University, Urdu language and Muslim personal Law.158 One of the grievance of
the Muslims is that they are discriminated against with the result that they are economically
worse off that the Hindus. Humayun Kabir, educationist and politician, admitted that there was
a lot of discrimination against Muslims.159 Muslims have been victim of the Hindu-Muslim strife.

150 Matther Flinders, Defending Politics, Why Democracy Matters in 21st Century, OUP, 2012, p. 168.
151 Barbara Metcalf, ‘Travellers’ Tale in the Tablighi Jama’at’, David Taylor (ed), Islam in South Asia, Routledge,
2011, p.176.
152 Anwar Alam, ‘Political Management of Islamic Fundamentalism, A view from India’, David Taylor (ed), Islam
in South Asia, Routledge, 2011, p.287.
153 Yogender Sikand, ‘A New Indian Muslim Agenda’, David Taylor (ed), Islam in South Asia, Routledge, 2011,
p.306.
154 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad , 1974, p.3.
155 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography , Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad , 1974, p.6.
156 Balraj Puri, Indian Muslims since Partition, Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi, p.17.
157 Balraj Puri, Indian Muslims since Partition, Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi, p.13.
158 Balraj Puri, Indian Muslims since Partition, Institute of Objective Studies, New Delhi, p.13.
159 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography , Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad , 1974, p.10.
liv
The Muslims, however, support Raghubir Dayal Commission recommendation of establishing
‘inter-religious board’ to promote mutual understanding.160

Today, many Muslim localities across the country are denied bank loans as they are ‘blacklisted’
by the banks. Many years ago, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, confessed of unequal treatment meted
out to Muslims in respect of loans and licenses for the industry.161 Under the false notion that
Muslims alone were responsible for the creation of Pakistan, the misguided fanatics make use of
every available opportunity wrecking vengeance on the members of the community. 162 On
October 13, 1968 the all India federation of Muslims along with scheduled castes and backward
classed was set up under auspices of Muslim Majlis.163 Legislators and officials …have yet to
repeal laws providing effective immunity from prosecution to government officials, including
soldiers and police, responsible for human rights violations.164

Today, Muslim polity is not only facing the problem of Muslim Personal Law, but there are
more causes of concern. For instance, the issue of Babri Masjid, the right of Muslims to offer
congregation prayers in mosques designated as ‘protected’ monument by the Archaeological
Survey of India, Aligarh Muslim University and now Jamia Millia Islamia.165

Conclusions and Recommendations

Education, employment, self-employment schemes, minority schemes etc., poverty and literacy
of the community are the main issues. Health has been a concern for Muslims as many men
working in hazardous industry. On education, the state should take proper care of existing
schools, madarsas, maktabs, and ensure that the SSA schools have an equal presence in MCD.
The overall standard of education is well below global standards. Muslims are way behind the
national average. People call for strengthening the education base amongst Muslims at all levels.
Indian Muslim should be educationally, intellectually, socially and economically well advanced.
More educational institutions, like the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) should be established.
Modern and meaningful education should be given to all. The drop-out rate among boys and
girls should be checked. In areas, and regions, which do not have school and college, the
government should take special initiatives and open institutions. Also, community initiatives
should be encouraged to provide affordable quality education. There should be 100 percent
literacy among Muslims.

The elite and educated section of the community has to come forward and shoulder some
responsibility. Madarsa education should be modernized. Madarsa students should be eligible to
write all entrance exams, and be provided with all the facilities on par with other students. For
example, they should get the same concessions in railway, bus and air travel that other students
get. Students should learn to avail the government schemes for scholarships, boarding schools,
and other schemes on time. The ideal teacher student ratio should be maintained. In places like
Assam and Jammu & Kashmir, which faces inadequate power supply, solar plants and lamps
should be installed.

Skills

Skill development is critical today for a large number of youth, especially among Muslims, both
men and women. The use of simple ICT techniques built into any intervention allows for

160 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad, 1974, 19.
161 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad, 1974, p.10.
162 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad, 1974, 12.
163 Moin Shakir, A trend report and Bibliography, Parimal Praksahsn, Aurangabad, 1974, 26.
164 Human Rights Watch, World Report, 2011.
165 Mushirul Haq, IIIrd Sir Syed Lecture, 5 October 1988, Maktaba Jamia, 2011, p. 31.
lv
capacity development through well designed training programs and professional trainers. This is
one investment that can be made quickly, and is something that is widely accepted by all
communities in all locations and brings quick results. Given the growth rates we see in UP (7.5
percent for nearly 5 years) and Bihar (11 percent for the last five years), there is a great need for
skilled labour and therefore the demand creation is not a bottleneck. In fact, supply is far from
catching up with the demand that is being generated and this gap can be quickly closed through
well designed skill development initiatives. The skill development program would take local
needs, available skills and local language capabilities into account.

Backwardness among the Muslims has to be seen in the framework of democratic polity, which
necessitates full participation of the community in the public platforms of the wider society. The
Vision 2025 envisages inclusive development of the Muslim community in Maharashtra with the
objective of empowering the community for their active participation in the development
process.

This study underlines the extremely unfortunate and sad condition of the Muslims in India.
Their socio-economic condition makes one wonder about their strategies of survival. Their
educational status is extremely low, not equipping them with skills necessary to procure jobs in
liberal market economy. The infrastructural condition of the areas in which they reside is
extremely pathetic. They lack access to basic resources. Even the community resources do not
reach the extremely poor and the needy. Above all, a larger section of the Muslims is either not
aware of government schemes/programmes or does not possess emotional, intellectual,
financial, physical and social resources necessary to benefit from them.

Cases of discrimination form a collective perception of discrimination, further damaging the will
of Muslims to assert and gain from the public resources. We feel that mere attempts to provide
material goods and support to the community will not help. What the community needs is a
three dimensional approach. The first refers to the attitude of the wider society and the second
to that of the Muslim community. These have impact on the access of the community to
resources and its capacity to negotiate for the same. We feel that only once there are attitudinal
changes in the community and the wider society, the third dimension, that is, measures
supporting development in the community would be effective. The following recommendations
are made in the light of the preceding submissions.

A Diversity Index, as suggested in the Sachar Committee Report, would be an effective

measure towards initial attitudinal change in the wider society as well as the Muslim community.
The diversity principle entails an annual social audit through an independent organization like
the state level Equal Opportunities Commission to determine whether the equality and non-
discrimination principle is being followed in government departments, schools, employment
agencies, public and private sector etc. This would ensure dispersal of the minority community
members in all walks of life. The dispersal of Muslims and their acceptance in the public would
wean them away from ghettoized conditions of living.

The Diversity index should include mapping of representation of the community at every public
platform/departments especially those which involve participation in the decision making
process. This representation can be ensured by having proportional quota in the State offices.
However, in the private sector, it can be encouraged by linking incentives to the presence of
minorities.

Discrimination

Muslims in India live in an atmosphere of aggression and suspicion having overpowering

feelings of insecurity and discrimination. Legislative actions like Anti-Discrimination Acts in
lvi
other countries have been found to be effective to deal with prejudiced behaviour of the
members of the wider society. The Government should take initiative to enact legislation on
communal violence on the line of the Communal and Targeted Violence (Prevention, Control
and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill 2011, drafted by National Advisory Council.

While such punitive steps are essential, one has to imbue them with preventive measures. This
necessitates a campaign towards repealing stereotypes against the community. Media and
educational institutions can play an important role in this regard. Measures should be taken to
scrutinize activities and programmes in these institutions and to make them responsible towards
co-existence.

Arrests of Muslims after every terrorist act should also be stopped with immediate effect. In fact,
nobody irrespective of caste, class and creed should be arrested without proper evidence.
Community policing should be encouraged as this would strengthen trust of the minority in the
system.

A strong well channelized administration is necessary for ensuring inclusive growth for the
Muslims and also for addressing the issue of discrimination. The Minorities Ministry
Department and Minorities Commission are two active offices already working towards minority
affairs. Need is to further strengthen them. There is a need to develop efficient lateral (local
level) monitoring and facilitating system which can be met with establishing regional offices of
MDD in each district of the state. These offices would function as public relation office would
disperse information on government programmes. These offices would also assist in facilitating
implementation of the government schemes and programmes.

More specifically, these offices should assist in helping the community members in applying and
getting loans, scholarships, BPL and ration cards etc. Due publicity should be made for
government schemes/programmes for minorities. These should not only be advertised in
newspapers of national, regional and minority languages but also on televisions and radio.
Procedure for applying for and utilizing from the schemes/ programmes for minority should be
made simple. Paper work on these should be reduced and regional minority office should help
the community members in applying and utilizing from these schemes and programmes.

Transparency should be maintained in dealing with minority affairs. Data bank should be made
and should be accessible to all. This might be done through regional offices on minority affairs
and NGOs. The most efficient mechanism, however, would be to maintain information on
websites accessible to every citizen of India. Although, women share problems with men, some
problems remain exclusive to their domain. Understanding and dealing with these problems
require presence of a sensitive woman officer in each and every office dealing with minority
affairs. A women cell in the Minorities Commission is strongly recommended. Among the two
posts of Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson, Minorities Commission, at least one is
recommended to be filled by a woman.

Poor infrastructure like roads, public facilities, electricity supply, street lighting, water supply,
sanitation, availability of schools colleges and hospitals in Muslim concentrated areas is identified
as a major reason for higher poverty and deprivation among the community. The access to these
infrastructures would make a positive impact on the Muslims and would help in improving their
socio-economic conditions. Need is for the local bodies to focus on the Muslim concentrated
areas.

lvii
Housing

Discrimination against the Muslims in the housing markets is conspicuous. This results in
pushing Muslims to Muslim concentrated areas, many a time, making them purchase flats in
illegal buildings. The stay in illegal buildings makes it difficult for this population to extend
documents like address proof for accessing government institutions and schemes, thus
furthering their deprived socio-economic status. The situation demands that the Government
should intervene in the housing market and assure that at least 8 percent houses in the housing
stocks of the government agencies go to the Muslims.

There is also a need to sensitize private builders and housing societies in this regard. The
builders and housing societies can be provided some tax/monetary incentive on the basis of
religious diversity of flat owners in the housing societies that they maintain. This will encourage
better inter-community interactions and hence higher possibility of reducing misunderstanding
against stereotypes that may result in communalism and communal riots. Legal measures and
fines should be taken and imposed on the people who are found to be discriminating on the
lines of religion in selling and renting of property.

It also has been found that the Muslims face difficulties in getting housing loans from the banks.
Most of the Muslims concentrated areas are often informally marked as negative areas for the
bank loans. The studies on Muslims have reported misconceptions about Muslims among the
bank employees who often perceive them negatively. This necessitates sensitizing programmes
for the bank employees. As such a sensitizing process would take time, a share of total housing
loan (a minimum of 8 %) be ear-marked for the Muslim.

There is an urgent need to develop the Muslim concentrated areas and slums by implementing
the various government schemes such as, Basic Services for Urban Poor (BSUP) under
JNNURM, Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme (IHSDP), Slum
Development Programme (SDP) and Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan. There is a need to remove
infrastructural bottlenecks in Muslim concentrated Industrial towns. Towns in Western UP, for
example, have a high concentration of Muslim entrepreneurs, traders and industrialists.
However, the reports show hardships in their running the business. There is frequent disruption
of electric supply, while water supply remains erratic.

Credit

Banks and credit providing institutions are in short supply. Road and transport infrastructure are
adverse as well as training and skill development institutes are absent. Further, the hospitals and
health care facilities in these areas are inadequate and not equipped to deal with diseases that can
be considered as occupational hazard. The multi-sectoral development scheme as a part of
Prime Minister’s 15-point programme, should be implemented as a top priority in all minority
concentrated areas/ towns.

This study as well as recent researches on Muslims shows a desire in the community for formal
education. The data as shared in the chapter on education, however, reports that a large number
of community members quit education by the middle level of education. Recognizing that
education is essential in today's world for maintaining minimum quality of life and also for
upward mobility, the study group recommends all possible measures to enhance educational
opportunities for Muslims.

The Area Intensive scheme as proposed in VIII Five Year Plan involves locating districts/
blocks having high concentration of educationally backward minorities and to generate
educational programmes for them. The programmes are supposed to address local needs and are
lviii
expected to be multi-dimensional, covering measures for general, community specific and skill
oriented education. The Area Intensive scheme should have a time bound implementation plan
(10 to 15 years) with a focused approach wherein all the available resources, existing government
schemes and government mechanisms should be put to use in the selected districts/blocks. This
scheme should be implemented in all minority concentrated blocks, with special emphasis on
rural and poorest parts (slums) of cities/ towns.

Education

Strengthening education of Muslims at upper primary and secondary levels is a key for the
educational upliftment of the community. This requires provision of government/ municipal
schools at secondary and higher secondary levels. Intensive campaign on getting children into
the education net is necessary. A policy on Public Private Partnership should be put in place.
The need of the hour is to tap the private initiatives at community, corporate and NGO levels
for providing quality education and infrastructural support.

Establishment of quality educational institutions in minority concentrated areas with the

mandate of providing admission to the candidates belonging to the minority community needs
to be popularized by the grant of extra FSI, registration, land etc. Regular RTE inspection
should take place in the schools especially in minority concentrated areas. Measures should be
taken to either recognize or close down the not ‘recognized’ schools as these schools extend a
high possibility of providing bad quality yet expensive education. High rate of failure and
difficulty in receiving returns from education generate a fatal attitude in the minorities. These
can be damaging as these have higher probability of strengthening perception of discrimination
among the minorities.

Minority Education Institutions provide space to the minorities to integrate their cultural
requirements with those of the formal education system. It is important to note that these
institutions are not isolating as the Supreme Court has made it obligatory for the minority
Institutions to keep 50% enrolment for the general category. Petitions made to the Study Group
reflect problems that the Minority Education Institutions face in establishing and administering
educational Institutions. Need is to expedite solving these problems and to grant state
recognition and support to the Muslim Minority Educational Institutions (MMEI).

There is a greater need for educational institutions which are open to all religious, regional and
caste groups to promote multiculturalism. Proportional allocation of the seats in these
educational institutions should be made for the Muslims and other minorities in the area to
facilitate inclusion of these minorities in the formal education system. A number of Muslim girls
opt out of higher education due to the unavailability of schools in their vicinity. Hence, there is a
need to open more secondary schools and colleges in Muslim concentrated areas.

Residential schools/colleges especially for girl students and the children of shifting population
like construction labour, can help in furthering their education. We recommend establishment of
more residential schools/colleges. Adequate ICDS coverage in the minority concentrated areas is
required. Medium of instruction in these centres should be either home language of the children
or the dominant language of the area.

Keeping in mind the discrimination that the Muslim youth faces in getting accommodation,
there is a need to provide hostels to the Muslim students in the government run institutions.
However, care should be taken for intermingling of students of different religions and not
ghettoization of Muslim students by creating separate hostels for them. The medium of
instruction is an important issue that requires adequate research, as medium of instruction bears
on the identity issue as well as has implications for the job market. We recommend proper
lix
facilities to the Urdu medium schools for teaching English language in Muslim concentrated
areas.

Opening of Urdu Pre-school classes in schools run by the government or working out a
partnership with private players for Urdu preschools is important. This would encourage the
community for education from an early age. Even though a small number of students take
education exclusively in Madarsas, we recommend establishing Madarsa Education Board at the
state level. This would facilitate higher education for the madarsa educated. The Board should be
linked with the central and state boards of primary and secondary education. Nevertheless, the
registration should not be made compulsory for the madarsas and their joining the Board,
should remain a voluntary effort. Further, Modernization of Madarsa scheme cannot replace
programmes and schemes for the Government recognized formal education.

Lack of awareness about scholarships particularly among the Muslim residents of rural and
urban slum areas is also observed. The need is for information dissemination through
information centres/community centres at the grass root level. Further, many deserving students
from the Muslim community are finding it difficult to apply for the scholarships as they are
unable to procure documents required for application. We recommend relaxation in the
requirement of documents in case of deserving students. Formation of action groups within the
community and utilization of the already existing action groups (having both Muslims and non-
Muslims) would be essential to implement and follow-up on the scholarship schemes.

Need to improve and secularize contents of the school textbooks is acutely felt. It has come to
notice that Muslim students are unable to meaningfully relate themselves and their past to what
is taught in the school and colleges. Periodisation of history is often done on religious lines,
showing Muslims as aggressors. However, these are myths and fallacies of deliberate creation
and need to be overcome through secularising the content of school textbooks and making them
reflective of unbiased facts.

Provision of reading rooms and libraries in Muslim concentrated areas is essential. Majority of
Muslim families living in one room houses in urban areas face space crunch, which specifically
affects the studies of the children. It is therefore, recommended that government should provide
spaces and also monetary assistance to set up libraries and reading rooms in Muslim
concentrated areas. The information and career counselling centres recommended above can
also be housed in these libraries.

In Muslim concentrated areas, the quality of the existing schools is reprehensible and in no way
the schools have the capacity to allow the talents to blossom. There is an irresistible urge on the
part of the students, teachers and well-meaning people in these poverty ridden hovels to make
the students reach their full stature by imparting them high quality education. While the
ambience of these government and Urdu medium schools can be enriched, it would be more
expedient and appropriate if one or two existing schools in every Muslim concentrated area
could be upgraded and modernised with full government support for the remodelling and
reconstruction of the academic and infrastructural facilities.

This scheme of modernisation and remodelling of schools should have the definite objectives
of making schools the centre of modern and creative learning. While making the selection of the
schools for modernisation, the selection may be made with circumspection to upgrade only
those schools which are in dire need of remodelling. Quite inevitably these schools when
remodelled will remain accessible to the students on merit-cum-need basis. These schools should
be made residential schools with the provision of adequate facilities.

lx
Employment

Unemployment is high among the Muslim men and still higher among Muslim women. The
government based employment programmes should be suitably implemented in cities and rural
areas, giving priority to the underdeveloped and higher unemployment prone Muslim
concentrated areas. Given that most of the Muslims are self-employed, there is a need to
establish ITIs and Polytechnic institutions in Muslim concentrated areas. The government needs
to strengthen the marketing networks and open new avenues for export of products by Muslim
artisans. This will strengthen the household economy of Muslims and provide them
employment. The quality of training provided in the ITIs should not be compromised.

The situation requires that the government encourages NGOs and community based
organizations to strengthen the marketing of the products and eases the regulatory frameworks
to allow the export of products to other countries. This will raise demand, thereby raising wages
and help Muslims overcome economic hardship that they are presently facing. The share of
Muslims in the government employment specifically in the administrative and police services is
significantly lower than the share of their population in the state. The situation requires that the
government should prioritise the issue of Muslims' share in the government employment. It is
recommended that the government should reserve 10% or a minimum of 8% of government
jobs for the Muslims.

Various analysts suggest that the OBC list for the Muslims should be expanded to include all
deprived sections of the Muslim population. A survey to this effect is strongly recommended
involving the community and academic institutions of repute. Muslims have considerably lower
share in comparison to other religious minorities in bank credit. One of the reasons for the same
is blacklisting of the Muslim concentrated areas. Such a blacklisting should be prohibited. RBI
should strictly monitor the distribution of bank credit to Muslims. Strict action should be taken
in cases of non-cooperation and religious bias in the disbursal of credit. Given the poverty of the
Muslims, the issue of collateral requirements, subsidy and interest rates should be duly
addressed.

Attempts should be made to establish and promote micro-finance institutions in Muslim

concentrated areas to overcome the small credit crunch. There is a need for the government to
take stock of PHCs, UHCs, hospitals etc. in these areas and to provide these services as per the
government norms. Care should also be taken to have adequate surveillance on quacks and
measures should be taken to prohibit their services. There is a need to look into the grievances
of Muslims against the hospital administration and health officials. The discriminatory treatment
of Muslims should be prevented and officials and doctors should be suitably sensitized to
address the issue.

Healthcare

The health care issues of Muslims women are important. Studies on Muslim concentrated areas
show that Muslim women are reluctant to approach male doctors. Adequate provisions should
be made to appoint female doctors in public health institutions. A strong perception of
discrimination and ill treatment has been widely reported, especially by those women who go for
gynaecological treatment. Adequate sensitization programmes should be organized for in-service
staff of the medical institutions. A sensitizing module should be an integral part of the medical
courses for doctors, nurses and other medical staff. Disciplinary action should be taken on any
reported discriminatory practice in order to prevent such practices and to address the perception
of discrimination among the Muslims. Counselling and mental health services should be
extended to those suffering from trauma of discrimination, communalism or any kind of
atrocities.
lxi
More ICDS centres, balwadis and anganwadis are required in Muslim concentrated areas. These
provide platform for taking care of health of children, adolescent girls and lactating mothers.
Urban health planning should not only focus on providing primary health care as well as health
issues emerging due to occupational hazards. State must take concrete steps towards improving
the living and livelihood environment through ensuring better housing and working conditions,
clean surroundings, better drainage and access to potable water.

Gender

The Muslim community is especially faltering on women's rights and freedom. The triple talaq
issue, property rights of women, right of women to choose the occupation they like etc., need to
be taken up by the community leaders to overcome the conservative elements within the
community. The economic and social empowerment of women will go a long way to cure many
ills that the Muslim community is presently facing. There should be a special provision for
Muslim women within the gender budgeting of the state.

Lack of adequate transport services restrict women mobility required to access quality
educational institutions and occupation especially in the atmosphere of insecurity that the
Muslims experience. In such an atmosphere, provision of good secured transport facilities would
go a long way to help the women in being mobile and in utilizing from the state resources thus
contributing towards the cause of development. Muslim women suffering from domestic
violence must get unbiased protection from police, protection officers, public hospitals and
counsellors under Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

The rules governing the acquisition of ration cards and BPL cards should be relaxed for
divorced women, widows and women headed families as such women find it difficult to procure
the same from their families (both parental and in-laws).The number of Muslims in prisons is
alarmingly high in most states among the Muslims. However, it has been revealed that most of
the Muslims imprisoned in jails are due either to false cases against them or to lack of economic
capabilities to hire quality lawyers to fight their cases. Further, the police discrimination against
the Muslims, causes them to file cases of magnitude even for inconsequential matters. We
recommend establishment of a committee to go through the processes prior to filing of the
charge-sheet and to give its recommendations to the government to overcome over-
incarceration of Muslims. This committee should function in close association with the
Minorities Development Department. Any prolonged detention of Muslim youth in custody
should follow the legal procedure.

Police

Police and judicial systems in many states are understaffed and overloaded, reducing the
possibilities of arrest, prosecution and conviction of the perceived rioters. The police and
judiciary should be sensitized on issues of minority identity and state politics. Need is to make
the two systems strong enough to resist instructions from politicians to either drop or go slow in
investigating cases of mob brutality and damage to property.

The Police Complaints Redressal Authority/Cell should be immediately constituted at the state
and district levels as recommended by the National Police Commission (NPC). The structure
was envisaged to deal with complaints of the public who are not satisfied with the police action
taken whether as complainants or accused.

Trained social workers to be appointed at police stations. Social workers would provide psycho-
social and rehabilitative support to complainants, victims, accused and their families, who
lxii
approach the police. The presence of such social workers would help the police in discharging
their duties more effectively and bridge the gap between the police and citizenry. The committee
report had made it clear that these social workers would not interfere with police investigations
and would only focus on providing guidance and information on welfare schemes and NGOs
while extending counselling and psycho-social support to the victims and the accused.

The police officers being guided by biases rather than professionalism should be weeded out.

Required qualifications and the method prescribed for recruitment in the police at all levels viz.
Constable, Sub-Inspector, Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Indian Police Service,
should be given wide and sustained publicity, particularly in areas where there is a sizable Muslim
population.

Muslim youth should be encouraged to complete formal education at least up to 12th standard
and to join the police through a systematic campaign. Community leaders and educational
institutions should take lead in this campaign.

Police department can hold regular training camps for the Muslim youths to prepare them for
recruitment in the police. These camps should be held at all those places where there is a sizable
Muslim population. While the police and the community get into the process of orienting
themselves towards Community Policing, persons trained in conflict resolution could be
appointed at each and every place known to be communally sensitive. Persons so appointed may
be called Community Relations Officers, who should have an independent office. It should be
mandatory for the local police to maintain a close liaison with the Community Relations Officer
while dealing with a conflict ridden situation besides having regular consultation with her/ him
on maintaining peace, harmony and public order.

Absence of accurate data on the socio-economic conditions of the Muslims has been identified
as a major pitfall. There is a need for the government to promote and financially support
collection of data on various socio-religious categories at regular interval. This data is needed to
be collected from micro spatial units like wards, gramsabhas or tehsils, with the help of
concerned government departments.

Provocative media coverage has often caused communal riots, breaking down the social fabric
of religious tolerance. The media coverage of the sensitive issues should be adequately
scrutinized and monitored. Several studies have examined in graphic details the problems
confronting the Waqf properties, erosion of Waqf endowments and even dilution of the concept
of Waqf under which valuable Waqf assets have disappeared. It has been averred by several
analysts that the prized Waqf property has been misappropriated for consideration other than
merit, violating the undisputed maxim, “once a Waqf will always remain a Waqf”. There should
be a separate cadre of Waqf administrative and subordinate services, so that dynamic people
could be recruited at the appropriate age. Only experienced and knowledgeable people should
remain in the sphere of Waqf administration, Waqf promotion, and Waqf property preservation.
A Committee consisting of a chairman and an expert member can be constituted to work out
detailed modalities of the Waqf Administrative and Subordinate Services Act.

Existing Waqf properties should be used for generating maximum returns to the community.
The properties should be used for developing colleges, universities and other community
oriented services. It is undeniable that the Muslims overwhelmingly, nearly 82%, are living in
sub-human conditions and they will continue to slide further down in terms of living index.
They are not able to access quality education and their due share in employment. It is
recommended that Muslims should be provided reservation in proportion to their population.

lxiii
It is felt that the communal riots can be controlled effectively, if the composite nature of the
police force deployed in the riot affected areas is insisted upon and for this the present meagre
presence of Muslims in the police force should be enhanced to 10% or a minimum of 8% as
recommended for all the services. Muslims at many places are finding it difficult to get land
allotted for mosque and burial grounds due to sheer indifference of the local authorities
including the police or objection by some socio-political groups. It violates fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution and requires immediate corrective action from the State
Government.

The Indian Economy is in a state of transition. In emerging economies, small scale businesses
and the unorganized sector have a huge role in creating a dynamic market environment and this
contributes in a big way to economic and social development of the country. It is also realized
that these small entrepreneurs are the drivers of economic growth, innovation, regional
development and job creation. Small scale businesses in India run by Muslims comprise a
substantial percentage of overall business in the unorganized sector making enormous
contributions to the Indian economy.

Some steps can be taken up immediately in this direction. To begin with, a mapping exercise
needs to be taken up to identify clusters where Muslim artisans and entrepreneurs thrive. This
can be done quickly as some of the data already exists. These clusters can then be taken up for a
multi-pronged strategy that would enable units there to upgrade their design skills, develop their
business models, build marketing capacity and establish a broader presence in the market. This
background has enabled civil society across the world to develop a complete portfolio of social
investments that have been tried and tested in various scenarios. The same can be attempted
specifically for Muslims and areas where Muslims predominate. Growth with equity has been the
focus of Indian economic policy since the 1960s. By 2020, India is projected to be the youngest
nation in the world in terms of size.

More job opportunities needed to uplift the India Muslim upto the standard of the main stream
other community. The presence of Muslims in government jobs is negligible and in private
sector, it is worse. Muslim should be asked to develop educationally and become employable.
While the global economy is expected to witness a shortage of young population of around 56
million by 2020, India will be the only country with a youth surplus of 47 million. (Economic
Survey, 2014-2015) The main issue to address then is not just providing employment but
increasing the employability of the labour force in India. Thus, any solution to the problem lies
in a well-designed education and training regime that sets out to meet these objectives. Self-
employment continues to dominate, with a 52.2 percent share in total employment. What is
critical is the significant share of workers engaged in low-income generating activities.
(Economic Survey, 2014-2015).

An overwhelming 95 percent of the Muslims are self-employed. Efforts should be made to

cover them under health insurance and general insurance. The educated Muslims face
discrimination in the job market. Fear about getting job along with there being no provision for
Muslim reservation is there. Some analysts and experts have been arguing that reservations are a
must for the Muslim community. They have felt that reservation along with affirmative policies
at the primary and secondary schools will enable a proper feeder system to higher levels of
education and jobs.

Muslim youth should get reservation and this should be followed by categorization, where
women can get advance education in vocational training. There has been a demand to remove
Article 341 or extend the reservation to Muslims. The question raised is why do we have
reservation for Hindus on religious basis and the same extended to Sikhs and Buddhists? There
is bias in selection committees and Muslims should be made members of Selection Committees
lxiv
to ensure there is no discrimination in the process. Muslims should find place in Grade III & IV
jobs. Muslim artisans who lost their livelihood due to reforms, and government’s ‘Clean Ganga
Plan’ should be rehabilitated. In Jammu & Kashmir, the tourism industry should be developed
and timber industry should get better price from the market. Efforts should also be made to
promote saffron and other cultivation among the Kashmiris. Muslims associated with rag
picking, and other menial jobs should be rehabilitated.

Across all classes and regions of the Muslims, there prevails a deep sense of insecurity and
mistrust for the lawmakers and government agencies, which seems a core issue. Policemen on
beat in Muslim areas drop lines like, ‘Chacha SIMI chhor Di?’ (Uncle, when did you leave
SIMI)? Muslim youths are asked to comment on ‘ISIS’. During cricket matches, and Indo-Pak
clashes, deliberate efforts are made to provoke Muslims and their neighborhood. The lynching
of Akhlaq in Dadri, Shahzad in Jammu, killings of a toddler and infant in Faridabad, attacks on
Dalits, murders of rationalist thinkers Dhabolkar, Kalaburgi and Pansare in Karnataka, and
Maharashtra have rekindled the dangers posed to scientific thinking in Indian society. The ink
attacks on people in Mumbai and Delhi, attacks on Churches show that there is tussle among
Hindu fanatics to claim the space for ‘Rashtrabhakt’. The issue of holy cow has been deliberately
raised in states where cow slaughter is banned for decades. This has been done to target Muslims
and polarize majority class for electoral gains. The rise in cases of rape against women, girls,
minor girls, and even infants in the heart of the National Capital have exposed the claims of
India being land of ‘Ahimsa’. Human development or growth is not possible in an atmosphere
of insecurity, and fear. As the 2014 Human Development Report says, ‘Conflict and sense of
personal insecurity have pervasive adverse impacts on human development and leave billions of
people living in precarious conditions. Many countries in the bottom tier of the Human
Development Index are emerging from long periods of conflict or still confront armed conflict.
Religious Freedom should be ensured for the Muslims in BJP-ruled states too. One culture
should not be enforced upon the people and young minds should not targeted for cultural war.
Muslims girls should not feel insecure in moving out alone. During communal riots, there
should be a check that the administration should be impartial to all, and not pick on Muslims.
The security and intelligence agencies should not discriminate against the Muslim youth.
Muslims should not be scared of going to the police station and lodge an FIR. The issue of
refugees/migrants should be dealt with equity and justice, and Muslims should not be singled
out. The representation of Muslims in police forces should be in proportion. Muslim youth
should not be provoked with irrational queries. There should be regular interaction between
Muslims and Hindus and other communities at mohalla levels based on mutual trust and respect.
Small groups of like-minded people in the Muslim community should gather to have interfaith
meetings on regular basis to have more understanding. Deficit of trust between the two
communities should be reduced. The attitude of ‘immigrant issue’ should be changed and it
should not be used to intimidate poor Muslims in states like Assam and West Bengal.

Political Empowerment

It is agreed that the Delimitation Commission failed to address the issue disproportionate
representation of Muslims in the gram panchayats, local bodies, state assemblies and Lok Sabha.
Muslims did not protest against the Delimitation Commission of Justice Kuldeep Singh, which
has reshaped and redesigned the constituencies across the country. The Muslims feel that the
delimitation has harmed the case of Muslim representation throughout the country, and it has
split the Muslim votes in different constituencies for municipal, assembly, Lok Sabha in such a
way, that lesser number of Muslims make to the state assemblies and Lok Sabha. Delimitation
Commission did not work in Assam because of opposition from (AASU).

Working with all political parties for ensuring proper share in state resources and development is
the agenda for all. Many want to produce a prime ministerial candidate and overcome all
lxv
challenges. A total empowerment of Indian Muslims along with other marginalized people by
using available resources at all levels. Muslims have to be powerful in politics and have political
empowerment which should translate into numbers in Assemblies and Lok Sabha. If the
Parliament passes law to reserve seats for women, there should be reservation within that quota,
for Muslim women. In urban local bodies, and gram panchayats, the representation of Muslims
should be ensured by training Muslim women for such roles. The issue of Uniform Civil Code
has been target Muslims, though every section including Buddhists have their personal laws in
place. Muslims should join with other minorities for the protection of their interests while not
allowing such issues to affect the vision of the Muslims. There was also suggestion to replicate
the Kerala-model of political empowerment in other states, so that Muslims are not even
counted.

Democracy should ensure that minority views, opinion and votes are not ignored when
governments are formed by the majority principle. In the Hindu view of political economy, what
is of importance is not the form of government or who forms the government, but the quality of
the ruling elite. Muslims should be politically aware to foil any attempt by certain quarters to
divide their vote and ensure victory of non-Muslim candidates from the Muslim-dominated
areas. There has to be a solution within the democratic structure to ensure proportional
representation for every section. The political future of Muslims lies in alliance with Dalits,
Adivasis and other weaker sections. Muslim leadership and organisation should work as center
and take fellow communities on the basis of proportionate representation at all levels.

In South India, where Muslims are comparatively better off than in Northern India, response
was to not expect much from the Government and depend more on self-initiative. There was a
concern for sectarian divide within the community and respondents called for unity within the
community. Every Muslim has to think of ways to bring in a change in the community. Also,
internal clashes within Muslims has given power to communal forces– this too needs to be
checked. Lack of Muslim leadership is blamed for many of the existing problems. Muslim, as a
community should make sure that everyone is educated, they help each other and stay united. If
this can happen, Muslim as a whole will be a significant community in India-nation.

People in the community were asked as to the kind of reforms that they would expect. Many
suggestions poured in from within the community for better results and development of
Muslims at large. Some of the most common suggestions in the interest of the community were:

 Muslims should be motivated to join government services, especially in the field of

education and police. Even in judiciary, the Muslim presence should be increased.

 It is also hoped that the community will find ways to deal with rampant corruption
existing in Waqf Boards across the country. Waqf Board officials should be held
accountable for its activities and it should be dealt with sternly.

 Similarly, Haj Boards should be reformed to accommodate the public view. Haj Boards
and Waqf Boards should not be headed by political appointees but professionals who are
accountable to the community and nation.

 The issue of Jammu & Kashmir should be resolved.

 The name ‘Pakistan’ should not be used to stigmatise Muslims of India. The right wing
groups’ attempts of linking Muslims of India with Pakistan should be nipped in the bud
once and for all.

lxvi
  Former Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh once talked of introducing Islamic
banking in India, but it was turned down by the RBI. With Indian banking gradually
shifting towards interest-free banking, Islamic finance and banking should be introduced
in phases in consultation with the RBI.

 Mainstream economy excludes Muslim from benefits of economic growth and

development. That should be looked into.

 There is a need to organise a team, like the missionaries, to work for the cause of the
community for the upliftment of the community and growth of the country.

 To make use of mosque, marriage/function hall for moral construction for maktabs.

 Over all, Muslims need to be optimistic and there is wider scope for voluntary reforms
within the society. Muslims definitely have bright future in India, but they must change
their mindset and must give top priority to modern scientific education.

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 Chapter 1

INDIAN MUSLIMS ANDTHE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE: SOME FEARS,

SOME HOPES AND SOME ADVICE
Muqtedar Khan

Abstract

We live in the age of Islamic turmoil; perhaps we can call it the age of the third fitna. The early two fitnas led to
the cleavage of Islam into Shia and Sunni. Muslim lands and Muslim communities are in a state of violent and
intense political transformations across the Muslim heartland. States are destabilized, national identities are being
deconstructed, sectarian and ideological fault lines are getting exacerbated and radicalism, extremism and state
oppression is escalating. The paper attempts to look into the despair of Muslims living in the world, including
India.

Indian Muslims in the Age of Turmoil

Living in the age of Islamic turmoil, it can perhaps be called the age of the third fitna. The early
two fitnas, led to the division of Islam into Shia and Sunni. Muslim lands and Muslim
communities are in a state of violent and intense political transformations across the world.
States are destabilized, national identities are being deconstructed, sectarian and ideological fault
lines are getting exacerbated and radicalism, extremism and state oppression is escalating. Even
in stable and democratic states such as Turkey, political discontent and hardening of ideological
postures can be witnessed. In this ocean of despair, one finds the Indian Muslim community, an
island of calm moderation. It is not a small island either - Indian Muslims are about 180 million
and constitute nearly 15 percent of the Indian population. If Indian Muslims of today were an
independent country, they would be the fifth or sixth most populated country in the world.

What is remarkable about Indian Muslims is not that both extremism and radical politics in the
community is on the decline, but that this moderation is emerging in spite of worsening
existential conditions and heightening political provocations1. By all accounts, India’s economy
has done extraordinarily well in the past 20 years, but Muslims not only enjoy a lesser share of
these gains their relative economic condition compared to everyone else has suffered
significantly in spite of spectacular national growth. India is growing but it is leaving behind its
largest minority. It should be obvious to anyone who looks at macro indicators that Indian
Muslims will constitute a bigger and bigger share of the population while simultaneously holding
a smaller and smaller share of the economy.

In addition to lagging behind in the economic sphere, Muslims are also falling behind in their
share of the national political pie. The victory of BJP and the current reign of Narendra Modi as
PM are emboldening many of the fringe and radical elements of the Sangh Parivar – the broader
Hindutva movement. Media reports from India are reading more and more like that from
Pakistan and Afghanistan during the heydays of the Taliban. Minorities harassed on a regular
basis, violence and forced conversions, enforcement of Hindu dietary laws on the rest of the
nation are frequently the themes in the news headlines. This trend cannot promise stability and
sustain Muslim moderation for an extended period. There is a limit to the extent that
disenfranchisement, marginalization and harassment of a large minority can be sustained without
causing irreparable damage to the body politic.

1 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains-3
Consider the Ghar Wapsi programme that seeks to convert minorities to Hinduism2. Trying to
convert 200 million people maybe a tall order, but it is not deterring the Hindu groups. They
have launched their effort in earnest. In a rather troubling development an offshoot of the ruling
Hindu nationalist party, BJP, converted nearly 200 Muslims from the poorest segments of the
society en masse to Hinduism using coercion and the promise of providing ration cards. Ration
cards are a right of all citizens. These people should automatically get those ration cards. But
now that Hindu nationalists are in power, the Hindu extremists are able to use the state and its
benefits as a religio-political leverage.

It appears now that the levers of power are in the hands of a “moderate Hindu party” which
continues to provide democratic cover using the language of good governance, the extremists
are free to persecute without fear of prosecution or even condemnation from the elected leaders.
This phenomenon of moderates and extremist religious groups becoming partners in
democracies to harass religious minorities, is not limited to India alone. In Egypt and Tunisia,
when the moderate Islamic parties were in power, extremists– Salafi groups became empowered
and unleashed violence against Copts, Sufis and secularists. The Salafi mobs ruled the streets in
Egypt and Tunisia only when the so-called moderate Islamists were in power. The extremists
provide votes and street power to the moderates and the moderates when in power provide legal
and political cover for the extremists. Unfortunately, the only solution to this problem is for the
ruling moderates to curb and marginalize the extremists as was attempted in Tunisia, but only
after the Genie was out of the bottle. If the moderates do not act firmly against their theological
and political cousins, the situation will necessarily deteriorate and lead to violence and instability.

India, despite the persistent presence of extremists of every hue, is a nation that has a very long
and strong tradition of religious pluralism, tolerance and syncretism. It is also an enduring
democracy that has sustained itself despite poverty, religious, ethnic and political differences and
has never succumbed to the temptations of authoritarianism. Therefore, in order to achieve their
impossible goal of creating a 100 percent Hindu India, Hindu extremists will have to first
trample on India’s very soul before they unleash a systematic persecution that will make the Nazi
holocaust look like a picnic. It is therefore imperative that this idea of a 100 percent Hindu
India dies an immediate death in order that no innocent life is sacrificed in its pursuit.

I fear that the double whammy of the economic development and empowerment of the majority
community so lavishly and garishly paraded in public, and the rapid underdevelopment of the
minority community that not only has to cope with relative deprivation but also suffer violence
harassment will engender an ethic of resentment in the minority psyche. Indian Muslims unlike
many other places have not responded to the Arab uprising by calling for their own Indian
spring or Indian Intifada, and this is a testimony to both the enduring culture of democracy in
India and the deep rooted political and religious moderation of Indian Muslims. The Hindu
majority and the secular society must realize that this more or less stable and semi-harmonious
condition can be maintained only through power and wealth sharing with Muslims and not
through marginalization and disempowerment of Muslims.

India is on the verge of a major breakthrough. Its economy is growing rapidly. It has become a
major hub of scientific and management knowledge along with a large pool of technically
competent people. A global diaspora gives it a global reach both in terms of investment potential
but also in terms of access to latest developments in science and management. India can join the
developed world, if it does not allow religious strife and violence from undermining international
investor confidence and also domestic focus on development. The politicians are on the right
verbal track with slogans such as sab ka sath, sab ka vikaas, progress together, and with emphasis
on good governance. Now they need to walk the talk. But India can progress only if all Indians

2 http://www.turkeyagenda.com/rampaging-religio-nationalists-india-playing-with-fire-1742.html
2
progress. It cannot become a developed nation, if a large segment of its population remains
backward, poor and disenfranchised.

Perception to Reality

Since the partition of India, the reconstitution of the nation and religious identities has
engendered communal discourses fights over monuments and interpretation of history. The
majority Hindus try to justify their ill treatment of Muslim minorities in the light of past
injustices and the minorities seek to drown the past grievances by focusing solely on current
crimes. At some point Indian Muslim must deal with Hindu grievances, which are all historical
even as they demand that Indian government addresses their current plight.

The publication of the Sachar Commission Report in late 2006 and subsequent surveys,
confirmed what many had feared or suspected, that Indian Muslims were lagging behind the rest
of the country on nearly all indicators of development, income, education, representation in state
institutions and in government. Perceptions were now an unquestionable reality. The economic
and developmental boom that India had experienced since the 1990s had bypassed the Indian
Muslim community. Many Muslims who were part of the educated middle class and had
benefitted from family members working in the Gulf were forced to acknowledge that while
their personal circumstances maybe tolerable the overall economic condition of Indian Muslims
was deplorable.

The Sachar commission also hinted at what was becoming increasingly apparent to Muslims that
not only they were economically left behind, they were also politically and socially marginalized.
A second rate India was emerging where Muslims resided, like the second rate professional
schools were the best and the brightest of Muslims went or the second rate neighborhoods were
the elite of the Muslim community resided, banished from even socio-cultural fraternization with
the dominant Hindu elite. While Muslims and others were expecting a bad report from the
commission, what was not expected was the startling finding that Muslims were doing even
worse than the so called backward and scheduled castes communities.

The report also debunked several important myths about the community. Three of the most
important myths that were busted were (1) that Muslims had significantly high birthrates, (2) that
Muslims preferred to send their children to madarsas – only 4 percent of Muslim children went
to madarsas and only in areas where there were no viable alternatives (3) and that Muslims were
enjoying a high quality of life as a result of foreign remittances. Ultimately, what was clear from
the Sachar Commission Report was that there were structural discriminatory factors that were
keeping Muslims from enjoying equal opportunity in key areas of education, employment and
access to government services and jobs. These factors were slowly but steadily under developing
the community and enhancing the contrast between the quality of life of Muslims and others.

The Sachar Commission report also helped undermine the factual basis of many Hindu
grievances against Muslims. One could summarize Hindu grievances as follows: (1) Muslim
invasion of India and conquest and a millennium of rule makes Muslims former oppressors.
This perception often justifies what would otherwise be considered as shocking treatment of a
vulnerable minority. (2) Partition of India; many Hindus squarely blame Muslims for the
partition. They need to read India’s history and recognize that Muslims, Hindus and the British
were all culpable for the partitioning of India. (3) Many Hindus, especially those under the
influence of the Sangh Parivar, think of Muslims as pampered and taking a disproportionate share
of state benefits like the Hajj subsidy. (4) Muslims are seen as a demographic threat to India. (5)
Sometimes, even as the fifth column. The Sachar Commission report debunks 3 and 4. But
Hindutva narratives continue to exploit 1, 2, and 5 and tensions with Pakistan keep 3 and 5 alive.
Some readers might argue that the Sachar Commission report is outdated, but the more recent
3
report by the Kundu Committee not only confirms that the condition of the minorities remains
precarious but also exposes the negligence of the government and inadequacy of its response to
the Sachar report3.

Transformation of Indian Muslim Politics

The Sachar Commission Report has had a huge impact on Indian Muslim activism and political
thinking both at home and abroad. First of all, the report has now become the starting point of
all discussions on dealing with the Muslim question. It is the benchmark against which policies
towards Muslim minorities are now calibrated. For example, when the governments at State or
Central level speak about Muslim issues they do so in reference to the Report. They point to one
or the other deficiency and advance programs to address them. So far only meagre resources
have been directed towards the fund that is supposed to help Muslim minorities advance their
education cause4.

The Muslim political mindset too has been influenced significantly. The report by highlighting
the state of underdevelopment of the Muslim community has reprioritized Muslim political
goals. Symbolic and identity issues such as the Babri Mosque, support for Urdu, and Muslim
Personal Law protection do not resonate as much with Muslims as jobs, education and political
participation. Development and no identity has become the more important goal across the
spectrum. In the last two-to-three decades, the Indian Muslim community has invested heavily
in education as this is evidenced by the emergence of many minority professional colleges,
especially in the South.

There is a growing awareness among the younger Muslim elite that they are being left behind by
a rapidly developing and advancing India and the negligence of the Indian government towards
Muslim backwards means they must fend for themselves. This sensibility is affecting how Indian
Muslims are thinking about mainstream political parties and also explains the emergence of
some of the new Muslim political parties such as the Welfare Party. Both old and new Muslim
parties from the Mallis in Hyderabad to the Welfare Party increasingly are framing their political
goals in the context of material and economic underdevelopment of Muslims rather than in
religious terms. Still, we must note that Muslim parties are not always on the same page. For
example, the Welfare Party supported creation of the Telangana State but MIM (All India Majlis-
e-Ittehadul Muslimeen) opposed it. Both framed their arguments in terms of whether the
division benefitted Muslims in politics. If the Welfare Party argued that it would strengthen
Muslim power in Telangana, MIM argued that it would benefit BJP and in the long-term reduce
Muslim influence.
There are still two trends, which depart from this emerging consensus that Muslims must focus
on economic issues. There are many Muslims with pan-Islamic interests, such as the Student’s
Islamic Organization. They are more galvanized by events in Cairo and Gaza than in Chennai
and Goa. But this is a rapidly diminishing constituency as the harsh realities of Muslim life in
India intrude often and loudly in their daydreams about Caliphate and global Muslim unity.
Muslim presence in Politics and Governance
Even though Islam and Muslims are a major political issue both on the domestic as well as the
international front, Muslims generally play a very diminished role in politics and in governance.
Muslims constitute anywhere between 14-16 percent of the population but enjoy only 6-8
percent representation in elected offices. This is not an accident since Muslims are excluded

3 http://www.sunday-guardian.com/news/kundu-committee-will-revive-diversity-index-for-muslims
4 Here is a government report with a list of actions it has taken as follow up to the Sachar Commission report:
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/SACHARCOMMITTEEREPORT.pdf

4
from competing for seats, which are reserved for Backward Classes 22-27 percent in the national
and regional assemblies limiting the size of the pie for Muslims. Additionally constituencies
where Muslims have significant population and can therefore win elections are designated as
reserved for some class and thus effectively disenfranchising them through Indian style
gerrymandering.. There are issues of lack of resources, media access and poor quality of
leadership that further subvert the prospects of Muslims in governance.

Three Trends in Indian Muslim Political Engagement

For many decades the pattern of Muslim political participation was simple. On the national level
they supported the Congress and is some places like Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, Muslims voted
for regional parties like Majlis-e-Ittehad Al-Muslimeen and Indian Union Muslim League. These
parties are secular, pro-Muslim and loyal to the Indian constitution. With the emergence of the
BJP the Indian Muslim Vote bank became one of the key strengths of the Congress as it fought
of the Hindu nationalists. Muslims started to vote not for Congress but against BJP and as the
only viable national party Congress continued and continues to cash in.

Starting in the 1990s in the Hindi belt, Muslims disillusioned by Congress started voting for
regional parties such as Samajwadi party (Mulayam Singh) Bahujan Samaj (Mayawati) and
Rashtriya Janata Dal (Laalu Prasad) heralding a new era of charismatic leaders seeking and
winning Muslims away from the Congress and an emerging political alliance between Muslims
and lower and backward caste Hindus. The third and recent trend is the emergence of regional
Muslim parties with secular goals that seek to share power locally and share representation
nationally. The two examples of this trend are the Welfare Party established by the Jamaat-e-
Islami of India that operates in their traditional strongholds and the AIUDF (All India United
Democratic Front) in Assam. AIUDF now boasts an MP like MIM (their leader Badruddin
Ajmal) and has 18 MLAs.

But the election of 2014, which brought Narendra Modi and BJP to power in what is clearly a
watershed moment in both Indian and Hindu politics. Muslim, for the first time, realized their
relative inability to impact national politics. According to most analysis Muslims voted just as
much for BJP (7-8 percent) as they did in 2009 and they did not abandon the Congress either.
Just as many Muslims voted for the congress (around 38 percent) as they did in 2009. BJP won
the elections based on shifts in upper class Hindu voting and the overwhelming incompetence
and corruption of the Congress. I suspect that this is reversible because the BJP is probably just
as corrupt and incompetent and comes with the additional problem of Hindu radicalism that
undermines domestic harmony and international image of India5.

The lesson from 2014 elections for Indian Muslims is very clear. Unless they become very
cohesive and united, that is that they do work like a monolithic community and vote in great
percentages, say more than 80 percent, to a single party they cannot become a decisive force that
can sway politics. American Muslims for example have in the last four Presidential elections
voted nearly 80-90 percent to one party, but that is possible in a system, which has only two
parties. In India where there can be as many parties as voters such political discipline is difficult
to muster.

An additional political danger of vote bank politics by minorities is that it hurts the minority. In
the US, African Americans vote in large numbers for the Democratic Party. So Republicans do
not even try to seek their vote and when they are in power their policies hurt the minority
community. The Democrats confident that they have the black vote in their pocket do not really
care for the community when in power or otherwise. So Muslims if they always vote for

5 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-27615592
5
Congress, Congress will take them for granted and if they always oppose BJP that party will not
seek their vote and will hurt them when in power. So what can the Muslims do? The answer can
be philosophical and not tactical. Think national but act local. Vote for the candidates and
parties that have a track record of supporting Muslims in their constituency. Ignore ideology and
emphasize governance and delivery. Make policies and not politics the basis for their political support.

A Political Vision for Indian Muslims

Political strategies are transient and local and should vary from constituency to constituency
both in their goals and tactics. But Indian Muslims do need a political vision that can help guide
their politics. In this brief section, I want to suggest a few principles that can possible help to
guide Indian Muslim politics. Indian Muslims must contemplate upon, articulate and internalize
a concept of India. What kind of India do they want? What is their vision of India? This vision
must appeal to most Muslims and a vast majority, of the majority for it to have a chance.

An India that is a secular democracy with pluralism as a vital public principle will best suit to
everyone, in my humble opinion. A secular democracy is already a national aspiration for many,
Muslims just need to get on the bus and help those who are already working to defend India’s
secularism. It will require Indian Muslims to alter their own internal political discourse to use
secular idioms and secular benchmarks for analysis and conversing about politics. Pluralism is a
principle that allows religious values to enter the public arena without privileging one religion
over another. Pluralism will allow Muslims to assert their Islamic values in politics without
undermining secularism and it will also allow other faith communities to advance their own
politics in the light of their beliefs. As long as there is mutual respect and tolerance this model
works fine, but if there is coercion and desire for domination then the model will fail.

There is a lot of significance attached to symbolic and identity politics in India. Politicians
should be judged on their capacity for delivering on promises made about governance and the
common good. Before Indian Muslims vote for anyone, they must ask the question, is the
candidate is capable of good governance and is the candidate good for most of us and not be
swayed by religious or partisan rhetoric. But until a culture of good politics is not instituted good
governance will not be the product of the political system.

Finally, Indian Muslims need to take ownership of India. Indian Muslims are Indians too. They need
to internalize this reality. In every lecture, rally and sermon that I hear from all the stars of the Indian
Muslim firmament, I see an overwhelming emphasis on the Muslim part of the Indian Muslim
identity and very little attention is paid to the Indian part. What is Indian about Indian Muslims? I
interact with Muslims from the Arab World and they always talk about Arabs and Islam as if they are
two separate identities and they make sure to privilege and express pride in their Arab identity. I
found this true of Turkish Muslims as well as Iranian Muslims. This is possible because they remain
deeply connected to their history and their languages besides their religion.

Indian Muslims are diverse ethnically and cannot think of one language as central to their
identity as Arabic is for Arabs, Turkish is for Turks and Persian is for Iranians. But they do have
a long history of Islamic mystical tradition that engendered a culture of tolerance and religious
harmony. Indian Muslims must draw from the shared Indo-Muslim heritage and rediscover who
they are. The Muslim is well defined what needs to be unveiled is the Indian in Indian Muslim.
Final Thoughts: Vision 2025
Smart social scientists never make predictions, especially long-term ones. Many unanticipated
events can fundamentally and very rapidly alter the trajectory of things and make social scientists
look foolish. But good and serious social scientists understand both the limits of forecasting and
also the necessity of forecasting regardless of its many perils. So in the interest of helping shape
6
public policy and civil society initiatives, I shall hazard a few prognostications. Recognize that
these are guarded and reluctant predictions.

The following things are most likely to happen by 2025. India will become the world’s most
populous country; it will either draw on par with China or surpass it 6. India will remain a
democracy but with looming threats from both disenchanted minorities and angry and intolerant
radical groups from the majority community. Five years of Modi and BJP rule will make BJP the
party to beat and it could continue to rule through tortured coalitions. Narendra Modi will
probably look more and more like Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu, lamenting the problems created
by millions of Palestinians (Muslims inside India) and the existential threat of a nuclear Iran
(Pakistan to India). He could use this discourse to rally the global Hindu diaspora to bankroll his
campaigns in India and cement the Hindutva vote bank at home making him and his ilk immune
to electoral judgments on the effectiveness of his governance.

The wealth and prosperity gap between Hindus and Muslims is likely to expand primarily
because I have very low expectations from the current regime. I do not expect it to invest the
necessary finally resources and devote the needed political attention to rectify the negative trends
in the Muslim community. But what will be more shocking are the income and opportunity gaps
between urban and rural Muslims, between the middle class and the backward class
(economically speaking) Muslims. Those with access to education, urban markets and
international job opportunities will do well but those who cannot make it to the cities will suffer.
Indian Muslims will be well on their way to becoming the biggest Muslim population surpassing
Pakistan, Indonesia and Bangladesh7.

If the political uncertainty in the Arab World engulfs the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, many Indian
Muslims will be returning home reducing the foreign remittances that have so far kept the
community in the game. These returning NRIMs (Non-Resident Indian Muslims) rather than
expanding the Muslim presence in the market and service sector could end up cannibalizing the
sources of income from Muslims who are at home. If the NRIMs return and they are not guided
properly this Ghar Wapsi could further undermine the fragile economy of Indian Muslims.

Tipping Point

India is growing and there is enormous wealth available both to the state as well as the civil
society and if good will prevails a fraction of it can be used to correct the negative trajectory of
Muslim reality in India. The state can not only provide the resources to jump start Muslim
development, but it can also do more to protect them from extremist movements acting on
prejudice. Muslims too are acting sensibly at the moment, maintaining moderation and trying to
move away from constructivist politics based on identity to rational politics based on
materialism8. While the former can exacerbate identity politics the latter can align rival and
diverse groups in pursuit of wealth and prosperity.

But I fear that if the current government of Narendra Modi allows radical groups to unleash
violence and intolerance towards religious minorities without taking strong measure to restore
law and order, we might reach a tipping point9. A tipping point where Muslims will be forced to
accept a subordinate status combined with various levels of routinized and institutionalized
discrimination or to trigger a nationwide movement either like the Arab uprising or the more

6 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1009.pdf
7 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/04/21/by-2050-india-to-have-worlds-largest-populations-of-
hind us- and-muslims/
8
http://www.amazon.com/Jihad-Jerusalem-Identity-International-Relations/dp/0275980146
9
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Arun-Shourie-tears-into-Narendra-Modi-also-targets-Arun-Jaitley-
Amit-Shah/articleshow/47127712.cms
7
dangerous ISIS like rebellion. We are not there yet. Terrorism is globalizing10 but it has not
engulfed India in the kind of violence that Pakistan and Iraq suffer. ISIS has no appeal for
Indian Muslims11. India’s growth and the hope of trickle down are also stemming the possibility
of an uprising.

The tipping point is quite far, but I fear that the window of opportunity to address the Muslim
question in India is shrinking. I hope commonsense prevails and this government, which made
promises of good and inclusive governance, will ensure that we never reach that dreaded tipping
point.

To be honest, Indian Muslims need to be taken care of by the state and helped to find a
foothold in the market place and in the public sector. An economically backward, less educated,
politically insecure community cannot alter its own destiny in a society that is mildly hostile to it.
It needs a helping hand. Every study about the Muslim situation screams for government
attention. It is in India’s national interest to have an economically thriving minority. It will invite
investments from rich Muslim nations and in general create a positive investor environment.
Politically secure minorities are an indication of the health of any democracy. Comfortable, safe
and a happy Muslim minority is a necessary ingredient of a strong, vibrant and thriving India.

Dr. Muqtedar Khan is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and International
Relations at the University of Delaware. He lives in the United States and is from Hyderabad. His website is
www.ijtihad.org.

10
http://www.glocaleye.org/terglo.htm
11
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/happy-that-the-influence-of-islamic-state-on-the-indian-
youth-is-negligible-rajnath-singh/
8
 Chapter 2

FAMILY PLANNING AND INDIAN MUSLIMS – MYTHS

AND REALITIES

S. Y. Quraishi

Abstract

There is a widespread belief that Muslims in India produce too many children which is disturbing the demographic
balance. A serious propaganda is that this is part of a deliberate plan to capture political power. The author
argues that Islam has not prohibited family planning and is in fact the forerunner of the concept. This paper
explains the comparative position of major religions on the subject and argues that though the prevalence of family
planning is the lowest among the Muslims, but Islamic injunctions are not the reason. It's also significant to note
that the assertion that Muslims are predominantly polygamous is a myth. The Status of Women in India Report,
1975, had revealed that all the communities of India are polygamous and Muslims are indeed the least! The
myths need to be broken but since this is a highly sensitive subject, the approach has to be rational, rather than
emotional, informative rather than didactic, and most importantly persuasive rather than antagonistic. Population
explosion is a matter of immense national concern. It must be addressed urgently yet sensitively. The paper
provides lots of answers.

Current Level/Trend of FP

The practice of family planning among the Muslims has been a subject of a lot of debate and
speculation for decades, ever since the growth (or explosion) of population started getting public
attention. It did not take very long turning into a blame game among communities. In fact, in
the absence of a serious and informed analysis, the debate got too distorted and murky.

India is a multi-religious society with Hindus constituting 79.8 percent, Muslims 14.2 percent,
Christians 2.3 percent, Sikhs 2.08 percent (Census 2011). All minorities together constitute 20.2
percent. The multi-religious character of Indian society, with a large segment of Muslim
population provides an interesting case to study. (Table 1)

Table 1: Ratio of different religious communities over censuses starting from 19511

All Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist Jain

1951 100 85 9.9 2 1 0.74 0

1961 100 83.4 10.7 2.4 1.8 0.5 0.4
1971 100 82.7 11.2 2.6 1.9 0.5 0.4
1981 100 82.3 11.7 2.4 1.9 0.5 0.4
1991 100 81.5 12.6 2.3 1.9 0.4 0.4
2001 100 80.5 13.4 2.3 1.9 0.4 0.7
2011 100 79.8 14.2 2.3 1.7 0.7 0.4
Source: Census of India, 2011

1 http://firstbiz.firstpost.com/economy/hindu-population-set-to-fall-below-80-in-census-2011-21991.html
Ever since 1951, the country’s total population has grown from 361 million to 1210 million, a
growth of nearly three and a half times, cutting across all communities. However, the ratio of
growth has not been uniform with some communities having recorded a net increase in their
population (Table 1). The share of Hindus in India’s population has come down marginally from
80.5% in 2001 to 79.8% in 2011– a decline of 0.7%. In 2001, Muslims constituted 13.4% of the
country’s population. This has gone up marginally to 14.2% - an increase of 0.8%. The share of
Sikhs and Buddhists in population has gone down.

Population and Family Planning

The growth of population depends mainly on fertility behavior of the country, besides reduction
in mortality rate and migration. Economic status is largely determined by the rate of work
participation. It is a paradox that while expressing anxiety over the high birth rates among
Muslims, commensurate concern about addressing the contributing factors like literacy, income,
work participation and service delivery levels of the community is not being shown. Some
people attribute political motives to the high birth rate of the Muslims. It is, therefore, important
that we objectively study the demographic dynamics. Let us first look at the level of adoption of
family planning among Muslims and how it compares with other religious groups in India. The
latest available information is the third National Family Health Survey 2005-06 (Table 2) in
India. This table brings out the following scenario:

Table 2: Use of any method of contraception NFHS 3 (2005-06)

Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist Jain Others

All India 57.8 45.7 57.6 66.5 67.7 75.4 25.3

Source: NFHS 3 (2005-06)

While the population is counted by the Census every ten years, fertility practices are specifically
studied by professional surveys. Since 1997 Operations Research Group (ORG) was conducting
such survey every 10 years. This was repeated by National Family Health Survey (NFHS) by
1105 from 199. Both organisations have done three surveys each. These surveys together throw
light on complex issue of fertility behavior across all communities in all the states of the country.

Muslims have indeed the lowest level (45.7 %) of family planning practice. Even among the
Hindus, the proportion of acceptors (57.8 %) is less than most other communities. Minorities
other than Muslims have fared rather well. The most significant finding is that Hindus and
Muslims are not on the opposite ends of the spectrum, but are on the same end with the lowest
contraception prevalence though the gap between the two is undoubtedly wide. It is noteworthy
that the adoption of family planning by different communities shows enormous interstate
variations across the country which has important lessons, as analyzed herein. (Table 3)

Table 3: Current use of any method of contraception by state NFHS 3 (2005-06)

State Hindus Muslims

Andhra Pradesh 68.1 62.2
Assam 61.3 46.2
Bihar 36.9 19.0
Chhattisgarh 53.1 50.8

10
 Delhi 67.9 51.7
Gujarat 67.0 60.9
Haryana 65.9 18.0
Himachal Pradesh 72.7 75.4
J&K 56.6 49.9
Jharkhand 40.5 26.8
Karnataka 64.7 56.2
Kerala 74.3 54.6
M.P 55.5 54.9
Maharashtra 68.0 58.3
Orissa 51.0 44.1
Punjab 62.2 49.3
Rajasthan 47.8 38.8
Tamil Nadu 61.5 57.1
Uttarakhand 59.5 52.8
Uttar Pradesh 46.3 29.6
West Bengal 75.1 61.1
Source: NFHS-3, 2005-06 State Reports

In terms of religious community-wise use of contraceptives, this table reveals interesting pattern:

• No generalization can be made for the country as a whole, since there are wide variations
among States and Union Territories (UTs)−with the rate of Muslim acceptors ranging
from as low as 18 % in Haryana and 19 % in Bihar to as high as 75.4 % in Himachal
Pradesh, 61.1% in West Bengal and 60.9% in Gujarat. The range for the Hindus was half
as wide (36.9 % - 75%) in one state (HP), the Muslims acceptors are even higher (75.4%)
than their Hindu counterparts (72.7%).

• In 12 States, there are more Muslim acceptors than Muslim non-acceptors.

• More significantly, Muslim family planning acceptors in as many as 17 States are higher
than Hindu acceptors in Bihar (Table 3), and in 14 states higher than UP, two most
populous states in the Hindi heartland indicating that socio-economic situation of the
region rather than religion is a causative factor.

Two things clearly emerge: Muslims are not a homogenous or monolithic group but differs
widely in terms of their socio-economic and demographic behavior in different regions of the
country. There is no such thing as a 'Muslim family planning behavior'. Regional factors
outweigh religious ones as Hindu and Muslims show more similarities with each other within
regional demographic regimes than they do with co-religionists elsewhere in the subcontinent
(Dyson and Moore, 1983). Thus, the Muslims are closer to Hindus in their socio-economic and
demographic behavior within each region in the country (Ahmad 1999; Jeffery and Jeffery 2000,
2002) as will also be evident from the discussion that follows.
11
Signs of change

While Muslim acceptance of family planning is the lowest among all the communities, there are
signs of change. The data of the last 6 surveys (3 ORG and 3 NFHS) shows that the total
fertility rate among Muslims has been steadily declining as a result of which the gap between
Hindus and Muslims is narrowing, coming down from 1.1 to 0.4. (Fig.1)

Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate by Religion over 3 rounds of NFHS

4.4

3.6
3.3
2.9 2.8 3.1
2.4 2.7
2.43
2.4
2.26
1.95

Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh

NFHS 1 NFHS 2 NFHS 3

Source: NFHS

The consistent decline of total fertility rate among all communities has been possible with
increasing use of contraception (all methods Table 4 and sterilization Table 5).

Table 4: Use of any method of contraception over 3 rounds of NFHS (in percent)

Community NFHS 1 NFHS 2 NFHS 3 % Change

NFHS 2 NFHS 3
Hindu 41.6 49.2 57.8 7.6 8.6

Muslim 27.9 37 45.7 9.3 8.7

Source: NFHS1, 2 and 3

The trend shows that from NFHS 1 to NFHS 3, the rate of increase of the use of Family
planning (any method) among Muslims (64%) is higher than Hindu (39%) during the same
period(Table 4). However, for sterilization, the rate of growth is much lower for both
communities particularly among the Muslims (Table 5).

Table 5: Trend of female sterilization over NFHS 1, 2 and 3

NFHS 1 NFHS 2 NFHS 3 % Change NFHS1 to NFHS3

Hindu 29.0 36.2 39.9 38%
Muslim 14.4 19.6 21.3 48%

12
It is very significant to note that there has been a growing acceptance of sterilization among
Muslims (from 14.4 in 1991-92 to 19.6 in 1998-99 and to 21.3 in 2005-06), despite an
overwhelming religious opinion against it (as explained in detail later).

Unmet Need

The most important factor in analyzing the family planning behavior is the men’s and women's
desire to restrict the number of births, or, conversely, resistance to the idea. Those who desire to
restrict should be promptly given facilities to do so or in other words, to meet their needs.
Unmet need for family planning is an important indicator for assessing the potential demand for
the family planning services. The prevailing unmet need for modern family planning service is
high among all communities and indeed, surprisingly, highest among the Muslims.

Table 6: Use of contraception & unmet need for contraception by religion, 2005-06
(India)
Religious % of couples (15-49 yrs.) % of couples (15-49 % of couples (15-49
group protected by any yrs.) protected by yrs.) having unmet
modern method sterilization need for any modern
method
Hindu 50 41 12
Muslim 36 21 19
Christian 49 41 12
Sikh 58 54 06
Jain 69 41 07
Total 48 37 13
Source: National Family Health Survey-3 (2005-06), IIPS, Mumbai, 2007.

The contraceptive figures would have been even better, if the demand of the Muslim community
for family planning services had been met. The unmet need of the community continues to be
more than any other community (Table 7). This underscores the need for better delivery of
services.
Table 7: Total ‘wanted and unwanted’ fertility rates by religious groups

NFHS 2 NFHS 3
TFR Unmet Unwanted TFR Unmet Unwanted
Hindu 2.78 2.08 0.7 2.65 1.9 0.75
Muslim 3.59 2.54 1.05 3.09 2 1.09
Christian 2.44 2.07 0.37 2.35 1.9 0.45
Sikh 2.26 1.62 0.64 1.96 1.5 0.46
Neo/Buddhist 2.13 1.57 0.56 1.96 1.5 0.46
Jain 1.9 1.7 0.2 2.02 1.7 0.32
Source: NFHS 2 and NFHS 3

13
The above descriptions lead to the following conclusions:
1. Muslims are lagging behind all other communities in family planning practices.
2. They are, however, neither oblivious nor averse to family planning and are trying to
catch up and fast.
3. Religion does not seem to be a deterrent for them to accept family planning as evident
from the fact that their adoption of family planning is quite high in almost half of the
states. If religion was the decisive factor, they would be shunning it totally in all parts of
the country. Even the sterilization is fairly considerable despite overwhelming religious
opinion that it is un-Islamic.
4. The fact that the Hindus stand second, shows that it is not the religion that is holding
them back (as well as the Hindus) but other important factors (like literacy, income,
service delivery etc., as analyzed in detail later in this report.).
The Fig. 4 shows that the use of family planning (any method) is steadily increasing in
both communities. In fact, it is faster among the Muslims. As a result, the gap between
the two communities has been narrowing from 13.9 in NFHS 1 to 12.2 in NFHS 2 and
12.1 in NFHS 3 (Fig. 2.)

Figure 2: Trend of use of any method of family Planning by religion

Hindu Muslim

49.2 57.8

41.6 45.7

27.7 37.

NFHS 1 NFHS 2 NFHS 3

Source: NFHS 1, 2 and 3

Figure 3: Decreasing gap between Hindu and Muslim level of FP users

14.5
13.9
14.
13.5
13.
12.5 12.2 12.1 Difference
12.
11.5
11.
NFHS 1 NFHS 2 NFHS 3

Source: NFHS 1, 2 and 3

14
The trend has been persistent as clear from the three NFHS results (Table 8).

Table 8: Rate of decadal increase in family planning acceptance

(All methods) in NFHS surveys

NFHS 1 NFHS 2 NFHS 2 NFHS 3

Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim

7.6 9.3 8.6 8.7
Source: NFHS 1, 2 and 3

Table 9: Rate of change in Family Planning Acceptance (Sterilization)

NFHS-1 NFHS-2 NFHS-3 Percentage Points Percentage Change

1992-93 1998-99 2005-06 Change
NFHS1 NFHS2 NFHS1 to NFHS2
to to NFHS2 to
NFHS2 NFHS3 NFHS3
Hindus 32.7 38.3 32.0 5.6 -6.3 17.1 16.4
Muslims 16.0 20.4 17.5 4.4 -2.9 27.5 14.2
Christian 33.8 38.6 28.0 4.8 -10.6 14.2 27.5
Sikh 32.9 31.8 24.2 -1.1 -7.6 -3.3 23.9
Buddhist 42.2 57.5 48.6 15.3 -8.9 36.3 15.5
Jain 36.0 43.7 34.2 7.7 -9.5 21.4 21.7
Other 29.1 27.1 13.6 -2 -13.5 -6.9 49.8
Source: NFHS 1, 2 and 3

It is significant that sterilization is being increasingly adopted despite an overwhelming Islamic

interpretation against it.

Change in Attitudes

The increase in acceptance of family planning would not have been possible without a change in
attitudes. This change was noted among the Muslims as much as in other communities right
from the decade 1971-80.

Table 10: Attitudes of Eligible Couples towards the practice of

Family Planning: 1970 & 1980 Percentages

Hindus Muslims Others

1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980
Approving FP 60 83 53 65 67 85
Disapproving FP 40 16 47 33 33 15
Source: Operations Research Group, Baroda Family Planning Practices in India - Second All India Survey (1980)

The acceptance and use of family planning among the Muslims has increased sharply, keeping
pace with all their compatriots and in fact, in many cases has been much faster than others. R.B.
15
Bhagat and Purujit Praharaj, in their journal published in the Economic and Political Weekly on January
29th, 2005 observed, “Although a Hindu- Muslim differential in fertility has persisted in India, it is no
more than one child, and even this gap is not likely to endure as fertility among Muslims declines with
increasing levels of education and standards of living. While the lower level of contraceptive use among
Muslims is the most important factor responsible for the fertility differentials, the use of contraceptives
has increased faster among Muslims in recent times. However, the relatively higher fertility among
Muslims cannot be understood independent of its socio-economic and political contexts.”

Part A: Real Factors Influencing Family Planning

It is indeed imperative to deal with the issue of family planning practice with reference to the
socio-economic conditions of the communities involved. As Dr. Banerjee2 has pointed out, ‘The
decision-makers committed a very fundamental and almost a fatal mistake in taking a very
narrow view of the problem of rapidly rising population growth. They did not realize adequately
that for containing population growth, a family planning program forms merely a component of
a wider spectrum which embraces a combination of programs dealing with different social and
economic problems of the country. Population control was considered, rather simplistically, to
be a precursor of development in other social and economic fields”.
Evidence is recurrent that the factors that have the maximum influence on family planning
practices are socio-economic and cultural in nature like- literacy, income, awareness and service
delivery. There is an interplay of other factors too like work participation that adds to income on
one hand and delays the marriage on the other. In turn, both these happen with increase in literacy.
A study by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Govt. of India, of 90 districts having the
highest birth rate also revealed that literacy, especially among women, IMR, income, and age of
marriage were the crucial factors influencing the family planning acceptance. Religion as a factor
for high birth rate was not found relevant, as quite a few of these districts virtually had no
Muslim population.3

Social Factors Influencing Family Planning Behavior

Literacy

All studies over the decades have indicated the decisive negative correlation between literacy and
fertility rate. As the level of education goes up, the TFR goes down (Fig. 4).

Figure 4: Fertility by educational background

4.5
3.55 TFR
3.6
2.45 2.51
2.7 2.23 2.08
1.8
1.8
0.9 TFR

0.
No <5 years 5-7 years 8-9 years 10-11 years 12 or more
Education complete complete complete complete years

Source: NFHS 3, 2005-06

2 D. Banerjee, Family Planning in India-Some Inhibiting Factors” in Population in India’s Development 1947-
2000 (ed.), Vikas, 1974, pp 405-14.
3 National Survey of 90 Districts under Social Safety Net Scheme, sponsored by Ministry of Health, New Delhi
(1993).
16
Age at Marriage

The next critical factor with a distinct impact on Total Fertility Rate (TFR), is the age at
marriage. The women who marry early have a longer period of exposure to pregnancy as well as
a greater number of lifetime births on an average. This is evident from Fig. 5.

Figure 5: Impact of Age at Marriage on TFR

6.
5.41
5.03
5. 4.61 4.67
4.06 4.12
4. TFR (Rural)
3.53
TFR (Urban)
3. 2.52

2.
Below 18 years 18-20 years 21-23 years 24 and above

Source: NFHS-3, 2005-06

The age of marriage in turn, is itself influenced by the core factors like education and economic
status. There is ample evidence to show that an increase in education delays the age of marriage
(Fig. 5). The difference between women of age 25-49 with no education and women with at least
12 years of education is as high as 4.8 years. The patterns are similar for men.

Figure 6: Median age at first marriage among women (age 20-49) and men (age 25-49),
by current age, according to Education, India 2005-06

28.6
24.5
25. 22.9
21.4 21.8
20.3 19.7
21.4 18.7
16.5 17.3
17.8 15.5
14.1 Women Age 20-49
10.5
No 5 years 5-7 years 8-9 years 10-11 years 12 or more
education complete complete complete complete years
complete

Source: NFHS-3 2005-06

Media Exposure

Exposure to family planning messages helps in bringing about an understanding on issues

pertaining to contraceptive use. NFHS surveys have shown women are much less exposed to
family planning messages—61% women as compared to 92% men. Education of women plays a
key role in this.
17
 Figure 7: Exposure to FO Messages goes up with education

Exposure to Family Planning messages

goes up with education(Women)
93.2
85.7
78.9
68.4
57.2

37.9

No education <5 years 5-7 years 8-9 years 10-11 years 12 or more

Exposure to Family Planning messages

goes up with education(Men)

96.4 97.8 99.3

92.7
87.7
75.5

No education <5 years 5-7 years 8-9 years 10-11 years 12 or more
Source: NHFS-3, 2005-06

Exposure to family Planning messages is also influenced by the income factor—with prosperity
the level of exposure goes up.

18
 Figure 8: Exposure to Family Planning messages goes up with Wealth index

Exposure to Family Planning messages

goes up with Wealth index (Women)
88.4
74.9

59
45.1
30.8

Low SLI Second Middle Fourth Highest

Exposure to Family Planning messages

goes up with Wealth index (Men)

97.6 99.4
93.6
87.3

75.8

Low SLI Second Middle Fourth Highest

Source: NHFS-3, 2005-06

Lower exposure to electronic media could be due to lower ownership of radio and television
which in turn is the result of their inferior economic status. Further, lower exposure to
newspaper, magazines, wall paintings and hoardings is obviously due to their lower literacy.

Economic Factors

Economic factors equally play a decisive role in family planning acceptance. The income-fertility
correlation is clearly evident. As the income grows, the TFR goes down (Fig 9).

19
 Figure 9: Impact of Income on Total Marital Fertility Rate (rural and urban)

7.

6.05
5.75 5.72
4.78 TMFR Rural
4.5 4.62
TMFR Urban

3.49
3.25
2.97

2.
Rs. 50 and below Rs. 51-100 Rs. 100 +

While income is one criterion of looking at economic status, another perhaps more effective,
way is the expenditure. It was found that with increasing per capita expenditure GMFR goes
down. (Fig. 10)

Figure 10: With increasing per capita expenditure GMFR goes down

217.5
Rural
189. Urban
190.
178.8
162.5
145.4
135.
134.4

107.5 110.8

95.1
80.
Rs. 50 and below Rs. 51-100 Rs. 101 and above

Source: NFHS 3

This nexus is re-emphasized by another set of statistics which show that the people with work
have a lower fertility than those without work (Fig. 11).

20
 Figure 11: Workers have lower fertility than Non-workers (Rural and Urban)

5. 4.76
3.85
3.75 3.24
2.25
2.5
Non Workers Workers
1.25

0.
Rural Urban

Source: SRS: 1990

Part B: Socio-Economic Determinants and the Muslims

Socio-economic determinants of Family Planning

Having seen that socio-economic factors rather than religion, influence the family planning
behavior in India, let us now see how different communities fare on this score.

1. Education Level

The educational level of the Muslims has been lower than all other communities all through the
decades. A national survey conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs, GOI, in 1970-71, in 35
districts of 14 states showed that in every category of education, Muslims lagged behind all other
compatriots (Gopal Krishna, 1971). Two decades later, the same pattern was evident for all age
groups for males and females, (Fig. 12).

Figure 12: Lower number of Muslims currently attending educational Institutions per
1000 persons by age-group, in rural India

1000

791
800
736

600 590 Hindus

541
497

400
276
Muslims

200 155
82 79
42 7 6
0
0 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15 to 19 20 to 24 <25
Source: ‘Sarvekshna’ National Sample Survey, 43rd Round, 1990

21
The pattern of lower attendance of Muslim children in school has continued till the latest NSS,
2013 (Fig. 13) Low enrolment and attendance and high dropout rate leave many children out of the
education system. The malady is the highest among the Muslims.

Figure 13: More Muslim children (10-14 years) out of education system
(Never attended and dropout), 2007-08

27.5
21.6
22.
17.9
16.5 14.9
11.2
9.8
11. 8. 8.4
6.4
5.5 Male Female
0.
Hindu Muslim Christians Others

Source: International Research Journal of Social Sciences P-8; Vol. 2(5), May 2013; ISSN2319-3565

Figure 14: Percentage of children (15-19 years) out of education system

(Never attended and dropout) by religion, 2007-08

75.

60. 58.1

46.7 45.7
45.

31.3 30.7
30. 25.5 26.7
23.6 Male Female

15.

0.
Hindu Muslim Christians Others

Source: International Research Journal of Social Sciences P-8; Vol. 2(5), May 2013; ISSN2319-3565

22
Low school attendance has an obvious bearing on literacy levels. Muslims compare unfavorably
in this as well (Table 11).

Table 11: Rate of Literacy (general and women) among Muslims is lowest

Religion Literacy Rate Female Literacy Rate

Hindus 65.1 53.2
Muslims 59.1 50.1
Christian 80.3 76.2
Sikhs 69.4 63.1
Buddhists 72.7 61.7
Jains 94.1 90.6

However, in whichever state the enrolment of Muslims corresponds to their population ratio or
is higher, their use of family planning is greater than the national average (74.04 % as per 2011
Census).

2. Age at Marriage

The level of literacy also influences knowledge and compliance of the legal age of marriage
across all communities. According to NFHS 3, Hindu and Muslim women have the lowest and
same level of median age at first marriage of 16.7 years. Although, currently the age at marriage
for women and men among both Hindus and Muslims is identical (16.7 and 22.5 years), it is
lower than other communities. This needs to be addressed seriously as every year of delay will
help in reduction of TFR as seen earlier in Table 7.

3. Exposure to Media

In direct proportion to their low literacy, Muslims have been found to have a lower exposure to
family planning messages in various media (Table 3/4) like the radio/television/newspaper/
magazine/wall painting/hoarding. The data collected from different religious groups shows that
absence of exposure was the highest for the Muslim men and women. (Table 12) Gender
disparity is also stark.

Table 12: Muslims have the least exposure to Family Planning messages
(Men and Women)
Religion Men Women
Hindu 8.0 38.0
Muslim 9.9 46.1
Christian 8.3 30.8
Sikh 2.2 26.8
Buddhist/Neo 3.9 32.1
Jain 0.0 7.9
Source: NFHS-3 2005-06

23
4. Service Delivery

In the adoption of family planning practices, personal counseling by doctors and para-medical
staff plays a vital role. Health workers, therefore, are required to visit, inform and counsel all
women and men within the reproductive age about family planning especially the most
appropriate contraceptive methods.

The Table 13 indicates that the knowledge of contraception methods is lowest among Muslims.
The biggest contributing factor for this is that they have not been reached by the health workers
adequately.

Table 13: Muslim non-users of family planning have least exposure to FP methods

Religion Percentage who were ever told by a health or family

planning worker about any method of family planning
Hindu 18.5
Muslim 17.2
Christian 23.0
Sikh 18.3
Buddhist/Neo 22.0
Jain 25.1
Source: NFHS-3 2005-06

5. Unmet Need

The lesser public knowledge about the people and places delivering health advice and services,
and the contraceptive options leads to a large unmet need and low satisfaction of demands for
services. The number of currently married women age 15-49 with unmet need for family
planning and percentage of demand unsatisfied both amongst Hindus and Muslims, is
unacceptably high and needs to be addressed urgently (Table 14).

Table 14: Unmet Need for family planning among currently married women
(15-49 years) based on religious affiliation

Religion Unmet: For Unmet: For Unmet: Total Percentage of

spacing limiting demand not satisfied

Hindu 5.8 6.1 11.9 17.1

Muslim 8.6 10.2 18.8 29.1
Source: NFHS-3 2005-06

The higher unmet need for family planning of the Muslims is directly attributable to lesser reach
of health workers in the community.

24
 Figure 15: Relative services availed by Muslims are lesser

98.75

80. 76.9 Hindus Muslims

73.4

61.25
44.4
42.5 35.6 36.3
30.2
23.75 18.4 20.3
15.4 17.3
10.7
7.3
5.
TT Injection POD-Publice POD-Private Doctor Midwife Vaccination

Source: NFHS-3, 2005-06

Among all religious communities, child births amongst Muslim mothers are least likely to take
place in a health facility (33%). This also is the result of poorly outreach of health workers
among the community (Fig. 16). Both in terms of service delivery (TT injection and vaccination)
and access to doctors and midwives Muslims fare poorly.

Figure 16: Percentage deliveries a health facility are the least among Muslims

Percentage delivered in a health facility

100. 93.1

77.5
58.3 58.8
53.4
55.
39.1
33
32.5

10.
Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist/Neo Jain

Percentage delivered in a health facility

Source: NFHS-3, 2005-06

6. Economic Factors
Work Participation
According to the Census 2001, Muslims have the lowest work participation rate in the country
(Fig. 17).

25
 Figure 17: The rate of work participation among Muslims is the least

50.
48.4

45.

40.4 40.6
40. 39.7 39.1
37.7 Total

35.
32.9
31.3
30.
Hindus Muslims Christians Sikhs Buddhists Jains Others India

Source: Census of India, 2001

The above discussion brings out the main reason for the high fertility rates among Muslims in
India, is their socio-economic backwardness. This underlines the need to invest more in things
that create development, education, awareness, skills, healthcare, roads, power, banking and
credit facilities et al. But, any move to step up investment in Muslim-majority areas, as the
Planning Commission has made, is immediately branded as minority appeasement.

Polygamy as a factor
On top of the misinformed campaign is the propaganda that all Muslims take multiple wives to
produce a multitude of children (“hum paanch, humaare pachchees”). While Muslims are
assumed to be synonymous with polygamy in India, it is important to note that the data reflects
otherwise (Fig. 18 and Table 15). The fact is that polygamy has been practiced in India for
centuries among all communities and is therefore, more attributable to cultural norms rather
than any religious ideology.

Figure 18: Polygamy prevalent in all communities and is least among the Muslims

20.00%
15.25%
16.00%

12.00%
9.70%
8.00% 6.72% 5.80% 5.70%
Religion
4.00%

0.00%
Tribal Buddhists Jains Hindus Muslims
communities

Source: Towards Equality: The Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India, 1974, Ministry of Social Welfare.

Even in the earlier decades, polygamy was found prevalent among Muslims and non-Muslims.
Between 1931 & 1960, while it has gone up among the Tribal community (and they are not
Muslims), it has come down significantly both among Muslims and the Hindus. (Table 15)
26
 Table 15: Polygamous Marriages in India across different communities

Incidence of Polygamous Marriages in India

Community 1931-40 1941-50 1951-60

Tribals 9.53 17.53 17.93
Hindus 6.79 7.15 5.06
Muslims 7.29 7.06 4.31
Source: Census of India 1961 (Incidence of Polygamous Marriages in India)

Is there a political motive behind high TFR of Muslims?

While significant number of Muslims mentioned Islamic belief in their reluctance for practicing
family planning, no evidence of political motive was found as alleged by the right wing. On the
contrary, the right wing keeps on prodding the Hindus to shun family planning and produce as
many children as possible to ensure that Muslims cannot outnumber them any time in the
future.

Hindus are regularly exhorted to start having more children or else they will become a minority
in India in the near future.4

Contrary to the public perception of family planning being a Hindu versus Muslim issue, the
reality is that both communities are on the same end of the spectrum– being lowest and second
lowest in family planning practice. Muslims and Hindus have the highest TFR (3.09 and 2.65)
while all others are lower than 2.35.

Total Fertility Rate which is used as a measure to estimate the population growth is the highest
among Muslims at 3.10 followed by that of Hindus at 2.65 (NHFS-3, 2005-06)

Figure 19: TFR of Muslims and Hindus is the highest among the religious communities

3.2 3.09

2.65
2.65
2.35

2.1 1.96 1.96 2.02 TFR

1.55

1.
Hindu Muslim Christian Sikh Buddhist Jain

Source: (NFHS-3) 2005-2006, MOHFW, GOI

4 T.K Arun, Muslim population myths; TOI, October 30, 2013.

27
Lowest Practice of Family Planning

Muslims have the lowest level (45.7 percent) of family planning practice. This is followed by the
Hindus whose proportion of acceptors (57.8 percent) is less than other communities barring
Christians with a 0.2 difference.

Figure 20: Contraceptive use among Muslims and Hindus is the lowest
across all religious groups

80.
75.4

66.5 67.7
65.
57.8 57.6

50. Use of any

45.7 method of
contraception

35.

20.
Hindus Muslims Christians Sikhs Buddhists Jains

Source: NFHS-3, 2005-06

7. Highest Infant Mortality Rate

The reason why Hindus and Muslims are at the bottom is that their socio-economic indicators
are identical. They have highest Infant Mortality Rate (IMR), lowest median age at marriage,
lowest literacy, highest school drop-outs, lowest media exposure. Even in polygamy, they share a
common place– Hindus 5.8, Muslims 5.7. It is therefore important that the problem of high
birth rate is not viewed from a communal angle but as a socio-economic issue where both
communities are almost similarly placed. Backwardness of both must be addressed.

Part C: Religious Beliefs

It is a widely held view that Muslims do not accept family planning on the ground of their
religious beliefs. The first National Family Health Survey tried to probe whether this was a
decisive factor among currently married women, who were not using any method of
contraception and also did not intend to use it in the future. It is found that only 3.5% cited
family planning being against their religion (NFHS-1, 1992-93). The NFHS-2 found a much
higher percentage of Muslim women (12.5%) reporting this belief (NFHS-2, 1998-99).
However, NFHS-3, 2005-06 found that 5% of all respondents (not just Muslims) stated that they
did not intend to use family planning because their (respective) religions prohibited its use.

It may be noted here that, it was only during NFHS-2 that the data among different religious
groups was studied. This is a lacuna of the survey that in spite of religion being considered a
major factor that influences TFR, no adequate research has been carried out to investigate its
impact. It was therefore, considered necessary to carry out an empirical research that could shed
some light on this much talked about yet least explained phenomenon.

28
The study was carried out in three states representing three zones with sizeable Muslim
population - Alwar in Rajasthan, Lucknow in Uttar Pradesh and Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh.
While the trends found in other studies, particularly National Family Health Survey, were by and
large re-confirmed, the study threw a new light on religion as a factor. All studies in the past had
not touched upon the religious beliefs as the cause of resistance to family planning among the
Muslims, it was decided not to duck the issue and take it headlong.

Attention was more focused on Muslim eligible couples who were asked whether the use of
temporary family planning methods like condoms, IUD, pills, etc. is against religion. Their
response was almost equally divided. While 47 percent of the couples said that it is not against
religion, 44 percent think otherwise, with 9 percent undecided.

The analysis of data turned up highly revealing new information: Muslim eligible couples out
step their Hindu counterparts in the use of temporary family planning methods. While 65
percent of Muslim couples were taking recourse to temporary methods, only 55 percent of
Hindu couples reported doing so. The reason for this unexpected trend seems to be their
reluctance to adopt sterilization, widely considered un-Islamic, and depending entirely on
temporary methods.

Family Planning Methods and Religious Ideology

Muslim thinking in family planning is not identical and across the board, a lot of regional
variations were seen regarding temporary contraceptive methods. More than 56 percent of the
Muslim eligible couples from Alwar think that the adoption of even temporary methods of
family planning is against religion, nearly 58 percent from Lucknow think it is not. Asked to
recall the name of the religious leader who opined that the use of temporary family planning
methods is against religion, 58 percent mentioned neighborhood imam or some local Maulana.

More than three-fourths of the Muslim couples are given to the idea of permanent family
planning methods are against Islamic faith, 18.2 percent do not think so and 6.7 percent are
undecided. Alwar appears to be the most conservative in that 83.7 percent of the Muslim
couples consider these methods as un-Islamic. In contrast, Lucknow is found to be a lot more
liberal— nearly a fourth of the couples think that the adoption of these methods is not against
the religion.

Why do Muslim couples think that the adoption of permanent family planning methods is
against the religion? Most couples (20.2 percent) state that it is forbidden in Hadith (without
citing one), followed by those who refer to discourse of some religious leader (without
mentioning name). Besides, quite a few couples mentioned to have heard about this prohibition
in talim or religious sermons (8.7 percent), to have been instructed by the elders in the family (7.9
percent), and several other mixed and garbled reasons.

Opinion leaders’ views are on the same pattern. Their reasons: The adoption of permanent
methods of family planning is forbidden in Hadith (53.8 percent); it is forbidden in religion (26.9
percent); or simply ‘Maulana told so’ (7.7 percent). Apparently Muslim opinion leaders too
would need some orientation.

Significantly, not only the beliefs of the Muslims as a class were studied but an attempt was
made –the first ever –to see the comparative beliefs of different sects and sub-sects, as Muslims
are not a monolithic group, as is generally perceived.

29
Adoption of Family Planning among Firqas

Like many other religious groups, Muslims too have sects and these sects are often categorized
into sub-sects or firqas. Adoption of family planning among various firqas is guided by their own
set of beliefs and norms. The trends in adoption of family planning among firqas show that
Barelvi (38 percent) are highest users of family planning methods, followed by Jamaat-e-Islami (22
percent) and other firqas (11 percent). It is notable that 11 percent currently using family
planning do not have any firqas affiliation. On the other hand, those who are adherents of
Nadwat-ul-Ulema (Lucknow), Deobandi School or Tableeghi Jamaat are noticeably less inclined
towards family planning. A concerted IEC campaign with these and similar groups is called for.

The fact may not be missed that as many as 38 per cent do not think that Islam prohibits
temporary family planning methods. In the adoption of temporary methods of family planning
among different Muslim firqas the adherents of Jamaat-e-Islami (28 percent) are found to be on
the forefront, followed by Barelvies (24 percent) and Deobandis (11 per cent) and Ahl-e-Hadees (11
percent). It is quite encouraging that adherents of some of conservative firqas, too, are turning
towards small family norms.

Views of health workers

Health workers, involved in the delivery of family planning services often face, during routine
consultation in the hospital or during their field visits, challenging situations, including
ideological resistance by their patients and religious leaders. Quite a few of them reported that
they have often been told that even temporary methods of family planning contravene religious
values. It is a matter of concern that these workers are not equipped to field such questions.

Permanent Family Planning Methods and Religious Ideology

Now, we see the factors which play significant role in adoption of family planning. We will
examine social, economic and education factors and how they affect the choice of the people.
More than three-fourths of the Muslim couples are given to the idea that permanent family
planning methods are against Islamic faith. Opinion leaders’ views are along the same pattern.

Part D: Islamic Edicts and Family Planning

Having seen that the prevalence of family planning among the Muslims is the least due to their
being at the bottom of the ladder in education, economic status and the access to health
services- the main influences - let us see if religion has been the contributor too.

In order to properly appreciate this, we need to focus on the following questions:

▪ What does Islamic law prescribe with regard to family planning?

▪ What is the opinion of Ulema or religious scholars in India and other countries about
family planning?

Polygamy and Islam

At the center of the debate is the belief that Islam encourages polygamy which leads to a spurt in
population growth. The reality is that Islam does permit polygami, but discourages it. Even this
permission has to be understood in context. Though, the Qur’an allows marrying up to four
wives, it is in the context of marrying orphans. Surah 4:2 says, “And give to the orphans their
property and do not substitute worthless (things) for (their) good (ones) and do not devour their
30
property, this is surely a great crime”. The next verse (4:3) goes on to secure the position of the
orphans even further, “And if you fear that you cannot act equitably towards orphans, then
marry such women as seem good to you, two and three and four, but if you fear that you cannot
act equitably (between them) then (marry) only one.”

It is obvious that the permission to have more than one wife has often been abused by some
Muslims who do not realize that it is a conditional permission. In fact, it is subject to not one
but two conditions: marrying orphans and equal treatment. The emphasis of the Holy Qur’an is
very clearly on having one wife. One has to understand the historical context of the time i.e. the
presence of a large number of orphan girls and widows as a result of constant tribal wars in pre-
Islamic and early Islamic years. The permission to have more than one wife was given with a
view to rehabilitating these orphans and widows. Scholars are also of the opinion that, in an age
where men of means, used to have multiple marriages, the Qura’nic injunction (“permission”)
had actually put a ceiling on the number of wives. In his highly respected English commentary
on the Qur’an, Abdullah Yusuf Ali remarks- "the unrestricted number of wives of Jahiliyya
(the age of ignorance) was now strictly limited to a maximum of four, provided you could feed
them with perfect equity in material things as well as in affection and immaterial things. As these
conditions are more difficult to fulfill, I understand the recommendation to be towards
monogamy."

The second question is whether on account of the so-believed permission for polygamy,
Muslims actually have more than one wife. The reality is that only a few have. The report of the
Committee on the Status of Women in India, 1974, revealed that polygamy was not exclusive to
Muslims but was prevalent in varying degrees among all the communities of India (Fig. 21). In
fact, the Muslims were the least polygamous. (Source: Towards Equality: The Report of the
Committee on the Status of Women in India, 1974, Ministry of Social Welfare.)

It is interesting to note that the Muslims were found to be the least polygamous. The report also
quoted census data which corroborates the finding (Table 15). In addition, it indicated that the
incidence of polygamy among Muslims has been significantly less than the Hindus and has been
steadily coming down, while it has increased among the tribals.

Yet another indicator of low prevalence of polygamy is the male-female disparity ratio. The
2011-Census showed that there were only 940 females per 1000 males in India – the highest ever
in 50 years. In such a situation, polygamy is statistically impossible. The Report of the
Committee on the Status of Women in India (CSWI) also stated that whatever be the other
implications of polygamy, it cannot lead to high birth rate, since the number of polygamous men
would leave an equal number of men unmarried. It is observed that second wife of a man has
lesser number of children than the first/only wife. Studies show that the average number of
children from the second wife of Muslims was only 1.78 % as compared to 4.67 % from the first
wife (Rao, 1974).5 Thus, it is clear that the presumption of prevalence of high polygamy rate
among Muslims is unfounded and polygamy is not a factor in high birth rate among Muslims.

What does Sharia’h say about family planning?

Qur’an and Hadith are replete with verses and traditions supportive of the concept of family
planning.

It is extremely important to note that nowhere has the Qur’an prohibited Family Planning! There
are only interpretations, for or against.

5 Rao, Kamala Gopal, Studies in Family Planning: India, New Delhi; Abhinav Publications, 1974.
31
Anti-Family Planning Interpretation is based on the following concepts: Tawakkul (Reliance on
Allah), Qadr (Predestination), and Rizq (Provision).

Do not kill your children (for fear of poverty); We make provisions for you, and for them too.
(Surah 6:152)

Do not kill your children for fear of poverty. We make provisions, for them and for you too.
Verily, the killing of them is a severe crime. (Surah 17:31)

And Allah has made for you, your mates from yourselves and made for you, out of them,
children and grandchildren. (Surah 16:72)

Your wives are as a tilth unto you, so approach your tilth how you wish. (Surah 2:223)

Marry and multiply, for I will make a display of you on the Day of Judgment (Authenticated by
Abu Dawoud).

Clinching verse of the Qur’an

Let those who do not find the wherewithal for marriage, keep themselves chaste, until Allah
gives them means out of His grace. (Surah 24:33)

This is amplified by the Prophet:

O young men! Those of you who can support a wife and household should marry. For, marriage
keeps you from looking with lust at women and preserves you from promiscuity. But those who
cannot should take to fasting, which is a means of tampering sexual desires. (Authenticated by
Bukhari).

Another Hadith goes to endorse the method of birth control. On the authority of Abu Saa’d,
who said ‘A man came to the Prophet to ask about the practice of al-azl with his mate. He added
“I do not like her to get pregnant and I am a man who wants what other men want. But the Jews
claim that al-azl (withdrawal) is minor infanticide.” The Prophet categorically denied such a
contention by the Jews. (Authenticated by Abu Dawoud, lbn Hanbal and al-Tahawi)

The first is the Qura’nic injunction, second the elaboration of the same by the Prophet and the
third prescribes the method of birth control. I consider this a complete prescription for family
planning.

The following narrative based on Qura’nic verses and traditions of the Prophet reinforces the
interpretation.

Islam is a Religion for Ease

Allah desires for you ease (yusr). He desires not hardship (usr) for you. (Surah 2:185)

No soul shall impose (upon it) a duty but to its capacity, neither shall a mother be made to suffer
injury on account of her child, nor shall he to whom the child is born (be made to suffer) on
account of his child. (Surah 2:223)

And know that your wealth and your children are a persecution (or trial) (fitna). (Surah 8:28)

Your wealth and your children are indeed a test (fitna). (Surah 64:15)
32
The most grueling trial is to have plenty of children with no adequate means. (Authenticated by
al-Hakim on the authority of Abdullah lbn Omar)

A multitude of children is one of the two poverties (or cases of penury), while a small number is
one of the two cases of ease. (Authenticated by Quda’ei in Musnad al- Shahab)

Purpose of Marriage is Conjugal Tranquility

And one of (Allah’s) signs is, that He has created from you mates from yourselves, that you may
dwell in tranquility with them, and has ordained between you Love and Mercy. (Surah 7:189)

It is He who created you from a single soul (nafs) and there from, did make his mate that he
might dwell in tranquility with her. (Surah 7:189)

Islam is a Religion for Quality

How oft, by Allah’s will, has a small force vanquished a numerous force. (Surah 2:249)

Allah has given you victory in many battles, but on the day of Hunayn, when you exalted in your
multitude, it availed you naught. And the earth, vast as it is, became tight for you, then you
turned back in retreat. (Surah 18:46)

The right of a child on his parent is to be given good breeding and good name. (Authenticated
by al-Baihaqi)

There is nothing better for a parent to leave for his child (in inheritance) than good breeding.
(Authenticated by al-Tabarani)

To leave your heirs rich is better than leaving them dependent upon people’s charity.
(Authenticated by al Bukhari)

Right of children to breastfeeding (spacing)

And mothers shall suckle their children two full years to complete breast-feeding. (Surah 2:233)

And a child’s weaning is two years. (Surah 31:14)

Gender Equality

Men and women are equal halves. (Authenticated by Ahmad and Abu Dawoud)

Do not hate having daughters, for they are the comforting dears. (Authenticated by Ahmad and
al-Tabarani)

It is a woman’s blessing to have a girl as her first child. (Authenticated by Mardaweih and ibn
Askir). Based on their understanding of the Islamic law, the opinion of the great Imams is
supportive of family planning.

It is well known that many Indian, driven by the traditional son preference, continue to have
children ending up with a large family. Islam enjoins gender equality.

The opinion of the great Imams

33
Interpreting verse 4:3 of the Holy Qur’an, Imam Shafei, opined that more children should not
be produced if they cannot be properly supported.

Imam Raghib, interpreting 17:31 verse of Qur’an, says that it is not only the physical killing of
children which is prohibited in Islam, but also killing them spiritually and intellectually. The
denial of access to education, for example, amounts to killing them intellectually.

"Those few (qalil)", records Hadith, “who are virtuous are superior to those many who are
undesirable". It implies that the number of children should be restricted to the capacity of
parents to make them virtuous.

Imam Ghazzali, a sufi of great eminence, mentions a tradition from the Prophet: Smallness of a
family (qillat al'ayal) is a facility (yusur) and its largeness (kathrat) results in faqr (indigence,
poverty).

The opinions of contemporary Ulema

Opinion of Haji Nasiruddin Latif (Indonesia, 1974):

There is no verse in the Qur’an forbidding the wife or husband to practice family planning. “I,
for one, do not feel that Islam interdicts family planning to ward off hardship in Muslim married
life”.

Opinion of Sheikh Abdel Aziz (Jordan, 1985)

Family Planning in Islam starts with the choice of the wife and puts a great emphasis on raising
children physically, educationally and spiritually, that is why quality is favored over quantity.

Several Hadiths listed by Imam Ghazali underline benefits of ‘azl’: (1) preservation of wife’s
beauty and charm; (2) protection of her health and life; (3) shielding her from hardship (kathrat
al-haral) on account of child birth; and (4) keeping away financial hardship to the family.

The famed Indian scholar Shah Abdul Aziz (1864), states in his monumental Tafsir
(commentary) of the Qur’an:“Al-azl is lawful on the basis of authentic and well-known traditions
of the Prophet. The use of medicines before or after coitus for preventing conception is as
lawful as Al-azl”.

Fatwa of Sheikh Mahmoud Shaltout, Great Imam of Al-Azhar (1959):

● Strongly endorsed the use of contraceptives on an individual basis for health, social or
economic reasons.
● Under certain conditions contraception becomes mandatory. Fatwa of Advisory Council
on Religious Matters (Turkey, 1960).
● Contraception allowed with the wife’s consent - Even without wife’s consent in case of
war, turmoil or conditions where bringing up children becomes difficult.

Opinion of Sheikh Sayyid Sabiq (Saudi Arabia, 1968):

The use of contraception is allowed, especially if the husband already has a large family, if he
cannot bring up his children correctly, if his wife is weak or sick or has repeated pregnancies, or
if the husband is poor.

Opinion of Indian ulema is on the same lines: Allama Shah Zaid Abul Hassan Farooqi, Delhi:
34
 ● All the four Imams regard ‘Azl’ as permissible. However, in one Hadith, a condition has
been prescribed that it should be done only with the wife’s consent.
● Ibn Abidin, Tahtawi and Abus Saud opine that, even a woman has the right to shut off
the mouth of her uterus without the permission of the husband to avoid pregnancy.

● Anti-pregnancy pills and medicines are also permissible. However, for using any
contraceptive medicine, it is advisable to consult an experienced doctor.

Maulana Masood Ahmad Qasmi, Nazim-e-Deeniyat, Aligarh Muslim University:

● When permissibility of ‘Azl’ is proven, the use of other comparable measures (like
condom, etc.) stands automatically endorsed.

Maulana Khalid Saifullah Rahmani, Sadar Mudarris, Dar-ul-Uloom, Sabeel-ul-Islam, Hyderabad:

● Preventing conception temporarily which does not lead to permanently impairing the
capability is legal.

● Use of loop (IUDs) and Nirodh (condom) is equivalent to the practice of ‘Azl’.

Maulana Jamil Ahmed Naziri, Jamia Arabia, Ahya-ul-uloom, Mubarakpur, Azamgarh:

● To prevent short space between children which will make them naturally weak, use of
temporary contraceptive methods like loop (IUD), Nirodh (condom), medicine or
ointment is valid.

Mufti Zafir-ud-din Miftahi, Mufti, Darul-Uloom, Deoband:

If there is a valid reason or disease because of which a woman cannot bear the hardship of
pregnancy, in such a situation, Shari’at allows temporary birth control measures.

It is thus amply clear that Islam is fully supportive of the temporary methods of family planning.
However, sterilization or irreversible methods are disallowed by almost all sections of the Ulema
though some Ulema have a positive interpretation about sterilization too.

Islam and Irreversible Family Planning Methods

Fatwa from the Fatwa Committee of Al Azhar (1953):

The Committee permitted contraception or reversible family planning methods, on health and
other grounds, but disallowed permanent sterilization.

Fatwa of Haji Abdel Jalil Hassan (Malaysia, 1964): Contraception is permitted but sterilization is
disallowed.

Mufti Shamsuddin, Delhi:

● It is wrong to regard vasectomy as castration.
● Vasectomy and tubectomy do not amount to terminating birth cycle but to keep it limited.

35
Islam on Abortion

Even regarding abortion, many scholars feel that, it is permissible for health reasons but before
ensoulment of the fetus- within 120 days of pregnancy. However, some scholars like Maulana
Jamil Ahmed Naziri, Jamia Arabia, Ahya-ul-uloom, Mubarakpur, Azamgarh says that abortion is
not allowed even within 120 days, if it is for medical determination of the sex of the fetus.

With such explicit opinion of the religious authorities, jurists and scholars, it would be thus a
truism to say that Islam is, in fact, the forerunner of the concept of family planning. It is
important to note that fourteen hundred years ago, when Islam appeared on the scene, there was
no population problem anywhere on the globe, even then, Islam directly or indirectly
encouraged family planning.

Prof. Abdur Rahim Omran (1992) of the most respected Islamic University, Al Azhar, observes,
"It is a wonder to the thinkers of today that Islam should give so much (importance) to child
spacing and family planning so early in human history, and in the absence of compelling
population pressures".6 He, however, clarifies that the term family planning as used in his text,
refers to the use of contraceptive methods by husband and wife with mutual agreement, to
regulate their fertility with a view to warding off health, social and economic hardships, and to
enable them to shoulder their responsibilities towards their children and society. Such a choice
should be voluntary with no coercion or law fixing the number of children a couple should
beget.

Conclusion

The above analysis should cause a rethink among those who tirelessly condemn the entire
Muslim community for producing large families with political motives. No such motive is in
evidence. Muslims are indeed most backward in family planning practices but the reason lies in
their socio- economic backwardness. Literacy, income and better delivery of health services hold
the key. And those Muslims who think that Islam is opposed to family planning should, on the
contrary, understand that it is indeed the forerunner of the concept. The future of the country
and all its constituent communities lies in the quality of upbringing of their families, with
education as the key strategy.

Dr. Shahabuddin Yaqoob Quraishi is a former Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) of India. An IAS
officer of 1971 batch, he has occupied other key positions. He has been election observer in many countries. Dr.
Quraishi has written extensively on elections, democracy and population related issues. Recently, he was the
FICCI Fellow at King's College, London. Like civil officers of colonial period, he has deep interest in research
and academics and divides his time sharing experience and intellect at Universities, seminars and workshops with
students and others in India and abroad.

6 Abdel Rahim Omran, Family Planning in the Legacy of Islam, Routledge, London 1992.
36
 Chapter 3

POLICY CHALLENGES: HAVE DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES MEANT

FOR MUSLIMS WORKED EFFECTIVELY?

Jawed Alam Khan

Abstract

The Constitution of India, in its Articles 14, 15, 29 and 30, lays emphasis on the protection and promotion of
rights of religious minorities. Among the religious minorities, the Muslims are largest group with more than 70
percent share. The paper assesses the policy initiatives and its design, adequacy of financial resources, fund
utilization, physical performance and status of implementation. It highlights that largely Muslims have not been
benefitted from the schemes and programs meant for them, and the community faces exclusion in planning,
budgeting and implementation processes of development programs at various levels of governance.

Introduction

The Indian constitution talks about the idea of equality among its citizens and prohibits
discrimination on the grounds of religion. It has also committed for preservation, protection and
assurance of the rights of minorities (Article 14, 15, 29 & 30). Unfortunately, Muslims have for
long been counted among the most backward sections of the population. The Muslim
constitutes 15 percent of India’s total population and the largest share – more than 70 percent
among the total religious minority population.

The socio-economic and educational backwardness among large sections of Muslim population
in India is owing to their extreme poverty and lack of modern education both in the pre and
post-Independence period. The partition of the sub-continent led to many problems relating to
issues of identity and security which the Muslim community in India faced in the form of
communal riots in the recent past and discrimination in almost every sphere of life. The issues of
identity and security, both historically and in the recent past, have emerged as a major hindrance
for addressing equity-related issues. Further, there has been continuous neglect on the part of
the Union and State Governments in addressing the development deficit among Muslims.

Therefore, it was expected that the needs of Muslims too would have been recognised separately
by the Union and State governments and some policy provisions made in the national or States
Five Year Plans (FYPs) for their development. However, an analysis of FYP documents since
1951 shows that this was clearly not the case for Muslims until 10th FYP. Nonetheless, in 2006,
Ministry of Minority Affairs (MoMA) was set up as the nodal ministry for the welfare and
empowerment of the religious minorities. In addition, two development strategies designed to
address the development shortfalls faced by the religious minorities are being implemented – the
Prime Minister's 15 Point Programme (15 PP) and the Multi-Sectoral Development Program
(MSDP).

The paper assesses how development schemes meant for Muslims worked effectively in terms of
policy initiatives, adequacy of financial resources, fund utilization and physical performance,
policy design, and status of implementation. In terms of methodology, the paper heavily relies
on secondary level data sources. An assessment of seven years of policy implementation in this
direction shows several gaps with respect to policy design and budget allocation, utilization of
funds, and implementation of government programs specific to the development of minorities.
It also highlights that Muslims have not benefitted from the schemes and programs meant for
them, and the community faces exclusion in planning, budgeting and implementation processes
of development programs at various levels of governance.
Policies and Programs

In 2005, for the first time after fifty-five years of development planning, Government of India
realised that there is a need for a comprehensive policy-driven intervention for the development
of Muslims. But it was noted that there was a dearth of authentic data and information about the
social, economic and educational condition of Muslims in India. In light of this situation, Prime
Minister’s High Level Committee under the chairpersonship of Justice Rajindar Sachar was
formed in 2005 to assess the social, economic and educational status of the Muslim community
in India. The Committee found that issues related to development deficit faced by the Muslims
are diverse, but very similar to the ones faced by other backward sections of society like the
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and the Scheduled Tribes (STs). However, SCs and STs have been given
reservation in government jobs and educational institutions and a separate plan strategy SCSP
and TSP were devised to give benefits to SCs and STs in the Union and States Budgets in
proportionate to their population.

The report presents its recommendations under two broad categories - General Policy Measures
and Specific Policy Measures. In order to address the specific problems of backwardness among
the Muslims, the Sachar Report advocates special attention to developmental issues within the
Muslim community in the areas of education, economic development and access to basic
amenities. Further, the general policy initiatives such as setting up a National Data Bank, an
Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) and constructing a Diversity Index aimed at to promote
inclusion of excluded communities in public institutions. In this regard, although the reports of
working groups on setting up of an EOC and constructing a Diversity Index have been
submitted, but no headway has been made in terms of actual implementation so far.

Further, the 11th Plan through its core approach of ‘faster and inclusive growth’ adopted a four-
pronged strategy- educational and economic empowerment, access to public services,
strengthening of minority institutions and area development program. 15 PP for the welfare of
minorities focuses on enhancing opportunities for education, equitable share in economic
activities and employment, improving the conditions of living of minorities and prevention and
control of communal riots. The target for development of minorities under 15 PP has to be
achieved with a definite goal in a specific timeframe. The 15 PP envisaged earmarking 15 percent
of total allocations and achieving the physical targets under select flagship programs for
development of minorities. Except MSDP, all the schemes run by MoMA are also part of 15 PP
which are 100 percent meant for the development of minorities. There were two important
commitments made under 15 PP- one by the ‘department of personnel and training’ with a
promise to ensure 15 percent share in public employment; and another by ‘department of
financial services’ with targets to disburse 15 percent of the annual ‘priority sector lending’ (PSL)
to favor minorities.

Currently, eleven Union ministries/departments claimed to be involved in implementing the 15

PP, including Ministries of Rural Development, Water and Sanitation, Urban Development,
Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Labor and Employment, Home, Finance, Women and
Child Development, School Education and Literacy, Personal and Training, Minority Affairs.
The selected schemes from eleven Union ministries/departments are Indira Awas Yojana (IAY),
Ajivika, National Rural Drinking Water Program (NRDWP), Urban Infrastructure and
Governance (UIG), Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns
(UIDSSMT), Integrated Housing Slum Development Program (IHSDP), Basic Services for
Urban Poor (BSUP), Swarna Jayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SJSRY), Priority Sector Lending to
Minorities, Integrated Child Development Services(ICDS), Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs),
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) and Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalay (KGBV). These schemes are
amenable to earmarking at least 15 percent fund for minorities.

38
There are other programs under 15 PP which are exclusively implemented for the minorities like
Madarsa Modernization Program, scholarship schemes and Maulana Azad Education Foundation
(MAEF) that aim at addressing the education deficit among the minority community. These
schemes include the (i) Pre-matric for up to Class X, (ii) Post-matric for Class XI to PhD, (iii)
Merit-cum-Means for technical and professional courses at undergraduate and post-graduate
levels, (iv) Free coaching and Allied Scheme for competitive examinations, and (v) Maulana
Azad National Fellowship for minority students pursuing M.Phil. and PhD. Some of the
common features of all these scholarship schemes such conditionalities as - that the student
should have secured not less than 50 percent marks in the previous final examination;
scholarship will not be given to more than 2 students from the family. Further, the parent’s
annual income must not exceed Rs 1 lakh in the case of Pre-Matric while it is Rs 2 lakh for Post-
Matric; the limit is Rs 2.5 lakhs for Merit-Cum-Means while the same is Rs 4.5 lakh for Maulana
Azad National Fellowship.

Box 1: New Schemes Introduced in the Union Budget

In the run up to the 2014 general election in the country, the BJP manifesto had promised to
give adequate focus on the development of minorities, particularly Muslims. The important
promises made in the manifesto by new government included modernization of Madarsas,
empowering Waqf Boards in consultation with religious leaders, taking steps to remove
encroachments on and unauthorised occupation of Waqf properties, preservation and promotion
of Urdu and ensuring a peaceful and secure environment where there is no place for either the
perpetrators or exploiters. However, the manifesto did not focus on the real development issues
such as low budgetary allocation, poor utilization of funds, exclusion in planning and budgetary
processes, low share in public employment and educational institutions, poverty and illiteracy.

In terms of the new announcement in the budget 2015-16, an integrated education and
livelihood scheme called ‘Nai Manzil’ will be launched this year to enable minority youth who do
not have a formal school-leaving certificate to obtain one and find better employment. Further,
to show-case civilization and culture of the Parsis, the Government will support, in 2015-16, an
exhibition, ‘The Everlasting Flame’. In budget 2014-15, the government introduced a new
scheme “Up-grading the Skills and Training in of Traditional Arts/ Crafts for Development
(USTTAD)” for promoting and preserving the traditional craft, arts for development of
minorities through skill up-gradation. In terms of budget, Rs 0.45 crore was allocated for
USTTAD in the 2014-15 RE, whereas Rs 17 crore has been earmarked in the 2014-15.

In terms of institutional strengthening, the Government promises to strengthen the National

Minorities Development Finance Corporation (NMDFC), the Maulana Azad Education
Foundation (MAEF) and the Central Waqf Board. To promote access to credit among the
backward sections within minorities, the NMDFC was established in 1994. The NMDFC
focuses on providing microfinance to the poorest of poor among minorities through NGOs,
educational loans to persons belonging to minority community, facilitating vocational training
programs among the minority community and finance tailor-made market assistance options to
artisans and crafts persons. The NMDFC receives contributions from the Union Government
(65 percent), State Governments (26 percent) and individuals / organisations (9 percent) towards
its share capital. 15 PP also focuses on opening more branches of banks in areas that have a
concentration of minority population and distributing 15 percent of total credit to minorities
under priority sector lending as per the RBI Master Circular, 2006.

A year after introducing 15 PP, MoMA launched the MSDP in 2007-08 in 90 Minority
Concentrated Districts (MCDs) that adopted an area development approach with a bouquet of
schemes to address deficits related to a number of issues like male-female literacy and male-
female work participation, housing, drinking water and electricity. MSDP was also seen as a gap-
39
filling measure or top up approach to expedite the development deficits in MCDs. In the 12th
FYP, MSDP was extended to 710 Minority Concentrated Blocks (MCBs) of 196 districts and 66
Minority Concentrated Towns (MCTs) having at least 25 percent minority population.

Allocation of Financial Resources, Utilization and Physical performance

Budgetary Allocation for Minorities in the Union Budget, 2015-16

Looking at the budgetary allocation for minorities in the Union Budget, it may be noted that
only 0.26 percent of the total Union Budget 2015-16 has been earmarked for development of
minorities. The ministries and department allocated fund for minorities include MoMA, School
Education Department, Ministry of Civil Aviation and Ministry External Affairs (Table 1). The
total expenditure reported for minorities by the central government through 15 PP and MSDP
accounted 2 percent in the total expenditure in 2012-13, although the religious minorities
constitute 21 percent of total population as per census 2011.

Table 1: Budgetary Allocation for Minorities in the Union Budget, 2015-16

(Amount in Rs crore)

Ministry/Department 2015-16 Budget Estimate(BE)

Ministry of External Affairs 5.28

Ministry Civil Aviation 500.00
School Education Department 375.50
Ministry of Minority Affairs 3738.00
Total Allocation for Minorities 4618.78
Total Union Budget Allocation 1777477.00
Share of Minorities in Total Union Budget (%) 0.26
Source: Compiled by CBGA from Ministry of Minority Affairs, Govt. of India

Allocation and Utilization by MoMA

The budget total allocation (in absolute number) under MoMA has increased marginally from Rs
3,734 crore in 2014-15 (BE) to Rs 3,738 crore in 2015-16. Further, the allocation has declined to
Rs 3165 Crore in 2014-15 (RE). Table 2 analyses the performance of MoMA in terms of fund
utilization which has been unsatisfactory in the 11th Plan. The ministry was able to utilize merely
78 percent (average) of the total outlay (Rs 7000) earmarked in the 11th Plan period. In the first
year of 12th Plan, the percent of utilization is found to be as low as 60 percent in 2012-13 but it
has gone up to 86 percent in 2013-14. The MoMA noted that poor utilization has primarily been
due to a delayed start in implementation of major schemes such as Pre-Matric scholarship and
MSDP for select MCBs and MCTs.

40
 Table 2: Status of Fund Allocation and Utilization under Ministry of Minority Affairs
(In Rs Crore)

Year Allocation Expenditure Utilization*

B.E R.E (in %)
2007-08 500 350 196.7 39.3
2008-09 1000 650 619.1 61.9
2009-10 1740 1740 1709.4 98.2
2010-11 2600 2500 2080.9 77.3
2011-12 2850 2750 2292.3 80.4
2012-13 3155 2218 2157.9 60.4
2013-14 3531 3131 3026 86.0
2014-15 3734 3165 - -
2015-16 3738

Source: Compiled by CBGA from Ministry of Minority Affairs, Govt. of India

Note: *Utilization has been reported taking into account BE figures.

RE: Revised Estimate
BE: Budget Estimate

Table 3 shows scheme wise details of expenditure/allocation under MoMA since 2012-13 (first
four years of the 12th FYP). The total expenditure and allocation of fund during the first four
years in the 12th FYP amount to Rs 12018.25 crore, which is 69 percent of the total proposed
allocation of Rs 17,323 crore. Further, the analysis of the allocation and utilization of each of the
schemes for the same period shows that major schemes such as MSDP, Pre and Post
Scholarships, Women Leadership Scheme, Support for Students clearing Prelims conducted by
UPSC, SSC have had very low fund allocation and utilization. Schemes like Research,
Monitoring and Evaluation, Leadership Development, Merit-cum-means scholarship and Post-
Matric Scholarship have not been able to achieve 70 percent targets of 12th FYP, which is a
major cause of concern in terms of effective functioning.

Table 3: Scheme-wise Plan Allocation by MoMA in 12th Five Year Plan (in Rs. Crore)

Schemes/Programs 12th Plan 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 Total

Proposed (Actual) (Actual) (RE) (BE) Allocation/
Allocation Exp. as % of
Proposed
Allocation for
12th FYP

1 2 3 4 5 6 7=3+4+5+6/
2*100
Maulana Azad 500 0 160 113 113 77
Education
Foundation
Free Coaching and 120 14 23.68 29.17 45 93
Allied Scheme
41
Research/Studies, 220 31.05 42.42 23.47 44.75 64
Monitoring and
Evaluation
Merit-cum-means 1580 181.18 259.9 317 315 68
Pre-Matric 5000 786.14 962.99 1017 990 75
Scholarship
Post Matric 2850 326.43 515.67 538.50 550 68
MSDP 5650 641.26 953.48 769.72 1232 74
Maulana Azad 430 66 50.02 0.9 44.85 38
National Fellowship
Grants-in-aid to 10 0 2 1.8 1.8 56
State NMDFC
Support for Students 75 0 1.95 2.1 3.6 10
clearing Prelims
Examination
Leadership 75 10.45 11.95 12.5 14.13 65
Development of
Minority Women
Computerization of 17 0.89 2.98 3.15 3.15 60
records of State
Waqf Boards
Strengthening of the 25 0 1.91 3.6 6.08 46
State Waqf Boards
Interest subsidy on 10 0 0 3.5 4.19 77
Educational Loans
for overseas studies
Skill Development 60 0 16.99 41.4 64.22 204
NMDFC 600 99.64 0 27 107 39
Total Plan 17323 2157.98 3007.49 3140 3712.78 69
Allocation under
Minority Affairs
Ministry
Source: Compiled by CBGA from Ministry of Minority Affairs, Expenditure Budget Vol. II

Multi- Sectoral Development Programme

The MSDP have seen a major revamp in terms of increase in geographical coverage and positive
changes in implementation and planning strategies in 12th Plan. But in terms of expansion of
activities in MSDP and making some kind of flexibility in the guideline of CSS for preparing
tailor made projects as per local felt need was not done at the desired level. As per the data
reported by MoMA, in the initial 2 years and 9 months of 12th Plan, government was able to
release only 34 percent of total proposed allocation in 12th Plan in MSDP and actual expenditure
data made available on MSDP for the same period shown disappointing picture (Table 4).

42
 Table 4: Financial Achievement under MSDP in 12th Plan as on 31.12.14

12th Plan Proposed Allocation (In Rs Crore) 5650.00

Total Cost of Project Approved in 12 Plan (In Rs Crore) 3257.37
Fund Released for projects approved (In Rs Crore) 1933.00
% of Fund Released over Approved Fund 59.34
% of Fund Released over 12th Plan Proposed Allocation 34.21

Source: Compiled by CBGA from Ministry of Minority Affairs

From table 5 below, it can be seen that there has been a very low achievement in physical
outcomes across the components of MSDP. The components like education, skill building,
health, Anganwadi Centre (AWC), drinking water supply, IAY and income generating
infrastructure have poor completion rate against the unit sanctioned under the MSDP project
and many activities under the MSDP have not yet started. Table 5 shows that the water supply,
IAY and income generating infrastructure have poor completion rate against the unit sanctioned
under the MSDP project and many activities under the MSDP have not yet started.

Table 5: Physical Achievement under MSDP in 12th Plan as on 31.12.14

Unit Unit Work in % of Completion

Sanctioned Completed progress against
sanctioned units
Activities
A. Education
Degree College 12 0 0 0.0
School Building 520 3 29 0.6
Additional 7070 419 3319 5.9
Classrooms
Hostels 449 21 132 4.7
Computers 881 373 16 42.3
Lab Equipment 27 0 0 0.0
Toilet and Drinking 3330 39 464 1.2
Water in School
Teaching Aid 313 0 0 0.0
Free Cycle 10860 0 0 0.0
Digital Literacy 170005 0 0 0.0
Skill Development
ITI Building 71 0 36 0.0
Polytechnic 14 0 8 0.0
Skill Training 124985 1175 307 0.9

43
 C. Health 1265 39 221 3.1
D. AWC 6970 746 3268 10.7
E. Drinking Water
Hand Pump 11841 4505 1426 38.0
Drinking Facilities 9892 2621 2388 26.5
F. IAY 35501 1049 17320 3.0
G. Income 56 6 39 10.7
Generating
Infrastructure
H. Miscellaneous 2381 0 235 0.0
Source: Compiled by CBGA from Ministry of Minority Affairs/www.indiabudget.nic.in

Allocation and Utilisation in - PM’s New 15-Point Programme

The MoMA collates scheme wise information on the 15 PP. There are only few schemes which
report the financial achievement. Theutilization rate for the period 2006-07 and2013-14 is found
to be low in IAY (70.53 percent), SJRSY (53.08) and ITI (68.20 percent) with some degree of
variation whereas the disbursement in Priority Sector Lending (102 percent) shows over
achievement (Table 6). However, Muslims have largely not benefited from this program.

Table 6: Financial Achievement under 15 PP (2006-07 to 2013-14) (Rs in Crore)

Schemes Financial Target Financial % of Financial

Achievement Achievement
IAY 12522.66 8832 70.53
SJRSY 355.62 188.76 53.08
ITI 219.95 150 68.20
Priority Sector 235016.00 240383 102.28
Lending
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs, Govt of India.

The scheme wise information on the 15 PP like SSA, KGBV, ICDS, and SGSY (renamed as
Ajivika), only the data on physical achievements is reported without the information on their
financial performance. The component related to JNNURM (UIG, UIDSSMT, IHSDP and
BUSP) and Madarsa Modernisation Programme did not report the data on fund utilisation and
physical outcomes. Table 4 shows that important schemes like ICDS (59 percent), SGSY (61
percent) and IAY (82 percent) have low physical achievements whereas SJRSY has higher
physical achievement. The physical achievement in SSA is found to be low with some degree of
variation across the components (Table 7).

Table 7: Physical Achievement under 15 PP (2006-07 to 2013-14)

Schemes Physical Physical % of

Target Achievement Achievement
Operationalization of ICDS center 118775 70371 59.25
Formation of Self Help Groups 1889556 1157381 61.25
in SGSY/Ajivika

44
 IAY 3135049 2572132 82.04
Micro Enterprises in SJRSY 97596 115483 118.33
Skill Training under SJRSY 363848 365034 100.33
Primary Schools (SSA) 21726 15939 73.36
Upper Primary School(SSA) 10326 8151 78.94
Additional Classrooms 281671 230639 81.88
Number of Teachers 186229 125386 67.33
KGBV 1192 555 46.56
Source: Ministry of Minority Affairs, Govt of India.

The scholarship schemes during last three years have shown over achievement in terms physical
targets despite the low utilisation funds. The data on over achievement in scholarship schemes
reflects both fresh and renewal scholarships distributed among minority students. The data on
physical achievement in scholarship schemes should be reported in two separate columns as
fresh and renewal case. Here it is worth noting that scholarship schemes and NMDFC are
providing the beneficiary data on the basis of religious bifurcation.

Design of the Schemes and Programs

The objectives and design of 15 PP reveal that somehow government’s intent was to provide
policy-driven benefits for minorities akin to the budgetary strategies such as the SCSP and TSP.
The SCSP and TSP promises Plan allocations to SCs and STs in terms of their proportion within
total population through central ministries/departments and State government departments. The
15 PP was aimed at channeling public resources equitably to minorities. However, the guidelines
do not mention clearly 15 percent, as the targeted share for earmarking benefits for minorities
and it says certain percentage of the physical and financial targets will be earmarked for poor
beneficiaries from minority communities’. This does not provide any clarity on the specific
numbers/share of beneficiaries and leads to confusion at the time of operationalization of the
scheme.

Also, the share of fund flows to minorities through 15 PP is not based on the proportion of
minority population. It is also found that the minorities have not been included in budgetary
process of either the Union or the State government. In terms of expenditure reporting and
accounting at the Union, State and district level, the SCSP and the TSP are better placed than
the 15 PP. The allocation for SCs and STs are reported through budget (minor) heads 789 and
796 in the Detailed Demand for Grants in the Union and State budget documents.

The existing rigid policy guidelines of CSSs covered under the 15 PP do not allow for tailor
made interventions for minorities/Muslims within the general sector program. In the reporting
format, there is scant scope to monitor and track the benefits accruing to Muslims. The
concerned ministries under 15 PP should be urged to report their achievements, both physical
and financial, under their respective schemes for the benefit of minorities. The same needs to be
reported on a regular basis to the MoMA or introducing a budget statement, to maintain this
information on fund allocation, utilisation and beneficiaries. The reporting of expenditure under
15 PP by the Union ministries has been more in the nature of ‘retrospective budgeting’, where
the allocations for minorities are earmarked after the budgets for the schemes have been
finalised without any special measure taken for minorities during the budget preparation phase.
The schemes and programmes in 15 PP should prepare exclusive action plans for minorities
considering the specific needs and challenges particularly faced by Muslims.

45
Box 2: Problems in Policy and Programme Designs

o 15 PP has a very narrow policy approach in terms of coverage of the program and schemes
for development of minorities focusing only on few departments/ ministries related to basic
public services. The ministries like IT, industry, trade and commerce have been kept out
from the preview of 15 PP.

o In terms term of allocating the fund (15 percent wherever it is possible) under the 15 PP, the
proportional share of minorities in total population was not kept into consideration which is
21 percent as per the census, 2011.

o It is allocating the funds in few ongoing schemes, it has not asked the ministries/department
to initiate new schemes/programs which suites to need of minority community.

o In sum, the design of 15 PP is not appropriate in terms of comprehensive coverage of

minority population and addressing their development needs until and unless government
initiates/design some exclusive schemes /program for minorities. Further, it is focusing just
on the Centrally Sponsored schemes without any changes in the guidelines of those CSS.

o Under 15 PP, there is no specific policy focus on the development of Muslim community.

o No clear instructions given to states to implement 15 PP through their own state plan
scheme or even in the CSS about fund allocation to districts from states.

o There is no provision for awareness and sensitisation at sates level among the officials those
who are implementing the 15 PP as well as for beneficiaries.

o Have the enough scope of fund diversion to non- minority under the infrastructure related
project; diversion is less in beneficiary driven schemes.

o The States government and Panchayats have not been given any kind of clear role in annual
district planning and implementation of 15 PP.

o Minorities have not been included in budgetary process of either the Union or the State
government by opening a minor head in detailed budget book and introducing a budget
statement on minority related programs.

Lack of Clarity in Allocation of Fund

Most of the CSSs that are part of the umbrella program have not been altered in any way (by
way of bringing about changes in the scheme guidelines) to cater to the specific disadvantages
and needs of the community. The State and district level implementing agencies do not have
adequate clarity on the share of allocations available towards the program due to the lack of
disaggregated data in most schemes. Weak implementing mechanisms with the State level
functionaries and PRI representatives remaining unclear about their role in the district-level
planning process and subsequent implementation of the program contribute to the concerns
about the design of the program.

Lack of Local Need Based Plans

Under the 15 PP, the IAY, SJSRY and SGSY are beneficiary-driven schemes, while the other
schemes have followed an area-based approach for infrastructure development. Under the area-
46
based approach, districts were considered as the unit of implementation and planning of
infrastructure projects and not minority-dominated hamlet or ward. Hence, in 11th Plan, in many
places, (like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana) the ITIs, AWCs, school buildings are located in
non-minority areas with only a handful of beneficiaries from the minority community. The 12th
Plan document suggested that the annual targets and outlays for 15 PP/MSDP should be broken
down to hamlet/ward level. It is expected that in the revised MSDP guidelines the emphasis
should be on local need-based plans to overcome deficits.

Activities related to ensuring girls’ education, technical education and income generation
activities (as proposed by the district administration in many MCDs) that are essential to advance
the educational and economic conditions of the community have been neglected by MoMA. For
instance, in Darbhanga district in Bihar the proposed scheme of building additional classrooms
in recognized Madarsas got shut down by the MMA on the grounds that SSA guidelines do not
sanction Additional Class Rooms (ACR) to Madarsas. The baseline survey conducted for MSDP
in Mewat district in Haryana suggested more focus be given to programs promoting female
literacy in rural areas but the district administration built additional classrooms, staff quarters and
a hostel in Mewat Model School that already had adequate and quality infrastructure. Another
concern relates to the diversion of benefits of MSDP to non-minority areas as evinced in the
infrastructure projects in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Haryana in 11th FYP.

The vital objective pertaining to building neighborhood schools for Muslims girls with female
teachers and promoting gainful employment among the Muslims could be furthered by
apportioning adequate outlays for creation of artisan clusters in MCDs across the country.
Needless to add, the success of these interventions would largely depend on the extent and
scope of community participation in planning and implementing the services.

The 15 PP should have adequate coverage of schemes, desired allocation and enough scope for
tailor made interventions that suit specific needs of the community. However, very few
departments/ministries are allocating the requisite funds and reporting physical targets in
disaggregated form. A large number of schemes under the 15 Point program focus on essential
services and employment generation while critical sectors such as - information and technology,
commerce and industry, and micro, small and medium enterprises - that would address long
term development of minorities, remain out of the programs ambit.

Exclusionary Nature of Identification Criteria

In MSDP, the criteria for identification of MCDs tend to be more exclusionary leaving a
significant proportion of the minorities out of the program in 11th Plan. The 12th Plan
recommended for expansion of the coverage and scope of the 15 PP over a large number of
programs and also for expanding the coverage of MSDP to more MCDs. The population
criterion to identify MCBs and MCTs was suggested to be brought down from 25 percent to 15
percent of a block as unit of planning and implementation. The new guidelines of MSDP for 12th
Plan would target a large number of the Muslim population through MCB and MCT. MSDP was
designed as an umbrella program in order to priorities the developmental needs of the
minorities, specifically Muslims, in critical sectors. However, when it comes to the selection of
activities by the districts, the bulk of the spending is directed towards construction of IAY
houses, AWCs, school buildings and health sub-centers- provisions that would cater to the
common populace and are not exclusive to the minorities.

Lack of Disaggregated Data

There are also instances where funds meant for minorities get diverted to non-minority areas
due to lack of clarity in the guidelines of MSDP and 15 PP. With regard to providing housing
47
facilities, the District Magistrate (DM) of Barabanki in UP had thought that 15 percent of the
houses should be allotted to minorities following IAY guidelines for both MSDP and the 15 PP.
With regard to provision of housing facilities under MSDP, there is no data available at national
level on minorities who have benefited from IAY. In Barabanki district more than half of the
total benefits have gone to the non-minority communities owing to non-inclusion of Muslims in
the BPL list in 11th FYP. Thus, the flaw in program design, making the BPL category a
prerequisite, leads to exclusion of the targeted community benefitting from the program. As a
result, a majority of the BPL Muslims are not counted in the first place. Further, there is absence
of a separate minor head, a budget statement and physical reporting under minority related
programs which makes it difficult to track the funds flowing for minorities’ welfare across
schemes and programs in various sectors (Khan and Parvati 2012).

Cumbersome Rules and Procedure

The scholarship schemes are ridden with many basic, design-related problems particularly the
application procedures that are cumbersome and time consuming. Most of the scholarship
schemes entail opening bank accounts and providing supporting documents such as income
domicile and religion certificates. Related concerns of absence of clear-cut institutional
mechanisms for submission of application forms, unrealistic unit costs in terms of amounts
provided as admission, tuition fees and maintenance costs, and prevalent eligibility norms of
supporting not more than two students from a family for the scholarship constrain effective
implementation and comprehensive coverage of beneficiaries.

Implementation and Monitoring

The assessment of implementation of 15 PP and MSDP during last seven years shows that the
policy initiatives of the government towards the development of minorities, in general, and
Muslims, in particular, leave a lot to be desired. MSDP being the largest area development
program to address directly the socio-economic deficits among Muslims was allocated largest
share of the total MoMA budget in the 11thand 12thFYP. However, non-submission of DPR by
the State governments for MSDP due to poor capacity at the district level and delays in the
submission of Utilization Certificates led to delay in undertaking and completing projects under
the program. Further, factors like inadequate institutional arrangements for implementation at
the district level, lack of planning capacity, shortage of staff and required infrastructure and
insufficient funds to monitor the programs have crippled the effective working of these
schemes.

Poor Coordination between Line Departments

The MoMA monitors the implementation of the 15 PP, the MSDP and other schemes. Based on
scrutiny of available data and perceptions of officials at the State and district level, it is felt that
MoMA has not been consistently proactive in terms of strengthening the implementation. The
coordination with other line departments at the Union government level (such as the 15 PP and
the MSDP) is also found to be weak. At the State level too, the Minority Welfare Departments
are starved of financial and human resources and implement schemes without a clear policy
mandate or conducting regular needs assessment of the community. Poor coordination between
line departments mars scheme implementation even at the sub-State level.

In order to effectively monitor schemes like the 15 PP and MSDP, the scheme
guidelines1provided for setting up Central (Committee of Secretaries), State and District level

1 Guidelines for implementation of PM’s New 15 Point programme that are accessible at:
http://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/upload_files/moma/files/pdfs/pm15points_eguide.pdf
48
committees to report progress on a quarterly basis for various schemes. A scrutiny of the
notifications by the governments of Bihar and Haryana reveal that State Level Committees
(SLCs) were formed only on August 10, 2010 and June 03, 2010 respectively, which was with a
delay of more than three years.

Box 3: Implementation Issues

o Delay in submission of Detailed Project Report (DPR) by the State governments for MSDP
due to poor capacity at the district level.

o Delays in the submission of Utilization Certificates led to delay in undertaking and

completing projects under the program.

o Further, factors like inadequate institutional arrangements for implementation at the district
level, lack of planning capacity, shortage of staff and required infrastructure, delayed
submission of DPR and insufficient funds to monitor the programs have crippled the
effective working of MSDP.

The implementation of many programs are poorly monitored despite having the provisions for
establishing monitoring mechanism at Centre, State and District level and the mandated
involvement of Members of Parliament, State Legislatures and NGOs in the monitoring and
review processes. In terms of monitoring the implementation of MSDP and 15 PP, State and
District Level Committees have been constituted in 20 States and UTs, but these monitoring
committees have not been functioning properly. Except in Jharkhand, State level meetings in the
19 MCD states have not been held as per the program guidelines which stipulate the holding of
a meeting at least once every quarter (GoI, 2011-12).

Apart from the delays in constituting the SLCs, the norm of holding quarterly meetings have
also not been adhered to in most MCD states2. At the district level too, although the District
Level Committees (DLCs) are constituted, they lack representation from the minority
community. Lack of clarity and proper awareness among government officials is also believed to
inhibit effective implementation of schemes exclusively for the welfare of minorities. Further,
the prevailing perception among government functionaries that interventions focusing only on
Muslims might lead to social disruption also compounds the problem.

Box 4: A Case Study from Barabanki and Mewat on Access to Benefits

In Barabanki and Mewat, enrollment of Muslim children in government school at primary and
upper primary level found to be more than 80 percent but with high dropout rates. The parents
showed preference to sending their wards to Madarsas or private schools because of their
perception of poor quality of education in government schools. When quizzed about other
facilities such as scholarship, uniform, books and mid-day meals, respondents shared that these
were not provided on time. Overall, the access to school-related services and entitlements by the
community was weak.

In Barabanki, access to credit support was also non-existent as none of the 160 respondents
(from all four GPs) had been provided credit through Priority Sector Lending for Minorities or
the 15-PP. Lack of awareness among the community was seen to be the single-most important
factor. With regard to functioning of the NMDFC, it was seen as a total failure in Barabanki due
to inadequate administrative support and staff. Issues such as poor outreach, low involvement of

2 Two meetings of the SLCs have been held in Assam, two in Bihar, three in Haryana, six in West Bengal, and
nine meeting in UP have been held since early 2007.
49
the bank in providing credit, unrealistic and antiquated loan support and eligibility criteria have
all contributed to this failure. The landless weavers with no collateral shared how they found it
hard to get loans with the continuing mind set of officials to discriminate against Muslims.

There is an absence of awareness among the Muslims of any policy initiatives exclusively for
Muslims such as MSDP or 15 PP in Barabanki and Mewat. The community is mainly confronted
with low levels of girls’ education and inadequate health facilities (nutrition and health check-ups
for children up to six years). The long distances to the school have encouraged the trend of
sending girls to Madarsas. With regard to livelihood-related problems, access to credit was cited
as a key factor by all respondents through NMDFC and Priority Sector Lending (PSL).

In this regard, the onus lies with the MoMA to actively engage with other departments and push
for greater attention to concerns of the Muslims in schemes falling within the 15 PP. Lack of
availability of social group-wise disaggregated data also affects tracking coverage of Muslims
through government jobs – another commitment of the 15 PP. In this regard, although the
Department of Personnel and Training directed the Union ministries/ departments to provide
disaggregated data on recruitment of Muslims, the MoMA website does not provide any
information.

Policy Recommendations

From the analysis, it is evident that promises made in the Election Manifesto and the
commitments made in the 12th Plan in terms of policy priorities and budgetary allocations have
not been fulfilled yet. The need of the hour is to put in place targeted, well designed
interventions and need-based strategies for the overall development of the Muslims. Certain
corrective measures have taken pertaining to budgetary allocations, fund utilization, design
problems and implementation of 15 PP and MSDP. The adequate focus has to be given on the
development of Muslims through special provisions for inclusion of the community in public
policies and programmes. In order to ensure adequate funds, the existing guidelines of
earmarking 15 percent wherever possible was revised to 15 percent and above in proportion to
the size of minority population.

Further, it is suggested that MSDP and 15 PP should work in synergy rather than the former
duplicating the latter. Also, 15 PP should take care of sectoral investments/ongoing Centrally
Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) while MSDP should fill gaps amongst those particular communities
or settlements which have not been covered under existing CSS. Minority concentrated
villages/towns (having a total of 50 percent minority population in the total population) outside
MCDs should have a separate program. Further, it suggested regular revision in the unit cost of
scholarship schemes to be to factor in the effects of inflation. Moreover, government should do
away with the two child norm in scholarship schemes and all eligible minority students could be
covered following a demand driven approach.

Assessing the implementation of the provisions under the 12th FYP, not much headway has been
made, except regarding expansion of coverage of MSDP from 90 to 196 MCDs and planning
and implementation of MSDP at the block and town level. However, the design of MSDP and
the 15 PP do not have much scope for creating a tailor-made project that suits the needs of the
Muslim community. In both these programs, the norms and guidelines of the existing CSSs are
being adopted which are not flexible for addressing the needs of the Muslim community. The
government has to improve the governance and performance in service delivery 15 PP and
MSDP through better transparency and effective implementation mechanism (preparation of
disaggregated data, adequate human resources, decentralized need based planning and strong
monitoring and evaluation).

50
Considering the problems in the guidelines and designs of the schemes, the 15 PP could be
implemented along the lines of the SCSP and TSP. It would also help to include minorities in
the budgetary processes through introducing separate minor heads for minorities and “separate
budget statement” on minority related programs in the Union and States Budget as is already
being done in the case of SCs and STs (for expenditure reporting). The Plan funds for minorities
should be allocated in proportion to their population. And out of these fund allocations a larger
share should be utilized for need based projects exclusively aimed at the development of
Muslims.

The process of setting up a National Data Bank and implementation of Equal Opportunity
Commission (EOC) need to be expedited and the recommendations on study Diversity Index
need to be applied in private and government run institutions related to jobs and education.

References

1. Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (2014): “Has the Tide Turned?-Response
to Union Budget 2014-15”, CBGA, New Delhi
2. Government of India (2011-12): Report of the Steering Committee on Empowerment of
Minorities, Planning Commission.
3. Government of India (2011-12): Twenty Seventh Report on Parliamentary Related Standing
Committee on Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment R on MSDP.
4. Government of India, 2006, “Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Social, Economic and
Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India”, Cabinet Secretariat, (Sachar
Committee).
5. Government of India, 2009 Report of the “National Commission for Religious and
Linguistic Minorities”, (Ranganath Mishra Committee Report), Vol. I-II, Ministry of
Minority Affairs, N. Delhi.
6. Government of India, 2009, National Commission for Minorities Handbook Statutory Rule
– 1,www.ncm.nic.in
7. Khan Jawed A and Pooja Parvati (2012): “Government’s Commitment towards Development
of Muslims –A Post –Sachar Assessment of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana” in India Social
Development Report 2012, Oxford and Council for Social Development, New Delhi.
8. Khan, Jawed A and Subrat Das (2014): “Exclusion in Planning and budgetary Processes” in
India Exclusion Report 2013-14, Books for Change, New Delhi.

Mr. Jawed Alam Khan is an M. Phil in Economics and is now a Ph.D. scholar at JNU. He is currently
working as Senior Research Officer at Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) New Delhi,
focusing on rural development, fiscal decentralization and responsiveness of budgets to disadvantaged groups like
minorities, Dalits and Adivasis. He has 12 years of experience in field-work based research in areas like fiscal
decentralization and utilization of funds in social sector programs.

51
 Chapter 4

POLITICS, VIOLENCE AND PRODUCTION OF ‘FEAR’: WORKING OF

SHIV SENA IN MUMBAI
Abdul Shaban

Abstract

Socio-cultural and racial diversities provide richness and the colour the humanity can have. However, they also
make available the schism and layers on which politics can operate, divide people and sustain violence. The paper
examines how the democracies remain prone to negative exploitation of the diversities. It also attempts to
investigate identity politics, which can be practiced and interest groups which can be mobilised. Among others, the
recurrent communal violence and polarisation of religious groups around certain political parties in the post-
independence period remain consequence of this. The deprivation and access to socio-political institutions still
remains an issue to the lower castes.

Introduction

Socio-cultural and racial diversities provide richness and the colour the humanity can have.
However, they also make available the schism and layers on which politics can operate, divide
people and sustain violence. The democracies remain prone to negative exploitation of the
diversities along which the identity politics can be practiced and interest groups can be
mobilised. The migration from one region to another in search of livelihood opportunities may
further add to this negative use of the diversities (Katzenstein 1973). In order to consolidate the
diverse groups and their identities, the ‘unity in diversity’ has been advocated in India. However,
the diversity and identity of ethnic and linguistic groups have become rich source of regional,
communal and national politics and very productive to political parties to secure their votes even
at the cost of violence – looting and killings. The fault line along religion, language, caste and
region had started manifesting themselves in the country in the national movement for freedom
from the British rule. The British also used the Indian social diversity and complexity for their
advantage and to sustain their rule.

The religious division was to be first utilised by the British. The mutiny of 1857 made them
believe that the Muslim Mughal king was the symbol around which different communities
mobilised themselves to oppose the colonial rule. As a result, Muslims were the first target of the
British. Muslims were not only discriminated against in the government civil and military
services but their entry to Delhi was restricted in the subsequent years. The ‘divide and rule’
policy of the British gave rise to the ‘two nations’ theory and subsequent division of the country
on the basis of religion. Among others, the recurrent communal violence and polarisation of
religious groups around certain political parties in the post-independence period remain
consequence of this. The deprived lower castes of India also started demanding the separate
electorate under leadership of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar which was later abandoned by his pact (Poona
Pact) with Mahatma Gandhi. However, the deprivation and access to socio-political institutions
still remains an issue to the lower castes. In 1990s, caste divide further accentuated due to
provision of reservation for lower castes in government services.

The regional issues also remain alive in the country. They also have their root in partition and
accession to Union of India, or reorganisation of states in 1956 on linguistic basis. The present
paper attempt to study the ‘son of the soil’ movement and politics around it by Shiv Sena in
Mumbai. Although, Bal Thackeray, the founder of the party, passed away in 2012 (under whose
leadership the party grew leaps and bounds only contracting in later years) and the party now
seems to be adopting more universalistic values and less oriented to violence, it demonstrates the
possibilities of extremes in political innovations, threats and violence along religious, caste,
regional and linguistic lines not found in any other states of the country. The paper highlights
and underscores the productivity which diversity of Indian could have for political party like
Shiv Sena to mobilise their votes and perpetuate violence against constructed ‘others’. It first
discusses the context in which Shiv Sena emerged and later examines its reaction to democracy,
‘othering’ strategies, political innovations, violence, and inherent contradiction in its political
ideologies.

Birth of Shiv Sena

The formation of states in India on linguistic basis provided much needed base to sub-national
groups to unite and assert their identities in democratic peaceful ways or otherwise. The
movement for Maharashtra and Mumbai as its capital started by socialists and some of those
associated with Indian National Congress through Samyukta Maharashtra Movement (SMM)
resulted in consolidation of the identity of those speaking Marathi. Whereas ‘Marathi’ as an
identity unified some but at the same time it also differentiated and divided them from others.
This is what exactly happened in Maharashtra. The identity of ‘Marathi’ cultivated by the SMM
has been much utilised by the extreme right wing parties like Shiv Sena and recently by
Maharashtra Nav Nirman Sena (MNS) for ‘othering’ and violence. Once the Maharashtra State
on linguistic basis was achieved and Mumbai became its capital, the SMM died out and
important issue became that of employment and livelihood. Given the influx of educated and
skilled workers from other parts of the country (particularly from Tamil Nadu), the Marathis
(Maharashtrians) especially found it difficult to get middle and upper level jobs in industries and
service sector in 1950s and 1960s. Bal Thackeray, a cartoonist and acid tongue right-wing
journalist, sensed the opportunity to use unity of native people against those from outside the
state (Joshi 1970). Bal Thackeray wrote in Marmik:

"As a class they (Maharashtrians) feel that in the State of Maharashtra, they, who are the
sons of the soil and as such must get full opportunities to develop their look of life, do
not get them even in small measure. They find their interests woefully neglected (Marmik
1967:6).

Though Shiv Sena’s definition of Maharashtrian initially was reasonably wide but the party
interpreted it on its own term and as per the occasions. In Shiv Sena’s conception,
Maharashtrians:

“not only includes Marathi-speaking Maharashtrians, but extends to all those of all
castes, creeds and religion, who look upon Maharashtra as their home-land, who have
been living here for generations together carrying on trade or business, contributing to
the welfare and prosperity of Maharashtra and above all co-mingling their wails and
woes with those of the sons of the soil” (Marmik 1967:8).

This movement in turn gave birth to a political party, Shiv Sena. The emergence of Shiv Sena
and its rise and fall has drastically impacted the social spaces, crime and violence, relationship
between people from other states and those ‘sons of the soil’ or Marathis {also called Marathi
manoos (marathis), or dhartiputra (sons of soil)}; the relationship between Muslims and Hindus, and
also the relationship between dalits (mostly those neo-Buddhists) and caste Hindus. The ‘sons of
the soil’ movement run by Shiv Sena has also impacted the relationship between dalits (the lower
caste of the Hindus, treated at untouchables) and Muslims. Most importantly, the antagonistic
relationship of Shiv Sena with other groups has often translated into violence: killing, looting
and murders, creation of ‘mass fear’ and ‘enmity’.

54
The seed of violent-cultural-regionalism was sown by the SMM in the latter half of 1950s, when
it expressed its demand for Maharashtra State and Mumbai (then Bombay) as its capital through
violent ways – by strikes and emotional political speeches full of regional sentiments. The left
wing labour trade unions in the city had also united the workers and taught them how to express
their demands in violent ways. These two components combined together to form the base of
the success of Shiv Sena in keeping itself alive and kicking.

The growth of Shiv Sena can be divided into the five phases. Phase I (1966-75), Shiv Sena rose
as anti-Communist and anti-South Indian movement and remained limited to Mumbai-Thane
urban belt. Phase II (1975-84), the period of first decline of the party when its popularity shrank
mainly due to influence of Datta Samant on mill workers and its support to emergency (Dhawale
2000). Phase III (1984-99), the period of rapid expansion due to failure of Datta Samant’s led
mill workers strike and manufacturing of Muslims as new ‘others’ leading to major riots in
Bhivandi in 1984 and in Mumbai in 1992-93.

This period also coincided with rapid rise of Hindu Nationalist sentiment at the national level
due to rath yatra (travel on chariot) undertaken by BJP and VHP, and their support by the RSS.
The Shiv Sena learned much politically and ideologically from the above right wing organisations
and effectively utilised the same against Muslims in Maharashtra and elsewhere. It formed
coalition with BJP in Maharashtra, won assembly election and ruled the state in alliance with BJP
during 1995-99. This phase also marks its growth in other states like Gujarat, Rajasthan, Delhi,
Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh due to its adoption of Hindu Nationalist
agenda.

This got combined with its ideology of violence and became attractive to the youths who already
were ideologically fed by right wing cultural and political organisation. Phase IV, from 1999 to
2012 was a period of decline and split in the party due to a family feud. The party got defeated in
Assembly Election in 1999, 2003 and 2008. The internal war between cousins, Raj Thackeray
(nephew of Bal Thackeray) and Udhav Thackeray (son of Bal Thackeray) to control the party
began as Bal Thackeray due to old age was unable to attend meetings and control the party
effectively. In the feud between the cousins, Bal Thackeray supported his son Udhav as Shiv
Sena leader leading to relegation of Raj Thackeray to the secondary position. Raj Thackeray felt
dissatisfied with this development and separated from Shiv Sena launching his own political
party, Maharashtra Nav Nirman Sena (MNS).

MNS adopts symbolic truce with dalits (the schedule caste population in India) and Muslims by
including green (colour generally associated with Muslims) and blues (a symbol of dalits), and
recruiting a few of Muslims and dalits in the party and putting hoarding in the city with their
names. The MNS in order to establish itself has also adopted the Shiv Sena’s nativist agenda.
The MNS, along with sloganeering against north Indian, has also attacked major film personality
like Amitabh Bacchan and Sharukh Khan for their expressing loyalties and associations with
their native places, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi, respectively. This period also saw resignation of
two other prominent and politically virulent leaders of Shiv Sena, Narayan Range and Sanjay
Nirupam as their ambitions despite all their innovations and loyalties to Bal Thackeray could not
be satisfied. Both of them have interestingly joined the Congress party, which is strategically
using them against Shiv Sena and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP).

The IVth phase also reflects the corporatisation of few individuals in Shiv Sena due to amassed
wealth. Some of them are presently engaged in real estate business, most important being the
buying of Kohinoor Mill land in Mumbai for millions of rupees by a few from the party. Phase
V of the party can be identified after the death of Bal Thackeray, that 2013 onwards. In this
period, the political rhetoric of party chief, Udhav Thackeray, has been more temperate though
some senior leaders of the party who occupied important positions in Bal Thackeray regime
55
have been shooting their pernicious statements against Shiv Sena’s usual ‘others’. In this phase
the party has also electorally done well by winning 63 state assembly seats in 2014 election.

The formation of a unilingual state of Maharashtra, with Mumbai as its capital, was achieved on
1st May, 1960 only after a long and bitter mass protest for five years (1955-60) by the Samyukta
Maharashtra Samiti, which mainly comprised of the socialists, communists and other democrats
(Dhawale 2000). Bal Thackeray who was working as a cartoonist in the Free Press Journal, the
English daily in Mumbai, separated himself from the newspaper in 1960 and started publishing
Marmik (that which grapples with the essence), a Marathi weekly journal of cartoons, political
comment and humour (Lele 1995). In Marmik, he wrote scathingly against communists, South
Indians and plight of bhumiputras (the Maharashtrians) in employment. Here, he first
conceptualized outsider (non-Maharashtrians) and insider (Maharashtrians) perspective, which as
an instrument was first used against South Indians, then Muslims, and now those from North
India.

The launching of Marmik, which became a precursor to the formation of the Shiv Sena, took
place against the backdrop of a huge mass movement, as mentioned earlier, for Samyukta
Maharashtra, i.e., a united Maharashtra inclusive of Mumbai, Konkan, Western Maharashtra,
Vidarbha and Marathwada regions but exclusive of Gujarat. On 20th October, 1966, the day of
Dussehra, Shiv Sena organized its first rally (RSS also organizes rally on Dussehra day at its
headquarter in Nagpur) at Shivaji Park. The support was immense and since then every year on
day of Dussehra, Shiv Sena’s rally is held at Shivaji Park. The reasons for the formation of Shiv
Sena were many ranging from politico-cultural to economic.

The party was formed to fight against the perceived injustice in employment and other matters
faced by the Marathis in Mumbai. For instance, between April and September 1967, the
Marmik, a Marathi cartoon weekly edited by Bal Thackeray, carried lists of persons in
executive positions in some 40 leading Industrial Houses in Bombay and some
Government Departments (Joshi 1970). The lists showed that "out of 1500 executives on
the rolls of those establishments, only 75 were Maharashtrians, while an overwhelming
majority (about 70 percent) were South Indians. It also revealed that from higher to
lower categories the staff was found cent per cent of the same community” (Thackeray
1967:13).

North Indian seths (businessmen and industrialists) used to call Maharashtrian workers by
derogatory names like Ghatis (dwellers of hills) and Hamals (head loaders). This no doubt had
hurt the sentiments of those belonging to the state. Further, as has been mentioned earlier, the
middle class Maharashtrians had tough time in getting employment as South Indians were
proving better skilled for employment. In fact, that is why many claim that Shiv Sena is an
outgrowth of middle-class job competition (Katzenstein 1973). The trade union movements in
Mumbai was largely controlled by the leftist from South India and this further infuriated Bal
Thackeray who used abusive languages in Marmik to describe the leftist trade union leaders.

The Gujarati seths could somehow escape from the violence of Shiv Sena but South Indians
became the target. Shiv Sena started coining derogatory words for South Indians and started
building animosity against them among Marathis in the city. It started branding South Indians
with abusive words like ‘Yandu Gundus’ (a meaning abusive term), and ‘Lungi Wallas’ (those
wearers of lungis – an unstitched cloth hung from waste) and arousing Maharashtrians to attack
South Indians with slogans like ‘Uthao Lungi Bajao Pungi’ (lift lungi and blow air between legs). At
this juncture, Shiv Sena started demanding 80 percent reservation in government jobs and 80
percent houses for Maharashtrians in Housing Board colonies which further widened its support
in native population and intensified attacks on communist leaders and trade unions controlled by
South Indians.
56
Innovations and Mobilisation

Shiv Sena has shown very resilient and innovative character to Indian politics. It has always
attempted to use the opportunities and symbols on its disposal to its political advantage and to
initiate violent events and processes for ‘othering’. It creates myths, and then involves people in
imagining and searching the facts for these myths. It massifies the myths, and dispossesses them
by religious belief or mob-mentality (Lele 1995; Heuze 1995). This mass is then used for
violence. It survives on its innovations– terminology, symbols, new methods of violence and
threat to new groups. It remains perpetually busy in seeking enemies. If they come themselves
before it, it welcomes otherwise it constructs and makes them. The same method is now being
adopted by the MNS.

The symbol of Shivaji’s persona, his youth and physical and political prowess against fighting
with Mughal Empire, have been used to motivate youths. The events of 17th and 18th Century
AD are glorified and interpreted out of context to strengthen the religious and cultural
sentiments of Hindus and particularly Maharashtrians. Now, it uses Shivaji as a symbol of
power, political strategist, masculinity, and virility, and attempts to bring ‘Chhatrapatiraj’ (the
benevolent dictatorship). Till late 1990s, motor cycle rides of party youths which symbolises
horse riding of Shivaji further fascinates many for involvement in the party and being part of
such rides. It often celebrates Shivaji Jayanti, to mobiles youths and takes advantage of Bal
Gangadhar Tilak initiated Ganapati worship, Janam-ashthami (birthday of Krishna) and
Dussehra (the symbolic day of murder of evil Ravana of Lanka by Rama). The Ganapati worship
is an example of ‘little tradition’ being used by Bal Gangadhar Tilak in Maharashtra to mobilize
people against the British rule in India. The small one day worship of believers was turned into
an elaborate 14 days worship to mobilize people. Now Shiv Sena has almost taken over more
than 70 percent of Ganesha Pandals in the city and the occasion is now used to impart cultural
nationalist ideology rooted in ‘national-Hindu’ ideology of V.D. Savarkar” (Heuze 1995: 215)
and recruitment of unemployed poor youths in the circuit of this violent ideology.
Dussehra day had been usual occasion, when Bal Thackeray himself delivered speech in Shivaji
Park of the city to his followers and it was this day when the first rally of Shiv Sena was
organized in Shivaji Park in 1966. There has also been vicious association of capitalist class with
Shiv Sena and those with right wing ideology. They (capitalist class) actively participate and help
the party by providing generous donations and putting big hoardings on roads and streets.
English and vernacular news papers and electronic media owned by big media barons, publish
and highlight photos and events associated with these festivals in order to capture viewer-ship
and market. This further, strengthens trust and belief of common man in the rituals and ideology
those advocated by the culturo-religious nationalists.
Further, under the leadership of Bal Thackeray, Shiv Sena has also been able to the use the
grievances and plight of common Maharashtrian in Mumbai to its political advantage. The Shiv
Sena has over the years struggled through violent ways to create respect for Maharashtrians as
they had often been called with derogatory names by the people from other regions. As most of
the Maharashtrian workers were engaged in lower and menial jobs in 1960s and 1970s. Given
that Shiv Sena attempted to provide a respect to common Maharashtrians and their culture, it
appealed to common man and number of its supporters surged. In fact, Shiv Sena was initially
not much inclined to Hindutva ideology as towards nativism but in 1970, this ambivalence was
abandoned by Bal Thackeray, who declared:
“Our victory is a victory of Hindu-ness, the victory of true nationalism. What is
shameful in it? Jan Sangh, Hindumahasabba, R.S.S. and Swatantra were with us. I thank
them.” (Marmik 1970)

57
After Marmik, Bal Thackarey started Saamana (meaning ‘confrontation’), a Marathi daily. The
bold and virulent writing in the paper by its editors and sponsors against its invented enemies
keep on appearing in the news paper. In fact, the party leaves no opportunity to publish such
type of write ups. This keeps the ideology of the party whizzing around. This also has kept the
mobilized flock of the party-men together over the years and motivates the youth to join the
party. Although, many a times, civil society has attempted to drag the newspaper to the court
and get it gaged for publishing such news. However, the overt and covert supports by the
administrators of the city to the thinking propagated by the party have every time rescued the
newspaper from judicial strictures. In fact, “Bal Thackeray has combined media techniques that
portray him as an incarnation of Shivaji, as a deliverer of unfulfilled promise with purely
instrumental alliances and have targeted Muslims, elite Marathas and Mahar dalits as the enemy”
(Lele, 1995: 209). The violence perpetuated by it has often left behind the trail of human
sufferings.

To recruit, organize and mobilise youths and supporters, Shiv Sena has had a well-established
structure. At the lower level, it has ‘gata’ (small organization). A number of ‘gata’ combine
together to form ‘shakhas’. It has borrowed the organizational efficiency and structure much
from the RSS. Youths spend a long hours at shakhas or vyayamshalas (gymnasium) and get
exposed to its ideology of hatred. The unemployed and uneducated youth, form foot soldiers or
army of the activists. In addition to the support of upper caste, white-collar workers and
professionals, the Shiv Sena needed an army of activists to give credence to its name (Lele 1995).
It has believed in a strategy that “at least a part of the cadres, have to be young, perpetually new
and assertive and involve themselves in political work that is continuously considered as ‘a
struggle’ (Heuze 1995:215).

Shiv Sena (now its splinter MNS as well) has often been involved in using emotional themes
through any kind of tactics for building and maintaining the unity of its followers. It propagates
fascistic concept of cultural nationalism and to the aim of achieving a ‘Hindu Rashtra’.
“Hindutva has become a convenient ideology in sustaining this posture in number of ways”
(Lele 1995: 204). Issues and occasions have often been chosen and manipulated, so as to retain
the core supporters and provide new vigour and enemy to the violence workers. It had engages
in, for creating homogenous Hindu consciousness and construction of stereotypes and
demonisation of ‘others’. It has also represented, as we see later, a new capital-state-crime nexus
and is involved in fostering and being fostered by predatory capitalism.

To attract potential candidates for recruitments, Shiv Sena has also been engaged in many
philanthropic works. It offers social services, like ambulance services, in slums. The recruitments
of followers, in the past, had generally been through demonstration of force of violence in riots.
It also uses family and local associations, mitra-mandals (friendship organisation), and network of
clubs to recruit its sympathizers and army. In fact, many say that the party comprises of those
who want to take political advantage of common man expressing their feeling of powerlessness
through violence (Heuze 1995). Association with Shiv Sena provides common man an informal
power and gives a sense of ‘virility’.

By acid tongue and blistering speeches, Bal Thackeray through his chromatic leadership had
been able to mesmerize both educated and uneducated marathi youths (Katzenstein 1977). In
fact, Dipankar Gupta in 1980 wrote, “Bal Thackeray…is in many ways a typical charismatic
leader which allows him to exercise complete dictatorial authority over the organization”
(p.24) and use the mass power for his political ends. The petty goons, who otherwise would be
afraid of the police, have found shelter in the Shiv Sena, and the party needs them in order to
physically express its virulent ideology. The informal power or acceptance and omission of
criminal acts what the petty musclemen needed and that what Shiv Sena has been able to
provide them.
58
In Mumbai, Shiv Sena “organizes presently some 40,000 hardcore activist and perhaps 2,00,000
sympathisers through 210 shakhas (urban branches), about 100 sub-shakhas (gata shakhas) and
several mass organizations, especially trade unions, the Women’s Front (Mahila Aghadi) and
Sthanya Lok Adhikar Samiti that tries to procure job for educated unemployed” (Heuze
1995:214). Shiv Sena has also shown extreme opportunism with regard to its victims. It engaged
in violent clashes against the Muslim League and the Dalit Panthers but also sought their
support for mayoral election in 1980s. It initially called South Indians as enemies, and then
moved to Savarkarian Ideology of Hindu Rashtra perpetuating violence against Muslims.

It has further widened its scope and attacked North Indian migrants along with Muslims. North
Indian Hindus in the city, in fact, had helped Shiv Sena in precipitating violence against Muslims
in 1992-93. South Indian surrendered to Shiv Sena in 1970s and became friendly to it. In
Dharavi, where most of the lower income group South Indians and dalits reside, Shiv Sena held
special recruitment drive. These Dalits were later used as instruments for killing Muslims in
1992-93 riots. A large recruitment of South Indians in the party was carried out in Dharavi in
late 1970s and early 1980s. Thus, the enemy has changed for Shiv Sena. The usual prey (South
Indians) now feels secure. Shiv Sena chooses its enemies as opportunities require.

Shunning Democracy and Plurality

As the ideology of Shiv Sena (now that of MNS as well) remains that of dictator, which wants to
homogenize people to one culture, one nation, one religion, one region and one belief, obviously
often finds it odd to appreciate Indian democracy which propagates and assures diversity,
respect for all, and to live and earn livelihood anywhere in the country, irrespective of birth
place, belief or culture. Shiv Sena under the authoritarian grip of its supremo Bal Thackeray, had
never disguised his contempt for democracy and adulation of dictatorship (Dhawale 2000). It
supported emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1970s. But many also believe that the
support was mainly due to the fear that Shiv Sena office bearers would be rounded off and put
in prison like those from Rashtra Swayamsevak Sangh (a Hindu cultural organisation) and
Janasangh (political wing of RSS till 1980s when it was renamed as BJP) by dictates of Indira
Gandhi. The emergency was perhaps the only occasion when the ideology of Shiv Sena and
those in RSS and presently in BJP (BJP comprise mainly those from Janasangh party) diverged
so much.

“Under the Emergency, the Sena relegated to the background its earlier attacks
on Congress and applauded Mrs. Gandhi’s ascending power. It is said that when
Sanjay Gandhi passed through the city, Thackeray showed his respect by touching
his feet. During the pre-election campaigns this March, Thackeray overruled those
in the Sena ranks who supported the Janata and declared the Shiv Sena's open
alliance with Mrs. Gandhi’s Congress.” (Katzenstein 1977:246-247)

Shiv Sena (now MNS as well) has also shown occasional praise to and glorified Adolf Hitler,
Nathuram Godse (who killed Mahatma Gandhi), and Sangh Parivar (the RSS, Vishwa Hindu
Parishad (VHP), and Bajarang Dal, whose ideology remains of Hindu Rashtra and cultural
nationalism). Occasional criticism and mocking of parliament and its elected representative have
been regular appearance in its news paper Saamana.

Many Victims

The hall-mark of Shiv Sena has been its ability to perpetuate violence. The ability that it has
bestowed to its cadre to engage in violence through its ideology is noteworthy. Since its birth in
1966, it has always expressed its ideology in violent ways. Of course, the state machineries have
59
often looked other side and thus supported it covertly. While returning from the first rally
organized by Bal Thackeray in 1966, Shiv Sainiks (supporter of Shiv Sena) targeted South Indian
establishments, looted and burned down restaurants. They also kicked and attacked South
Indians on their way to the rally and while returning from the same. The Maharashtra-Karnataka
boarder dispute provided another opportunity to Shiv Sena to display its power in Mumbai in
February 1969.

The riots against Kannadigas led to loss of 59 lives, 274 persons wounded, 151 police men
injured and property worth millions destroyed and looted. It was the first and the last time that
Bal Thackeray was arrested (Dhawale 2000; Heuze 1995; Lele 1995). Another major event was in
1984 in Bhiwandi where it killed hundreds of Muslims and looted their property. The anti-
Muslim riot in 1984 and 1992-93 are chilling reminder of the support base of the party and its
penetration in the Police. Wherever its political leaders could not reach (like those in Muslim
ghettos of Byculla, Nagpada, J.J. Marg, and Pydhoni) to kill Muslims, the police did the job for
Shiv Sena. On occasions it has been engaged in violent protest against the people from other
states in the city. It has specifically targeted North Indian (those from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh).
Bengalis have been scoffed as ‘useless’, and ‘lowly’, and Muslims from West Bengal have often
been innovatively targeted as Bangladeshis. As mentioned earlier, Shiv Sena have not even
spared the film personalities like Amitabh Bachchan, Shahrukh Khan, and Shabana Azmi from
its violence. The art and media are its favourite targets. It has also violently targeted on occasions
new year celebration and celebration of Valentine’s Day, as it regards them of western origin and
pollutant for Hindu culture.

Shiv Sena has shown tremendous ability of political innovation and at the same time translating
the innovations into violence in order to eradicate ‘others’. One of the main targets of Shiv Sena
have been communists and leftists. The party used its regional and religious agenda so effectively
that communist movement which was extremely strong in Mumbai disappeared within two
decades (by 1985). Shiv Sena set up Bhartiya Kamgar Sena (BKS) on August 9, 1968. It needed
to break other unions in order to establish its supremacy in working class. Through violence and
muscle power, it succeeded in breaking the labour unions having communist support. Some
major examples of communist-led unions that were broken in this manner were the AITUC
unions of Larsen and Toubro, T. Maneklal and Parle Bottling Plant in Mumbai, and the CITU
unions of Devidayal Cables, Wyman Gordon and Surendra Industries in Thane (Dhawale 2000).
The Congress led governments and the capitalist class (mill owner and media baron) actively
supported Shiv Sena in its project. The climax was reached on June 6, 1970, when armed
members of the Shiv Sena murdered the sitting MLA of the Communist Party of India (CPI),
Krishna Desai. Krishna Desai was a popular militant mass leader in the textile belt and had been
elected as municipal corporator four times before he was elected to the state assembly in 1967
(Dhawale 2000).

Targeting Minorities

Shiv Sena has constantly changed its enemies except that of Muslims. Many from South India
(South Indians were once targeted by Shiv Sena) have become a part of Shiv Sena and are now
its violent workers and foot soldiers. Many North Indian Hindus have been actively siding with
Shiv Sena over the years and more so, when South Indian were targeted. Against Muslims, both
North and South Indian Hindus and even those belonging to dalit community (as in Dharavi)
were utilized in 1984 and 1992-93 riots. Shiv Sena has not willingly pitched these regional,
religious and caste groups against each other, but for saving themselves from the violence of
Shiv Sena and ideological convictions within have led these groups to behave in such a manner.
By associating with Shiv Sena, they feel more secured, as they have experienced and seen failure
of the state to provide them security.

60
Further, religious divides and conflicts lead these regional and caste groups to unite with Shiv
Sena (and other Hindutva ideologues like RSS, VHP, BJP, etc.) to target Muslims. Shiv Sena uses
religious occasions and festivals for political ends. They serve as platform for continuously
keeping in touch with masses and keep the masses ideologically intoxicated. Major festivals like
Durga Puja, Ganesh Chaturthi, Shivaji Jayanti and Navratri are used to spread the Hindutva (to
turn the Hindus against its imaginary religious enemies) and regional ideology (to divide them on
regional line to garner local votes) and recruit people in party fold.

A large section of Muslims in Mumbai lived and continue to live with precarious livelihood and
lack of appropriate shelter (Shaban 2010). Shiv Sena never ran the analysis of employment
situation of Muslims vis-à-vis Maharashtrian Hindus as it did for South Indians. The attacks on
Muslims was based on perceived sense of their being Pakistan supporters, Bangladeshis and fear
that they through their population growth will take over the Hindu population.

“Indeed, the Sena did not claim (nor would it have rung true) that Muslims were
taking jobs or educational places or housing away from Maharashtrians as the Sena
had claimed about South Indians in the 1960s. No exposes about Muslim economic
encroachment, similar to the 1960s lists of South Indian company employees, ran
in the pages of Saamna, Shiv Sena's daily. Rather, there were at best vague allusions to
the burden that must be borne by the taxpayer who has to support ever the
allegedly rising numbers of illegal (Bangladeshi) immigrants and to the Muslim
(Bangladeshi) hawkers who crowd the roads and to the thousands who occupy
scarce space, preying on urban services in an already overcrowded city. Muslims were
not portrayed as traders whose wily ways were suspect or as privileged professionals who
dominated the higher rungs of the city's white-collar occupations. What Muslims were-
according to the Sena’s creed- were seditious. It was their presumed lack of political
identification with the Indian nation rather than their societal position that was the
subject of Shiv Sena's diatribes”. (Katzenstein, Mehta and Thakkar 1997: 376)

In 1980s and 1990s, India-Pakistan relations became major determinants of Hindu-Muslim

relations, particularly in urban areas in the country. By targeting Muslims, the right wing Hindu
groups enjoyed vicarious feeling of punishing Pakistan. For Muslims, it became difficult to
watch live telecasts of cricket matches between these two countries particularly in offices, hostels
and other public places. Appreciation of game and players for their ability, and if they belong to
Pakistan and the appreciators were Muslims, was construed to be anti-national. Those who
celebrated win of Pakistan were considered gaddar (disloyal) to the nation and needed to be
punished at appropriate time. Then there were also those Muslims who celebrated winning of
Pakistan team. The appreciation or support of team slowly translated into religious hatred. The
vent often came out in the form of riots against Muslims.

Shiv Sena (even BJP, VHP and Bajarang Dal) understood the potential which the cricket
matches offered to them besides other issues like Ram Mandir at Ayodhya and Shah Bano case.
This ideology later also got combined synergistically with the U.S. ideology of pursuance of war
against terrorism. As such, Shiv Sena has systematically targeted Muslims and sometimes other
minorities as well in a cynical attempt to build its mass support. Involvement of Shiv Sena in
anti-Muslim riot in Bhiwandi (a suburb of Mumbai) in 1970 led to the death of 43 people. The
riot also spread to Mahad and Jalgaon (where 39 people were killed). The property, mainly of
Muslims, of millions of rupees was destroyed.

“The early eighties in Maharashtra, as elsewhere in the country, saw the first stirrings of a
new drive launched by the forces of Hindu communalism, which was spearheaded by the
RSS-controlled Sangh Parivar. Capitalising on events like the Meenakshipuram
conversions, terrorism in Punjab and Kashmir, Christian missionary activities in the
61
 north-east and so on, the VHP began to make direct appeals for Hindu consolidation to
meet these challenges. Ganga Jal yatras were taken out across the country and the Ram
Janma bhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute was deliberately raked up. The communal cauldron
was being stirred up by the saffron brigade” (Dhawale 2000).

Shiv Sena took up the Hindu revivalist tendency in Maharashtra more prominently. It started
translating the ideas which Savarkar, Hedgewar, Golwalkar and latter RSS propagate. Invigorated
with communal ideology propagated by the BJP, VHP and RSS and yatras (travel) for Ram-
Mandir, Shiv Sena unleashed its violence against Muslims in Bhivandi Riots in 1984.

“The provocation for the riots was a public speech by Bal Thackeray, wherein he made
derogatory remarks against the Prophet, Paigambar Mohammed. These remarks were
printed in exaggerated form by some Urdu papers. As a reaction to this, in far-off
Parbhani in the Marathwada region, a Congress MLA, A.R. Khan organised a large
protest in which Thackeray's photo was garlanded with shoes. This ignited the fuse
which led the Shiv Sena to unleash massive riots in which at least 258 people were killed,
thousands injured and property worth millions destroyed. The riots were replete with
terrible instances of cruelty, the most heinous being the Ansari Baug massacre at
Bhiwandi.” (Dhawale 2000)

The venomous attacks on Muslims who have always been seen as traitors and anti-Hindu by
right wing Hindu parties and their sympathizers provided the needed platform to Shiv Sena for
its resurrection in mid-1980s. In 1986, Shiv Sena in order to capture the loyalties of Hindus in
villages started ‘Saffron Week’ all over Maharashtra. Opening up of the lock of Babri Mosque
during the same time by Rajiv Gandhi led regime and subsequent further polarization of Hindu
and Muslim masses helped Shiv Sena in propagation of its brand of Hindutva more
conveniently.

Another opportunity came to attack Muslims in 1992-93. On December 6, 1992, Babri Mosque
in Ayodhya was attacked and demoslished. Muslims started protesting against the government
which could not prevent it and those who did it. Violence started in Mumbai. An unprecedented
attack started on Muslims, only to be repeated in Gujarat riots in 2002. Great brutality and
dehumanisation were displayed by Shiv Sainiks. It led to the counter violence by Muslims
(largely by criminals and underworld) through serial bomb-blast. This was also first time in
Mumbai’s history that such a coordinated and managed bomb-blast took place, as were riots.
The violence has often helped the Shiv Sena in its political game plan, for which, in fact, it uses
the violence. In 1995, Shiv Sena in alliance with BJP emerged as victorious party in state
assembly. Thus, riots paid up. Later Sri Krishna Commission Report on Mumbai Riots in 1992-
93 thread bared the involvement of Shiv Sena in killing of Muslims in the city (Punwani 2010).

Although, attacks against dalits, tribals and Muslims had occurred, independent of each other,
before and during the seventies. They continued in the eighties. A highly publicized event in
1981 placed the fear of rising subaltern militancy in the larger context. With the conversion to
Islam of a thousand dalits in the South Indian village of Meenakshipuram, the fear of loss of
hegemony of savarna (upper and middle-ranking castes) elites came to be expressed as danger
lurking of Hindus being reduced to a minority in their own country. Discrete local acts of
defiance by dalits and Muslims could now be explained as a part of nationwide conspiracy
financed by foreign powers. The support received by the janajagaran movement of the Vishva
Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the popularity of the slogan ‘Say with pride, I am a Hindu’ (gurve se
kaho hum Hindu hain) bear testimony to the fact that the changing conditions of material life
were providing an easy breeding ground for an old ideology in a brand new manifestation (Lele
1995: 201). And this is what the Shiv Sena has used effectively for its political end. Further,
repeated propaganda for dehumanization and demonisation of Muslims has been carried out.
62
Threatening Dalits

Shiv Sena is a party with brahminical, Kshatriya and kayashtha loyalties. It has got supports from
other Hindu castes because of their loyalties to Hinduism and lack of independent thinking from
system in which they are embedded. The Dalit Panther was set up by Neo-Buddhist dalits in
1972 and it attacked the perpetuation of caste system by attacking Hindu Gods and Goddesses.
The first flash point came in January 1974, when there was a violent clash between Shiv Sena
and Dalit Panthers. Shiv Sena unleashed riots and violence against dalits in Bombay
Development Directorate (BDD) chawls (poorly made residence where most of dalit workers live)
in Mumbai. Dalit Panther leader Bhagwat Jadhav was brutally killed by Shiv Sena musclemen.
Since then, the animosity between Shiv Sena and radical dalits continues. In rural Marathwada
and Vidarbha, the attack on dalits continues. They are attacked for their encroachment on fallow
land or water bodies. The Mandal Commission controversy in late 1980s and early 1990s further
brought to the fore the anti-dalit character of Shiv Sena. Bal Thackeray opposed caste-based
reservation. This in turn assured him loyalties of upper caste Hindus not only in Maharashtra but
all-over India. In 1988, the publication of Dr. Ambedkar unpublished work ‘Riddle in Hinduism’
further provoked Shiv Sena which started abusing Dr. Ambedkar for assault on Hindu Religion
and breaking it up. The attack on Mahatma Jyotiba Phule, another great champion of radical
social justice, by RSS leaning journal Sobat around the same time further crystallized the upper
castes and widened its wedge with lower castes (Dhawale 2000). The renaming of Marathwada
University after Dr. Ambedkar provided other opportunities to Shiv Sena and its right wing
alliance parties to carry out violent suppression of dalits.

Many Linkages

Shiv Sena has overtly and covertly been in alliance with a number of petty and hardened
criminals. The links of the Shiv Sena with mafia gangs, organised crime, extortion rackets and
corruption scandals are notorious.

“By the early eighties the most characteristic feature of Sena was its image as nothing
more than a network of gangs which thrived on extortion of protection money from
hawkers, businessmen, shopkeepers. It also became known for extortion from and actual
involvement in the various illegal deals in the larger construction, contraband and drug-
trafficking industries (Lele 1995: 199).

Shakhas of Shiv Sena paved the way of entry of criminals. As mentioned earlier, shakhas recruit
urban unemployed and underemployed youths. Many petty criminals and those ambitious to
find political power join the shakhas. The extra-legal authority of Bal Thackeray also provide
legitimacy to violent acts of the criminals and position/status within the urban power hierarchy.
Through Shiv Sena for the criminals “opportunities were opened for individual material gain
through collective action of rioting, looting and extortion” (Lele 1995: 199). However, 1995
onwards (when it came to power) there has been gradual disillusionment of middle class white-
collar workers from the party. Presently “the most abiding core of Shiv Sena activism is located
most firmly in Bombay’s lumpenized youth”(Lele 1995: 200). Some of them now represents
MNS.

Shiv Sena has also been blamed for having its active link with underworld and crime mafia. Bal
Thackarey himself declared, “If they (Muslims) have their Dawood Ibrahim, then we have our
Arun Gavli” (Dhawale 2000). Gavli who belongs to lower castes and fell out from Shiv Sena due
to his loyalty toward Chhagan Bhujbal, a lower caste Shiv Sena leader who came out from Shiv
Sena due to its opposition to Mandal Commission recommendations and promotion of
Manohar Joshi by Bal Thackeray against Bhujbal. Later on underworld dons, Amar Naik and
63
Ashwin Nayak (two brothers) got patronized by Shiv Sena, and when Amar Naik was killed by
the police in an encounter, Samanaa denounced it as selective killing of Hindu and Marathi mafia
dons by the police and leaving out Muslim don Dawwod Ibrahim.

Shiv Sena also nominated the wives of these dons for Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai (MCGM) election, and one of them was also promoted for Assembly election. After
the serial-bomb-blast in Mumbai in 1993, Shiv Sena has tried to patronize Chhota Rajan gang by
declaring him as a Hindu don. In fact, 1980s and early 1990s were peak periods of relationships
between Shiv Sena and Organised Criminal Gangs within the city. In this period, Shiv Sena
accumulated power through local neighbourhood and criminal networks. Several well established
gangsters, major slumlords, and dadas (goons) ran on Shiv Sena Tickets (Lele 1995; Hansen
2001).

Since the beginning, Shiv Sena stood against the communists. It often sided with capitalists to
break the trade unions run by the organized labours. “It in fact described some big capitalists as
annadatas (food givers) of Maharashtrians, while describing ‘all lungiwalas’ (South Indians) as
criminals, gamblers, illicit liquor distiller, pimps, goondas and Communists” (Lele, 1995:190). In
late 1960s and 1970s attacks on South Indian establishments became a regular feature, and it was
then that the extortion racket under the name of ‘protection money’ began. In 1968, cinema
theatres screening Hindi films brought out by South Indian producers were attacked and the
shows brought to a halt. The shows began only when considerable sums of money changed
hands. “…attacks on property were easily transformed into a protection money racket and were
made a source for financing many shakha activity.”(Lele 1995: 195)

Corruption charges have repeatedly been made against many leaders of Shiv Sena by Gandhian
activist and social reformer, Anna Hazare. The list of corruption included names of Bal
Thackarey, Pramod Mahajan, Manohar Joshi, Narayan Rane (now in Congress (I) Party),
Shashikant Sutar, Babanrao Gholap, Mahadev Shivankar, Nitin Gadkari, Shobha Phadnavis (all
Shiv Sena-BJP ministers in Shiv Sena– BJP government during 1995-99), Kirit Somaiya, Raj
Thackeray and many others. In some cases, the High Courts and Inquiry Commissions passed
strong indictments, due to which Shiv Sena ministers Sutar and Gholap were forced to resign
from the Cabinet (Dhawale 2000). In fact, the muscle power of these leaders is such that media
has been afraid of seriously taking up the charges and police due to its own corruption, religious,
caste and regional loyalties have looked other way.

The ‘Maharashtra Times’ of January 13, 1994 published a shocking report, which was never
denied by Shiv Sena sources, that a fund of five crore rupees was being collected by the Shiv
Sena through large-scale extortions and other means, and that this fund would be presented to
Bal Thackeray on his 67th birthday, the following week. Compulsion was made that every Shiv
Sena MLAs in Maharashtra must give rupees one lakh, every corporator Rs. 50,000 and every
shakha pramukh Rs. 25,000 to this fund. The report said that even the previous year, a similar
fund was collected. All this, was before the Shiv Sena came to power. After coming to power, all
these haftas (weekly extortion) were hiked much further, and all Shiv Sena ministers were also
included, with much higher ‘haftas’ which were fixed taking into account which ministry they
headed! (Dhawale 2000). However, the ideology of Hindutva and its real-time demonstration
keeps people loyal to Shiv Sena. The police and media both remain under its influence.

Overpowering Media, Judiciary and Creative Class

Shiv Sena has always successfully bullied the media to its favour. Further, recognising the danger
of opposing Shiv Sena, and the market Shiv Sena represents, media has also willingly sided with
Shiv Sena and facilitated its political agenda. The media and literary persons who attempted to
deviate the line of submission have been attacked. Shiv Sena’s first attack was on P.K. Atre, a
64
Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti leader and communist. Bal Thackeray hated communists as they
stood between his ideology and people. He started attacking Atre by derogatory names. In
Marmik he used to refer Atre as “that pig from Worli” (Dhawale 200). The location of office of
Maratha which Atre was publishing was in Worli. In 1967, Atre was attacked in a meeting by
Shiv Saniks but escaped. In October 1991, three journalist (including two women) were
assaulted for protesting against Shiv Sena attack on Marathi eveninger for writing editorial
against Shiv Sena’s involvement in digging pitches prepared for India-Pakistan cricket match.
Later on Shiv Sena’s Dophar Ka Saamna (noontime Saamana) started attacking women journalist
by characterising them as ‘prostitutes’ (Dhawale 2000). Shiv Sainiks attacked Nikhil Wagle,
editor of ‘Mahanagar’ in 1993, when he was addressing a seminar and in 1994 they assaulted a
dozen of journalist in Aurangabad in February 1994. Subsequently ‘Lokmat’ (Marathi daily)
office was vandalized by Shiv Sainiks.

Justice Srikrishna, who headed the commission of enquiry on Mumbai 1992-93 riots was
attacked by Samanaa as ‘biased, anti-Hindu and pro-Muslim’, Shiv Sena also attacked Vijay
Tendulkar, a playwright, for his plays ‘Sakharam Bunder’ and ‘Ghasiram Kotwal’, as the plays
exposed the degenerated ways of the Peshwas, Brahmin rulers of Maharashtra. Dilip Kumar, the
famous film actor, was declared as ‘Pakistani’, when he defended Deepa Mehta’s film ‘Fire’
which depicted lesbian relationship and also accepted Nishan-e-Pakistan (an award for his
achievements). Even High Court decisions are not spared. Bal Thackarey attacked the judgment
of high court which ruled to unseat some BJP-Shiv Sena MLAs. In a speech in 1991 he termed
high courts and judges as ‘corrupt’ and ‘partial’ (Dhawale 2000). In September 2008, Raj
Thackeray imitating the style of his uncle Bal Thackeray, challenged a Mumbai police officer,
with the statement - ‘He (the police officer) should come out without his badge and uniform and
he will know to who Maharashtra and Mumbai belongs to. The police officer had protested and
cautioned Raj Thackeray against the threatening email sent by him to every shop-owner in the
city to put their signboard in Marathi. The statement, the police officer gave, was that Mumbai
belong to none but every Indian and so they can put their signboards in the language they wish.

Contradictions Within

Shiv Sena is an amalgam of contradictions and opportunism. It uses the tools which suits its
most to further its ideology and political ends. Playing religious and regional cards, it brought
workers associated with the left to its own fold. It sided with capitalist class against communists
in the city and latter started attacking them for not recruiting enough Marathis. It has tendency to
shift from parochial and local issues to Hindutva and all India nationalism as situation desires. It
uses cultural symbols of god and goddess to pull people from all-walks of life and also degrades
common man by calling them with regional and cultural derogatory names like Biharis (those
from Bihar state), Bhayyas (those from Uttar Pradesh) and lungiwallas (those from South India). It
is led by regionalism and simultaneously nationalism, it is guided by national Hindusim but
becomes parochial and attacks even Hindus on regional basis.

Shiv Sena is an interesting phenomenon. It promotes agitations and riots in the name of order. It
engages in garnering political power but hates democracy, politicians and gives adverse remarks
on the Parliament. It hates communists and socialists, but directly inherits their ways of
protesting, organizing and vandalizing. The communist worker unions have taught many tactics
to Shiv Sena and it now uses it with utmost brutality. It promotes masculinity through
vyayamshalas (gymnasiums) and speeches of its leader by calling congressies (followers of
Congress Party) chhakka (eunuch) and offering them bangles, but it also equally thrives on
Mahila Aghadi, many of who assisted in perpetuating violence on women of minorities and
looting in 1992-93 riots. The women supporters have not only been used to block the arrest of
several of its leaders in the past but during 1992-93 riots also “prevent fire engines from going to

65
Muslim areas engulfed in flames, and even loot stores and attack Muslim women”. (Banerjee
1996:1214)

Shiv Sena perpetuates ‘dada culture’, ‘gundaraj’ (rule by criminals and musclemen) but aspires for
‘Chhatrapatiraj’ (benevolent dictatorship) (Lele 1995; Hueze 1995). It has converted the poor
and vulnerable into marauding mass.

“Shiv Sena leaders are among the most vociferous in condemning criminal activities,
hooliganism, smuggling and so on. Usually they say that it is not ‘their people’ who are
involved, but only Muslims or other ‘alien’ (in their view) people.” (Heuze 1995: 226)

Bal Thackeray condemns the violence by the Communist trade unions but he himself led the
violent mobs against others. He wrote:
“The Communists in India desired to bring to this country Communist rule by
violent ways, to organize country-wide strikes, to bring about destruction, to
create disorder . . . and to establish red dictatorship.” (Marmik 1961)
It attempts to provide roop (shape) to the city. The roop for them is ‘beauty’ but engages in
violence, riots and looting. It is called by Heuze as “a monster of ambivalence” (1995:230) and
“a place where bad can become good (Heuze 1995:226, emphasis in original).

Shiv Sena after Bal Thackeray

Has the ideology and practices of Shiv Sena changed after Bal Thackeray? Have the pernicious
and evocative statements of Shiv Sena against those it considers other side of its ideology and
practice changed? Is the new leadership able to effectively take forward the people’s
mobilization strategy for which Shiv Sena was known during life time of Bal Thackeray? How
does one see the future of the city Mumbai, which remained the battle ground and in ideological
grip of Shiv Sena under Bal Thackeray? These are a few questions which have been attempted to
deal with in this section, by examining a few events and the reactions that came to these events.

Bal Thackeray, the architect of Shiv Sena and its chief since its birth in 1966, passed away on 17th
November, 2012. On the very next day of Bal Thackeray’s death, a significant incident happened
that shows how ideologues of the party would like to preserve the ideology and practices of Bal
Thackeray. On the day of the funeral, bandh was called in a locality by some Shiv Sainiks. Reacting
to the calls of bandh one girl wrote on her Facebook page, “… one should not observe bandh for
Thackeray's funeral. We should remember Bhagat Singh and Sukhdev" (India Today, 2012). As
reaction to this statement, she was arrested by the police and her uncle’s clinic was attacked by
Shiv Sainiks. To take the case to the extreme, one of the girl’s friends was also arrested for liking
the post on Facebook. This happened during the Congress government in the state and that goes
on to show that how much Bal Thackeray captured the public mind and also how much the
personnel manning the institutions which are to safeguard individuals’ liberty and freedom
provided under the Constitutions are also affected by Shiv Sena’s ideology. The girls were released
on bail and later on the case was withdrawn by the police after enormous protest by civil liberty
groups.

On 17th July 2014, Shiv Sena’s Member of Parliament (MP), Rajan Vichare, with other 10
colleagues, forced feed a Muslim Employee, Arshad Zubair, who was fasting (during Ramadhan)
in Maharashtra Sadan, New Delhi, on alleged issue that a Government caterer was not making
proper and Marathi food. On this Shiv Sena run newspaper on 23rd July wrote: “If speaking up
against such tyranny is a crime, then our ‘mards’ have committed this crime“ (Times of India
2014: 6). Reacting to the incident, Social activist Teesta Setalvad said:

66
 “The politics of justifying violence through the logic of action and reaction is not new to
the Shiv Sena...and has been used well before the Gujarat riots. This logic has been
disproven by the Justice Srikrishna Commission report on the 1992-93 riots in
Mumbai” (Times of India 2014: 6).

What is important here is to understand the events and actions which divide the communities on
the basis of religion and perpetuate hate mongering. For instance, reacting to incident a leader of
Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM), said “The Shiv Sena believes in jungle raj. Their MPs
behaviour proves it once again. They have thrived on hate and will not leave any opportunity to
insult Muslims” (Times of India 2014: 6). Quoting as senior poet, Phadke writes:

“The MPs need to think about how they would react, if they were fasting during say,
Shravan, and someone force fed them meat. I fail to understand why there continues to
be such little tolerance for someone else's religion here. The Sena has often acted in this
manner… (Phadke 2014: 2)

Many still blame that ineffective governance was responsible for many untoward actions by Shiv
Sena in the past and the current governments are still ignoring the issues. “The Sena went
unchecked in the 1960s and 1970s, during which time it attacked trade unions and destroyed
Left politics in Maharashtra…The Congress has remained a silent spectator and was unable to
check the Sena” (Mukherjee 2014: 6). Shiv Sena has always been associated with muscle power.
Quoting a senior journalist, Mukherjee writes, “A string of former Congress CMs have used the
Sena for their gain” (Mukherjee 2014: 6), while other put it as Shiv Sena’s “behaviour is quite
consistent with their political philosophy…Why is everyone surprised?” (Phadke 2014: 2).

Many claim that the current government in Delhi may further embolden Shiv Sena to attack its
opposition. Quoting Teesta Setalvad, Mukherjee writes:

“The silence on the part of the political leadership in Delhi is frightening, as silence
normally means consent. We saw a similar silence when a young Muslim was murdered
in Pune. The silence comes from a PM, who ran a highly proactive campaign where he
spoke of every issue under the sun” (2014: 6).

Many blame that India’s democracy has been such that it is favouring those who wield muscle
power and money. While those who want to question them are afraid of their safety. Not only
many do not write against such parties and their actions, but also publishers do not publish due
to fear. The fear is very evident from the fact that two students who spoke against not allowing
such public representatives to govern cities requested that their names be changed as they were
“afraid of how the Sena will react” (Phadke 2014: 2). Many claim, “Such violations of
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, by lawmakers who have been entrusted with
upholding civil liberties, make a mockery of democracy” (Phadke 2014: 2) while other view,
“The Sena MPs did it because they think they enjoy impunity from law and can get away with
any misconduct” (Wajihuddin 2014:2). The Times of India put it:

“The muted response from a large section of the BJP and the central government
indicates it values its uneasy political alliance with the Sena more than it respects the law
of the land. The state government's role, too, will not bear scrutiny; it would be difficult
for it to explain why it waited for the media to first focus on the issue before enacting
the probe charade (Times of India 2014: 6).

While summing up the events DNA newspaper wrote, “Terrorizing, vandalism, gunda-gardi, and
rioting, communal polarization, inflammatory speeches are legendary synonyms for Shiv Sena”
(DNA 2014: 2). Shiv Sena has not hesitated to attack Muslims in post-Bal Thackeray phase as
67
well. Party veterans have repeated the arguments of Balashaheb Thackeray which violate basic
citizenship rights of Muslims. During the run up of Municipal election in 2015, some Shiv
Sainik’s demanded:

“Voting rights of Muslims should be revoked as the community has often been used to
play vote bank politics….If Muslims are only being used this way to play politics, then
they can never develop. Muslims will have no future till they are used to play vote bank
politics and thus Balasaheb had once said to withdraw Muslims voting rights” (Press
Trust of India 2015).

Besides lampooning its so called oppositions and its ‘others’, it also sometimes displays certain
empathies, but on its own terms. A section of Muslims around the world are known to be
sympathizers of Palestinian’s cause and so one finds a section of Muslims supporting the cause in
Mumbai too. Shiv Sena’s minority wing also finds opportunity to display messages in support of
Palestinians against Israeli occupations and oppressions. In first week of August 2014, against the
Israeli attack against Palestinians, a Shiv Sena hoarding in Urdu language in Mumbai displayed:

“From all Muslim Shiv Sainiks’ it is entreated from all brothers of Islam to pray from God
for Palestinians in Ghaza against Jewish (Israel’s) oppression and that God keeps Muslims
safe from Satanic activities of Jews. Ameen! Mohammad Asif Qureshi” (see Figure 1).

What is peculiar to this hoarding is the fact that it requested only Muslims to pray and singled
out Jews not Israel State. This shows that Shiv Sena’s par excellence in political manoeuvring still
survives. The ideology of Shiv Sena still remains the same of masculinity, regionalism and
parochialism. It uses the same method of attack, as it used during Bal Thackeray’s regime on its
‘others’. However, a very significant difference is noticeable. Whereas during days of Bal
Thackeray, the attack on opposition and their lampooning was led by Bal Thackeray himself.
The new chief of Shiv Sena, Uddhav Thackeray, son of Bal Thackeray, has kept himself largely
away from these attacks and his deputies coming mainly from past politics have largely been
involved in such attacks. Further, Shiv Sena has overcome the split in the party (Nav Nirman
Sena floated by his cousin Raj Thackeray) after the death of Bal Thackeray and still holds its
popularity, as it has alone won 63 seats in Assembly Election of Maharashtra in 2014.
Figure 1: Shiv Sena’s hording on Israel’s action against Palestinians in Aug 2014

Source: Photograph by the author

68
This provides an indication of changes in practice and it is possible that these slow changes in
the party may further get momentum as new generation leaders take larger command of the
party. Further, the party has largely kept away from its usual aggression, strike and beating its
‘others’ in the Mumbai, except for a few occasions. This augurs well for the city.

Summing Up

Shiv Sena has been the master of political innovations, derogatory terminologies and violence. It
has been sporadic but predictable hunter. It changes its targets and attacks victims with its
ferocious force. It is also a bundle of contradictions. At each stage till now it has overcome these
contradictions through political and social engineering. Although it involves in act of violence,
killing and crime, it has its most loyal friends and sympathisers in police and administrations. It
has inherited the ideology of Hindutva and preaches cultural-regionalism/nationalism which
threatens the existence of minorities and people from other cultures. The fertile grounds for
Shiv Sena have been provided by the failing successive governments in delivering development
to the people. The marginalisation of lower class over the years has further added to its
advantage. It has been said that:

“One of the major reasons for the success of the communal appeal, whether of the Shiv
Sena or the BJP, is … the fertile soil provided by the deepening economic crisis resulting
from the policies of successive Congress governments. Another important reason has
been the ruling class tendency of compromising with the communal forces, at both
national and state levels. In the case of the Shiv Sena…this tendency has been exhibited
with a vengeance” (Dhawale 2000).

Mumbai as a city of diversity has for a long time remained threatened with the ideology of
cultural homogeneity propagated by Shiv Sena. The post-Bal Thackeray phase, though, has
shown many continuity in the ideology and practice of Shiv Sena, there are significant changes
visible as the party Chief has himself kept away from the usual pernicious statements. This
indicates that Shiv Sena may acquire some significant changes as new generation of leaders take
control of the party.

References

1. Banerjee, Sikata (1996).The Feminization of Violence in Bombay: Women in the Politics

of the Shiv Sena.Asian Survey, 36(12):1213-1225.
2. Dhawale, Ashok. 2000. The Shiv Sena: Semi-fascism in action. The Marxist 16 (2).
http://cpim.org/marxist/200002_marxist_sena_dhawle.htm (accessed on 28 October
2008).
3. DNA (2014). Old habits die hard. DNA (Bangalore) 25 July.
4. Gupta, Dipankar. 1980. The Shiv Sena movement: Its organisation and operation, Part
one. Social Scientist, 8 (10): 22–37.
5. Hansen, T. B. 2001. Wages of violence: Naming and identity in postcolonial Bombay. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press.
6. Hueze, Gerard. 1995. Cultural populism: The appeal of the Shiv Sena. In Bombay: Metaphor
for Modern India, ed. Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner, pp. 213–47. New Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
7. India Today (2012). Two Mumbai girls arrested for Facebook post against Bal Thackeray
get bail. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/2-mumbai-girls-in-jail-for-tweet-against-bal-
thackeray/1/229846.html (accessed on 23 August 2015).
8. Joshi, Ram (1970). The Shiv Sena: A Movement in Search of Legitimacy.Asian Survey,
10(11):967-978.

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9. Katzenstein, Mary F. (1973). Origins of Nativism: The Emergence of Shiv Sena in
Bombay. Asian Survey, 13(4):386-399.
10. Katzenstein, Mary F. (1977). Mobilisation of Indian youth in the Shiv Sena. Pacific Affairs
50 (2): 231–248.
11. Katzentein, Mary F., U.S. Mehta and U. Thakkar (1997). The Rebirth of Shiv Sena: The
Symbiosis of Discursive and Organizational Power. The Journal of Asian Studies, 56(2):371-
390.
12. Lele, Jayant. 1995. Saffronization of the Shiv Sena: The political economy of city, state and
nation. In Bombay: Metaphor for Modern India, ed. Sujata Patel and Alice Thorner, 185–212.
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
13. Marmik (1961). Editorial. Marmik Cartoon Weekly, Diwali Issue.
14. Marmik (1967). Shiv Sena Speaks. Bombay: Marmik Cartoon Weekly.
15. Marmik (1970). Editorial. Marmik Cartoon Weekly, Diwali Issue.
16. Mukherjee, Anhita (2014). Activists decry Sena tactics, slam BJP. The Times of India, 25 July,
Mumbai.
17. Phadke, Mithila (2014). Shocked Mumbaikars slam `lawlessness by lawmakers'. The Times of
India, 24 July, Mumbai.
18. Press Trust of India (2015). Revoke voting rights of Muslims to put an end to vote bank
politics: Shiv Sena. Times of India, Mumbai. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ India/
RevokevotingrightsofMuslimsShivSena/articleshow/46896066.cms?prtpage=1 (accessed
on 24 August 2015).
19. Punwani, Jyoti (2010). Police Conduct during Communal Riots: Evidence from 1992-93
Mumbai Riots and Its Implications, in Abdul Shaban (ed), Lives of Muslims in India: Politics,
Exclusion and Violence, pp.187-207. New Delhi/London: Routledge.
20. Shaban, Abdul (2010). Mumbai: Political Economy of Crime and Space. Hyderabad: Orient
Blackswan.
21. Times of India (2014). Sena `mards' spoke up against tyranny: Saamna. The Times of India, 25
July, Mumbai.
22. Wajihuddin, Mohammed (2014). Suspend, arrest Sena MPs, say outraged state Muslims.
The Times of India, 24 July, Mumbai.

Abdul Shaban is a Professor, at School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Deonar,
Mumbai. He has published 3 books and over 35 papers have been published in various refereed journals and
edited books.

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 Chapter 5

MUSLIMS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA: ISSUES OF SECURITY

AND EQUITY

Ram Puniyani

Abstract

The problems of Muslim community have a long legacy. From coming of Islam to India, the conversions to Islam,
the process of rise of communal streams as a parallel and opposite to the freedom movement have laid the basis
discrimination of Muslim community in India. From last four decades the process has worsened due to the rise of
Hindu communal forces and the provocations provided by the Muslim communal stream. The result has been an
all-round demonization of Muslims, impacting their security, equity and social status. The situation has been
worsened by the global politics of oil, which has given birth to the likes of Al Qaeda and its clones. The popular
perceptions about Muslims only worsen the scenario.

This paper traces the origin of the Muslim community in India, its politics during last century and attempts to
outline the steps needed strengthen the democratic rights of this biggest religious minority in India. The focus on
education and employment along with social reform have to be given importance to steer out of the difficult times
being faced by this community.

Introduction

Indian Muslim community is under multiple discriminations. The occurrence of regular

repetitive violence against them has left them with a deep sense of insecurity on one hand and
on the other, their representation in the employment, political bodies has been continuously
declining. The social indices about their literacy, economic conditions, employment status and
other parameters show a very dismal picture. These have been well reflected in two reports,
those of Rajinder Sachar and Rangnath Mishra Committees. The situation has come to such a
pass that when Sachar Committee was working, it faced a diverse responses, “While many
welcomed and appreciated this initiative, there were others who were skeptical and saw it as
another political ploy. There was a sense of despair and suspicion as well. “…‘tired of
Memorandums’ many wanted ‘results’. The non-implementation of several earlier commissions
and committees has made the Muslim community wary of new initiative.” (Sachar, 2007, p3).
Rangnath Mishra Committee observed “Muslims are behind other religious communities in
areas of literacy and education, industrial promotion and economic pursuits.”(Misra, 2007)

Their state of social ‘security’ is reflected by the increase in the ghettoisation of the community.
With the rise of communal violence from the decades of 1980s, the community has not only
been demonized in different arena of society, but due to being subject of communal violence of
increasing intensity they have been forced to ghettoize in different cities, cut off from the social
interaction and social facilities like education, trade and banking. “The message of communal
agenda manifested through violence and through creating difficult situation for minorities is now
isolating them in most parts of India. So one can see the trajectory of violence as follows: it
begins with pre-violence biases, stereotypes, then violence, post violence neglect, isolation,
ghettoization and finally leads to partitioning of the national community at emotional and
physical level.”(Puniyani, 2010)

Today, the Muslim community stands at a crossroad. On one side there are states, where
Muslims are already being treated as second class citizens, on the other there is an overall
atmosphere in the country due to which they feel intimidated and marginalized. The
consideration of condition of Muslims is very crucial to the very concept of secularism in India,
“The status of the Muslim minority is fundamental in any consideration of India as a secular
state,…the treatment meted out to religious minorities is the best gauze of any state’s
commitment to secularism; in the case of Muslim minority in India, however this test is
absolutely crucial.”(Smith, 1963, p 411)

Indian Muslim Community: Formation

The formation of Muslim community in India took place at various stages. To begin with, it
started emerging along the Malabar Coast when the Arab traders used to come for trade during
the 7th century A.D. The social interaction and influence of Sufi saints were the major factors in
spread of Islam in India. A large section of untouchables converted to Islam to form a bulk of
Muslim population. The Muslim community was not a monolithic one. There were different
economic strata, majority being low caste poor peasants, and another group belonging to traders,
and a very small number of landlords. The difference in interests of elite and poor was very vast.

After the great rebellion of 1857, British held Muslims responsible for the revolt and punished
them severely, tried to keep them out of government jobs and deprive them of other facilities.
The newly introduced modern education and government jobs were initially filled mainly by
Hindus. The Muslim intellectuals noticed this and criticized the British Government for this,
“Even when some Muslim intellectuals began to notice that Muslims in some parts of the
country were lagging behind Hindus in modern education and Government jobs, they
blamed…the Government’s anti-Muslim policy and neglect of modern education by upper class
Muslims.” (Chandra,1989, 414) Later, with Sir Syed’s initiative the matters changed slightly but
the difference in the status of Muslims and Hindus as communities continued. Muslims had
more of poor, uneducated sections, while section of Hindus was able to take good advantage of
the educational and employment related opportunities.

The perception of interest between the elite and the poor Muslims was that the former shared
different cultural values having aspirations for higher number of jobs and wanted to make a
compromise with ruling powers for their social and economic aspirations. The upper and middle
class aspirations got channelized through the politics of people like Sir Syed Ahmed and Jinnah,
while those of the lower castes were represented through the politics of people like Badruddin
Tyabji, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad.

Freedom Movement: Communal Politics

The rise of communalism in India has been a very complex process. Colonial policies generated
the growth and economic domination of merchant-money lenders (by and large Hindus).
Hindus could take maximum advantage of modern education and accordingly, a place in
bureaucracy. Post 1857, anti-Muslim bias of the British gave slight edge to Hindus, who took to
modern enterprises/professions with great keenness. While the British historians used the
categories Hindu, Muslim, and Brahmin etc., Indian historians picked up only two of these
categories, Hindu and Muslim. Indian leadership used religious consciousness to inculcate
'Modern nationalism’ amongst the people, for example, Ram Rajya, Khilafat. This resulted in
two processes: (a) arousal of nationalism (b) arousal of communalism. We will shortly see that
communalism arose due to the politics of Muslim feudal lords, Hindu zamindars and British
policy of divide and rule.

With the introduction of modern education, industries and new transport and communication,
there took place a deeper process of rise of new classes, while the old feudal classes, princes
continued their existence. These two groups of classes threw up different politics during
freedom movement. “It is not an accident that feudal elements were the leaders of both Hindu
and Muslim communal forces. The leadership of Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha were in
72
the hands of upper castes and big landlords. These elements used communalism to promote
their class interests.” (Rai, 1998, p 48)

Partition was a multi-factorial tragedy which led to Muslim Communal politics, Hindu
Communalism and British policy of ‘divide and rule’ played the central part. Muslim League was
representative of the interests of Muslim elite. It wanted to appropriate maximum privileges for
the rich Muslims. It stated that Muslims are 25 percent of the population, but for passing any
legislation 2/3 majority is necessary, Muslims should be granted 1/3 representation in
legislatures, so that they can prevent anti-Muslim legislations, Congress rejected this demand.
Jinnah emerged as the major leader of Muslim League. Two nation theory was simultaneously
accepted by Muslim communalists (Chowdhary Rahmat Ali, Muslim League) and Hindu
Communalists (Hindu Mahasabha, RSS,) Along with the birth of Congress, began two opposite,
but in some way similar trends which were opposed to the secular politics of Congress. The first
of these was expressed by Sir Syed Ahmed, who opened this campaign in 1887, and the second
was the Hindu revivalist streams.

The Communal Triangle

With the formation of Indian National Congress (INC) and its representation of the cause of
‘rising classes’, and methods of ‘protest’ vis-a-vis loyalty, criticism of British crown, Sir Syed got
alarmed and kept aloof from the Congress. His focus of promoting education among Muslims
was the hallmark of his work. After the formation of INC, Sir Syed determined to hold aloof
and instead he set out to organize the Jagirdari elements amongst Muslims, and along with his
followers, he propagated that Congress is meant for the interests of the Hindus and ‘low born’
classes. In contrast to the Congress demand for representation, he was for nomination of elite
by the British and said that the British are the best guardians of the Muslim interests in India.
Later, with the formation of Muslim league, a political party came up which stood for the
interests of Muslim landlords and Nawabs of Riyasats.

Simultaneously, the principles of the Congress were being opposed by another section also. This
again was the section of Hindu zamindars, baniyas, (traditional tradesmen) and the rajas of
riyasats (rulers of the princely states). From 1870s, a section of Hindu zamindars, money lenders
and middle class professionals began to arouse anti-Muslim sentiments, simultaneously opposing
the Congress goal of a single nation, of a common nation irrespective of religious identities.
They talked of tyrannical rule of Muslim rulers and of the role of British in giving liberation
from that. They came up with the formulation, that ancient, pre-Mughal, age was the golden age
of India. The leader of Arya Samaj, Pandit Lekh Ram went on to condemn all forms of Islam
and demanded that either Muslims should be expelled from India or converted to Aryanism.
They founded the Punjab Hindu Sabha and were hostile to Indian National Congress. According
to them, INC's role of uniting people of different religions into a single nation meant sacrificing
Hindu interests to appease Muslims. According to them, the religion came before the nation - a
Hindu was a Hindu first and then an Indian. The culmination of these efforts led to the
formation of Hindu Mahasabha and later the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).

In addition to these old classes, a section of emerging middle classes also supported communal
politics in later period. Some of these were ideologically influenced by the emotive appeal of
religion based politics and its exhortation to one’s religion being in danger while others felt
insecure for their professional careers these were especially from amongst the sections of
Muslim middle classes. Mushirul Hasan points out, ‘The swiftness with which the idea (of
Pakistan) succeeded in becoming actualized and the intensity of emotions involved had more to
do with political and economic anxieties of various social classes than with profound urge to
create an Islamic/Muslim state. Both in its conception and articulation the Muslim League’s
demands summed up the fears and aspirations of the newly-emergent professional groups,
73
especially in Punjab, Sindh and UP, and industrial magnates of western and eastern India.”
(Hasan, 2001, p 56) One recalls that after the partition, it was mainly this section of Muslims
which migrated to Pakistan.

British Policy of Divide and Rule

British rulers realized the differences between Hindu and Muslim elite and embarked on the
policy of divide-et-empera (divide and rule). “As far back as 1821, a British officer writing under
the name of ‘Carnaticus’ in the Asiatic Review of May, 1821 was declaring the ‘divide-et-empera’
should be the motive of India Administration, whether political, civil or military.” (Engineer,
1994, p 100) With the formation of the Indian National Congress, they were very uncomfortable
with its demands. Sir Syed’s opposition to these demands came in handy for them and they
encouraged Sir Syed and his elite followers in their ‘communal demands’. British played their
cards well and taking advantage of Hindu Muslim divide, they tried to snub the INC times and
over again. They recognized a group of Muslim nawabs and jagirdars (Shimla delegation 1906) as
the representative of Muslims, and similarly encouraged the Hindu Mahasabha and RSS. None
of these organizations undertook any anti-British agitation, neither were these subject of
repression by the British.

“The British rulers took advantage of the aspirations of the elite Muslims for playing their
devious game of ‘divide and rule’. As the expression of loyalty to the united platform of
Congress began to abate, a communal platform appeared to express the loyalty to British more
vehemently, their thinking being that in the space for concessions more loyal had greater chance
to win…Shimla (Muslim) delegation under Prince Aga Khan, which was the beginning of so
called ‘Muslim separatism’, was comprised only of nawabs and zamindars. In demanding
separate electorates and excessive representation they were in councils, they were in fact angling
for greater share of for Muslim elite.” (Gadkari, 1999 p 18)

Thus, there are three major factors which resulted in the partition of the country. First was the
British policy of 'divide-and-rule'. Second was the Muslim communalism representing the
interests of Muslim zamindars, nawabs and other elite? The third was the Hindu Communalism
(RSS Hindu Mahasabha and partly through Congress) which represented the interests of Hindu
zamindars, brahmins and baniyas.

Partition Tragedy: Impact on Muslim Community

The Partition took place on a strange basis. The Muslim majority areas were demarcated as
Pakistan, West and East, and the scattered Muslims all over India were given the option and
right to stay in India with full citizenship rights. The elite section of Muslims, landlords,
bureaucrats and businessmen migrated to Pakistan with the hope of getting greener pastures.
Many of them were accommodated and compensated in Pakistan, but later the other Muslims
going from India to Pakistan were not welcome and were relegated to the life of subjugation. A
large number of them were deprived of basic rights and social facilities and are still called as
mohajirs. The Muslims who remained in India were more from the poorer sections, large
number of them illiterate, poor artisans and landless labour. They were heaped with the stigma
that it is because of them that India has been partitioned. “Radical change in the political order,
amidst bloodshed and carnage was accompanied with threat to old ways of living…They feared
the worst. As in 1857, their loyalty to the new state was suspect. They felt helpless and forlorn as
they experienced distrust and hostile discrimination in their daily lives.” (Noorani 2003, p1)

Time and over again, the Hindu communal forces assert that they are foreigners and the right
place for them is to be in Pakistan. “For Muslim communities that remained in India, partition
was a nightmare. The demographic picture changed drastically in Punjab and Bengal, two
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provinces that had largest concentration of Muslims in South Asia.” (Hasan, 2001 p.6). Hasan
further points out, “Lawyers, doctors, engineers, teachers and civil servants were comfortably
ensconced in Lahore or Karachi either in response to Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s clarion call or to
bolster their career prospects. On the other hand, the so-called Islamic community in India,
which had no place in Jinnah’s Pakistan, was fragmented, and left vulnerable to right wing Hindu
thoughts.” (Hasan, P 7, 2001, p. 7)

As different writers have pointed out, there is a great diversity in the culture, language and
economic life of Muslims in India. Rafiq Zakaria in Widening Divide: An Insight into Hindu Muslim
relations points out that while a small section of Muslim community, traders and industrialists are
well placed, the majority of them are impoverished laborers or landless peasants. Hasan sums it
up as “The fortunes of Muslim professionals dwindled and their influence waned after partition,
yet some of them have prospered during recent decades owing to expansion of trade, commerce
industry and services in medium sized urban centers and some have benefited from powerful
social and class factors, and political and family ties.” (Hasan, 2001 p 6)

Communal Violence

Communal violence is the bane of Indian society, the superficial manifestation of the
communalism prevalent in India. It began during the colonial period. The British policy of
divide and rule had a great role to play in this phenomenon. Communal violence has been
preceded by the ‘hate propaganda’ which the communal organizations spread against the other
communities. The Muslim League spread the venom against Hindus and the Hindu Mahasabha-
RSS spread the same against the Muslims in particular and lately against the Christians also in a
big way.

With India adopting a secular constitution, the stench of communal violence, which was worst
in the post partition riots, was supposed to die down. As a matter of fact the decade of 50s
witnessed a great amount of calm, though the undercurrents of hate ideology continued even
during this period. The Jabalpur riots of 1961 reminded the nation that communal ideology was
not dead. And since then, it kept visiting this or that part of the country at frequent intervals.
The situation in the country was like a saturated solution, ‘solution of communal hate’, in which
any small or large crystal can spark the process of violence. The decade of 60s saw the riots in
Jabalpur, sparked by the elopement of a Hindu girl with a Muslim boy. Incidentally the parents
of both happened to be bidi merchants and also trade rivals in a sense. Two other factors
provoked riots during this phase. “A series of major communal riots followed the Jabalpur riot.
Riots took place in this phase mostly in Eastern India, in Jamshedpur, Rourkela, Ranchi and
other places. In Rourkela, some Hindu workers threw Muslim workers into steel furnaces and
their bones were also not found.” (Engineer in Benjamin, 2006 p 40). In Eastern India, in
Jamshedpur, Rourkela and Ranchi, most of riots were sparked by the tales of refugees coming
from the East Pakistan.

By late 60s, the communal riots went up in India, “It was said in the late 60s that a riot a day
takes place in India which also included minor riots. It was on the basis of the report placed in
parliament by the then home minister.” (Engineer, 2006, p 39). Inder Malhotra, an eminent
journalist pointed out, “The strength and influence of avowedly communal and objectionable
militant Hindu parties has grown alarmingly. This cannot be utterly unconnected with distressing
rise in the number of communal incidents and riots.” (Malhotra, 6th Oct, 1969)

In Ahmadabad, Gujarat the riots were engineered due to opposition to the policies of Indira
Gandhi, the policy of Bank nationalization and abolition of privy purses, to which many in
Congress were opposed, and they were supported by Bhartiya Janasangh, the previous avatar of
the BJP, and the then prevalent right wing party, Swatantra party. At the same time riot was
75
sparked in Bhivandi due to a provocative speech by Bal Thackeray, the Shiv Sena chief.
“Bhivandi and Jalgaon in Maharashtra were shaken next in 1970 and Shiv Sena played a major
role in engineering communal violence in which unofficially death toll was more than 300 most
of whom were killed in villages around Bhivandi and Jalgaon. (Engineer, ibid, p 40). Riots in the
late 70s in Jamshedpur, Aligarh and Benaras, were mainly due to instigation from the RSS, which
wanted to assert its presence during the 'dual membership' issue. Business rivalry was one of the
major factors in the Moradabad riot.

In the initial period, the sensitivity towards riots was minimal, “Even major riots like that of
Bihar Sharif, in which hundreds of innocent people are brutally done to death, do not seem to
evoke a heartfelt response least of them from our intelligentsia committed to secularism and
democracy.” (Engineer, 1991). On the barbarity of the violence Hussein Shaheen points out,
“Seeing the horrifying nature and extent of communal riots which have occurred during the post
partition period in India, one cannot but wonder whether the people of India, have made any
progress at all…”. (Hussein Shaheen, In Engineer, 1991, p 166)

The precipitating factors of violence have been changing. Despite all this the victims of the
violence have been Muslims to a large extent, “During the colonial period, the nature of the riots
was…reciprocal between two groups, with British-officered police intervening to restore
normalcy. But since the achievement of independence in 1947, the nature of the riots has
changed. In every riot since independence, no matter when or where or how the riots take
place…in the end victims are mainly Muslims, whether in the number of people killed, wounded
or arrested.” (Khalidi, p 17). This is largely due to communalization of state apparatus and the
attitude of the police force in particular. V.N. Rai in his book Combating Communal Conflicts based
on the study of major riots concludes that police are partial in most of the riots. They do not act
as a neutral force but act more like a ‘Hindu force’. “It is basically the behaviour of police in
communal strife which makes the members of a minority community like Muslims view it as an
enemy…”.(Rai, ibid, p 89)

The discrimination is obvious in preventive arrests, enforcement of curfew, treatment of

detained persons at police stations, reporting of facts and investigations, detection and
prosecution of cases registered during riots. Hindus view the policemen as their friends. The
popular slogan shouted during communal riots has been “Hindu-Police Bhai-Bhai, Beech main Vardi
Kahan Se Aayi, (Police and Hindus are brothers, the police uniform does not matter). Muslims by
and large, consider policemen as their enemies. Generally policemen, predominantly Hindu,
don't shed their prejudices at the time of entering police force and this bias is manifested at the
time of riots. The police personnel are expected to protect the communal interests of the
community. Amrik Singh (Riots and Law Enforcement) points out that the partisan behaviour of the
police has a lot to do with, "the composition and social outlook of police. Most of the recruits
come from majority community. Therefore, as and when minorities come under attack, there
was no one to protect them.” The bias of police force is very well shown in the report of Justice
Srikrishna dealing with Mumbai riots. In general the conviction rate in riot cases has been low
over the years. It is very hard to prove these cases for the simple reason that witnesses do not
come forward as they fear that they have to live alongside others who they do not want to name.

The decade of eighties had been the worst in the period of Indian republic. During this phase,
one witnessed the rising communalization of society. The next phase was the demolition of
Babri Masjid and political ambition of the Shiv Sena in Mumbai and machinations of the BJP
in Gujarat. The riots, which were spontaneous and un-planned, came under control very fast,
while those simmering for longer duration were the ones where the political forces were
operating from behind the scene. Another interesting point made by Vibhuti Narain Rai, a top
police official who had done an analytical study of riots from authentic sources was that no
riot could sustain beyond forty-eight hours, if the authorities decided to control it. Laloo
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Yadav's policies in a way concretely demonstrated the absence of communal violence in Bihar
and the CPM's policies in West Bengal to some extent endorsed the validity of it. On the point
that communal violence was an urban phenomenon, communal riots erupted more often in
medium and small towns, though Mumbai might be an exception. Ahmedabad and Surat too
became foci of the communal violence. Villages are no more immune from the communal
poison. Asghar Ali Engineer, through his pioneering work on communal violence has
provided valuable insights into the dynamics and changing nature of communal violence in
India. (Engineer, 1991, 2004)

Changing Nature of Communal Violence

The earlier anti-Muslim violence was amongst the poor Muslim localities. From decade of 1990s,
the violence changed its character and even the affluent sections of Muslims were targeted. This
was seen both in Mumbai (1992-93) and Gujarat (2002) with the anti-Muslim pogrom. “In most
of the communal riots, the victims were largely slum dwelling poor Muslims. However, the
pogroms in 1990s affected almost all segments of Muslim society including the hitherto
protected members of the elite…wife of Rahi Masoom Raza, the script writer of Mahabharat,
the popular mega-serial aired at Doordarshan fled up town Bombay to seek refuge amongst her
co-religionists in Bhendi Bazar during 1993 riots.” (Khalidi, 1996, p 12) Initially, there were
multiple causes of provocation of the riots, still the major reason remains the planned offensive
by the majority communalists, “…that is to say, they are essentially pogroms or massacres
perpetrated by a majority upon a defenseless minority.” (Khalidi, p 14)

The trends of communal violence clearly show the biases of the state machinery as well. The rise
of communalization and role of hate propaganda has crept in very deep in the society. In most
of the riots, which have pained us since the first Jabalpur riot of 1961, one sees a common
pattern. While the bureaucracy soft peddles the offence, different wings of RSS and police play
the partisan role. While the administrative machine is ‘sympathetic, to the ‘Hindu sentiments’
(read Hindu Communal politics), the communalization of police has been blatant.

There are instances (Meerut-Malyana, 1987) where the Provincial Armed Constabulary lined up
around 300 Muslims besides the canal and shot them so that the bodies gets disposed off in the
canal. There are instances (Bhagalpur, 1989) where the police along with the rioters killed 180
Muslims, buried them in a paddy field where cauliflower was grown. Most of the inquiry
commission reports have shown the partisan role of police in the riots. The Sri Krishna
Commission also indicted the police especially, Addl. Commission R.D. Tyagi for his shooting
of the innocents in the Suleman Bakery.

The popular perception that Muslims are the ones who start the riots and then due to retaliation
they have to suffer, has no basis in reality. Teesta Setalvad, the prominent human rights activist,
has analyzed the truth of as to who starts the riots, based on the inquiry commission reports. She
(‘Communalism Combat’, March 98) by citing the extracts from five commissions of inquiry
shows the truth behind the start of communal riots.

Mumbai Violence 92-93-Gujarat: 2002

Srikrishna Commission Report shows in an immaculate manner as to who was behind the
Mumbai violence. “The irresponsible act of Hindutva Parties in celebrating and gloating over
demolition of Babri structure was like twisting a knife in the wound and heightened the
anguished ire of the Muslims. The celebration rally organised by Shiv Sena in Dharavi
jurisdiction is an example” it further continues, “the police mishandled the situation and by their
aggressive posture turned peaceful protests into violent demonstration during which the first
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targets of the anger of the mob became the municipal van and the constabulary, both visible
signs of establishment.” (vol. 1 Pg 4)

"The Maha Artis were started from 26th December, 1992 and kept adding to the communal
tension and endangering the fragile peace which had been established. Some (were used to
deliver) communally inciting speeches and the crowds dispersing from (them) indulged in
damage, looting and arson of Muslim establishments in the vicinity.” (Volume 1, page 13) On
1st January, 1993 there was an article in Samna under the caption ‘Hindunni Akramak Vhayala
Have’,(Hindus should become aggressive now) openly inciting Hindus to violence.” (Volume 1,
page 13). On 4th January, 1993 a big mob of Hindus led by Sheri Gajanana Kirtikar, Shri
Ramesh More and other Shiv Sena activists, took a Morcha to the Jogeshwari police station
complaining of lack of security for Hindus. Some of the people in the morcha attacked Chacha
Nagar Masjid and the Muslims in the vicinity and injured them. Several Muslim huts in Magdum
Nagar in Mahim jurisdiction were set on fire by the Hindus.” (Volume 1,page 13-14).
Commission is forthright in pointing out that Shiv Sena chief was acting like a General,
coordinating the carnage. Mumbai violence changed the nature of communal violence in India.
It was at large scale, well planned and well concealed, led by Hindu communalists and assisted by
the attitude of police, bureaucracy and political leadership.

Gujarat

Godhra, Gujarat and Akhshardham have been the major blots on our democratic ethos in post-
Independence India. In the din of the tragedies which gripped Gujarat for over a period of ten
months, different versions were floating about “who did it?’ Concerned Citizens Tribunal was
conceived and most outstanding legal brains of the stature of Justices V.K. Krishna Iyer, PB
Sawant, Hosbet Suresh, Adv. K.G. Kannabiran, and serious sociologists, Prof. Ghanshyam
Shah, Prof. Tanika Sarkar and social workers, Aruna Roy formed this tribunal.

The two volume report, ‘Crimes against Humanity’, which in a way is a landmark investigation in
situations like these, where vested interests not only try to hide the truth but also to distort the
same. The findings of the tribunal at one level are close to what many leading Human Rights
activists and scholars were suspecting. Its findings point to the complicity of state leadership in
the whole tragedy.

The tribunal concludes that Godhara incident does not seem to be pre-planned. Neither is there
a proof of ‘foreign hand’, which was propagated with confidence. Tribunals’ tentative conclusion
that the fire was lit from inside and not outside will force us to review the whole, action-reaction
thesis, which in a way was used to give legitimacy to state inaction in the face of one of the most
severe riots in independent India. (“Crime against Humanity”, Mumbai, 2002)

Why was the state political leadership so eager to jump at make believe-conclusions, and what
might have been the deeper design behind the whole carnage becomes slightly clear after going
through the twin volumes. The tribunal also makes it public that witnesses deposing before the
tribunal informed it about the meeting called by the chief minister in which instructions were
given not to take action against the ‘Hindu reaction’ to Godhra. This speaks volumes about the
real mechanics of the whole tragedy of marathon proportions. Most of the significant part is put
in the annexure.

Insecurity: Impact on Muslim Community

The Mumbai violence of 92-93 was followed by the internal migration of the battered minority.
Many from minority were displaced or chose to shift to areas, which may be safer for them,
Mumbra, Jogeshwari, Bhendi Bazar being the foremost. Incidentally, the population of Mumbra
78
before the violence was less than one lakh, today it is more than seven lakhs. Similarly, many
from minority community sold their houses in the mixed areas to shift to the Muslim majority
areas, increasing the pressure on civic amenities in those areas.

In Gujarat also ‘borders’, ‘Gaza Strips’ have come up to supplement the ‘mini Pakistan’. As the
extent of myths, biases, stereotypes against minorities are going through the roof, the mental
partitions are created and these partitions get converted in to the ones of brick and mortar. The
communal partitions are the definite aftermath of the communal violence. In Gujarat, the
victims of violence were not permitted to return into their own houses, even the written
undertakings were demanded from the victims that they will not seek legal justice for whatever
happened to them during the violence. As an example Asghar Ali Engineer observes, “…five
years after the carnage, more than 5000 families are rotting in horrifying conditions in various
refugee camps. Not only this, Modi recently returned more than Rs 19 crores to the Central
Government claiming that funds are no more needed as all have been ‘settled’. (Engineer, 2008,
p 143)

Today, more than a decade and half after the Gujarat carnage, nearly five lakh Muslims have to
live in isolated ghettoes and that too in abysmal situations. The extension of civic and other
amenities to these areas is conspicuous by its absence. Water, sanitation, health, education,
banking and other amenities and facilities are not reaching these areas. These internally displaced
people are being helped only by conservative Muslim groups, who are competing with each
other in increasing their area of influence amongst them. In a survey conducted amongst the
victims of Gujarat by social group Anhad, showed the dismal condition in which the victims of
violence are living, “While a large number of people have heard about the massacre of 2000
Muslims during the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, majority remain ignorant about the existence of
thousands of ‘second class’ citizens who have not been able to return to their homes six years
after the carnage.” (Hashmi 2008, p 5)

This is also becoming the zone with poverty, illiteracy, hunger, disease and misery. These
conditions are worst in the whole of state. Since the state is shirking from its basic
responsibilities of provision of infrastructure for social life, the Muslim fundamentalist groups
are providing the same and are also having a field day in these areas. Who is to blame for this, a
particular religion or the communal politics which not only resulted in the massive genocide but
even now is dictating the state policies by abandoning the responsibilities of the victims of
violence and others from minorities who have felt insecure and shifted or were made to shift in
these areas.

The message of communal agenda manifested through violence and through creating difficult
situation for minorities is now isolating them in most parts of India. So one can see the
trajectory of violence as follows: it begins with pre violence biases, stereotypes, then violence,
post violence neglect, isolation, ghettoization and finally leads to partitioning of the national
community at emotional and physical level.

The communal violence always polarizes the communities. In the initial phase till, say the
seventies, the ghettoization was minimal. From the decade of 90s, on one hand the communal
violence has gone into higher gear, ‘hate other’ sentiments have worsened and this ‘non sale of
housing units to the Muslim minority’ started becoming unwritten norm. What can be more
ironical than the fact that a housing rights activist herself is denied the house, just because she
carries a Muslim name!

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Communal Violence: Contemporary Trends

The communal violence has been changing its forms continuously. The first major observation
was the role of police, its partisanship against Muslims, minorities as such. In case of Dhulia in
Maharashtra, the role of Hindu mob was substituted by police itself (Puniyani) majoritarian
politics. Secondly now it’s no more just an urban phenomenon. The Muzaffarnagar violence
showed it can spread in rural areas also with equal ferocity, as the process of communalization
has been made to reach the interior places as well1. The issue around which violence has been
instigated has also been changing and currently love jihad is among the major instruments of
‘hate propaganda’ and foundation of communal violence.

Muslims Youth as Terror accused

The phenomenon of terrorism had been the major one resulting in the blasts in cities like
Nanded, Parbhani, Malegaon, Hyderabad, Ajmer etc. The investigating agencies operating on the
understanding of “All Terrorists are Muslims” arrested Muslim youth in large numbers. Later,
most of them had to be released for the lack of any evidence. In this context the people related
to Hindutva groups came under the scanner leading to the arrest of Sadhvi Pragya Singh Thakur,
Lt. Col. Prasad Shrikant Purohit, Retd. Major Upadhyay, Swami Aseemanand among others.
Swami Aseemanand is in jail and in his confession in front of a magistrate, revealed the role of
the Hindutva organizations in planning and executing many acts of terror. A tribunal was
organized by Anhad and associated human rights organizations in Hyderabad (2007). Tribunal
observed the gross violation of basic legal norms and the gross mistakes in arresting the Muslim
youth due to the prejudiced behaviour of police towards Muslim youth. (Puniyani, 2015) The
careers of many a promising young man was totally ruined due to such arrests without any proof
what so ever.

The pattern observed in most of the cases was that there were illegal detentions. Following the
torture, if the person is to be released, it seems to be a norm that police takes the signature on a
blank paper and also threats with dire consequences, if the person goes to human rights activists
or lawyers. At times they are made to shout ‘Jai Shri Ram’ just to humiliate them. Sometimes
even possession of Urdu literature is taken as a proof of terrorist links. Third degree torture to
the accused and severe torture to the relatives of the accused, to elicit confession is employed
widely. The accused and their relatives are taken to the police station or other places of
detention on false pretexts and the elementary needs of water and food are not looked at. For
permitting the families to see the accused under custody, bribe is extracted most of the times.

What happens to the future of those who are accused and released later? The students lose their
career-track, at times colleges don’t take them back until the court ruling is brought to that
effect. The families of accused get ostracized from the community out of fear. Others stop
relating to them. The business gets a severe setback and at these times banks refuse to give them
loans etc. Some of the accused are also tempted to become approvers with the carrot dangled in
front of them that they will be released. The powers vested with the police seem to be present
only through there misuse, most of the times.

A two way impression operates in the society. One, amongst the larger sections of society, that
Muslim terrorists are a big threat to the nation. Two, amongst Muslims the feeling is that state is
totally partisan and deliberate injustice is being done to them since they are Muslims. Two set of
mechanisms of investigation norms are coming to be rooted. One, Muslim youth are picked up
after every blast and are subjected to torture till courts pronounce them non-guilty. And two, to
treat the blasts accused who are Hindus, with kid gloves.

1 (http://www.milligazette.com/news/9312-polarization-with-a-difference-muzaffarnagar ).
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Sachar and the Rangnath Misra Reports

In the light of the declining status of Muslims, the Government appointed Sachar Committee,
which submitted its report in November, 2006.

The committee after extensive homework found that the Muslim minority is way behind the
national averages in most of the parameters of social development, its economic status has been
sliding seriously, its representation in jobs, bank loans is abysmal, and its representation in the
political process has been very poor and is continuing to worsen. Its significant finding can be
presented as “percentage of Muslims in government employment was a mere 4.9 percent of the
total 88,44,669 employees.

The report points out that the number of Muslims in security agencies was 3.2 percent – 60,517
out of the total of 18,79,134 in CRPF, CISF, BSF, SSB and ‘other agencies’ In many states,
Muslims are significantly over-represented in prison. In Maharashtra, for instance, Muslims make up
10.6 percent of the population but 32.4 percent of those convicted or facing trial. Among district
judges in 15 states surveyed, 2.7 percent were Muslims. As per the report, the literacy rate is
about 59 percent, compared with more than 65 percent among Indians as a whole. On average, a
Muslim child attends school for three years and four months, compared with a national average
of four years. It further observes that less than 4 percent of Muslims graduate from school,
compared with 6 percent of the total population. Less than 2 percent of the students at the elite
Indian Institutes of Technology are Muslims. Equally revealing, only 4 percent of Muslim
children attend madarsas.

In sum and substance, Muslim community is under-represented, in most of the arenas of society
barring the jails. One also recalls the report of Gopal Singh Committee of 1982, which also had
found the poor status of this minority. Gopal Singh Committee report kept lying in the deep
freeze while the issues like Ram Temple kept hogging the national attention. To add up, one can
say this community’s representation as riot victim is way above its percentage in population. The
committee has recommended that an ‘Equal Opportunity Commission’ should be set up, a
‘national data bank’ should be started, a ‘nomination procedure’ should be started to ensure their
participation in public bodies, in order to promote religious tolerance by a procedure to evaluate
text books for appropriate social values, so on and so forth.

Whatever one can glean from policies being contemplated in the wake of Sachar report, it seems
a lot needs to be done. Steps are being contemplated, short of reservations to improve the lot of
the Muslim minorities. It is a matter of conjuncture whether this Government is really serious
about it or is it a mere replay of the earlier broken promises during last several decades. During
the last several decades while governments after governments have been promising to look after
the problems of Muslims, nothing much came out. This includes not only the longest reign of
Congress party but also of the one’s of formations, in which BJP was an important component
or supporter. Amongst multiple reasons of this neglect of the Muslims, one was the aggressive
propaganda of Hindu right that Government is out to ‘appease’ the Muslims so that they can be
used as vote banks. One does not know whether this aggressive anti-minority propaganda did
contribute to the policies of the government, but one can say for sure that this ‘appeasement of
minorities’ had become a part of ‘social common sense’ in the face of the worsening situation of
Muslims.

The National Commission on Religious & Linguistic Minorities, lead by Justice Ranganath
Mishra, former Chief Justice of India, submitted its Report to the Prime Minister on 22 May,
2007. It confirms the findings of Sachar Committee, about the backwardness of Indian Muslims
and goes on to recommend 15 percent of reservation for Muslim minorities in education and
81
employment to improve their condition. It is another matter, whether the Government will be
able to gather strength to implement such a dire necessity or not!

Summing up

The exclusion of Muslim community has taken place and its worsening, at economic, social and
political level. There multiple reasons, some in history and some in the political scenario as it has
unfold during last sixty years. The bulk of Muslim community comes from the poor castes. The
1857 rebellion, was attributed by British to Muslim leadership and there was a big backlash on
the common Muslims, who had to partly retreat in a shell. Thereby, while Hindus could become
the part of the education and jobs, Muslims as a community were fairly left behind. The efforts
of Sir Syed etc. resulted in the process of education and jobs mainly for elite upper caste
Muslims. The Partition was also a major setback to the Muslims who choose to stay back here,
these were also again from the lower socio-economic strata of society. During this process, there
was also a failure of leadership to pull out the community from this morass and take them to the
path of modern education and jobs in a big way. There was a definite discrimination against the
Muslims due to which they remained marginalized from the jobs also. The rising crescendo of
communal violence and later their demonization, linking them with terrorism put immense
pressure on the efforts of the community to progress in the modern fields.

The need of the hour is to ensure amity, security and equity. The prevalent perceptions about
Muslims, demonize them and provide the ground for violence instigated by communal politics.
The concerted attempts to present the proper picture of the Muslim community has to be done
globally and nationally both. The presentations which can undo the myths and biases against this
community should be taken up in a concerted manner. The promotion of inter-community
programs, joint celebrations of social events-festivals will promote the interaction and cut the
mistrust which has been manufactured over a period of time.

The central focus of the community leaders has to be to promote employment oriented
education, far and wide. The newer opportunities in different sectors need to be understood and
promoted in the community. There are significant efforts in this direction but more needs to be
done. A team also needs to be promoted which takes up the violation of human rights of
innocents and prevent the legal harassment. The legal team has to seriously take up the cause of
justice of innocents who have and are arrested and put in jails just because of the lack of
professional attitude of state authorities. These are marathon challenges and they can be
accomplished only through an alliance with social groups working for promotion of democratic
and secular values, groups working for human rights of the society. It’s a great challenge, the
goal of achieving security and equity of the community have to be paramount.

References

1. A.G. Noorani, The Muslims of India; A Documentary Record, Oxford Delhi 2003, page 1.
2. Asghar Ali Engineer, Communal Riots in Post Independence India, pg1, Sangam,
Hyderabad, 1991.
3. Asghar Ali Engineer, Muslim Fundamentalism and Modern nation-states. In Religious .
4. Fundamentalism in Asia, (Ed. V.D. Chopra, Gyan Publishers, 1994, p100.
5. Asghar Ali Engineer ‘Communal Riots After Independence-A Comprehensive Account’
Centre for Study of Society and Secularism, and Shipra Publication, Delhi, 2004.
6. Concerned Citizens Tribunal, “Crime against Humanity”, Citizens for Justice and Peace,
Mumbai, 2002.
7. Asghar Ali Engineer, in Minorities in Indian Social System, Joseph Benjamin, Gyan
Publishing, Delhi 2006, p39.

82
8. Asghar Ali Engineer, Muslim Minority, Continuity and Change, Gyan Publishing House,
Delhi 2008, p143.
9. Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, p. 414, Penguin, Delhi 1989.
10. Donald Eugene Smith, India a Secular State, Princeton, Princton Uni Press, 1963, p411.
11. Hussein Shaheen, In Engineer, 1991, p166.
12. Jayant Gadkari, Hindu Muslim Communalism: A Panchnama, Kosambi Trust, Mumbai
1999 p18.
13. Inder Malhotra, The Statesman, 6th Oct, 1969.
14. Kashif Ul Huda http://www.indianmuslims.info/reports_about_indian_muslims/
ranganath _ mishra_commission_recommendations.html / accessed on 20th July, 2010.
15. Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation, OUP Delhi 2001, p56.
16. Omar Khalidi, Indian Muslims Since Independence, p12, Vikas Publishing House Delhi
1996.
17. Rafiq Zakaria in Widening Divide: An Insight into Hindu Muslim Relations (Delhi Viking
1995).
18. Ram Puniyani http://www.twocircles.net/2008sep15/house_shabana_azmi.html, accessed
on 6 July, 2010.
19. Ram Puniyani, Communal Threat to Secular Democracy, Kalpaz, Delhi, 2010, page 70
20. Ram Puniyani
http://www.countercurrents.org/puniyani310113.htmhttp://www.countercurrents.org/p
uniyani310113.htm
21. Ram Puniyani, Deconstructing Terrorist Violence, Sage Delhi, 2015, p87 onwards.
22. Rajinder Sachar, Quoted in Editorial, Communalism Combat, Jan-Feb 2007, p3.
23. Rangnath Misra, “Report of the National Commission for Religious and Linguistic.
24. Minorities”, Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India, May, 2007.
25. Shabnam Hashmi, in ‘The Wretched: A Profile’ by Gauhar Raza and Surjeet Singh, Anhad
2008, Delhi, p5.
26. Rajinder Sachar, minorityaffairs.gov.in/newsite/sachar/sachar_comm.pdf , accessed on 20 July, 2010.
27. http://offstumped.wordpress.com/2006/11/30/rajinder-sachar-committee-report-on-
muslims-confirms-muslim-vote-bank-politics-hurt-the-nation/ accessed on 20 July, 2010.
28. Teesta Setalvad, Who Casts the First Stone, Communalism Combat, March, 98.
29. Vibhuti Narain Rai, Combating Communal Conflicts, Renaissance Publishing House
Delhi, 1998, p48.

Mr. Ram Puniyani is an activist, author and former professor of the Indian Institute of Technology-Bombay.
A distinguished academic, he took voluntary retirement in 2004, to devote time energy for communal harmony.
He also campaigns for human rights, civil rights and is associated with various organizations which work in these
areas. He was awarded the Indira Gandhi Award for National Integration in 2006. He has written many
books.

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 Chapter 6

HINDUTVA AND MUSLIMS

Irfan Engineer

Abstract

The paper focuses on what Rajnath Singh, the BJP president while addressing the Muslims on 25 th February
2014, sought to bridge a trust deficit between his party and Muslims by saying that he was ready to apologize for
any mistakes committed by the party in the past and urged the community to give his party at least one chance.
The BJP leaders appear to reach out to the Muslims as elections approach, not to address the needs of minorities
nor make any attempt to understand them, but to confuse the Muslims about intentions of the BJP. This paper
attempts to examine the uneasy relation between the Hindutva and Muslims.

Introduction

Rajnath Singh, the BJP president while addressing the Muslims on 25th February, 2014 sought to
bridge a trust deficit between his party and Muslims by saying that he was ready to apologize for
any mistakes committed by the party in the past and urged the community to give his party at
least one chance. Singh’s political secretary, Sudhanshu Trivedi clarified, “The BJP president said
if Muslims feel that wittingly or unwittingly, there have been mistakes on our part, he is ready to
make amends.” While campaigning during the state elections in Delhi, Rajasthan, MP and
Chhattisgarh, in rallies addressed by Narendra Modi, burkhas and skull caps were distributed to
signify that Muslims too, were attending the rally and would vote for the BJP. Will the Muslims
be wooed by such insincere moves? The BJP leaders appear to reach out to the Muslims as
elections approach, not to address the needs of minorities nor make any attempt to understand
them, but to confuse the Muslims about intentions of the BJP. Their objective is to mobilize
Muslim votes if possible and ensure that they (Muslim votes) do not get consolidated against the
BJP in any case.

Hindutva ideology always considered the Muslims and Christians as foreigners, holy lands being
outside the geographical area of their idea of ‘Akhand Bharat’. The saffron party’s attitude
towards the Muslims and Christians is reflected from the slogans their cadres often shout on the
streets like “pehle kasai- phir Isai” (implying that first the Muslims and later on, the Christians will
be taken care of during the riots.) They further stigmatized Muslims as terrorists, violent and
aggressive, practicing polygamy and breeding (sic) so rapidly that they would outnumber Hindu
population. Aggressive stigmatization of Muslims leads to periodical outbreak of communal
violence and ghettoization of the community. 40,000 innocents have been killed in communally
targeted violence since independence. In order to stigmatize Muslims as terrorists, the security
agencies had a free hand in Gujarat to periodically murder Muslims youth and after killing them
proclaim them to be terrorists killed in encounter. Sohrabuddin and Ishrat Jehan are a few
examples of this. Some of the slogans against Muslims are so unparliamentary that they cannot
be reproduced here. Yet Rajnath Singh is not even categorically accepting that it made any
‘mistake’ by following Hindutva ideology.

Politically, the BJP opposes every move of the government to ensure inclusion of marginalized
groups, particularly the minorities and to ensure that they too have equal opportunities. Modi
claimed that his secularism meant India first. When only certain sections of the society are in a
position to grab opportunities because they are socially privileged, proclaiming India first policy
would work to the advantage of the privileged (for example, majority community, upper castes
and males). India first privileges the corporate sectors which are grabbing the resources of the
country like the 2G spectrum, coal and mining, water, environment and have become
millionaires unjustifiably enriching themselves. The marginalized sections, like the dalits,
adivasis, women and minorities continue to be excluded and denied their fair share in
opportunities and common resources of the country as mandated in the directive principles of
the Constitution.

The BJP in the past, has often opposed any measures that afford religious minorities their
cultural space and cultural specificities. For example, they are opposed to separate family (or
personal) laws on grounds that it breeds separatism in minorities. They have opposed any
encouragement to Urdu language. BJP’s political project is to obliterate cultural diversity and
homogenize culture by imposing upper caste culture and turning the state into guardian of upper
caste culture– what they call as cultural nationalism. Thus, making the singing of saraswati
vandana, teaching of Bhagwat Gita and practicing yoga compulsory in the schools, where BJP rules.
Series of stringent anti-cow slaughter legislation and campaign against inter-religious marriages
falsely accusing such marriages particularly of Hindu women with Muslim men as a conspiracy
to out populate Hindus.

The BJP is opposed to cultural diversity and particularly against protecting the cultural space for
minorities. It has never stood for security of minorities and never raised a tiny figure against
discrimination of minorities in jobs, education, government contracts, bank loans etc. which has
resulted in their backwardness. This has now been well documented by the Sachar Committee
report and other studies.

The BJP has also demanded in the past that the Church and Islam should ‘Indianize’. What does
Indianizing actually mean? Muslims in India are as diverse as believers of any other religion are.
They speak the same language as other Indians like Tamil, Malayalam, Kannada, Marathi,
Konkani, Gujarati, Kutchi, various dialects of Hindi, Marwari, Kashmiri, Urdu, etc. They eat the
same food that people of the region eat and by and large wear the same dress and even follow
the same customs and traditions and participate in the festivals of believers of all religions. For
lack of space here, we are not going into instances and other details. Volumes have been written
on shared culture, customs and traditions between believers of all religions. The famous Poet
Iqbal called Lord Ram as Imam-e-Hind. Mazhar Jan-i-Jana, the sufi saint termed Ram and
Krishna as Prophets of Allah and Saint Nizamuddin would begin all his mornings by singing
bhajans (Hindu devotional songs) of Ram and Krishna. When he saw a Hindu woman
performing surya namaskar (worshipping sun), he told his disciple Khusro that she too was
worshipping Allah! Baba Farid Ganj-i-Shakkar composed all his devotional songs in Punjabi and
many of them are included in the Guru Granth Saheb, the Scriptures of Sikh community. The
Church too embraces rituals and culture of the people of India which it calls acculturation. What
more can one expect? Muslims and Christians in India are so Indianized that they even follow
the caste system, which they should not!

By calling upon to Indianize Islam and Christian Church, the BJP and RSS want two things.

1) The Church and the Islamic Madarsas should be cut off from the rest of the world, to
insulate themselves from any religious thoughts and theology from “outside” in this
global age and time, while Hindutva would continue to be global and receive its life
blood and funds from Hindus who have become citizens of US or European or other
countries.

2) Muslims and Christians should accept Hindu supremacy. These “foreign” religions have
equality as its foundational concept and universality in its approach. The bhakti saints like
Mirabai, Kabir, Ravidas, Tukaram, and many others belonging to the Siddha, Nath,
Tantra traditions too propagated equality and universality. Hindutva on the other hand is
based on notions of race and nationalism, which privileges the already privileged. RSS
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 and BJP’s prescription for the Muslims and Christians is that they too should accept the
concept of race and nationalism and hierarchies of privileges according to the “race” or
“nationalism” one belonged to. The then RSS Sarsanghchalak, K S Sudarshan addressing
the meeting of RSS sponsored Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM) on 24th December, 2002
wondered “as to why Muslims in India accepted the minority status when they belonged
to this land by birth and shared the same culture, race and ancestors with the Hindus?”
Concept of race and ancestors is alien to the Constitution as well as Hinduism of Kabir,
Islam and Christianity! Indresh Kumar, the Margdarshak of the Muslim Rashtriya Manch
prescribed the path of Muslims and Christians embracing Hindu nationalism or in other
words, Hindu supremacy. Indresh Kumar wants the Muslims to realize this as the spirit
and soul of India and promised the Muslims that all barriers would vanish if they did so.
It is not Islam or Christianity that needs to Indianize as may be evident from the
foregoing. It is the RSS and Hindutva ideology that needs to Indianize and give up
Hindu supremacist positions of race and embrace the Constitutional morality of equality
of all citizens irrespective of caste, gender, creed, race, religion, language or place of
birth.

In spite of the BJP’s well known position, a section of Muslims (roughly about 10 percent)
would vote for the BJP, for which there are reasons too.

Do Muslims Vote for the BJP?

The Centre for Study of Society and Secularism (CSSS) had carried out a survey during the
Maharashtra Legislative Assembly elections held in 1995. The survey then showed that about 10
percent Muslims were going to vote for the BJP. Muslim voters then were angry with Congress
for allowing demolition of the Babri Masjid under their watch. The Muslim votes shifted away
from the Congress to the regional parties like the SP in UP and Lalu Prasad in Bihar. However, a
small section was willing to vote even for BJP in absence of any other alternative to Congress. A
Muslim voter from Western Maharashtra represented the mood of Muslims in the 1995 elections
in these words “jis party ne Babri Masjid girte dekhi, ham usse girte dekhna chahte hain.” (we want to see
that party falling, which saw the Babri Masjid being demolished under its watch). Personal
security mattered more than the Babri Masjid to an ordinary Muslim. The demolition of Babri
Masjid was followed by heinous communal riots in many towns. The Muslims who voted for the
BJP did so more out of anger against the Congress rather than endorsing the BJP. In local body
elections however, a tiny section of Muslims did vote for a good BJP-Shiv Sena candidate in
local bodies. However, politically, Muslims shunned BJP understandably.

During the Maharashtra Assembly elections in 1995, Bal Thackeray would typically ask Muslims
to leave the venue while he was addressing as they would not be able to tolerate his tirade. He
would openly declare that he did not need Muslim votes. By demonizing the Muslims he wanted
to mobilize and consolidate the Hindu votes across the castes. He called himself Hindu Hriday
Samrat (one who ruled the hearts of Hindus). Bal Thackeray was found guilty of corrupt electoral
practices on 28th July, 1999 for mobilizing votes in the name of religion and his right to vote was
suspended for six years.

The Bombay Hotel area in Ahmedabad was visited in 2008. The area is the waste dumping
ground for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. It is also the place where the survivors of
the 2002 pogroms have put their dwellings– literally on the Municipal waste. A quick unscientific
study was conducted asking the survivors whether the fact was true that Muslims had voted for
the BJP, and the reason for the same. One survivor informed that he did not want to vote in
that election. Casting their vote would be under duress of the BJP. He did not even have the
choice of not voting. He was compelled by the BJP workers to accompany them to the booth for
voting. He voted for the BJP under the watchful eyes of their workers and the booth officer. It
87
was difficult to believe him, but then he had absolutely nothing to gain by lying. The condition
of the survivors was utterly helpless. They were staying on heaps of waste without sewage,
electricity connections and were paying heavily to the mafias for a few posts of water pumped
out of the bore. Municipality did not extend any services whatsoever. No school for children. All
they had was security, at least temporarily. They were boycotted socially and economically by
non-Muslims and not given work. They wove ropes and spent most of their meager earnings on
doctors and few pots of water. The helplessness and desperation was reflected even in their
votes casted in favour of the BJP.

“Ame toh jaruriya”

When Shankarsinh Vaghela had revolted against Keshubhai Patel’s leadership in Gujarat and
split from BJP and taken his supporters to Khajurao, the two factions were called khajurias and
hajuriyas. One Sonubhai Chaudhary, a sincere activist fighting for adivasi rights in Dangs district
had shocked everyone by joining the BJP. Sonubhai was asked if he was a hajuriya or a khajuriya
(Patel loyalist or Vaghela loyalist). Sonubhai replied, reflecting the helplessness of the adivasis –
“Saheb, ame nai hajuriya, nai khajuriya, ame toh jaruriya” (Sir, we are neither hajuriyas, nor khajuriyas,
we are needy people). The situation of the survivors reminded of that statement of Sonubhai.
People who have been relegated to the status of almost beggars due to violence and state
policies need state services, howsoever poor the services may be, and if nothing, they need
security for survival. Needy people do not have the luxury of choice in voting. They vote with
the hope that it will pacify the demon and the demon will keep off them.

The Congress is politically so weak in Gujarat, controlling a few municipalities. BJP won 47 of
the 75 Municipalities. The ones that are controlled by the Congress are discriminated in
allotment of funds by the State govt. Therefore, even a tiny share in development is possible
only the patronage of BJP. Even for basic things like ID documents, for a Gujarati Muslim has
to depend on the patronage of the BJP.

Jaruriyas of a Different Class

Modi then started nurturing the ambition of becoming a PM, after managing to win third term
as the Chief Minister of Gujarat. For this he needed to shift gear and an image makeover from a
hardcore Hindutva leader (loh purush– person with iron will) to a leader who stands for
development (vikas purush). Hindutva image was needed for winning elections in Gujarat but that
would not be acceptable in the rest of the country. There was also a possibility of being charge
sheeted for his role in Gujarat riots in the year 2002.

When the Supreme Court left it to the trial court to decide whether to frame charges against
Narendra Modi in the 2002 communal riot cases, Modi claimed he already had clean chit from
the Supreme Court. In order to further mislead the people about the so called “clean chit” he
organized a series of “Sadbhavana Mission” for public consumption where he would sit on a day’s
fast. The “Sadbhavana Mission” were farcical without acknowledging any wrong doing on
anyone’s part and without expressing any remorse for the riots, let alone seeking forgiveness.
The “Sadbhavana Mission” were instrumental in image makeover for his prime ministerial
ambition. He invited some Muslim leaders for his “Sadbhavana Mission” in one of which he
refused to wear the cap offered by a Maulvi. He won over a tiny section of Muslims – those in
business– offering them some opportunities. Zafar Sareshwala became a face of this section.
Sareshwala would defend and applaud Modi publicly, whenever he was called upon to do so.
The Bohra priestly establishment (sitting on a huge empire amassed through various means) too,
needed political patronage to save his empire. They encouraged their followers to attend all the
rallies and functions of Modi with their traditional caps. Since this tiny section of businessmen
now enjoying patronage of Modi loyalists, they opined that it was time to move ahead and forget
88
the 2002 riots, and that Muslims were worst off during Congress regimes. That during Congress
regime too similar riots occurred and that Modi had now changed. However, though it is true
that riots took place even during the Congress regimes, but the planners and executors of the
riots and instigators and agent provocateurs, rumour spreaders, hate spreaders were Hindutva
cadres and this has been established by several inquiry commissions. The elite of Muslim
community cheering Modi are jaruriyas of a different class –needing political patronage in a state
where normal political processes and political opposition has not been allowed to survive. The
business class always tends to support the ruling party and the Bohras and Khojas, traditionally
supported the ruling party. With BJP Government getting elected for four terms, they had to
come around.

The BJP for Narendra Modi’s image makeover, shook hands with the jaruriya Muslims and made
headlines when BJP fielded Muslims candidates in 24 of the 27 wards in Salaya (Dist. Jamnagar)
Municipal elections in February 2013, and all 24 won. A closer examination would however
reveal that the 90 percent of the 33,000 strong population of the town is Muslim and it is the
Muslims that helped BJP win the elections for the first time rather than the other way round.
Salem Mohammad Baghaad, the leader who was instrumental for BJP’s victory said, he now
expected funds for development of the town to flow in. Till a decade ago, the town was
notorious for smuggling at its small time port. The anti-terror squad of Gujarat with its draconic
reputation frequented the town could now be expected to keep away.

A BJP Muslim Corporator of Bhuj (Kutch Dist.) was met. He was well off, living in a bungalow,
heading a few education institutions and owning a real estate business. Being in real estate and
redevelopment business, he could not expect to move an inch further without state patronage.
For lack of space, not going into details but suffice to say that for small benefits he would be
required not to speak up against the marginalization of Muslims and demonizing them as
terrorists and cow slaughterers for which Muslims are regularly detained and harassed. He would
also have to campaign for Modi. We also met one of the three corporators of Anjar town
(Kutch). This corporator represented himself as well wisher of the community and claimed to be
in the BJP for the good of the community. He further claimed that he would go to any extend to
defend the community’s interests. 20 percent of Anjar’s population is Muslim with three Muslim
Corporators and all the three belong to the BJP. The other two were his proteges. He was a local
toughie and could not afford to antagonize the ruling party. But he claimed that he had to resort
to strong arm tactics in the interest of the community. The citizens from Anjar told us that all
Muslim areas in Anjar - Sheikh Timba, Devadiya Naka and Ekta Nagar were backward and with
poor services like water, electric poles, roads and sewerage. The corporator however, told us that
he got about Rs 30 millions sanctioned from the corporation for installing electric poles and
improving sewerage facilities. In turn, however, the corporator would have to ensure that the
Muslims voted for the BJP. Ensuring about 12000 votes for sanctioning fund of Rs 30 million!
That seemed to be the quid pro quo.

Muslim Corporators but not Muslim MLA

BJP refused to give ticket to a single Muslim during the 2012 assembly elections in Gujarat.
Image makeover for Modi and the Sadbhavana Mission did not offer anything beyond a few
corporator seats to Muslims. The BJP’s victory in Gujarat in 2012 ensured that the Muslim
representation came down from 5 in 2007 to 2 in 2012. Muslims form about 10 percent of
Gujarat’s population and proportionately there should have been at least 18 MLAs in the house
of 182 members.

In the three states where elections were held recently – Rajasthan, MP and Delhi, only six
Muslims of the more than 500 legislators were given tickets by the BJP. There were 17 sitting
Muslim MLAs in the pre-poll assemblies and about 50 Muslim dominated constituencies. Even
89
the top office bearers of the BJP Minority Morcha candidates were denied tickets. Arif Aqueel
was the lone BJP Muslim MLA elected MP from Bhopal. In an Assembly of 200 in Rajasthan, 4
candidates fielded by BJP were Muslims and two of them got elected. Rajasthan has 8.5 Muslim
population and 17 of its MLAs should be from Muslim community. One Muslim candidate was
fielded from Delhi having membership of 70 in the house and 12 percent Muslim population.
BJP fields Muslims only in those constituencies where Muslims are in absolute majority and
there are very little chances of winning the seat with a non-Muslim candidate.

Muslims are not encouraged where policies and laws are going to be framed and where
distribution of national resources is going to be decided. Cultural homogeneity project of
Hindutva has no space for divergent voices. There, only the RSS and the staunch ideologues of
the Hindu Nationalists have space as they alone can ensure that national resources are
distributed only among the natural base of the Hindu Nationalist– North Indian upper caste
males and the corporate sector.

The national leaders from the Muslim community in the BJP ranks are merely show pieces to
mobilize the Muslims to vote for the BJP or at least confuse them so that they do not vote
collectively against the BJP. They are in BJP either as a staunch reaction to Muslim
fundamentalism as for example Sikander Bakht and Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi. Arif Mohammed
Khan can be in the same category. However, strengthening of the BJP does not weaken Muslim
fundamentalism, it strengthens fundamentalism within the Muslim community as the
community, in reaction to series of communal riots gravitates around the fundamentalist
leadership of the community with the hope of ensuring unity to meet the onslaught collectively.
Fundamentalism in Muslims in Gujarat has strengthened.

A tiny section of Muslims are in BJP because Congress or some other party denied them ticket
or post or high office they were hoping for. Najma Heptullah was eyeing for the post of Vice-
President of India. When Congress did not show any inclination, she embraced BJP. Shahnawaz
Hussain climbed up the ladder very fast being one of the few Muslim faces when the BJP led
NDA Government was formed in 1999. These Muslim leaders are never heard protesting when
security of Muslims is in danger or when Babri Masjid is being demolished or on any other
cultural issues. They do not even succeed in pushing the BJP towards more inclusionist policy.
Their task is to represent the BJP’s exclusionist politics of “India first” to the community and
keep demanding that the community be happy with its second class citizenship that Hindutva
wants to relegate it to and preparing the Muslims be “nationalists” (in another words, Hindus
with lower caste status accepting the privileges of born “nationalists”).

Mr. Irfan Engineer is Director, Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. He writes on and
advocates secularism, harmony and peace. His organization was awarded ‘2013 Award for Communal
Harmony’ by the National Foundation for Communal Harmony. He has authored many books and contributes
to magazines and journals on regular basis.

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 Chapter 7

LIVE-REPORTING AND DEMOCRACY:

THE NON-PUBLISHABLE CRIME OF THE TELEVISED
ANTI-MUSLIM VIOLENCE IN GUJARAT 2002

Britta Ohm

Abstract

Until 1991, the reporting of communal violence had, in permanent violation of India’s democratic constitution,
been censored “for the good of the people”. This was the case both in the approach adopted by the then single state-
owned TV broadcaster Doordarshan, and the result of pretty effective self-censorship in private newspapers. The
official argument was that news of riots, and especially the naming of communities, would instigate further violence
amongst a population never deemed quite “developed”, i.e. secular, democratic and civilised enough. Indeed, that
the Gujarat pogrom was the first communal violence in India that was televised, after the liberalisation of the
media landscape had set in after 1991, is probably the only fact that goes uncontested. This identification is where
even scholarly debate so far still ends. As such, this fact tells us little, though, because it is the very precondition for
the prevailing antagonistic interpretations of the event itself. The coming decade, for Muslims to take steps out of
their marginalisation, will require to move beyond complaints about stereotypisation and exclusion. It demands a
greater understanding of the logic with which discourses evolve and are being organised, of the mechanisms of media
and of the fact that “being in the media” may work as much against them as for them. Precisely their precarious
position in India equips them for approaching this task.

Even 13 years after its occurrence, the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002, continues to be
a pivotal topic in debates over democracy, justice and (Hindu) nationalism in India. Therein, it
does not fundamentally differ from other instances of severe communal violence in recent
history, notably the 1984 anti-Sikh pogrom in Delhi and the “Bombay riots” that followed the
destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya through organised Hindutva forces in 1992. Both
these massacres showed numbers of killed and displaced persons similar to those in Gujarat
(even though apparently fewer cases of organised rape).1 It could even be argued that the
Gujarat violence, which was pursued during the BJP-State government (2001-2014) under the
then Chief Minister and now Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has helped to reminisce
about earlier instances of large-scale violence against minorities, and particularly against Muslims,
animating their re-evaluation and contextualisation. There is today a heightened consciousness
across diverse sections of society that “riots” do not somewhat “naturally happen” between
different religious communities but have a long history of directed instigation and state-
/government-involvement (Akbar 1988; Brass 2003; Das 1990; Eckert 2003).

Of all the incidents, however, the Gujarat violence has remained the most contentious. This
appears all the more paradoxical as it was covered by the media, and especially by television, like
none before (which immediately suggests a faster conclusion on its nature). While the '84-
pogrom is meanwhile widely understood as an organised attack on the Sikh community by the
then Congress government in the context of the Khalistan-movement, and the “Bombay riots”
have acquired the tag of a “nation's shame” as a Shiv Sena-orchestrated pogrom in the wake of
the Sangh Parivar's Ram Janma bhumi campaign, one can to this day, even with highly informed

1 The drastic level of sexual violence against Muslim women during the Gujarat pogrom has been a pivotal focus
of fact finding reports (see, for instance, “How has the Gujarat Massacre affected Minority Women? The
Survivors speak” (http://cac.ektaonline.org/resources/reports/womensreport.htm). It remains difficult to
verify, however, whether there was really a substantial increase as compared to earlier violence, or whether this
impression is evoked by the greater publicisation of documentation.
scholars, get into charged controversies over causes and context of what “actually” happened in
Gujarat and how to name it.2

How is it possible that such a continuum of conflicting interpretation and lack of established
information prevails despite unprecedented media coverage and visual documentation?

This article argues that it is precisely because this violence was occupying the media, and
particularly the nation's TV screens, for weeks on end that its contestation is ongoing. In fact,
the Gujarat pogrom - and, of course, calling it a “pogrom” in itself still means taking a contested
position - marks an exceptional case not only in relation to earlier, less mediated anti-minority
violence in India. A comparison with other genocidal attacks on minority populations in
different parts of the world and at different points in history will reveal that the Gujarat pogrom
was also the first, and remains to date the only, state-sponsored genocidal violence against a part
of the domestic population on a global scale that was broadcast live, 24x7, over several weeks to
national audiences by uncensored, commercially competing TV stations from the same country.

What does this imply?

Indeed, that the Gujarat pogrom was the first communal violence in India that was televised,
after the liberalisation of the media landscape had set in after 1991, is probably the only fact that
goes uncontested. This identification is where even scholarly debate so far still ends. As such,
this fact tells us little, though, because it is the very precondition for the prevailing antagonistic
interpretations of the event itself. It is the act of televising that enabled Hindutva-supporters and
the BJP-governments (both in Gujarat and at the centre 1998-2004) to argue that a large number
of inexperienced first-time TV journalists were at work who “got carried away” with “over-
reporting” (India First Foundation 2002; Ohm 2007).

They, hence not only questioned the images that were broadcast, but also the context of their
production. To Hindutva-opponents, on the other hand, the extensive visual coverage presented
unquestionable evidence that the State government supported the violence against the Gujarati
Muslims. They considered it the proof of an organised pogrom and made it the source of their
moral outrage, not least because large numbers of media audiences defied this “proof”. Tellingly,
it thus were the opponents to the coverage who appeared as exercising democratic media
criticism, while it were the opponents to the violence who appeared as blind defenders of media
opinion.

It appears helpful, and overdue, to try and move beyond this ongoing, emotionally and politically
charged polarisation, which reproduces the reading it claims to falsify. To begin with, the
televised character of this pogrom meant that it exceeded not only the usual public-ness that has

2 It is quite fascinating to see how even leading critical scholars, who otherwise clearly condemn the Gujarat
violence and even speak of its genocidal quality, have fallen for the temptation to take a position in the
polarised debate that inadvertently makes them advocates of the Hindutva propaganda of a “Muslim attack”
(on the Sabarmati Express train at Godhra), which provoked “retaliatory” violence. Michael Mann (2005), even
though he is not known to have been around, claims witness-like that 'the train was stopped outside of the
town, right by one of the most militant Muslim suburbs. It was promptly attacked by a crowd of Muslims who
stoned and set fire to the train. It went up like a tinderbox […]' (sic!) (494). Similarly presents Arjun Appadurai,
in his 2006 Fear of Small Numbers as a fact that 'a small group of youth set fire to a train compartment filled with
Hindu activists returning from the sacred shrine at Ayodhya' (95). Most recently, even Christophe Jaffrelot
stated that 'a train of returning Hindu activists who had gone to Ayodhya to build the contested “Ram temple”
was attacked—probably by Muslims—in Godhra station' (2015, 347). The urge to present easily absorbable
knowledge, in tune with popular stereotypes, seems to override the minimal fact that none of this is verified
evidence but will be, due to carefully destroyed forensic evidence by the Gujarat government, probably forever
remain a matter of contestation (the 2005-issued Justice Banerjee Report, for instance, suggests that the fire
could not possibly have been set to the train (made of steel, after all) from outside but must have originated
inside the compartment and has potentially been caused by an accident).
92
characterised communal violence all along (in the sense of its occurrence before the eyes, and
partly with the participation, of the local population). The coverage also went much further than
during earlier violence such as the post-liberalisation “Bombay riots” of 1992/93. Even though
private and transnational television made itself already felt then, there was virtually no presence
of cameras (other than of the BBC), and the media audience still learnt about the violence
almost exclusively from newspapers (even if in a more accentuated form than during the anti-
Sikh pogrom of 1984).

The Gujarat pogrom, instead, was visible and consumable for everybody who could find a
screen to watch it on, amidst soap operas, game shows and Bollywood movies, throughout the
whole of India. This in itself indicates that the majority of this watching and consuming public
did not react with shock and condemnation to what they saw. Had public outrage been
dominant, the violence might have stopped earlier, and the “world public” would have heard
more about it at the time. As it was, the overwhelming reaction was, if not indifference, denial or
even open approval of the violence, even though – or rather because – the coverage was conveyed
with heavy criticism by Delhi-based national news channels that many now openly perceived as
the mouthpieces of the dominant “secular-liberal” elite. It was the first time that media
instinctively dropped the traditional restraint of naming communities in riot reporting. Reports
that pointed to Hindus as the aggressors and to the Gujarat government as actively supportive,
however, were promptly rejected by audiences and often verbally attacked, both in floods of
hate-mails to particular journalists and in the online commentary sections of TV channels or
newspapers, which were just becoming available then.

Many of these online commentators inaugurated their use of the medium of the internet by
flagellating critical information on a massacre against their co-citizens as “exaggerated” and
“sensationalist” and as biased towards Muslims and against Hindus and “Gujarat”. The Gujarat
violence was hence not merely the first that was televised in India. It was the first during which
form, context and source of the reporting, and the exposure of their dominance through the
“secular-liberal” elite, took precedence over the actual event and its character of a crime.

This constellation fundamentally disrupted the genuine link between public and democracy as it
is routinely invoked in liberal thought. Instead, there occurred an open antagonism here that was
directly connected both to the unprecedented on-location visual reporting and the first-time
access of large numbers of people to commercial television. Both covering the anti-minority
killings and criticising the media for reporting the violence in an “exaggerated”, “sensationalist”
and “biased” manner marked an increase in democracy and media maturity. Under the historical
preconditions, however, sustaining both of these postures at the same time and against each
other turned them mutually exclusive.

What thus got documented was not the crime but rather two other things. For one, the large
absence of condemnation (and frequent clearly anti-democratic statements such as “finish them
[Muslims] once and for all”) indicated how well the Sangh Parivar's increasingly aggressive
politics of naturalising Hindu supremacy over the previous two decades had taken root.
Secondly, it became obvious that the simultaneity of crime and coverage will tend to work in
favour of the crime rather than its condemnation and investigation.

The Reason and Historical Preconditions

Until 1991, as is well known, the reporting of communal violence had, in permanent violation of
India’s democratic constitution, been censored “for the good of the people”. This was the case
both in the approach adopted by the then single state- owned TV broadcaster Doordarshan, and
the result of pretty effective self-censorship in private newspapers. The official argument was
that news of riots, and especially the naming of communities, would instigate further violence
93
amongst a population never deemed quite “developed”, i.e. secular, democratic and civilised
enough.

Basically, this premise served to conceal the Indian state’s long-standing passive or active
involvement in communal violence and the successive transformation of riots into ever more
organised anti-Muslim massacres, usually on the pretext of “self-defence” against “Muslim
aggression” (especially after the growing public influence and electoral successes of Hindu
nationalism from the 1980s onwards). Censorship is always motivated by the rulers' fear of the
subordinated to build their own, uncontrollable opinion. It can thus be assumed that even the
Indian state expected the population to protest the riot politics they had become implicit in once
they had more information on its background and patterns of execution.

Post-censorship, commercial television instinctively followed this logic. It began reporting from
Gujarat’s killing fields in the manner of an enlightenment intervention, invariably acting as
though it was opening up the atrocities of a non-democratic, if not wholly totalitarian regime “to
the light” and to “the eye of the public” and making them accessible and assessable to all.
However, there was an inherent pitfall in this. Anti-democratic and majoritarian convictions and
practices have clearly been flourishing across the citizenry and the state over the past three
decades, feeding the legitimacy of anti-minority violence. Yet, this development has neither led
to abandoning India's framework as a constitutional democracy nor has it evoked amongst
citizens, the feeling of living under dictatorial conditions – on the contrary (Hansen 1999).

The excitement of the Gujarat coverage acquired before this background the impression of
being singular and arbitrary. It did not, and could not, lay open the mechanisms of riot politics
and anti-minority mobilisation in their entirety and their historical dimensions, including their
precarious and complex relationship with democracy. Instead, the media was with hitherto
unknown immediacy reporting one atrocity against Muslims under one (and the time not yet
elected) government whose ideology was particularly prone to supporting such violence. And
because the coverage focused on what was happening at the very time, it was also not repealing
the erstwhile censorship, as it was not revealing anything that had been previously hidden. It
merely (en)acted post-censorship, i.e. a liberalisation policy that was promoted by the state and
the BJP-governments themselves.

The revelation of the crimes of classic totalitarian and fascist regimes illustrates that the
dimension of time and its passing, the intervention of non-domestic media and its own
clandestine character have been critical in the attempt to make state-induced and political
violence public. These classic regimes took considerable care, even in the case of legalised
violence- think of the officially so-named 'Night-and-Fog' decree of the German Nazis3 – to
keep their crimes secret, elevating the secret police and the secret service key institutions within
the regime. The eventual publication of its crimes usually indicated the imminent demise of the
regime, if it did not occur only after its downfall. The collapse then duly elicited a secondary
response, shock and condemnation amongst people abroad as well as in the “host” country.

3 "Nacht und Nebel" ("Night and Fog") was the codename given to a decree of December 7, 1941, issued by
Adolf Hitler and signed by Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the German Armed Forces High Command
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or OKW).
The decree directed that persons in occupied territories engaging in activities intended to undermine the
security of German troops were, upon capture, to be brought to Germany "by night and fog" for trial by
special courts, thus circumventing military procedure and various conventions governing the treatment of
prisoners. The code name stemmed from Germany's most acclaimed poet and playwright, Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe (1749–1832), who used the phrase to describe clandestine actions often concealed by fog and the
darkness of night' (Holocaust Encyclopedia, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php? ModuleId
=10007465). See also Alain Resnais' famous 1955 film “Night and Fog” (Nuit et Brouillard)
http://www.disclose.tv/action/viewvideo/185403/Night_and_ Fog_1955/
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At this point the secrecy of the crime, while it is the precondition for the absence of a public,
allows for, and indeed supports, the claim that they did not know what had taken place (so that
it remains quite unclear if the subsequent condemnation is provoked by the actual crime, by the
fact of having been kept “in the dark”, or by the reflex involved in denying one’s own
complicity; see below). In the classic scenario, a third factor is that the media that makes the
crime public is usually not from the same country. The secrecy of the crime is contingent on a
strict censorship of the domestic media, and even if killings are public, this is generally done in
order to force both the national media and the population into fearful compliance. Uncovering
the crime itself is consequently, because of the hermetic practical and discursive conditions,
often a risky and lengthy process that commonly can only be initiated by foreign media. Bits and
pieces of information get then fed to the (world) public sometimes over decades and shifts in
time from journalists to scientists, judiciaries and international human rights organisations.

None of these conventional conditions applied in the case of the Gujarat pogrom. Yet, the
reporting somewhat instinctively followed their pattern– basically because there is hardly another
way of democratic media conduct in a situation of large-scale state crime. Not only were
journalists thus acting as though they were revealing a shocking truth; interestingly, they also
somewhat instinctively gave the impression that they were reporting the atrocity from another
country (which inadvertently negatively mirrored Narendra Modi's claim of Gujarat's exceptional
status; Jha 2006). However, as mentioned above, a pogrom is, in contrast to secret executions
for instance, anyway always at least semi-public, in as much as it often involves parts of the local
population.

In a democracy such as India's the repeated occurrence of violence remains no secret, even if the
state censors its appearance in the media. Because, moreover, no secured information about the
context of this particular pogrom could be reported, it was thus, beyond its live-mediated form,
nothing really new to Indian audiences. That this pogrom entered the terrain of genocide, in
terms of the state-orchestrated determination to kill as many of a different group as quickly
possible, was a small qualitative shift in conduct that had also happened before (against the Sikhs
1984) and that was anyway conveniently denied by the Gujarat government. The democratised
media that strove to enlighten the public about the horrors committed thus met with a public
that thought that it already knew what was happening.

There's more to this aspect. The live-coverage also enabled viewers/media consumers for the
first time to register their own readings of what they saw within that very public, and these
readings were impacted by the same post-censorship freedom that the reporting media
somewhat only claimed for themselves. As the audience-turned population had been in the
know of, and even involved in, communal violence for decades, while being denied information
on the reasons and larger contexts both by state- and privatising the so-called “elite” media, they
brought to the fore a strong mistrust against any reporting that claimed authority over the
interpretation of the events.

The Sangh Parivar, besides mobilising already convinced followers and existing anti-Muslim
prejudice, thus reaped the harvest of an entrenched democratic deficit. One cannot but
acknowledge that the resistance against the basic narrative advanced by secular-liberal journalists
in their reporting bore a genuinely democratic question: why should the claim of this commercial
journalist authority, which had not bothered itself much with other instances of violence since
the 1990s and now instantly held Hindutva forces responsible for the Gujarat bloodshed, be
more credible than the earlier monopolised and censored media, which had averted all
responsibility from the Congress-state?

Yet another crucial point has to be considered in this context that lends a second dimension to
the 'form before content'-theme, addressed above. The history of live-coverage has not
95
coincidentally developed along sports events (Kelner 2012). Here, the live-broadcast is to
suggest to audiences their witnessing audio/visual presence in an actually happening,
ostentatiously harmless, “unpolitical”, and joyful competitive event– an event whose inherent
excitement and evolving tension virtually lives on (the feeling of) popular participation. Indeed,
the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games under the Nazi regime were the first-ever televised sports event.
It marked not only the beginning of TV live-broadcasting as such but also an essential
component of fascist entertainment spectacle and direct aesthetic involvement of a depoliticised
citizenry (Benjamin 1996-2004; Ohm 2014). In 2002 India, however, live-coverage drew
audiences into the very opposite of a joyful competitive event.

While it were the different TV stations themselves that operated under the new rules of market
competition and TRPs (Television Rating Points), audiences were precisely made part of what
conventionally has been carefully kept away from public witnessing. This same, or rather
enhanced, technique and procedure of live-coverage in a reverse situation seems to have yielded
highly ambiguous audience reactions. On the one hand, several observers have, usually with
shocked disbelief, pointed to the completely disinhibited, carnivalesque “dance of death”-
atmosphere that surrounded the perpetrators' actions on the ground in Gujarat (Ghassem-
Fachandi 2012; Janmohamed 2014). Live-coverage brought at least some of these images
unfiltered to audiences that had only since the middle of the 1990s become familiar with a fast-
advancing logic of direct transmission, first of a growing number of cricket tournaments and
then, after 2000, increasingly of game- and reality shows.4

Unfortunately, the novelty of the situation, which continues to go underestimated, seems to have
prevented scholarly investigation among viewers during or shortly after the pogrom itself. My
own random observations at the time seem to support the hypothesis that the fast
entertainmentization of television in combination with an advancing aura of immediacy and
directness has abetted a pattern of viewing and consuming the violence which put the carefree
feeling of partaking in a harmless event over the actual content, thus benefitting and enforcing
the celebration of Hindutva that sanghis had pursued all along.

On the other hand, it is precisely this logic of drawing viewers into the pogrom through live-
coverage that both enabled as well as provoked an instinctive distancing on their part. For one
they were, in fact, in contrast to the reporters, largely not physically on location and were not
confronted with the real dimensions and complexities of violence, fear and suffering. They could
neither be physically affected nor actively take part. However, live-coverage, through its
immediacy, inherently poses the question of audiences' own role in what they see unfold in real
time, especially if it happens in the same country. It directly and without warning confronts them
with their own potential implication and responsibility. The instinctive human reaction, when
confronted with the suggestion of responsibility for grave injustice (even more so than with
direct guilt), is likely to be rejection, though, particularly so if the forces pursuing this injustice
have not been criticised and battled beforehand. The histories of post-genocidal societies
indicate that it takes time and persuasion- effected, amongst other things, through the step-by-
step release of new and fact-checked information- to challenge and eventually overcome this
instinct.5

If genocidal violence is being live-reported, and the time-gap shrinks to zero, the impulse to
deny responsibility is consequently not only likely to be enhanced. Because live-coverage also
suggests that “everything has been seen at the time”, the later placing of fact-checked
information becomes very difficult. The manifold futile attempts by Indian journalists and
filmmakers during the first few years following the pogrom to reveal 'the truth' – as a cover of

4 Most of these shows were not actually broadcast live but conveyed the feeling of live-ness.
5 I thank Farah Naqvi for making me think more about this point.
96
the investigative magazine Tehelka in 2007 confidently announced – speak of this problematic.
What drove them was their own disbelief at the absence of shock they had witnessed amongst
the watching populace. Shock, however, when failing to occur in the first instance, cannot be re-
evoked, and images of cruelty that have already been used by audiences to support a self-
comforting interpretation of the events cannot be employed to convince them of a different
story.

Correspondingly, when looking at the actual cases since WW II in which accused perpetrators of
state-induced violence have eventually been judicially tried and sentenced, we find a remarkable
correlation between the absence of such trials and the increase of non-embedded media on the
location of the crime (including more and more media operated by private users, particularly in
the form of mobile phones). Beginning with the Vietnam War, during which horrific war crimes
by the US-military against the local population were pretty promptly documented, more recent
atrocities against people in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Libya, Palestine, Egypt and Syria
(committed by both the respective state governments and the “intervening” Western powers, or
groups supported by either) have all seen a good share of live-reporting and private
documentation.

The demand for judicial action, however, has remained largely confined to scattered victims'
groups and their activist supporters. This does not mean that people would necessarily back the
cruelties of their leaders, elected or not, in the same way as under erstwhile totalitarian regimes.
Rather, it bespeaks the inherent ambivalence of democracy, the ever decreasing possibility to
ascribe the 'dark side' only to clearly identifiable dictatorships (Mann 2005; Mouffe 2000). Live-
reporting (and internet-based documentation), contrary to still widely-held beliefs, does thus not
seem to have particularly helped to establish uncontested, realizable facts about violence against
minorities and local populations. While it has certainly raised the general knowledge about such
incidents, it has also, on a global scale, generated excited opinions about “truth” and majoritarian
defence mechanisms that are backed by the democratic freedom of speech.

The Indian case and the Gujarat pogrom take a particular place in this scenario, because a basic
definition holds that genocidal attacks on minority populations are irreconcilable with
constitutional democracy (Mann 2005; Rummel 1995). Since WW II, the “interventionist”
politics of the West, and the US in particular, are informed by the narrative that, on the contrary,
democracies intervene to prevent or stop genocides elsewhere, i.e., in non- or less democratic
states. They consequently take great care, and are in the privileged position to ensure, that
whatever atrocities they themselves commit in the course take place outside their own country
(even illegal detention is, as in Guantanamo, kept ex-terrestrial). The reporting of such crimes
(which rarely happens live) may be problematic for them as it, increasingly, tarnishes and
questions their democratic credentials but can usually still be digested (Abu Ghraib) and
explained to the own population as an unwanted side-effect (“collateral damage”). The live-
reporting of violence in the “intervened” states, on the other hand, poses no problem as these
are by definition not democratic.

This definition of the mutual exclusion of democracy and (reporting of) genocidal violence,
however logical and important, obviously works not only as an analytical and practical guideline
but also, and increasingly, as a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense that whatever crime is being
committed (and covered) in a constitutional democracy, cannot have genocidal quality. This
reverse logic was very much at work in the reactions to the Gujarat pogrom, including those by
international scholars and, particularly, international media (who largely accepted the claim of
the Indian central and Gujarat governments that the violence was an unfortunate but internal
matter that a democracy like India could handle herself). For the victims, the situation thus
became particularly precarious, because they could not hope for much exposure of their plight
to the outside world. The national live-coverage, on the other hand, equipped Indian audiences
97
not only with the argument that such freedom of professional reporting can only happen in a
democracy, and the violence can hence not be genocidal. Their interpretations of the transmitted
pogrom also turned India's long history of state-induced killings of parts of its own population –
as a democracy with one of the most liberal constitutions world-wide– into evidence that this
violence was nothing extraordinary.

Under the conditions, the Indian media was virtually robbed of its self-appointed investigative
and enlightening intention. As long as reporting journalists focused on the crime committed,
there was no way for them to avoid becoming the advertisers of what they wanted to expose
(which is one reason why the reporting on Gujarat faltered rather quickly altogether). Precisely
because it was (made) public, the crime became non-publishable as a crime. The Indian public,
meanwhile, insofar as it rejected the crime to have happened, fundamentally changed its role.
While it had for long been prevented from being the power that, in Habermasian terms,
monitors public authority through public opinion, it now made itself indispensable in preventing
the disclosure of the authority’s guilt. By defying its own implication in what it witnessed on its
small screens, it tied itself to Narendra Modi, making eventually his election as Prime Minister
the price for upholding the self-comforting belief that the Gujarat pogrom has been no pogrom
at all.

Precisely because India is still a democracy, however, this potentially closed interpretation has
not remained uncontested even over the years that have passed. Gujarat has resurfaced in the
public debate ever since, even if largely because of the relentless dedication of a few, who,
tellingly, have refrained from arguing with media-based evidence and have mainly operated
legally. Even if it has been rightfully argued that relying on the 'fact-finding' of the judiciary has
become as questionable in a process in which facts have systematically been replaced with
interpretations of “truth” (Mitta 2014), their efforts have nevertheless crucially contributed not
only to keeping “Gujarat” on the agenda but also, as I mentioned at the outset, to unravelling
earlier pogroms. Yet even in this laudable counter-agency some tendency prevails to focus on
large-scale atrocities– rather than include ongoing and everyday violence against minorities and
weaker sections of society – and to treat these events as exceptions from the democratic norm.

It is, however, not the violence but India that represents today an exceptional case of a
democratic constitution and routine drastic violence against large sections of her own
population. That the televised Gujarat pogrom loudly and visibly marked this exception remains
within the blind spot in the understanding of democracy that many people both in India and
beyond nurture. This might explain why the debate has hardly moved past the initial polarisation
and the media dimension of this pogrom has been left remarkably under-analysed. The emphasis
in India, both in everyday practise and in scholarship, still lies squarely on access, acquisition and
quantity of media (and their users). Whatever we find published on Muslims and media laments
their stereotypisation and lack of access, while in turn, amongst Muslims the idea prevails that
“being more in the media” would support their causes, document their difficulties and meet the
promise of democracy.

During the Gujarat pogrom, however, Muslims have been “in the media” and documented in the
most grave of the dangers they face – and it has not helped raising consciousness and promote
inclusion. On the contrary: in the decade after the pogrom, Muslims were all over India and
more than ever before - under a Congress-led central government eager not to be left behind in
“anti-terrorism” policies - exposed to the permanent threat of prosecution, willful detention and
police “encounters” that killed again many (Sethi 2014), forcing them to keep their heads down.

The coming decade, for Muslims to take steps out of their marginalisation, will require to move
beyond complaints about stereotypisation and exclusion. It demands a greater understanding of
the logic with which discourses evolve and are being organised, of the mechanisms of media and
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of the fact that “being in the media” may work as much against them as for them. Precisely their
precarious position in India equips them for approaching this task.

* Short parts of this article have been reproduced from my piece Public against Democracy: the case
of the Gujarat pogrom 2002, published in 2012 in the Open Democracy-digital commons
(https://www.opendemocracy.net/openindia/britta-ohm/public-against-democracy-case-of-
gujarat-pogrom-2002)

References

1. Akbar, M.J., 1988. Riot after Riot. Reports on Caste and Communal Violence in India, New Delhi:
Roli Books.
2. Appadurai, Arjun, 2006. Fear of Small Numbers. An Essay on the Geography of Anger, Durham:
Duke University Press.
3. Benjamin, Walter, 1996-2004. Selected Writings, vol. I-IV, ed. M. Bullock et al., Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press.
4. Brass, Paul, 2003. The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
5. Das, Veena, ed., 1990. Mirrors of Violence. Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia,
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
6. Eckert, Julia, 2003. The Charisma of Direct Action. Power, Politics and the Shiv Sena, Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
7. Ghassem-Fachandi, Parvis, 2012. Pogrom in Gujarat. Hindu Nationalism and Anti-Muslim
Violence in India, Princeton University Press.
8. Hansen, Thomas Blom, 1999. The Saffron Wave. Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern
India, Delhi: Oxford University Press.
9. India First Foundation (ed.), 2002, Godhra and After: The Role of Media. A Report, New Delhi.
10. Jaffrelot, Christophe, 2015. “Narendra Modi and the Power of Television in Gujarat” in
Television & New Media 16 (4), special issue Modi and the Media: Indian Politics and Electoral
Aftermath, 346-53.
11. Janmohamed, Zahir, 2014. “Some young Gujaratis want to know: what really happened in
2002?”, in scroll, 22. April (http://scroll.in/article/662406/some-young-gujaratis-want-to-
know-what-really-happened-in-2002).
12. Jha, Prashant, 2006. “Gujarat as Another Country. The Making and Reality of a Fascist
Realm”, in Himal Southasian 19:7 (Oct.), at: www.himalmag.com/2006/october / cover _
story.htm.
13. Kelner, Martin, 2012. Sit Down and Cheer. A History of Sport on TV, London: Bloomsbury.
14. Mann, Michael, 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge
University Press.
15. Mitta, Manoj, 2014. The Fiction of Fact-Finding. Modi and Godhra, New Delhi: Harper Collins.
16. Mouffe, Chantal, 2000. The Democratic Paradox, London: Verso.

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17. Ohm, Britta, 2007. The Televised Community. Culture, Politics and the Market of Visual
Representation in India, PhD thesis, http://opus.kobv.de/euv/volltexte/2011/46.
18. Ohm, Britta, 2014. “Contesting Interpretational Authority: Democracy and Fascism in the
Indian Empowered Public”, in Media International Australia 152, 119-32.
19. Rummel, R.J., 1995. “Democracy, Power, Genocide and Mass Murder”, in The Journal of
Conflict Resolution 39 (1), 3-26.
20. Sethi, Manisha, 2014. Kafkaland. Prejudice, Law and Counterterrorism in India, New Delhi:
Three Essays Collective.
21. Tehelka 2007, special issue Gujarat 2002: The Truth in the Words of the Men who Did it, Nov. 3.

100
 Chapter 8

HANDLING COMMUNAL VIOLENCE

Vibhuti Narayan Rai

Abstract

Having been given the responsibility to conduct a study on the neutrality of the police during communal riots,
especially between Hindus and Muslims in India, by the National Police Academy, Hyderabad, I encountered
some disturbing trends in its behaviour. The paper dispels on the police behaviour in pre-Independence India, and
post-independence India, and what were the people’s expectations from the police.

The National Police Academy, Hyderabad, awarded me a fellowship to conduct a study on the neutrality of the
police during communal riots, especially between Hindus and Muslims in India. During the course of my study, I
encountered some disturbing trends in its behaviour. In most parts of the country, the relationship between the
police and Muslims was inimical and community perception of the police in situations of communal tension was
that of an enemy. This is true not only for the post Independence period; pre-Partition Indian society too expected
the police to behave in a communal fashion. For a policeman, Hindu or Muslim, continued to be looked upon
primarily as a protector of his own community.

While working on the project, I came across two interesting incidents from pre-Partition days. The riots in East
Bengal during the ’20s and ’30s were abetted by Muslim policemen spreading rumours among the Muslim
peasants that attacks on Hindus would be considered as acts of loyalty to the Raj. Further, there was an
agreement between the Nawab of Dhaka and the Emperor of Britain that attacks on Hindus would not attract
any punishment. I also came across a petition submitted in the ’30s by one Pandit Raghuvar Dayal of Kanpur
that Hindu citizens of the town felt insecure because of a lower representation in the Kanpur police. These two
instances exemplified the dominant trend in Indian society of the time.

Introduction

The situation has not changed significantly and the relationship between citizens of a particular
religion with policemen of the other religion remains more or less the same. We need to examine
minority fears regarding the behaviour of the police keeping these ‘facts’ in view. Is the current
behaviour of the police and the reaction of the minorities just an extension of the earlier trend?
Is the Muslim perception regarding the police based on certain realities or is their behaviour too
responsible? Why are the perceptions of Hindus and Muslims about the Indian Police so
diametrically opposed to each other? Muslims in India consider the police as their enemy, the
Hindus see them as friends and protectors. The answers to these questions have to be sought in
the behaviour of the police combatting communal riots, the representation of minorities in the
police, and conflicting expectations of different segments of society in any given situation.
We should first analyse the efforts of the police to quell incidents of communal violence. Like
with any other law and order problem, police efforts to cope with the situation can also be
divided into many stages. Collection of intelligence and preventive actions – detention of anti-
social and communal elements, execution of bonds, instilling fear in the minds of mischief-
mongers through show of force, and diffusing tension through re-conciliatory measures, form
the first stage of police strategy.

The second stage of police action begins with the eruption of violence. This includes actual use
of force– lathi-charge, firing, arrests, and imposition of curfew and extension of protection to
the victims of violence. The third and final stage involves measures like investigation and
prosecution of riot cases, rehabilitation of riot victims, necessary arrangements to ensure that
there is no recurrence of communal violence and rebuilding of confidence among the people.
The neutrality of police behaviour and its relationship with members of different communities
can be understood better only after analysing police actions during the above three stages. It is
basically the overall behaviour of the police in situations of communal strife which pushes
members of a minority community, like the Muslims, into viewing it as an enemy.
I was stunned to discover that in most major communal riots in the country, Muslims were the
worst sufferers, both in terms of loss of life and property. Often, the percentage of Muslim
casualties was more than 60 percent of the total. Their losses in terms of property were in similar
proportion. Given these facts, it is not unnatural to expect that the law enforcing agencies would
react in a manner commensurate with this reality.

Unfortunately, the real picture is quite different. Even in riots where the number of Muslims
killed was many times more than the Hindus, it was they who were mainly arrested, most
searches were conducted in their houses, and curfew imposed in a harsher manner in their
localities. This observation holds good for even those riots where almost all killed were Muslims,
e.g., Ahmedabad (1969), Bhiwandi (1970) or Bhagalpur (1989). This phenomenon can be better
understood through the accompanying table.

Arrests and Casualties Hindu Muslim

Bhiwandi Riots (1970): Arrested in cognisable/

substantive offences 21 901

Casualties 17 59

Meerut Riots (1982): Arrested in cognisable/

substantive offences upto15 September 124 231

Casualties 28

Similarly, Muslims are often at the receiving end during house searches. The general pattern
during a communal riot is that a Muslim mohalla is cordoned off with the help of the army or
para-military forces after which the houses are searched indiscriminately. Such acts only result in
injuring the pride of the entire community. What is more disturbing is the mind-frame of the
civil and police administration. While the curfew is enforced with all strictness in the Muslim
localities, it is virtually confined to the main roads in Hindu areas, with normal activity in the
lanes and by lanes remaining unaffected.

In interviews with the riot victims of Ahmedabad, Meerut, Bombay and Allahabad, this single
factor came across as the most important in explaining Muslim anger towards the police. This
complaint of discrimination was more bitter in areas of adjoining Hindu and Muslim residential
townships. Further, the experience of curfew was different for the poor residents of slum areas
belonging to the two communities. Most houses lack basic facilities such as drinking water and
lavatories. The Muslims invariably complained that while they were not permitted to move out
of their houses to fetch water from public taps, which happen to be the main source of water
supply in such areas, the Hindus were rarely subjected to such restrictions.

An analysis of the number of victims of police firing in communal riots reveals a similar trend.
Normally, Muslims suffer the brunt of police firing. The table below shows that Muslims suffer
differentially in police firing even in those riots where they have already suffered far more than
Hindus in the violence.

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 Number of Persons killed in Police Firing

Place Hindu Muslim

Bhiwandi (1970) nil 9

Firozabad (1972) nil 6
Aligarh (1978) nil 7
Meerut (1982) nil 6

It is not difficult to identify the reasons behind the discriminatory behaviour of the police. The
conduct of an average policeman is guided by the same predetermined beliefs and
misconceptions which influence the mind of an average Hindu. Not unlike his average co-
religionist, an average Hindu policeman too believes that Muslims by nature are generally cruel
and violent. In the course of my study, I spoke to a large number of policemen of various ranks.
Most held the view that apart from being cruel and violent, Muslims were untrustworthy, anti-
national, easily influenced by a fanatical leadership, and capable of rioting at the slightest
provocation. Further, most policemen believed that riots are initiated by the Muslims. Even
when confronted with evidence that it was not in the interest of Muslims to start a riot, the
arguments rarely changed.

It stands to reason that since policemen are convinced of the mischievous role of Muslims in
riots, they rarely entertain doubts regarding the modalities required to check them. They believe
that the only way to control riots is to crush the mischief mongering Muslims. Instructions from
the state government or senior police officials to deal firmly and ruthlessly with the rioters are
interpreted in a prejudiced and biased way. Being firm and ruthless with rioters is interpreted as
firmness and ruthlessness towards Muslims, arrests means arrests of Muslims, search means
search of Muslim houses, and police firing means firing on Muslims.

Just how strongly the subconscious is affected by the prejudices and predetermined beliefs we
hold, and the degree to which our conduct is influenced by them, can be discerned from the
actions of policemen during communal riots. Even in situations where Muslims were at the
receiving end from the very outbreak of rioting or where the killing of Muslims was totally one-
sided, the police did not hesitate in claiming that the Muslims had caused the riot. Even
subsequently, after it was established that the Muslims had suffered most, they continued to
argue that Muslims were responsible for the outbreak of riots.

In my conversations with some of the policemen posted in Bhagalpur (1989) and Bombay
(1992-93), it became clear that their perception about Muslims as violent and cruel was so deeply
embedded in their psyche, that even after admitting the disproportionate destruction of Muslim
life and property, they continued to ‘discover’ many ‘reasons’ to dismiss the suggestion that the
‘naturally non-violent and pious Hindus’ could in any way have been responsible.

It is this psychology that governs police reactions during communal strife. While combatting
riots, they look for friends among Hindus and foes among Muslims. It is a common sight in the
towns of North India that outside forces sent to control communal tensions make their lodging
arrangements in temples, dharmashalas and parks in Hindu localities or the space available in
Hindu homes and shops. When shops are shut during curfew, food, tea and snacks are supplied
to them by Hindu homes. Members of the majority community, who in normal times may
maintain a distance from the police just like members of the minority communities, suddenly
perceive policemen as friends. This is their ‘natural’ expectation from a ‘friendly’ police – that it

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will not use force against them. Whenever the police has used force against Hindus, they have
reacted in amazement and behaved as though cheated.

The first information report (FIR) lodged by Ajit Dutta, during the Bhagalpur riots (1989),
candidly underscores this mentality. He writes about the dismay and anger expressed by a mob
of law-breaking Hindus when confronted by the police. Obviously, for them this was just not
done. This reminds me of a similar experience at Gadiwan Tola in Allahabad (1980). I warned a
Hindu mob that we would open fire if they did not disperse. The crowd refused to take the
warning seriously believing it was a joke. Subsequently, when they heard the order to open fire,
there was the unambiguous reaction of disbelief and surprise.

How far this deeply entrenched perception of Muslims as being solely responsible for riots and
strictness towards them as the only way to quell a riot affects, the reaction of a policeman may
be illustrated by the example of Hashimpura, where the savagery and horrifying lack of
professionalism of the police became a matter of national shame.

The Meerut riots (1987) were unprecedented in the toll of human life and for the long period of
continued and unabated violence. The magnitude of the riots can be gauged by the fact that the
services of about 50 gazetted police officers and magistrates along with more than 70 companies
of PAC, para-military forces and army had to be pressed into service. The policemen deployed
here harboured all the above-mentioned beliefs and prejudices. When their round-the-clock vigil
failed to control the violence, some of them went berserk.

Fully convinced that the only way to quell riots in a civilised society was by teaching the Muslims
a lesson, one section of the PAC picked up more than two dozen Muslims from Hashimpura.
They were transported in police trucks and killed at two places in Ghaziabad. I was SP,
Ghaziabad at the time and after receiving the information, registered two cases against the PAC.
The cases were handed over to the Uttar Pradesh CID and after eight years of investigations a
charge sheet was reportedly filed against the erring personnel of the PAC.
Why should the PAC have committed such a detestable act? I talked to a number of policemen
deployed in Meerut in this period during my tenure as SP Ghaziabad (1985-88) as well as during
the course of my study.

An understanding of the psychology of these men may help us, to better appreciate the
relationship between the police and members of the minority communities.

Most of the policemen posted in Meerut thought that the riots were a result of Muslim mischief.
They also believed that Meerut had become a mini-Pakistan because of Muslim intransigence;
that it was necessary to teach the community a lesson in order to establish permanent peace in
the city. They were deeply affected by rumours which suggested that Hindus in Meerut were
totally vulnerable to Muslim attacks.

Instances like Hashimpura only worsen the already strained relationship between Muslims and
the police. We find that some riots did start with a Muslim attack on the police. Often, in a
surcharged atmosphere, the presence of police angers people. For instance, reacting to the
demolition of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, angry mobs of Muslims in different cities initially
chose the police rather than the Hindus as a target. There are many other examples of
communal rioting in which trouble started as a clash between the police and Muslims and only
subsequently turned into a Hindu-Muslim conflict. The Idgah incident in Moradabad (1980) is a
case in point.

The clearest reflection of the hostile relationship between Muslims and the police can be
witnessed in the behaviour of the police entering a Muslim locality during communal tensions.
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The briefing, preparation and weaponry of the police party before entering a Muslim locality for
arrests, searches or even normal patrolling is such that it thinks it is entering enemy territory. I
have encountered many such groups and invariably found them comprising of people full of
apprehension and fear. Their behaviour is not inexplicable. It is necessary for them to be alert, as
they could be the target of attack. Who is responsible for this feeling of distrust and enmity?
Perhaps, the seeds are to be found in the terms ‘we and they’ used by police officials for Hindus
and Muslims during conferences organised to devise ways and means to deal with a communal
situation.

The reporting of facts, the investigation into and prosecution of those involved in communal
riots, are other aspects where a clear communal bias in police behaviour can be discerned. Facts
are reported at various levels. Intelligence reports prepared at the police station to be sent to
government and senior police officials are normally affected by this bias. For example, a list of
habitually communal agitators, maintained at various police levels in Uttar Pradesh, is dominated
by Muslim names. Even during the days when Hindu communal forces were active in the Ram
Janam bhoomi agitation, it was difficult to find the name of Hindu inciters in the list. Perhaps
the same perception which holds that to be communal is the prerogative of the Muslims was at
work here.

The damage this bias does to police professionalism can be understood from the incidents that
led to the destruction of the Babri mosque. It is evident from the charge sheet filed by the CBI
that the demolition of the mosque was the result of a well-planned conspiracy. However, none
of the intelligence agencies actually discovered this fact before 6 December, 1992.

A heinous example of this bias in reporting facts is available from Bhagalpur (1989). 116
Muslims were killed in Logain village on 27 October, 1989. This brutal massacre was enacted by
the Hindus of Logain and other neighbouring villages. Logain stands 26 kms from the district
headquarters of Bhagalpur, with the police station only 4 kms away at Jagdishpur. The Muslims
killed were buried in the fields. The 65 Muslim survivors went to many places, including
Bhagalpur town, and reported this ghastly incident. Details were published in local and national
newspapers. Despite this, the district and police administration of Bhagalpur continued to deny
any such incident till a police party led by dig Ajit Dutta dug out some bodies from the fields on
8 December, 1989.

The Justice D.P. Madon Commission which enquired into the riots of 1970 at Bhiwandi-Jalgaon
cited similar examples of bias in reporting. His analysis about the failure of the police to take
effective measures at Jalgaon, even after receiving the report of Bhiwandi troubles, is scathing-
‘The real reason for the inadequacy of the measures taken by the authorities was the communal
bent of mind, of some officers and incompetence of others. Unfortunately, SP S.T. Raman
appears to have possessed a communal bent of mind and perhaps a pro-Jan Sangh bias. As
shown by some of his own reports and his noting on the reports of Inspector Sawant, incharge
of the Jalgaon city police station, he fully realised the seriousness of the situation. He, however,
chose to turn a blind eye to it and even to mislead the government and the IGP about the true
state of affairs in his report dated 29th March, 1970.’

The commission found a similar bias in the conduct of PSI Bhalerao, who did not include
incidents of brick-batting by Hindus in the records of the police station. The officials of the
intelligence department displayed a similar bias. PSI Badgoojar sent an entirely false report to
DIG (Int.) that the riot was caused by Muslims throwing burning torches on Hindu houses.
Investigating agencies too are afflicted by a communal bias while looking into riot cases. There is
the classic case of Hashimpura, Meerut, cited earlier, in which the Uttar Pradesh CID took eight
years to complete its investigation. Another example relates to the cases registered during the
1984 anti-Sikh riots. In most of these situations, the police organisations failed to book the
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culprits.

The role of the special investigation squad, set up to investigate the riot cases of Bhiwandi, was
focused on by the Madon Commission as a glaring example of communal bias. The squad’s
effort to establish the theory of a Muslim conspiracy was ridiculed by the commission, finding it
totally untenable. The commission highlighted many examples of investigators trying to fabricate
evidence against Muslims and shielding Hindu culprits. It also cited many instances of tampering
with official records in a communally biased manner.

The same communal bias on the part of state agencies is evident in their treatment of arrested
persons. In any civilized society it is a well-established norm that once a person is taken into
custody, it becomes the duty of the state to protect his life and provide him facilities to which he
is entitled as part of his human rights. Unfortunately, there are numerous instances when the
basic human rights of persons under custody are violated by police and jail officials, solely
because of their communal bias. Nowhere is evidence of this bias better described than in the
Justice Joseph Vithayathal Commission of Inquiry Report on the Tellicherry Disturbances
(1971). How one wishes that the above examples were simply aberrations and exceptions, and
not reflective of the general behaviour of our law enforcing agencies.

Mr. Vibhuti Narain Rai former Vice Chancellor of Mahatma Gandhi International University-Wardha is
famous for his stupendous work and impeccable record in the Indian Police Service, which he served for 36 years.
A winner of many awards for his meritorious service, his major postings include Kashmir Valley, and Kumbh
Mela. He has written and spoken against communal bias among police personnel. National Police Academy
awarded him fellowship to do research on police neutrality during communal riots. He is also known for his bold
writings and has written five novels--Ghar, Shahar mein Kurfew, Kissa Loktantra, Tabadla and Presm ki
Bhootkatha.

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 Chapter 9

ANCHORING BEHAVIOUR IN THE WORD OF GOD

M. D. Nalapat

Abstract

Human law should never be used as a substitute for divine law. Human behaviour should change and evolve less
through human law than through divine influence. The use of state law as a bludgeon to force behaviour changes
except in a small number of instances, as for example bodily harm, theft or abuse of the young and helpless, will
fail to change character, as has been the case in countries across the world. Is alcohol absent in countries where it is
banned? Is adultery not present in every society? Each individual should search inwards to understand and accept
divine law rather than look outwards at human law, which in many cases is ineffective. India can be the fulcrum
of such a return to the core values of Mercy, Compassion and Beneficence.

Every religious text is embedded with scenes of war and bloodshed, yet in none of the other
great religions of the world, is there a characterization of generalised violence as there is an
increasingly world made Islamophobic, by the actions of a few. More than traducers from the
outside of the accepted boundaries of the Muslim faith, the problem lies within, in the relatively
small group of Wahabbis (within the Sunni population) and Khomeinists (within the Shia), who
emphasize a few references to violence in the Holy Qura’n in their theologies, rather than the
beneficence, mercy and compassion which suffuse each segment of the revealed Word of God,
and which are therefore explicitly shown to be the core virtues to be sought after by the believer.

Of course, let it be repeated that the word ‘Muslim’ does not find any mention in the Word of
God, which is clear that every living being, every object, every subjective impulse, is the creation
of the Supreme Being. Interestingly, although the Hindu faith is considered outside the category
of the three ‘Religions of the Book’ (Islam, Christianity and Judaism), the fact is that much of
the philosophy of that faith is also embedded in books, and hence the term to use may be
‘Religion of Books’. The centrality of the Almighty is explicit in the Gayatri Mantra, the primary
chant of believers in Hinduism, which speaks of the Supreme Being which controls all and is yet
unaffected any. Each of us is child of the Almighty, the Supreme Being, and is therefore, a
brother or a sister to every other, no matter what faith be subscribed to.

The teaching of the Word of God needs to be understood and followed in spirit and not just in
letter, the way the Wahabbis and Khomeinists do. In the 21st century, this message of Peace
needs to be accepted, especially by those who believe in the reality of the Almighty, the Supreme
Being, who controls everything. Should this be accepted, hatred between communities will be
shown to be contrary to the fact that each is a child of the Almighty. Prophet Muhammad
himself (PBUH) saw conflict only as the exception and never the rule, and gathered followers
because of his sincerity in ensuring fairness, compassion and mercy rather than hatred and
vengeance. To do so, would be to usher in a new Golden Age of Humanity, just as there was a
Golden Age of Islam, which flourished for five centuries after the passing away of Prophet
Muhammad (PBUH).

They need to escape from the ritualism and exclusivism of theologies that are entirely the
opposite of the message of the Qura’n, in particular from the interpretations given by Wahabi
and Khomeinst theologians, several of which provide excuses and reasons for the use of force in
situations other than the few instances where it is justified. Violence can only be the default
option, never the preferred option, and should be resorted to only in situations of unbearable
injustice. Some scholars have called for a ‘reformation of Islam’ when in fact what is needed is
a return to the core philosophy of the Holy Qura’n, which has placed at the apex the qualities of
Mercy, Compassion and Beneficence. Such an affirmation of the fundamentals of Islam would
serve as the trigger for a revival of the spirit of enquiry as well as the expansion of the
boundaries of tolerance within the universe of those accepting the message of the Word of God
as revealed to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Enquiry rather than a closed mind, acceptance (as
exemplified by the over hundred thousand prophets who came before the Word of God was
revealed in the purest form) rather than rejection of ideas from outside, is key to hewing closer
to the core virtues blessed by the Holy Qura’n.

The Word of God is universal rather than sectarian, and so should be the mindset of those
claiming to live by its principles. They should include rather than exclude, embrace rather than
hate, other children of Almighty. A verdict on the worth of the deeds a human life takes place
only on the Day of Judgment and not in this life. Hence, those who promise Paradise as the
reward for deeds often of violence alien to the glow of the message of the Word of God are
wrong, for no human being has been given the power to make a judgement as to whether a
human being will enter Paradise or the other world after the passage of the physical self. Such a
verdict is the prerogative of the Almighty, as indeed is every other action or form.

And the criteria on which the Almighty will judge is not known to human minds. It is possible
that a single good deed may count for more than several less worthy actions in the final
reckoning. Hence, to condemn another or to praise another is wrong, for each of us is a
combination of good and evil, of weakness and strength, of purity and vice, whomsoever we be.
That is the reality of being human, which is why those who claim superior knowledge over
others are going against the Total Democracy of the Holy Qura’n, which is meant to be directly
read and understood by each rather than pass through the sieve of interpretation. Even the
Prophet (PBUH), perfect as he was, did not claim to interpret, only to reveal.

Human law should never be used as a substitute for divine law. Human behaviour should
change and evolve less through human law than through divine influence. The use of state law
as a bludgeon to force behaviour changes except in a small number of instances, as for example
bodily harm, theft or abuse of the young and helpless, will fail to change character, as has been
the case in countries across the world. Is alcohol absent in countries where it is banned? Is
adultery not present in every society? Each individual should search inwards to understand and
accept divine law rather than look outwards at human law, which in many cases is ineffective.
India can be the fulcrum of such a return to the core values of Mercy, Compassion and
Beneficence, for the Muslim community in India is known and appreciates globally for its
modern and moderate mindset. Indeed, geopolitically, there should be a civilisational alliance
between the Three "I"s: India, Indonesia and newly modernizing Iran, that would present to the
world the true face of the teachings revealed fifteen centuries ago.

Prof. Madhav Das Nalapat is an academic and columnist. A former Editor of Mathrubhumi and Times
of India, he is editorial Director of ITV Media, which publishes the Sunday Guardian. An expert on security,
public policy and international relations, he is Director of the Department of Geopolitics & International
Relations of Manipal University. Professor Nalapat writes extensively on security, policy and international
affairs. His columns are published in newspapers in India and abroad.

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 Chapter 10

MUSLIM REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT: A CASE STUDY OF 96

MUSLIM CONCENTRATED CONSTITUENCIES
Shafeeq Rahman

Abstract

Indian Muslim are largely under-represented across the socio-economic and political segments as compared to other
fellow religious and social communities. This marginalization was highlighted by the government sponsored Sachar
Committee report (2006) and pointed out by other official figures. Backwardness got worsened but the Muslim
voices for reforms have not been adequately entertained in legislative bodies due to their political under-
representation in proportion to population at each level of legislation from panchayat, local bodies, state assemblies
to the national parliament.

Continuous inadequate representation of Muslim in parliament is due to several internal and external reasons i.e.
devoid of constitutional provisions like reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs)/Scheduled Tribes (STs), lack of
proportional ticket distribution by political parties, low poll percentage in Muslim areas, reserving of Muslim
concentrated constituencies for SC, vote polarization against Muslim candidates, split of Muslim votes and many
others.

The paper aims to highlight the level of Muslim under-representation in parliament, to find out its reason through
the case study of last two election results, and to list out the remedial measures to overcome with such
marginalization. It will try to channelize the discussion between all major stakeholders i.e. government, Election
Commission, political parties, community organizations and the individual electoral, so that adequate voices
regarding the community problems and issues reach to the legislative bodies through enhance representation.

Paper is divided broadly into three parts. First is the evaluation about the level of under-representation, historically
at national level and for last two elections at state level by gender. The second section contains the case study on
demographics and general electoral behaviour of 96 Muslim concentrated constituencies and the performance of
Muslim political parties and candidates. The paper ends with some suggestions towards the enhancement of
representation.

Level of Muslim Under-representation in Parliament

Parliament is an apex body for legislation, proportionate representation of all sections of society
is a pre-requisite component for implementation of successful inclusive democracy. Muslim
would have been 73 out of 543 members in Indian parliament according to their population
ratio – 14 percent of the total population - but such a purely mathematical mark has never been
achieved since independence. Muslim in the 16th Lok Sabha has hit an all-time low 4.24 percent
representation. This is the worst in the history of Indian Parliament with the previous low being
in 1952 when there were only 4.29 percent representation of Muslim MPs. The highest was in
1980 when 49 Muslims were elected to Parliament and constituted 9.04 percent.

A timeline comparison is shown in Table 1 which indicates the number of Muslim members in
parliament and level of representation during the various terms:
 Table 1: Number of Muslim Won and Percentage Representation in Indian Parliament

Election Year Muslim Won Total Seats Percentage of

Representation

1952 21 489 4.29

1957 24 494 4.86
1962 23 494 4.66
1967 29 520 5.58
1971 30 578 5.19
1977 34 542 6.27
1980 49 542 9.04
1984-85 46 543 8.47
1989 33 543 6.08
1991-92 28 543 5.16
1996 28 543 5.16
1998 29 543 5.34
1999 32 543 5.89
2004 36 543 6.63
2009 30 543 5.52
2014 23 543 4.24

This level of under-representation varies across the states during the last decades. To envisage
the adequate number of Muslim representation at state level in the parliament and number of
actual Muslim won during the post delimitation parliamentary elections 2009 and 2014, a
methodology across the states is adapted on which pattern the Delimitation Commission of
India entitled the parliamentarian seats for Schedules castes and tribes for the purpose of seats
reservation according to their population ratios.

Delimitation Commission (2008), a constituent body for demarcation of assembly and

parliamentary constituencies, has fixed the boundaries in view of average population
representation and has reserved the constituencies for scheduled castes and tribes as per their
population ratio in the particular state. This demarcation implemented in the year 2008 is on the
basis of population census 2001 and will remain the same till the year 2026.

In spite of knowing that a similar kind of reservation for Muslims as for the SC/ST, is
constitutionally not feasible in the existing set up, but through such appropriation as shown in
Table 2, we can at least visualize the strength of Muslim and their ideal representation across the
states:

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 Table 2: Entitlement of Lok Sabha Seats for Muslims across the States

States Muslim %age Share Entitlement Muslim Muslim

Population of Muslims of PCs for Won - 2009 Won - 2014
in Million Muslim
Uttar Pradesh 30.74 18.5 16 7 0
West Bengal 20.24 25.25 11 6 8
Bihar 13.72 16.53 7 3 4
Maharashtra 10.27 10.6 5 0 0
Assam 8.24 30.92 4 2 2
Kerala 7.86 24.7 4 2 3
Andhra Pradesh 6.99 9.17 4 1 1
Jammu & 6.79 66.97 4 4 3
Kashmir
Karnataka 6.46 12.23 3 0 0
Rajasthan 4.79 8.47 3 0 0
Gujarat 4.59 9.06 2 0 0
Madhya Pradesh 3.84 6.37 2 0 0
Jharkhand 3.73 13.85 2 0 0
Tamil Nadu 3.47 5.56 2 2 1
Delhi 1.62 11.72 1 0 0
Haryana 1.22 5.78 1 0 0
Uttarakhand 1.01 11.92 1 0 0
Lakshadweep 0.06 95.47 1 1 1
India 138.19 13.43 73 28 23

Rest states don't have the large share of population for the seat entitlement.

Most of seats entitlement are in Uttar Pradesh (16), West Bengal (11), Bihar (7) and Maharashtra
(5), followed by other states. In the last general election of 2014, highest representation among
the major states was achieved in West Bengal and highest deprivation found in Uttar Pradesh
where at least sixteen members should be reached to the parliament but none of the Muslim was
elected from the state. List of Muslim elected candidates is annexed in 1A and in 1B.

One more interesting fact reflects through the analysis of both the elections is that Muslim MPs
are not elected out of the proportion in any state. Muslims are being elected in predominant
Muslim constituencies only except for some selected Muslim members who were elected outside
of these constituencies, mainly due to their individual recognition or political affiliation. These
members were Choudhary Mahboob Ali Kaiser, Anwhar Raajhaa. A, Aparupa Poddar (Afrin
Ali) and Dr. Mamtaz Sanghamita in 2014 election and Dr. Monazir Hassan, Syed Shahnawaz
Hussain, Abdul Rahman, Salman Khursheed, Sk. Saidul Haque in 2009 election.

Similar level of under representation is observed in case of Muslim women, who constitute
around 7 percent of total country population but have worse representation than male in the
parliament. According to the population ratio, their ideal representation should be around 35
seats but unfortunately only 4 (Mehbooba Mufti, Aparupa Poddar (Afrin Ali), Dr. Mamtaz
Sanghamita & Mausam Noor) and 3 (Tabassum Begum, Kaisar Jahan & Mausam Noor)
candidates won in last two parliamentary elections 2014 and 2009 respectively.
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Along with scarcity of representation, elected Muslim members have not been shown the
competencies to raise the issues beyond their political belongings. Agreeable instance that
proportionate representation for Muslims is not only a solution to the problem of backwardness,
but it of course a milestone toward achieving the equality in availing the socio-economic
opportunities.

A Case Study of Muslim Concentrated Constituencies and Muslim Candidates

To gauge the depth of under-representation and to investigate its reasons at constituency level, a
case study is formulated on the demographic composition and electoral behaviour of Muslims
for the parliamentary constituencies (PCs) having the Muslim more than 20 percent in total
population of a constituency. These constituencies are identified through the estimation of
Muslim population (based on 2001 census) as per the mapping demarcated by the Delimitation
Commission 2008.

Most of the winner and runner-up Muslim candidates contested from these constituencies.
Strength of 20 percent is an effective number, to influence the overall outcome of election and
could also have the potentiality to become a source of enhanced Muslim representation through
better electoral management and strategies. Instead of the entire country, focus on these
constituencies could bring the more fruitful results in terms of minimizing the Muslim under-
representation.

Case study also includes the performance of Muslim candidates and the parties which have the
Muslim leadership across all 543 constituencies in terms of their ranks and vote share.

Data driven analysis is discussed comprehensively in reference to the last two parliamentary
elections - 2009 and 2014 - under the following broad classifications:

• Constituencies by population size of Muslim

• Reservation of Muslim concentrated constituencies to Scheduled Castes

• Muslim participation in election

• Tickets distribution by political parties

• Voting behaviour in terms of splitting and polarization

• Splitting of votes between the favourite political parties

• Performance of parties with Muslim leadership and Muslim candidates

• Competency of Muslim candidates and winners

Constituencies by Population Size of Muslim

Muslim concentrated constituencies (MCCs) are spread across the states with different
population ratios. Mostly MCCs fall in Uttar Pradesh (28), West Bengal (20), Bihar (9), Kerala
(9), Assam (9), Jammu & Kashmir (6), and Maharashtra (5), two each in Andhra Pradesh &
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Karnataka and one each in Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Haryana and Delhi. List of
constituencies in descending order according to population size groups are as following:

Constituencies with more than 90 percent Muslim population (4 PCs): Three seats of
Kashmir region (Baramulla, Srinagar, Anantnag) and one in Lakshadweep.

Constituencies with Muslim population between 50 to 80 percent (11 PCs): Murshidabad

(West Bengal), Malappuram (Kerala), Kishanganj (Bihar), Ponnani (Kerala), Jangipur (West
Bengal), Hyderabad (Telangana), Maldaha Dakshin (West Bengal), Dhubri, Barpeta and
Karimganj (Assam) and Baharampur (West Bengal).

Constituencies with Muslim population between 40 to 50 percent (14 PCs): Rampur (UP),
Basirhat (West Bengal), Moradabad (UP), Ladakh (J &K), Maldaha Uttar (West Bengal), Katihar
(Bihar), Raiganj (West Bengal) Nowgong (Assam), Nagina (UP), Sambhal (UP), Wayanad
(Kerala) and Araria (Bihar), Saharanpur (UP) and Joynagar (West Bengal).

Constituencies with Muslim population between 20 to 40 percent (67 PCs): Secundrabad

(Andhra Pradesh); Silchar, Kokrajhar, Gauhati, Mangaldoi, Kaliabor (Assam); Valmiki Nagar,
Paschim Champaran, Sitamarhi, Madhubani, Purnia, Darbhanga (Bihar); Gurgaon (Haryana);
Udhampur, Jammu (J&K); Dharwad, Dakshina Kannada (Karnataka); Kasaragod, Kannur,
Vadakara, Kozhikode, Palakkad, Kollam (Kerala); Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh); Dhule,
Aurangabad, Mumbai North Central, Mumbai South Central, Mumbai South (Maharashtra);
Kairana, Muzaffarnagar, Bijnor, Amroha, Meerut, Baghpat, Ghaziabad, Aligarh, Badaun, Aonla,
Bareilly, Pilibhit, Kheri, Sitapur, Lucknow, Kanpur, Barabanki , Bahraich , Kaiserganj, Shrawasti,
Gonda, Domariyaganj, Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh); Cooch Behar, Balurghat, Krishnanagar,
Barasat, Mathurapur, Diamond Harbour, Jadavpur, Howrah, Uluberia, Bardhaman Purba,
Bolpur, Birbhum (West Bengal); Rajmahal (Jharkhand); Hardwar (Uttarakhand); North East
Delhi (Delhi).

Hindus are the second largest community in all the MCCs except in Kerala, where Christians
also have the notable population.

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A spatial distribution of Muslim population across the 543 constituencies as shown in Map 1.

Reservation of Muslim Concentrated Constituencies to Scheduled Castes

Some of Muslim concentrated constituencies are reserved for scheduled castes which seem to be
a systematically deliberate denial of Muslim representation in parliament. In reserved
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constituencies for SC, Muslim cannot contest the election. Muslim concentrating constituencies
reserved for scheduled cates are Nagina, Barabanki, Bahraich in Uttar Pradesh; Cooch Behar,
Joynagar, Mathurapur, Bardhaman Purba, Bolpur in West Bengal and Karimganj in Assam.

Criteria for reserving of seats to Scheduled Caste are not well defined like the specification
mentioned for scheduled tribes. Percentage of Scheduled Tribes population in a particular state
is used for allotting the proportionate number of parliamentarian seats and the highest
Scheduled Tribe populated seats in descending order is the criteria for notification of particular
constituency reservation for scheduled tribes. But such methodology is not adopted in case of
scheduled castes. Delimitation Commission has added another feature of dispersal of seats
across the state. Dispersal doesn’t have any defined methodology and provides the discretion to
commission to entitle the seats without providing logic.

Due to such provisions, many seats which have a less population of SC in compare to others are
reserved for scheduled castes. This discretion mainly affected the Muslim prospective in Uttar
Pradesh and other Muslim concentrating seats. Muslim population in Nagina (Estd. Muslim 44
percent, SC 22 percent) Bahraich (Estd. Muslim 34 percent, SC 16 percent), Karimganj (Estd.
Muslim 53 percent, SC 12 percent), and Joynagar (Estd. Muslim 40 percent, SC 38 percent) are
much larger than scheduled castes. Whereas the constituencies with higher scheduled castes
population in respective states are left unreserved constituencies in general category as
Dhaurahra (31.14 percent), Unnao (30.52 percent), Rae Bareli (30.38 percent), Sitapur (27.35
percent), Amethi (26.61 percent) etc in Uttar Pradesh, Silchar (14.9 percent) in Assam.

This kind of unjustifiable notification indicates how the Muslim concentrated seats reserved for
scheduled castes while within the respective states, there are many seats that have the large
population of SCs.

This issue was highlighted in Sachar Committee report (2006) and considered it as
discriminatory and certainly reduces the opportunities that Muslims have to get elected to
democratic institutions. The Committee also recommends the elimination of the anomalies with
respect to reserved constituencies under the delimitation schemes. A more rational delimitation
procedure that does not reserve constituencies with high minority population shares for SCs will
improve the opportunity for the minorities, especially the Muslims, to contest and get elected to
the Indian Parliament and the State Assemblies.

Muslim Participation in Elections

Political representation could achieve through the participation in electoral process by casting
their votes in election. Better turnout is also a potential tool to show their choices for contesting
candidates. Sometime winning margin of votes is small tool that results can be changed in favour
of runner up candidate by slight improvement in turnout, and can increase the tally of Muslim
elected members in parliament. Level of acceptance, as per total electoral are not higher in
Muslim concentrated constituencies.

Voter turnout in most of Muslim concentrated constituencies generally lies below the national
average of poll percentage. Top three parliamentary constituencies in India where the lowest poll
percentage accounted in last parliamentary elections have the Muslim majority population from
Kashmir. Female participation is worst in these constituencies in compare to male.

Poll percentage status across the Muslim concentrating constituencies is shown in Table 3:

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 Table 3: Voter Turnout in Muslim Concentrated Constituencies

Poll percentage Male Female Total

2014 (Average: 67%)

0-50 5 6 4
50-67 36 37 39
67-80 32 29 28
80-100 23 24 25
2009 (Average: 58%)

0-50 22 36 26
50-58 18 17 24
58-80 38 26 25
80-100 18 17 21

Top 5 PCs with lowest poll percentage: Srinagar (25.86), Anantnag (28.84), Baramulla (39.13),
Mumbai North Central (48.61), Gonda (51.07) in 2014 election and Srinagar (25.55), Anantnag
(27.1), Lucknow (35.33), Kanpur (36.9), Mumbai South Central (39.5) in 2009 election.

Top 5 PCs with highest poll percentage: Dhubri (88.22), Lakshadweep (86.61), Bardhaman
Purba (86.21), Basirhat (85.45), Birbhum (85.33) in 2014 election and Murshidabad (88.14),
Bardhaman Purba (87.21), Balurghat (86.65), Basirhat (86.62), Jangipur (85.95) in 2009 election.
Sachar Committee has enlightened another point for lack of participation – the absence of a
Muslim name in the electoral list which ultimately cause to low participation of Muslim in
election. Such a situation could be true at the time of preparation of committee report in the
year 2006 and can be a reason in some selected places only but the overall situation has been
widely changed in last ten years. Election Commission emphasis to enroll the each eligible
electoral including Muslim in more hassle free and transparent environment.

Tickets Distribution by Political Parties

Muslims are largely considered as a vote bank only by mainstream political parties without taking
any due consideration about their representation in parliament. Parties can voluntarily play the
pivotal role, towards the enhance representation by distributing the proportionate tickets to
Muslim candidates, specifically in MCCs where the winning chances are higher. Parties known to
have the Muslim support and which shown interest about their issues, do not seem to be much
serious in allocation of an electoral ticket to a Muslim. A cross comparison of political parties in
ticket allocation are analyzed in Table 4:

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 Table 4: Ticket Distribution and Number of Muslim Candidates
won by Major Political Parties

2014 2009

Muslim Percentage Muslim Muslim Percentage Muslim

Parties candidates of total Won candidates of total Won
candidates candidates

AAP 43 9.95 0 Not Exist

AIADMK 1 2.5 1 1 4.35 0
AIMIM 1 20 1 1 100 1
AITC 25 19.08 4 3 8.57 2
AIUDF 12 66.67 2 15 60 1
BJP 7 1.64 0 5 1.15 1
BSP 57 11.33 0 64 12.8 4
CPI 1 1.49 0 5 8.93 0
CPM 14 15.05 2 8 9.76 1
DMK 2 5.71 0 1 4.55 1
INC 37 7.97 4 30 6.82 10
IUML 23 92 2 20 90.91 2
JD(S) 1 2.94 0 7 21.21 0
JD(U) 10 10.75 0 4 7.27 1
JKNC 3 100 0 3 100 3
JKPDP 4 80 3 4 66.67 0
JMM 2 9.52 0 3 7.14 0
LJP 1 14.29 1 17 16.04 0
NCP 2 5.56 2 5 7.35 0
RJD 7 23.33 1 9 20.45 0
SP 39 19.8 0 35 18.13 0
Independent 306 9.46 0 377 9.84 1
Total 882 10.69 23 819 10.15 28

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AITC, BSP, CPM, JMM, LJP, RJD and SP are the parties which have considered the
proportionate representation of Muslim up to some extent in ticket distribution. Spatial
presentation of winner parties in Muslim concentrating constituencies as shown in Map 2:

Voting Behaviour in Terms of Splitting and Polarization

Large splitting among multiple-Muslim candidates also realized in their concentrated

constituencies. Besides the candidature from mainstream political parties to Muslim candidates,
there are large hopeful persons in fray as independent or from unknown parties. Collective
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voting in favour of Muslim candidates could have also improve the Muslim representation in
parliament. For the sake of analysis, all Muslim candidate votes are combined, which outcome is
quite optimistic as is shown in Table 5 for the constituencies where combined Muslim votes are
larger than winner votes:

Table 5: PCs where Combined Muslim Votes are Larger than Winner Candidates

PC Name Winner Combined

Party - Muslim -
Vote % Vote %

Parliamentary Election 2014

Madhubani (Bihar) 41.61 46.76

Ladakh (J&K) 26.36 50.25
Kasaragod (Kerala) 39.52 39.96
Vadakara (Kerala) 43.41 45.83
Moradabad (UP) 43.02 54.03
Rampur (UP) 37.5 60.17
Sambhal (UP) 34.08 59.26
Amroha (UP) 48.26 49.01
Meerut (UP) 47.87 50.17
Shrawasti (UP) 35.32 36.94
Jangipur (W. Bengal) 33.8 54.91
Birbhum (W. Bengal) 36.1 41.87

Parliamentary Election 2009

Madhubani (Bihar) 29.48 48.23

Araria (Bihar) 38.71 45.64
Katihar (Bihar) 37.23 49.33
Kozhikode (Kerala) 42.92 43.99
Bijnor (UP) 34.57 44.43
Rampur (UP) 38.06 44.92
Amroha (UP) 40.09 54.13
Shrawasti (UP) 33.29 44.73
Domariyaganj (UP) 31.24 33.21

From such polarization in favour of particular candidates, Muslim members could be increased
to 9 in 2009 and 12 in 2014.

Further, Muslim votes also split on account of casteism, mainly in Western Uttar Pradesh where
sharp division among Muslim exists on the line of castes. Absence of trust between Muslim
castes further split the votes between the communities which ultimately cause to the defeat of
Muslim candidates. A case study of parliamentarian election 2014 for the two different caste
dominating polling stations of Hapur assembly constituency under Meerut parliamentary
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constituency reveals in Table 6, that Muslim votes were divided between two Muslim candidates
- Shahid Akhlaq (Qureshi) from BSP & Shahid Manzoor (Chaudhary) from SP on line of
casteism.

Table 6: Votes Distribution of 36 Polling Stations where the Muslim Population is above
90% in Hapur AC of Meerut PC (Parliamentary Election- 2014)

Particulars Chaudhary Qureshi Mixed Total PS Overall

Dominance Dominance Population where Hapur
Muslim is AC
above 90%
PS 20 10 6 36 306
Total Electoral 24568 15119 6391 46078 330652
Total Muslim 23104 14450 6077 43631 88289
% Muslim 94.04 95.58 95.09 94.69 26.70
Valid Votes 15052 8806 3744 27602 206277
BSP Votes 2947 5049 1654 9650 62013
BSP Votes % 19.58 57.34 44.18 34.96 30.06
SP Votes 11282 3225 1844 16351 38269
SP Votes % 74.95 36.62 49.25 59.24 18.55
BJP Votes 294 78 51 423 93176
BJP Votes % 1.95 0.89 1.36 1.53 45.17
INC Votes 249 225 107 581 8314
INC Votes % 1.65 2.56 2.86 2.10 4.03

Chaudharys have voted for Samajvadi Party (SP) while Qureshis voted for Bahujan Samaj Party
(BSP) due to being a candidate from their own castes. Such caste based approach deepens the
division and split the votes further.

Splitting of Votes between the Favourite Political Parties

Muslim votes usually split into the different favourite political parties in their concentrated seats,
specifically in the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, where the splitting accounted at large scale
in compare to others states. Muslim voters get confused between SP, BSP & INC in Uttar
Pradesh and RJD, JD(U) & INC in Bihar. These parties are known to having the vote bank
among Muslim and generally allocate the ticket to Muslim candidates in their concentrated
constituencies. Such confusion within the favourite parties leads to splitting their votes and
makes the election three or four cornered. A candidate with less vote share becomes the winner
while the candidates from these parties, mostly Muslim, lost the election.

Division of votes due to these parties confrontation in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, badly affect the
prospective of Muslim representation in parliament. Runner-up Muslim candidates in 4 & 13
constituencies in 2009 & 2014 elections respectively could have become the winner in such a
possible alliances of the favourite parties as is shown in Table 7:

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Table 7: PCs where Combined Votes of Possible Alliance between Favorable Parties are
Larger than Winner Candidates

PC Winner Runner Runner Candidate Runner Combined

Party Party Party - Vote % of
(BJP) - Vote % Possible
Vote % Alliance

Parliamentary Election 2014

Bihar (Possible Alliance between INC+JD(U)+RJD)
Madhubani 41.61 RJD Abdul Bari Siddiqui 39.22 45.78
Darbhanga 38.02 RJD Md. Ali Ashraf Fatmi 33.79 46.41
Uttar Pradesh (Possible Alliance between INC+BSP+SP+RLD)
Saharanpur 39.6 INC Imran Masood 34.15 58.25
Bijnor 45.92 SP Shahnawaz Rana 26.51 48.22
Moradabad 43.02 SP Dr S T Hasan 35.26 51.28
Rampur 37.5 SP Naseer Ahmad Khan 35.05 59.88
Sambhal 34.08 SP Dr Shafiq- Ur Rahman 33.59 59.01
Barq
Amroha 48.26 SP Humera Akhtar 33.82 48.7
Meerut 47.87 BSP Mohd. Shahid Akhlak 27 49.88
Baghpat 42.17 SP Ghulam Mohammed 21.27 55.25
Sitapur 40.66 BSP Kaiser Jahan 35.69 53.73
Shrawasti 35.32 SP Atiq Ahmad 26.55 48.48
Domariyaganj 31.96 BSP Muhammad Muqeem 20.88 49
Parliamentary Election 2009
Bihar (Possible Alliance between INC+RJD+LJP+NCP)
Madhubani 29.48 RJD Zubair Alam 27.7 47.72
Araria 38.71 LJP Zakir Hussain Khan 35.63 42.43
Katihar 37.23 NCP Shah Tariq Anwar 35.3 41.62
Uttar Pradesh (Possible Alliance between INC+BSP+SP)
Varanasi 30.52 BSP Mukhtar Ansari 27.94 56.53

During the last two elections, mainly in the last election of 2014, it is commonly observed that
split of Muslim voters among the secular parties and polarization of other communities towards
the BJP has minimized the representation of Muslim. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are the major two
states where such polarization politics has succeeded. Winning of BJP in large number of seats
restricts the Muslim entry in parliament as it allocates fewer tickets to Muslim candidates.

Performance of Parties with Muslim Leadership and Muslim Candidates

Political parties with Muslim leadership have contested the election to consolidate the Muslim
votes but due to lack of grassroot level working and not being acceptable to all electoral, these
have not performed well. Apart from JKPDP, AIUDF, IUML and AIMIM, any party was not
able to win a seat. Most of their candidates forfeited their deposit and were not been able to
come under the top three positions. Similar were the Muslim candidates, where the ratio is

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around 10 percent in total contesting candidates but most of candidates have not been able to
retain their deposits.

A cross comparison about these parties and candidates with their performance have been
assessed in Table 8:

Table 8: Performance of Parties with Muslim Leadership and Muslim Candidates

Parties Total Parties Rank Deposit

Seats Forfeited
Contested
1 2 3
A. Parties with Muslim Leadership (Parliamentary Election - 2014)
Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party 5 3 0 2 2
All India United Democratic Front 18 3 4 13
Indian Union Muslim League 25 2 0 1 22
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen 5 1 0 1 4
Peace Party 51 0 0 0 51
Social Democratic Party Of India 29 0 0 1 29
Welfare Party Of India 25 0 0 0 25
Qaumi Ekta Dal 9 0 0 2 8
Rashtriya Ulama Council 8 0 0 0 8
Vanchitsamaj Insaaf Party 8 0 0 0 8
National Loktantrik Party 7 0 0 0 7
Minorities Democratic Party 6 0 0 0 6
Akhil Bharatiya Muslim League (Secular) 5 0 0 0 5
All India Minorities Front 5 0 0 0 5
Other (17) parties with less than five candidates 36 0 3 1 33
Total of Muslim Parties 242 9 3 12 226

B. Overall Muslim Candidates Performance

Parliamentary Election - 2009 819 28 54 51 718
Parliamentary Election - 2014 881 23 56 48 787

Competency of Muslim Candidates & Winners

Although, counting of numbers of community strength in quantitative terms are important for
the appropriate representation, but confining to numbers only is up to some extent a narrow
approach. Qualitative representation with duly required competences is an integral and
undeniable merit. Muslim representation in terms of education qualification is evaluated at Table
9, which shows that Muslim candidates are less qualified in compare to others:

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Table 9: Percentage Distribution of All and Muslim Candidates/Winners by Educational
Qualifications

Level of Candidates (%) Winners (%)

Education 2014 2009 2014 2009
All Muslim All Muslim All Muslim All Muslim

Illiterate 1.35 1.84 0.96 1.4 0.18 0 0 0

Literate 3.57 5.63 6.1 10.33 0.92 4.35 0.96 7.14
(Without
specification)
Upto Middle 13.26 20.32 11.81 16.58 2.77 0 3.26 3.57
Classes
Middle to 29.32 26.98 26.85 25.89 19.56 4.35 18.97 17.86
Higher
secondary
Under & Post 46.33 39.49 41.05 32.78 68.63 86.96 71.26 64.29
Graduate
Doctorate 2.73 0.57 2.22 1.15 6.09 4.35 4.41 7.14
Not Given 1.24 1.26 9.02 10.2 0 0 0 0
Others 2.19 3.79 1.98 1.66 1.85 0 1.15 0

Muslim candidates with most criminal cases were Atiq Ahmad (42), Mukhtar Ansari (15),
Shahnawaj Rana (11) and Mehboob Alam (11) in 2014 election while Mohammed Usman (30),
Mehboob Ali (11), Mukthar Ansari (10) and Mahboob Alam (9) were in 2009 election.

Muslim also have the crorepati candidates in both the election. Highest richest candidate were
M. Shahid (199 Cr.), Tariq Hameed Karra (98 Cr.), Nilufar Jamani (74 Cr.), Shah Alam Alias
Guddu Jamali (70 Cr.), Siraj Uddin Ajmal (67 Cr.) in 2014 and Abu Asim Azmi (125 Cr.), Mohd.
Shear Nabi Chaman (61 Cr.), Siraj Uddin Ajmal (41 Cr.), Anwar Ahmed (32 Cr.) in 2009
election.

Vision: Steps to enhance representation

With the aforementioned analysis in regard to Muslim candidates and their concentrated
constituencies, an assessment has been completed in terms of identification, population size and
behaviour of electoral and other associated political institutions during the last two elections.
Preparation of election is not of a single months exercise. In fact, it requires long-term strategies
at various levels. Profiling of constituency, creating awareness for casting the votes, literacy
towards tactical voting, analyzing of voting behaviour, categorizing of constituencies in terms of
winning possibilities and many others are to be planned and executed many years before the
election held. While there are certain statutory restrictions towards the proportionate
representation of Muslim, a wielder field of voluntarily work is still untapped. Muslim
organizations, political parties and individuals have lot of scope to improve their representation
quantitatively as well as qualitatively in the existing setup.

Multi-prolonged remedial measures are required to minimize such unjustifiable status quo
towards under-representation in parliament that could be pointed out as following:

123
Formation of united non-political forum would be helpful in negotiation with parties and
creating of awareness about electoral participation. This forum will undertake the responsibilities
regarding representation and participation of Muslim in electoral activities. It will discuss with all
parties for the proportionate ticket distribution and also will try to make the pre-poll alliances
between the Muslim favourite parties, mainly in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. This forum would
never contest the election directly and would perform as a bridge between community and
mainstream as well as Muslim lead political parties. After the election, it will watch the fulfilment
of promises by political parties and the performance of Muslim elected members.

Instead of establishing a new common acceptable forum, Muslim personal law board or any
similar organization can also consider to assign the task to a dedicated team.

A detail research analysis on the depth of population size and electoral behaviour at a more
micro level i.e., at village, town and polling station level is a pre-requisite for the electoral
planning. There is a dire need to establish a full-fledged research body or institution which
conducts the research and surveys to assess the mood of voters and the performance of ruling
parties in regard to the fulfilment of their manifestoes towards the minorities or Muslim.
Generally, we don’t have the idea about the strength of Muslim electoral and their level of
participation, which increase the frustration level of voters and motivate them to opt out the
voting. Better planning leads to the wisely involvement of Muslims in electoral politics which
ultimately enhances the representation.

Specific long and short term strategy is required for SC reserved constituencies.
Delimitation commission reserved the constituencies to scheduled castes (SC) by adhering its
own ambiguous criteria which restricts the representation of Muslim in certain seats. Sachar
Committee was in hope that, Delimitation Commission would receive the attention of the
Government immediately because it was engaged in this exercise of demarcation and
notification, and would take their notes seriously in its recommendation, but unfortunately the
concern of Sachar Committee didn’t get the attention in the final report of Delimitation
Commission – 2008. Kundu report, a follow up evaluation of Sachar by Ministry of Minority
Affairs, also did not consider the Muslim representation in its recommendation.

In long term strategy, a committee of Muslim representative should be formed which persuade
the government for denotification of constituencies which have less population of SCs and
reserve their most SC populated PCs. It may also suggest the rotation of reservation for
constituencies around the state. Commission also keeps on practice to reserve the constituencies
based on subsequent census i.e. 2011. Such a notification was also issued about the reserving of
Saharanpur AC for SC while it is a Muslim concentrated constituency and have the lesser
population of SC. This committee of Muslims should notify to commission about their concern
and persuade to freeze the process of reserving such constituencies to scheduled castes (SC).
Government can pass the women reservation bill for 33 percent seats to women, this committee
need to register their concerns and try to allocate a sub quota of Muslim women candidates.

In short term strategy till such a demand is fulfilled, focus should be diverted to elect the
qualitative representation among the scheduled castes into the parliament from these reserved
constituencies who would be able to raise the voices for their issues and would be more
committed towards the overall development of constituency.

Change initiates from bottom to top and in step by step manner. Same strategy needs to
adhere for the enhanced representation in parliament. Panchayat and local bodies’ election
provides the larger scope towards making the awareness for fairer representation. At the outset,
Muslim parties and candidates contest the local elections and perform better in terms of
providing the services to all section of society. Contesting of assembly and parliamentary
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election only can be considered after making the goodwill in front of electoral and after
establishing a network of dedicated worker at gross root level i.e., at town, village and polling
station level.

Participation is the key of representation. Muslims are not really aware about the importance
of casting their votes. They don’t even bother about the proper listing of their names in electoral
roll. Muslim organizations require to chalk out their own strategy map to improve the voter
turnout in their localities like the Election Commission prepare a district plan and SVEEP
(Systematic Voters’ Education and Electoral Participation) campaign to enhance the overall
electoral participation. Election Commission, up to some extent, have succeeded in the form of
increased turnout in elections in recent years, and even more emphatically in the recent national
election- 2014, where a turnout history was made.

Community organizations need to coordinate with the election commission in SVEEP plan and
participate for its proper implementation. Through SVEEP, Election commission tries to
eradicate the social and religious hurdles. Like a case is mentioned in its document, “In Purulia
District of West Bengal, at Nutandi High Madrasa and Hariharpur Balika Prathamik Vidyalay,
voters were reluctant to cast their votes due to the social stigma attached to it among Muslim
community women voters. The district administration undertook a special SVEEP campaign to
promote women’s participation, with the result that 34 female voters of the former polling
station and 63 female voters of the latter came out and cast their votes.” (SVEEP: P 50)

It is generally observed in Muslim localities that ambitious campaign and announcement made
every day by social and religious leaders in and against the favour of parties/candidates during
the election, but the whole enthusiasm cools down on the day of voting. Muslim organizations
can lead the campaign for better turnout on the day of voting and arrange the voluntarily
services for the convenience and access of voters to the polling stations.

Consolidation of Muslim votes is essential to avoid the split between favourite parties.
Greater alliance of Muslim and other likeminded parties similar to National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) and United Progressive Alliance (UPA) would be more helpful to consolidate the
Muslim votes. Sense of untouchability in politics regarding any specific party like BJP must be
vanished. Such behaviour leads to reverse polarization against the Muslim candidates among the
other communities, which became the main reason for winning of this party. Muslims need to
encourage the issue based politics including the problems of Muslim. For resolving the issues,
the Muslims must be ready to discuss their problems with any party.

Muslim candidate should have the universal acceptability. Muslim elector and organization
generally evaluate a Muslim candidate with his interest and performance towards the Muslim
issues only. This narrow approach makes the candidate a Muslim representative only, which
imply other communities to vote against him in bloc. Whereas in such a cosmopolitan
democracy, an elected member is a representative of all and should have the requisite
competence to represent the constituency universally. Therefore, the candidate should be
qualified in all manner and not remain the Muslim flag bearer only. Approachability would be
wide and be an active person to resolve the overall problem of constituency. After winning the
election, he does not confine to Muslim issues only. He needs to address the overall problem of
constituency by utilizing the allocated funds in terms of infrastructure development, proper
implementation of social schemes and other issues.

Forming of national Muslim party is not the only solution of under-representation. India
is a union of 36 states and union territories, where the situation of Muslims is different from
each other in every state. Muslim party in some states could be effective but in other states
where already some secular parties exist for raising the voices on Muslim rights, would not be
125
workable. Forming of a Muslim party will cause to further split in votes and to reverse
polarization against the Muslim candidates.

Notes:

1 Aparupa Poddar (Afrin Ali) is an elected member of parliament from Arambagh, a reserved
constituency of scheduled caste in West Bengal. She married Md. Shakir Ali and used her
name as Afrin Ali. Therefore, she is treated as a Muslim elected member in the analysis of
paper.

2 Data on the voting behaviour of Muslim is not specified in the official documents. A
generalization method is adapted in the Muslim concentrated constituencies to their electoral
behaviour which can differ from actual.

3 Since religion is not a mandatory category to mention in the candidate’s affidavit, Muslim
name for candidates are sorted out manually by finding the title and actual name resemble to
Muslim. These sorted names treated as Muslim in the analysis.

4 Parties with Muslim leadership are accounted as Muslim parties.

5 Electoral data is taken out from the publications of Election Commission of India and state
election commissions.

6 Actual data for the population of scheduled castes is taken from the state level final papers
of Delimitation Commission 2008 while the population of Muslim in a constituency is
estimated (Not the actual) through the 2001 census data at town and sub district level and
other allied sources according to the mappings demarcated by delimitation Commission and
through the published estimation of newspapers.

7 Maps used in paper are not to scale and sketched for the purpose of better visualization only.

8 Methodology for entitlement of Muslim seats similar to the Delimitation Commission for
SCs as following:

Entitlement of Seats for Muslim = Proportion of Muslim to Total Population multiplied by 543
(i.e. total seats in the parliament)

Proportion of Muslim : 0.1343

Total Parliament Seats : 543

Seats for Muslim in Parliament = 0.1343 x 543 = 72.92 = 73

Seats for Muslim in State= Population of Muslim in State/Population of Muslim in Index 73

List of Tables, Maps and Abbreviation

Table 1: Number of Muslim Won and Percentage Representation in Indian Parliament

Table 2: Entitlement of Lok Sabha Seats for Muslim across the States
Table 3: Voter Turnout in Muslim Concentrated Constituencies
Table 4: Ticket Distributions and Number of Muslim Candidates Won by Major Political Parties

126
Table 5: PCs where Combined Votes of Possible Alliance between Favourable Parties are Larger
than Winner Candidates
Table 6: PCs where Combined Muslim Votes are Larger than Winner Candidates
Table 7: Votes Distribution of 36 Polling Stations where the Muslim Population is above 90% in
Hapur AC of Meerut PC (Parliamentary Election - 2014)
Table 8: Performance of Parties with Muslim Leadership and Muslim Candidates
Table 9:Percentage Distribution of All and Muslim Candidates/Winners by Educational
Qualifications
Map 1: Distribution of Muslim Population by PCs after Delimitation – 2008
Map 2: Winner Parties in Muslim Concentrated Constituencies – 2009 & 2014

AC Assembly Constituency JD(U) Janata Dal (United)

AAP Aam Aadmi Party JKN Jammu & Kashmir National
Conference
AIADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra JKNC Jammu & Kashmir National
Kazhagam Conference
AIFB All India Forward Bloc JKPDP JK Peoples Democratic Party
AIMIM All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul JMM Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
Muslimeen
AITC All India Trinamool Congress LJP Lok Jan Shakti Party
AIUDF/ All India United Democratic MCC Muslim Concentrated
AUDF Front Constituencies
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party NCP Nationalist Congress Party
BOPF Bodaland Peoples Front PC Parliamentary Constituency
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party RJD Rashtriya Janata Dal
CPI Communist Party of India RLD Rashtriya Lok Dal
CPM Communist Party of India RLSP Rashtriya Lok Samta Party
(Marxist)
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam RSP Revolutionary Socialist Party
INC Indian National Congress SC Scheduled Castes
IND Independent SHS Shivsena
IUML/M Indian Union Muslim League SP Samajwadi Party
UL
JD(S) Janata Dal (Secular) ST Scheduled Tribes

Annexure 1 A: List of Elected Muslim Member of Parliament – 2014

Andhra Pradesh (1)

Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM) - Hyderabad
Assam (2)
Badruddin Ajmal (AIUDF) - Dhubri
Siraj Uddin Ajmal (AIUDF) - Barpeta
127
Bihar (4)
Tasleem Uddin (RJD) – Araria
Mohammad Asrarul Haque (INC) - Kishanganj
Tariq Anwar (NCP) – Katihar
Choudhary Mahboob Ali Kaiser (LJP) - Khagaria
Jammu & Kashmir (3)
Muzaffar Hussain Baig (JKPDP) - Baramulla
Tariq Hameed Karra (JKPDP) - Srinagar
Mehbooba Mufti (JKPDP) - Anantnag
Kerala (3)
M I Shanavas (INC) - Wayanad
E. Ahamed (IUML) - Malappuram
E. T. Mohammed Basheer (IUML) - Ponnani
Tamil Nadu (1)
Anwhar Raajhaa.A (AIADMK) - Ramanathapuram
West Bengal (8)
Md. Salim (CPM) – Raiganj
Mausam Noor (INC) - Maldaha Uttar
Abu Hasem Khan Chowdhury (INC) - Maldaha Dakshin
Badaruddoza Khan (CPM) - Murshidabad
Idris Ali (AITC) – Basirhat
Sultan Ahmed (AITC) - Uluberia
Aparupa Poddar (Afrin Ali) (AITC) - Arambagh (SC)
Dr. Mamtaz Sanghamita (AITC) - Burdwan - Durgapur
Lakshadweep (1)
Mohammed Faizal P.P. (NCP) - Lakshadweep (ST)

Annexure 1 B: List of Elected Muslim Member of Parliament – 2009

Andhra Pradesh (1)

Asaduddin Owaisi (AIMIM) - Hyderabad
Assam (2)
Badruddin Ajmal (AUDF) - Dhubri
Ismail Hussain (INC) - Barpeta
Bihar (3)
Mohammad Asrarul Haque (INC) - Kishanganj
Dr. Monazir Hassan (JD(U)) - Begusarai
Syed Shahnawaz Hussain (BJP) - Bhagalpur
Jammu & Kashmir (4)
Sharief Ud Din Shariq (JKN) - Baramulla
Farooq Abdullah (JKN) - Srinagar
Mirza Mehboob Beg (JKN) - Anantnag
Hassan Khan (IND 3) - Ladakh
Kerala (2)
E. Ahamed (MUL) - Malappuram
E.T. Muhammed Basheer (MUL) - Ponnani
Tamil Nadu (2)
128
 Abdul Rahman (DMK) - Vellore
Aaron Rashid.J.M (INC) - Theni
Uttar Pradesh (7)
Tabassum Begum (BSP) - Kairana
Mohammed Azharuddin (INC) - Moradabad
Dr. Shafiqur Rahman Barq (BSP) - Sambhal
Zafar Ali Naqvi (INC) – Kheri
Kaisar Jahan (BSP) – Sitapur
Salman Khursheed (INC) - Farrukhabad
Kadir Rana (BSP) - Muzaffarnagar
West Bengal (6)
Mausam Noor (INC) - Maldaha Uttar
Abu Hasem Khan Choudhury (INC) - Maldaha Dakshin
Abdul Mannan Hossain (INC) - Murshidabad
Sk. Nurul Islam (AITC) - Basirhat
Sultan Ahmed (AITC) – Uluberia
Sk. Saidul Haque (CPM) - Burdwan – Durgapur
Lakshadweep (1)
Hamdullah Sayeed (INC) – Lakshadweep

Bibliography

Books

Sachar Committee Report, Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community
of India, A Report by Prime Minister’s High Level Committee Cabinet Secretariat Government
of India, November, 2006.

Changing Face of Electoral India: Delimitation 2008, Delimitation Commission of India,

Volume I & II, 2008.

Systematic Voters’ Education & Electoral Participation, India National Document (2009-2014),
Election Commission of India.

India Elects 2014, by Dr R. K. Thukral & Dr. Shafeeq Rahman, Datanet India Pvt. Ltd New
Delhi, 2014.

Websites

Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in/eci/eci.html)

Delimitation Commission (http://eci.nic.in/delim/)
Elections in India (http://www.electionsinindia.com/)
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) (http://www.csds.in/lokniti)
Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) (http://adrindia.org/)
Chief Election Commission Office of Uttar Pradesh (http://ceouttarpradesh.nic.in) & other
states

129
Disclaimer and Limitation of Paper

This paper does not intend to encourage the voters to vote on line of religion as all citizen of
India pledge to vote without being influenced by considerations of religion, race, caste,
community, language or any inducement. The main purpose behind this paper is to create an
awareness about Muslim representation among all stakeholders and to increase the participation
level of Muslim in Indian elections.

All due care has been taken in compiling, estimating and sorting of data and name from original
sources, but it does not guarantee the accuracy, adequacy or completeness of any
information/analysis and author or publisher will be not responsible for any errors or omissions
or for the results obtained from the use of such information/analysis. It is highly recommended
from the reader to cross check the information at your end before making any decision, and
make ensure to use the information on his own behest.

Mr. Shafeeq Rahman is associated as Manager - Research with an IT enabled data research company,
Datanet India Pvt. Ltd (www.datanetindia.com), a company which facilitates socio-economic and electoral data
about India. He is a researcher based in Delhi and holds PhD in Economics. He writes usually on
Representation of Muslim.

130
 Chapter 11

MUSLIM INDIA: BROTHERHOOD IN BIRADRI

Abdul Azim Akhtar

Abstract

The Muslims started as ruling elite in pockets of the Northern India, Eastern India, Western India, Central
India, and Southern India. In course of their spread in these areas, there were substantial segment of local
inhabitants, particularly from the lower and lowest sections of the society (Shudra /Chandala /Dasyus), who
embraced Islam due to the influence and work of Sufi saints to begin a new life. This ensured for them new
avenues under the patronage of Muslim rulers and promised a life of respect. However, this proved to be a short-
lived dream, and with the passage of time, Muslims in India realised that their society was no better than age-old
‘Brahmanic order’. Soon, there was race among Muslims to prove their superiority among themselves through links
with some companions/tribe/Prophet Mohammad family or showing lineage to Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and
Central Asia. This race resulted in division of Muslims in various groups, which came to be identified in three
categories: Ashraf (elite), Ajlaf (backwards and lowly) and Arzal (Unclean).

After living in the shadows of the Ashrafs, some section of the marginalised Muslims, particularly Muslim Julaha
asserted their prowess during the 20th century through Momin Conference in Bihar, Bengal and Uttar Pradesh.
Over the years, some other castes from marginalised Muslims also asserted their strength through organisations,
notable among them Quraishi, Rain (Kunjra) and got rewarded by the government, but the majority of backward
castes continue to struggle for their rights and development in the absence of leadership and organisation. This
paper attempts to trace the origin of castes among Muslims and explore the issues and challenges of the
marginalised Muslims in 20th century in view of dominance by Momin /Ansari, Rain and Quraishi and others.

Introduction

More than a thousand years before the French Revolution of 1789, Islam revolutionised the
world with ideals of equality and brotherhood. During the medieval time, when people were
fighting not only for territory but also for honour, cattle, and other trifle matters, the twin ideas
apart from monotheism became the weapon for a new dawn. It shaped the world and large
numbers of people were drawn to it to experience the change, it promised for the followers.
However, these ideals were soon contaminated and polluted as Islam made inroads into new
lands. By the time Islam reached India, it was under the influence of Arabs, Iran, Afghanistan,
Turkey and Central Asia.

In India, Muslims faced the twin challenge of Brahmanism and Caste, which not only moved the
society but also shaped it. The Muslim soldiers and sufi saints looked upon this differently. The
Muslim soldiers were busy in territorial expansion in different parts of the region and did not
bother with the social order. The Sufi saints who accompanied the soldiers settled at various
places and engaged themselves in dialogue and interaction with local inhabitants, which resulted
in conversions. For the neo-Muslims, the first question was of rank and position, as most of
them came from low castes. No one was ready to address this question and it was finally passed
over to the Muslim soldiers. Faced with a tough life in India, these soldiers—who took pride in
their racial and social supremacy also skipped this question but promoted the theory of ‘low-
born’ and ‘high-born’. Thus, Caste won the first battle against the noble ideals of Islam. Let us
briefly examine caste before we turn to our area of focus.

What is caste? Caste is not an Indian word. It was applied by the Portuguese when they first
arrived in the East, to designate the peculiar system of religious and social distinctions which
they observed among the Hindu people, particularly as founded on race.1 The Spaniards were
the first to use it (caste), but its Indian application is from the Portuguese, who had so applied it
in the 15th century. The current spelling of the word 'caste' which appears in 1740 in the
academics and is hardly found before 1800.2

Caste was a group system based on services and functions. It was meant to be an all inclusive
order without any common dogma and following the fullest latitude to each group.3

The authority of caste rests partly on written laws, partly on legendry fables and narratives, partly
on verbal tradition, partly on injunctions of instructors and priests, partly on custom and usage,
and partly on the caprice and convenience of its votaries. No doubt the man who shall follow
the rules prescribed in the Shruti (what was heard from Vedas) and in Smirit (what was
remembered from law) will acquire fame in this life and in the next world.4

There was a time when the Aryan society recognised only three Varnas, namely Brahmins,
Kshatriyas and Vaishyas. Owing to the denial of Upanayana, the Shudras who were Kshatriyas
became socially degraded, fell below the rank of Vaishyas and thus came to form the fourth
Varna.5

The Hindu Society in common with other societies was composed of classes and the earliest
known are the (1) Brahmans or the priestly class (2) the Kshatriya or the military class (3) the
Vaishyas or the merchant class and (4) the Shudra, or the artisan and menial class. Particular
attention has to be paid to the fact that this was essentially a class system, and therefore classes
did change their personnel. 6 What were the main castes? If we leave out for a moment those
who were considered outside the pale of caste, the untouchables, there were the Brahmins, the
priests, teachers, intellectuals, ; the Kshatriyas-the rulers and warriors; the Vaishyas or
merchants, traders, bankers etc.; and the Shudras-who were the agricultural and other workers.
Probably the only closely knit and exclusive caste was that of Brahmins. The Kshatriyas were
frequently adding to their numbers both from foreign incoming elements and others in the
country who rose to power and authority. The Vaishyas were chiefly traders and bankers and
also engaged in number of other professions. The main occupations of the Shudras were
cultivators and domestic service.7

The earliest law books mention 10 to 15 mixed castes, but the law book of Manu, a work of the
first century AD enumerates 61 mixed castes. This number exceeds 100, if we add to it the list of
additional castes given in Brahmavaivarta Purana.8 The first three were divijya (twice-born) and
the Shudra (also referred as untouchables, depressed classes) was destined to serve the first three
without any rights and respect. For the prosperity of the worlds he caused to proceed from his
mouth, arms, thighs, and feet, the Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishyas and Shudra.9

No collection of wealth maybe made by a Shudra even though he be able to do it; for a Shudra
who has acquired wealth gives it to Brahmans.10 The twice born men who in their folly wed
wives of the low castes soon degrade their families and children to the status of Shudra. 'A

1 John Wilson, Indian Caste Vol. I, KK Book Distributors, 1877 pp. 12-13.
2 Shridhar V Ketkar, The History of Caste in India, Cosmo Publications, N Delhi, 1979, p. 12.
3 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, OUP, N Delhi, 1997, p. 252.
4 John Wilson, Indian Caste Vol. I, KK Book Distributors, 1877,pp. 14-15.
5 B R Ambedkar, Who Were the Shudras? pp.4-5.
6 B R Ambedkar, Castes in India, Columbia University, New York, May 1916, p.24.
7 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, OUP, N Delhi, 1997, p. 253.
8 Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing House, 1969, N Delhi, p.22-23
9 John Murdoch ( compiled by), The Laws of Manu, or Manava Dharma Sastra, The Christian Literature Society
for India, Madras, 1898, p. 2.
10 Shridhar V Ketkar, The History of Caste in India, Cosmo Publications, N Delhi, 1979, p. 97.
132
Brahman who takes a Shudra wife to his bed will sink to hell. By begetting a child by her, he
loses Brahmanhood.'11

Each caste was divided in various groups of clan, or ‘gotra’. In simple words, persons belonging
to same ancestor were of one ‘gotra’. Usually people married within caste, but outside ‘gotra’.
The people of one clan belong to a single kul, or line of patrilineal descent, the founding
ancestor of which is their bans (clan). Each caste is divided into a large number of named
exogamous patriclans. For Palampur sub-division alone, I have a list of 176 Rajput Clans.12 In
some areas of northern India the clan is designated by the by the term 'got' or 'gotra', but
elsewhere the gotra is a group of clans. 13

Early Reference

Foreign travelers and Ambassadors to India have left their impression of caste in their own
words. Greek Ambassador Megasthenese, who stayed at the court of Indian ruler
Chandgragupta Maurya, in his book Indica (which survives in fragments), he talked about ‘seven
divisions’ in Indian society. Megasthenes as is well known divides the population of India into
seven principle division of classes.14 This may be the earliest mention of division in Indian
society.

As people moved and new people entered into the society, the caste became more rigid.
Common people were disgusted with the complications in their life due to ‘rites and rituals’ of
the Brahmans. Gautam Buddha and Mahavira, both from Kshatriya caste, promised to provide
an egalitarian society sans discrimination. But their efforts to fight caste proved ineffective.
Though it is evident both from testimony of Buddhists themselves and of their enemies the
Brahmanas, that they opposed caste as far as they were able according to the exigencies of the
times in which they lived, as a matter of policy, often winked at its existence in Indian Society.15
I may take the liberty of reminding advocates of this creed (Buddhism) that the pretensions of
the Buddhists regarding pollution and purity were at least as extravagant as those of the
Brahmana, and Gautama is not free from the guilt of promoting such pretensions. In cases he
has shown much greater stupidity in these matters than that of all Brahmanas put together.16
Both became victim of existing social order. Buddhism came to be divide into 18 sects, an
Jainism came to be divided into seven sects in Karnataka. It is an irony of history that the
religious sects which sprang up to remove caste disparities and privileges based on birth were
themselves swallowed by the caste disparities and the caste system. However, the struggle
between Brahmanism and Buddhism for survival continued.

The separation among different social groups become stringent as people moved from the north
to the south. Apart from the four class division, a large number of people were declared
Chandalas, who were outside the Varna system. This division seems to have been promoted by
Gupta rulers around 4th century CE. Fa-Hien who came to India in 400 CE said about this,
‘throughout the country the people kill, no-living thing nor drink wine, nor do they eat garlic or
onion, with the exception of Chandalas only. The Chandalas are named evil men and dwell apart
from others: if they enter a town or market, they sound a piece of wood in order separate
themselves,...the Chandalas only hunt and sell flesh.’17 Bana in Kadambari describes a Chandala

11 Shridhar V Ketkar, The History of Caste in India, Cosmo Publications, N Delhi, 1979, p. 144.
12 Jonathan P Parry,Caste and Kinship in Kangra, Vikas Publishing House, 1979, p. 132.
13 Jonathan P Parry,Caste and Kinship in Kangra, Vikas Publishing House, 1979, p. 133.
14 John Wilson, Indian Caste Vol. I, KK Book Distributors, 1877, p. 337.
15 John Wilson, Indian Caste Vol. I, KK Book Distributors, 1877, p. 313.
16 Shridhar V Ketkar, The History of Caste in India, Cosmo Publications, N Delhi, 1979, p. 122,).
17 B R Ambedkar, The Untouchables, Who They are and Why they became Untouchables, Amrit Book Co., New
Delhi, 1948, P.148.
133
(600 CE) ‘ I beheld the barbarian settlement, a very market place of evil-deeds in all sides the
enclosures were made with skulls, the dust heaps on the roads were filled with bones, the yards
of the huts were miry with blood, fat , and meat chopped up.

The life there consisted of hunting; the food of flesh, the ointment of fat, the garments of coarse
silk, the couches of dried skins, the household attendants of dogs; the animals for riding, of
cows. The men’s employment of wine and women; the oblation to the gods, of blood; the
sacrifice of cattle, the place was the image of hells.’18 Another Chinese traveler corroborates the
condition of Dalits in 7th century CE. Hieun Tsang/ Yuan Chwang came to India in 629 CE.
and stayed for 16 years. He said: ‘Butchers, fishermen, public performers, executioners, and
scavengers have their habitations marked by a distinguishing sign. They are forced to live outside
the city and they sneak along on the left when going about in the hamlets.’19

Writing about Chandalas and Shudra, Mughal Historian Abul Fazl wrote, ‘Water and
thoroughfare which became impure due to the shadow of Chandal, it is purified with sunlight
and moonlight.’ 20 Talking about dress code for the lower castes, he says ‘Indigo coloured dress
made of Pashmina and Silk is only suitable for Shudra.’ 21 Hieun Tsang clearly states that the
Shudras were agriculturists. Alberuni notes the absence of any significant difference between the
Vaishyas and Shudras, who lived together in the same town and village and mixed in the same
house.22

Since Lower castes were the main adherents of Buddhism, they were declared to be outcasts/
untouchables. As Dr. Ambedkar writes: ‘Nilkant in his Prayaschit Mayukha quotes a verse from
Manu which says: ‘If a person touches a Buddhist or a flower of Pachupatm Lokayataka, Nastika
and Mahapataki, he shall purify himself by a bath.’23 Another reason for keeping these people
outside the Village community was the beef-eating. The reason why broken men only became
untouchables was because in addition to being Buddhists they retained their habit of beef-eating
which gave them additional ground for offence to the Brahmins to carry their new found love
and reverence to the cow to its logical end. 24

Dr. Ambedkar, who himself came from lower (Mahar) caste wrote: ‘As has been shown by D R
Bhandarkar, cow killing was made a capital offence by the Gupta Kings sometime in the 4th
century AD. Untouchablity was born some time about 400 AD. It is born out of the struggle for
supremacy between Buddhism and Brahmanism.’25 Who were the depressed classes and the
untouchables? The depressed classes are a new designation applying rather vaguely to a number
of castes near the bottom of the scale. There is no hard and fast line to separate them from the
others. The untouchables are more definite. In north India, only a very small number engaged in
scavenging or unclean work, are considered untouchables. Fa-Hien tells us that when he came
the persons who removed human faeces were touchable. In South India the numbers are much
larger. How they began and grew to such numbers is difficult to say. Probably those who were
engaged in occupation considered unclean were so treated; later landless agricultural labour may
have been added.26

18 Ibid., pp.149-150.
19 Ibid., p.154.
20 Abul Fazl, Urdu Translation by Fida Ali, Aina-e-Akbari, Part-II, Jamia Usmania, Deccan, Hyderbad, 1939,
Reprinted Hinduism in the 16th Century, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, p.264.
21 Abul Fazl, Urdu Translation by Fida Ali, Aina-e-Akbari, Part-II, Jamia Usmania, Deccan, Hyderbad, 1939,
Reprinted Hinduism in the 16th Century, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, p. 266.
22 Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing House, 1969, N Delhi, p. 17.
23 Ibid, P. 71.
24 Ibid., p.82.
25 Ibid., 1948, p.155.
26 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, OUP, N Delhi, 1997, pp 223-224.
134
There was always a continuous process of new castes being formed as new occupations
developed, and for other reasons the older castes were always trying to get up in the social scale.
These processes have continued to our day. Some of the lower castes suddenly take to wearing
the sacred thread which is supposed to be reserved for upper castes. All this really made little
difference, as each caste continued to function in its own ambit and pursued its own trade or
occupations. It was merely a question of prestige. Occasionally men of lower classes, by sheer
ability attained to positions of power and authority in the state, but this was very exceptional.27

In northern India many castes are grouped under Kshatriya and Vaishyas from early times, but
in South India and Bengal we find mainly Brahmanas and Shudras to the exclusion of
intermediary castes.28 The Namasudras or Chandals of this region has a very low social position
among Hindus and were branded as untouchables. They were refused services of the barbers,
the washerman, and sometimes even the scavengers and the Brahmans. Quite naturally in order
to avoid this stigma, many of them embraced Islam or Christianity during the 19th century and
early 20th century.29 Formation of new castes was a continuous process. In ancient times,
however, the effect of a union between two different castes was ordinarily the formation of new
caste.30

Frequent land grant and partitions led to the rise and growth of new literate class, called the
Kayastha, whose place in the Varna system could not be clearly defined. The varna system was
also modified by the transformation of the Shudras into cultivators and the relegation of the
Vaishyas to the position of the shudras, with the result that the newly founded brahminical order
in Bengal and South India provided mainly for Brahmanas and Shudras.31

Land grants and subinfeudation led to unequal distribution of land and power on a large scale
and created new social groups and ranks which did not quite fit in with the existing fourfold
varna system.32 Faced with the problem of finding a place for the Kayastha in the varna system
the Brahmana lawgivers fell into a dilemma and connected them with both the shudras as well as
the dvijas (twice born). Since the Dharmashastra texts on the origin of the kayashtha are
ambiguous and historical examples not confined to one varna, in recent times the Calcutta High
Court called them Shudra and the Allahabad High Court called them brahmanas.33

Al-Beruni, who visited India in 11th century, has left behind an important account of India. He
wrote: ‘The Hindus call their castes varna, i.e. colours, and from a genealogical point of view,
they call them jataka, i.e. births. These castes are from the very beginning only four. The highest
caste is the Brahmana, of whom the books of the Hindus tell that they were created from the
head of Brahman. The next caste is the Kshatriya, who were created, as they say, from the
shoulders and hands of Brahman. After them follow the Vaishyas, who were created from the
thigh of Brahman. And the last one is the Shudra, who were created from his feet.’34 The noted
Arabic scholar however, does not talk of any such division among Muslims. Urdu Poet Iqbal
writing after many centuries of the raids of Mahmud Ghazni referred to the ‘one-rank’ of Islam
when he wrote: Ek Hi Saf Mein Khare Ho Gaye Mahmood-o-Ayaz-Na Koi Banda Raha na koi Band

27 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, OUP, N Delhi, 1997, p. 253.

28 Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing House, 1969, N Delhi, p. 18.
29 Shekhar Bandopadhyaya, Caste Class and politics in Colonial Bengal, A case study of the Namasudra
Movement of 1872-1937 in K L Sharma (edited), Caste and Class in India, Rawat Publication, Jaipur, 1998, p.
22.
30 H A Rose, A Glossary of the tribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces, Vol. I, Amar Parkashan
Delhi, p. 43.
31 Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing House, 1969, N Delhi, p. 27.
32 Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing House, 1969, N Delhi, p. 11.
33 Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing House, 1969, N Delhi, p. 15.
34 Qiamuddin Ahmed Trnsl., Al-Beruni’s India, National Book Trust, N Delhi.
135
Nawaz (In the same line Mahmood (king) and Ayaz (slave) stood while praying, Neither was one
Master, nor one slave).

After the failure of Buddhism and Jainism, it was the turn of the Bhakti saints in South, Central
and Northern India to check the caste-based social order. This was also necessitated, following
the popularity of the simple monotheistic message of Islam and its appeal to the masses. Many
such saints emerged under the group of Nirgun (formless) and Sagun (form) who advocated
devotion as a way of salvation. Even these saints failed and the followers of Kabir, Nanak and
Basavanna are today a separate sect. But the tragedy or irony of the Bhakti Movement was that it
not only failed to make a dent on caste hierarchy but actually ended up becoming a caste.35

Over a thousand years the social conditions worsened and the divisions among different castes
and sub-castes only multiplied. The rule of Delhi Sultans and Mughals, where large number of
soldiers and nobility came from outside, a new phase of racial supremacy was promoted. This
paved the way for the creation, birth and addition of caste among Muslims in India.

Caste among Muslims

For Muslims in India, it was obvious to be influenced by the caste system. Reeling under the
sectarian differences and the emergence of heterodox sects, this became a cause for new division
in the Muslim rank. After centuries of inroads, it were the Delhi Sultans who attempted to
consolidate and expand their rule. Their stay in Delhi, creation of court, nobility, recruitment of
soldiers, establishment of new colonies, and new markets created a demand for hands who could
meet the growing demand. However, these Sultans which included manumitted slaves had great
regard for the Turko-Afghan nobility and soldiers who played key role in battles and decision
making. These nobles not only decided the fate of the Kings, but also shaped the society.

All this was done under outside influence. As historian Muhammad Umar says, ‘When Islam
entered western India via all the countries of Central Asia in 11th and 10th centuries, Islamic
cultural structure has become Iranian from inside and outside. The Muslim ruler of India
considered himself representative of Persian lifestyle. During the entire rule of Muslims in India
Persian continued to be official and educational language while Arabic was religious language.
Sheikh and Syed were considered Islamic elite during the beginning in Mecca and Madina....while
Mughal and Pathan who trace their lineage to ruling elite are considered good martial race.
Sheikh and Syed are given religious respect while Mughal /Pathan are respected for their valour
and lineage. Like this, converted Indian Muslims made separate group of theirs and are seen in
several divisions.36 Ghaus Ansari, who studied caste system in Uttar Pradesh in 1960s, writes:
‘Sayyad and Sheikh are acclaimed for their sacredness; Mughal and Pathan for their royal blood.
All of these together i.e. Sayyad, Sheikh, Mughal, and Pathan although tracing their descent from
different racial stocks, have united themselves under the categorical heading of
(Ashraf) honourable to set themselves apart from the Muslim converts of Indian origin.37

A new faith did not guarantee new way of life. Conversion to Christianity or Islam and even
conversion of B.R. Ambedkar and his followers to Buddhism did not make the caste system
irrelevant.38 The large majority of the Muslims in India were originally recruited to Islam from
the intermediate and lower rings of Hindu society wherein status was rigidly defined in terms of
birth and maintained by strong social sanctions.39 The emphasis upon birth and ancestry

35 M N Srinivas, An obituary on Caste as a System, Economic and Political Weekly, February 1, 2003, p.459,).
36 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 70-71.
37 Ghaus Ansari, Muslim Caste in Uttar Pradesh Ethnographic and Folk culture Society, Lucknow, 1960.
38 S B Wad, Caste and the Law in India, DCCBR, N Delhi, 1984, p. 3.
39 Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 13.
136
acquired acceptance in Islamic law as time went by...Caste among the Muslims in India owes
itself directly to Hindu influences, but it has been reinforced by the justification offered for the
idea of birth and descent as criteria of status in Islamic law.40 Sikand says, ‘The Fatwa-i-Jahandari
shows Barani as a fervent champion of Ashraf supremacy and as vehemently opposed to the
Ajlaf.’41

The division among Muslims was akin to the varna system of Hindus. B N Pande writes,
‘Socially the Mussalmans of India developed an organisation similar to that of the Hindus.
Muslim societies in India, unlike Muslim societies in other countries, became divided into castes
comparable with the Hindu caste system. Sayyids correspond with Brahmins, Mughal and
Pathans with Kshatriyas, Sheikhs with Vaishyas, and the group of artisans’ craftsmen labourers
with Shudras. The distinctions between the four divisions were based not merely on economic
and vocational considerations, but also on heredity, which was recognised throughout the
middle ages as a factor of supreme importance among both the Mussalmans and Hindus.42

Iran and India share a long and unparalleled journey. It is argued that there was a class division
in Iranian society which had its origin in ancient times, and was similar to the one prevailing in
India. In Iran, four class divisions has been there since the time of Avesta.....the ideal of
brotherhood and equality had to bow before the well established social differences and divide of
Persia. Famous Persian scholar Naseerudin Atui, has approved the division in society and also
the division during the time of Sassani empire. He wrote in 'Akhlaq-e-Nasri' that all classes
should be kept in place. Another book 'Jamia Mufidi' of 7th century also retains the division,
only there has been a change in sequencing, where martial class has replaced religious class as the
first class. Religious class been relegated to the second position. When Islam came to India in
12th century, there were already changes in social structure, and fraternity and equality remained
only a vision and remains today also a vision. Victor Muslims were divided in two classes-
religious group, which included preachers and the ruling elite and the people. In the beginning
the religious workers were not hereditary but slowly it became.43

People visiting India find it amusing to find caste among Muslims. As one visitor writes, ‘It is
interesting to see how caste practice has penetrated the Muslim communities, people for whom
concepts of rebirth and preordained destiny are foreign- a form of social harmony evolved as
certain aspects of Hindu behaviour organically crept in’.44 In India, Muslims castes generally fall
into two categories: higher castes of Syed, Sheikh, Pathan and Mughal and lower service castes.
The high castes claim foreign origin from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, or Central Asia, while
the members of the low castes are low-caste Hindu converts.45

Talking about its prevalent among non-Hindus, M N Srinivas says, ‘It is a ubiquitous institution
in India, being found among Hindus, Sikhs, Jains, Muslims, Christians and Jews. It is one
institution that cuts across religious, regional and class divisions. There is a widespread
impression among educated Indians that caste is on its last legs, and that the educated,
urbanized, and westernised, members of the upper classes have already escaped its bonds. Both
these impressions are wrong. These people may observe very few dietary restrictions, marry
outside caste and even region, but this does not mean that they have escaped entirely the bonds
of caste. They show caste attitudes in surprising contexts.46

40 Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 14-15.
41 Yoginder Sikand, Islam Caste and Dalit Muslim Relations in India, Global Media Publications, 2004, p.22.
42 B N Pande, Islam & Indian Culture, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1987 p. 59.
43 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 72-73.
44 Sophie Baker, Caste At Home in Hindu India, Rupa, 1991, p. 53.
45 Syed Ali, Collective and Elective Ethnicity: Caste Among Urban Muslims in India, Sociological Forum, Vol. 17,
No. 4, December 2002, p. 602-603.
46 M N Srinivas, Caste in Modern India and Other Essays, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, p. 88.
137
While the institution of caste is in a sense fundamental to Hinduism, it is not confined to
Hindus, as Indian Muslims, Christians and Sikh are all divided into castes. And caste also cuts
across religious divisions--it is not only Hindus who are segmented into castes but also Jains,
Sikhs, Muslims and Christians. Normally the existence of a common cultural or social idiom is a
predisposing condition for unity, but in the case of caste there is a double difficulty.47

In every society army and theologians command respect owing to their role. For newly founded
Muslim state in India, their role was no less important in keeping intact the nascent kingdom.
The Muslim castes emerged from various races and kept on adding new castes. Muslims came
from different races: Arab, Afghan, Turk, Tajiks. Immigrant Muslims followed two broad
divisions-Muhajirin and Indian Muslims (converted). The feeling of division was based on racial
differences, 'Ashraf' was the word used for migrated Muslims. Ashraf was used for migrants like
Syed, Mughal, Pathan and Sheikh, and for indigenous Muslims, the word was 'Arzal'. Sharfa has
same meaning as Arya.48 Ghaus Ansari writes, Muslim society in India is in first instance divided
into four major groups. These are (i) Ashraf- who trace their origin to foreign lands such as
Arabia, Persia (Turkistan) and Afghanistan (ii) Hindus of higher birth who were converted to
Islam (iii) clean occupational castes, and (iv) the Converts from the Untouchable Castes: Bhangi
(scavengers) Chamar (tanner) etc.49

The racial division in the Muslim rank was approved of by the Muslim thinkers of the day. As
Umar writes, ‘People with high and glorified posts and professions were considered elite and
they were eligible for government positions and they were considered to provide luck to the
government and has within them virtues…..as opposed to this, lower people were only capable
of doing menial and low profile jobs and they were epitome of all the evils. Historian Ziaudddin
Barni has given good account of this. According to the views of Barni, new colonies were
established for the newly arrived migrant Muslims in Delhi. Following colonies (Mohalla) were
found during the reign of Sultan Ghayasuddin Balban: Mohalla Abbassi, Mohalla Sanjari,
Mohalla Khawrizm Shahi, Mohalla Welimi, and Mohalla Alvi.

Mohalla Atabki, Mohalla Ghori, Mohalla Changezi, Mohalla Romi, Mohalla Sanqari, Mohalla
Mosil, Mohalla Samarqandi, Mohalla Kashghari, Mohalla Khatai. During the time of Sultan
Jalaluddin Khalji, a new Mohalla of Mughals was added and was called Mughalpura and these
Mughals were called neo-Muslims.50 Caste based Mohallas can still be found in many cities of the
country, viz., Diwan Mohallah-inhabited by Kayasth, Mughalpura-inhabited by Mughals, Darzi
Mohalla-inhabited by Darzi, Pathantoli- Inhabited by Pathans, Sheikhpura-inhabited by Sheikhs.

Not only the Muslim state approved of racial division, like the Hindu society, the upper castes
practiced seclusion from the lower strata of Muslim castes, who were Indians. Umar writes,
‘Migrant Muslims were soldiers and due to superiority of their race kept away from Muslims and
looked down upon indigenous Muslims, who were also denied jobs in government. When
indigenous Muslims tried to garner political power, they were migrant Muslims revolted and they
were removed. One such incident took place during the reign of Sultan Nasir udddin Mahmud,
when Amauddin Raihan came to power. But Turks under Balban removed and killed him. After
the death of Qutubuddin Mubarak Khalji, Hasan Pardari took the power in his hands but was
called 'impure' by Barni because he was from Hind. He belonged to low caste of Pardari from
Gujarat. Due to these reservations and policies, Indian Muslims were forced to bank on their

47 M N Srinivas, Caste in Modern India and Other Essays, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, p. 150.
48 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 74-75.
49 Ghaus Ansari, op. cit. p. 31.
50 Ibid.,
138
ancestral professions to make a living, and even after becoming Muslims they were not
considered equal to Turks.51

The raids made by Delhi Sultans and its generals at various places led to the creation of similar
society there. In this regard the most notable was the so called transfer of capital from Delhi to
Deogir by Muhammad Bin Tughlaq. This resulted in creating new Muslim colonies in the
Deccan region. Afghan mercenaries were always in demand from different quarters, and the rule
of Lodis and Sher Shah made them more popular with Indian as martial race. Interestingly, in
border districts of Bihar there is ‘Shershahbadia’ caste whose lineage is not known. They claim
to have been given land by Emperor Sher Shah.

Indian artisans were always known for their skill. So much so that even Mahmud Ghazni took
artisans to his home town. He also hired the services of Tilak as General to punish the local
troublemakers. After initial days of consolidation, Mughals took to other tasks. During the reign
of Emperor Akbar, a new phase of Muslim social order and institution took shape, in which
each section of society and all types of skilled workers were allowed to join the empire and
government industries. This gave recognition to the local converted Muslims, but the other side
was that Muslims society was divided into various profession/ skill based groups. They began to
marry within their group and also passed on their skill to their sons.52

Due to the entry of these artisans and skilled workers, the Islamic system gave way to a society
which was divided on the basis of work/ profession. Umar says, ‘The Medieval Indian Muslim
society may be divided into three classes. The first two- Ahl-e-Saif (men of sword) and Ahl-e-
Qalam(men of pen) together constituted the social aristocracy of the ruling class…at the bottom
of the ladder were ‘Awam-e-Khalq’ or the common people53. Due to political insatiability of the
18th century, and worsening economic condition, Muslims took to the all existing occupation.
For example, the profession of soldier was in decline, and even if someone became a soldier by
buying a horse, he did not get salary. So, people left this profession and took to new career. For
example, the ancestral profession of Sauda was military service, but he took to poetry and made
a living in his life from this profession. Same was the case with Ghalib. Poet Mashafi belonged
to a Kalal family of Amroha, who took to trading and then poetry. Sauda has shown the
precarious condition of the different professionals , such as Qazi, Mullah, Khatib, Wayez, Tabib,
Dokandar, Saudagar, Bawarchi, poet, teacher, writer, singer (Qawaal), sheikh were in pitiable
condition. Despite being associated with the court, they lived life of misery. Similarly Nazir
Akbarabadi, has bemoaned the conditions of unemployed people of Agra.54

Because of this, many Muslims left their traditional occupation and took to new jobs, and this
was later identified with caste, and every profession's caste was fixed on the basis of profession.
Present Muslim society is divided into four groups or castes: 1) Ashraf-those people who trace
their lineage to Arab, Persia, Turkistan, ond Afghanistan, 2) Upper caste Hindus who became
Muslim, 3) Clean profession castes, 4) Unclean/ Untouchable castes who converted to Islam
such as Bhangi, Chamar, and other lower castes.55

From Punjab to Bengal, there is huge population and large numbers of Muslims are living there.
They are divided in two racial groups: migrant Muslims such as Syed, Sheikh, Mughal, and

51 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 76-
52 Ibid,
53 Muhammad Umar, Muslim Society in Northern India during the 18 th century, CAS in History, Aligarh, 1998,
p.16
54 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 77- 78
55 Ibid
139
Pathan and their successors. Second group is of people whose forefathers became Muslims.
Native Muslims are known from their profession and are divided in three categories:

1) Upper caste Hindus who became Muslims like Rajput

2) People who did clean work and included all except those in third class
3) Unclean and menial workers, such as Kalal, Bhangi, Halalkhor, Lalbegi, Chamar,
Khakrob.

Based on the prevailing castes among Muslims and their division based on clean and unclean
work, we can make following categories:

1. Ashraf - Syed, Mughal, Pathan, Sheikh

2. Muslim Rajput (Ajlaf)
3. Mewati Muslim( Ajlaf)
4. Castes doing clean work-Julahe, Darzi, Qasab, Hajam, Nai, Kunjra, Merasi, Kumhar,
Manhar, Dhuniya, Teli, Dhobi, Gaddi and Faqir (Arzal)
5. Castes doing menial works- Kalal, Halalkhor/ Lalbegi, Bhangi, Chamar etc.

Above division is broadly seen as Ashraf and Non-Ashraf. Based on the list of Anthropological
Survey of India, and works of Muhammad Umar and Mirza Muhammad Hasan Qateel,
following list56 of Muslim castes are given. This is not complete list.

Ashrafs & Their Title

The Ashrafs57 enjoy the same position among Muslims, which is respectively enjoyed by
Brahmin and Kshatriya among Hindus. Thus, Syed and Sheikh as religious pontiff and Imam are
equal to Brahmin, while Mughal and Pathan are known for bravery and are at par with
Kshatriya.

1) Syed- Usually they use prefix of Syed or Mir and also use some title. Some time the
adopted professional title is also used, if it is acceptable. Other titles used are: Abdi,
Askari, Baqri, Husaini, Hasni, Kazmi, Naqvi, Rizvi, Zaidi, Chishti, Jalali, and Qadri title
are usually used by Saints who are usually Sunni and are claimants to the Syed, Sheikh
and Pathan race. Some titles are common among Shia as well as Sunni. They are Syed in
Shia and Sheikh in Sunni: Abbasi, Alvi, Hashmi, Jaafri. English scholar writing in the
19th century wrote about Sayyads: ‘All over the eastern Punjab small shrines exist to
what are popularly called Sayyids. These shrines are Muhammadan in form, and the
offerings, which are made on Thursdays, are taken by Muhammaden Faqirs-very often
however the name of the Faqir is unknown and diviners will even invent a Sayyid
hitherto not heard of as the author of a disease and a sharing will be built to him
accordingly.58 It is interesting to note Syeds continue to occupy most of the sufi shrines
spread in Indian subcontinent and in addition to ‘Syed’ also use ‘Shah’ to confirm their
sufi lineage! They also use Khanqah (shrine) for their political career.

56 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 82-84.
57 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p.104.
58 H A Rose, A Glossary of the tribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces, Vol. I, Amar Parkashan,
Delhi, p. 14.
140
 2) Sheikh- Ansari, Farooqi, Kharasani, Malki, Qidwai, Quraishi, Siddiqui, Usmani Mirza
Md. Hasan Qateel says this about Sheikh and Syed: ‘In countryside the marriages of
Sheikh and Syeds are solemnised according to Sunnat....Amongst Ashraf in India, Sheikh
is addressed as Sheikh and Syed is addressed as Meer. Syed is not addressed as Mirza and
Sheikh is never addressed as Mirza. And no matter how high is the position of Mirza and
Afghan, there cannot be conjugal relations with Sheikh/ Syed. And the peasant is not in
the line of Ashraf, they are outside, and they are considered as servants. 59

3) Mughal groups- Usually Mughals use Mirza before their names and in the end add
position title- Chughtai, Quzlibas, Tazik, Taimuri, Turkman, Uzbek, or Azbeg.

4) Pathan tribes- Usually Pathans do not use the name of tribe and only use title of 'Khan'
before their names. And if they use the title of the tribe, they drop Khan. Afridi,
Bangash, Barakzai, Barak, Daudzai, Durrani, Ghaurgashti, Ghauri, Kakar, Khalil, Lodi,
Mohmmadzai, Aurkzai, Rohilla. A trible of Pathan live in the Rohilkhand region of Uttar
Pradesh. It is not difficult to form some idea of the way in which the modern population
has been formed. The Pathan or Iranian element is slight; the Mughal or Turki still
slighter; while the Arab element is practically negligible. The Pathan tribes, as we know
them are by no means ancient and their earliest settlements in the Peshawar valley and
other tracts of predominantly pathan do not go back much later than the 14th century. 60
To preserve their racial supremacy and higher social position above real Muslims from
Hind, Muslims adopted the title of high lineage names against their names. Among
Pathan and Mughal, Syed and Sheikh fulfil the responsibility of Imam and Peer...maybe
this is because they are considered to among the descendents of migrants 'Shurfa'. So
they are given respect...In India this has become the domain of Syed and Sheikh and
have become hereditary. In Northern India, Peer is either Sheikh or Syed and even if he
belongs to some other caste, he traces his lineage from some Syed saint, like Chishti,
Jalali, Qadri, Qutbi etc.,61 Saraban and Kalantari are two groups of Afghans. Kalantari
has many types, such as Bangash, Afridi, Dilazak, Khatak, Rakzai. In India, Pathans are
of two kinds. One real Saraban or Kalantari or Gharghasht or Betan Pathan. Second
such slaves who became Muslims to please them.

In India, four castes are considered to be Ashraf: Muhgal, Syed, Sheikh, and Afghan...Usually
any person coming to India from Iran is addressed 'Aqa'. He is Sharif, or worker, or a soldier, or
Razil or Bazari and children of Ulema or working officials are also addressed as 'Mirza'.62

These four are Ashrafs provided they are careful of their lineage and if any Mughal to eke out a
living takes to the profession of Seqqa Giri, he will cease to be a Sharif. He will be expelled from
Mughal Biradri.63

Similarly, Mughals have some types: Descendents of Irani and Turani, Slaves of Shia, and new
Muslims. They are Sunni as well as Shia64 Sheikh also have types: one seeking lineage from
companions of Prophet- Siddiqi, Farooqi, Usmani 2) Kanbu, Parache, Khoje.65

59 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p. 162,).
60 H A Rose, A Glossary of the tribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces, Vol. I, Amar Parkashan
Delhi, p. 58.
61 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p.81.
62 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p. 129.
63 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p.134-135.
64 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p.132.
65 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p. 133.
141
In Shahjahanbad (Delhi) and other towns where people of Delhi inhabit, there are marriages
between Syeds and Mughals, even if their claim to lineage is not proven.66

Muslim Rajput & Titles

Among higher caste, there are clans which embraced Islam like Bais, Bargujar, Bhatti, Besan,
Chandil, Chauhan, Gautam, Rathore, Sombansi, and Tomar and this Muslim Rajput are found in
Meerut (UP). They do not interact with lower caste and also do not like to have matrimonial
alliances with Ashraf (Syed, Sheikh, Mughal and Pathan). Sometime, they also marry in Hindu, if
they do not get compatible offer...despite being Muslims they practice Hindu traditions and
usually do not marry in the maternal and paternal extended family.

Bhal Sultan (Bulandshahar, Saharanpur), Khanzadah (Avadh), Ranghir, Lalkhani are spread in
Uttar Pradesh. Important and large branches of Muslim Rajput are: Bargujar, Bhati, Besan,
Chandail, Chauhan, Gautam, Panwar, Raikor, Rathore, Som Vanshi, Tomar.67

Mewati Muslim

Meo- according to local tradition became Muslim due to the efforts of Salar Masud Ghazi, who
attacked Mewat in 1002....Meos are divided in 12 Pal and 52 Gotra. Pal is old system and Gotra
is racial division.68 Meo- A highly composite tribe found in the hill country of Gurgaon, Alwar,
and Bharatpur and also scattered over Delhi district. The Meos have given their name to Mewat.
The Meos are divided into 52 original gots (sub-groups) which include 12 Pals.69 For several
centuries after their conversion to Islam, the Meos continued to observe the Hindu rituals with
the assistance of Hindu castes, including the Brahmins.70 The term ‘Khanzada’ has specially been
used to designate the Mewatis71.

Profession-Based Castes

After Ashraf and Muslim Rajput, there are many castes of skilled workers, and large number of
Northern Indian population is based on this type of workers. They are found among Muslims as
well as Hindus, such as carpenter, tailor, washerman, potter, blacksmith, goldsmith, barber, and
teli. They are socially and culturally apart from Hindus, though they may belong to some
common trading guild. They are divided in three groups:

1) such castes which are absolute Muslims, and their Hindu counterparts either do not exist
or they are different.
2) Such castes which have more Muslim branches than Hindu branches.
3) Such castes which have more Hindu branches than Muslim branches.

66 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p.136, Mirza Md
Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p.136.
67 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 105.
68 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 68.
69 H A Rose, A Glossary of the tribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces, Vol. I, Amar Parkashan
Delhi, p. 79-83.
70 Partap C Aggarwal, Caste Hierarchy in a Meo Village of Rajasthan, , Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification
among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p.154.
71 Muhammad Umar, Muslim Society in Northern India during the 18 th century, CAS in History, Aligarh, 1998,
p.14.
142
 I

Momin/ Julaha- In Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal, they converted in large number from
Hindu. They are in large number compared to other Muslim castes in 1931 census. To claim
their high caste position, they prefer to marry in higher caste Sheikhs. They made an
organisation -All India Jamiat-ul-Mominin in 1930. They claim to be Sheikh and call themselves
Momin Ansari. Ansari- One of the most interesting Ansari families in the Punjab is that of
Ansari Sheikhs of Jullundur. It claims descent from Khalid Ansari, who received Prophet
Muhammad in his house in Madina72; Momin 'faithful' a synonym for Musalman; a designation
of Mohammedan Julahas which distinguishes them from the Hindu Julahas.73 The Ansaris are
Muslim Julahas or weavers. They are Sunni by sect and are also known as Momin and Julaha. 74
Those engaged in weaving and cloth making were called Julahe. They were originally from Hind
and after embracing Islam were called Nor Baf. During Emperor Akbar's reign, textile was
promoted and factories were established Lahore, Fatehpur, Ahmedabad, Gujarat. They are
settled in UP, Bihar and Bengal.

Qureshi- The Kassabs or Qassabs are a class of Muslim butchers. They deal with slaughtered
cattle, and are sub-group of Qureshi. Etymologically, Kassab means those who slaughter cow
(bara Karbar) and those who slaughter goat/ sheep are known as chick.75

Gaddi- Muslim shepherd caste, which is a branch of Ghosi. Amongst Teli, Dhobi, and Faqir
they are ranked lower. They are allowed to pray in the mosque. They marry in their caste though
there are cases of them marrying outside as well. They claim that they are the decedents of the
first bujurg named Gaddi Salahuddin. They are goalas who migrated to Bihar.76 They closely
resemble Ghosi, they are perhaps like him a sub-division offshoot. As said- Gaddi Mitr Bhola-
Denda tap to mangda chola (The Gaddi is a simple friend, he offers his cap and asks a coat in
exchange)...A caste of people who work as grass-cutters and sell milk in the United Provinces,
the term is said to be only used in the Punjab for a Mohammaden cowherd, or milkman whether
Gujjar, Ahir or any other caste.77

Faqir- They are shown as separate caste in 1931 census. Apart from begging, they also do
household work.

Meerasi- Some authors believe that they are descendents of Daravid. They have two basic
works- a) To sing on occasions like birth, marriage etc., b) To sing at Urs, and because this is
called Qawwali, they are called Qawwal in UP. Because of their association with caretakers of
tombs, their social position was elevated and their women have started observing Purdah and
they claim to be Quraishi.

II

Darzi- In 1818 their population in UP was 22441 while Hindu Darzi were 15522. In 1931,
Muslim Darzi population increased to 168906.

72 H A Rose, A Glossaray of the trribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces, Vol. II, Amar
Parkashan Delhi,p. 13.
73 H H Risley, Tribes and Castes of Bengal, Ethnographic Glossary, Vol. II , 1891, p.94.
74 K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, Amitava Sarkar, p. 70.
75 K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, p. 476, Amitabha sarkar.
76 Samira Dasgupta, in K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, P. 307.
77 H A Rose, A Glossary of the tribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces, Vol. I, Amar Parkashan
Delhi, p. 255.
143
Dhuniya- They deal with cotton and start preparing quilt and mattress with the onset of winter
season.

Manihar- They make bangle from ancient time and they marry only in their caste. Married
woman cannot be divorced without the permission of Panchayat.

Kunjrah- They sell vegetable and their Panchayat is very powerful. Among them it is allowed to
marry two sisters at the same time (though this is not allowed in Islam).

Rangrez- They were a separate caste in 19th century, but their demand has declined due to no
demand for print work. Very few are left who do the traditional job, they marry within the caste
Seqal gar- They were considered separate caste by Williams, Neisfield, and Blunt. Not much is
left of their caste, but some Seqalgar do traditional job. But they have been absorbed by
Dhuniya, Barhai, Kumhar. The person responsible for fetching water and carrying it to
households is called Siqqa or Bhishti. During the time, water was procured from wells, and
Muslim women observed Purdah while men were working. So, there emerged a group of water
carriers which was similar to Kahar in Hindus. They claim to be Rajputs....Professional Saqqel
offer water to pedestrians and can be seen in Delhi's Jama Masjid area.

III

Dhobi- Among Hindus they are considered doing menial jobs. Among Muslims, they are
considered above to Chamar and Bhangi. In 1869 their population was 249, and now they are in
thousand. They are divided in small branches...they practice many Hindu traditions and customs.
In Punjab they are divided in two groups-Multani and Desi.

Nai- Barbers, they are called Nai in Hindus and Hajjam in Muslims. Apart from this Muslim
Hajjam also do circumcision, and play important role in the festivals of Ashraf. They also fix
marriages, and carry the Invitation Register in the mohalla in Hisar, they are divided in four
groups- Bhallam, Chauhan, Khatrim and Kharl etc., Two branches are found in Gurgaon-
Sheikh/Turkman who came with Muslim invaders. Second, those who embraced Islam like
Bhati, Chauhan, Naryan, Tanur and Ghauri. Ghauri believe that they embraced Islam during
Ghauri period.

Teli- According to Risley, this caste may have belonged to upper caste because oil was an
integral part for cooking food.

Among “clean” professionals, it happens that such castes slowly become extinct with the decline
of the profession or new branches come up which embrace this profession...Among Muslims
Rangrez, Bhatiara, and Seqalgroh have declined socially and finally disappeared. Print making
declined so this caste has disappeared. Similarly with new mode of transportation, Bhatiyara
have disappeared, or have adopted new profession of Nan bai. Bawarchi, Halwai and Nan bai
have submerged.78

Nazir Akbarakbadi and author of Tarikh- e- Muhammad Shahi has mentioned 36 profession
based castes, but actually there were lot more who earned their living. The downfall of 18th
century led to the emergence of new castes and reorganisation of Muslim society. H Elliot has
mentioned 56 Muslim castes while Martin Montgomery has mentioned 79 professional castes
Bengal and Bihar. Hatim has mentioned ordinary professional in his poetry Shahar Ashub:

78 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p.89-90.
144
Abdali-The Abdalis believe that they are from Western India and Delhi...they have an effective
and well organised social council known as Panchayat Jamiate Hashmita.79

Dafalis- The Dafalis also known as Hashmi and Saudagar are traditionally a Muslim community
of daf (tamborine) players...Remember the Bollywood song- Dafali wale Dafli baja! They belong
to the category of OBC.80

Bhanr- Bhanr is the generic name of mimics buffons and jesters. They are Mohammedans.
Bhand/ Bhanr /Bhagat.81

Bhat- The Bhats, a Muslim community is known for their phikra in praise of some body or
something.82 They used to recite lineage of families on occasions and remember them.
According to their own claim, they became Muslim during the reign of Aurangzeb Alamgir.
Their services are specially used during marriage, birth, etc. and are divided in three groups in
Delhi-Gurgaon-Rohtak region.

Bhatiaras- The Bhatiaras, members of a backward Muslim community, are distributed widely in
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Bhatiara and Farooquie are synonym.83

Gadiharas- The Gadiharas are Muslims. They are synonyms of Gadhayia an infafros. The
etymological meaning of the term Gadihara is the owner of an ass.84

Hajjam- The Muslim Hajjams (are) or barbers live in village with other communities.85

Baghbani- Mughal kings were fond of gardens, and the consumption of flowers increased during
the reign of Emperor Akbar. Because of large number of gardens, and association Muslims
adopted this profession to earn a living.

Bawarchi- Muslims were fond of tasty food and spent freely. Royal kitchen employed chef from
all parts. With the decline of courts, Chefs opened their own hotel. Still, Muslims use the
services of Bawarchi in social feasts like marriage and reception.

Barhai- Carpenters and blacksmiths were required in large number to make bullock carts, horse
carts and plough for agriculture. When they embraced Islam, they continued with their
traditional profession. Large numbers of them were employed in government service by
Mughals. Many of them are still engaged in traditional work and use the title ‘Saifi’.

Bharbhunja- Who fry cereals in Tandoor are called Bharbhunja. They are divided into four
‘Gotra’.

Baqqal (Ghalla Farosh)- Before the arrival of Muslims in India, group of people were engaged in
selling food grains, and were called Banjara. Perhaps, after becoming Muslim, they were called
Baqqal. Hemu Baqqal is a famous name in History.

79 K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, p. 29.

80 Susanta Mahanti, K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta pp. 31-34.
81 K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, Ashok Kumar
Mukhopadhaya, pp 153-154.
82 S N Mahato, K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta., pp 155-157.
83 Susanta Mahanti, K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta pp. 158-
162.
84 Susanta Mohanti, K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, p. 311.
85 S B Ray, K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta , p. 381.
145
Tanboli- The betel seller is called Tanboli. Before Muslims, Betel was grown by Hindus. When
Muslims started using betel they also took to this profession. There was separate department of
betel seller during Mughal period and other profession associated with this was tobacco
cultivation.

Kafsh Farosh- Shoe makers were Chamar, and in Punjab they are called Mochi. Mochi are
usually Muslim. Mir Taqi Mir has mentioned shoe sellers in his poetry.

Arzal

Halalkhor/Lalbegi- The Halakhors are a community of Muslim sweepers. They are also
musicians. Their synonyms are Mehtar, Bhangi, and Halalbegi.86A class of Mohammedan
sweepers supposed to have come from upper India, some with sepoy regiment, others as
wanderers in search of work. Though styled Mohammedans, they neither practice circumcision
nor abstain from pork. The Lalbegi are employed as sweepers in European households, and are
always addressed as Jamadar by other servants. A few of the Lalbegi keep the fast of Ramzan,
although they dare not enter a public mosque...it seems not improbable therefore, that the
'Lalbegi' like many other tribes converted to Mohammedan saint as their common ancestor. 87
Members of groups within these categories (Ashraf) do not eat or drink with the Lalbegis. The
Dafalis who work as priests for the Lal Begis, or the Qalandars who sometime live in the
neighbourhood, refuse to accept food or water from the Lalbegis.88

Bhangi- A Bhangi, whether Muslim or Non-Muslim is not allowed to enter mosque, no matter
how purified he was. Though, legally they are allowed to pray in group, but practically he was
not allowed to visit holy places and tombs of saints which was disliked...so they were forcibly
prevented from entering.

Kalal/ Araqi / Ranki -A Muslim community of distillers, they are also called Araqui from world
Araq or liquor. They are engaged in making liquor in Bhatti and selling it.89 They are settled in as
distillers. Haria Tax was imposed and wine trade through vendors was allowed. They are settled
in parts of Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh. The Muslim assign a status lower than
Halakhors (Muslim sweeper) to the Kalal, due to their occupation. In Ranchi, one mosque
refused to accept contribution (chanda) as the income was haram (not clean). Risley90 has referred
to this as Ranki/ Kalal, a sub-caste (Mohammedan) of Kalwars in Bihar. Ramanand devotee and
poet Kabir said, ‘Kabir Bhati Kalal ki, Bahutak Baithe Aye- Sar Saunpe Soi Piye, Nahi to piya na jaye(
Kabir the bar (Bhathi) of Kalal is one and many people sit. Only those will drink, who bow their
head, otherwise none can drink).
Structure, Organisation and Pattern

The caste system of Muslims is a by-product of Hindu caste system. Thus, the restrictions and
rules are not as rigid among Muslims as amongst Hindus.91 Among Ashraf and some
professional castes, unlike Hindus there is no particular body, which works. Instead people react
with their own dislikes and condemnation. When there is reaction, usually the guilty person is
socially boycotted. Among higher castes, extended family works as a unit, which takes care of
social individual actions of its members. Amongst Muslims, Bhangi, Sabzi Farosh, Dhobi,

86 K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, Amitabha Sarkar, P. 383
87 H H Risley, Tribes and Castes of Bengal, Ethnographic Glossary, Vol. II , 1891, p. 3-4,)
88 M K A Siddique, Caste Among the Muslims of Calcutta, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among
Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p.261
89 Samira Dasgupta, K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, p. 427
90 H H Risely, Tribes and Castes of Bengal, Ethnographic Glossary, Vol. II, 1891, p.196
91 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 91,
146
Manihari, and Teli have useful effective Panchayat.92 Birth decides his status in society and in
affairs of marriage position and lineage both play equal role. A higher caste Muslim will accept
food from all castes except Bhangi. 93

However, there are some traditions which traces social division within the Islamic law. The
following aspect of Shafi law gives clear indication of the presence of graded distinction between
different types of ancestry and between different occupations. ...Regarding ancestor, a non-Arab
cannot be considered an equal of an Arab woman or a non-Quraishite that of a Quraishite
woman or a non-Hashmi and Muttalibi equal to any of the above. The similar ancestry could
also exist amongst the non-Arabs. About the professionals a person having a menial profession
is not an equal of a person having a higher profession. A sweeper, barber, a watchman, a
Shepherd, and a conductor of boats are not equal of a daughter of a tailor, nor is a tailor an
equal of a daughter of a trader and retailer, agriculturist or a dairyman, and they in turn are not
equals of daughter of a scholar or a judge.94

The rigid caste system had its effect on the Muslims. We see that lineage as well as profession
was equally important. If a person of such family improves his social status by development and
his relatives were Kalal (who used to be attendant to the King, or made liquor, sold liquor and if
were very poor used to fetch water), he used to hide his family background. For example poet
Mashafi belonged to Kalal group but he kept this a secret. Once he told Abdul Qadir Rampuri
that he was born in Ballam Garh. He lied about this when talking about to others. Similarly Meer
claims to be Syed, perhaps be belonged to Fatmi from mother side, but his contemporaries has
questioned his lineage which creates doubt about his caste and at some time his family was
engaged in the profession of Nan Bai. The step-brother of Meer Muhammad Hasan has not
used title of Meer.95 And consider this line of Sauda: Baithe Tanur Tabaa to Jab Garm Ke Meer-Kuch
Sheer Mal samne kuch nan kuch Paneer (When Meer sits in front of lighted Tandoor- You can see
Sheermal (stuffed bread), Naan (bread), and Paneer).

Most of the Ashraf tend to live in urban areas, while the lower castes dwell in rural areas. It is
most likely that the zamindars are Ashraf, while the cultivators and farmers come from the lower
strata. In Northern India Ashraf consider themselves among upper castes Zamindars, and they
consider Muslim and Hindu workers living in rural areas inferior. Even if a lower caste like Teli
or Nai acquires disproportionate land, he would not be considered equal to Ashraf in rank.96 It is
important to note that fast lifestyle of urban areas has decreased the influence of lineage, but it is
also important that new groups are elevating their status through competition and also adopting
the suffix of Ashraf castes and attempt to be Ashraf so fake groups of Ashrafs have also
emerged.97

Muslims, as opposed to Hindus do not give religious colour to social division in their ranks, or
try to prove as per religious tenets.....there is struggle between the basic Islamic ideals of equality
and brotherhood and the existing differences, discrimination and divisions.98

92 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 92.
93 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975,
p. 94.
94 Minhaju-Ut Taliban of Yahya b. Sharaf an.Nawawi, 1318AH quoted, in Leela Dube, Caste Analogues among the
Lakshadweep Muslims, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p.
93.
95 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p. 30-33.
96 Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi, 1975, p.
96).
97 Ibid, p. 98.
98 Ibid., Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications Division, N Delhi,
1975, p. 62,).
147
Eminent Sociologist M N Srinivas has talked in detail about Sanskritisation among Hindus, in
which lower castes try to uplift their position in society by imitating the lifestyle and habits of
upper classes. Muslim lower castes do likewise to improve their position. This is found
particularly in Northern India, where Rajputs who embraced Islam use 'Khan' title to claim
parity with Afghan and Pathan. Only recently Kassab has started using 'Qureshi' to claim lineage
from Banu Quraish...Similarly Julahas have started using 'Ansari' title to claim lineage from
Ansar of Madina. But this claim does not mean that they are easily integrated into 'Ashraf'
group...but it takes long periods and perhaps one or two generations after which this can be
realised. Sometime it also happens that lower castes start imitating the traditions and lifestyle of
upper castes to elevate their social position.

For instance, if their women do not observe purdah, they start doing so and also engage services
of some respectable Maulvi to perform/ deliver sermon on the occasion of death/ mourning
and marriage.99 Socialist Ram Manohar Lohia agrees, ‘Those among the lower castes who rise to
high position tend to assimilate themselves to the existing high castes. In the process, the
inevitably appropriate the baser qualities of the high castes.100 There are interesting stories about
the upward mobility of the lower castes and their claim to have become Ashraf. Mann says, ‘This
is reflected in a Persian proverb widely quoted locally (Aligarh): Pesh a Yin Qassab budum; bad azan
gashtam Sheikh; ghalla chu arzan, Shawad, imsal Sayyid meshawem’ ( Yesterday our work was butchery,
then we became Sheikhs, having acquired a taste for that, tomorrow if the harvest is good, we
shall with the grace of God become Sayyids).101

There are some common traits, which makes one Ashraf. The use of Ashraf title, purdah by
women, control of shrine, membership of some religious organisation, control over mosque/
madarsa are some usual signs of Ashrafs. It is also in practice that Ashrafs do not allow widow
to remarry. One such interesting story is narrated by Qateel: ‘Widow is not allowed to remarry,
even if she became widow at the age of 16 or even less. In this Ashraf's attitude is similar to that
of Brahmins, and because of ignorance do not follow Shariah. Those who remarry are
considered mean, and lowly. If the girl has relation with even thousand men it is not
discouraged, but they will not marry her. According to one legend an Indian went to Arab for
Hajj and stayed there for more than six months with one Arab family. He was shocked to
discover that his hosts went in the marriage of his mother and said 'La-Haul-Wala Quwat'. Later
on he realised his folly and regretted for making such remark. He also felt ashamed that he was
living all these years with non-Muslims (in Hind).102

It is also found that Ashraf usually belong to elite class and live in urban areas. Ali Ashraf writes
in his study on Muslim elite of Bihar, ‘Almost two-thirds of elite belonged to the Ashraf castes.
Only Syed and Sheikh account for 61%, and together with Malik and Pathan it goes to 68%.
Among backwards, Momin and Rayin (Kunjra) are prominent. Momins particularly have
progressed much socially and politically after independence.103 It is also important to note that
majority of Ashraf dwell in urban areas. Even if they have big landholdings in countryside, they
prefer to live in urban areas. Ashraf writes, ‘It is very important that 91% of Muslim elite live in
urban areas, and almost two-thirds live in Patna alone...after taking into account the profession
of last two generations of the elite, one can see a change in the occupational pattern. The
profession of these elite was agriculture, civil service, law, and trade. Apart from trade, the

99 Ibid, p. 80.
100 Rammanohar Lohia, The Caste System, Navahind, Hyderabad, 1964, p. 101.
101 E A Mann, Boundaries and Identities, Muslims, work and Status in Aligarh, Sage, N Delhi, 1992, p.50.
102 Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6, 1967, p.138.
103 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 66.
148
children of the elite have no representation in agriculture, civil service, and law. They are better
represented in academic, medicine, engineering, and journalism.104

Purdah by women is common among Ashraf. It is common for women of low castes to be
lenient in observing purdah. On the contrary, women of low Muslim castes freely go to market
and interact with men without any inhibition even in rural segments. Until few years ago, Julaha
/Momin and other lower caste women were seen going to jungle at dawn and return home by
early morning after collecting burning wood and carrying them on their head all the way from
jungle to home in rural Gaya.105 Some did this to save money, but others did this as a habit and
did not stop even after being asked to by men of the household. As one scholar presents in a
case study of rural Bengal: ‘The most common ground on which the Sayyads, Sheikhs, Pathans,
and Mughals deny equal status to the Shahs, Patuas, and Momins is the failure of the women of
these ethnic groups to observe purdah.’ 106

Another researcher says about the scene in Ranchi, ‘Though purdah is observed by Muslim
women of all ethnic groups in general, laxity in its observance can be observed among certain
ethnic groups of middle and lower status.107 Bhangis in the city are discriminated against. In the
village only the Shahs the mendicant beggars are note invited to social feasts. The concept of
purity also exists among Muslims. The emphasis placed by the high caste on cleanliness and
sense of hygiene as reasons for their refusal to inter-dine with the Momins, Pathans and Shahs is
a way of rationalising social behaviour patterns, which are inconsistent with Islamic social values.
They have a concept of purity and pollution.108

In the urban areas, it is not difficult to find lower caste Muslims using Ashraf title. This is
particularly done by lower castes, who want to hide their background and lineage. As take this
case of Calcutta: The Malkis from Bihar have started claiming Sayyad as their title, and the
Churihar and even the Chirmar have resolved to adopt Siddique as a title.109 However, such
people are called fake (farzi) and are not accepted. It is impossible for an individual to be
legitimately called a Sayyad, a Momin, a Rain, a Qureshi, or a Lalbegi without having been born
into the respective group. These are therefore closed groups, in the form of Jatis, known
variously as Qaum, Biradri, Jamaat or Zat.110 Convert groups of Islam are generally characterised,
as new Muslims and they are look down upon by the social groups which are known to be of
foreign origin or who have succeeded in eliminating the stigma of recent conversion. The
conversion of Sheikh/Siddique from the Kayastha caste actually made relatively little obvious
difference to the caste and it continued to retain its traditional customs and practices much as
before.111

Although caste is prevalent across the country in some form, it moves life in eastern India.
Bihar, Bengal and Uttar Pradesh have large number of Muslims belonging to backward castes,
and it has been the centre of caste-based movements. As one scholar writes, ‘Compare West
Bengal with Bihar, for instance. A well-known historian used to say, 'In Bihar only the mosquito

104 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p.59
105 Case study by author.
106 Ranjit K Bhattacharya, The Concept of and ideology of caste among the Muslims of Rural West Bengal, Imtiaz
Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 294.
107 Hasan Ali, Elements of Caste among Muslims in a District in Southern Bihar, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social
Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, pp-26-33.
108 Ranjit K Bhattacharya, The Concept of and ideology of caste among the Muslims of Rural West Bengal, Imtiaz
Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 291.
109 M K A Siddique, Caste Among the Muslims of Calcutta, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among
Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 257.
110 M K A Siddique, Caste Among the Muslims of Calcutta, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among
Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 265.
111 Imtiaz Ahmed, Endogamy and status mobility among Siddique Sheikhs of Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, p. 187.
149
is free from sentiments of caste: it bites everyone irrespective of caste. Everything else is
governed by caste.' Now if you look at West Bengal, the language of politics is very different
there.112

In Kasuali (near Lucknow) there is one lineage of Sayyads, but the Sheikhs through the sub-caste
of Kidwais and Pathans dominate numerically. There are no Mughals and Pathans. There are 18
non-Ashraf castes excluding the Sipahi caste, which is placed on the lower fringe of the non-
Ashraf castes.113 The Muslims of Kabirnagar has brought to the fore the following conclusions:
1) there does exist a pattern of caste hierarchy among the Muslims of Kabirnagar, 2) People do
recognise this pattern of stratification, 3) Caste Stratification directly influences access of persons
to particular occupations, education, and leadership positions.

The Sheikh respondents at Khiruli had mentioned the existence of Sayyad, Sheikh, Mughals and
Pathans, as the Muslims ethnic group found in the area, but during the latter part of my stay in
the field, I came to know about the presence of three other Muslim ethnic groups. These were
the Shahs or Shah Fakir, Momin or Julahas and the Patuas or Patos.114

In down south, the scene is little different but the division exists in some form. On the west
coast of India, there are three main distinguishable sections of Shafi Muslims, the Moplahs being
one of them. The other two sections are the Konkani Muslims of the coast of Konkan and
Navayatas of Karna...Among the Moplahs in Malabar Malbaris and the other sections are called
the Thangals, the Arabis, the Pusalars and the Ossans. The Thangals traces its ancestry through
the progeny of the Prophet's daughter Fatima.The Arabis are descended from a union of Arab
men and local women. The term Pusalars literally means new Muslims that are Muslims who are
later converts. The so called Pusalars are converts from among the Hindu fishermen called
Mukkhvans. The Ussans are a group of barbers among Moplahs, and by virtue of their low
occupation are ranked lowest. The main bodies of Moplahs are called Malbari.115

In coastal Lakshadweep116 Muslims are divided in three groups. Following are the main classes:
1) Karnavars -a) Proper b) Less wealthy; 2) Malumi's - Pilots / Sailor- a) Proper b) Urukers ; 3)
Melecheris (tree Climbers) - They draw toddy. In neighbouring Tamil Nadu, Muslims are divided
in four groups. The four named divisions are: The Rawther, Labbai, Marakayar and Kayalar.
Most marriages are between person of the same subdivision, and most Muslim Tamils consider
subdivision identity to be an important factor in selecting a spouse.117 The Khojas of Bombay
became divided into two distinct camps, the followers of the Aga and his opponents.118

These divisions among Muslim castes remained under the carpet for centuries, as there was a
mark of demarcation between duniya (worldly life) and deen (religion). During matters of
religion, the backward (pasmanda) castes Muslims were allowed to practice rites and rituals
without much hindrance. The Muslim castes were based on birth. As Imtiaz Ahmed writes, ‘The

112 Andre Beteille, Caste, Inequality and Affirmative Action, International Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, p.
14.
113 S P Jain, Caste Stratification among Muslims in Township in Western Uttar Pradesh, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste
Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 241.
114 Ranjit K Bhattacharya, The Concept of and ideology of caste among the Muslims of Rural West Bengal, Imtiaz
Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 277.
115 Victor S D'Souza, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p.41.
116 Leela Dube, Caste Analogues among the Lakshadweep Muslims, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification
among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 66).
117 Mattison Mines, Social Stratification among Muslim Tamils in Tamil Nadu, South India, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste
Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978- p. 161-163).
118 J C Masselos, The Khoja of Bombay the Defining Formal Membership Criteria during the 19th Century, Imtiaz
Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 106.
150
argument that Muslim groups, biradris and Zats, are not based on recruitment by birth only is
equally fallacious’.119

But there was a feeling of ‘inferiority’ among low caste Muslims owing to the feudal mindset of
the Ashraf and the ruling elite. As Nehru writes, ‘The Moslems who had come from outside
India, were feudal in outlook and did not take kindly to trade. The Islamic prohibition against
the taking of interest also came in the way of trade. They considered themselves the ruling class,
the nobility and functioned as state officials, holders of grants of land or as officers in the
army.’120 The Ashrafs did not find much social and cultural difference between Hindus and
indigenous Muslims. This similarity became a cause of further alienation of indigenous Muslims.
As Nehru writes, ‘Most of the Moslems were converts who were still full of their old traditions.
They did the same kind of work, lived similar lives, wore the same kind clothes, spoke of the
same language...Mostly these people were peasants and artisans and craftsmen.’121 With the
decline and final disappearance of Muslim rulers, the elite Ashrafs began to lose their prestige
and power. The establishment of the British rule and deindustrialisation affected large segment
of lower caste Muslims, who lost their livelihood.

Backward (Pasmanda) Muslim Organisations/Movement

With the beginning of the Census and National Movement, these marginalised sections started
to group and regroup themselves in biradari specific bodies to promote the welfare of their
caste. Muslims realised that caste was affecting the development of the community. The elite
also agreed. On the question of differences within the community, 287 person (98%) elite agreed
that within Muslims, there were differences of caste, ideology, educational and economic
backwardness and questions arising out of it. The causes of major differences were narrow mind
and feeling of caste.122 Echoing the mood of the time, founding INC leader, Surendranath
Banerjee writes, ‘It is this sentiment of hatred fostered amongst the masses directed in the first
instance against the British, then came by natural process of growth to be extended to all others
who worshipped in different temple, culminated in those communal, and caste feuds that have
darkened our recent history.’123

Caste feuds have been an integral part of Indian civilisation. Many centuries before, saint Kabir
expressed the feelings in following verses124: Ek Jothin sab Upja- Kaun Bahman kaun Suda (From
one light is born everyone, who is Brahmin and who is Shudra?). In what appears to show a
similar positions of Ashraf and Brahmins in society, Kabir says, ‘Syed Sheikh Kitab Nirkhe, Pandit
Shastra Vichare-Satguru Ke Updesh Bina-Tum Janke Jivhin Mare (Syed, Sheikh read book, Pandit
recite Shastra. Without the will of Almighty God, you kill people deliberately. )

The political awareness, social organisation, economic prowess, educational progress of

backward castes, there has been a drastic change the Muslim leadership and power sharing.
Within the Muslim community, the Momins were asking for their own rights. It is pertinent to
mention Momin Movement. Momins were engaged in handloom and specialised in making cloth
with hand. With the coming of British, there was a setback to their traditional handicrafts, which
could not survive the import of goods from Britain. When Mahatma Gandhi stressed on

119 Imtiaz Ahmed, Recognition and Entitlement, in Basic Problems of OBC & Dalit Muslims, Ashfaq Husain
Ansari ( compiled), Serial Publications, 2010.
120 Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, OUP, N Delhi, 1997, pp. 268-269.
121 Ibid.,
122 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 51-
52, Inter-community problems.
123 Surendranath Banerjea, A Nation in the Making, Humphrey Milford, OUP, 1925, p. 302).
124 Kabir, Kabir Saheb, Pandit Manohar Lal Zutshi, Hindustani Academy, Allahabad, 1930.
151
charkha and khadi, he became hugely popular among Momins, who supported the National
Movement.

Because of their economic decline, the condition of Momins worsened and they were exploited
by the elite class (Ashraf). Thus, poverty and ignobility of backward caste provided excellent
background for a reform movement, which was in harmony with the constructive programme of
Mahatma Gandhi. For Momins, there was no reason for the elite and aristocratic leadership of
the Muslim League to show sympathy, so they were attracted towards the leadership of
Mahatma Gandhi and social and political aims of the Indian National Congress. During the
Khilafat movement, educated Momins developed some feeling to serve their community. 125
While backward caste Momins were organising themselves to fight for their cause, the elitist
Muslim League was working towards new strategy to remain politically relevant. Eminent
Muslim League leader and Urdu poet Iqbal was also affected by the growing caste feuds in the
Muslim society. In a series of poetry, he chided the unity of the Muslim Qaum.

Taking pot shots at the sectarian differences and caste-based divisions in Muslim rank and file,
Urdu poet lamented: ‘Firqa bandi hai kahin, aur kahin zatein hain-Kya Zamane mein panapney ki yahi
batein hain (There are sectarian differences, there are caste divisions-Are these things something
to be promoted in this age? ). At other place, he wished that Muslims were one unit: Ek hi sab ka
nabi, deen bhi, Iman bhi ek- Kya bari bat thi hote jo Musalman bhi Ek (They have one prophet, one
religion, and one faith-It would have been great if they were one unit). Seeing the division in
Muslim society, Iqbal wrote: Yun to Sayyad bhi ho, Mirza bhi ho, Afghan bhi ho- Sach kaho to
Musalman bhi ho? (Though you are Sayyad, you are Mirza, you are Afghan, - Tell me whether you
are Muslim? As you always talk in these terms?)

During the turbulent 1920s, it was Momins seized the opportunity and decided to form
association to stake claim for a share in the political space, and development. Overall, all
backward castes and particularly Momins were victims of political and economic backwardness,
because of which they became outcastes among their community. Their pitiable condition can
be gauged from the fact that the elite class made fun of poverty of backward castes and avoided
attending their functions. It is said that for the first time, some educated persons of Momin
community gathered in Patna in 1916, but the outcome was not important. In 1925, Maualana
Yahya decided to launch his journal. The first All India conference was held in Calcutta in 1925,
which was presided over by Professor Shamsuddin of Patna.

From Bihar, the Momin leaders like Maualana Asim Bihari, Abdul Qayum Ansari, Khan
Bahadur Jalil, landlord Latifur Rahman, Hafiz Manzor and Shafiqullah Ansari were prominent.
Abdul Qayum Ansari was one politician whose political influence was more than any leader
from Momin or Non-Momin and was minister in Bihar cabinet for long period. After
Independence, the middle class has emerged mostly from Momin caste.126 In other areas such as
Rajasthan, the feeling of Biradari is important even though Muslims are not in large numbers.
Abbasi writes, ‘The Biradari Panchayat is an institution which enables the fellow members of the
Biradari to interact with each other and links them with each other horizontally through its social
bonds for sharing their common problems, beliefs and social values’127.

In 1931 census, there is long list of lower castes who started using new title / suffix to claim new
status in society. Only three castes are mentioned who have done this: 1) Muslim Julaha, who
have started using Sheikh Momin or Sheikh Ansari 2) Merasi, who claimed to be Quraishi 3)
Qassab, who claimed to Sheikh Quraishi. Till 1937 the aim of Momin Movement was
educational and economic development through social awareness, which was obviously against

125 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p.59.
126 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p.59.
127 Parvez A Abbasi, Social Inequality among Indian Muslims, A C Brothers, 1999, Udaipur, p. 62.
152
the upper caste Muslims, who discriminated against backward Muslims. After 1937 Momins
joined Indian National Congress. They opposed two-nation theory of Muslim League and
worked for welfare of the people and freedom of the country.128

While the Momins were gaining acceptability in the Northern region, the Muslims in South India
were given reservation early. Azra says, ‘It was Madras Presidency that treated Muslims as
backward for the first time for promoting their education and giving employment in public
services.129 It was on the recommendations of the Hunter Commission that Muslims were
considered for reservation. Chalam says, ‘The British Indian government had implemented a
policy of reserving certain places in educational institutions for Muslims, who were considered
by the Hunter Commission as underrepresented in education. Therefore, the origin of the
concept of reservation goes back to the 19th century (1882).130

Talking about the status of Momins, Abdul Qayum Ansari, wrote in August 1972, ‘In the state
approximately 2 lakh Bunkar and in total 3 lakh persons are dependent on the handloom for
their livelihood. Almost 60% handloom is closed. When Bunkar are without job, they are taking
to other professions in compulsion. And those Bunkars who are still engaged in this work, are
not getting yarn at reasonable price. And they do not have capital to buy yarn. Thus, many
Bunkers are taking credit to buy yarn and sell the cloth at very nominal price to Mahajan. The
cooperative societies of Bunkers are not functioning. Every patriot should pay attention to the
pitiable condition of theirs. Just as the government is paying attention to the agriculture and
industry, the government and people should pay attention towards Bunkers and address their
issue of unemployment and poverty.

Bunker belonged to weaker and backward section of society. After independence, there have
been schemes for upper classes and big industries, but the Bunkers were ignored. Every section
of society is being concession and facilities by the government, but the Bunker community is still
poor and backward. It is necessary that people and government should heed towards their
condition, so that this community can feel the fruits of freedom. If the freedom does not
address the issues of weaker sections and poor, it is of no use.’131

The untiring work and hard bargaining of Abdul Qayum Ansari was fruitful for the Momin
caste, when they became the early beneficiary of scholarships at school and college level. In
Bihar (including Jharkhand), which has large junk of Momin population it did wonder for the
progress of the Momins, in the fields of education, polity, and business. They joined government
jobs, and with financial assistance from the government improved their business fortune. As
Ashraf says, ‘the notable exception worth noting is all round development of Momin Biradri.
This is more important because this took place much before the development of Hindu
backward castes. The development and prosperity of the Momin caste from backwardness and
marginalised section is a shinning chapter of Muslim history in independent India’.132

While Abdul Qayum Ansari was calling for the rights and reservation for Momins, a similar
demand was being made by Hindu backward classes. The sheer number of the backward castes
opened the eyes of many leaders. Lohia writes, ‘Women, Shudras, Harijans Adivasis, and the low
castes among religious minorities number around 38 crores.’133 However, the numeric strength

128 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 57-
69.
129 Azra Khanum, Muslim Backward Classes, Sage, N Delhi , 2013, p.131.
130 K S Chalan, Caste Based Reservations and Human Development, Sage, N Delhi, p. 16.
131 Ghulam Mujtaba Ansari (Compiled by), Abdul Qayum Ansari, , Bihar Urdu Akademi, Patna, 2006, p. 60-61,)
Abdul Qayum Ansari, Haftawar Momin Duniya, Azadi number, 15 August 1972, quoted.
132 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 57-
69.
133 (Rammanohar Lohia, The Caste System, Navahind, Hyderabad, 1964, p. 143, ).
153
posed another problem. It was discovered that there were no safeguards for castes, which were
not in large numbers. Lohia foresaw this problem and he writes, ‘Some among the low castes
such as Ahirs, Julahas and Chamars are numerically large. Other low castes such as Mali, Teli,
Kahar etc., are small when taken separately but taken together their number is much greater. As
a result when low castes rise and the caste system is attacked, the major beneficiaries are the
numerically big castes.134

Apart from Momin, Rain/Kunjra, and Qureshi have been prominent caste among backward
Muslims who after independence organised themselves at local and national levels to press for
their demands. As one scholar puts about Calcutta, ‘Several such Panchayats form a larger
council in a sort of confederation on the all Calcutta level. The Qureshi's have twelve such
panchayats while the Rains have twenty-two.135 In Aligarh area caste is more of an honour. Mann
writes, ‘The core unit of social organisation in the city is the biradri. In Aligarh, the meaning of
biradari is understood to be a named endogamous status group associated with a specific
occupation or lineage, from which it often but not always derives its name. It is imbued with a
sense of honour, on the basis of which it is ranked higher or lower in relation to other
biradaris136.

Besides the Momin Conference, the Raeen/ Rain Conference representing the caste of vegetable
vendors (sellers) and Mansoori Conference, representing the oilseed pressers, also played their
role in the socio-political mobilization of Muslim OBCs between 1930s and 1950s.137 Ghulam
Sarvar was an important leader of Raeen and his son-in-law Ejaz Ali, continues to lead the caste-
based organisation. The All India Muslim OBC Sanathan held its first convention on August 29
1996...In a series of political mobilization of Muslim OBCs the latest is the establishment of
Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz in a convention on 25 October, 1998 in Patna. Ansari/Momin
continues to dominate the backward Muslim space though they have been enjoying the
government favors and fruits of reservation in jobs, and provision of scholarships from an early
period. As Ali Ashraf writes, ‘The upsurge of Momins is continuing and it is having impact on
others.’138

Conclusion

Caste among Muslims is a fact and majority of the people are backward. After the
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, few Muslim backward castes have made
progress, but this is not equitable growth. An analysis of the spread of education among various
intermediate castes would reveal that it has not been even.139 There can be equality among castes
only when castes are abolished, and castes can be abolished only when backward castes are given
special and preferential opportunities, whether able or not, women, Shudras, Harijans, backward
castes, Adivasis and Muslims like weavers will have to be given 60% reservation.140 More than
quota of reservation, there needs to be safeguards for minority castes so that their share is not
taken by the castes which are high in numbers, influential and powerful. Only then, we can
assure growth for all, share in power and injustice for none.

The bulk of Muslims that were converted deemed to have come from the social classes and
occupational groups such as artisans, craftsmen, menial labourers, and small peasants and

134 (Rammanohar Lohia, The Caste System, Navahind, Hyderabad, 1964, p. 146,).
135 M K A Siddique, Caste Among the Muslims of Calcutta, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among
Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978, p. 257-259.
136 E A Mann, Boundaries and Identities, Muslims work and status in Aligarh, Sage, N Delhi, 1992, p.43.
137 Nadeem Hasnain, Caste Affinity and Social Boundaries of Backwardness, pp. 33-41 in Basic Problems of OBC
& Dalit Muslims, pp 33-44.
138 Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna, 1996, p. 71.
139 Pradyat Lal & Tara Nair, Caste vs Caste, Trublence in Indian Politics, Ajanta, 1998, p. 103.
140 Rammanohar Lohia, The Caste System, Navahind, Hyderabad, 1964, p. 141.
154
marginalized people. The feeling of aristocracy has been limited to non-indigenous groups of
Muslims. The indigenous Muslims remained at the same lowest rung of the ladder for centuries
because of the nature of their occupation.141

References

1. John Wilson, Indian Caste Vol. I, KK Book Distributors, 1877

2. Shridhar V Ketkar, The History of Caste in India, Cosmo Publications, N Delhi, 1979
3. Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India, OUP, N Delhi, 1997
4. B R Ambedkar, Who Were the Shudras
5. _____________, Castes in India, Columbia University, New York, May 1916
6. ______________, The Untouchables, Who They are and Why they became
Untouchables, Amrit Book Co., New Delhi, 1948
7. Ram Sharan Sharma, Social Changes in Early Medieval India, Peoples Publishing
House, 1969, N Delhi
8. John Murdoch (compiled by), The Laws of Manu, or Manava Dharma Sastra, The
Christian Literature Society for India, Madras, 1898
9. Shridhar V Ketkar, The History of Caste in India, Cosmo Publications, N Delhi, 1979
10. Jonathan P Parry, Caste and Kinship in Kangra, Vikas Publishing House
11. Abul Fazl, Urdu Translation by Fida Ali, Aina-e-Akbari, Part-II, Jamia Usmania,
Deccan, Hyderabad, 1939, Reprinted Hinduism in the 16th Century, Khuda Bakhsh
Oriental Public Library, Patna
12. Shekhar Bandopadhyaya, Caste Class and politics in Colonial Bengal, A case study of
the Namasudra Movement of 1872-1937 in K L Sharma (edited), Caste and Class in
India, Rawat Publication, Jaipur, 1998
13. H A Rose, A Glossary of the tribes and castes of the North West Frontier Provinces,
Vol. I, Amar Parkashan, Delhi
14. Qiamuddin Ahmed Trnsl., Al-Beruni’s India, National Book Trust, N Delhi,
15. M N Srinivas, An obituary on Caste as a System, Economic and Political Weekly,
1/2/2003
16. Muhammad Umar, Hindustani Tahzeeb ka Musalmano par Asar, (Urdu), Publications
Division, N Delhi, 1975
17. _______________, Muslim Society in Northern India during the 18th century, CAS in
History, Aligarh, 1998
18. S B Wad, Caste and the Law in India, DCCBR, N Delhi, 1984
19. Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978
20. B N Pande, Islam & Indian Culture, Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library, Patna,
1987
21. Sophie Baker, Caste At Home in Hindu India, Rupa, 1991
22. Syed Ali, Collective and Elective Ethnicity: Caste Among Urban Muslims in India,
Sociological Forum, Vol. 17, No. 4, December 2002
23. M N Srinivas, Caste in Modern India and Other Essays, Asia Publishing House,
Bombay
24. Mirza Md Husain Qateel, Trns. Md. Umar, Maktaba Burhan, Urdu Bazar, Delhi-6,
1967
25. H H Risley, Tribes and Castes of Bengal, Ethnographic Glossary, Vol. II , 1891
26. K S Singh, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta,

141 Azra Khanum, Muslim Backward Classes, A Sociological Perspective, SAGE, 2013, p. 89

155
 27. M K A Siddique, Caste Among the Muslims of Calcutta, Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social
Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978
28. Rammanohar Lohia, The Caste System, Navahind, Hyderabad, 1964
29. Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public
Library, Patna, 1996, p. 66,
30. Imtiaz Ahmed, Caste Social Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978
31. Andre Beteille, Caste, Inequality and Affirmative Action, International Institute for
Labour Studies, Geneva.
32. Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite of Bihar, (Urdu Trnsl), Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public
Library, Patna, 1996, p. 51-52, Inter-community problems
33. Surendranath Banerjee, Nation in the Making, Humphrey Milford, OUP, 1925
34. Kabir Saheb, Pandit Manohar Lal Zutshi, Hindustani Academy, Allahabad, 1930
35. Ghulam Mujtaba Ansari (Compiled by), Abdul Qayum Ansari, , Bihar Urdu Akademi,
Patna, 2006
36. Rammanohar Lohia, the Caste System, Navahind, Hyderabad, 1964
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Stratification among Muslims in India, Manohar, 1978
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Basic Problems of OBC & Dalit Muslims
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Dr. Azim Akhtar, teaches History at the Guru Tej Bahadur University in Haryana.

156
 Chapter 12

FORGOTTEN AT THE MARGINS - MUSLIM MANUAL SCAVENGERS

Manjur Ali

Abstract

Manual scavenging goes against traditional saying that ‘kaam koi bhi ho, bura nahi hota’ (no job is bad). It
shows lack of alternative to individuals and preaches to be happy with the limitlessness. In Indian context, where
division of labour is decided by a person’s caste, this lack of job alternative should be construed as a major
principle of casteism. It is not just the ‘division of labour’, but also “division of labourer”.1 It justifies manual
scavenging in the name of ‘job’, as Manusmiriti propagates casteism as a natural evolution of human existence.
Hence, despite all the law against caste practices, its most inhuman attribute i.e. manual scavenging is still
practiced in India.

Introduction

To deal with such a “dehumanizing practice”2 and “social stigma”3 Union government has
passed a law known as Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their
Rehabilitation Bill, 2013. This Bill will override the previous one as it had “not proved adequate
in eliminating the twin evils of insanitary latrines and manual scavenging from the country.”4 It is
in this context that the paper intends to analyse the relevance of the present Bill for the Muslim
manual scavengers, a little known entity. The most of the ‘recognized’ scavengers, probably 97
percent, belong to the Scheduled Castes (SCs) category. Author’s emphasis on the word
‘recognized’ is due to the refusal by the state to incorporate manual scavengers belonging to
Muslims and Christian socio-religious communities into the list of Scheduled Castes. This is
happening despite social, economic, educational and cultural similarities among the manual
scavengers belonging to these religious communities. Hence, this paper would like to bring forth
the wretched condition of Muslim manual scavengers who live an ‘undignified’ life. Why are they
not able to avail the facilities meant for manual scavengers? What has been the role of the state
in providing a dignified life to its citizens? In addition, the paper will also undertake a critical
analysis of the movement against manual scavenging. The effort of this paper is not to create
division among the scavengers but to bring forth the similarities and mainstream the discussion
on Muslim manual scavengers.

Muslim Manual Scavenger: Who are they?

Researchers and scholars, both national and international, have been delving upon the issue of
manual scavenging since long time. They have brought forth the humiliation and agony of
manual scavengers and contextualized the debate within the framework of democracy and
dignity. But, rarely have the issues and challenges before Muslim manual scavengers been
debated or put in to a similar framework. The history of this group is very thin and scattered,
which further stops scholars who want to research on this topic, to approach the issue. Satyamev
Jayate (2012), a popular TV show by Amir Khan, rightly discussed about the prevalence of
manual scavenging in India but failed to go deeper into the issue.

1 Dr. Ambedkar argued that in caste system each group has specific occupation to perform and they cannot move
to other job. Birth in a particular caste decides individual occupation and person has no choice of their own.
2 Thirty-Second Report, Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment, Ministry of Social Justice and
Empowerment, Government of India, 2013.
3 Sonia Gandhi used the term while emphasizing in favour of this bill.
4 Op. Cit. Thirty-Second Report, Standing Committee on Social Justice and Empowerment.
In history, some scholars have pointed out the presence of Muslim scavengers known at that
time by different names. Muslim scavengers have many sub-castes, known as Halalkhor, Hela,
Lalbegi etc. W. Crooke in his book “The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western India” (1896)
has enlisted no less than forty-seven Muslim scavenging castes. Almost all the Chuhras, west of
Lahore were Musalmans, and they were very commonly called Musalli or Kutana, the two terms
being apparently almost synonymous, but Kutana being used in the south west and Musalli in the
north-west. One list from Benares divided the caste into nine sub-castes, Shaikh, Hela, Lal Begi,
Ghazipuri Rawat, who trace their origin from Ghazipur, Hariri or Hah, Dhanuk, Bansphor and Dhe.
Halalkhor has been a prominent caste of Muslim scavengers and the origin and meaning of caste
name had remained in discussion, especially by colonial travelers and anthropologists.

Fryer refers to Halalkhor as base people “because they defile themselves by eating anything and
do all servile offices.”5 Ovington also refers to the Halalkhor as “eat-alls or eaters at large”6
people who drink anything potable and eat whatever comes along including carrion. They
performed the sanitary services in the houses of all the residents in a ward and were untouchable
as their contact was considered as polluting and despised. The meaning of their name has been
subjected to wide misinterpretation. The above caricature defined them as ‘eater of anything’ or
“eat-alls” which are wrong in approach. However, the definition is oblivious to the fact that
Halalkhor community is adherent to Muslim religion who cannot eat anything or everything.
There are specific injunctions in Qura’n about what is lawful and prohibited for eating. Hence,
Lang’s definition would be more appropriate where he argues that a Halalkhor is “The lowest (in
status) of all servants were the sweepers (khak-rub, ja-rub-kash, kannas), who belonged to the so-
called ‘menial’ castes. Characteristically, Akbar renamed them halal-khor, i.e. the people who
worked hard to earn their pay (as against haram-khor, the idle). Their remuneration, despite this
‘improved’ nomenclature, was still at the lowest rate, two dams per days (i.e. Rs. 1.50 per
month).”7

Apart from their caste based occupation, Halalkhor community was used by Mughal rulers to spy
in the neighbourhood and report to the local authority. Gokhale (1979) pointed out that these
men were under obligation to go twice a day to clean out every house, and inform the kotwal
about all that went on. Crooke (1896), writing about this community, states that the name Mehtar
was commonly applied to the servants of the Emperor Humayun. Another title for them is
‘Halalkhor’, one who eats what is lawful, one whose earnings are legitimate. Halalkhor is also
known as ‘Khakrob’, or “sweeper of dust” and Baharwala, one who is not admitted into the house.
Another euphemistic name for them in Punjab is ‘Musalli’, ‘one who prays’. From their religion
and patron saint they are sometimes known, collectively, as Lalbegi, which is the name for one of
their sub-castes.

There has been a campaign by right-wing political parties that scavenging was the outcome of
Mughal rule in India. But, this is far from the truth as Gita Ramaswamy (2005) explained it. She
wrote ‘This argument fits neatly into the Hindutva theory that all social evils emanate from
Muslim rule and reconstructs a glorious Rajput heritage for communities like bhangis’.8 The
practice was in operation even prior to the Mughal period and even after conversion to Islam
many of these scavenger castes continued with their practices. There had been no change in
occupation of Muslim scavengers even during the British rule. According to the Census of India
(1901), “in some places a third class, called Arzal or ‘lowest of all’ is added. It consists of the

5 B.G. Gokhale, ‘Surat in the Seventeenth Century – A Study in Urban History of Pre-Modern India’, Popular Prakashan,
Bombay, 1979.
6 Ibid. B.G.Gokhale.
7 Peter Lang, ‘Domestic Service and the Formation of European Identity – Understanding of Globalisation of Domestic Works,
16 and 21st Centuries’, European Academic Publishers, London, 2004.
8 Gita Ramaswamy, ‘India Stinking – Manual Scavengers in Andhra Pradesh and their Work’, Navayana Publishing,
Pondicherry, 2005, p. 6.
158
very lowest castes, such as the Halalkhor, Lalbegi, Abdal, and Bediya, with whom no other
Mohammedan would associate, and who are forbidden to enter the mosque or to use the public
burial ground.”9 The humiliating ‘job’ continues in post-colonial India and so does the
involvement of Muslim scavengers in scavenging.

Today, there is no clear estimate of population of this community as government does not
conduct caste census among Muslims and Christians. Bindeshwar Pathak (2010) argued that “the
complete information in respect of all the scavenging communities is still not available. Even in
the case of those included in the list of Scheduled Castes full information about their social
customs, social status, their economic position, culture etc. is not available anywhere on an all-
India basis.”10 Thus, enumeration of castes and their number among Minorities is a very
important task for well-crafted policy intervention for their welfare and any opposition to caste
census from various quarters will scuttle the process.

Nevertheless, according to 1961 Census, of the total workforce i.e. 8,02,400 persons engaged in
the profession of scavenging, Scheduled Castes constituted 48.2 percent and the remaining 51.8
percent were non-Scheduled Castes, such as Sikhs, Muslims, Christians. The Task Force
constituted by the Planning Commission (1989) had estimated the number of scavengers
belonging to groups, like Muslims, Christians and Tribal at around three lakhs. Sachar
Committee Report also throws some light on the number of this community, according to
which 0.2 percent of Muslim urban workers work as building caretakers, sweepers, cleaners and
in other related occupations. In rural areas this proportion is 0.1 percent. Gender analysis of
manual workers among Muslim reveals that 0.1 percent are male workers whereas women are a
larger chunk with 0.2 percent. The number is small in comparison with Scheduled Castes.

Law to deal with Manual Scavengers

After Independence, pioneers of national movement dreamt of a dignified life for every citizen
of the country, in spite of a difference of approach to deal with the situation. Mahatma Gandhi
once said, “I may not be born again, but if it happens, I will like to be born in a family of
scavengers so that I may relieve them of the inhuman, unhealthy and hateful practice of carrying
night soil.”11 M.K. Gandhi eulogized the ‘undignified life’ of scavengers. Ambedkar presented
different ideas to deal with scavenging. According to him, caste system is at the root of this
practice. He pointed out that scavengers, if he belongs to upper caste, do not face
‘untouchability’ whereas a child born in scavenging caste does, even if he is engaged in other
occupation.

Ambedkar quoted Gandhi to critique his stance on scavenging. Gandhi said, “I love scavenging.
In my Ashram, an eighteen year old Brahmin lad, is doing the scavenger’s work in order to teach
the Ashram cleanliness. The lad is no reformer. He was born and bred in orthodoxy. But he felt
that his accomplishments were incomplete until he had become also a perfect sweeper and that
if he wanted the Ashram sweeper to do his work well, he must do it himself and set an
example”.12Ambedkar then proceeds to critique Gandhi’s position thus: “What is the use of
telling the scavenger that even a Brahmin is prepared to do scavenging when it is clear that
according to Hindu Shastras and Hindu notions, even if a Brahmin did scavenging he would
never be subject to the disabilities of one who is a born scavenger? For in India, a man is not a

9 Kenneth David, ‘The New Wind – Changing Identities in South Asia’, The Moulton Publishers, Paris, 1977.
10 B. Pathak, ‘Sanitation and Scavenging in India – Achievements and Challenges’, Sulabh International Social Service
Organisation, New Delhi, 2010.
11 Bindeshwar Pathak, Present Dalit (Scavengers) situation in India, 2010, p. 7.
12 B. Ravichnadran, Scavenging Profession: Between Class and Caste, EPW, Vol, XLVI, No. 13, 2011, p. 2
159
scavenger because of his work. He is a scavenger, because of his birth irrespective of the
question whether he does scavenging or not”13.

Nevertheless, the debate over the scavengers and their democratic rights as citizens of India
helped to frame policy in Independent India. In 1949, the then Government of Bombay
appointed the Scavengers Living Conditions Inquiry Committee, under the Chairmanship of
Shri V N Barve. The report of the Committee was published in 1952. It touched upon the
problem of abolition of Gharaki or customary rights to scavenging in Gujarat. Subsequently, a
more detailed study of the problem was undertaken by the Scavenging Conditions Enquiry
Committee, set up by the Central Advisory Board for Harijan Welfare on 12th October, 1957
under the Chairmanship of Professor N R Malkani. The report was submitted in 1960. One of
the major recommendations related to the Government of India was giving grants for the
purchase of equipment which would help eradicating the practice of carrying night soil on head.
Later on, two more Committees were formed in 1965 and 1968 to look into the status of
scavengers.

Apart from various committees and commissions that have been established to assess the
situation, Government of India took various legislative measures to deal with manual
scavenging, like The Law on Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry
Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993; Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their
Rehabilitation Bill, 2013, Schemes for Low Cost Sanitation and Liberation of Scavengers taken
by other Agencies; The National Scheme for Liberation and Rehabilitation of Scavengers and
their Dependents (1992); New Self Employment scheme for Rehabilitation of Manual
Scavengers (SRMS).

But, one ‘biased’ Official Order (OO) pushed Dalit Muslim in general and Muslim scavengers in
particular at the margin and excluded them from the benefits accruing to the SC population.
Article 341 of Indian Constitution provisioned that “Scheduled Castes 1) The President may
with respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a State after consultation with the
Governor thereof, by public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups
within castes, races or tribes which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be
Scheduled Castes in relation to that State or Union territory, as the case may be. 2) Parliament
may by law include in or exclude from the list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification
issued under clause ( 1 ) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within any caste, race or
tribe, but save as aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall not be varied by any
subsequent notification.”

With the Presidential Order, 1950, Dalit among Muslim and Christian communities were
excluded from availing the reservation facilities under Scheduled Castes category. The logic put
forward by the then Indian government that Islam as a religion does not propagate a caste
system or any type of inequality among human beings. There has been a conscious denial of the
caste practices among the Muslims, which was recorded by colonial ethnographers. But, this rule
was amended twice till now to include Dalits among Sikhs and Buddhist communities.
Following an agitation by Master Tara Singh, the Constitution (Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes) Orders (Amendment) Act, providing for inclusion of Dalit Sikhs in the list of
the Scheduled Castes, was passed in 1956. It said; “Notwithstanding anything contained in para
2, no person who professes a religion different from the Hindu or Sikh religion shall be deemed
to be a member of a Scheduled Caste.” In May 1990, to commemorate the birth centenary of
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Prime Minister V. P. Singh brought Dalits who converted to Buddhism into
the list of Scheduled Castes. Hence, Presidential Order, 1950 is against the spirit of Indian

13 Ibid. B. Ravichandran
160
Constitution which mandate ‘Right to Equality’ of all citizens without discrimination based on
caste, creed, religion, colour, language etc.

Law into Action

State has been trying to improve the basic living standard of manual scavengers and preparing
them to be incorporated into the mainstream. Since inception of the Total Sanitation Campaign
(TSC), a total number of 11.4 crore toilet units (IHHL-BPL + IHHL-APL) were approved. The
progress against the target as on 15th May, 2007 was 3.2 crore i.e. 28 percent. Besides the
construction of Individual Households Latrines (IHHL), toilets were also constructed in schools
and balwadies. Prior to launching of TSC, under Central Rural Sanitation Programme, 94.80 lakh
IHHLs had been constructed in the rural areas.

Table 1: The Cumulative disbursement made for coverage of beneficiaries under

National Safai Karamcharis Finance and Development Corporation (NSKFDC) schemes
(Since inception up to 31.12.2010)

S. No. Scheme Cumulative disbursements since incorporation

Amt. Beneficiaries
(Rs. In Lac)

1 Term Loan 40617.01 46423

2 MAY 1291.45 3191
3 MCF 9300.9 82498
4 MSY 9880.7 78009
5 Education Loan 49.53 38
Total A 61139.6 210159
6 Training (Grant in aid) 519.79 6968
Total B 519.79 6968
Grand Total A+B 61659.4 217127

Source: www.nskfdc.in (MAY = Mahila Adhikarita Yojna; MSY =Mahila Samridhi Yojna; MCF = Micro Credit Finance) 14

Initial observations about the government efforts to eradicate scavenging are very impressive. But,
group discussion and testimonials of beneficiaries have another story to tell. A report on public
hearing on ‘Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers and their children in India’ revealed that
“Corruption was done on large scale in the rehabilitation scheme, which is Rs. 735.6 crores
rehabilitation scheme implemented by Government of India. About 76 percent people got
benefits; those are not in eligible criteria.”15 Report also shows that the middlemen are playing a big
role in corruption. 24 percent people do not get any benefits of Scheme for Rehabilitation of
Manual Scavengers (SRMS), according to data, and department released amount on their names.

14 MCF is term loan assistance for engaging in small and petty trade/business and sundry income generating
activities is provided to the SCAs for project costing up to Rs. 5.0 lakhs restricted to Rs. 25,000/- per borrower.
The SCAs may implement MCF through reputed NGOs. Term loan can be provided up to the maximum of 90
% of the cost of project cost and the remaining 10 % is to be provided by the SCA. MSY is a MCF for women
and the dependent daughters of Safai Karamcharis and Scavengers. MAY is loan provided to Women Safai
Karamcharis and Scavengers women and their dependent daughters up to Rs. 50,000 /- per beneficiary.
15 Rashtriya Garima Abhiyan, ‘National Public Hearing on Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers and their
Children in India’, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi, 2012.
161
On an enquiry in to the status of implementation of scheme in various States, it was found that
Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh were the top States where maximum number of
people got benefited whereas Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh are the
States where 77.6, 71.8 and 69 percent of the identified people were kept out of the benefit.
Thus, 50 percent of identified people from 8 States out of 18 (16 States + 2 UTs) where this
scheme is implemented were not benefited.

Report also reveals that the benefits are going to fake entities. “Middle men or commission
agents would visit Dalit bastis telling households to sign on so and so papers as the government
had chosen them as beneficiaries of a new scheme. The beneficiaries would never get to know
the loan amount, sanctioning officer or other details of the transactions. After a while, the
middle men would revisit them and hand over Rs 3,000 to Rs 4,500. Many of these people did
not even know why they were being given the money or how much money had been borrowed
in their names.”16 For instance, Madhya Pradesh has the highest number of beneficiaries who
receive benefit. So, in Madhya Pradesh most cases of SRMS beneficiaries are registered, but 30
percent of them are deprived of any such benefits. Thus, 3982 cases out of 13272 never got the
money which was sanctioned against their name. In Uttar Pradesh too, 160 beneficiaries out of
3176 were deprived of the loan sanctioned against their name.

Critical look at Policies, Programmes and movement to end Manual Scavenging

A critical focus on the policies programmes and movement against manual scavenging is
required, as classification of scavengers on religious basis brings forth the issue of
discrimination. Muslim manual scavengers have been discriminated against by authorities
responsible for implementation of schemes and movement meant to eradicate this practice. A
report ‘Eradication of inhuman practice of Manual Scavenging and Comprehensive
Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers in India’ by Rashtriya Garima Abhiyan, 2011, recorded that
government programmes have completely ignored the Muslim communities, such as Hela and
Halalkhor, who inhabit several States of India and have been as much a slave of this exploitative
tradition as the Dalit Hindu communities. It is also notable that the actual victims in this case
too are primarily women. Jan Sahas survey argued that “…They are deprived of other welfare
measures despite being manual scavengers and experience similar discrimination and
exploitation as Hindu manual scavenging communities”.17

Looking at the condition of manual scavengers in Jammu and Kashmir, V. B. Rawat argued that
“…Jammu & Kashmir is one of the biggest violators in this regard where 1,78,330 households
need manual scavenging.”18 In this Muslim populated State almost all the scavengers belong to
the Muslim community and follow Islam. They have remained unaffected by the programmatic
intervention. It led Rawat to question the benefit of the new laws against manual scavenging. He
argued “…how are the Muslim manual scavengers going to be benefitted from that. Secondly,
there is the issue of whether the act would be implemented in Kashmir as it is always a problem
that all central acts have to be separately developed for this region. What will the J&K
government propose to eliminate this crime against humanity? Will it rehabilitate the people and
provide them alternative employment?...If the Centre is making a law against elimination of
manual scavenging practices or even if a law is enacted for reservation in Promotion, the Muslim
and Christian Dalits would not be able to get any benefit of the reservation.”19

16 Divya Trivedi, A Blot upon the Nation, The Hindu, March 30, 2012.
17 Socio Economic Status of Women Manual Scavengers- Baseline Survey Jan Sahas Social Development
Societies, UN-Women, 2014, pp. 16-17.
18 Vidya Bhushan Rawat, ‘Caste, Religion and Untouchability – Condition of Manual Scavengers in Jammu and
Kashmir’, www.Countercurrent.org. Visited on 15 December, 2012.
19 Ibid. V.B.Rawat.
162
Table 3: Survey Conducted by Safai Karamchari Andolan to record Manual Scavengers

Sr. State Total No. of District No. of Manual No. of

No. Survey Manual Scavenging Scavengers Dry
Conducted Documented Profiles Latrines
Documented
1. Uttar Pradesh 50 13 4831 28050
2. Bihar 38 27 944 1394
3. Uttrakhand 12 4 451 2484
4. Madhya Pradesh 16 5 171 398
5. Jammu & Kashmir 9 9 161 361
6. Maharashtra 24 13 70 75
7. West Bengal 12 5 29 56
8. Assam 7 1 22 22
9. Punjab 8 1 13 13
10. Jharkhand 3 1 12 16
11. Gujarat 1 1 4 4
12. Chhattisgarh 11 1 1 1
Total 191 81 6709 32874

Source: safaikarmachariandolan.org

The Safai Karamchari Andolan (SKA) has been advocating for eradication of manual scavenging
and for the same purpose it has completed a State based survey to identify the scavengers.
However, the list prepared after the survey is faulty and exclusionary. For instance, in the case of
of Mau district, Uttar Pradesh, the list fails to identify Muslim manual scavengers although the
State has 4,831 total identified scavengers. In Mau, there are many Muslim families involve in
scavenging. Shakeel Ahmed, an activist with Poorvanchal Gramin Vikas Sanstha (PGVS), whose
grandmother was a manual scavenger, speaks of the taboos that prevailed in her days and how
the stigma exists even today. “We are Muslims so technically there is no untouchability, he says.
But it exists, maybe with a meethapan (sugar coating). The word halal (good) is used with reference
to our work, but when my grandmother went to Mecca there were sniggers where we live that a
mehtarani was going on Hajj. People would not visit us or eat with us. Even today people are
surprised that I send my son to school.”20

Sayina has repeatedly asked the civic authorities for a job as a sweeper. Her anger is palpable
when she says: “I am throwing their dirt because that is the only way I can earn something” She
spends lavishly on paan – it is the only way she can get rid of the foul odor that stays even after
the work has been completed. Among the Dom it is the women who are more prone to
alcoholism; they often drink heavily to numb their sensibilities. Sayina also speaks of the sexual
harassment faced by women scavengers: “Middlemen approach us promising us work but
demand sexual favours in lonely gullies or take us to their shops.”21

20 Freny Manecksha, ‘India Stinking – The Toilet for an Office’, Times of India, 2007.
21 Ibid. Freny Manecksha.
163
When Fatima Kaneez’s mother died it was a foregone conclusion in Nadwasarai village in Mau
district of Uttar Pradesh that she would have to start doing what her mother and grandmother
had done for many years, that is, lift human excreta from dry latrines, using only a small broom
and tin plate. Fatima, who is from a community of scavengers called Halalkhor, recalls: “The
thought of such work was repulsive, but when I hesitated the villagers put pressure on me. They
said my husband was unemployed, I had small children to support, and this was after all my
family’s hereditary occupation.”22 In a perverse twist of logic, the villagers even argued that
Fatima’s daughters’ chances of marriage would be enhanced if she worked as a scavenger
because this would imply that there was a steady flow of income into the household.

Though the caste Halalkhor and Lalbegi prominently work as scavengers the survey did not
record their presence in Bihar. While writing about the scavengers of Bihar, Sachchidanand
argued that “In Bihar, according to an estimate of the Planning Commission (1989), the number
of scavengers is 22,400, out of which 10 percent reside in rural areas…There is general
misconception that all scavengers are Scheduled Castes and are, therefore, entitled to the
benefits provided for the Scheduled Castes in the Constitution.”23 But, Halalkhors, as they are
Muslim by religion, do not enjoy such rights. In his field study Sachchidanand found the
existence of Halalkhors or lalbegis in both rural and urban areas. S. Musi Raza in his study (1992)
argued that “After liberation, the situation has changed. The curse of untouchability is being
gradually removed. Some social interactions have started with poor Muslim families of lower
strata. In certain cases, they are invited by lowly placed Muslims on certain occasion and they
also invite them. But such interactions are not free and on a large scale. The Ashrafs and well
placed Ajlaf do not regard them untouchables, but avoid social intercourse.”24

More than a decade later, Ali Anwar accounted for the plight of Muslim scavengers of Patna and
their socio-economic position in his book Masawat ki Jung (Fight for Equality). “Close to the
Imarat-e-Shariah office there is a huge settlement of Halalkhors (Dalit Muslims). Cholera broke out
in the halakhors locality a few years ago killing six poor people. Not to speak of providing any
material assistance, the Imarat-e-Shariah’s office bearers did not even prefer to meet the affected
families and inquire about their welfare”25, the book says. Sachchidanand (2001) presented the
number of household of Muslim scavengers in Bihar Sharif. He found that more than 1,100
Muslim scavengers live in this area.
Table 4: Number of Muslim Scavengers in Bihar Sharif
Sr. No. Mohallas No. of Household

1. Bagnabad 40
2. Soh 12
3. Pahariper 06
4. Nanuatoli 06
5. Choti Saluganj & Saluganj Kharihani 50
6. Domkhana (Gulshan Bag Katra) 48
7. Kagaji Mohalla 02
Source: Sachidanand (2001)

22 Purvanchal Rural Development and Training Institute

23 Sachchidanand, People at the Bottom: A Portrait of the Scavengers, 2001, Concept Publishing Company. Patna.
24 S. Musi Raza, Liberated Muslim Scavengers of Biharsharif, 1992.
25 Ali Anwar, Masawat Ki Jung, Vani Prakashan, New Delhi 2005.

164
The new Act ‘The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act’, 2013, or
any bill prior to this, has never discriminated between the scavengers belonging to different
religions. The new Act defines a manual scavenger as “a person engaged or employed, at the
commencement of this Act or at any time thereafter, by an individual or a local authority or an
agency or a contractor, for manually cleaning, carrying, disposing of, or otherwise handling in
any manner, human excreta in an insanitary latrine or in an open drain or pit into which the
human excreta from the insanitary latrines is disposed of , or in a railway track or in such other
spaces or premises, as the Central or State Government may notify, before the excreta fully
decomposes, and the expression “manual scavenging” shall be construed accordingly.”
However, experience shows that the application of this Act or implementation of any welfare
programme has always been discriminatory against the scavengers belonging to the Arzal
Muslims.

Why State did not recognize Dalit (Manual Scavengers) Muslim

There are many factors that cumulatively act against the case of Dalit Muslims: a) Elite Muslim
leadership, b) Homogenized politics, c) Piecemeal approach of democratization, d) Assertion of
Hindutva politics.

Elite Muslim Leadership: From class/caste perspective, there has been almost no change in
the socio-economic profile of the Muslim leadership since Independence. Muslim politics has
been continuously dominated by upper class and caste. According to an analysis by Theodore P.
Wright, Jr., out of 58 (Rajya Sabha member) 25 were upper class Nawabs and Zamindars with
titles from the British or from Muslim princely states like Hyderabad, Bhopal, or Rampur; 20
claim relationship by blood or marriage to famous Muslim figures of the past or to princely
houses; 24 others report parental middle class callings business, professional, or civil service.26
These leaders filled with reactionary heritage of past and mixing religion with politics, resisted
any attempt of democratization or never raised such issue as caste practices among the Muslim.
In the changed circumstances, these leaders were more conscious about, how to maintain their
political power without annoying other communities and mobilize masses for their respective
political parties. They appealed to maintain the unity, without which neither individuals nor
society could progress.27 They never came out of belief of the homogeneity of Indian Muslims.

Meanwhile, so called secular government by a secular party did not confronted with
communalism. Arend Lijphart’s ‘The Politics of Accommodation’ brings forth the argument that
how leaders from the emerging groups accommodated in mainstream and use of them garner
votes in election. The Congress party for long did the same with Dalit and Muslim community.
This clientele politics has failed from 1980s onward.

The co-option of congress Muslims in governmental structures restricted their ability to keep up
their links with large segments of the Muslim people. They eschewed involvement in all issues
which were seen to be specifically Muslim and were likely to leave them vulnerable to charges of
promoting sectarian causes.28 In particular, in first three general elections, ‘the nomination and
election processes work[ed] to put into the legislatures Muslims who [were] incline to be docile
and not raise embarrassing issues too persistently, lest they either not “[got] the ticket” next
election or [were] shifted to less safe constituencies’ (Wright 1966:110). The lacuna shown by the
secular parties and Muslim leaders in raising the caste issues has sheer political motives.

26 Theodore P. Wright Jr, A New Demand for Muslim Reservation in India, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 9, 1997,
Pp. 854.
27 This is a line used by Syed Mahmud during All India Muslim Consultative Convention on 8 th August 1964.
Reported in The times of India, 9 August 1964.
28 Mushirul Hasan, Islam in the Sub-continent, Manohar Publication, 2002.
165
Once Nehru was out of the scene, communal polarization became more and more sharp and
Indian politics once again seen the mixing of religion with politics. Once conservative forces
took over the community politics, the Congress in spite of countering positively with them,
made underhand dealing with these forces. For electoral gain, Congress invariably relied upon
these conservative elements amongst Muslims. In addition, Muslims were appeased by elevating
a few from the community to exalted positions in government. These forces consistently
propagated the idea of homogenized Muslim community putting forth the argument that, in
Islam there is no such concept of caste, in its fold all are equal. Moreover, the communally
charged atmosphere allowed them to ask for unity among the Muslims. Resultantly, the issues
like women rights, caste practice, democratization of various Muslims institutions, and agitation
for modern education have been neglected throughout the decades.

Homogenized Politics: British rulers established Muslims as a homogenised category in Indian

sub-continent. The process began immediately after the 1857 revolt and shaped up with 1909
communal award of separate electorate. Formation of Pakistan cemented this process. After
Independence, rise of homogenised politics strengthened this proposition. During this period,
politics of Urdu, AMU, Haj subsidies, Personal Law are a few issues Muslims were racked with.

Assertion of Hindutva Politics: Creation of Pakistan satisfied the Muslim communalism;

however, India did not transform into a Hindurashtra, the dream of Savarkar, which was a
disappointment for the Hindu communalists in India, who had vigorously tried to achieve it.
The nationalist leadership certainly did not give room to these divisive elements, but, it failed to
negate them completely. The Hindu fundamentalist forces continued their propaganda against
the Muslims, which in turn fed into the efforts of the Muslim elite leadership to strengthen their
grip over the community.

Government lackluster approach toward Muslims: Government run by a single party for
such a long period set certain trend which became the characteristics of the state. Government
considers each social group as a vote bank which facilitates them to ride the power. The
government associated various project of upliftment with different social groups to make a
balance. Thus, reservation associated with SCs/STs, development fund to north-east region,
militancy with Jammu and Kashmir, language problem (anti-Hindi) with South India and
security issue for minorities (Sikhs, Muslims and Christians). As Sikhs and Christians
communities have high development indicators, hence security is their main concern.

However, Muslims have the problems of identity, security and development. But state is not
objective in its treatment to the Muslims. This led Zoya Hasan, to raise the question that “does
state policy reflect objective realities or does it reinforce and privilege certain categories over
others?”29 Whenever Muslims have started weaning away from Congress, it came up with some
populist measure to show their concern for minorities. For instances, Indira Gandhi 15 points
programmes, UPA government’s new 15 points programme, Sachar Committee etc. The policies
generated from these programmes have lack will of implementation in a holistic ways and always
ended up pacifying the anger against the government.

Way-out

There have been some efforts by the Government to root out the malaise of manual scavenging.
Government has taken occupation as criteria to draw a list, which gives chances of inclusion to
all those who are involved into this menial works. Policy has broader outline. However, it goes
contrary to Ambedkar’s approach, who argued that upper caste involved in sweeping did not
necessarily face the wrath of untouchability but the lower caste does. So, the lower status is the

29 Zoya Hasan, Op. cit, p.197.

166
resultant of lower caste ranking in social hierarchy which sweepers belong to, rather to their
occupation.

Today, due to lack of job opportunities in the public sector many lower class upper caste Hindus
have been working as sweepers. And, it has been a trend that these upper caste sweepers
delegate their jobs to men/women belonging to lower castes. Hence, caste rather than
occupation should be given priority in designing programmes. Further, Muslim scavengers, who
belong to the Arzal category, should be included into the programme equally. Secondly, the
policies of the government have been such that it forces people to remain in the jobs that they
traditionally do as family occupation. In most of the cases educational help or scholarship has
been stopped by the government as it was found that families were out of the profession. An
example of a particularly self-defeating government programme is the scholarship for the
children of families involved in scavenging. To avail the scholarship, children or families have to
prove their engagement in manual scavenging for at least 100 days in a year.

This scholarship scheme provides a negative incentive to the Dalit households to continue in
this occupation. Recently, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment changed the criteria, but
due to lack of awareness lakhs of children are not able to get this scholarship. This forces them
to remain in the profession to avail the scholarship. Third, Muslim (Arzal) scavengers are not
included into the Scheduled Caste category. They remain out of benefits government provides to
the other scavenging communities in India. Hence, they should be included in the SCs list.

Manual Scavenging is a blot on the face of civilized society and democratic political structure.
The presence of a ‘pre-medieval’ practice certainly does not go with India’s claim of the largest
democracy in the world. State’s commitment to remove the practice of manual scavenging is
proving to be a false promise. Unless and until a determined effort takes place against the
annihilation of casteism, the manual scavengers, who might not doing the menial job, would not
find themselves living a ‘dignified life’. Their lower caste identity would continue to deceive
them a ‘respectful’ life.

Bibliography

David, Kenneth. (ed.) 1977, The New Wind: Changing Identities in South Asia, The Hague and Paris-
The Moulton Publishers, Paris.
Gokhale, B.G. 1979, Surat in the seventeenth Century – A study in Urban History of Pre-modern India,
Popular Prakashan, Bombay.
Lang, Peter. 2004, Domestic service and the formation of European Identity – Understanding of Globalisation
of Domestic works, 16-21st centuries, European Academic Publishers, London.
Malkani, N R. 1965, Clean People and an Unclean Country, Harijan Sevak Sangh, Delhi.
Pathak, Bindeshwar. 2010, Sanitation and Scavenging in India – Achievements and Challenges, Sulabh
International Social Service Organization, New Delhi.
Prasad, Debi. 2007, Scavengers and Scavenging in Andhra Pradesh, Indian Journal of Social Work,
Vol. 68, No. 2, pp.189-203.
Ramaswamy, Gita. 2005, Manual Scavengers in Andhra Pradesh and their Work, Navayana, Chennai.
Rashtriya Garima Abhiyan, 2012, National Hearing on Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers and their
Children in India, Indian Social Institute, New Delhi.
Ravichandran, B. 2011, Scavenging Profession: Between Class and Caste?, Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. XLVI, No. 13.
Sachchidanand. 2001, People at the Bottom – A portrait of the Scavengers, Concept Publishing
Company, New Delhi.
Srivastava, B.N. 1997, Manual Scavenging in India – A Disgrace to the Country, Concept Publishing
Company, New Delhi.

167
Thapa, Shanker. 1995, Caste Hierarchy: The Inter-Ethnic Stratification in the Muslim Society of
Nepal, Tribhuvan University Journal, Vol. XVIII, pp: 78-87.
Ziyauddin and Singh, Rajeev K. 2009, Manual Scavenging as Social Exclusion, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 26 & 27, pp. 521-523.

Dr. Manjur Ali Research Officer, Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability, New Delhi.

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 Chapter 13

EMPLOYMENT OF MUSLIM WOMEN WORKERS IN THE

INDIAN LABOUR MARKET
Rakshandah Hani

Abstract

Employment is considered as a powerful instrument of inclusion. Muslim women have been identified among the
most marginalized groups in the country. This paper aims to bring out the extent of their employment in the
Indian labour market. The data has primarily been sourced from the latest National Sample Survey report.
Labour force participation rate and work participation rate for Muslim women have shown a declining trend.
Concentration in low paying home-based self-employment, participation of uneducated women in the labour force,
informalization and dominance in manufacturing characterize their work. Certain measures to improve their
employability have been suggested.

Introduction

India adopted the neo-liberal economic policy reform in the early 1990s. The main focus of this
policy has been on maximizing economic growth. It was assumed that high economic growth
will take care of economic development. But later, the ability to reduce poverty and inequality
with economic policy reforms was questioned. There was a paradigm shift in India’s economic
policy in favour of an inclusive growth strategy. Employment is considered as a powerful
instrument for inclusion in a developing country like India. An assessment of employment-
unemployment profile among marginalised groups is crucial for understanding how they
participate in and benefit from growth. Women and Muslims have been identified among the
disadvantaged groups in the Indian labour market.

The Muslim community constitutes the largest religious minority in India. It constitutes 12.6
percent of the total population while other minority groups such as Christians and Sikhs with a
share of 2.1 and 1.7 percent of population lag far behind (NSS, 2009-10). But this community is
characterised by social exclusion, political alienation, educational backwardness and economic
vulnerability. The condition of women in this marginalized group is worse wherein they face
multiple challenges both within and outside their community. The process of economic progress
among Muslim women has been much slower as compared to women from other minority
groups. Studies on Muslim women reiterate that the majority are among the most disadvantaged,
economically impoverished, and politically marginalized sections of Indian society today.

Hasan and Menon (2004) state that the lives of Muslim women are located at the intersection of
gender, family and community within the dynamic context of Indian society, polity and
economy. At the same time, however, their minority location does qualitatively transform
women’s experiences and perceptions in very distinct ways. In India, there is a shortage of a
community-disaggregated data on women’s status. The increasing documentation of gender
inequality and women’s economic and social subordination has left Muslim women out of this
discussion. It is necessary to understand the specific factors that keep a large section of Muslim
women in a state of poverty and subordination.

Labour force participation is an important determinant of economic status. Availability of work

provides income to persons, thereby enabling them to acquire better quality of life. It depends
on ownership of assets, level of education and health and the existence of employment
opportunities. The decision to work, especially among women is a function of a variety of
economic, social and cultural factors.
This paper aims to bring out the extent of employment of Muslim women in the Indian Labour
market and suggest measures to improve their employability. The National Sample Survey Office
(NSSO), as part of its 66th round survey during the period 2009-2010 has come out with a report
on employment and unemployment situation of the people of India belonging to different
religious groups. This is the latest report released by the Government of India that consists of
data disaggregated by religion. The data on employment of Muslim women has been primarily
sourced from this report.

Muslim Women in Indian Labour Market

Employment provides a source of income and purchasing power to an individual, thereby

enabling the person to satisfy various needs and maintain a living standard. An increase in
income due to employment increases the capacity to invest, which may include investment in
education, health and business. This may lead to further increase in incomes. Employment has
various extra-economic benefits as well, especially for neglected groups such as women and
minorities who suffer from low self-esteem. It boosts their level of confidence and ushers in a
sense of well-being.

Employability depends on the state of human capital formation and ownership of assets. If these
are inadequate, the workers occupy a lower position in the labour market. The Sachar
Committee has pointed that the positive impact of education depends upon the existence of
employment opportunities. Economic returns to education include the probability of getting
employment or earning higher income. Without it, investment in human capital formation will
not occur.

This section looks into the conditions of employment, particularly of Muslim women and the
vulnerabilities they face. The analysis is based on the latest 66th Round of National Sample
Survey. In this report, estimates of employment and unemployment indicators for major
religious groups have been generated with respect to usual status (ps+ss) where the activity
status of a person has been determined on the basis of the usual principal activity and usual
subsidiary activity of the person taken together.

Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR)

Labour force, or, in other words, the ‘economically active’ persons refers to the population
which supplies or seeks to supply labour for production of goods and services and therefore,
includes both the ‘employed’ and the ‘unemployed’. The number of persons in the labour force
per 1000 persons gives the measure of labour force participation rate (LFPR). Table 1 presents
the labour force participation rate (LFPR) among different categories of persons of the major
religious groups.

It is seen that the rural-urban differentials exist in the LFPRs for all the religious groups. It also
depicts that the LFPRs for men were much higher than those for women for all the religious
groups. In urban areas, the male-female differentials were greater due to very low LFPRs of
women. During the period, 2009-10, among the major religious groups, the LFPR for rural men,
rural women, urban men and urban women was the lowest among Muslims. The difference in
LFPR between Muslim women and those from other communities was quite large both in rural
and urban areas. It has also been observed that between 2004-05 and 2009-10, the LFPRs for
rural women and urban women among Muslims have declined.

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 Table 1: LFPR for major religious groups in NSS 66th round (2009-2010)

Religion Rural Urban

Men Women Persons Men Women Persons
Hindus 560 279 423 563 151 368
Muslims 526 146 344 536 101 327
Christians 573 346 459 540 226 382
Sikhs 550 268 415 568 167 380
Others 576 293 437 573 184 379
All 556 265 414 559 146 362

Worker Population Ratio (WPR)

The number of persons employed per 1000 persons is referred to as the workforce participation
rate or worker population ratio (WPR). It provides an idea of the extent of participation in
economic activity by a specific population. The ability to find work depends on the ownership of
assets and availability of work. For instance, women coming from economically well to do
households may not participate in the workforce because there is no compelling need to do so.
The work preferences are dependent on a variety of social, cultural and economic factors.
Further, non-availability of employment may result in the withdrawal of women from the
workforce.

The estimates for Worker Population Ratio (WPR) according to usual status (pp+ss) for persons
belonging to the major religious groups have been presented in Table 2. It can be seen that rural-
urban differential exists in the WPRs for all the religious groups. WPR among rural men (52
percent), rural women (14 percent), urban men (52 percent) and urban women (9 percent) has
been the lowest among Muslims. The table also shows that the WPRs for men were much
higher than those for women for all the religious groups – the differentials being greater in urban
areas where the WPRs of women were very low. The male-female differential in WPR was the
highest among Muslims.

Table 2: WPR for major religious groups in NSS 66th round (2009-2010)

Religion Rural Urban

Men Women Persons Men Women Persons
Hindus 551 275 417 547 142 355
Muslims 517 143 337 523 94 317
Christians 558 326 441 528 215 371
Sikhs 535 263 405 536 153 356
Others 567 291 432 562 182 373
All 547 261 408 543 138 350

The Sachar Committee holds that the aggregate work participation ratios for Muslims are low
due to much lower participation in economic activity by women in the community. It is much
lesser than among women in other religious groups, though there is not much difference among
the men. It has been observed that the low work participation of Muslim women in rural areas is
171
due to the fact that the engagement of Muslim households in agriculture is less. It has been
found that the amount of land possessed among Muslims is the lowest. The WPRs for Muslim
women in urban areas is even lower (9 percent) because their mobility is restricted and work
opportunities for women within the household are limited. Such opportunities are relatively
higher in rural areas due to availability of agricultural work. Hence, the WPR of Muslim women
is higher in these areas.

Das (2005) states two main reasons for the low participation of Muslim women in the labour
market. In rural areas, it is due to their limited engagement in agriculture within the overall
context of differential land ownership patterns by religion. In urban areas, it is due to their
exclusion from professional, technical and clerical jobs. Since the families of Muslim women are
mostly self-employed, it is feasible that these women are engaged in family based ventures, but
do not report themselves as employed, even as unpaid helpers. Moreover, employed Muslim
women’s concentration in non-farm self-employment should not be seen as a way to reconcile
their seclusion with paid work but a deficiency of the Indian labour market which presents
barriers to particular groups of people from regular salaried jobs.

Hasan and Menon (2004) have stated that low work participation of Muslim women has been
usually explained in terms of restrictions imposed on them in the public domain. Contrary to the
popular idea that Islam imposes cultural restrictions, such as purdah, and therefore greater
gender inequality, the Muslim Women Survey findings point out that these restrictions on
women’s physical mobility are not limited to Muslim women since other communities share
them in more or less the same degrees. Given that the levels of autonomy and mobility of
Muslim and Hindu women are also not very different, Muslim women’s work participation may
be impeded by several other factors. Two major reasons for the low work participation of
Muslim women are their restricted engagement in agriculture owing to differential patterns of
land ownership in rural areas and their exclusion from low-level jobs in urban areas. As Muslims
and as women, they are twice as disadvantaged in access to jobs and possibly low-level jobs in
the informal and casual labour.

Urban employment often requires skills that most Muslim women in the sample would not
possess. Most Muslim women are simply not in competition with men or other women, are
absent from the subsectors of manufacturing and if they happen to be working at all they would
be concentrated in low-paying and low-skill jobs that are extensions of domestic work. This type
of work could be the most disadvantaged. This may heighten discrimination against women at
various levels evident in low work participation rates, small proportion of women in better paid
jobs and low earnings of Muslim women in the unprotected wage sector. It is further increased
by an overall social discrimination within families which discourage women from acquiring the
skills and education needed to enter the labour market.

The age distribution of Muslims has shown that the proportion of children (0-14 years) is the
highest among Muslims. This indicates a high young dependency ratio. The women in the
household are required to stay at home and take care of the young, thereby reducing their work
opportunities and consequently their work participation rates. NSS data shows that between
2004-05 and 2009-10, the WPRs for women in general has declined. In case of Muslim women it
has fallen from 18 % to 14 % in rural areas and from 12% to 9% in urban areas. It is
compounded by the fact that Sachar Committee recommendations are not taken seriously.

Distribution of usually employed persons of age 15 years and above by educational level

The distribution of the employed persons across educational levels for a given section of
population at a given point of time, reflects the quality of its workforce at that time. Table 3a
gives this distribution for rural India. It is seen that among rural men, the proportion of workers
172
with level of education not literate and literate up to primary was the highest for Muslims (67
percent). Among rural women, proportion of workers with level of education not literate was
the same for Hindus and Muslims (59 percent). In rural areas, the proportion of workers with
general education level higher secondary and graduate and above is the lowest for Muslim
women. The percentage of Muslim women in the not literate category is higher than Muslim
men while in all the remaining educational categories the share of Muslim men is higher.
Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, proportion of literates in the workforce has increased for both
rural men and women. The proportion of illiterate Muslim women in rural areas has declined
from 68 percent to 59 percent while the proportion of graduates has doubled from 0.6 percent
to 1.2 percent during this period.

Table 3a: Distribution of employed persons by general educational level for major
religious groups in NSS 66th round in rural India
Men

Religion Not Literate Primary Secondary Higher Graduate All

Secondary & Above
Hindus 27.9 27.7 32.9 6.8 4.7 100
Muslims 33.4 33.8 26.7 3.7 2.4 100
Christians 16.3 28.9 41.2 5.9 7.7 100
Sikhs 26.9 25.7 35.9 9.5 2.0 100
All 28.2 28.3 32.6 6.5 4.4 100
Women
Hindus 58.9 22.4 15.2 2.0 1.5 100
Muslims 59.4 25.8 12.5 1.1 1.2 100
Christians 26.9 32.7 31.1 4.5 4.8 100
Sikhs 48.0 20.5 22.9 5.1 3.5 100
All 58.7 22.1 15.5 2.1 1.6 100

Table 3b shows the distribution of employed persons by general educational level for major
religious groups in urban India during 2009-10. It is observed that the proportion of workers
belonging to the education category not literate and literate up to primary is 48 percent for
Muslim men and 64 percent for Muslim women which is the highest among other religious
groups. On the other hand, the proportion of Muslim workers with level of education higher
secondary and graduate and above is the lowest for Muslim men and women in urban India. The
percentage of illiterate Muslim women is double of Muslim men. However, in the education
category primary, secondary and higher secondary the proportion of Muslim men is higher while
under graduates and above, the share of women exceeds that of the men. Between 2004-05 and
2009-10, proportion of literates in the workforce has increased for both urban men and women.
The proportion of illiterate Muslim women in urban areas has declined from 49 percent to 40
percent while the proportion of graduates has increased from 7 percent to 10 percent during this
period.

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 Table 3b: Distribution of employed persons by general educational level for major
religious groups in NSS 66th round in urban India

Men
Religion Not Primary Secondary Higher Graduate All
Literate Secondary & Above
Hindus 9.9 17.9 35.9 11.9 24.4 100
Muslims 20.9 27.3 38.9 6.0 6.9 100
Christians 6.9 16.3 43.2 9.3 24.3 100
Sikhs 15.8 15.9 33.9 13.9 20.5 100
All 11.4 18.3 37.5 10.8 22.0 100
Women
Hindus 30.8 19.8 22.0 6.2 21.2 100
Muslims 40.4 23.9 20.3 5.0 10.4 100
Christians 12.8 13.5 28.0 9.7 36.0 100
Sikhs 29.4 14.9 22.2 5.0 28.5 100
All 29.8 20.4 21.9 6.2 21.7 100

In both rural and urban areas, the proportion of Muslim men and women is highest among
illiterates while their share is lowest in the higher education category. It shows that a lot
improvement is required in the quality of labour force among Muslims.

Worker Population Ratios (WPRs) among persons of age 15 years and above for different
levels of general education

Among persons of age 15 years and above, the number of persons who were usually employed
(principal status + subsidiary status) per 1000 persons of a particular level of general education
has been considered as the education level-specific worker population ratio. It is seen from
Table 4a that during 2009-10, in rural areas, the WPR for Muslim men of age 15 years and above
was highest for the general educational level up to primary (90 percent) and the WPR for
Muslim women was highest for educational level graduate and above (25 percent). But the WPR
of Muslim women was the lowest among major religious groups across various educational
categories.

Table 4a: WPR for different level of general education in NSS 66th round in rural India

Men
Religion Not Primary Secondary Higher Graduate Secondary All
Literate Secondary & Above & Above
Hindus 876 902 702 640 802 700 813
Muslims 879 897 647 617 717 654 817
Christians 832 884 653 524 759 653 776
Sikhs 786 857 725 610 684 684 755
All 874 900 697 634 793 695 812

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 Women
Hindus 458 407 226 183 293 225 392
Muslims 235 207 111 116 245 128 209
Christians 482 528 297 274 404 322 433
Sikhs 398 341 301 201 366 282 341
All 432 384 222 183 297 224 372

Table 4b gives education level – specific worker population ratio in urban India. It shows that
during 2009-10, in urban areas, the WPR for Muslim men of age 15 years and above was highest
for the general educational level up to primary (86 percent) and the WPR for Muslim women
was highest for educational level graduate and above (24 percent). Following similar trend as in
rural areas, the WPR of Muslim women was the lowest among major religious groups across
various educational categories even in urban areas. It may be assumed that more educated
Muslim women are likely to join the workforce and the lack of access to education keeps them
out of it. Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, WPR for Muslim women in urban areas has declined
for all the educational categories.

Table 4b: WPR for different level of general education in NSS 66th round in urban India

Men
Religion Not Primary Secondary Higher Graduate Secondary All
Literate Secondary & Above & Above
Hindus 815 841 663 591 788 696 738
Muslims 829 862 699 481 760 651 763
Christians 803 853 666 434 822 668 722
Sikhs 785 765 668 658 723 681 706
All 816 844 667 576 788 691 740
Women
Hindus 250 217 98 90 250 156 187
Muslims 156 146 50 88 239 107 134
Christians 263 249 158 183 463 316 282
Sikhs 232 181 155 66 292 178 188
All 231 206 97 94 259 159 183

While education depresses labour force activity for all women, its negative effect is less
pronounced for Muslim as compared to Hindu women. Thus, the returns to education are
higher for Muslim women than for Hindu women.

Das (2005) states that the main puzzle in Muslim women’s employment is the participation of
uneducated women in the labour force. It is expected that poverty among uneducated women
would drive employment among Muslim women as much as it does among Hindu women. It is
known that poorer and uneducated women are more likely to be employed. The data does not
support this idea for Muslim women. There is greater divergence between Muslim and Hindu

175
women’s employment at lower than higher levels of education. It points to a possibility that
Muslim women have little access to low level jobs.

Unni (2010) in her study, calculated returns to education to regular salaried non-agricultural
workers in rural and urban areas. It was found that women in general, in rural and urban areas,
benefited the most from education, once they were able to access it. The returns to mean years
of education were higher for women regular workers compared to men. Muslim women in
urban areas had higher returns to education, while rural women had lower returns than all
women. The return to education was close to 16 percent for urban Muslim women. With such
high returns one would expect that the demand for education would be high among Muslim
women. However, the discrimination in entry into regular jobs noted earlier and the social
barriers to mobility operate against the Muslim women and keep a majority of them confined to
their homes in low paying sub-contracted work, if they manage to work at all. It has also been
noted that the Muslim community has not been able to take the education route out of poverty.
With minimal access to coveted regular salaried jobs, particularly in the public sector, the Muslim
community was mainly engaged in self-employment.

Status of Employment

WPRs indicate the extent of participation of a community in economic activities while the status
of employment describes the capacity in which workers participate in these activities. According
to status of employment, National Sample Survey has classified workers into self-employed,
regular employee and casual labour. The self-employed in household enterprises include own
account worker, employer and unpaid family worker. It is important to know, if women in the
Muslim community are concentrated in specific type of activity.

Table 5 gives the status of employment for women belonging to major religious groups in rural
and urban areas during 2009-10. It is seen that a significant portion of Muslim women workers
in rural areas (65 percent) as well as in urban areas (60 percent) were self-employed. The
proportion of self-employed Muslim women is the highest among other major religious groups
in urban areas. The Sachar Committee has observed that within self-employment, less Muslim
women are engaged in agriculture as compared to non-agricultural activity. Greater participation
in self-employment requires more availability of credit to the Muslim community. The
participation of Muslim women as regular employees, 4 percent in rural areas and 22 percent in
urban areas is the lowest among major religious groups. The Sachar Committee has brought out
that Muslims lack access to jobs, especially in the public sector. The regular workers are in small
unorganized enterprises rather than large enterprises with social security and other benefits. The
policy of job reservation has worked in favour of SC/ST workers and their employment in
government sector is higher than Muslims.

Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, the proportion of self-employed Muslim women in rural areas
has increased from 52 percent to 65 percent while the proportion of regular employees has
declined from 17 percent to 4 percent. Similarly during this period in urban areas, the proportion
of Muslim women engaged in self-employment almost doubled from 33 percent to 60 percent.
On the other hand, the proportion of urban Muslim women working as regular employees
became less than half, from 59 percent to 22 percent. The increasing trend of Muslim women
employment away from regular employment and towards self-employment exposes their
disadvantaged position in the labour market. Studies as well as anecdotal evidences have shown
that the quality of self-employment among Muslims is poor. This indicates that the various
governmental strategies aimed towards employment expansion have not worked for Muslim
women.

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 Table 5: Distribution of usually employed women by status of employment for major
religious groups during 2009-2010

Rural
Religion Self-employed Regular employee Casual labour All employed
Hindus 54.8 4.1 41.1 100
Muslims 64.9 3.9 31.2 100
Christians 55.4 11.4 33.2 100
Sikhs 78.9 8.6 12.5 100
Others 43.8 6.0 50.2 100
All 55.7 4.4 39.9 100
Urban
Hindus 39.3 40.4 20.3 100
Muslims 59.7 21.6 18.7 100
Christians 28.4 60.7 10.9 100
Sikhs 51.5 36.7 11.8 100
Others 33.6 45.1 21.3 100
All 41.1 39.3 19.6 100

The access to higher paid jobs for Muslim women has been extremely limited. Studies on the
community have brought out many causes for this. As seen above, Muslim households are
among the poorest in the country. They are unable to afford the cost of higher education. In
case of shortage, preference is given to the education of men, due to which the women remain
deprived further. As brought out by the Sachar Committee, Muslims as a religious group suffer
discrimination and there is lack of gainful employment for this marginalized community.
Majority of Muslim dominated areas suffer from non-availability of technical and higher
education facilities. Government led employment programmes are conspicuous by their absence
thereby limiting their chances of growth. The problem gets aggravated for women in the
community. Self-employment remains the obvious choice available to them that comes with its
own set of problems like low remuneration, sub-contracted work and lack of any social security.
Studies and anecdotal evidence show that Muslim women in particular have no access to
productive assets and work with lower levels of human capital. So they are concentrated in
wage-employed and self-employed activities with lower levels of income. Hasan and Menon
(2004) conducted a national level Muslim Women Survey. The analysis of work status of Muslim
women brought out four main points. The first is the under-reporting of work; second, the
generally low work participation of women in the sample; third, the low levels of work
participation across all regions and very low proportions in skilled jobs; The fourth feature that
distinguishes Muslim women’s work profile is that two-thirds of Muslim women like their men
counterparts, are self-employed and least likely to be employed in regular salaried jobs in urban
areas.

The work pattern reported in the survey indicated that self-employed women are in petty trade,
retailing establishments, small businesses and home-based work such as tailoring, embroidery,
etc. In short, Muslim women have a high probability of being self-employed in home-based

177
work. They are concentrated in domestic and low-paid or under paid work. They often
undertake piece-rate work in the home, arguably the lowest paid or unpaid and low-skilled of all.
Unni (2010) reiterated that urban Muslim women were overwhelmingly self-employed. While
this gives the impression that they were in control of their economic activity, a deeper analysis
showed that the women were mainly engaged in sub-contractual manufacturing activities within
the confines of their homes. Restrictions on mobility and interaction with members outside the
community led these women to undertake contracts that were not very remunerative. The
consequence of such a labour market scenario among Muslim men and women was that a far
greater proportion of them belonged to the ‘working poor’. Labour market segmentation pushed
the Muslim men and women into much more precarious situations than the Hindu community.

Unemployment Rates

Unemployment rate, as defined by National Sample Survey, is the number of persons

unemployed per 1000 persons in the labour force. This gives the unutilised portion of the labour
force. It reflects the persons available for and seeking employment as a proportion of the labour
force. It has been observed that in developing countries open employment is found to be low.
One of the reasons for this is that a large number of poor do not remain unemployed for long
and undertake whatever work comes their way. They do not report themselves as seeking work
throughout the year. The National Sample Survey Office Report discusses various employment
and unemployment indicators according to usual status approach by adopting major time
criterion.

Tables 6 (a & b) give the unemployment rates for major religious groups in rural and urban
areas. It is seen that unemployment rates in rural areas are less than those of urban areas. Among
Muslims, women unemployment in rural areas (2 percent) is marginally higher than the men
unemployment (1.9 percent) while it is much higher (6.8 percent) than the men unemployment
(2.5 percent) in urban areas. Between 2004-05 and 2009-10, though unemployment rate among
Muslim women has declined from 3.8 percent to 2 percent in rural areas, it has increased from
5.5 percent to 6.8 percent in urban areas. The problem of women unemployment is more severe
in urban areas.

Table 6a: Unemployment rates in rural areas for major religious groups
during 2004-2005 and 2009-10

Religion Men Women Persons

2009-10 2004-05 2009-10 2004-05 2009-10 2004-05

Hindus 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5

Muslims 1.9 2.0 2.0 3.8 1.9 2.3
Christians 2.6 2.6 6.0 6.8 3.9 4.4
Sikhs 2.7 3.3 1.7 3.8 2.4 3.5
Others 1.5 1.8 0.6 2.9 1.2 1.1
All 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6

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 Table 6b: Unemployment rates in urban areas for major religious groups during
2004-2005 and 2009-10

Religion Men Women Persons

2009-10 2004-05 2009-10 2004-05 2009-10 2004-05

Hindus 2.9 3.6 5.8 7.0 3.4 4.4

Muslims 2.5 3.7 6.8 5.5 3.2 4.1
Christians 2.2 5.6 4.6 14.1 2.9 8.6
Sikhs 5.6 3.4 8.3 9.0 6.1 4.6
Others 1.9 7.2 0.9 3.5 1.7 6.4
All 2.8 3.9 5.7 6.7 3.4 4.5

Types of Enterprise
NSS, 61st round data has been used by the Sachar Committee, to provide information on the
type of enterprises in which Muslim women workers are concentrated. It has been noted earlier
that Muslim women are concentrated in self-employment followed by casual labour and their
participation in regular jobs, especially in the public sector, is very limited. Table 7 gives the
distribution of workers by enterprise type for different religious groups. It shows that a
significantly larger proportion of Muslim women workers are engaged in women-owned
proprietary enterprises. It is higher than for women in other religious groups. However,
anecdotal evidence brings out the fact that most enterprises run by Muslim women are home-
based. They are engaged in sub-contracted work with low levels of earnings. Participation of
Muslim women in the formal sector, which includes the government sector, is the least among
all religious groups. This holds true even for Muslim men. It has been observed that the share of
OBCs and SC/ST workers in formal sector jobs is higher than Muslims, who are largely
concentrated in the informal sector. There is a strong link between informality and poverty
among Muslim women wherein they primarily work to support the family rather than to
supplement family income.
Table 7: Distribution of Women Workers in Each Religious Category by Enterprise
2004-05, all workers aged 15-64 years

Hindus Muslims Other All

Minorities
Informal Sector 88.3 95.3 87.9 89.0
Proprietary Men 44.8 38.4 30.4 42.8
Proprietary Women 32.2 47.7 42.0 34.8
Partnership with members of same household 1.8 1.8 5.9 2.2
Partnership with members of other household 0.9 0.4 0.9 0.8
Others 8.6 7.0 8.8 8.4
Formal Sector 11.7 4.7 12.1 11.0
Government/Public Sector 8.7 3.5 9.8 8.2
Public/Private Limited Company 3.1 1.2 2.3 2.8
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Sachar Committee Report, 2006

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Location of work

Distribution of women workers in each religious category by location of work (Fig. 1) shows
that a larger proportion of Muslim women workers work in their own dwellings. This is
consistent with the larger reliance of these workers on self-employment and their engagement in
informal activities. The percentage of Muslim women workers working within their own homes
is much larger (70 percent) than for all workers (51 percent). Concentration of Muslim women
in home-based work may be attributed to the restrictions on their mobility and other work
related constraints that women face today. It has been pointed out that traditional barriers still
prevent women from going out of their homes to work. Most women face this issue though it is
more pronounced in case of Muslim women. The scope of their work gets limited and they are
compelled to take up sub-contracted work. Moreover, women are burdened with child-care and
household responsibilities which make it difficult for them to move out of their house for paid
work. Quite often, they work on piece rate wages which is even lower than casual wage rates. A
high concentration of Muslim women in sub-contracted home-based work leads to more
poverty among them. It is the most exploited category of work other than bonded labour.

Source: Sachar Committee Report, 2006

Type of Industry group or nature of occupation

The concentration of Muslim women workers in informal self-employment has been noted
earlier. Table 8 gives the distribution of women workers in major religious groups by Industry
groups. It is observed that the engagement of Muslim women workers in agriculture (52 percent)
is much lower than that for all women workers (74 percent). It may be attributed to poor
possession of land holdings among Muslims. On the other hand, the share of Muslim women
workers in manufacturing (32 percent) is much higher than the national average for women (11
percent). Since Muslim women are not much involved in agriculture, they crowd into petty
production related activities. A more detailed exploration of employment by industry groups by
the Sachar Committee has revealed that Muslim women are concentrated in the manufacture of
tobacco products and textile products. In general, the shares of Muslims in the total workers
engaged in the tobacco and textile/garment related industries are quite significant. Anecdotal

180
evidence has revealed that Muslim women possess good craftsmanship and creativity required by
the manufacturing industry.

Table 8: Distribution of Women Workers in Each Religious Category by Industry

groups, 2004-05, (all workers aged 15-64 years)

Hindus Muslims Other All

Minorities

Agriculture, livestock, forestry, etc 75.8 51.8 71.4 73.8

Mining & quarrying 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3
Manufacturing 9.6 31.8 8.5 11.1
Electricity, gas & water 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Construction 1.9 0.9 1.6 1.8
Wholesale & retail trade 2.9 5.3 3.3 3.1
Hotels & restaurants 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8
Transport, storage & communication 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3
Finance, insurance, real estate, etc. 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.6
Community, social & personal services 7.8 8.5 12.7 8.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Conclusion and Recommendations

India cannot achieve progress without the co-operation and mutual assistance of its various
communities. This co-operation can be possible and mutually beneficial when all communities
are more or less economically equal. Muslim women suffer from the handicap of being women
and belonging to the minority community and form a large group in the lowest economic
categories. An integrated approach is required to harness their full potential and improve their
employment quantitatively and qualitatively.

The shortage of three essentials- knowledge, economic power and autonomy, define Muslim
women’s low status. These are not distinct but inter-related to each other. Greater visibility in
the work force will increase their income and economic status.

One of the most important factors inhibiting their growth is low level of educational
attainment. In urban areas, Muslim women have shown higher returns to education. Providing
educational facilities will help in making them employable.

Skill Development programmes need to be undertaken for Muslim women. It would include soft
skills like communication and multi-tasking. The Government should devise schemes to develop
skills of these people so that they can start their own enterprises. The Sachar Committee has
recommended the setting up of Teacher Training Programmes for Muslim women so that they
find placements especially in Urdu-medium schools. Greater opportunities in employment
enhance the ability to translate education into employment.

Provision of credit will provide impetus to Muslim women’s work. Setting up of microfinance
institutions should become a part of credit related initiatives. The commercial banks or co-
181
operative banks must be made to disclose the quantum of credit sanctioned or disclosed to the
minority communities in general and women of these communities in particular.

There is a growing need for Muslim women in various medical fields, in education, in
professions like social work, counselling, psychiatry and psychology. Growth of technology and
communication has opened opportunities for women to do some form of work or business
from home. This would eliminate many concerns that may arise for working Muslim women.

Majority of Muslim women are concentrated in the informal sector. Certain social security
measures should be extended to workers in this sector as well. Government intervention
programmes are necessary to protect Muslim women against discrimination. In recent years,
liberalization and privatization have opened new opportunities. Muslim women organizations,
supported by NGOs are required to increase their visibility in the work-force.

A substantial contribution will have to come from social action groups and organizations that
are in constant touch with the people, particularly with the marginalized sections. Voluntary
organizations help in increasing the effectiveness of various programmes aimed at women and at
minorities. Many such organizations should be established in Muslim concentrated areas.

Zakat money can be tapped by these voluntary organizations to finance anti-poverty and self-
employment schemes. The concept of paying zakat in a collective system should be encouraged.
Interest free loans to poor Muslim women should be disbursed from this collection since the
receipt of interest is prohibited in Islam.

Muslim women have a strong presence in manufacturing. Hence, sales and marketing centres
should be established to provide outlets for the goods produced by them. Such centres will help
in connecting the artisans with the consumers, retailers and wholesalers on more favourable
terms.

The Muslim community should attempt to create awareness among its women and equip them
with better education and skills so that they can utilize the opportunities resulting from the rapid
economic development taking place in the country.

References

 Das, M B (2003): The Other Side of Self-Employment: Household Enterprises in India, Social
Protection Unit, World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/sp.
 Hasan, Zoya and Menon, Ritu (2004): Unequal Citizens: Muslim Women in India, Oxford
University Press.
 National Sample Survey Organisation (2013): Employment and Unemployment Situation among
Major Religious Groups in India, Government of India, NSS 66th Round (2009-2010), New
Delhi.
 Sachar Committee (2006): Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of
India- A Report, India- Cabinet Secretariat, New Delhi.
 Unni, J (2010): “Informality and Gender in the Labour Market for Muslims” in R Basant and
A Shariff (eds.), Handbook of Muslims in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 221-
234.

Dr. Rakhshandah Hani is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Maharashtra College, Mumbai.

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 Chapter 14

SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF MUSLIM WOMEN

IN MAHARASHTRA

Vibhuti Patel

Abstract

Apart from housework– of cooking, nurturing children, carrying water and buying provisions for the family–
women also supplement the family income in many ways. Some women work from home at piece-rate payment.
Women sometimes find work as domestic workers and cooks in the nearby residential complexes.

Other important areas of intervention by the state are security and safety, combat Gender Violence, Drug and
Alcohol Abuse, enhance Muslim women’s political participation, reforms in the family laws to ensure gender
justice. There is need to include Muslim community and women in particular in mainstream development
programs of the government. Women’s participation in Self Help Groups was marginal in the areas investigated
by our team.

The report of the Minority Commission of Government of Maharashtra released in March, 2014 shows that even
after 7 years of Sachar Committee’s Recommendations, profile of women of minorities in Maharashtra has not
improved. This demands vigorous efforts to integrate girls and women from minority communities, especially
Muslims and Buddhists.1 Given the existing levels of gender inequality in Indian society, manifestations of gender
discriminations evident in Indian society are also reflected in Muslim communities. It is argued that the socio-
economic exclusions experienced by Muslim communities in Maharashtra are reinforced for Muslim women
because of the existing realities of gender subordination in India. Muslim women suffer double disadvantages - as
women and as members of a minority religious group.

Health Profile

In Maharashtra, the sex-ratio among Muslim communities is alarmingly low, 886 per 1000 males,
while the overall sex ratio for the state is 922.2 The Sachar Committee Report indicates that the
poor health of Muslims, especially women, is sanitation.3 The community (particularly women)
suffers from malnutrition, anemia and morbidity. Falling prey to a variety of diseases, their life
expectancy is low. Geographically located in poor areas, women face hardship in meeting the
survival needs of their families. Water, for instance, has to be brought from considerable
distance. The lack of adequate toilets is dehumanizing. The women in our study spoke of the
urinary tract infections that they contracted because of trying to control their excretory needs
and very often fights ensued while standing in the queue to use the toilets. It also indicates the
prevalence of TB, malaria and other life threatening disease in Muslim areas.4 These studies
attribute the high incidence of TB among Muslim women to the nature of work and the poor
living conditions of the areas.

1 Prime Minister’s High Level Committee, Government of India. Socio-Economic Status of Muslim Community in
India- A Report. (Sachar Committee Report. 2006) and Ministry of Minority Affairs. Government of India.
Report of the National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities. http://minority
affairs.gov.in/sits/upload files/moma/files/pdfs/Vol 1.pdf Downloaded on 02/12/11 (Ranganath
Commission Report).
2 Sachar Committee Report-- Computed from the 2001 census reports.
3 Sachar Committee Report. Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim Community of India:
Prime Minister’s High Level Committee. Cabinet Secretariat, GOI Nov. 2006.
4 Op cit, see foot note 4.
Another reason why women do not access government health care facilities is because these
facilities do not exist in the vicinity. Apart from overcrowding and the indifference of the service
providers, they feel discriminated by the staff. As a woman in Mumbra deposed at the Jansunwai,
she had registered at the nearby PHC for her delivery, but when she arrived at the hospital in
labour, she found that there was no doctor and that she had to go to Mumbai for her delivery.
She added that she faced similar discrimination when she needed treatment for TB. The
dispensary timing was not suitable and that she had to buy medicines from outside.

Muslim women’s reproductive behaviour (i.e. the age at marriage, acceptance of family planning,
number of children, spacing of children and child mortality) vary according to the socio-
economic status of the family. An examination of the NFHS-2 and NFHS-3, reports on the
antenatal practices in Maharashtra shows that Muslim women are more likely to use these
services than other Socio-Religious Categories (SRCs). Consequently, there is a lower neonatal
and other child related mortality rates among the Muslims. Muslim women also have higher
ANC visit than other SRCs.

In urban areas, Muslim women were aware of the importance of birth registrations and the
majority of the births took place in Government hospitals (Kulkarni and Alagarajan, 2005). The
data also indicates the high rate of home deliveries among Muslim women. An enquiry into this
trend in Mumbai slum indicates that this is often because women do not have a respite from
their household duties for their deliveries. This is particularly so, when there are older children in
the home. An additional reason is that the ICDS scheme for antenatal care does not extend to
more than two deliveries. Women complained of overcrowding in government hospitals and the
lack of proper care.

They were subjected to humiliation by the care providers when in labour. They were sometimes
assaulted or subjected to verbal abuse. Nurses sarcastically, remark while the women are in
labour, “why scream now, you did not thought of this when you enjoyed sex.” Private facilities
were expensive and ill-equipped; while those who had home deliveries said that the mid-wife
could not cope with birth related complications.5 The birth interval between children is lower
among Muslim women. On the plus side, there is lower rate of early pregnancies among
Muslims. While the child survival in the 0-6 years is better for Muslim children compared to
other communities, there is poor coverage of Anganwadi centres in Muslim areas.

Prejudice among Health Care Providers

The behaviour of health care providers in the public health system is generally known to be
insensitive. Various studies conducted in Maharashtra have noted that the behaviour of staff at
hospitals is rude. Patients have reported that health care providers speak without any respect for
patients. Doctors often speak in English and do not explain what ailment women are suffering
from, nor do they explain the medications that need to be taken. Further, incidents of verbal and
physical abuse in the labour ward have also been reported; women are beaten and scolded to
make them bear down the pain. Such behaviour encountered by people at public health facilities
is, in itself highly objectionable. The right to health includes the aspect of acceptability and
quality – health services must not just be available and accessible, but also respect the dignity of
patients. In addition to this pervasive insensitivity of health care providers, there is an added
layer of prejudice towards people from the Muslim community.

Evidence from the primary studies conducted particularly in Bhiwandi, Behrampada and the
CEHAT study in Mumbai show that there are deep rooted religion-based prejudices among
health care providers. Focused group discussions showed that women felt that they were treated

5 Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes, Mumbai, 2013
184
differently from women of the majority community. Muslim women reported that the manner in
which they were spoken to, at the health facility was different from how health care providers
spoke to people of their ‘own’ community. This feeling of ‘otherness’ was perpetuated by the
fact that HCPs would refuse to pronounce or spell Muslim names correctly. Muslim women
have also reported that they are called names with a derogatory connotation, such as ‘landiyabai’
(wife of circumcised man) at health facilities.

They are referred to as ‘ladaku log’ (aggressive people) if they refuse to remove the burqa.
Moreover, women have expressed that it is the wearing of the burqa that brings about a change
in attitude of the hospital staff. “They look at the veil and they make a face- feel irritated. They feel that we
are dirty underneath the veil. They ask us to remove it the minute we enter the hospital. Now-a-days, in certain
hospitals they do not allow women with veils. They say that women in veils steal children. Someone may have done
it, but is it right to label the entire community because of one act?” The women were very aware of the
stereotypes that health care providers had about them – that ‘Muslims have too many children,
they are dirty and uneducated, and they smell.’ Indeed, these misconceptions are common
among health care providers. In Behrampada, one health worker mentioned that Muslims tend
to have more TB because they eat beef which may result in transmission of Bovine TB.

Literacy and Education

Sachar Committee’s Report (2016) on ‘Social, Economic and Educational Status of the Muslim
Community of India’ has stated that when compared to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, the growth in literacy for Muslims was lower than for the former and educational status
of Muslim women was lower than their dalit counterpart (Sachar, 2011). Muslim women in
Maharashtra are demanding technical and vocational education at the post school education
level. (Patel, 2014). They also desire Urdu medium education along with English. Because of
their inability to pay the high fee, the Muslim girl-students drop out of education.

Our field level discussions showed that students did not receive scholarships from the Maulana
Azad scheme, despite submitting applications and the people were very disgruntled about it. The
lack of proper toilets and drinking water discourage Muslim girls from attending schools on
puberty. The teachers use derogatory language in their interaction with students. Most of the
children have not acquired the learning of the grade that they are in, but are sent to the next
class due to ‘no fail’ policy. It is not surprising that they drop-out after 5th or 7th grade. Those
that stay on, are forced to take tuition which is about Rs 200 for municipal schools and Rs 250-
300 for private schools (Jain and Shaban, 1999).

Gender gap in the literacy levels among the Muslims in the urban and rural areas are 10 and 21
respectively. It is also a matter of great regret that there is the abysmally low percentage of
Muslims who complete school education. The extremely poor educational status of Muslim
women is also apparent. (Table 1)

Table 1: Gender Differences in the Completion of School Education among Muslims

State Urban Rural

Maharashtra Male Female Male Female
36.9 36.6 39.0 20.5
Source: Sachar Committee Report page- 288 Appendix Table 4.1a. & 4.1b (Estimated from Census of India 2001 table C9-C8)

“I am Mumtaz, studying in class 9 in an Urdu medium private school. I did my first seven years
from a municipal school. There, the classes were not regular and studies were not given too
much importance. We would be promoted irrespective of how we performed in the exams with
the result that we were not up to the mark. So when I joined the private school, I could not cope
185
with the pace of studies. My parents could not afford to put me through private tuitions as we
are four children studying and my father is a rickshaw puller earning around Rs 5000 per month.
I failed the 8th standard. In April I heard about YWCA study centre and told my mother to check
it out. After enquiries, I joined the same and am doing much better this year. I hope to do
graduation and become a teacher. I will be a very sincere teacher and see to it that all my
students understand whatever I teach.” (Dhara, 201)

Pre-matric Scholarship for Minorities

In the case study of Gilbert Hill, Dhara (2013) stated, “Khalil narrates his experience as Head
Master of Kasturba Municipal Urdu Secondary school, in getting minority scholarships in BMC
schools of Rs 1000 per child per year. They were asked to file the forms online for which the
school had to spend Rs 50 per form at the cyber cafe as they did not have the facility in their
school. Furthermore, they had to spend on stamp paper, bond paper, open a savings account in
the bank for each child etc. Kasturba Municipal Urdu Secondary school filled up 50 forms of
which only two students got the scholarship.” Some of the problems in proper implementation
of the pre-matric scholarship for minorities’ scheme are as under:

• Institutions have received late circulars for online form submission.

• Only few Institutions have infrastructure for online form submission
• Schools and students have only one option of opening bank account in the Bank of
Maharashtra.
• Since schools are not having infrastructure for online form submission, they have to
spend Rs 50 per form in cyber cafe.

People aspire for English education but have no expectation from the government. They feel
they just cannot access government facilities and funds. So they send their children to private
English medium schools which are expensive.

Entitlements of Muslim Women in Maharashtra

There are enormous differences in their socio-economic locations among Muslim women and
therefore not all women are able to access the rights and entitlements given to them in the
Quran. Micro level studies of Muslim communities in Mumbai, Thane, Parbhani, Malegaon,
Washim, Dhule, Buldana districts indicate that women’s intersecting identities of gender and
religion limits their access and entitlements to health care, education, livelihood and
employment. The majority of these women live in urban ghettos and slums, experiencing the
drudgery and violence of survival without basic amenities of housing, water, electricity and
sanitation. They have no social security or access to the existing welfare policies of the state. 6

Communal Riots and Muslim Women

The repercussions of communal violence are more acutely felt by women; for it justifies
attempts by the family/community to control women’s mobility. This in turn interferes with
their education/vocational training and opportunities to earn a living. Forced to earn a living
within the safe confines of their homes or in the neighbourhood, Muslim women are vulnerable
to sexual and economic exploitations by the contractors and middle-men. They do not have the
bargaining power to demand better wages. Three overarching concerns of Muslim women are
the security, identity and equity concerns. (Masselos, 1994)

6 Rauf, Taha Abdul. “Violence Inflicted on Muslims: Direct, Cultural and Structural”. Economic and Political
Weekly. 4 June 2011.Vol. 46. No.23.
186
Security Concerns

The sporadic burst of communal violence in Maharashtra has far-reaching implications for the
development of Muslims. They are often displaced from their traditional moorings and migrate
to the cities to live in ghettos and shanty towns. Living on the fringes of the socio-economic life
of the cities, they lead lives of quiet desperation without access to economic opportunities,
education, vocational training or cultural space. These factors increase possibilities of domestic
violence and create conditions whereby women are exposed to sexual harassment. These
everyday experiences of gender violence are aggravated for Muslim women in times of
communal violence. They have been subjected to unspeakable violence. Memories of fear haunt
communities and curtail women’s space within the community and outside.

Gender Dimensions of Identity Concerns

The protection of religious and cultural identities of minorities is guaranteed in the Indian
Constitution. Despite these guarantees, the maintenance of their cultural roots/identities is a
matter of concern for the minorities in an environment of resurgent hegemonic politics of the
majority community (Phadke, 2007). This concern of protection and preservation of their
distinctive cultural identities often results in the rise of conservative discourse within the
community (Robinson, 2005). The politics of cultural identities, however, have different
implications for men and women. Conservative discourses see women as the visible markers of
cultural identities and seek control over their sexuality, fertility and labour.

Gender Violence

Apart from the insecurities of communal violence experienced by Muslim women as members
of a minority community, they experience gender-specific violence in the home and within the
local community. Instances of gendered violence range from use of force, physical assault and
intimidation; it also includes overt and subtle coercion/intimidation by the family and
community. Apart from the dangers of domestic violence, women also face harassment and
abuse when they seek to access health care and educational facilities or access other public
utilities such as transport or targeted public distribution system (TPDS).

The Gender Dimension of Identity: Muslim Personal Law

Gender equality must begin by reforms by the community of the discriminatory laws that are
currently in usage. These laws are based on customary practices rather than on the injunctions
of the Quran. The call for reforms of the Muslim Personal Law by the All India Democratic
Association (AIDWA), CAFYA(CEHAT, Awaz-e-Niswan, Forum Against Oppression of
Women, YUVA-Youth for Unity and Voluntary Action and Akshara) and Bhartiya Muslim
Mahila Andolan (BMMA) highlights Women’s unequal access to ancestral property, a man’s
unilateral right to divorce in one sitting which is in contravention to the injunctions in the Quran
and Polygamy.7

Food Security

“I am Wahida Sheikh, a housewife. My husband is an electrician and is attached to an electric

shop. People call him to fix their fans, tube lights, geysers etc. He makes around Rs 300 a day on
an average of which he has to give the shop 20 percent of his earnings. So he makes around Rs
6500 a month. We have four children- two daughters and two sons, all in school. Our sons study
in English medium schools while the girls are in Urdu medium municipal schools. I have to send

7 Socioeconomic Status of Muslims in Maharashtra, Minority Commission, Government of Maharashtra, 2013.

187
the boys for tuition as we are not educated. It is difficult to make ends meet. I do some tailoring
from time to time; alter old torn clothes which fetch me Rs 1000 a month. We pay huge amount
as rent – Rs 3000 and also for electricity, water, garbage removal and for cleaning public toilets.
There is hardly anything left for food. The ration shops do not give anything, not even sugar.
Every time we go and enquire, we are told that sugar is over. One day, in a fit of rage, we beat
up the shop keeper. Thereafter, sugar was available for a while. Now it is back to the same story.
Life is very difficult and I am worried for the children’s future.” (Dhara, 2014)

The Public Distribution Systems, the perennial shortages and the unrealistically low levels
followed by state policies in providing food subsidies. Obstacles faced by women (particularly
poor, illiterate single Muslim women) in possessing the important document of a ration card
need to be addressed urgently. The reasons for non-possession of rations card also include single
women migrants. These women who may be divorced/ widowed are often unable to get their
previous marital families in their hometowns to release the necessary documents by which they
can acquire a new card. To circumvent this problem, single women should be allowed to
produce the documents belonging to their parents.

Basic Amenities: Housing, Sanitation Water and Electricity

Tremendous majority of poor Muslim women in all cities and towns of Maharashtra are in the
slum communities on reclaimed land and do not have clear housing titles. They live under
constant threat of eviction and demolition of houses. Living on the margins of the city, their
tenements are made from temporary building materials and therefore families incur considerable
expenses in renovating them. They do not necessarily have access to civic services such as water
and electricity.

Drinking Water

Our study showed that since the Muslim communities are at the margin of the city or village;
they get inadequate water. There are common taps and it comes for about 2/3 hours in the
morning. So there are many fights over water. In some places, the drinking water gets mixed up
with drain water as the two pipes are touching one another and leakages occur. This leads to
many water-borne diseases and skin ailments. (Dhara, 2013)

Sanitation: Gutters\Drains

In most of the Muslim ghettos our study found open gutters which are filled with garbage
overflowing and filling the road with dirty, stinking water during monsoon. Children wade
through this water on their way to school Public Toilets. According to the Corporator, Mr.
Haider, there is no space to build new ones. In any case only MLA/MPS have funds to build
toilets. Corporators can only repair, not build toilet blocks. The residents pay Rs 50 per month
for maintenance and Rs 1 or Rs 2 to use it. Often there is no water and it is broken filthy, full of
flies. The Anganwadi Sevikas complained that money is extracted from the residents separately
for garbage collection, gutter cleaning, roads cleaning, toilet cleaning etc. but no improvement is
visible.

Garbage Disposal

As there is no system, people throw garbage anywhere and everywhere. Garbage trucks cannot
enter as roads in the ghettos are narrow and congested. The whole process of garbage disposal is
outsourced to the private contractors which are a failure as they keep collecting money from the
people but do not cater to them. According to Mohsin Haider, a social worker from Gilbert Hill,
Andheri (W) planning should be vertical, systematic and coordinated which will release space for
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roads and other infrastructure, only then can we think of effective garbage disposal. (Patel, et al,
2013)

Recreation: Parks

In none of the areas in our multi-centric study, we found a garden in the Muslim dominated
areas where women could go with their children.

Reading rooms\ libraries

No community halls were not provided in any of the Muslim bustees, we visited. The politicians
as well as voluntary organisations perceived Muslim children as mostly as service providers and
workers, not as citizens who were entitled to right to education, leisure time activities or social
life.

Economy and Livelihood

The decline of the manufacturing sector in Maharashtra has serious implications for the kind of
employment opportunities available. The shift from the manufacturing to the service sector
employment for the industrial workers meant that they had to deskill themselves to find
employment. People living in Muslim ghettos are largely self-employed and unorganized (NSSO,
2007). Men work as hawkers, petty shop keepers, taxi drivers, auto-rickshaw drivers or in the
garment manufacturing units in urban slums. The Muslim women do monotonous, labour
intensive unpaid home-based work in the household enterprises. Muslim Men worked as bus
drivers and conductors, carpenters and painters. Very few, however, had government jobs.

The manufacture of readymade garments and zari products are undertaken in dimly lit room, no
larger than 10 by 12 sq. feet. At least 10 to 12 workers, work through the day and sometimes
through the night in these manufacturing units. Muslim women and children also work in these
units. These sweat shops whether in Behrampada or Bhivandi, Malegaon or Parbhani do not
have proper toilets or ventilation. While the units are usually situated on the first and second
floors, the families stay on the top floor. Men working in the garment industry were involved in
cutting and tailoring as well as the sale of the finished products. Young boys are generally
involved in the sale of the readymade garments on Linking Road as many of the shops there are
owned by Muslims. Women do hemming, buttoning, stitching and embroidery. In Bhiwandi,
Muslims work in power-looms as workers or as entrepreneurs.

The Muslim Women’s Work

Muslim women’s workforce participation in the organized sector is negligible. Apart from
housework - of cooking, cleaning, nurturing children, carrying water and buying provisions for
the family- the Muslim women also supplement the family income in many ways. Some women
work from home at piece-rate payment. It may involve helping the husband to assemble small
parts in toys such as whistles; finishing a bag of whistles will fetch her Rs 200 per day. At times
she may get help from the children in the neighbourhood to finish the work. Women also
undertake zari work on saris and salwar kameez, attaching sequins and beads on finished products,
tailoring and block printing. She may also be involved in making artificial jewellery items.
Women also use their cooking skills to cook and supply food to the migrant workers living in
the area. The migrant workers may be either living with or at a shelter provided by the
contractor. Women sometimes find work as domestic workers and cooks in the nearby
residential complexes. During the focused group discussion, one woman said that she found it
difficult to find employment in the nearby residential colonies because she was a woman.

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Massive Corruption

In our focus group discussions in the field areas, we were told that there is massive corruption
within the local self government bodies in each and every activity– whether laying roads,
cleaning gutters, building toilets or any other infrastructure. They felt helpless and frustrated
about this state of affairs. PDS was paralysed. The grains available were not fit for human
consumption. Kerosene meant for the poor was and is openly sold in the black market at thrice
the ration price to these very same people. Earlier municipal workers used to be safai kamgars.
Now the BMC has outsourced the work to private contractors or NGOs floated by party leaders
or municipal officers. These fake NGOs corner all the funds but do not deliver on the service.
The local self government bodies do not bother to cross check or seek accountability for funds
disbursed to these NGOs.

Awareness about the Loan Schemes for the Minorities

There is absolutely no awareness about Ranganath Mishra Sachar Committee report. Our
research team spoke to a wide range of people from social workers, party workers, professionals
(teachers), Anganwadi Sevikas and community women regarding the loan facilities that exist for
their development. None of the sections had any clue whatsoever about the facilities barring the
social workers and party workers who had a vague idea but no particulars. The only scheme they
had ever heard of was the Maulana Azad loan scheme. One of them narrated at length how an
acquaintance had applied for a loan of Rs 50, 000. He ran from pillar to post for a year and a
half, collecting documents, guarantors etc. and then gave up in disgust, having spent Rs 3000
from his pocket.

There is skepticism regarding the intentions of the government, their sincerity regarding
implementation of the schemes. According to our respondents, so far the loans have been given
mainly to chamchas of netas. In 2006, many people from bastis had filled up forms. The Maulana
Azad scheme was in the news. The application forms were being sold by the leaders. They used
to sell photo copies of the forms bearing the same serial numbers. Naturally, people spent their
time, money, labour in filling up the forms which were invalid in the first place. Those who were
eligible were deprived of loan and not given any reason for the deprivation. Whenever they
enquired, they were told that they were on the wait list. They felt that the Maulana Azad
Financial Board which disburses funds is a political tool in the hands of the political parties to
draw minority votes towards them. Just before elections, they make a big show and get loans
sanctioned to a few people from scheduled banks, not from the above scheme, amidst huge
fanfare. They felt that these government schemes are not meant for the welfare of the Muslim
community or to improve their economic condition but to keep them bound and obliged to the
ruling party by dangling the schemes at them. They averred, “This is nothing but vote-bank
politics.”

According to Khalil, Head Master of a BMC Urdu school in Andheri (W), the formalities are
awesome like producing bank letter, Income certificate, affidavit, guarantor etc. He further said
that in 2006, 15 to 20 people had applied for loan under Maulana Azad loan scheme. They made
several rounds to old custom house, spent Rs 5000 from their pockets but it came to nothing.

Personal Testimonies of the Muslim Women about Social Evils

Hasina Shaikh (name changed) shared how her 25 year old married son was addicted to charas.
He is a school dropout and does not do any job. No amount of persuasion is helping him quit.
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 He is in complete denial and will not even admit to consuming it. But he is drowsy all the time
and inactive. His case is representative of many boys in this area.

Shahnaaz talked about militant groups pressuring their children to work for sectarian outfits.
Underworld also seduced their unemployed youth into illegal and anti social activities.

Rashida expressed her anger about charas mafia that took toll of young lives in the community
and used them as cannon fodder to escalate communal strife and domestic violence.

Conclusion

As compared to non-Muslim women, the Muslim women rank low in terms of several socio-
economic indices. The older women have not crossed high school and most of them are
dropouts. Their men are self-employed in semi-skilled work with no growth prospects
whatsoever. The access of Muslims to bank credit or any other facility that they are entitled to as
minority community is zero. There are few self help groups of Muslim Women. Forget accessing,
the awareness about the special provisions for minorities is zero across parties, occupations,
classes. They have not heard of Ranganath Mishra report or Sachar Commission report, barring
one couple who were into politics and call themselves social workers. There is widespread
cynicism about the funds actually reaching them. One or two of the respondents complained that
to avail any government scheme, agents charge Rs 1000/- for fulfillment of formalities/paper
work and if the amount is granted by the state, they disappear with the money or seek a hefty
commission. Hence, it is important to monitor the implementation of the schemes through
voluntary organizations like NGOs or through Anganwadi Sevikas.

Other important areas of intervention by the state are security and safety, combat gender violence,
drug and alcohol abuse among youth, enhance Muslim women’s political participation, reforms in
the family laws to ensure gender justice (in the matters concerning marriage, divorce, maintenance,
alimony, property, custody and guardianship of child and right to residence), food security,
education-higher, vocational and technical education, health and family welfare, employment and
livelihood, credit facilities and pro-active efforts to make available government schemes to Muslim
women. There is need to include Muslim community and women in particular in mainstream
development programs of the government. Women’s participation in Self Help Groups was
marginal in the areas investigated by our team. Affirmative action by the financial institutions for
economic empowerment and financial inclusion of poor Muslim women are a MUST. In order to
facilitate this, there is an urgent need for sex segregated data for minorities, SC and ST so that
realistic approach can be adopted to address their educational, health, employment and skill
development needs.

Recommendations:

Education

In the Muslim dominated areas, the government aided schools should provide the necessities on
time and delays should be avoided. The teaching– learning process should become more
organized. There should be monitoring of absenteeism among teachers. The government with its
infrastructure and funds could make a positive contribution towards school education if they
show some commitment. To promote higher and vocational education among Muslim girls and
women, colleges and vocational training institutions must be started in the areas inhabited by
Muslims. Education should be completely free till from Pr-primary to post graduation. The state
government should also run good English medium schools up to 12th standard. They must ensure
that the teachers are regular and committed and also see to it that they are paid their regular
scales, on time.
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According to estimates, a major drop-out among Muslim students takes place at the primary stage
and only 2.5 percent of the population reaches the level of graduation. The others drop out of
education to work on their traditional family occupations. Poverty and poor access to education
partly explains the high school dropout rate among the Muslims. The other part of the problem is
the perception that the economic gain from education is poor. This perception of poor returns
from education is because of Muslims find it difficult to get organized sector, white collar jobs.
To facilitate the education of Muslims, it is necessary to ease the registration process of new
educational institutions in the Muslim pockets with English and Marathi teaching facility. The
government schemes of scholarships and payment to parents on school attendance of their
children need to be enhanced. There is also a need to simplify the documentation requirement for
school enrolment.

Pre-matric Educational Fund (scholarship)

Minimum amount for pre-matric scholarship should be Rs 5000. The state should keep its
demand for documentation to the minimum. Give full authority to the headmaster to administer
the fund. There is a time limit of 10 days for the cumbersome procedure which should be
extended and the procedure simplified. Also there is a condition at present that a student has to
get minimum 50 percent marks to avail of this scholarship. This condition should go as
struggling and working students may not be able to satisfy this condition and hence are deprived
of this meager fund.

Basic Civic Amenities

The Muslims find it hard to get the ration card as about 60 percent of them live below the
poverty line and very few of them, about 10 percent, survive on marginal lands less than 2.5
acres. Their problems are compounded by the apathy of officials and the lack of access of the
community to welfare schemes and programmes.

It is indeed very sad to see the dismal ghettoes and shanty towns that the vast sections of the
Muslim community are forced to live in. There is therefore a need for infrastructure
development of improved sanitation, water supply, schooling, and electricity supply in these
areas. So long as people are forced to live in marginal strips of land, under bridges and over
putrefying and stinking drains there is the possibility of the emergence of criminal network. A
plan for shifting these unfortunate slum dwellers to well developed areas must be embarked by
the government as soon as possible. The ghettoes need to be replaced by proper housing. The
builders should be given incentives to develop the Muslim ghettoes and slums in the same way
as other low income areas have been developed. They should be grant of extra FSI and TDR to
provide housing for the Muslim Community. By providing better housing and other basic
amenities of water, electricity, sanitation health and education, it is possible prevent the
criminalization of young people. Criminalization is directly linked to lack of space, abject poverty
and hunger. It is also perpetuated by insecurity and alienation.

Proper drainage system be provided so that most of the illnesses related to water born diseases
can be controlled. Public health and sanitation measures against unhygienic living and working
condition must be taken as early as possible. Eradication of contagious disease programme TB,
skin ailments needs an immediate attention. People spit anywhere and everywhere and that
compounds the problem. Basic civil amenities such as water, street lights in the urban areas,
sanitation, road, hospital/health centre, ICDS centres, school, multi-purpose activity centres,
community libraries and banking facilities must be ensured on a top priority basis.

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Loan Schemes

The procedure for loan facilities needs simplification. The Minority Commission should fan out
into Muslim majority areas, set up office to give information and guidance to access loans.
Formalities, documents should be reduced to a minimum. The government should come to
where the people are and not make the people run around for meager sums. Wide publicity
should be given to Maulana Azad Employment Loan Scheme, Educational loan and
Scholarships. The local TV channels run by cable operators could be used to publicise the
schemes. For effective time bound implementation of minority welfare schemes, the formalities
should be simplified, paper work reduced, people should not have to travel long distance to
submit their form etc. as they lose out on the day’s salary which they can ill afford. Government
employees should be posted in each ward. This person will constantly move in the basti or set
up shop. S\he should be accessible to people and help with the formalities. They can be given a
small commission from the government for each loan they actualize. This will effectively counter
the sprouting of unscrupulous agents, dalals and other dada elements that charge an exorbitant
fee and also cheat people. According to Mohsin Haider, corporator of Mumbai, loans should be
dispensed fast. They should simplify procedure, reduce cost and time involved in making the
application for getting the loan. The administrative procedure should be de-centralised. There
are 23 administrative wards in Municipality. These should be used as sub-centres for
disbursement.

Housing

Majority of the people seem to be living in less than 15 sq. feet of space for which they pay a
rent of Rs 3000 to Rs 4000 per month. The people who came here more than 30 years ago have
their own shanty but they have built two stories above their place and let it out on rent. This is
how the number of rentees exceeds the number of ‘owners’ three times over. SRA projects have
been there for some time now and some buildings with 225 sq.ft. areas have come up in the first
lap around 8 years ago. Thereafter, the project has slowed down considerably and some
unfinished projects are languishing. This doesn’t stop people from hoping for and dreaming
about a pucca house. According to Hashim Bhai, builder, 1/1/95 is the cutoff date for owners
with proper identification for being eligible for benefit under SRA. He strongly feels that the
government should give pucca houses to all, irrespective of cutoff date. If all houses are
regularized, the government will get more income by way of water bill, electricity bill. There will
be no anti-social elements as all will have permanent address and identity. Crime rate will come
down drastically.

The government should float tenders and by a transparent process entrust builders with the task
of providing accommodation for all slum-dwellers with complete infrastructure. According to
Sheikh, an activist of the CPI, in 2000 a survey was carried out by the government and 26,000
ownership houses were marked to come under SRA scheme. But when SRA came, 40 percent of
those who were eligible did not get accommodation in the building. No reasons were given for
their deprivation. There are lots of loopholes in SRA scheme implementation. Rules keep
changing and too many permissions have to be taken, too much bribe given. The government
agents, dalals, police, builders have formed a nexus (syndicate) to grab land, deprive the original
owners and sell the premise at a premium. Many of the MLAs. , MPs, and Corporators are hand
in glove with the builders in this massive scam. So say the social workers of the area. Massive
urban housing scheme is urgently required to be undertaken by the government and not SRA by
unscrupulous private developers.
Health Care
At least two full-fledged municipal hospitals with all facilities should be built in or around the
Muslim dominated areas on a priority basis. There is a need for reorienting the behaviour of
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medical doctors in all government, aided and supported hospitals towards Muslims and Muslim
women in particular. The necessity of opening of new ICDS centres in the Muslim concentrated
areas is essential and must be taken up in a phased manner.

Women-headed Households

The single (widows, deserted and divorced) Muslim women strongly expressed the desire to
have some home-based piece work to enhance their living standards. They were the poorest of
the poor within the community. Women-headed households should be given special
consideration in all affirmative and anti-poverty programmes of the state.

Aanganwadis

The food served in ICDS centres should not be sticky. This is messy for the teachers as well as
for the children. There is often no water for washing hands. Dry and nutritious snacks like
chikki, biscuit, kela, khajur, sengdhana and milk would be ideal. The ICDS centres should be housed
in more spacious premises, with water facilities. The Sevikas should not be pressurized to do a
lot of supplementary work, administrative paper work. They should be given more holidays.

Social Security and Access to Welfare Schemes

Following the interactions with different groups, the study group felt that specific schemes
dealing with education, employment and health are needed. When the committee visited Muslim
dominated areas of Bhiwandi and Malegaon, a large number of representations were made to the
study group regarding measures to be undertaken to improve the conditions of Muslims. The
study group found that despite several submissions on improving the conditions of Muslims, no
concrete steps have been taken to implement the recommendations. This has caused
disappointment and mistrust among the Muslims and there is a feeling of being alienated.

The state has to be pro-active in ensuring social security and social protection to the informal
sector workers. All of them must be provided with ration cards. There is the Rajiv Gandhi
Jeevandayi Arogya Yojana which is medical insurance for the economically backward where
money is not given to the beneficiaries but their medical bill is taken care of. This is merely on
paper than reality. This must change and the scheme must be effectively implemented.

Economic and Livelihood Needs

The Muslims who came to Maharashtra, particularly those who made Mumbai as their base,
initially did well in small manufacturing and export business. Their substantial economic
participation, however, has not grown rapidly because of a variety of factors that require in-
depth exploration. The Muslims feel that the expansion of their business enterprises has not
been rapid because of the reluctance of financial institutions to support their enterprises. They
also feel that they are discriminated by government officials in getting permits. As a consequence
there are very few Muslim entrepreneurs. Not only are the Muslim entrepreneurs are few in
number, they face grave difficulties in their own homes due to abject poverty, living in squalid
surroundings and the social evils of gender bias, laws of divorce and inheritance and require
government intervention and help from the social groups and reformists.

The Muslims who settled in Bhiwandi, Sholapur, Malegaon, Kamptee, Aurangabad and Nagpur
initially developed a flourishing textile business facilitated by the installation of power-looms.
Currently the textile industry is facing serious problems because of the non-availability of raw
material and marketing facilities. The industry needs government support through subsidized
electricity tariff and providing housing, education and medical facilities for the loom workers.
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Muslims have done well in petty trading, but they have not been able to expand their business
operations. This limited scale of their enterprises is also apparent in other sectors, for instance in
the transport sector, they are confined to small time transport business in the urban areas. They
have not been able to expand their activities to include inter-state transport business.

There is a need to ease the flow of credit to the Muslim concentrated areas for the development
of industry, promotion of vocational training centres, technological institutes, health
infrastructure and housing needs to be ensured on priority. The Study Group met bankers and
other key informants within the community in many vulnerable areas including Aurangabad,
Malegaon and Bhiwandi. It was found the banks could not find any plausible reason for the non-
existence of credit flow to the Muslims in those areas, where bank credit is the crying need of
the hour – for housing, industrial infrastructure, agricultural operations and marketing ventures.
The stock reply on this depressing state from the bankers was that the Muslims do not come
forward for the loans whereas the Muslims have attributed their lack of credit access to sheer
indifference to the Muslims. Without livelihood options, many Muslim families are living in
abject poverty. They are often dependent on the income earned by their children. They are
caught in a vicious cycle of poverty and unemployment.

Impact of Communal Violence

The memory of the frequent outburst of riots and communal flare ups have remained in the
minds of the people in Bhiwandi and Malegaon and created a trust deficit in the police and local
administration. They are however appreciative of the way that the police handled the most
recent instance of communal tension caused by the dominant community. As indicated earlier,
the frequent recurrence of communal riots has aggravated the squalor and misery of infamous
slums/ghettoes of Mumbra, Dharavi, Mazgaon, Kurla, Govandi, Jogeshwari, Millatnagar,
Mohammad Ali Road, and Bhendi Bazar. These ghettoes (as well as other areas of low facilities)
are breeding grounds for criminalization of youth and spread of underworld network (Patel et al,
2013).

The frequent outburst of violence and communal clashes in the state has taken a heavy toll of
harmonious relationship between the Hindus and Muslims. The many instances of terror attacks
have made the young men in the community vulnerable. There are countless instances when
they are arbitrarily arrested by a biased police and imprisoned. An important TISS study
indicates that Muslims constitute 30 percent of inmates in prison, many of them are under-
trials.11 This finding is reiterated in many newspaper reports. Sensitization of the Media and press to
the problems facing the Muslims, particularly the feeling of many knowledgeable and highly
patriotic Muslims elite that in the event of some terroristic inhuman action many Muslims are
indiscriminately picked up by the Police. There is a need for the exercise of care, caution,
sympathy and circumspection.

Role of Women’s Organisations

“I am Tahera Khan. I am a grassroots worker for an NGO. I am a trained nursing aide and was
employed in a hospital on contract basis. As my contract ended, I was out of a job and joined
the NGO on the recommendation of the doctor under whom I worked. I have to visit the bastis
everyday as a part of my job and talk to the women. Our NGO is trying to form a self-help
group and I am incharge of mobilizing the women for it. I also have to generate awareness
regarding my NGO’s services – creche, balwadi, beauty parlour classes, computer classes, study
centre etc. The women in the bastis are not very consistent or reliable. Sometimes they will
promise to come for a meeting at our centre but not turn up. I stay in the same basti so as to
know many of them personally. In spite of this, it is an uphill task to get women together. They
want to know what benefits they will get if they come. I tell them not to expect immediate
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benefits but think of the long run but they are not bothered. They live in the present. Theirs is a
fight for survival. They are bothered about today. Tomorrow is a distant dream. That’s how it is
with our people.” (Dhara, 2013)

A Case to Declaring Muslims OBC

The Study Group unanimously recommends to the government that the entire Muslim
population of Maharashtra be placed in OBC category. The need for affirmative action is
because Muslims have a disproportionately low representation in the government services,
ranging from 2 to 4 percent in the police force and bureaucracy. The Muslim community also
lives under conditions of substantive inequality.

The categorization of Muslims as OBC could be a way towards redressing some aspects of the
social injustices and economic inequalities they have faced. The inclusion of Muslims in the
affirmative action programme has been attempted by many other states. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil
Nadu, Kerala, and West Bengal have already included the Muslims in the OBCs category to
ensure that they are benefited by the various affirmative action schemes. Maharashtra can take
the lead in ensuring the development of Muslim community through strategies that sensitively
address their substantive needs. Other important areas of intervention by the state are security
and safety, combat Gender Violence, Drug and Alcohol Abuse, enhance Muslim women’s
political participation, reforms in the family laws to ensure gender justice (in the matters
concerning marriage, divorce, maintenance, alimony, property, custody and guardianship of child
and right to residence), food security, education-higher, vocational and technical education,
health and family welfare, employment and livelihood, credit facilities and pro-active efforts to
make available government schemes to Muslim women.

There is need to include Muslim community and women in particular in mainstream

development programs of the government. Women’s participation in Self Help Groups was
marginal in the areas investigated by our team. Affirmative action by the financial institutions for
economic empowerment and financial inclusion of poor Muslim women are a MUST. In order
to facilitate this, there is an urgent need for sex segregated data for minorities, SC and ST so that
realistic approach can be adopted to address their educational, health, employment and skill
development needs.

References

1. Dhara, Lalitha (2013) “Case Study I: Gilbert Hill, Andheri (W) Mumbai” in Vibhuti Patel et
al Socioeconomic Profile of Muslims : A State Profile of Maharashtra Prepared by Department of
Economics, SNDT Women's University, Mumbai
2. Kulkarni, P M and M Alagarajan (2005): “Population Growth Fertility and Religion in
India”, Economic & Political Weekly, 29 January. Jain, Ranu and Abdul Shaban (1999): “Socio-
Economic and Educational Status of Muslims in Mumbai”, A Research Report, Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Deonar, Mumbai (submitted to the State Minorities
Commission, Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai), February 2005.
3. Masselos, Jim (1994): “Postmodern Bombay: Fractured Discourses” in Sophie Watson and
Kathie Gibson (ed.), Postmodern Cities and Spaces, 199-215 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
4. NSSO (National Sample Survey Office) (2007): “Employment and Unemployment Situation
among Major Religious Groups in India 2004-05, NSS 61st Round (July 2004-June 2005)”,
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation Government of India, New Delhi,
March 2007.
5. Phadke, Shilpa (2007): “Dangerous Liaisons: Women and Man: Risk and Reputation in
Mumbai”, Economic & Political Weekly, 42(17): 1510-18.

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6. Patel, Vibhuti, Veena Devasthali, Ruby Ojha and Sanjay Phad (2013) A Study of
Socioeconomic Condition of Muslims in Maharashtra, Maharashtra State Minority
Commission, Government of Maharashtra, Mumbai.
7. Patel, Vibhuti (2014): “Socioeconomic Profile of Muslims in Maharashtra”, Mumbai:
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. xlviii, No 36, pp. 68-73
8. Robinson, Rowena (2005): Tremors of Violence: Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife in Western India
(New Delhi: Sage Publications).
9. Sachar Committee Report (Government of India) (2006): “Social, Economic and
Educational
10. Status of the Muslim Community in India”. Prime Minister’s High Level Committee,
Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, November.
11. Shaban, Abdul (2008): “Ghettoisation, Crime and Punishment in Mumbai”, Economic &
Political Weekly, 42(23): 68-73.

Prof. Vibhuti Patel, is Director Centre for Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, and Head, Department
of Economics, SNDT Women's University, Mumbai. She has made contributions in Women’s Studies and
Gender Economics. She has authored a book ‘Women’s Challenges of the New Millennium’ by Gyan
Publication, Delhi, published in 2002. She has co-authored two books: ‘Indian Women - Change and Challenge’
(1985) and ‘Reaching for Half the Sky’ (1985). She has co-edited volume ‘Macro Economic Policies and the
Millennium Development Goals’ published by Gyan Publications, Delhi in 2006. She is co-editor of series of 15
volumes on ‘Empowering Women Worldwide', The Women Press, Delhi, 2008. She has edited the book,
‘Discourse on Women and Empowerment’, ‘The Women Press, Delhi, 2009 and ‘Girls and Girlhoods-At the
Threshold of Youth and Gender’, 2010 by The Women Press, B. R. Publications, Delhi.

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 Chapter 15

INFLUENCE OF EDUCATION IN ENHANCING SOCIAL INCLUSION

OF MUSLIM WOMEN THROUGH ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES
Broto Rauth Bharadwaj

Abstract

This paper attempts to find the role of education in enhancing the impact of education in improving the status of
Muslim women entrepreneurs. The data was collected from all over India (east, west, north and south). The
empirical study aims at developing understanding about role of nature of business influencing Muslim women
entrepreneurship. Several organizations from manufacturing and services sectors were selected for the empirical
study established by Muslim women entrepreneurs.

The data was collected through questionnaire survey, observation and interview method and has been analyzed
through SAP-LAP framework of Flexible Systems Methodology (Sushil, 1994, 1997, 2000). There is a
significant relationship between size of the business expansion and the sector of business and profit generated. This
implies that in Indian context, mostly Muslim women entrepreneurs invest and set up enterprises mostly in sectors
including beauty, retail, food, childcare and others sectors which require less investment and comparatively non-
heavy engineering sectors. The results also show that the expansion plan is dependent on the profits generated in
the business.

Introduction

There is a huge gap in the study of nature of business in promoting Muslim women
entrepreneurship. Despite considerable research on academic entrepreneurship, female
entrepreneurship in general, and the causes of under-representation of female scientists in
academic institutions, there has been little research on the influence of gender on academic
entrepreneurship. Several researchers investigated entrepreneurial activity and analyzed the
incentives of female participation in the labour market (Apergis and Pekka-Economou, 2010). It
is interesting to find that female entrepreneurial activity enhances the social and economic
condition of a country. They represent a driving force, active and effective members of
economic, political, professional and managerial societies.

On the other hand, they have families with serious maternal responsibilities and inelastic
household obligations, roles which they are trying to balance effectively. The study involves
Muslim women entrepreneurs from Greece and examined the issue of entrepreneurial activity,
personal characteristics and various motivation incentives. The data was collected from 1600
industrial firms located in the prefecture of Piraeus over the period 1999-2009, this study makes
use of the panel methodology approach to provide evidence about the main determinants of
female entrepreneurship. The study findings show that a combination of pull and push motives
and effective mentoring framework, in addition to a set of personal characteristics such as risk of
failure, educational level, creativity, innovativeness, ambitiousness and marital status are drivers
of Muslim women entrepreneurship in Greece.
Rosa and Dawson (2006) studied the commercialization of university science, particularly the
creation of spinout companies from the science base and found that in Europe and the USA,
only 12 percent of these entrepreneurs are women. The paper explored reasons for this low
representation through follow-up postal interviews of the 21 women founders, and a man
control sample. Under-representation of female academic staff in science research is dominant
but not the only factor to explain low entrepreneurial rates amongst female scientists.
Owing to the low number of Muslim women in senior research positions in many leading
science departments, few Muslim women had the chances to lead a spinout. This is a critical
factor as much impetus for commercialization was initially inspired by external interest rather
than internal evaluation of a commercial opportunity. External interest tended to target senior
academics, which proportionally are mostly male. A majority of the Muslim women surveyed
tended to be part of entrepreneurial teams involving senior male colleagues. As a whole both
men and women science entrepreneurs displayed similar motivations to entrepreneurship, but
collectively as scientists differed appreciably from non-academic entrepreneurs. Muslim women
science entrepreneurs also faced some additional problems in areas such as the conflict between
work and home life and networks.

The paper reports the confirmatory analysis of the role of nature of business (measured in terms
of sector, size and profit) in enhancing Muslim women entrepreneurship. The paper has the
following structure - literature review, hypothesis development, data collection, analysis, and
research and managerial implications and limitations of the study.

Literature Review

Langowitz and Minniti (2007) found that entrepreneurship is becoming an increasingly

important source of employment for Muslim women across many countries. The study findings
suggest that the level of female involvement in entrepreneurial activity, however, is still
significantly lower than that of men. Taking a behavioral economics approach and using a large
sample of individuals in 17 countries, the authors investigated what variables influence the
entrepreneurial propensity of Muslim women and whether these variables have a significant
correlation with differences across genders. In addition to demographic and economic variables,
we include a number of perceptual variables. Our results show that subjective perceptual variables
have a crucial influence on the entrepreneurial propensity of Muslim women and account for
much of the difference in entrepreneurial activity between the sexes. Specifically, we find that
Muslim women tend to perceive themselves and the entrepreneurial environment in a less
favorable light than men across all countries in our sample and regardless of entrepreneurial
motivation. Our results suggest that perceptual variables may be significant universal factors
influencing entrepreneurial behaviour.

Lassithiotaki (2011) investigated the entrepreneurial beliefs/attitudes, ambitions, expectations,

goals and visions of rural Muslim women who choose to cooperate and found Muslim Women's
Rural cooperatives in the Prefecture of Heraklion on the island of Crete. The results of a
qualitative study involving a sample of eight Muslim chairpersons of rural Muslim women's
established Traditional Food Production cooperatives, indicated that the traditional domestic
roles (housewife, mother), the low level of education, the lack of professional skills, enterprise
experience and mostly the unwillingness of rural Muslim women to undertake enterprise risk,
have turned them toward an enterprise model that lacks modern business methods in the use of
quality control production systems, in the production of Protected Geographical Identification
Goods and/or Certified Local Traditional Food and/or Organic Products, in the use of new
organizing and managing technologies, in advertising and promoting products and in
administrative renewal.

Sigalla (2012) studied the microcredit strategies combining the logic of business, progressive
approaches to learning from experience and the key aim to reduce poverty, especially amongst
Muslim women. The focus in such interventions on the independent, entrepreneurial citizen
suggests not only new ways to generate economic growth and sustainable development, but an
important recalibration of the repressive social relations thought to be at the root of Muslim
women's persistent ‘under-development’. This article explores Muslim women's experiences of
their roles as entrepreneurs, and reflects on how the learning processes and outcomes associated
200
with microcredit schemes ‘shape the self’, often in quite unpredictable ways. The article is based
on an ethnographic study of disadvantaged Muslim women in Dar es Salaam, and follows them
as they participate in NGO-based training schemes, ‘practice’ entrepreneurship in a range of
income-generating settings, and negotiate the consequences of the new subjectivities on which
the independent, entrepreneurial citizen is based. Like many microcredit programmes, the
majority of Muslim women in the study were full-time housewives before joining the scheme.

Others had left their jobs following retrenchment, prejudice or gender discrimination. In all
cases, they started their own businesses with little or no business experience or education. Whilst
some appear to have embraced the new opportunities, others have struggled. In all cases,
microcredit and the associated learning processes produced contradictory and ambivalent
feelings of success and failure, hope and disappointment, progress and exclusion. The article
explores these ambivalences in order to critique development initiatives that are based on
universal notions of autonomy and self-determination in contexts shaped by dependence and
structural inequality.

Lin and Abetti (2012) found that the article presents a case study of a woman entrepreneur, Li Lin,
regarding China's transition from socialist to capitalist free market economy. She started two
companies under difficult circumstances, the private foreign automobile repair and maintenance
shop and an educational testing service used by five million English students at Chinese primary
and high schools. In addition, the factors that contributed to her success and failure are analyzed.

Shabana (2011) found that entrepreneurship is a key element of growth and development for all
countries and it is most relevant to transition countries. Moreover, the study also found that
entrepreneurship has been a male-dominated phenomenon from the very early age, but time has
changed the situation and brought Muslim women as today's most memorable and inspirational
entrepreneurs. In almost all the developed countries in the world, Muslim women are putting
their steps at par with the men in the field of business. Muslim women are the nuclei of a nation.
They are the real builder and molder of a nation's destiny.

The study further suggests that the position and status of Muslim women in any society is an
index of its civilization and progress. A role of modern Muslim women is not confined to the
traditional role as a mother and housewife- it has and is undergoing changes. The hidden
entrepreneurial potential of Muslim women is gradually being surfaced with the growing
sensitivity to their role and economic status in the society; they are increasingly becoming
conscious of their existence and their rights.

At present, Management Institutions often boost of near 100 percent job placement for their
students and strive to create their identity around the same. However, in the days to come, the
basis to identify an excellent institution will depend on how many entrepreneurs have been
created by the institute. A questionnaire tool was used to gather information from 100 post
graduate students of Bharati Vidyapeeth Institute of Management, Kolhapur and Shahu Institute
of Business Education and Research, India. The study found various motivating factors which
make the Muslim women student select entrepreneurship as a career option as well as the
various perceived difficulties which hinder the choice of the students in selecting
entrepreneurship after their post graduate course.

Similarly, Sellers (2011) speculated for why no female entrepreneurs have launched businesses
the scale of social networking site Facebook. Muslim women are noted to favour negotiating for
others rather than themselves, to enjoy being influencers more than climbing the ladder, and
how their goal of creating companies people want to work for mean smaller dreams and less risk
than many Fortune 500 companies require. Other topics discussed include how many

201
entrepreneurs do not have formal business education. Therefore, we propose the following
hypothesis:

H1: Size of the business has significant correlation with Muslim women entrepreneurship.

Field, Jayachandran, Pande (2010) presented an exploration into the limitations and constraints
present in traditional business cultures towards Muslim women entrepreneurship. The study
revolved around the structure of traditional institutions inherently posing obstacles for would-be
business Muslim women, focusing on whether inadequate access, limited demand, or social
norms primarily lead to fewer Muslim women entrepreneurs. Field research was conducted in
business training programmes in India, comparing several features of the applicants and their
skills. The research showed that there is a positive effect of business education on the
prospective incomes of business Muslim women.

Moreover, Davis (2011) found that Muslim women entrepreneurs face a wide variety of barriers
and challenges throughout the life and growth of their entrepreneurial venture. This study
expands the knowledge base on Muslim women entrepreneurs' needs, specifically their needs in
terms of service areas and service delivery method preferences. Twenty three "needed" service
areas were identified by 95 Manitoba based Muslim women entrepreneurs. Some of these needs
include finding new customers, growth benefits and tools, market expansion, general marketing,
and networking skills. This study also found that there is significant difference between urban
and rural based entrepreneurs. Two service need areas included “identifying the mentors and
role models" and "legal issues" which exhibited significant correlation. The study findings
suggest that Muslim women entrepreneurs do not find service delivery a challenge. Overall, this
study concludes that regardless of location, Muslim women entrepreneurs' training and support
needs do not significantly differ w.r.t. male entrepreneurs. The effects of entrepreneurial stage
and years in business on entrepreneurial support needs are also examined. Therefore, we
propose the following hypothesis:

H2: Sector of the business has significant correlation with Muslim women entrepreneurship.

Ismail, Shamsudin and Chowdhury (2012) explored the effects of motivational factors on
Muslim women entrepreneurship venturing in Malaysia. The research was conducted on 80
entrepreneurs through random sampling technique. All hypotheses were tested using regression
analysis and Pearson correlations, controlling for demographic variables of gender, age, and
education, years of experience, and start-up funding. While the results of this study found
significant effect of pull motivational factors, there is a marginal effect of push motivational
factors on Muslim women entrepreneurship venturing in Malaysia. Implications and a number
of recommendations are discussed. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Profit maximization influences Muslim women entrepreneurship significantly.

Size of
Business

Profit Muslim Women

Making Entrepreneurship

Sector of
Business
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Research
202
Data collection

The data was collected from all over India (east, west, north and south). The empirical study
aims at developing understanding about role of nature of business influencing Muslim women
entrepreneurship. Several organizations from manufacturing and services sectors were selected
for the empirical study established by Muslim women entrepreneurs.

The data was collected through a questionnaire survey, observation and interview method and
has been analyzed through SAP-LAP framework of Flexible Systems Methodology (Sushil, 1994,
1997, 2000) as presented in Figure 2. The issues relating to the situation, actors, and process are
analyzed in the organizational context to generate/evolve learnings regarding Muslim women
entrepreneurship.

Situation

Process Learning

Actor

Figure 2: SAP Interaction for Learning

Methodology for the Questionnaire Study

This part of the study aimed at establishing relationships between the variables involved in the
study problem. It uses the questionnaire survey method, in which the unit of analysis is the
entrepreneur. The questionnaire was developed and pre-tested before mailing to the selected
respondents. To understand the correlation among the different variables, correlation analysis
has been used. Based on the conceptual model evolved in this chapter, the hypotheses have been
tested statistically through stepwise multiple regression technique and the results have been
synthesized to identify the organizational antecedents impacting ‘WE’ outcomes.
Analysis
The first major predictor of WE is sector of business as shown in Table 1. The other predictor is
profit maximization. All these variables together explain 25.0 percent of the variance in WE; the
rest is dependent on other variables and spurious variables not included in the model. The
corresponding ANOVA values for the regression model are shown in Table 2 indicating
validation at 99 percent confidence level.
Table 1: Regression Model Summary for Muslim women Entrepreneurship as dependent
Variable

Model R R Square Adjusted R Std. Error of the

Square Estimate
1 .375(a) .540 .123 .454
2 .530(b) .681 .250 .420
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sector of business
b. Predictors: (Constant), Sector of business, Profits generated
203
The model summary of macro variables for ‘WE’ outcomes is given in Table 3. Figure 1 shows
the validated model for macro variables as predictors of ‘WE’ outcomes.

Table 2: ANOVA for Muslim women Entrepreneurship as Dependent Variable

Mode Sum of Squares DF Mean F Sig.

Square

1 Regression 1.618 1 1.618 7.842 .007(a)

Residual 9.902 48 .206
Total 11.520 49
2 Regression 3.232 2 1.616 9.166 .000(b)
Residual 8.288 47 .176
Total 11.520 49

a. Predictors: (Constant), Sector of business

b. Predictors: (Constant), Sector of business, Profits generated
c. Dependent Variable: Size of business

Table 2 shows that there is a significant relationship between size of the business expansion and
the sector of business and profit generated. This implies that in the Indian context, mostly
Muslim women entrepreneurs invest and set up enterprises mostly in sectors including beauty,
retail, food, childcare and others sectors which require less investment and comparatively non-
heavy engineering sectors. The results also show that the expansion plan is dependent on the
profits generated in the business.

Table 3: Coefficient Summary for Muslim women Entrepreneurship

as Dependent Variable

Mode Unstandardized Standardized T Sig.

Coefficients Coefficients

B Std. Error Beta

1 (Constant) 1.745 .152 11.507 .000
Sector of business -.332 .118 -.375 -2.800 .007
2 (Constant) 1.502 .161 9.299 .000
Sector of business -.397 .112 -.449 -3.559 .001
Profits generated .117 .039 .382 3.026 .004

a. Dependent Variable: Size of business

The coefficient summary as shown in Table 3 gives Beta values of Intelligence Dissemination
(ID), Work Discretion (WD) and Management Support (MS) as 0.459, 0.235 and 0.206
respectively, which are fairly representative of their impact on the CE. Thus, Intelligence
Dissemination (ID) is emerging as a major influence variable for CE.
204
Correlation Analysis

All the eight macro variables and two micro variables of CE Outcomes have been correlated
using the Pearson correlation test for the full sample of 289 responses. The results obtained by
the test are shown in Table 4.

There is significant correlation among the micro variables of ‘WE’, namely size of business and
sector of business for the total sample of 289 responses at 99 percent of confidence level.

a. Dependent Variable: Size of business

The summary of the three regression models is shown in Table 3 in terms of the independent
variables acting as predictors, cumulative R square and the hypotheses codes for the hypotheses
accepted and the hypotheses rejected.

Macro Variables

Sector of business .540

Muslim women
Profit generated .681 Entrepreneurship

Size of business .545

- Predictor Variable Beta Value

- Dependent Variable - Macro Variable

Figure 3: Validated Model for Macro Variables as Predictors of ‘WE’

There are in all three hypotheses of association among macro variables and all of them have
been accepted.

The major predictors as per the hypotheses accepted relate to independent variables namely
sector of business, profits generated and size of business, which are either immediately preceding
the dependent variables or at the best having a second level impact. The most critical among
these variables is profit generated. It is interesting to observe that Muslim women entrepreneurs
in emerging markets such as India, prefer small scale sector more as it requires small investment
and skill set.

Hence, the government intending to promote ‘WE’, should have proper policy to provide the
loans to the Muslim women entrepreneurs which they can payback through small installments
with no interest to be paid. This will help them to build more enterprises and generate
employment as well as increase GDP of the country. Moreover, without providing the
autonomy and financial support to the Muslim women entrepreneurs for developing the ideas,
they will not be able to generate business for India.

All the eight macro variables and two micro variables of ‘WE’ Outcomes have been correlated
using the Pearson correlation test for the full sample of 289 responses. The results obtained by
the test are shown in Table 4.

205
There is significant correlation among the micro variables of ‘WE’, namely sector of business
and size of business for the total sample of 289 responses at 99 percent of confidence level.

Table 4: Correlation of Micro Variables for the Total Sample

Autonomy Flexibility Social Self

Status Achievement
Size of business Pearson -.241 -.319(*) -.267 .401(**)
Correlation
Revenue earned from Pearson .041 .089 .044 -.624(**)
the enterprise Correlation
Profits generated Pearson -.111 -.101 -.392(**) -.352(*)
Correlation
What made you start Pearson .533(**) .617(**) .665(**) .204
your business: profit Correlation
making
Autonomy Pearson 1 .653(**) .672(**) .132
Correlation
Flexibility Pearson .653(**) 1 .536(**) -.006
Correlation
Social status Pearson .672(**) .536(**) 1 .207
Correlation
Self achievement Pearson .132 -.006 .207 1
Correlation

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The highest level of correlation is between social status and autonomy (0.672) which is logical
since high-level autonomy will lead to internal understanding and awareness about the demands
of the markets and change in customer perceptions and also the social status of the Muslim
women. Also, in emerging country context, it is interesting to find that there is a significant
correlation between social status of the Muslim women entrepreneur and the degree of
autonomy she gets in handling her business, level of profit making and flexibility to pursue her
dreams. The results also show that there is a significant correlation between degree of flexibility
and profit making (0.617). So in merging country context, it is interesting to see that social status
and profit making is dependent on autonomy to pursue the business and flexibility in control
and decision making.

This indicates that entrepreneurship has given Muslim women entrepreneurs, an opportunity to
grow, become self-sufficient and have made them confident and economically independent. The
second most important factor as perceived by Muslim women entrepreneurs was “Autonomy
and Adequate Income” with the factor mean score of 3.385 which implies that the income of
the Muslim women entrepreneurs have taken a positive jump with the advent of new business
and therefore it has enhanced self- sufficiency among Muslim women entrepreneurs. The
attributes named “I can take my own decisions regarding the expenditure of my income”, “My
family income has increased by starting my own business”, “I am satisfied that I am using my
spare time in earning” and “I feel content that I am contributing to my family income” were
loaded on this factor with factor loading of 0.81, 0.78, 0.727 and 0.652 respectively. This
206
indicates that through entrepreneurship they have become independent and they can take freely
take decisions for spending the adequate income as generated through entrepreneurship.

The third most important factor as perceived by Muslim women entrepreneurs was
“Opportunities to use and develop human capacity” with the factor mean score of 2.6394 which
implies that entrepreneurship fosters human capacity to grab the various opportunities
encountered. The attributes named “Have freedom of taking decision for my work and family”,
“Get an opportunity to participate in the planning of my work and my family” and “Idea that
brings changes in the family is appreciated” were loaded on this factor with factor loading of
0.799, 0.753 and 0.727 respectively. This indicates that the proper allocation of resources both
for family and work provoked through entrepreneurship brings appreciation which in turn
fosters entrepreneurship through raised morale.

The fourth most important factor as perceived by Muslim women entrepreneurs was “Flexible
Working Environment” with the factor mean score of 2.43 which implies that Muslim women
feel quite satisfied as they can devote sufficient time both to their personal and professional
lives. The attributes named “I don’t neglect my health due to work”, “The working atmosphere
is clean and transparent” and “The working conditions of my job are quite relaxing” were loaded
on this factor with factor loading of 0.79, 0.62 and 0.54 respectively. This indicates that
entrepreneurship promotes healthy working conditions and flexible working environment so
that they are able to take care of their personal life also.

The fifth most important factor as perceived by Muslim women entrepreneurs was “Promotion
of Societal Responsiveness” with the factor mean score of 2.356 which implies that with
entrepreneurship Muslim women have become more socially aware. The attributes named “I am
aware of the present market situations”, “I prefer to accomplish in team rather than individually”
and “Entrepreneurship enhances social activities” were loaded on this with factor loading of
0.799, 0.753, and 0.727 respectively. This indicates that Muslim women entrepreneurs are
socially aware of the current market scenario which in turn increases their social integration.

Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the relative importance of the overall Muslim
women empowerment (dependent variable) and different factors derived from the factors
(independent variables).As shown in Table 3, in predicting goodness of fit in Regression Model,
the multiple correlation coefficient (R), coefficient of determination (R2) and F ratio were
examined. Firstly, the R of five factors on Respondents empowerment was 0.52, meaning that
there was a moderate correlation between independent and dependent variables. Secondly, the
R2 was 0.259 suggesting that about 26 percent of the Variation of the Muslim women
empowerment was explained by five factors. Lastly, an F-ratio of 4.572 (p<0.01) indicates the
fitness of model. In order to explain the relative importance of the five factors in contributing to
the variance in overall satisfaction with the organization standardized coefficients, or betas, were
examined. The main factors affecting Muslim women empowerment is promotion of societal
responsiveness with unstandardized beta coefficient of 5.453 (p<0.05) followed by opportunities
to use and develop human capacity with unstandardized beta coefficient of 3.094 (p<0.05) as
discernible from the table.

Conclusion

This study suggests that the five main factors enable Muslim women entrepreneurs are
autonomy and adequate income, flexible working environment, opportunities to use and develop
human capacity, inducement of empowerment and growth and promotion of societal
responsiveness. By improving all these factors Muslim women can be empowered both socially
and economically.

207
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Dr. Broto Rauth Bharadwaj is working as Head, Research and Entrepreneurship Development at Bharati
Vidyapeeth University, New Delhi. She has completed her Post Doctoral thesis from UCLA, USA. She has
done Ph.D. from IIT, Delhi. She has more than 16 years of industry and teaching experience. She has published
more than 100 papers in national and international journals. She is the editor of BVIMR Management Edge,
Greener Journal, UK. She is in the advisory and review board of several international journals. She has several
publications in entrepreneurship with impact factor and indexed journals. Her research areas include strategic
management, sustainability, and corporate entrepreneurship, women entrepreneurship, international
entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurship.

209
 Chapter 16

IMPERATIVES OF PERSONAL LAW REFORM

AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Zafar Mahfooz Nomani

Abstract

The political discourse of personal laws have changed over time but the basic discursive and conceptual field within
which they have evolved was defined in the colonial era and perpetuated by state in independent India without
innovation. The legal policies of Muslim personal law shaped under colonial legal institutions by Codification as
potential resolution mechanism on ideological platter of community for justification of colonial rule. The Indian
governments manifested continuity under secular republic without alteration by codification tantamount to
returning to the classical roots of religion. The fact remained that under the garb of non-interference, the
government responded to external political imperatives and often justified on community demand of returning to
Sharia’h roots, religious identity and popular support. Invariably, political considerations prioritized state interest
over and above the posited interest of the people, community and nation. The discernible trend in historical
sequencing follows that Muslim personal laws were codified first and the codification of Hindu personal law
started at later stage and conceptually linked to construction of national identity. In this process of reform, it is
always logical to question the myth of Hindu progressiveness and Muslim repressiveness simply because of
historical accident that the former took place in pre-independent days and the latter happened in independent
India. It is not out of context, to further ask as to why the partial reform of Hindu personal law by postcolonial
legislature simultaneously avoided codifying the personal laws of Muslim on succession, inheritance, marriage and
divorce. The parameters of non-interference and transplantation of colonial laws therefore needs to be examined de
novo in the ideology of legal centralism and personal laws. The paper subscribe that India’s continuation of trifocal
legacy of recognition of traditional laws, development of powerful norms and assumption of reform of personal laws
by state is not robust with the imperatives of inclusive growth and good governance.

Overview and Methodology

Studies on Muslim Personal Law (MPL) in India are often linked to politicization of Hindu-
Muslim relationship and satisfaction of vote bank politics.1 This trivializes gender justice reform,
empowerment and equalization.2 The women equality seldom goes beyond a formal requirement
of discrimination and burden of history. The stereotyping of MPL centered on bland and banal
descriptions competitive assertiveness of religious identity,3 sociological and anthropological
study on caste4 and Muslims,5 and rise of Islam in south Asia.6 The MPL studies require a
dispassionate reading in Muslim women’s right to govern by their choice of laws within the

1 Nasreen Fazalbhoy, Sociology of Muslims in India: A Review, Economic and Political Weekly June 28, 1997.
2 Nomani, Md.Zafar Mahfooz, ‘Empowerment of Minorities Through Equalisation of Opportunities: Some
Tentative Suggestions’, Mirza Asmer Beg & A.R. Kidwai (Ed.) Empowerment of Indian Muslim: Perspectives, Planning
& Road Ahead, Concept Publishing House Pvt. Ltd.; New Delhi: 2012; Pp79-93
3 Robinson, F (1983): 'Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia', Contributions to Indian Sociology, ns, 18 (2), pp
301-05. - (1986): 'Islam and Muslim Society in South Asia: A Reply to Das and Minault', Contributions to Indian
Sociology, 20, pp 97-104.
4 Lindholm, C (1986): 'Caste in Islam and the Problem of Deviant Systems: A Critique of Recent Theory',
Contributions to Indian Sociology, Vol 20 (1), p 61-73.
5 Madan, T N (1976): Muslim Communities of South Asia, (Revised and enlarged edition, 1995), Vikas Publishing
House, New Delhi. (ed.) (1992): Religion in India, Oxford University Press, Delhi.
6 Minault, G (1984): 'Some Reflections on Islamic Revivalism vs. Assimilation among Muslims in India',
Contributions to Indian Sociology, 18, pp 301-05.
framework of Sharia’h for social exclusion and good governance7 by suggesting appropriateness
of corrective measures.8

The legislative initiatives and reforms in the family laws are based on methodology wherein the
de jure legal status of rights of women has been determined through a study over legal history and
laws which attract the family matters. The judgments regarding women’s rights of the apex court
have been examined to understand its view and role in the reform of family laws. The de facto
condition is different of de jure condition and it has been identified by stir up the information
collected from the newspapers, reports and research outputs of NGOs. The United Nations on
implementation of Universal Declaration Of Human Rights, 1948, International Convention of
Human Rights European Convention on Human Rights, 19509, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), 196610 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), 1979 The European Court Of Human Right (ECHR)11 and Siracusa Principles,
198412 has been examined cautiously and the gaps between the commitments and both the
statutes of women have been diagnosed.13 The reluctance of Government in reforming the
family laws and withdrawn of reservations lies merely with its own policy and ideology not with
others and this finding has come out from the comparison of the spirit of religious personal
laws.

Theoretical and Juridical Dispositions

It is always profitable to be abreast with the theoretical disposition grounded in thoughts of

Thomas Aquinas, John Locke and John Rawls to place the role of state in MPL reforms. Locke’s
arguments for tolerance are seen to be of little value today because of their explicitly Christian
formulation. Locke’s commitment to reason as the method for arriving at truth on religious
questions shapes both his arguments for the reasonableness of Christianity. He puts forward
religious arguments as public reason. Rawls’s idea of public reason concede that the content of
public reason is variable over time and space, and may itself depend on the very belief that
human beings are free and equal.14 It is generally seen that the legal judgments concerning
equality, human rights and religious belief have frequently provoked controversy in public
discourse. The productive level of engagement to advance debate, practice and understanding in
relation to religious belief is with ‘front line’ decision-makers seems sine quo non for MPL.15

The right to religious freedom is grounded in religion’s status as a fundamental and irreducible
human good, which is nevertheless related to other goods and social in character. Its protection
for persons and groups is therefore also a component of the common good of political society.

7 Evans, Martin, 1998. “Behind the Rhetoric: The Institutional Basis of Social Exclusion and Poverty”, IDS
Bulletin 29(1): 4249.
8 Nomani, Md. Zafar Mahfooz, ‘Conceptualisation & Contexualisation of Social Inclusion and Exclusion
under Equal Opportunity Commission Report: Reflections & Appraisal’, II(1) Journal of Exclusion Studies, 1-
9,2012.
9 European Convention on Human Rights,1950[signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and came into force in 1953]
10 Article 18.3, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966.
11 Ovey, Clare & Robin C.A. White., The European Convention on Human Rights 1–3.(1962)[ European Court of
Human Rights, Founded January 21, 1959, Rome, Italy].
12 UN Commission on Human Rights ,The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 28 September 1984 E/CN.4/1985/4, available at: http://www.
refworld.org /docid/4672bc122.html [accessed 23 April 2015].
13 Consideration Of Reports Submitted By Parties By Parties Under Article 18 Convention On The Elimination Of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW):On Initial Report By State Parties: India,10th March 1999[
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/075/29/IMG/N9907529.pdf?logged on 18.4.2015].
14 David H. McIlroy, Locke and Rawls on Religious Toleration and Public Reason, 2 (1) Oxford Journal of Law
Religion,1-24(2013).
15 Alice Donald, Advancing Debate about Religion or Belief, Equality and Human Rights: Grounds for
Optimism? 2 (1) Oxford Journal of Law Religion, 50-70 (2013).
212
First it is based on a perceived conflict between recognition of the good of religion and
pluralism. A second objection comes from those outside the Thomistic tradition of Aquinas,
who either rejects the status of religion as a good deserving of explicit legal recognition and
protection or accepts it on inadequate grounds. Finally, within the Thomistic tradition who
accepts some limitations on religious freedom in the name of the common good and most
objections is based on a misunderstanding and misapplication of Aquinas’s account.16

Historical Evolution and Sequencing

The historical sequencing of the theoretical discourse coupled with MPL reveals that the legacies
of personal laws in colonial state and the postcolonial states unravel the policy of ‘non-
interference’. According to Rina Verma Williams, ‘the post-colonial states operate with its
colonial predecessor that is ambiguous and uneven; at times continuous and at other time
discontinuous; but certainly remained always present’.17 An insightful overview of the origins and
alternations of Indian personal laws shows how gender discrimination prevails in their
interpretation and application despite constitutional guarantees of equality. The Hindu Rightist
makes its claims that India needs to abolish the personal laws of minorities because they are
antithetical to gender equality while failing to interrogate Hindu personal law, and demands a
uniform civil code of a similar type to the Hindu Codes aimed purportedly to liberate minority
women.18 The present political stalemate for women’s rights addresses gender inequality in
family property relationships19 while to craft a reform platform that eludes the dichotomy which
pits gender justice against minority rights and seems to favour a strategy that does not attempt to
erase religion just yet from the terrain of personal laws.20 The problematic aspect of gender
justice litigation sometimes touches on the communal undertones which quickly popularizes the
view of minority rights as intrinsically anti-women.

Indian feminist legal theory often lurking behind the progressive nature of various provisions of
pre-colonial pluralistic laws and practices with respect to women’s rights have not been
adequately reflected in modern statutes.21 The British claim that colonialism was justified as a
civilizing mission to save women from their barbaric religious practices is if put in the context of
historical evolution glaringly that the ancient texts were used mainly to co-opt the anti-women
provisions of English matrimonial statutes.22

The application of the medieval European remedy of restitution of conjugal rights (which was
incorporated in the English matrimonial statutes in 1857), applied to Muslims and Hindus in
India by reinterpreting their ancient legal texts is one concrete example of this new trend. The
desirability of substantive versus formal equality still recedes and needs cogent argument as well
as engagement in present context. It is quite astonishing to note that ‘the legal system from
British Raj was incorporated more or less wholesale, only to yield to incrementalist changes at a
later stage.23 The interest represented by the postcolonial states, no matter how well intentioned,

16 V. Bradley Lewis, Religious Freedom, the Good of Religion and the Common Good: The Challenges of
Pluralism, Privilege and the Contraceptive Services Mandate 2 (1) Oxford Journal of Law Religion, 25-49 (2013).
17 Rina Verma Williams, Post Colonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legal Legacies the Indian States, 1(2006).
18 Archana Parashar, Women and Family Law Reform in India, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992).
19 See: Bina Agarwal, A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in South Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994) for the glaring disparities in the land holding entitlements for women in a primarily agrarian
economy.
20 See:Poonam Saxena, “Succession Laws and Gender Justice,” Redefining Family Law in India, eds. Archana
Parashar and Amita Dhanda (New Delhi: Routledge, 2008), 282–305.
21 Margaret Thornton, ed. Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995).
22 Flavia Anges, Law & Gender Equality: The Politics Of Women’s Right In India, Oxford University Press(1999).
23 Supra note17 at 5(R.V. William).
213
were those of nationalist elites who had more or less uncritically assumed the governmental
mantle that was bequest of the colonizers’.24

Gender Equality and MPL

Religious personal laws with gender sensitive family laws are not exclusionary to cultural identity
and gender justice which generally portrayed as antithetical values in India.25 The common rights
for all women under feminist discourse are constructive of inclusive legal theory and sensitive to
justice.26 The mainstream critics of feminism challenges indigenous demand for gender sensitive
laws and cultural identity27 and often critiqued that neutrality of law in effect maintained male
privilege while portraying legal rules as gender neutral. Therefore, feminist analyses of law must
constantly theorize the complex relationships28 between women and law by conceptualizing law
as a site of struggle meaning that law is nor a priori nor static and final.29 It is always an outcome
of contestation of women right to be governed by freedom driven gender laws.30 The enactment
of Domestic Violence (Prevention) Act, 2005 in India raises a number of relevant issues for feminists
seeking to understand law as a site of struggle.31 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of
‘matrimonial home’ under the Act and its interpretation lead to absurdity because it is clumsily
drafted and at odds with the objectives of the law and the interest of women.32

MPL in Multicultural Jurisprudence

India is an ancient land of religious pluralism and cultural diversity with 160 million Muslims as
country's second largest community.33 The majority of Indians have never favoured theocratic
states but there have been undercurrents of thought suggesting a space for religion in state
affairs. Contemporary India is a multicultural society and pluralistic with regards personal laws,
which India’s secular state is reluctant to reform. However, these laws have generated debate
about the meaning of gender equality in India, since all personal laws give women fewer rights
than men, but Indian women have been promised equality as a constitutional right. Though the
RPLs allow for inclusiveness in religion, the history of these laws in India shows that they have
been used selectively as a tool of governance and often to the disadvantage of women. In the
past, feminists argued that various differences of identity viz; race, ethnicity, and sexuality—
should be recognized and accounted for in the law. But in the case of India’s cultural pluralism,
religious difference comes into conflict with gender equality. There has been a demand for
replacing the religious personal laws with gender-just family laws as mettle of reform not
antithetical to cultural identity and gender justice. The historical and social specificities in the
forefront of argument for common rights for all women by re-conceptualizing the feminist
project as one of constructing inclusive legal theory that is sensitive to demands of differences
but also those of justice.34

24 Id at 47.
25 See: Archana Prashar et al., Redefining Family Law In India, New Delhi: Routledge, 282–305 (2008).
26 Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).
27 Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1989).
28 Maitrayee Chaudhari (Ed.), “Introduction,” Feminism in India, (Delhi: Kali for Women, 2004), xviii.
29 See: Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989).
30 Archana Prashar, Gender Equality & Religious Personal Laws In India, XIV(2)Brown Journal Of World Affair
103-112(2008).
31 See: S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra, 2007 (3) Supreme Court Cases 169:the supreme court interpreted Sections 2 (s) &
17 of Domestic Violence (Prevention) Act, 2005 in regard to notion of matrimonial home.
32 Refer to observations of Justice S.B. Sinha & Justice Markandey Katju and their reference to Matrimonial Homes
Act, 1983 to grapple the concept of matrimonial home in supra case.
33 Anver M. Emon, ‘Conceiving Islamic Law In A Pluralist Society: History, Politics And Multicultural
Jurisprudence’, Singapore Journal Of Legal Studies, 331-355(2006).
34 Supra note 30 at 103[Archana Prashar].
214
It is in this backdrop that the Sharia’h as a fountain head of MPL stems from the colonization of
Indian legal institutions to determine an abstract body of doctrines disconnected from a
historical or institutional context. This concept of Sharia’h has transformed its significance, no
longer a rule of law tradition, it is often used to provide (over) determinate anchors in contests
over political identity. The liberal societies grapple to find a place for religious communities such
as to develop a Muslim civil society within the religious community and between the
government and the religious. The history of institutions and doctrinal pluralism in Islam,
governments and private parties can support critically favours re-engagement with the Sharia’h to
provide mediation or adjudication services for Muslims in the contextual.35 By creating and
regulating institutions of Muslim civil society, the government will provide an equal playing field
for diverse voices in the Muslim community to articulate competing visions of Sharia’h values.
No single Muslim voice will be empowered by the state, rather the state will provide an equal
playing field for all voices to be heard, thereby contributing to debate and dialogue between
competing civil society groups.

Codification of MPL

The extent of diversity of the Islamic world, with current development in the constitutional and
international laws has tried to define justice envisaged under Universal Declaration Of Human
Rights,1948, International Convention of Human Rights European Convention on Human
Rights,1950, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966 Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979 The European Court Of
Human Right (ECHR) and Siracusa Principles, 1984. Various international conventions have forced
the signatory countries to legislate laws to uphold human rights, women rights and children's
rights. Many Islamic and non- Islamic countries have codified and enacted the Muslim family
law. It has become important to formulate the Islamic Law within Qur'anic frame work with a
reformative thinking to suit the modern day expectation. It has become important to formulate
the Islamic law within Qur'anic framework with a reformative thinking to suit the modern day
expectation. The Islamic Law is not static but has an inherent nature of adaptation by
application of Ijtihad, prudent interpretation of law to promote fiqh-e-Ijtihad (evolving new legal
principles on the basis of old one) to meet the challenges and changing social condition. 36
Personal Law have been reformed and codified in Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Palestine, Pakistan,
Philippines and Bangladesh with success.37 The time has come to codify the law relating to
Muslim marriage, divorce, maintenance, custody of children, adoption and inheritance in India
within the framework of Quran, Hadith and Sunnah.

The Muslim Law consists of injunctions of the Quran, Sunnah, the practice and teaching of the
Holy Prophet (PBUH), and the opinion of the Jurists which consists of Ijma, known as
consensus and Qiyyas, (known as analogical deduction). The civil law which relates to marriage,
divorce, dower, legitimacy, guardianship, gift, waqf, wills and inheritance are now collectively
called as Muslim Personal Law in India. The Muslim Law was applied the principles of school
viz., Sunni or Shia or sub school viz., Hanafi or Shafei. However, the personal law was also
intertwined with the local culture and customs. The Application of Shariat Act, 1937 restored to
the Muslims their own personal law in almost all cases and prohibited the customary law which
was prevalent.38 The Ulemmas never studied the Principles of Mohamedan Law as applied in the

35 Supra note 33 at 354[Anver M. Emon].

36 Syed Ameer Ali, Principles of Mohammedan Law, Allahabad Law Emporium: Allahabad: 1985.
37 Tahir Mahmood, Statutes of Personal Law in Islamic History, Text and Analysis Countries: 2 nd Ed., 1995 [Part
III, Pp. 241-53].
38 Nomani, Md. Zafar Mahfooz, ‘Impact of Indian Secular Laws on Islamic Law of Marriages in Regard to
Marital and Conjugal Rights, Dower & Maintenance: A Reformative Perspective’, in K. M. Baharul Islam (Ed.)
Issues in Women’s Right: A Practitioner Resource Book, Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi[Chapter26/262-
284(2014)].
215
courts of law nor did the lawyers and the courts know the fiqh as taught in the Madarsas. Many at
times the interpretation and fatwas are conflicting as there is no independent judgment. This
conflicting interpretation of Sharia’h has led to confusion among the Muslims and brought
criticism as well. These arbitrary fatwas or interpretation, given unmindfully of changing social
condition, has been the focus of media and canard of MPL.

Role of Law Commission

There is lack of uniformity in operation and application of Islamic law which warrants for an
urgent need to formulate the Qura’nic frame work of Sharia’h and bring it as legislation. An Act is
to consolidate and clarify the provisions of Muslim law and related procedure regarding Muslim
marriage, divorce, maintenance custody of children and inheritance.39 On the other hand
sporadic reform is suggested by 211th Report of Law Commission of India in 2008. The Law
Commission of India taken up suomotu cognizance of Supreme Court pronouncement in Seema v.
Ashwani Kumar [2006 (2) SCC 578] that all marriages shall be compulsorily registered and that the
State Governments shall initiate action for rule-making in this regard. The Births, Deaths and
Marriages Registration Act, 1886 which states that “Births and Deaths” are to be registered
under the Act by the Registrars of Births and Deaths appointed by the Sate but there is no
provision for registration of marriages and hence, the title of the Act is somewhat misleading.
The administrative machinery for registration of marriages is not regulated everywhere by one
and the same law. This creates a lot of confusion with registration officials as well as people
wanting or required to register their marriages. There was a tremendous diversity of laws relating
to registration of marriages making it complicated and confusing. Similarly for registration of
divorces, the laws which provide for any kind of registration of divorce is that of Muslims and
Parsis but provisions of the State laws are dormant and hardly in practice and thus leave
abundant room for misuse of law and cause great hardship to women. The Law Commission
recommends enactment of a “Marriage and Divorce Registration Act” to be made applicable in
the whole of India and to all citizens irrespective of their religion and personal law and without
any exceptions or exemptions. Accordingly, the Births, Deaths Registration Act, 1886 be
repeated and Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1969 be re-named as “Births, Deaths and
Marriages Registration Act” with a provision that officials working and records maintained
under the former Act shall be deemed to be working and maintained under the latter Act. This
reformative strategy is sporadic but manifest intent of highest codifying body of India.

Religion and Law in India

The platter of MPL reform can well be understood in the parlance of religion and law interface
in India. The concept of "secularism" adopted under the Constitution although there is no US-
type "non-establishment" clause erecting a "wall of separation" between State and religion, and
no space for the French doctrine of Incite. Religion has no substantive role to play in the affairs
of the Stale, but there is no ban on allowing it a ceremonial role in State functions and official
events.40 India never favoured theocratic states nor shunned from suggesting a space for religion
in state affairs. A quasi-secular ideology remained dominant in State affairs for about half a
century after independence, but throughout these years, certain concessions had to be
periodically made in favour of particular religions. Existence of these two competing political
ideologies - one believing, in principle, in equality of all religions and the other in a privileged
position for the historically oldest religion of the country - seems to have become a permanent

39 Tahir Mahmood, The Muslim Law of India, 3rd Ed. Butterworth: New Delhi: 2003.
40 Tahir Mahmood, Religion & Secular State: Indian Perspective, at 364 http://www.iclrs.org /content/ blurb/
files /India.rev.2011.05.16.pdflogged on 17.4.2015: see also: W. Cole Durham, Jr. Religion and the Secular State:
Interim Reports, International Center for Law and Religion Studies at Brigham Young University, Provo, UT
84602 USA.
216
feature of the Indian polity.41 This is no way to suggests that any taboo on religious freedom and
conscience.42 This is fortified with "liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship43 in
Preamble and right to culture, language and script44 along with correlative duty ‘to value and
preserve the rich heritage of our composite culture.45

Nowhere does the Constitution say or even remotely suggest that religion is to be the
foundation or source of state law. Nor is there such a provision for religion in any legislative
enactment. Parliament and state legislatures are empowered to make laws in the areas of
personal status, family relations and religious endowments, shrine management and organization
of inland and overseas pilgrimages, without saying that these are to be drawn on religious
sources. But in practice, religious tenets are usually kept in mind while enacting such laws. 46 The
judiciary has in several cases interpreted constitutional provisions relating to religious freedom to
lay down its parameters and boundaries. A distinction has been made between "essential" and
"non-essential" practices of religion, holding that the Constitution necessarily protects the
former and not always the latter.

Crisis of Legitimacy and MPL

India’s personal laws discourse47 reveals that ‘while the particulars of politics and policies have
changed over time, the basic discursive and conceptual field within which they have evolved was
defined in the colonial era, and has changed little since then’.48 The personal laws retained this
continuity in law and governance as a template of colonial knowledge.49The non-interference
entailed the government responding to external political imperatives, and then justifying their
policies using the language of non-interference, community demand and popular support. 50
These persisting conceptual and discursive limits have not frustrated the aspirations to modern
power and legitimacy of post-colonial Indian state.51 The historical sequencing follows that
Muslim personal laws were codified first and the codification of Hindu personal law started at
later stage. Even though the religious laws of India became conceptually linked to construction
of national identity.52 The myth of Hindu progressivism and Muslim regressivism simply because
of historical accident that the former took place in pre-independent days and the latter happened

41 Id at 356.
42 Article 25 Constitution of India,1950 says: Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of
religion.—(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons
are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion.
Article 25 Constitution of India, 1950 says: 26. Freedom to manage religious affairs.—Subject to public order,
morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right—
(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.
43 Supra note 40 at 364-5 [Tahir Mahmood].
44 Article 29 &30 ,Constitution of India,1950: 29. Protection of interests of minorities.—(1) Any section of the
citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its
own shall have the right to conserve the same. 30. Right of minorities to establish and administer educational
institutions.—(1) All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and
administer educational institutions of their choice.
45 Article 51-A(f): It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to value and preserve the rich heritage of our
composite culture.
46 Supra note 40 at 365[Tahir Mahmood].
47 Nomani, Md. Zafar Mahfooz. Book Review: Post Colonial Politics And Personal Laws : Colonial Legacies And The
Indian State By Rina Verma Williams XIII(1)Religion & Law Review 179-188 (2014).
48 Supra note 17 at 1-2 [Rina Verma Williams].
49 Id at 4.
50 Id at 90.
51 Id at 96.
52 Id at 100.
217
in independent India deserves contest. It is not out of context, to further ask as to why the
partial reform of Hindu personal law by post-colonial legislature simultaneously avoided
codifying the personal laws of Muslim on succession, inheritance, marriage and divorce.

The myth of Hindu progressivism and Muslim regressivism which led to engulf deep
enchantment between both communities. On the contrary, Nehru’s reforming zeal never
attended MPL due to Muslim resentment. This also deserves a mention that during this period,
the enlightened Muslim minority were in favour of reform. The government ostensibly
portrayed this inaction and failure to rhetoric of non-interference. On the other hand, reforms
were grossly disapproved by the majority of the Hindu populace and enlightened Hindu
minority as well.53 The ‘non-interference in Muslim Personal Law stood to test of time in the
wake of Shah Bano judgment54 and Muslim Women(Protection of Right to Divorcee)Act, 198655 the MPL
returned to the Indian political agenda after a long hiatus.56 The Government decision to pass
the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act by accepting conservative opinion, thereby,
marginalizing progressive Muslim opinion was a volte face of government.57

Where Nehru sided with pro-reform Hindu opinion to justify the reform and codification of
Hindu Codes, Rajiv Gandhi sided with anti-reform Muslim opinion to block effectively any
reform in MPL.58 In the aftermath of Shah Bano, the government vicariously became the arbiter
of public opinion as to legitimize the policy of non- interference.59 This triggered the Hindus to
question fundamental premise of non-interference making a clarion call for abolition of MPL
and its substitution by UCC. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) flatly rejected non-interference and
the system of personal laws calling instead for a uniform, secular code of family laws for all
Indians regardless of religion, but BJP remained inactive on the personal laws reform. This leads
safely to believe that despite political changes over time the fundamental terms of the debate
over the personal laws, and the underlying construction that defined that debate, were those that
had originated in the colonial era.60

Legal Basis of Reform

It is now logical to understand as to what should form the basis of MPL in international and
national legal context. The good governance entails that freedom of religion should not only
allow reasonable space but a proactive framework which can nurture MPL in multicultural
society. This is germane while looking at international norm and practices adopted in European
and US jurisdictions.

The law restricting manifestation of religion must be accessible and known for consultation.
This should not be vague and arbitrary so that unfettered discretion can be applied by state. The
limitation must be in furtherance of a legitimate state interest within the framework of the
European Court Of Human Right (ECHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), 1966 which identifies the five legitimate grounds upon which a state may restrict
manifestations of religion, the protection of public safety, public order, public health, public
morals, or the rights and freedoms of others than that of national security and giving more
leverage to traditional dominant religions. The legal practice discerns that the ECHR and the
UN Human Rights Committee have been highly deferential in accepting of the rationales offered by

53 Id at 111.
54 Mohammad Ahmad v. Shah Bano, AIR 1985 SC 945.
55 Supra note 17at 127.
56 Id at 130.
57 Id at 126.
58 Id at 135-6.
59 Id at 157.
60 Id at 156.
218
states to justify limitations on religious practices. It is generally said that restrictions on a
manifestation of religion must be ‘necessary’ or ‘proportional’. According to the ICCPR,
legitimate restriction on manifestation is of religion must be necessary and buttressed by ECHR
that the limitation is necessary in a democratic society.61

Unfortunately, the meaning of ‘necessary’ is not explained in the texts of the ECHR and the
ICCPR. The plain meaning of ‘necessary in a democratic society’ would seem to be that the
restriction on manifesting religion would either be something that must be imposed in order to
pre-serve democracy or that a democratic society concludes is necessary to protect itself. The
rule and those limitations clauses should not be employed in a way that undermines the basic
right. The UN Human Rights Committee has dated that limitations pursuant to ICCPR Article
18.3 should be strictly interpreted. A symposium convened by the International Commission of Jurist
developed what are called the Siracusa Principles, for interpreting limitations clauses and derogations
clauses. The Siracusa Principles state that limitations may not be undertaken in such a way as
jeopardize the essence of the right concerned and that all limitation clauses shall be interpreted
strictly and in favour of the rights at issue.62

The rule of necessity is supplanted by proportionality. The meaning of ‘proportionality’ in limitations

clause analysis in law has ancient origin and adopted into modern law under influenced by
German jurists.63 Moving beyond the ‘punishment should fit the crime’ explanation of
proportionality, a metaphor that is frequently used to describe it is that ‘a sledge hammer should
not be used to crack a nut’. While no doubt employing such a heavy tool would be effective in
breaking even the hardest of walnut shells, it would be at the cost of crushing the meat inside.
The force is sufficient to accomplish the necessary task of breaking the shell but with the
unacceptable consequence of making the not worthless.64 Proportionality analysis in limitations
of religious freedom assumes that there should be a proportionate correlation between the
seriousness of the harm that the State seeks to prevent when imposing the restriction on the
manifestation of religion and the severity of the infringement on the liberty that the restriction
imposes.65 To the extent that a state restriction prevents a great harm and the infringement on
the liberty is slight, the restriction presumably is justifiable. Proportionality analysis has now
become the principal method and judges employ for evaluating whether state restrictions on
particular manifestations of religion are permissible under the ICCPR and the ECHR.

MPL and Good Governance

In a secular polity like ours mingling of religion with politics is unconstitutional in other words a
flagrant breach of the constitutional features of secular democracy.66 Despite being the second
largest religious community of the country, the Muslims are overly under-represented in many
cases unrepresented in the governance of the country. Neither in the three organs of the State
nor in bureaucracy does the extent of their presence go anywhere near their population figures.
This has been confirmed time and again both by special committees constituted by the
government and the various Minorities Commissions referred to above. Leaders of the
community have since long been demanding a quota in government jobs and educational
institutions, but the demand has never found favor with the rulers who believe that this would
be contrary to the provision of the Constitution against religion-based discrimination between
citizens.

61 W. Cole Durham Jr., ‘Pattern Of Religion State Relations’, In John White et al.(ed.) Religion & Human Right: An
Introduction, OUP 360-376 at 361(2012).
62 Id at 362.
63 Id at 363.
64 Supra note 40 at 364[Tahir Mahmood].
65 Id at 365.
66 S.R. Bommaivs. Union of India,(1994)3 Supreme Court Cases 1.
219
In two South Indian states, this demand has been implemented to a certain extent, and a fourth
state, in eastern India, has just announced the same, but the same step taken in a third state has
recently been struck down by the local High Court for being allegedly ultra vires the
Constitution.67 In 2004, the government had appointed a special national Commission to
examine this demand of the Muslims and other religious minorities but its report submitted
three years later recommending quota for them by way of positive discrimination and affirmative
action is still unattended to by the government. This Commission has also recommended that
the Scheduled castes net be made religion-neutral but the proposal is being strongly opposed by
various political groups and the government has not yet shown any inclination to take action on
it.68

The pattern of religion and state always foster good governance much against popular
perception of repressiveness. The progressive sounding analysis of Cole Durham provides an
insightful and refreshing analysis of religion state relation.69 The religious freedom operates on
planes which include absence of religious freedom and optimal religious freedom. The secularity of state
leads to cooperative existence and paves for substantive equality than that of formal equality.
The negative identification of freedom of religion gives rise to persecution, hostility in an
abolitionist regime.70 The rigid separation of religion is also fraught with insensitivity and formal
equality. Therefore, positive identification of religion leads to accommodation and respect in
flexible religion state relationship. This is juxtaposed to theocratic state sloganeering unity of one
religion and monopolization and hegemonisation of religion. Thus in Cole’s scheme tolerance,
respect, secularity alone guarantees substantive equality to women and good governance. It is
high time that state should asses critically doctrine of necessity and proportionality in fostering
religious freedom. In ultimate analysis it is found that the more religious freedom is conferred
the more economic development can be pumped in the country. It therefore suggested that the
state should augur inclusive growth and good governance principles to achieve pro-community
reform of MPL in human right and gender justice perspective.

Dr. Zafar Mahfooz Nomani is Professor at Department of Law, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
He has extensively contributed to intellectual property and natural resource management. He has authored six
books and contributed more than one hundred papers in journal and edited volumes besides being editor and
referee to various law journals. He has completed World Bank & Union Ministry of Environment, Forest &
Climate Change, University Grants Commission & Indian Council for Social Science Research Major Research
Projects.

67 Supra note 40 at 372 ( Tahir Mahmood).

68 Id at 373.
69 Supra note 61 at 363 [W. Cole Durham Jr.,].
70 Id at 364.
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 Chapter 17

STEREOTYPES OF MUSLIM IDENTITY IN INDIA’S POPULAR MEDIA

AND ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY

Yousuf Saeed

Abstract

India’s mainstream media such as newspapers, magazines, popular art, educational publications, advertising,
television and cinema, have long been portraying the images of certain communities, especially Muslims, in
somewhat stereotypical images that range from the icons of innocent piety to extremism and violent behaviours.
These stereotypes have been reinforced so often in the media that a majority of people view all Muslims and their
actions from the same narrow perspectives, often leading to their victimization and even ‘ghettoization’. This essay
examines a range of media from the popular calendar art and advertisements to TV news channels and Bombay
cinema to look for the ingredients of the typecasting of a community. The study also raises the question whether the
stereotyping is entirely a representation of ‘the other’ community by a mainstream media or do the Muslims like to
perceive themselves in certain typecast roles due to political as well as religious reasons.

India’s mainstream media such as newspapers, magazines, popular art, educational publications,
advertising, television and cinema, have long been portraying the images of certain communities,
especially Muslims, in somewhat stereotypical representations that range from the icons of
innocent piety to extremism and violent behaviours. These stereotypes have been reinforced so
often in the media that a majority of people view all Muslims and their actions from the same
narrow perspectives, often leading to their social isolation and even ‘ghettoization’ into urban
and rural localities. This exclusion also becomes an impediment to their overall progress and
assimilation in the larger mainstream. The most common brunt of community stereotypes, for
example, is that they make it difficult for many Muslims to find homes or properties in regular
residential areas in Indian cities.1

This, of course, is not an Indian problem alone - Islam and Muslims have been represented in
the role of ‘the other’ by the world media since long, especially as has been shown by Edward
Said2 and others3. But an important question is whether the stereotyping is entirely a
representation of ‘the other’ community by a ‘majoritarian’ mainstream media or do the Muslims
like to perceive themselves with a certain typecast identity due to religious or political reasons?
This write-up makes an attempt to examine a selection of Indian media ranging from popular
calendar art and advertisements to TV news channels and Bombay cinema to look for the
ingredients of the typecasting of a community.

Talking of stereotypes established by popular media, this write-up itself runs the risk of
participating in the consolidation of such images by using the generic term ‘Indian Muslims’.
Thus, a clarification may be required. It is not only impossible but also inappropriate to slot all
the followers of Islam residing in India into one monolithic category. They are culturally,
linguistically, demographically, economically, and perhaps politically, as diverse as the rest of
Indians. They even follow the tenets of Islam differently all over South Asia. There is no single
standard image which can represent the demographic diversity of Indian Muslims, even though
India’s popular media continues to depict them, consciously or otherwise, through standard
emblematic images. However, one can also not ignore the recent (or past) trends among
Muslims of South Asia to be inspired by the notion of Pan-Islamism where some of them start
identifying with a more sanitized version of Islam, which practically orients them to an
Arabicized or Middle Eastern culture devoid of the local South Asian roots. Let us look at some
examples of the popular visual culture and media in India which reinforce the typecast images of
Muslims.
Visual Culture on Indian Streets

The stereotyping had started even before the

age of television, cinema and other forms of
mass produced images. For example, among
the kinds of popular images found in India’s
public spaces, an important category is the
religious posters and calendars depicting
deities, saints, and places of worship. Besides
posters that deal with recognizable Hindu
subject matter, one finds images with Muslim
themes, typically portraying the shrines at
Mecca and Medina, Qur’anic verses in
calligraphy, the portraits of local Sufi saints,
their tombs, miracles and other folklore. Since a poster or a calendar is frequently meant to
decorate the walls of a home, its imagery is always bright and attractive - young women or
children shown as embodiments of perfect innocence and beauty and a pious character. And this
is where the typecasting of communities too gets established in the mind of the onlooker.4

To explore how these images help build popular stereotypes of certain ethnic or religious
identities such as Indian Muslims, one could begin by examining some broad differences
between various popular posters and media types. The images with clearly Hindu and Muslim
themes differ, mainly, in the variety of subject matters they depict, and the purpose they fulfil in
a devotee’s life. Most Hindu posters represent deities, gods, and goddesses, their attributes and
myths, utilizing narratives that have been followed since ages, even though the painting/art
styles may have changed. In practice, a two-dimensional image of a Hindu god or deity serves
more or less the same purpose for an average devotee which an idol or statue does, that is,
worship or dhyana.

However, India’s Muslim devotional posters, which may or may not have been drawn by a
Muslim, carry some distinct differences from such Hindu images- even though some elements of
polytheism can still be found in it. Since the making of pictures, other than those of Mecca and
Medina, has been frowned upon in most Muslim societies,
human figures are often replaced by Arabic calligraphy,
flowers, crescent moon and other inanimate icons illustrating
various concepts, although it doesn’t mean that human
forms are never represented in Muslim devotional art.
Portraits of Sufi saints and holy men have been regularly
made and distributed in south Asia.

When a poster artist (not necessarily a Muslim by faith),

explores new subject matters to draw an image, or to make
innovative variations of Mecca and Medina, the first thing
he/she recalls (in the absence of any deities) are the clichéd
images of Muslim piety– cute little girls with headscarves
reading the Qur’an, innocent boys in skullcaps hugging each
other after the Eid prayers, beautiful and pious young
women with raised hands from which a translucent dupatta
(scarf) cascades down, all this against the essential backdrop of the Ka’ba and the green dome of
Medina. An image epitomizing the emblematic image of the community shows a little boy sitting
cross-legged, about to turn the page of the Qur’an, wearing a white sleeveless vest, a green check
lungi or mundu (printed loin-cloth), a little metallic talisman case in a necklace, and the
embroidered skullcap. Not to miss the rosary, the incense-sticks, the prayer mat, and the
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crescent-and-star encircling Mecca and Medina in the backdrop. The child may just walk out,
one imagines, into a noisy Muslim mohalla (locality) and chew a paan (betel) or enter a butcher’s
shop.

One wonders, however, if such stereotypes are simply a non-Muslim artist’s or publisher’s
narrow perception of the "other" community? Or are they more real? There are of course some
popular art genres such as the "educational" comics’ series called Amar Chitra Katha or even
some popular movies where Muslims have been deliberately portrayed in negative roles. But a
calendar artist and publisher have to consciously portray the community with a more favourable
image, in order to sell. Thus a praying posture is the safest icon they find, since it can play many
roles. One seldom sees a poster showing a pious Hindu woman worshiping a deity or a cute
Hindu boy reading a holy book – Hindu posters generally depict the deity itself and not the act
of worship. Since there is hardly any object of veneration in a Muslim picture, the believer
herself becomes the subject of the artist.

A peculiar fascination for popular media and industry for Islam and Muslims has been the
colour green. Some Indian shopkeepers dealing in clothes, paints, refrigerators and washing
machines reveal that many of their Muslim clients prefer to buy goods of green or somewhat
greener colour (although educated and elite Muslims may shirk from such a stereotype). There
may be several historical explanations for the apparent Muslim fascination with green. Besides
the desert dwellers of Arabia finding comfort in green, the Prophet himself is said to have liked
this colour as signifying peace. The use of green flags in the holy wars was common, and many
of the Prophet’s followers wore green turbans. Today, a patch of green is present in the national
flags of almost all Muslim countries. In India and elsewhere, devotees like to offer green chadars
on the graves of the saints, and green shrouds are used in many Muslim funerals. The most
popular devotional icon is, of course, gumbad-e khizra, the green dome of the holy mosque in
Medina, beneath which the Prophet is buried (although it wasn’t painted green until about 1837
AD). Khizr (green) is also the name of an immortal prophet with whom many myths and
legends are associated, especially in the realm of the Sufi narratives. Hence, popular devotional
posters are also full of green in various forms, although it would be interesting to explore how
much of this fascination with the green colour is actually manufactured.

In some cases, Indian Muslims themselves seem to legitimize such stereotypical images. A poster
of the cute boy (sometimes with his elder sister) reading the Qur’an, or some other book, is
commonly used in Muslim homes that have
young children, to emphasize the
importance of elm or knowledge in Islam. A
typical user is only aware of the evident
message that the poster gives to a child, and
not so much of the latent conditioning
about community stereotype being
imparted. Such images probably become
idealized forms to be emulated by
youngsters. In fact, it would not be entirely
wrong to say that some Muslims do make
an effort to look different from non-
Muslims. One has often heard in recent
religious discourses (such as Friday sermons
in many north Indian mosques) the emphasis on the need for Muslims to look like Muslims - a
lament that Aaj kal ke musalman, musalman jaise nahin dikhte (today’s Muslims don’t look Muslim
enough). What such sermons mean in practical terms is to follow the Prophet’s tradition of
keeping a beard, trimming the moustache, covering the head, wearing a trouser or pyjama above
the ankle and so on, for men, and a hijab or veil for women. However, it is difficult to say if this
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awareness about ‘looking like’ a Muslim has always been a part of Muslim society or has it begun
recently. It would surely be a challenging job for historians to find out how different did Indian
Muslims look from other Indians a couple of centuries ago.

It would not be surprising if the artists who drew the roadside

hoardings for Hindi movies were also the original painters of
some of the religious posters. Many printing presses that
churn out movie posters, no doubt, also produce the
inexpensive religious images. The big chunk of moviegoers,
the crowd that likes to see a blockbuster several times, and
revels in its images and music, has also been the client for the
devotional posters. Of course, in many elite Muslim
households it is a taboo to display a portrait of even a family
member, leave aside a movie poster. But some (among
Muslims) who may have hesitated putting up the image of a
film actress on their wall due to family or social pressure, find legitimacy in a picture that
combined the Ka’ba or the Qur’an with an attractive, pious lady who looked like the film actress
Madhubala or Waheeda Rehman. This twin purpose of providing the religious devotion with the
sensuous pleasure seems to be a selling point of most successful popular and bazaar art.5

Stereotypes in Cinema and Media

The depiction of a pious Muslim woman in popular posters may not have been possible without
drawing inspiration from popular Hindi cinema. Through a deliberate portrayal of Muslims as
the ‘other’ community, the Bombay film industry has created a stereotypical image of Indian
Muslims, often strengthening the popular perception about them as a ‘minority’ in India. 6 Such
portrayal basically associates some specific traits such as dresses, linguistic expressions, greetings,
architectural motifs, and societal behaviours with Muslims and Islam in popular media in the
public imagination. In fact, this vision of minority, or ‘Muslimness’, has also transformed more
recently from the images of naïve Muslim piety into political subversion, criminal behaviour and
militancy in many films, thus creating a demonic image of the community in the popular
imagination.7 But what are these cultural ingredients that constitute the ‘Muslim’ identity in
cinema or in real life? Have they historically been attributed only to Muslims and Islam? Or has
there been a shift in the identity formation through the decades? Although religion and religious
identity has been an integral part of Indian cinema, is it appropriate to classify films through
religion? These are some of the questions that need to be addressed while discussing the Muslim
themes in Bombay cinema. Much debate has also ensued about the etymology of terms such as
Muslim, Islamic, Islamicate, popular, Bombay and so on, which one tries to use here in the
conventional manner, often interchangeably, but with caution.8

It seems that many of these ingredients in the pre-cinema or early-cinema stages were not always
considered exclusively Muslim or Islamic – they had an inclusive or pan-regional appeal to a
large section of people. In fact, many of these traits reflected a unique amalgamation or
hybridization of Indian and Perso-Arabic cultural strains, permeating the society without
distinctions of religion or creed. It is only later (say mostly after the 1960s) that such cultural
entities started slowly being associated with Muslims. And deliberately or otherwise, India’s
popular cinema, media and education system have been responsible over the decades for the
creation of this image of ‘minority’ via typecast images.9 Through some common examples from
Bombay cinema and other popular media, I will try to explore how particular cultural traits that
are now associated exclusively with Muslims, were accepted initially as a norm in India, and
practiced by an eclectic set of people. For instance, until the middle of the 20th century, wearing
a sherwani (long robe), churidar (tight) pyjama and a crooked cap was in vogue for men of the elite
whether Hindu or Muslim. Similarly, the learning of Urdu and Persian languages and composing
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poetry in them was considered a mark of high society both among Hindus and Muslims. And
some of these traits were being reflected in early cinema too, although my observations about
cinema should not be seen as a representation of all of popular Indian media – many other
contemporary media such as music records, radio, novels, calendar art or newspapers/
periodicals might have followed different patterns of representing the minority community
stereotypes.10

Post 1950, a genre called the ‘Muslim Social’ pervaded Mumbai’s film industry for many decades,
contributing largely to the stereotyping of the Muslim community in the popular imagination
through classic films such as Mughal-e Azam (1960), Chaudhvin ka Chand (1960), or Mere Mehboob
(1963). Obviously, since the Hindi cinema industry tries to cater to a wide section of the society,
and a large chunk of its audience comprises north India’s middle-class Muslims, it has to
produce movies that can be seen by thousands of conservative Muslim families amongst whom
it is still taboo for an unmarried girl to go to the cinema with friends. At its height, this genre of
movies, although its main motive was entertainment, portrayed Muslim women as the role
models of modesty, morality and tehzeeb (etiquette).The stories of these films may have also
drawn from a wide variety of available literature such as Urdu novels meant for the shareef
zaadis (the noble daughters). One of the earliest films of such kind, Nek Parveen (1946) tells the
story of a pious Muslim girl who overcame the
hardships of life through her persistent belief in God,
managing to successfully reform her husband from
his gambling habits and so on.

The typical praying posture icon in the Muslim

calendar art may have been inspired by a genre of
devotional Muslim films with names like Khwaja ki
Diwani (1981) or Mera Salaam (1981) featuring the
importance of a
pilgrimage to Sufi
shrines. Beside the ones that became famous, there are
hundreds of lesser known titles such as Hamara Haj (1957), Idd
ka Chand (1964), Madine Ki Galiyan (1981) and so on. These
films probably fall in the same devotional genre that produces
films such as Jai Santoshi Maa (1975) or Shirdi ke Saibaba (1977).
However, the typecast image of religious woman (Hindu or
Muslim) remains the central character in most of such films, as
it is the woman of the family who suffers most. While going
through endless hardships in life (or suddenly hearing some bad
news) a Muslim mother, wife or a sister always runs towards a
corner of the house which has a devotional image pasted on the wall. In extreme cases, she visits
a saint’s tomb with her jholi (scarf) held out in a posture of ‘asking’, while an animated Qawwali
troupe sings and claps in the backdrop. Suddenly the miraculous rays of light from the jali or
lattice of the shrine start showering on the praying woman - her wishes come true (Jahan Ara
1964, Bahu Begum 1970). In the posters, these rays of light often come from the icons of
Mecca/Medina. The praying women are always an embodiment of extraordinary beauty, replete
with gold jewellery and expensive clothes.

Unlike the representation of Muslim protagonist in newer films (1960s onwards) where they are
usually given a special role to highlight their ‘Muslimness’, the Indian Muslims in early cinema
could do normal things in life without getting contrasted against a non-Muslim. For instance,
Dard (1947) is a story of a rich and generous Muslim man who adopts a young orphan boy
(besides having his own daughter of the same age) who grows up to become a medical doctor,
and risks his life by going out to help the poor when an epidemic of plague breaks out. The same
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character also falls in love with the daughter of one of the patients he treats, unaware that the
daughter of his adopted father too loves him. Although this film elegantly uses all the essential
ingredients of Muslimness– domestic items such as pandan (a metallic case for betel nuts), ugaldan
(spittoon), surahis (water jugs), women’s dresses such as shararas, ghararas (elaborate skirts),
dupattas (scarves), Mughal jewellery and so on (some of the promotional B&W stills for the
movie are classic portraits of Muslim aristocracy), it treats the Muslim characters with very
ordinary traits without playing too excessively with their religious identity.

An abundance of films in 1950s and 60s focusing on the nawabs, tawaifs (courtesans) and their
indulgence in music and dance not only created a strong image of Muslim extravagance, but also
addressed a general sense of loss of culture and heritage by the Muslims through the tragic
events of 1857 and 1947.11 But besides the Muslim historical movies whose sole purpose was to
recreate the lost history and heritage, the films with nawabs and courtesans are not simple
depictions of heritage. They are contemporary stories where the ‘tradition’ is mostly
problematized as it meets ‘modernity’ – a crisis most of the upper class north Indian Muslims
were in reality grappling with in the early 20th century.12 A large number of such films are either
about crumbling aristocrats or landlords who escape from their family/wife to find refuge at the
kotha (courtesan’s quarter), or about tawaifs trying to find more respectable modes of
sustenance. But despite this problematic, the picturization and the music or poetry used in such
films, with an essential backdrop of Lucknow/Awadh, does create an exotic image of the
Muslims’ obsession with the courtesans, and completely ignores the fact that kothewalian or
courtesans also existed in other communities and regions of India, for instance by the names of
baijis and devadasis in central/western India. The Muslimness of the courtesan is certainly
exoticized and overemphasized. At the beginning of Benazir
(1964) a courtesan film produced by Bimal Roy, even the
English text of the credits list is calligraphed and stylized
through symbols of Arabic/Urdu vowels (zer, zabar, pesh etc.)
to create an ‘Islamic’ milieu.

Certain stereotypes never get old. Urdu poets and their poetry
recitations are naturally shown as the hallmark of a cultivated
Muslim society in innumerable films, such as Ghazal (1964),
Barsat ki Raat (1960) or Dayar-e Madina (1975). But some
sha’ers or poets also happen to be non-Muslim characters. In
fact, in many nawabi/courtesan films where the Muslim male actor is trying to woo his female
counterpart by composing romantic poetry, he often has a sidekick friend, usually with a Hindu
name (and played by humorous actors such as Johny Walker), who too composes Urdu poetry
and participates in the mushairas (poetry soirees) with the lead actor, or supplies secret
information about the woman and so on. But Urdu poetry is certainly not confined to Muslims
only. At least one film, Pyasaa (1957) by Guru Dutt, tells the story of a rebel Urdu poet, Vijay,
who struggle hard to get his poetry recognised and published, while he has an affair with a tawaif
Gulabo. Some believe that the film was based on the story of real Urdu poet such as Sahir
Ludhyanvi (who is one of the lyricists of the film) or Majaz Lakhnavi who died two years before
the release of the film.13 But in reality there is no dearth of non-Muslim Urdu poets (or
connoisseurs) in India who regularly participated in mushairas.

Popular Muslim Piety in Media

Qawwali, the mystical form of music commonly performed in Indian and Pakistan, has also been
used as a major icon for Muslim identity in the movies, for several purposes. The most common
and cliched scenario is a qawwali’s heightened performance by a dramatically dressed troupe in
Sufi shrines where a distressed (Muslim) protagonist comes to pray for the resolution of his/her
crisis. While the character is praying before the tomb of the saint, a ray of light miraculously falls
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from the dome or sky, often through the jali (lattice) of the shrine, and the devotee’s problems
instantly get resolved. Qawwalis at Sufi shrines are
also used as a meaningful backdrop for the
miraculous meeting of two lost friends or
characters in some movies. Qawwali has been used
in many non-Muslim contexts too. Weddings and
family functions in Muslim families are the most
common venues for qawwali. It is probably
Bombay cinema that invented or ushered in the
style of ‘qawwali competitions’, often between
male and female troupes, singing non-devotional
and often bawdy lyrics, that became a rage in
hundreds of movies produced between 1960s and 1990s, Barsat ki Raat depending largely on
such a scenario. But in many situations, it becomes difficult to distinguish women’s qawwali and
a mujra (courtesan song and dance sequence).

Of course, qawwali has also been used in other unusual situations such as a secular
entertainment in a train excursion (The Burning Train, 1980). But the most memorable non-
Muslim use of qawwali is probably from the film Waqt (1965), where ‘O meri zohra jabeen’ is sung
in family festivity of a Hindu businessman in Peshawar/Punjab. Qawwali was also used in
certain derogatory or mocking scenarios. Some extreme gestures and clownish clothing used by
qawwals in some movies introduced an element of frivolity and idiocy with qawwali, best
exemplified by Rishi Kapoor in Amar Akbar Anthony (1977), when he jumps like an acrobat onto
the concert stage to sing as poet Akbar Allahabadi. The very concept of parda (veil) – normally
associated with Muslim women – has been mocked and typified in many ways in this song as
well as others, where the stereotypes of Muslim community, especially about women’s clothing,
continue getting strengthened. More recently, the qawwali has also been used as a backdrop for
sequences of criminals chasing each other or even murder and mystery scenes, which of course
have something to do with Muslimness of the characters, such as in movies like Gunaah (2003),
Haasil (2003), and Gangster (2006).

Most shrine qawwali scenes are shot in rather superficial sets and typified rituals. Comparing the
scenes of Sufi shrines from several of these movies, one could assert that Bombay cinema
industry has over the years managed to recreate a new extra-green space called the dargah as a
strong symbol of Muslim stereotype.14 The archetypes and iconography of many of these
artificial sets have been accentuated, stylised or often remodeled out of proportions in an effort
to create an “authentic” Muslim feel. The entire effort has been to present a dargah as a populist
space to find a resolution to one’s material problems, with hardly any film exploring the mystical
or intellectual aspects of the Sufis. A favourite icon in almost every designed set of a dargah is a
series of strings with small red and green paper flags carrying symbols of crescent and star
hanging overhead for decoration and identification as a Muslim shrine. No one knows if such a
symbol actually exists in any Sufi shrine or what it is supposed to mean Islamic folklore. But it
has been used in the films even by some of the most established directors like Mahesh Bhatt,
Manmohan Desai, Ketan Desai or B.R.Chopra, and suggests of a Sufi shrine being treated by the
designer as a space of the “other” community.

Usually, the body language and costumes given to the qawwals in the movies are what makes
them the most typical ‘Muslim’ characters created by Bombay film industry – a shiny achkan
(robe) and velvety crooked cap, lips red due to a paan (betel) in the mouth, a flowing
handkerchief with pink border in a hand, and a wicked smile. When clapping during a qawwali,
they press both hands in a twisting fashion as their chest comes forward. This is exactly how
Pran performs a qawwali in the film Adhikar (1971) where he acts as Banne Khan Bhopali, a
Muslim side-character who plays small but significant role to save the story at the end. Muslims
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in many films post-1960s did get a lot of such funny and side-character roles. There is the
inimitable Soorma Bhopali from Sholay (1975) with an accent that is supposed to exemplify a
Muslim-dominated urban neighbourhood in north India. The character of Soorma became so
popular that not only did Jagdeep (the person behind it) make an entire new film by the same
name (in 1988), but other minor films too featured their villainous or side characters with this
Bhopali accent, such as in Aakhri Sajda (1977) or Khwaja ki Diwani (1981), both Muslim
devotional movies.

Prominent among such devotional films from the 1970s onwards were Shan-e-Khuda (1971), Mere
Garib Nawaz (1973), Noor-e-Elahi (1973), Niaz Aur Namaz (1973), Alam Ara (1973), Dayar-e-
Madina (1975), Aakhri Sajda (1977), Noor-e-Islam (1978), Sultan-e-Hind (1978), Auliyae Islam (1979),
Deen Aur Iman (1979), and Labbaik (1980), all featuring a number of devotional qawwalis and
visits to the Sufi shrines as well as Arabia. But curiously, there is a common bunch of artists
acting in most of these films: Sona, Tarique, Raza Murad, Satish Kaushal, Mukri, Shakti Kapoor,
Veena, Tabrez, Husn Bano, Nazir Husain,
and sometimes Bharat Bhushan, among
others. Many films use stock shots of Mecca
and Medina shrines in the backdrop of
qawwalis or naa’ts (songs in praise of the
Prophet). However, due to the restrictions
on shooting in the Arabian shrines, the
depiction of such pilgrimages is not without
some amount of dramatization, such as in
Dayar-e-Madina (1975) or other Mecca-
oriented films, where the protagonists are
shown travelling towards Arabia riding camels, followed by stock shots of the Arab shrines
edited with actors praying at backdrops that looks like the Arab shrine. Hamara Haj (1957) was a
docu-drama film produced in Bombay, largely based on footage from the Hajj pilgrimage in
Arabia, to train the would-be pilgrims on the process of Hajj.

The Muslim Side-character coming to Forefront

As Muslim side characters in the movies, the benevolent Rahim Chacha (Deewar, 1975) or Karim
Baba (Dayavan, 1988) are always old bearded men living under a thatched roof in the wilderness
on a rainy and scary night, saving an endangered main character, without which the story would
have probably sunk. Some of them also come as turbaned pathans from Afghanistan or Pashtun
area into the Hindi-belt India, often being aggressive, but finally soft-hearted and sacrificing,
such as in Kabuliwala (1961) and Zanjeer (1973).15 These Muslim characters usually save others
through their good conduct, and often end up sacrificing their lives for the lead characters, but
always remain sidelined from the main story. Thus, the 1970s is a period when one can see the
slow disappearance of Muslims(and Muslimness) from Bombay cinema as the mainstream
feature – the Muslim cultural ethos being marginalized as something special, something other
than the norm, although the ‘bad character’ roles are still not assigned to any specific ethnic or
religious identity.

While the Muslimness was pushed to the corner in mainstream cinema in the 1970s and 80s, the
typical Muslim audience who longed to see movies they could culturally relate to, found an
added comfort in the low-budget devotional movies in the same era. Even if a light-hearted
attempt was occasionally made to ‘integrate’ the different communities or elucidate the concept
of Hindu-Muslim unity through films such as Amar Akbar Anthony (1977), where long lost
brothers (3 sons of the same mother) are brought up as Hindu, Muslim and Christian, the
devotional cloistered theme of Muslim films continued to get more typified. Thus, a few years
later, the hero of Allah Rakha (1986) sings, ‘Na Amar, na Akbar, na Anthony, mera naam hai Allah
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 Rakha…’ (I am neither Amar, nor Akbar, nor Anthony. My
name is Allah Rakha – the one rescued by God’). Could that
be seen as a doubting of the concept of cultural integration
or inclusiveness, and falling back on the exclusive identity of
a Muslim?

The Muslim side-characters were nevertheless also brought

to the centre stage in the 1980s, but only while keeping their
odd Muslim characteristics intact. They became the grand
heroes and saviours of urban slums or Muslim ghettoes, in
films like Coolie (1983), Allah Rakha (1986) or Ghulam-e
Mustafa (1997), where the protagonist helps and fights for the
poor and the weak, but could not break his link from the
crime and underworld, or his religious practice. Some of the
most sophisticated gang lords and smugglers of Bombay
cinema are shown with a rosary in hand and a pink
and white checkered Arab scarf on their shoulders.
Such a character can be seen as the epitome of
almost half a century long transformation of
Muslimness in cinema, for whom the next and
ultimate step is naturally the international militancy
based on religious identity, a favourite subject of
the present day Bombay cinema. The romantic
Urdu poet of the 1960s, who composed and sung
melodious ghazals for his beloved, now turns deceitful against his homeland and becomes
Gulfam, a Pakistani spy working against India, in Sarfarosh (1999).

There have been a few recent efforts where a Muslim could be seen as a regular character
without any peculiarity, such as in Munnabhai MBBS (2003), where a man named Maqsood can
be a cleaner in a hospital, and Zaheer, a cancer patient, without their religious identity or
appearance playing any role in the plot. Similarly, Chak De India (2008) is about a Muslim hockey
coach (Shahrukh Khan) who tries to break many stereotypes about Indian Muslims.16 In 3-Idiots
(2009), one out of the three friends is a Muslim boy (named ‘Farhan Qureshi’) who does not
invoke anything from his religion or cultural identity, and appears as a regular Indian boy
aspiring for a successful career. A little later, My Name is Khan (2010, Karan Johar) deliberately
tries to address the very issue of Muslim stereotype the world over, especially in the wake of the
9/11 incident of New York.17 One hopes to see more of such balancing acts in Bombay cinema
of the future that might offset the stereotypes of a ‘minority’ that have been created for last over
half a century.

Terrorists and the News

Every time there is an unfortunate ‘terror

attack’ in India (or anywhere in the world), it is
the ideal time for our media, especially print-
media, to bring out their talent of demonising
the Muslim community, even before the
security forces or the judiciary give their
judgement of who perpetrated the heinous
crime. Immediately after the incident, fingers
point towards Muslims and many young
Muslims are arrested as suspects. I would like
to point out one specific incident of one such
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deliberate representation of terrorists. After the 2008 ‘Batla House encounter’ in New Delhi
which took lives of two ‘terrorists’ and a police official, three other suspects were arrested and
presented to the media the next day. They were made to wear brand-new identical Arab scarves
or abaya to cover their faces, as if this is what they wear as ‘terrorists’ all the time. When asked,
the Delhi police accepted that it gave them these scarves, probably in a bid to reinforce the
image that they were Islamic terrorists.18

Of late, some media establishments, filmmakers and reporters have consciously tried to break
the stereotypes by trying to represent young Muslims as regular and progressive citizens of India.
But in some cases, the inherent biases among those journalists don’t seem to hide. One
interesting example was a series of feature stories titled ‘The New Muslim’ carried in The
Hindustan Times by journalist Neelesh Misra and others in October 2007. The series tried to
feature unique Muslims (mostly from Mumbai) who have made it big in life while remaining
steadfast to their faith. The series claimed:

‘Hindustan Times catches up with a community

in transition, with Muslims who are proud of
being Muslims, and do not hesitate to go back
(to) their religion to get ahead in life, make
money, get educated and change their lot. They
are the New Muslims.’19

The very first story of this series, ‘From masjid to stock

market’, was about Zafar Sareshwala, a young
Gujarati businessman who is trying to successfully
run an ‘Islamic’ stock exchange. Most of these characters started with a typical ghettoized
Muslim image, having been victimized by a communal riot or an orthodox family, each going
into a deeper study of her faith and finding the blueprint of worldly success in the holy
scriptures, many of them walking on a tightrope between terrorism and peace, many grappling
with the definition of jihad, each being proud of being a practicing Muslim, and finally making it
big financially while remaining in the decorum of a burqa (veil), or a skullcap and beard etc., the
most idealized 21st century Indian Muslim one can be. Visually too, this front-page series
depicted these Muslims with their typecast identities. While many readers appreciated the new
progressive image of Muslims shown in this series (as opposed to their being shown typically as
‘extremists’), many others also criticised this series for further asserting the stereotypes.20

A little later, The Hindustan Times did another

story to assert that not all Muslim youth are
getting attracted towards terrorism, and some
boys and girls from Hyderabad are actually
working hard to secure successful careers in
engineering and aviation. But this time, the
story featured a photograph of a Muslim girl
who is aspiring to become a trainee pilot.
The photograph showed her wearing a pilot’s
uniform and a hijab standing atop some
building near Hyderabad airport.21 The most
peculiar aspect of the photo was a green-
coloured mosque seen just behind her amid aircrafts parked on the tarmac. For many, this could
pass off as an ordinary photograph. But, it is also not difficult to guess the choice of such a
backdrop by the photographer/reporter – it subconsciously helps further strengthen our
inherent stereotypes about a community even when we are trying to break them.

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There are hundreds of other examples that can be quoted to show how the mainstream Indian
media continues to create and reinforce religious, sectarian and gender stereotypes. The real task
is to get the audience and readers to become aware of how to critically dissect what goes into the
making of our media. And this task is possible only when our education system incorporates this
critical appreciation of media and popular culture. Of course, members of communities like
Muslims, Sikhs and Christians themselves would have to see how they can help break such
stereotypes by being a part of the mainstream, and pin-pointing to the media of not demonising
them.

1 Syed, Aijaz Zaka (2012). ‘Muslims face housing apartheid in big Indian cities’, Arab News, 12 July 2012.
2 Said, Edward (1997). Covering Islam: how the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world. New York:
Random House.
3 Shaheen, Jack (2006). ‘Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People’, The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, July 2003 vol. 588 no. 1, 171-193.
4 Saeed, Yousuf (2007). ‘An Image Bazaar for the Devotee’, ISIM Review 17, Leiden, Spring 2006, pp. 8-9.
5 Saeed, Yousuf (2012). Muslim Devotional Art in India, New Delhi: Routledge.
6 Chadha, Kalyani, and Anadam Kavoori (2008). ‘Exoticized, Marginalized and Demonized: The Muslim as
Other in Bollywood Cinema’ In Anandam Kavoori and Aswin Punathambekar (ed.), Global Bollywood, New
York: New York University Press, 131-45.
7 Chakravarty, Sumita S. (2005). ‘Fragmenting the Nation: Images of Terrorism in Indian Popular Cinema,’ in
John David Slocum (ed.), Terrorism, media, liberation, Rutgers University Press.
8 Saeed, Yousuf (2009). ‘Muslim Exotica of Hindi Filmdom,’ (a review of Islamicate Cultures of Bombay Cinema by
Ira Bhaskar and Richard Allen, Tulika Books, Delhi, 2009), The Book Review, Aug-Sept. 2009 (South Asia Special
– XIV), New Delhi, pp. 23-24.
9 Saeed, Yousuf (2009). ‘This is What They Look Like: Stereotypes of Muslim Piety in Calendar Art and Hindi
Cinema,’ Tasveer Ghar, http://tasveerghar.net/cmsdesk/essay/78/ (Last accessed 8 Nov. 2010).
10 Farooqi, Athar (ed.) (2009). Muslims and Media Images: News Versus Views, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
11 Ansari, Usamah (2008). “'There are Thousands Drunk by the Passion of These Eyes': Bollywood's Tawa'if:
Narrating the Nation and 'The Muslim',” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Volume 31, Issue 2, August
2008, pp 290–316.
12 Dwyer, Rachel (2003). ‘Representing the Muslim: The ‘courtesan film’ in Indian popular cinema,’ in Tudor
Parfitt and Yulia Egorova (eds.), Jews, Muslims, and Mass Media: Mediating the 'Other', New York: Routledge
Curzon.
13 Taneja, Anand Vivek(2009). ‘Muslimness in Hindi Cinema’, Seminar #598, New Delhi. June 2009.
14 Saeed, Yousuf (2007). ‘This is what they look like: Stereotypes of Muslim Piety in Calendar Art and Hindi
Cinema,’Tasveer Ghar, http://tasveerghar.net/cmsdesk/essay/78/.
15 Also Khuda Gawah (1992), although it is a more mainstream film.
16 Sharma, Sanjukta (2009). ‘The new Bollywood Muslim,’ Live Mint, New Delhi, Jun 25, 2009.
17 Balraj, Belinda Marie (2011). “My name is Khan and I am not a Terrorist”: Representation of Muslims in ‘My
name is Khan’, Journal of Language and Culture Vol. 2(6), June 2011, pp. 91-95.
18 HT Correspondent (2008). Scarves spell trouble for Delhi police, Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Sep 23, 2008.
19 Misra, Neelesh, ‘The New Muslim’, Hindustan Times, Mumbai, 20 October 2007.(This series is no longer
available on the website of Hindustan Times).
20 Saeed, Yousuf (2007). "The New Muslim" in Hindustan Times, Sarai Readers List, October 29, 2007,
http://mail. sarai.net/pipermail/reader-list_mail.sarai.net/2007-October/010914.html.
21 Choudhury, Chitrangada (2008), Brave new world, Hindustan Times, Hyderabad, March 16, 2008.

Mr.Yousuf Saeed is a filmmaker, artist and researcher.

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 Chapter 18

KASHMIR ISSUE: PROSPECTS FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION

Ghulam Nabi Fai

Abstract

The Kashmir issue is simply this: the people of a large territory which is not a part of any existing sovereign state
were assured by the entire international community represented by the United Nations that they would be enabled
to decide their future by a free vote. In this paper, I will try as best as I can, to present facts and the perceptions of
the people of Kashmir about the situation in which, for no fault of theirs, they have been trapped. I will also
elaborate few possible scenarios that will help settle the conflict through tripartite negotiations and peaceful
procedures.

Introduction

The Kashmir issue is simply this: the people of a large territory which is not part of any existing
sovereign state were assured by the entire international community represented by the United
Nations that they would be enabled to decide their future by a free vote. Until now, this
assurance has not been honoured. The dispute primarily involves the life and future of the
people of the land. Because of its impact on relations between India and Pakistan, however, it
directly affects the peace and stability of the South-Asian subcontinent. This is a region which
contains one-fifth of the total human race.

Two wars have been the harvest reaped from the dispute. The possibility of a third, bloodier,
probably nuclear and more extensive one has by no means been eliminated. The dispute is not
insoluble through peaceful procedures. It appears to be so, only because the obduracy of one of
the parties is encouraged by the apathy of the world outside. I believe that the United States can,
and should, lead the effort to achieve a fair and lasting settlement of the dispute - fair to the
people most immediately involved and fair to its own commitments to democracy and human
rights. By doing so, the United States can strengthen the principles of a just world order. It will
also earn the gratitude of generations in Kashmir, in Pakistan and even in India itself.

In this paper, an effort has been made to present facts and the perceptions of the people of
Kashmir about the situation in which they have been trapped. Few possible scenarios that will
help settle the conflict through tripartite negotiations and peaceful procedures would also be
elaborated.

Background

A society with a settled historical continuity of its own, Kashmir has been independent over long
periods of time spanning centuries. During the colonial era, however, it was one of the
principalities called States, which were ruled by hereditary feudal chiefs (Maharajas or Nawabs)
and granted internal autonomy by Britain as the paramount power. The Maharaja of Jammu and
Kashmir was the descendent of a freebooter who obtained the territory from the British East
India Company in return for the payment of a sum of money in 1846. The resentment of the
people of Kashmir at having been treated as chattel in this sale-deed remained inarticulate during
the early colonial period but exploded in a freedom movement in 1931. It led to the ‘Quit
Kashmir’ campaign against the Maharaja in 1946 and to the Azad Kashmir movement which
gained momentum a year later. The first armed encounter between the Maharaja’s troops and
insurgent forces occurred in August 1947.
At that time, Britain was liquidating its empire in the subcontinent. The tripartite agreement of
Britain, the National Congress and the Muslim League partitioned British India into two
independent countries- India and Pakistan. As this settlement also meant the end of British
paramountcy over the autonomous principalities called States, these were supposed either to
merge with one of the two countries in accordance with the wishes of the people and the
principle of partition (Hindu-majority States with India and Muslim-majority States with
Pakistan). Kashmir was a predominantly a Muslim-majority State, besides it was far more
contiguous with Pakistan than with India. It was therefore, expected to accede to Pakistan. But
the Maharaja was Hindu and he rejected the first option and could not manage the second.

Faced with the insurgency of his people, which had been joined by a few hundred civilian
volunteers from Pakistan, the Maharaja fled the capital Srinagar, on 25 October 1947 and
arranged that India send its army to help him crush the rebellion. India, coveting the territory,
set one condition on its armed intervention. The condition was that the Maharaja must sign an
Instrument of Accession to India. He agreed but India didn’t wait for his signature to fly its
troops into the State.

Thus, a warlord in 1846 had acquired Kashmir and his fief through a sale-deed, so his
descendent in 1947 transferred Kashmir as a property to India. Though, hundred and one years
apart, the two acts were identically colonialist in nature, provoking the same popular outrage.
One difference however, was that the first took place in the colonial era and required no
legitimacy and the second occurred in the post-colonial age after coming into force of the
United Nations Charter.

Accessional Provisional

Though long planned and swiftly executed, the annexation of Kashmir could not be a simple
affair for India. First, there was the incongruity of the act which clearly violated the principle of
partition. Secondly, while accepting the instrument of accession from the Maharaja, India didn’t
wish to jeopardize its chances of annexing two other principalities/States (Hyderabad and
Junagadh) which, in contrast with Kashmir, had Hindu majorities but Muslim rulers. It had a
stake, therefore, in ostensibly preserving the principle that in case of conflict between the ruler's
and the people's wishes, the latter must prevail. Under these compulsions, India had to attach a
condition to the transaction with the Maharaja- the accession was made subject to "reference to
the people."

Kashmir Question at the United Nations

Between October and December of 1947, the Azad Kashmir forces successfully resisted India's
armed intervention and liberated one-third of the State. Realizing it could not quell the
resistance, India brought the issue to the United Nations in January 1948. As the rebel forces
had been undoubtedly joined by volunteers from Pakistan, India charged Pakistan with having
sent "armed raiders" into the State and urged that the United Nations call upon Pakistan to
withdraw them. This was coupled with the assurance that, once the "raiders" were withdrawn,
India would enable a plebiscite being held under impartial auspices to decide Kashmir's future
status. In reply, Pakistan charged India with having maneuvered the Maharaja's accession
through "fraud and violence" and with collusion with a "discredited" ruler in the repression of
his people. Pakistan's counter complaint was also coupled with the proposal of a plebiscite under
the supervision and control of the United Nations to settle the dispute.

The Security Council discussed the question exhaustively from January to April 1948. It came to
the conclusion that it would be impossible to determine responsibility for the fighting and futile
to blame either side. Since both the parties desired that the question of accession should be
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decided through an impartial plebiscite, the Security Council developed proposals based on the
common ground between them. These were embodied in the Security Council resolution # 47
of 21 April, 1948 envisaging a cease-fire, the withdrawal of all outside forces from the State and
a plebiscite under the control of an administrator who would be nominated by the Secretary
General. For negotiating the details of the plan, the Security Council appointed a five-member
Commission which proceeded to the Subcontinent in July, 1948.

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) worked out the concrete
terms of settlement in close and continuous consultations with both sides. These were
crystallized in two resolutions adopted on 13 August, 1948 and 5 January, 1949. As both
governments– India & Pakistan, formally signified their acceptance of the Commission's
proposals, these constituted an international agreement as binding as a treaty. A cease-fire was
immediately enforced. The Commission then started negotiations to draw up a plan for the
withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani armies from the State in a manner and sequence that would
not cause disadvantage to either side or imperil the freedom of the plebiscite. Meanwhile, a
distinguished American, Admiral Chester Nimitz, was designated as Plebiscite Administrator.

Cause of Stalemate

A development that hardened India's stance was Pakistan's joining military pacts sponsored by the
United States. From 1955, India took the position, that in view of this alliance, it could no longer
countenance the withdrawal of its forces from Kashmir. To repeated pleas that the withdrawal was
not meant to be unilateral in any case but would be coordinated with that by Pakistan, its response
remained immovably negative. India found a ready supporter for this position in the Soviet Union
which, after 1958, blocked every attempt by the Security Council to unfreeze the situation and
implement the peace plan originally accepted by both parties. This caused the paralysis of the
Security Council on Kashmir - a condition which lasted from 1958 to this day.

Plebiscite Entirely Feasible

India's obdurate stand has been effective in creating the impression that the idea of a plebiscite is
unworkable. This however, cannot be a considered conclusive. In the first place, the common
sense appeal and justice of the idea is undeniable. There is no way the dispute can be settled
once and for all except in harmony with the people's will, and there is no way the people's will
can be ascertained except through an impartial vote. Secondly, there are no insuperable obstacles
to the setting up of a plebiscite administration in Kashmir under the aegis of the United Nations.
The world organization has proved its ability, even in the most forbidding circumstances, to
institute an electoral process under its supervision and control and with the help of a neutral
peace-keeping force. The striking example of this is Namibia, which was peacefully brought to
independence after seven decades of occupation and control by South Africa. Thirdly, as Sir
Owen Dixon, the United Nations’ Representative, envisaged six decades ago, the plebiscite can
be so regionalized that none of the different zones of the state will be forced to accept an
outcome contrary to its wishes. Lastly, the idea of a referendum or plebiscite can be translated,
without derogation, into the idea of elections to one or more constituent assemblies which will
determine the future status of the state or of its different zones. The sole condition is that the
election should be completely free from undue pressure, rigging or intimidation, it must be
conducted under the control and supervision of the United Nations.
Arrangements for Plebiscite
It is clear from this historical narrative that there is nothing fuzzy about the modalities of
holding the plebiscite. These were exhaustively worked out during the negotiations concluded by
the United Nations about the implementation of its peace plan for Kashmir. The phased
withdrawal of forces on both sides, the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator by the
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United Nations Secretary General, his induction into office, the institution of the electoral
process under his authority, the exercise of powers deemed necessary by him-all these are fully
known to the parties. If a credible peace process is instituted, some t's will need to be crossed
and some i's dotted, but given the political will of India and Pakistan to implement their
international agreement, and the will of the Security Council to secure that implementation,
these can present no obstacles. It is not the inherent difficulties of a solution, but the lack of the
will to implement a solution, that has caused the prolonged deadlock over the Kashmir dispute.
The deadlock has meant indescribable agony for the people of Kashmir and incalculable loss for
both India and Pakistan. If the new world order is not to be an order of unreason, injustice and
terror and thus a permitted anarchy, that agony should be brought to an end and that loss
repaired. The peace that has eluded the South Asian subcontinent should be made secure.

The Idea of Independence Viable

For the greater part of its history, Kashmir has maintained an independent existence. Its
individuality has been shaped by its distinctive natural setting, the diligence and craftsmanship of
its people, its long experience of phases of growth and decline and its sustained traditions of
amity and tolerance between the different religious or cultural communities. There is no reason
of economics or strategy why it should not recover its freedom to pursue its own destiny.

Secondly, the idea of independence for Kashmir, if not for all its zones, has in fact never been
beyond the mental horizon of its people. Demand for it, however, was either suppressed or
somewhat muted because of two factors. The first was the cold war which generated the fear
that an independent Kashmir would be a likely victim of foreign aggression, subversion or
intrigue. The second was the supposition that small states would not be able to sustain their
independence.

Both these inhibiting factors have now disappeared. The cold war has ended. Scores of states,
individually smaller in size and population than Kashmir, have taken their rightful place as fully
sovereign members of the United Nations. This explains the resurgent support for independence
among all the strata of the population of Kashmir.

It must be pointed out that an independent Kashmir would not be a Kashmir isolated from
India and Pakistan. On the contrary, it would have close links, some of them established by
trilateral treaty provisions, with both its neighbours. Indeed, it would provide them a meeting
ground. In this respect, Kashmir could make a contribution to the stabilization of peace in South
Asia which no other entity can.

Kashmiri Resistance: Essentially of a Peaceful Nature

Kashmir could not remain untouched by the tide of freedom which rolled across the world in
the late 1980's, sweeping away the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraqi occupation
of Kuwait, South Africa's 70-year old rule over Namibia and unpopular establishments in
Eastern Europe. Inspired by it and also encouraged by the emergence from limbo of the United
Nations as a central peace-making agency, the people of Kashmir intensified their struggle
against the unwanted occupation. Their uprising entered into its current phase in July 1988. The
scale of popular backing for it can be judged from the established fact that, on few occasions,
virtually the entire population of Srinagar (Capital of Kashmir) came out on the streets in an
unparalleled demonstration of protest against the oppressive status quo. The further fact that
they presented petitions at the office of the United Nations Military Observers Group shows the
essentially peaceful nature of the aims of the uprising and its trust in justice under international
law. India has tried to portray the uprising as the work of terrorists or fanatics. Terrorists do not

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compose an entire population, including women and children, fanatics do not look to the United
Nations to achieve pacific and rational settlement.

Kashmir and the Issue of Fundamentalism

The resistance in Kashmir is not communal and should not be. The compulsions of Kashmir’s
history and the demands of its future alike forbid religious conflict or sectarian strife. It is
important to note that the people of Kashmir should not read their history wrong. It is a history
of tolerance and amity between different religious communities. Kashmiri culture has a long
tradition of moderation and non-violence. This culture does not generate extremism or
fundamentalism. The people of Kashmir know that the conflict was never a fight between
Hindus and Muslims. Nor was it a struggle between theocracy and secularism. It has always been
about the destiny, future and lives of 18 million people of Jammu & Kashmir, be they Muslims,
Hindus, Sikhs or Buddhists. Can anyone deny the fact – of no small significance – that while the
Subcontinent under British rule was the scene of recurrent murderous strife, communal riots
were unheard of in Kashmir? That unquestionable fact brings out the real character of
Kashmir’s heritage.

When all is said and done, one simple fact stands out. The Kashmiri Muslims as such do have
sentiments of regard and esteem for the Kashmiri Pandits which they cannot elicit from anyone
else. Should this alone not be a basic consideration in our thinking about the future?

Futility of Bilateral Talks

The mantra has been repeated too often that the US has no alternative to relying on bilateral
talks between India and Pakistan to achieve a settlement. The experience of more than sixty-
seven years is ignored. No bilateral talks between India and Pakistan have yielded agreements
without the active role of an external element. The missing element is sustained and coordinated
diplomatic pressure by peace-loving democratic powers. If the US does not deem it prudent to
get directly involved, there is no reason why the Security Council of the United Nations or, with
the Council’s support, the Secretary General should not be urged to play a real facilitating role.
Since bilateral India-Pakistan talks can never resolve the Kashmir conflict and nothing has
changed but the faces, therefore the Governments of India and Pakistan should be persuaded to
include the Kashmiri leadership - the All Parties Hurriyet Conference that represents the broader
spectrum of the opinion of the people of Kashmir - with the peace process. As Northern Ireland
required the participation of Sinn Fein in negotiations to succeed, Kashmir is no different.

Apathy of the World Powers

India's occupation of Kashmir has been left undisturbed by the international community, even
though its validity has never been accepted. At no stage, however, have the people of Kashmir
shown themselves to be reconciled to it. Kashmir's record of opposition to its annexation by the
Indian Union, can be no standard be reckoned as less genuinely demonstrated than that of
countries of Eastern Europe under the dominance of the Soviet Union. But while the popular
revolt in the countries of Eastern Europe was observed and reported by the international media,
that in Kashmir has remained largely hidden from the world's view.

Thinking at the Indian Public Square

Indeed, some discerning observers already perceive a growing awareness in the Indian middle
class that the persistence of the Kashmir problem weakens India by diminishing its stature
among the great powers. As a matter of fact, there have always existed saner elements in India
which have questioned both the ethics and the practical advantage of India’s intransigence on
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Kashmir. As they have received little support from outside, they have remained mostly subdued.
But the apparent failure of India’s policies, the tattered regime it maintains in Kashmir and the
losses it has made to sustain in Kashmir, despite the employment of an overwhelming force to
brutalize the people into submission– all these seem to be bringing home to more and more
people in India, even in its army, that the game is not worth the candle. But this constructive
trend will vanish if the world powers are seen as tolerant of India’s obduracy and unmindful of
healthier opinion in India itself about what is best for India.

Arundhati Roy, Booker Prize winner said on March 18, 2103, “And today Kashmir is the most
densely militarized zone in the world. India has something like 700,000 security forces there.
And in the '90s, early ’90s, the fight became—turned into an armed struggle, and since then,
something like 68,000 people have died, maybe 100,000 tortured, 10,000 disappeared, you know?
I mean, we all talk a lot about Chile, Pinochet. These numbers are far greater. And this is just the
crude end of it, you know? Can you imagine living in a place where there are so many soldiers,
you can't—you go out of your door, you come out, come to a barrier. Every aspect of life,
whether it’s joyous or otherwise, is sort of diverted through the military.” She also said on
October 28, 2010 (The Hindu, India), “Kashmir has never been an integral part of India. It is a
historical fact. Even the Indian government has accepted this.”

Vir Sanghvi wrote in the New Delhi based The Hindustan Times on August 16, 2008, “So, here’s
my question: why are we still hanging on to Kashmir if the Kashmiris don’t want to have
anything to do with us?” “I reckon we should hold a referendum in the Valley. Let the
Kashmiris determine their own destiny. If they want to stay in India, they are welcome. But if
they don’t, then we have no moral right to force them to remain.” “It’s time to think the
unthinkable.”Columnist Swaminathan Aiyar wrote in The Times of India “We promised Kashmiris
a plebiscite, six decades ago. Let us hold one now, and give them three choices: independence,
union with Pakistan, and union with India. Let Kashmiris decide the outcome, not the politicians
and armies of India and Pakistan.”

Gautum Navlakha, former Editor of Economic and Political Weekly of India said, “Long and short
of it is that Indian state has become its own worst enemy. There is no point blaming Pakistan,
fundamentalists, human rights activists and the usual alibis used by the Indian state. It is time to
acknowledge that ‘national security’ paranoia cannot hide the reality that Muslims of J&K have
no confidence in the Indian state.” Pankaj Mishra, an Indian scholar wrote in the Guardian on
August 13, 2010, “Once known for its extraordinary beauty, the valley of Kashmir now hosts the
biggest, bloodiest and also the most obscure military occupation in the world. With more than
80,000 people dead in an anti-India insurgency backed by Pakistan, the killings fields of Kashmir
dwarf those of Palestine and Tibet. In addition to the everyday regime of arbitrary arrests,
curfews, raids, and checkpoints enforced by nearly 700,000 Indian soldiers, the valley's 4 million
Muslims are exposed to extra-judicial execution, rape and torture, with such barbaric variations
as live electric wires inserted into penises.”

An Indian scholar-activist, Dr. Angana Chatterji wrote in the daily Greater Kashmir on September
26, 1010, “What do a majority of Kashmiris want? First, to secure a good faith agreement with
New Delhi and Islamabad regarding the right of Kashmiris to determine the course of their
future, set a timeframe, and define the interim conditions necessary to proceed. Following
which, civil society and political leaders would ensue processes to educate, debate, and consult
civil society, including minority groups, in sketching the terms of reference for a resolution, prior
to negotiations with India and Pakistan.” BBC quoted Prof. Sumantra Bose of London School
of Economics who said, “Any notion that the Kashmir conflict has been successfully put in
cold-storage has been exposed as a delusion during the summer of 2008. The lesson- Frozen
conflicts don't stay frozen, and windows of opportunity to make real progress towards solutions
don't come often. Stalling on such opportunities can be perilous.”
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The Factor of Afghanistan

Peace between India and Pakistan could help unlock another conflict with even higher stakes for
the United States: the war in Afghanistan. Indeed, a growing chorus of experts has begun
arguing that the road to Kabul runs through Kashmir—that the US will never stabilize the
former without peace in the latter. Suddenly, bringing India and Pakistan together seems to be
very much in America's interest. Which makes the Obama administration's determination to
avoid the issue increasingly hard to fathom.

Jonathan Tepperman wrote in Newsweek ‘The Road to Kabul Runs Through Kashmir’ on
February 10, 2010, “To understand why Kashmir is so important to Afghanistan, start with the
fact that the US can't defeat the Afghan insurgency without Pakistan's help. Pakistan midwifed
the Taliban and continues to provide it with shelter (and, allegedly, support). And that won't
change until Pakistan resolves its rivalry with India. For Pakistan, Afghan strategy is based on
the idea that it needs a pliant regime there to give it "strategic depth", room to retreat in case of
an Indian invasion. Fear of India also keeps Pakistan from putting enough troops on its 2,250-
kilometer-long Afghan border, which the Taliban still cross at, will… Yet even he (Richard
Holbrooke) concedes that Kashmir makes Afghanistan "more difficult to resolve," and
Washington simply can't afford to avoid it if it hopes to leave the region any time soon.”

Daniel S. Markey, Senior Fellow at Council on Foreign Relations wrote on July 14, 2009, “There
is little doubt that normalized relations between India and Pakistan, including a regionally
acceptable settlement on Kashmir, would offer tremendous benefits to the world powers. Indo-
Pak tensions are especially dangerous because they bring two nuclear states toe-to-toe, they
distract Islamabad from the urgent task of combating terrorists and militants on its own soil and
they contribute to Pakistani suspicions about India's activities in Afghanistan. Thus, the long-
standing dispute over Kashmir is one part of a wider regional dynamic that has direct
implications for Washington's ability to support a stable Afghan state and to address the threat
posed by terrorist groups in South Asia.”

Patrick J Larkin, Naval Post Graduate Scholl, Monterey, California wrote in his article ‘Kashmir:
The key to peace in Afghanistan’ in March 2013, that the thesis concludes that lasting solution to
the Kashmir conflict will allow both India and Pakistan to redeploy valuable diplomatic and
military resources elsewhere in the region. This will then enable India and Pakistan to assist the
stabilization of Afghanistan on a unified front. The US will not be able to achieve a lasting peace
in Afghanistan without the unilateral support of Pakistan and India. If the conflict in Kashmir
can be reconciled, this will aid U.S. objectives of a secure Afghanistan…Only by finding a final
status on Kashmir with South Asia be able to achieve a real, lasting peace.

Steve Coll, New American foundation wrote in New York Review of Books on September 30, 2010,
“Finally, the interests that the United States has in the Kashmir conflict are greater now than at
any time in the postwar period…The only way to gradually reduce ISI’s influence within the
Pakistani establishment and to strengthen more progressive civilian leaders is to pursue a
broader normalization of economic and political ties between Pakistan and India. That in turn
will require a durable settlement in Kashmir. Silence and indirectness about the conflict is no
longer workable….The United States does not need to intervene directly in Kashmiri
negotiations to support the Indo-Pakistani peace process. It does, however, need to rediscover
the sense of urgency and international leadership that characterized its engagement with
Kashmir in the 1950s and early 1960s.”

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Kashmir: A Way Forward

With all these factors in mind, what should be considered the essential guiding principles of the
negotiating process to resolve the Kashmir dispute?

i. First of all, there has to be a cease-fire from all sides during negotiations. Negotiations
cannot be carried out at a time when parties are trying to kill each other. Kashmir has
to be demilitarized on one hand and de-terrorized on the other.

ii. There cannot be and should not be any condition from any party, other than
commitment to non-violence and to negotiations.

iii. The leadership of both India and Pakistan must recognize that there can be no
settlement, negotiated or otherwise, without the active and full participation of the
people of Jammu and Kashmir living on both sides of the Cease-fire Line, including
the Kashmiri diaspora.

iv. Negotiations should be initiated simultaneously at four different levels, including:

a. an intra-Kashmir dialogue between the leadership of the Kashmiri political

resistance, Azad Kashmir, Gilgat Baltistan and minority groups in Kashmir;
b. talks between the government of India and Pakistan;
c. talks between the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri leadership;
d. talks between India, Pakistan, Kashmir, China and the United States.

v. The dispute can also be put towards the road to a settlement if without detracting from
the necessity of trilateral negotiations, Kashmiri leadership is ready for a preparatory
dialogue with the Indian Government provided an environment of non-violence is
established.

vi. To take the sting out of the dispute, we must detach moves towards demilitarization of
the state from the rights, claims or recognized positions of the three parties involved –
governments of India and Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. In order to do this, it
might be necessary to make the demilitarization of the State the first step towards the
reduction of Indian and Pakistani forces on their borders outside of Kashmir. It is
after the peace-process is set afoot that the rights and claims of the parties can be
considered in a non-violent atmosphere.

vii. In order to quicken and strengthen the peace process, the world powers would
definitely recommend improving the atmosphere in Kashmir by a full restoration of
civil liberties, including the liberty to express themselves peacefully on the question of
their own future. A suppression of this freedom means empowering terroristic
elements. This in turn paves the way for destabilizing Pakistan– something that is
certainly not in India’s own interest, nor in the interest of the world powers.

viii. The rights of all minorities in Jammu and Kashmir should be protected at all costs.

ix. The members of the Pandit community displaced in the recent past should be
facilitated to return and their rehabilitation guaranteed.

x. All those persons who have been displaced from Jammu and Kashmir since 1947
should be encouraged to return.

240
 xi. The ‘Armed Forces Special Powers Act’ (AFSPA) should be repealed as recommended
by the leadership of civil society of India, like Justice Rajinder Sachar & Ambassador
Kuldip Nayar.

xii. The bunkers from villages and towns need to be dismantled.

xiii. The release of political prisoners would go a long way to hasten the progress of peace
and reconciliation in the region.

xiv. Restoring the rights of peaceful association, assembly and demonstrations.

xv. Permitting to travel abroad without hindrance, Kashmiri leadership who favor a
negotiated resolution.

xvi. Issuing visas to the Diaspora Kashmiri leadership to visit Jammu and Kashmir to help
sustain the peace process.

xvii. There should be a third party facilitation to make sure that the talks between India,
Pakistan and Kashmiri leadership remain focused. Third party facilitator could be a
person of an international standing, like Nobel Laureate, Bishop Desmond Tutu of
South Africa or Dr. Kofi Annan of Ghana or Ms. Mary Robinson, former President of
Ireland and former UN High Commissioner on Human Rights.

Conclusion

I believe that peace and justice in Kashmir are achievable if all parties concerned– India,
Pakistan and Kashmiris, show some flexibility and make some sacrifices. Each party will have to
modify its position so that common ground is found. It will be impossible to find a solution that
respects all the sensitivities of Indian authorities, values all the sentiments of Pakistan, keep
intact the unity of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, and safeguards the rights and interests of the
people of all the different zones of the state. Yet this does not mean that we cannot find an
imaginative solution. Win-win solutions are further important because they safeguard against
prospective bitterness or humiliation that are the fuel of new conflict. If one party to a solution
feels exploited or unfairly treated, then national sentiments to undo the settlement will naturally
swell. We must not belittle, embarrass, or humiliate any party. Every participant should be
treated with dignity and humanity. Also, charity, not the triumphal, should be the earmark of the
negotiating enterprise.

Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai is the Secretary General of the World Kashmir Awareness (WKA). He is the
Chairman of World Peace Forum, and the founding chairman of the London-based International Institute of
Kashmir Studies, the UK-based Kashmir Press International. Dr. Fai was invited to New York to attend the
United Nations Conference on Conflict Resolutions in September 1992. Dr. Fai has been a leading spokesman
for the Kashmir cause for over three decades and has travelled to over forty countries lecturing on the subject.

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 Chapter 19

EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF MUSLIMS – FOCUS

ON TELANGANA

Amir Ullah Khan

Abstract

Education plays an important role in social and economic progress of society/community. Realising the importance
of education in socio-economic development of the nation, the Right to Education was enshrined in Article 26 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. India’s education sector is indeed in a bad state. There are serious problems with respect to
access to education itself and quality education is simply not available. 89% children of primary school going age of
the richest 20 percent of the population attend school both in the rural and urban areas, while that proportion
drops to 79% for kids in the poorest fifth of the population in rural areas and 78% in urban areas. This paper
focuses on the state of Telangana and analyses educational performance of the various Socio-religious categories.

Introduction

India’s education sector is indeed in a bad state. There are serious problems with respect to
access to education itself and quality education is simply not available. 89% children of primary
school going age of the richest 20 % of the population attend school both in the rural and urban
areas, while that proportion drops to 79% for kids in the poorest fifth of the population in rural
areas and 78% in urban areas. But, attendance drops sharply when it comes to secondary school
and becomes worse at the higher secondary level. Also, the difference between the richest and
the poorest in enrolment widens sharply from the primary section to the secondary and higher
educational levels.

The gulf between the poor and the rich widens as we go up the ladder. Only 6% of young
people from the bottom 20 % of the population attend educational levels above higher
secondary in urban India, while 31% among the richest 20 percent of the population attend
secondary school. The middle class is also substantially disadvantaged when it comes to higher
education. Muslims have the highest percentage of illiterates aged beyond 7 years at 42.72%, as
compared to 36.40% among Hindus, 32.49% among Sikhs, 28.17% among Buddhists and
25.66% among Christians1.

The difference between scheduled castes and tribes and other categories widens at higher levels
of education. It is particularly large for urban girls belonging to scheduled tribes at the secondary
and higher secondary levels. Enrolment of Muslims is lower compared to those of other
religions at every level, both for males and females. In urban India, while enrolment for Muslim
boys in primary schools is only marginally lower, the proportion at the higher educational levels
is substantially lower. Muslim girls enroll in comparable numbers in primary schools, but the
dropout rates at secondary levels are alarming.

1 Jains have the highest percentage of literates above 7 years of age among India's religious communities, with
Census India 2011 finding 86.73% of them as literate and only 13.57% as illiterate. As per the latest data
released on ‘education level by religious community for age 7 and above’ by the government, other minority
communities score over both Hindus and Muslims in literacy levels. As compared to 63.60% of Hindus and
57.28% Muslims in the 'literate' category, the percentage of literates among Christians is 74.34%, among
Buddhists 71.83% and among Sikhs 67.51%.
Much of this can be attributed to the low levels of expenditure on education. According to the
World Bank indicators, government expenditure on education as a percentage of gross domestic
product was 3.8% for India in 2012. Compared to other poor countries it is abysmally low. The
figure is 6.3% for Vietnam, 4.3% for Mali, 4.7% for Nepal and 5% for Rwanda. As a result, the
state is unable to provide education infrastructure to a large number of the poor. It also results
in primary schools rarely getting upgraded to secondary levels, forcing a number of our children
to stop studying after primary levels as they are not able to travel long distances to continue their
education. What is simply inexplicable is the state building primary schools after the Right to
Education Act has been passed. The RTE mandates compulsory education for children in the 6
to 14 age groups. How then can it justify making schools only for the 6 to 10 years old?

In India, the share of illiterate workforce was 30.7 % in 2009-10, and this is twice their 15.2 %
contribution to the GDP. On the other hand, 9 % of graduates contribute over 29 % to the
GDP. Labour productivity is critical for economic efficiency. East Asian economies developed
at a fast pace primarily because of their factor productivity and capital per worker. Estimates
from NSSO’s ‘participation and expenditure in education’ survey -2007-08 show that only 4.7 % of all
population has completed post higher secondary education.

6 % of the male population is educated up to post-higher secondary level in contrast with just
3.4 % of the female population. The socio-religious groups bear extremely high variation in
higher education achievement with a low of just about 2 % or less for the Muslims and H-
SCs/STs, through to 12 % for Hindu-General or upper castes. 3.7 % of rural population in the
age group 22 years and above has attained higher education. At the all India level, only 8.2 % of
the population has attained any degree higher than the higher secondary2. There is indeed a
hugely unequal access to higher education in the country and this needs some urgent solution.
What are the expectations from higher education? With millions of Indians now going to school
and getting skilled.

The role of Education

Education plays an important role in social and economic progress of society/community.

Realising the importance of education in socio-economic development of the nation, the Right
to Education was enshrined in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The
constitution of India under Article 45 enjoins that “the State shall endeavour to provide within a period
of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until
they complete the age of fourteen years”. The Right to Education Act 2009, also makes the Indian state
committed to provide mandatory elementary education to children till they complete fourteen
years of age.

Articles 29, 30 and 350A of Indian Constitution3 underline the effective protection and
educational development of minorities4 so that there will be an egalitarian development of

2 For the male, the educational achievement level is 11 %, for rural it is as little as 3.7 % ; for the Hindu-
SCs/STs it is 3.1 %, Hindu- OBCs - 5.7 % , Muslims - 4.1 % and for females it is 5.7 %.
3 Article 29 (Protection of interest of minorities) says (1) “Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of
India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of its own shall have the right to conserve
the same.” (2) “No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or
receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.”
Article 30 (Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions) says (1) “All minorities,
whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions
of their choice.” (1A) “In making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property of an
educational institution established and administered by a minority, referred to in clause (1), the State shall
ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property is such as
would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under that clause.” (2) “The State shall not, in granting aid
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Indian society. Sachar Committee (2006) clearly endorses the importance of human capital and
its augmentation for a nation’s development. It says that “Improvements in the functional and
analytical ability of children and youth through education open up opportunities leading to both
individual and group entitlements. Improvement in education is not only expected to enhance
efficiency and thereby earnings, but also augment democratic participation, upgrade health and
quality of life” (Sachar Committee Report, 2006; p. 47).

NSSO provides information on the levels of educational attainment through highest level of
education successfully completed by each member in a household. Levels of education are pre-
defined in the data. In order to obtain comparable results with that in the Sachar committee
report, the levels of education are re-defined using similar definition as used in the Sachar report.
In this study, primary education is defined for persons age 12 years and above who have
completed at least primary level of education; middle level education for persons age 15 years
and above who have completed at least middle level of education; matriculation has been
renamed as secondary education for persons age 17 years and above who have completed at
least secondary level of education; and finally, higher secondary education level is defined for
persons age 19 years and above who have completed at least higher secondary level of education.
In addition, higher education consists of information on individual age 20 years and above who
have completed graduation and diploma or certificate courses.

In the NSSO data, 15 % individuals are Muslims and 74 % are Hindus, with rest comprising of
other religious groups. 45 % Muslims live in the urban areas while 55 % live in the rural areas. 38
% Hindus live in the urban areas, whereas 62 % live in the rural areas. The data comprise 51 %
males and 49 % females. General Muslims and OBCs consist of 8 % and 7 %, respectively, of
the total population. The percentage of SCs/STs population is 29 %. Hindu general comprises
of 22 % of the total population, with Hindu SCs/STs and Hindu OBCs being 21 % and 31 %,
respectively. The data reveal that 74 % individuals are literate. 57 % individuals have completed
at least primary education, 44 % have completed at least middle level education, 29 % and 17 %
have completed at least secondary and higher secondary education, respectively.

6 % of individuals have completed graduation and only 1 % has completed either diploma or
certificate courses. 19 % of the total population is of age 6 to 14 years and 62 % are in the age
group of 20 years and above. Individuals belonging to different age categories comprise 78 % in
the age group of 12 years and above, 72 % in 15 years and above age group, 67 % in the age
group of 17 years and above5, and 63 % in 19 years and above age group. 54 % are currently
attending an educational institution, 25 % have never attended any educational institution, and
34 % have ever attended, but currently not attending any educational institution.

to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the
management of a minority, whether based on religion or language.”
Article 350A (Facilities for instruction in mother-tongue at primary stage) says “It shall be the endeavour of
every State and of every local authority within the State to provide adequate facilities for instruction in the
mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to children belonging to linguistic minority groups and the
President may issue such directions to any State as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provision
of such facilities.”
4 The National Commission for Minorities (NCM) looks after the minority communities of India under National
Commission for Minorities Act, 1992. According to Government of India, six religious communities, viz;
Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Zoroastrians (Parsis) and Jains have been notified as minority
communities in India.
5 A detailed analysis of the educational status of Muslims in Telangana was carried out by the G Sudhir
Committee on Socio economic conditions of Muslims in Telangana. A large part of this analysis is taken form
that report that has recently been submitted to the Government.
245
Focus on one South Indian State - Telangana

It has often been stated that the North must learn from the South in terms of achievements on
various socio-economic indicators, particularly in education for the Muslims. In this section, we
analyse what the status of education in Telangana is and learn some lessons. In spite of clear
constitutional and legal provisions the state has not succeeded in providing the compulsory and
equitable education to all. The developmental deficit among various strata of Indian society is
reflected in the inequalities evident in their educational attainments (Dreze and Sen, 1995; Desai
and Kulkarni, 2010). Against this backdrop, this chapter talks about the educational status of
different socio-religious communities (SRCs) as a whole and Muslims in particular in Telangana
State. It focuses on differences in the level of educational achievements of Muslims in
comparison to other SRCs.

Literacy rates across SRCs in Telangana, 2011

State Location Gender Total SCs STs Other Muslims Christians Others
Hindus
Rural Total literacy 57.25 53.90 47.10 56.67 66.10 67.61 62.62
Male literacy 67.48 63.60 57.20 66.96 75.33 75.06 73.11
Female literacy 47.11 44.40 36.90 46.46 56.86 60.55 52.15
Gender gap 20.4 19.2 20.3 20.50 18.47 14.51 20.96
Urban Total literacy 81.09 74.20 69.60 81.05 80.58 86.52 83.20
Male literacy 86.65 81.70 78.10 87.32 84.25 89.91 88.06
Female literacy 75.39 66.80 60.80 74.64 76.77 83.25 78.21
Telangana

Gender gap 11.3 15 17.3 12.68 7.48 6.66 9.85

Total Total literacy 66.46 58.90 49.50 64.64 76.89 80.65 77.78
Male literacy 74.95 68.00 59.50 73.69 82.01 85.33 84.08
Female literacy 57.92 49.90 39.40 55.57 71.63 76.15 71.40
Gender gap 17.0 18.1 20.1 18.12 10.38 9.18 12.68
Urban- Total literacy 23.84 20.30 22.50 24.38 14.48 18.91 20.57
Rural Male literacy 19.17 18.10 20.90 20.36 8.92 14.85 14.95
Gap
Female literacy 28.28 22.40 23.90 28.18 19.91 22.70 26.06
Gender gap -9.11 -4.30 -3.00 -7.82 -10.99 -7.85 -11.11
Source: Census of India, 2011.

Despite its inadequacies, literacy rate remains the most easily understood and widely used
indicator of educational achievement. The Census measures literacy rates in terms of the
percentage of persons aged 6 years and above, who can read and write. The overall literacy rate
in Telangana as per the Census, 2011 assessment is 66.46 %, which is much below the national
literacy rate of 74. 04 %. The Muslim community’s literacy rate is 76.89 % which is little higher
than the national literacy rate and much higher than the SCs (59%), STs (50%) and other Hindus
(64.64%).The other religious minority, i.e., the Christianity community have registered a higher
literacy rate (80.65%). Both Muslims and Christians and others minorities have recorded higher
literacy rate as compared to the overall national figure and SCs, STs and other Hindus. Other
Muslims dominated states have overall literacy rates as follows J&K (67.16%), Kerala (94%),
U.P. (67.68%), Bihar (61.80%) and West Bengal (76.26%) and Maharashtra (82.34%). Out of
that Muslim community has better literacy rate in comparison to other Hindus only in
Maharashtra and almost equivalent to other Hindus in Kerala. In rest of the Muslim dominated
states, Muslims are worse off in comparison to Hindus.

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 Source: Census of India, 2011.

Source: Census of India, 2011.

Source: Census of India, 2011.

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Rural-Urban Gap

The comparison of literacy rate of different SRCs on the basis of place of residence shows that
literacy rate in Telangana state is better in urban areas than the rural areas. The rural-urban gap is
similar across the SRCs. For other Hindus, the urban literacy rate is 81.05 % while the rural
literacy rate is 56.67 %. The SCs and STs have recorded a similar trend where the urban literacy
rates are 74% and 70% respectively. But, their rural literacy rates are 54% and 47%. Similarly the
Muslim community fares a better urban literacy rate (80.58%) while rural literacy rate is 66.10 %.
For other Hindu community, the rural-urban gap is 24.38 % but for SCs and STs, it is 20% and
23%. However, the Muslim community fares a better ratio of rural-urban gap (14.48%). Even
for other communities like Christians (18.91%) and others (20.57%), the gap is also much bigger.
In fact, rural-urban gap for Muslim community is the lowest one. This might be reason for the
higher overall literacy rate for Muslim community than Hindu community.

Changes in Literacy Rate over the Periods

Literacy rate in Telangana was below the national average both during 2004-05 and 2011-12.
Around 70 % of population of 15 years and above was literates in India during 2011-12 while it
was 65 % in Telangana. However, the improvement in literacy between 2004-05 and 2011-12
was two times higher in Telangana (16 percentage points) than that of all-India (8 percentage
points).

Low literacy among SCs, STs and Muslims was observed at all-India level during both the
periods. The situation of SCs and STs is worse than that of Muslims. In Telangana, the literacy
levels of SCs and STs were far lower than the other SRCs in the state and SCs and STs of all-
India. The level of literacy among Muslims was higher than SCs, STs, Hindu-OBCs and other
Minorities during both the periods. Muslim-OBCs in Telangana state showed significant
performance next only to Hindu upper caste in literacy rate during 2004-05. But there was a
dramatic decline in literacy among them during 2011-12. However, their position was better than
Hindu-OBCs during both the periods. The improvement in literacy between 2004-05 and 2011-
12 was higher among STs and Muslim-UCs. Further, the literacy rate was the second highest
among Muslim-UCs next only to Hindu UCs during 2011-12 with 82.2 and 86.3 % respectively.
Thus, Muslim-UCs registered not only high literacy rate but also showed greater improvement.
The status of Muslim-OBCs was same as that of Hindu-OBCs during 2011-12.

Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey.

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Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey.

Literacy rates in urban areas were higher than that of rural areas for all SRCs at all-India as well
as at the state level. However, improvement in literacy between 2004-05 and 2011-12 was higher
in rural than in urban areas except for STs and Muslim upper caste in Telangana. There was a
dramatic decline in literacy among Muslim OBCs in urban areas in the state during 2011-12.
Huge gap in literacy between rural and urban areas has been a persistent feature in India. The
rural-urban gap in literacy was the lowest among Muslims upper caste during both the periods in
Telangana as well as at all-India. However, the gap increased during 2011-12 in the state.

Since, more than 74 % of Muslim population lives in urban areas, lowest gap between rural and
urban areas shows poor performance in urban areas. The rural-urban gap in literacy crossed 30
percentage points in the case of SCs and STs in the state while it was below 25 percentage points
at all-India level. Currently there is 8 percentage rural-urban gap among Hindus (71% rural and
79 % urban among all-Hindus) and 10 percentage gap among Muslims (72% rural and 82 %
urban among all Muslims). Among Hindus, SCs have the highest rural-urban gap (around 11
percentage points), followed by Hindu UCs (10 percentage points), STs (7 percentage points),
Hindu-OBCs (6 percentage points). Similarly among Muslims, Muslim UCs have the highest gap
of 13 percentage points which is lesser than Muslim OBCs (9 percentage points).

Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey

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 Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey.

Mean Years of Schooling

On an average a child in the age group of 7-16 years went to school for 4.8 years during 2004-05
in Telangana. The average years of schooling was higher in urban areas at 5.3 years compared to
that of rural areas with 4.6 years. Thus, the average schooling was higher in urban areas
especially among girls (5.5 years). Across the SRCs in Telangana, it was higher among Muslim-
OBCs (6.4 years) compared to all other religious groups. Further, the average number of years of
schooling was higher among girls than that of boys only among both Muslim OBCs and
Muslim-UCs.

Mean Years of Schooling across the SRCs in Telangana (7-16 Years)

SRCs All Male Female

2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12

SCs 4.3 5.6 4.6 5.8 4.0 5.4

STs 3.4 5.3 3.8 4.8 2.8 6.0
Hindu-OBCs 5.1 5.7 5.3 5.6 4.9 5.8
Hindu-UCs 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.7 5.1 5.1
All Hindus 4.7 5.6 4.9 5.6 4.5 5.7
Muslim-OBCs 6.4 5.4 4.5 5.2 7.1 5.6
Muslim-UCs 4.8 5.8 4.6 5.4 5.0 6.2
All Muslims 5.3 5.7 4.6 5.4 5.9 6.1
Other 3.4 5.3 4.2 5.5 2.9 5.0
Minorities
All 4.8 5.6 4.9 5.5 4.7 5.8
Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey Mean Years of Schooling across the SRCs
in Rural Telangana (7-16 Years)

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 SRCs All Male Female
2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12

SCs 4.2 5.5 4.4 5.8 3.9 5.3

STs 3.3 5.3 3.7 4.6 2.6 6.2
Hindu-OBCs 5.1 5.7 5.3 5.4 4.8 6.0
Hindu-UCs 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.2 4.8
All Hindus 4.6 5.6 4.9 5.3 4.4 5.8
Muslim-OBCs 4.0 5.6 4.0 5.3 3.9 6.0
Muslim-UCs 4.6 7.6 4.8 7.8 4.3 7.5
All Muslims 4.5 6.3 4.7 5.9 4.2 6.7
Other 3.4 7.6 3.8 8.0 3.2 4.8
Minorities
All 4.6 5.6 4.8 5.4 4.3 5.9
st th
Source: NSSO 61 and 68 Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey Mean Years of Schooling across the
SRCs in Urban Telangana (7-16 Years)

SRCs All Male Female

2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12 2004-05 2011-12

SCs 4.8 5.6 5.4 5.7 4.2 5.6

STs 5.8 5.2 5.7 6.3 5.9 3.5
Hindu-OBCs 5.4 5.8 5.3 6.1 5.4 5.4
Hindu-UCs 5.0 5.8 5.2 6.1 4.8 5.3
All Hindus 5.2 5.8 5.3 6.1 5.1 5.4
Muslim-OBCs 6.9 5.2 4.7 5.2 7.8 5.2
Muslim-UCs 4.9 5.6 4.5 5.3 5.3 6.0
All Muslims 5.7 5.6 4.6 5.2 6.5 5.9
Other 3.3 4.3 5.0 3.3 2.4 5.1
Minorities
All 5.3 5.7 5.1 5.7 5.5 5.6
Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey.

The low mean years of schooling among Hindus in 2004-05 was mainly due to low participation
of children belonging to SCs and STs in education. The average number of years of schooling
among STs and SCs was 3.4 and 4.3 respectively. Among other minorities, it was same as that of
STs.

The average years of schooling has increased to 5.6 during 2011-12. It has increased across all
SRCs for both male and female. Muslims has shown highest years of schooling compared to
other SRCs but only in rural areas. It is due to low mean years of schooling among Muslim
OBCs, the overall mean years of education was low in urban areas for this community. In fact in
urban area, for Muslim OBCs, the average years of schooling declined from 6.9 years in 2004-05
to 5.2 years. The reason may be the high dropout ratio in the secondary level due to job seeking
and earning livelihoods.

On an average, a child in the age of 7-16 years had completed 5 to 6 years of schooling during
2011-12. It is expected that a child in the age group of 7-16 years should have completed
secondary level of education i.e. matriculation or 10 years of education. The average schooling

251
for this age group is a little higher than half of the expected. This shows that the level of
education for this age group has not crossed primary level.

The educational attainment for all the SRCs is analysed for both the periods i.e. 2004-05 and
2011-12. There has been a significant improvement in the attainment of higher education during
2004-05 and 2011-12 across all the SRCs. Differentials in educational attainments are significant
at higher levels of educations for all SRCs during both the time periods. Among the SRCs in
Rural Telangana, the attainment is higher for all Hindus. Of which the SCs registered an increase
of 8% in attendance in higher secondary followed by STs (5% increase), OBCs (5% increase).
The Muslim community as a whole recorded an 8% increase in attendance in higher education.
Of that Muslim OBCs registered the highest increase, i.e., 9%. But in urban areas the attainment
of overall Muslims at different levels of education is lower than SCs especially for male.

Percentage of educational attainment across SRCs in rural Telangana

SRCs 12Yrs + & 15Yrs + & 17Yrs + & 19 + & Higher

Primary + Elementary + Secondary + Secondary +

2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010

SCs 27.0 39.5 19.9 29.1 11.4 20.4 3.0 11.1
STs 17.7 34.6 9.7 25.9 4.6 15.0 2.0 6.8
Hindu-OBCs 35.7 49.5 25.0 40.1 14.1 28.0 5.7 11.1
Hindu-UCs 56.1 62.7 46.2 52.3 27.7 42.2 13.0 24.4
All Hindus 34.5 47.0 24.9 37.4 14.2 26.3 5.7 11.9
Muslim-OBCs 22.7 50.8 15.1 38.2 7.4 27.0 1.5 10.5
Muslim-UCs 39.4 66.6 28.9 63.3 13.5 41.7 3.1 11.3
All Muslims 35.0 58.1 25.2 50.0 11.7 33.8 2.6 10.9
Other 37.2 54.9 30.9 50.8 21.0 32.7 6.0 28.1
Minorities
All 34.5 47.7 25.0 38.3 14.2 26.8 5.5 12.1
Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment Survey

Percentage of educational attainment across SRCs in urban Telangana

SRCs 12Yrs+ & 15Yrs+& 17Yrs+& 19+&Higher

Primary+ Elementary+ Secondary+ Secondary+

2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010

SCs 56.8 72.8 48.3 66.1 33.0 50.9 22.9 34.1
STs 50.9 67.4 43.4 60.3 30.6 42.9 18.3 30.4
Hindu-OBCs 61.9 75.9 51.6 67.6 38.0 58.3 23.7 42.0
Hindu-UCs 84.2 92.3 78.1 87.2 71.8 81.9 55.9 67.8
All Hindus 67.2 78.8 58.5 71.4 47.2 61.8 33.3 46.1
Muslims-OBCs 86.0 60.6 73.8 43.5 61.5 31.7 49.2 14.6
Muslim-UCs 56.3 77.7 45.2 62.9 30.8 53.2 15.3 34.9
All Muslims 65.5 73.5 53.2 57.9 38.7 47.3 23.0 29.2
Other 51.3 78.5 39.7 54.6 39.8 44.6 25.5 33.0
Minorities
All 66.5 77.5 56.8 68.1 44.9 58.4 30.6 42.2
Source: NSSO 61st and 68th Rounds on Employment and Unemployment
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 Percentage distribution of household members (24 years and above) highest
level of education across SRCs.

Education SCs STs Hindu Hindu Hindu Muslim Muslim Muslim OTH All
OBCs UCs ALL -OBCs UCs ALL
(E)
Rural
Primary 24.5 20 22.7 13 21.5 24.2 24.2 24.2 21.4 22.3
Secondary 44.6 46.3 54.6 51.8 52.3 59.8 63.7 60.5 48.1 54.5
Intermediate 13.9 16.8 10.4 17.7 12.3 8.1 5.1 7.5 14 10.9
Graduation 13 10.5 8.6 13.5 10.1 5.6 5.9 5.6 12.2 8.9
Post 4 6.3 3.7 3.9 3.8 2.3 1.1 2.1 4.3 3.3
Graduation
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Urban
Primary 16.2 11.9 16.1 9.6 15.4 18.6 15.4 17.8 10.4 16.4
Secondary 53.6 54.2 52.1 59.6 53.2 58.1 59.7 58.5 42.7 55.4
Intermediate 15.7 16.9 14.3 13.5 14.7 9.5 11.1 9.9 20.1 12.2
Graduation 11.5 15.3 12.7 16 12.8 10.6 11.1 10.7 20.3 12.4
Post 3 1.7 4.7 1.3 3.9 3.2 2.6 3 6.3 3.6
Graduation
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
All
Primary 20.5 16.9 20.2 12 19.2 19.8 16.9 19.1 13.7 18.5
Secondary 49 49.4 53.7 54.1 52.7 58.5 60.4 58.9 44.3 55.1
Intermediate 14.8 16.9 11.9 16.5 13.2 9.2 10.1 9.4 18.3 11.8
Graduation 12.2 12.3 10.1 14.3 11.1 9.5 10.2 9.7 18 11.1
Post 3.5 4.5 4 3.1 3.9 3 2.4 2.8 5.7 3.5
Graduation
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Sample Survey conducted by Centre for Good Governance for Commission of Inquiry, 2016 Enrolment in Various
General Study Programmes

In this section we have analysed the enrolment ratio in various study programmes. This shows
Muslim students constitutes 10 to 12 % of total school enrolment. However, the Muslim girls
outnumber the Muslim boys consistently. In the intermediate education in Telangana, the
Muslim students constitutes the meagre percentage even less than the SCs and STs. Muslim boys
and girls are relative more concentrated in the CEC course and are scarce in HEC course. But
the boys are more scarce in HEC while girls are less in number in MPC course. Coming to
university education, we find a meagre percentage of Muslim students, even lesser than the
percentage of intermediate level. It seems that the number of students after intermediate do not
continue their study. University-wise information in Telangana shows that the Muslim students
prefer Osmania University and B R Ambedkar Open University more for higher studies.

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 University enrolment ratio of Muslim students in Telangana, 2014-15

Sl. University Graduates Post Graduates Graduates & Post

No. Graduates

Students

Students

Students

Students

Students

Students

Students

Students

Students
Muslim

Muslim

Muslim

Muslim

Muslim

Muslim
No. of

No. of

No. of
Total

Total

Total
% of

% of

% of
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 Osmania 82551 9717 11.77 14488 812 5.60 97039 10529 10.85
University
2 Telangana 9339 289 3.09 1302 80 6.14 10641 369 3.47
University,
Nizamabad
3 Dr. B.R. 66331 6708 10.11 8619 658 7.63 74950 7366 9.83
Ambedkar
Open
University
4 Prof. Jaya 639 20 3.13 NA NA NA 639 20 3.13
Shankar
Agricultural
University
5 Palamuru 498 31 6.22 NA NA NA 498 31 6.22
University,
Mahabub
Nagar
6 Mahatma NA NA NA NA NA NA 852 29 3.40
Gandhi
University,
Nalgonda
7 Kakatiya 23573 NA NA 2746 NA NA 26319 NA NA
University,
Warangal
8 Satavahana 9970 NA NA 1434 NA NA 11404 NA NA
University,
Karimnagar
Note: Data is related to all mentioned universities as other universities did not submit their data to the Commission.
Source: All concerned Universities and Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Hyderabad.

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 Enrolment in Various Professional Study Programmes

Total No. of Out of Them

Students SCs STs Hindu Muslims Christians
Name of the OBCs
Course

Female

Female

Female

Female

Female

Female
Male

Male

Male

Male

Male

Male
L.L.B 1605 537 9.35 10.61 2.24 1.86 30.3 26.3 4.9 7.6 1.00 1.49
(3 years)
L.L.B 263 162 12.93 15.43 3.04 3.09 26.6 21.6 5.7 5.6 0.00 0.00
(5 Years)
L.L.M 372 215 10.22 9.30 4.03 3.72 29.3 29.8 10.5 12.1 1.61 1.40
M.C.A 890 569 2.58 3.34 0.56 0.18 35.1 32.0 2.1 2.8 0.00 0.00
M.B.A 14096 8683 5.90 7.94 1.17 0.73 35.6 33.1 10.7 10.3 0.77 0.67
Source: Registrar, Osmania University, Hyderabad.

The enrolment in various professional courses in Osmania University is presented here. It is

found that share of Muslims male and female in both the 3 years LLB and 5 Years LLB is less
than 8%. However, their shares rise in LLM – 10.5% for male and 12.1% for female. In MBA,
the share of Muslims male and female students is about 10% each while their share in MCA is
less than 3% each.

English 25 24.9 27.7 34.8 27.7 39.5 45.6 40.9 37.1 36.3
Telugu 73.1 73.1 70.9 63 70.7 27.9 20.4 26.2 61.4 44.4
Any other* 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8
Source: Sample Survey conducted by Centre for Good Governance for Commission of Inquiry, 2016.

Medium of Instruction and Type of Institutions

The survey data presented reveals that in rural areas Telugu is the major medium of instruction
among Hindus, though the percentage declines gradually if one move across SRCs starting with
SCs. English is the second major language as medium of instruction. In urban areas also, there is
the same trend. But, there is a bigger gap between percentage of students studying in Telugu
medium and English medium in rural area as compared to urban area. Among Muslims there is a
different story. In rural areas, Telugu is major medium of instruction and Urdu is second major
language as medium of instruction. But in urban areas, English is major medium of instruction
and followed by Urdu. In both areas, Urdu is second major language for medium of instruction.
But English is preferred as the medium of instruction among Muslims.

The type of institutions that the household educated members have studied shows that
Government funded institutions are the major ones among all SRCS in Telangana. However, the
share of private institutions is also picking up in both rural and urban areas, though they play
more conspicuous role in urban areas. Inter-SRCs comparison shows that Muslims preference
for private educational institutions is more as compared to Hindus.

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 Percentage distribution of different reasons for discontinuing education/not going to
school in Telangana across SRCs

Reasons for

Muslim –
Hindu –

Muslim

Muslim
OBC-E
discontinuing

Hindu

Hindu
OBCs

minor
Other
UCs
UCs
STs
SCs

All

All
All
studies

Monetary problem 29.9 23.9 26.2 12.7 26.0 28.3 34.1 29.6 26.4 28.3
Any other 14.9 16.3 16.5 35.2 17.3 24.9 25.6 25.1 18.1 22.4
Had to work 18.0 27.2 20.6 16.9 20.3 15.9 14.7 15.6 20.5 17.3
Marriage 17.2 12.0 19.3 26.8 18.7 11.9 10.2 11.5 17.1 13.9
Unable to cope up 9.2 9.8 7.6 1.4 7.8 6.3 6.3 6.3 8.5 6.9
with study
Distance problem 1.9 1.1 2.8 1.4 2.4 5.4 3.4 4.9 1.6 4.0
Health Problem 5.0 6.5 3.4 1.4 3.9 2.8 3.1 2.9 5.2 3.3
Attendance problem 1.9 3.3 2.3 1.4 2.2 2.0 0.8 1.8 1.3 1.8
No facility for 1.1 0.0 0.6 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.6
further education
No Urdu medium 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.6
No girls school 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4
Vocational training 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note: *Any other: Got some kind of job. Also some felt though they study, there are no jobs; hence stopped.
Source: Source: Sample Survey conducted by Centre for Good Governance for Commission of Inquiry, 2016.

The household survey data presented shows that first five reasons are major reasons for
discontinuing education or not going to school across the SRCs. The monetary problem or the
poor economic condition is first major reason followed by the compulsion of working and
earning the living, marriage and other reasons. The other reasons include getting some kind of
job, no better future even if they study more, and so on. This reason of scepticism is a second
major reason among Muslims next to poor economic condition. Some other reasons which are
not major reasons are like not able to cope with study, distance from home, health problem and
so on.

The survey of AP Urdu Academy throws light on the depressing conditions in which this 10%
Muslim primary student population try to get education. According to this survey, of the total
21,899 students, 8,366 are boys and 13,533 are girls. Out of these 131 Government Urdu
primary schools, 85 schools don’t have proper electricity, and 100 schools lack drinking water
facility, 73 Primary Schools are in rented rooms, there are only 3,339 benches to facilitate more
than 21,000 students, and only 293 black boards in 131 schools. This survey also reports that
there is an urgent requirement of at least 194 primary school teachers, and construction of 310
toilets in Urdu primary schools. In the case of all Upper Primary and High Schools, Muslim
students are 1,44,682 in which 66,321 are boys and 79,361 are girls. According to the Urdu
Academy survey, there are 15,225 Muslim students in Government Urdu upper primary and
high schools, in which 4,733 are boys and 10,492, are girls. This statistics shows that nearly 15%
of high school Muslim students study in government Urdu High Schools. And this also shows
that in government Urdu high schools more girls study than the boys.

Another study by Penumalli Madhu in 2008 on educational conditions of Muslims in

Hyderabad, published in People’s democracy, delineate and analyse the situation in a succinct

256
way. It says that though the number of Muslim students in old city is more6, the education is in
bad shape. Shockingly, for the last ten years, 75 % of sanctioned posts for aided schools have
not been filled till date.

Recommendations and Learning:

1. Muslim institutions in the North must learn from all the mistakes and achievements of
their south Indian counterparts.

2. Some institutions from the South could very well set up branches or franchises in UP and
Bihar and should be encouraged.

3. Faculty development programs and student exchange programs must be held between the
various institutions doing well in the South.

4. A string fellowship program needs to be instituted that trains high quality skilled human
resource that can work across the country in educational institutions, developing curricula,
pedagogy and measurement tools.

5. More girls’ high schools and junior colleges through English medium with Urdu as a
language must be set up, funds need to be allocated for education of Muslim communities
by the State and the community.

6. The Government should establish primary, Middle and High schools for girls in all areas
with a high density of the Muslim community in order to lessen the gender disparity.

7. Muslim community leaders as well as the state to take the issue of educating Muslim girls
with the seriousness that it deserves. Given the poor condition of Muslim women’s
education, there is a special need, they rightly argue, for the state to take a pro-active role
in this regard in order to promote social justice and the empowerment of Muslim women
and to remove the barriers that systematically reinforce their marginalization.

8. Education through English medium along with a mother tongue language, particularly
Urdu at primary level should be made available.

9. Madarasa teachers should be trained in modern methods of teaching; more primary

schools are set up and Urdu teachers are appointed, with educational inspectors and
administrators, who know Urdu and can supervise the schools. Recognise Madarasas as
primary schools by inducting them into the mainstream school systems.

10. Madarasas should play a critical role in collaboration with Sarva Siksha Abhiyan. As they
enhanced literacy figures among the Muslims considerably. Since a large number of these
Madarasas go only upto middle and secondary level, there is a strong case of roping them
in Sarva Siksha Abhiyan and with the introduction of science and Mathematics subjects,
can establish their equivalence with the institutions of mainstream education.

11. The Government should establish ITIs, VTCs (vocational training centers), Polytechnics,
etc. in order to train Muslim youth for employment.

6 http://archives.peoplesdemocracy.in/2008/0427_pd/04272008 article by Penumalli Madhu, ‘Neglect of

Education in Old city of Hyderabad’ Peoples Democracy, Vol. XXXII, No. 16, April 27, 2008

257
12. Every Urdu-medium school should have Telugu as a compulsory language, so that if and
when students switch their medium of instruction at the high school level, they are not
completely lost.

These measures also call for a committed, grassroots leadership from within the community to
strengthen and supervise educational institutions. Local leaders would have to be trained in
management techniques by organizing orientation and refresher course and seminars for them in
order to enable awareness of contemporary district and state academics. Technical and
technological education should be given more emphasis.

To conclude, the redressing of minority community grievances by the Government and socio-
cultural modernization of Muslim society should go hand in hand. Indian Muslims in order to
face the challenges of globalization, have to alter their outlook, their ways and their style of
functioning. The Government has to offer an integrated approach to human development that
captures the creativity and potential of communities, schools, and workplaces. It should
combine the lessons of research and practice to establish lasting systems and structures that help
learners achieve, workers advance in their careers, and citizens improve their communities.

Literacy rates across the SRCs based on place of residence among

Muslim dominated states

State Location Gender Total Hindu Muslim Christian Others

(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Rural Total Literacy 63.18 74.38 57.84 72.78 72.71
Male Literacy 73.76 83.87 68.74 82.08 81.34
Jammu & Kashmir

Female Literacy 51.64 63.20 46.38 56.84 62.78

Urban Total Literacy 77.12 89.79 69.65 81.95 88.13
Male Literacy 83.92 93.91 77.19 87.58 91.26
Female Literacy 69.01 83.63 61.69 73.45 84.08
Total Total Literacy 67.16 79.09 61.03 78.03 81.15
Male Literacy 76.75 87.16 71.02 85.16 86.82
Female Literacy 56.43 68.87 50.50 66.66 74.29
Urban Total Literacy 13.94 15.41 11.81 9.17 15.42
Rural Male Literacy 10.16 10.04 8.45 5.50 9.92
Gap Female Literacy 17.37 20.43 15.31 16.61 21.29
Rural Total Literacy 65.46 66.99 56.79 63.70 72.61
Male Literacy 76.33 78.12 66.06 72.76 81.21
Female Literacy 53.65 54.82 47.04 53.98 63.20
Urban Total Literacy 75.14 81.05 61.94 83.67 85.80
Uttar Pradesh

Male Literacy 80.45 86.44 67.00 86.35 89.16

Female Literacy 69.22 74.96 56.44 80.92 82.01
Total Total Literacy 67.68 69.68 58.76 73.63 78.01
Male Literacy 77.28 79.73 66.42 79.44 84.58
Female Literacy 57.18 58.61 50.59 67.54 70.81
Urban Total Literacy 9.68 14.06 5.15 19.97 13.19
Rural Male Literacy 4.12 8.32 0.94 13.59 7.95
Gap Female Literacy 15.57 20.14 9.40 26.94 18.82
Rural Total Literacy 59.78 60.83 54.28 60.84 67.99
Bihar

Male Literacy 69.67 71.08 62.19 69.40 76.80

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 Female Literacy 49.00 49.61 45.85 51.68 58.40
Urban Total Literacy 76.86 78.69 69.06 87.09 87.60
Male Literacy 82.56 84.63 73.69 89.55 91.00
Female Literacy 70.49 71.98 64.02 84.72 83.63
Total Total Literacy 61.80 62.85 56.34 67.67 75.96
Male Literacy 71.20 72.63 63.81 74.44 82.87
Female Literacy 51.50 52.10 48.36 60.62 68.43
Urban- Total Literacy 17.08 17.86 14.78 26.25 19.61
Rural Male Literacy 12.89 13.55 11.50 20.15 14.21
Gap Female Literacy 21.49 22.37 18.17 33.04 25.23
Rural Total Literacy 69.34 74.70 60.45 65.57 80.55
Male Literacy 75.40 81.42 65.31 72.22 86.54
Female Literacy 63.03 67.71 55.35 58.83 73.71
Urban Total Literacy 88.47 90.48 78.73 90.70 92.74
Male Literacy 91.81 93.61 83.11 93.25 95.70
Female Literacy 84.94 87.15 74.11 88.21 89.64
Assam

Total Total Literacy 72.19 77.66 61.92 67.00 85.39

Male Literacy 77.85 83.72 66.74 73.39 89.97
Female Literacy 66.27 71.33 56.85 60.53 80.52
Urban- Total Literacy 19.13 15.78 18.28 25.13 12.20
Rural Male Literacy 16.41 12.19 17.80 21.03 9.16
Gap Female Literacy 21.91 19.44 18.76 29.38 15.93
Gender Gap -5.50 -7.25 -0.96 -8.35 -6.77
Rural Total Literacy 72.13 74.48 67.35 71.12 74.81
Male Literacy 78.44 81.74 71.09 78.26 83.58
Female Literacy 65.51 66.81 63.44 64.11 65.49
Urban Total Literacy 84.78 87.23 73.53 89.64 90.08
West Bengal

Male Literacy 88.37 90.81 77.34 92.31 92.84

Female Literacy 80.98 83.45 69.40 87.12 87.07
Total Total Literacy 76.26 79.14 68.75 75.99 82.57
Male Literacy 81.69 85.06 72.52 81.90 88.34
Female Literacy 70.54 72.89 64.77 70.24 76.62
Urban- Total Literacy 12.65 12.75 6.18 18.52 15.27
Rural Male Literacy 9.93 9.07 6.25 14.05 9.26
Gap Female Literacy 15.47 16.64 5.96 23.01 21.58
Rural Total Literacy 71.71 71.34 77.02 73.31 86.10
Male Literacy 81.61 81.35 85.55 80.47 91.08
Female Literacy 61.36 60.86 68.19 66.20 79.57
Urban Total Literacy 86.31 86.56 82.85 94.61 90.70
Male Literacy 90.98 91.28 87.99 95.90 93.40
Gujarat

Female Literacy 81.03 81.14 77.37 93.28 87.67

Total Total Literacy 78.03 77.46 80.82 83.94 88.46
Male Literacy 85.75 85.45 87.15 88.25 92.06
Female Literacy 69.68 68.80 74.14 79.58 84.39
Urban- Total Literacy 14.60 15.22 5.83 21.30 4.60
Rural Male Literacy 9.37 9.93 2.44 15.43 2.32

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 Gap Female Literacy 19.67 20.28 9.18 27.08 8.10
Rural Total Literacy 77.01 76.67 79.08 82.97 80.25
Male Literacy 85.15 84.91 85.87 88.23 87.09
Female Literacy 68.54 68.09 72.02 77.64 73.08
Urban Total Literacy 88.69 89.29 85.21 93.33 91.88
Male Literacy 92.12 92.86 88.17 94.87 94.22
Maharashtra

Female Literacy 84.89 85.29 81.86 91.85 89.46

Total Total Literacy 82.34 81.76 83.56 92.25 87.60
Male Literacy 88.38 88.18 87.57 94.17 91.59
Female Literacy 75.87 74.88 79.13 90.41 83.49
Gender Gap 12.51 13.30 8.44 3.76 8.10
Urban- Total Literacy 11.68 12.62 6.13 10.36 11.62
Rural Male Literacy 6.97 7.95 2.30 6.64 7.13
Gap Female Literacy 16.35 17.20 9.84 14.21 16.38
Gender Gap -9.38 -9.25 -7.54 -7.57 -9.25
Rural Total Literacy 68.73 68.23 71.83 84.44 74.94
Male Literacy 77.61 77.31 78.97 88.19 82.88
Female Literacy 59.71 59.01 64.54 80.77 65.47
Urban Total Literacy 85.78 86.10 82.94 93.16 88.92
Male Literacy 90.04 90.79 86.13 95.05 92.82
Karnataka

Female Literacy 81.36 81.21 79.64 91.39 84.25

Total Total Literacy 75.36 74.36 78.89 90.80 82.52
Male Literacy 82.47 81.98 83.53 93.16 88.29
Female Literacy 68.08 66.56 74.12 88.57 75.59
Urban- Total Literacy 17.05 17.87 11.11 8.72 13.98
Rural Male Literacy 12.43 13.48 7.16 6.86 9.95
Gap Female Literacy 21.65 22.20 15.10 10.62 18.78
Rural Total Literacy 92.98 91.86 92.62 96.21 93.10
Male Literacy 95.35 94.66 95.37 97.08 94.50
Female Literacy 90.81 89.28 90.22 95.39 91.65
Urban Total Literacy 95.11 95.22 93.91 96.94 93.64
Male Literacy 96.95 97.12 96.30 97.60 94.91
Kerala

Female Literacy 93.44 93.48 91.86 96.33 92.11

Total Total Literacy 94.00 93.49 93.29 96.49 93.42
Male Literacy 96.11 95.85 95.85 97.28 94.74
Female Literacy 92.07 91.33 91.08 95.75 91.95
Urban- Total Literacy 2.13 3.36 1.29 0.73 0.54
Rural Male Literacy 1.60 2.46 0.93 0.52 0.41
Gap Female Literacy 2.63 4.20 1.64 0.94 0.46
Rural Total Literacy 73.54 72.67 84.84 85.04 82.21
Tamil Nadu

Male Literacy 82.04 81.44 90.56 89.64 88.37

Female Literacy 65.05 63.88 79.42 80.58 75.72
Urban Total Literacy 87.04 86.20 89.19 93.02 92.14
Male Literacy 91.80 91.28 93.42 95.18 95.58
Female Literacy 82.31 81.11 85.02 90.96 88.13

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 Total Total Literacy 80.09 78.83 88.17 90.14 89.36
Male Literacy 86.77 85.92 92.76 93.17 93.62
Female Literacy 73.44 71.72 83.69 87.23 84.56
Urban- Total Literacy 13.50 13.53 4.35 7.98 9.93
Rural Male Literacy 9.76 9.84 2.86 5.54 7.22
Gap Female Literacy 17.26 17.23 5.60 10.38 12.41
Rural Total Literacy 57.25 56.67 66.10 67.61 62.62
Male Literacy 67.48 66.96 75.33 75.06 73.11
Female Literacy 47.11 46.46 56.86 60.55 52.15
Urban Total Literacy 81.09 81.05 80.58 86.52 83.20
Male Literacy 86.65 87.32 84.25 89.91 88.06
Telangana

Female Literacy 75.39 74.64 76.77 83.25 78.21

Total Total Literacy 66.46 64.64 76.89 80.65 77.78
Male Literacy 74.95 73.69 82.01 85.33 84.08
Female Literacy 57.92 55.57 71.63 76.15 71.40
Urban- Total Literacy 23.84 24.38 14.48 18.91 20.57
Rural Male Literacy 19.17 20.36 8.92 14.85 14.95
Gap Female Literacy 28.28 28.18 19.91 22.70 26.06
Source: Census, 2011

Dr. Amir Ullah Khan is a member of the Commission of Inquiry, set up by the Telangana Government, to
study the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in the State.

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 PRIMARY SAMPLE SURVEY

As an integral part of this study, a nation-wide survey, based on a carefully designed sampling model, was
conducted to gather incisive insights from Muslims as well as Non-Muslims on the situation of the Muslim
community at present and how things are likely to shape up as far as the key aspects are concerned in the next
decade. The results are perceived to provide the necessary framework for the overall body of work to be generated,
throwing light on the key issues determining the thought processes of the Muslim and Non-Muslim populations,
their perceptions on the problems and remedial measures, followed by their projections about the future.

The Study shows that Muslims, the largest minority in India, with 14.2 percent population
according Census 2011 are lagging behind in all parameters of development index. The Sachar
Committee Report, and the Rangnath Mishra Commission have not been implemented by the
government. They may have highlighted the pitiable conditions of the Muslims but this was not
enough to make the Muslims part of the development process. The people may have voted
Modi on the slogan ‘Sabka Sath-Sabka Vikas’ plank for growth and development but at the
ground level, most of the vulnerable sections are suffering due to lack of funds from the
government. Worse, the government has cut the funding for the social sector, and it has ignored
the Kundu Committee recommendations.

Amongst the people interviewed, 60 percent believed that no change took place in last ten years,
when Justice Sachar presented the report to the UPA government. From the respondents, 25
percent believed that somewhat changes have taken place in the form of minority scholarships and
schemes. From the people interviewed, 13 percent were sure of the changes in the last decade.
Around 2 percent of the people interviewed were not aware and ‘could not say’ on this aspect.

Most of the people interviewed found challenges in education, safety and security of the people.
They considered communalism and equality as big challenge for the community. For other
respondents, jobs, health, gender equality, political representation, and religious orthodoxy were
also challenges. Given the fact that an overwhelming majority of Muslims are self-employed,
many of the respondents were cynical about opportunities available. The respondents believed
that opportunities were shrinking in government jobs. Most of them also found hope in now
declining jobs in the Gulf countries. Some respondents found scope in private jobs. However,
majority of the respondents believed that self employment and traditional vocations were the
opportunities for the Muslims. Majority of the persons interviewed agreed that there was
discrimination and bias in the job market.

According to the general survey done by BRIEF, 44 percent were not aware about the Sachar
Committee, 39 percent were partially aware, and only 14 percent were aware. Given this, it
cannot be expected that the people are aware of the various schemes run by the government for
the Muslims/minorities. According to the survey, 86 percent of the people were not aware of
the government schemes. The survey shows that 14 percent were aware of the government
schemes. The survey finds that 37 percent feel that conditions of Muslims have not changed, 39
percent feel that Muslims are slightly better off, and 17 percent feel that they are considerably
better. A total of 7 percent feel that the condition has actually worsened in the last ten years.
According to the respondents, the community will emerge as a content community well
integrated into the national mosaic. The community is sceptic about economic growth, health
related issues, and religious freedom. It was also held that educational goals may not succeed.

So, the pertinent question comes up - what is it that needs to be done. Our study broadly deals
with five areas:

 Health
 Education
  Security
 Employment
 Political Representation in Parliament and State Assemblies.

Along with these, the Muslims also consider security and safety, vital for their survival in India.
Many of the participants were scared of their own identity. Some were apprehensive of being
followed by men of the Intelligence Bureau (IB). In fact, our workshop in Gujarat could not be
held due to negative feedback from the State. Abdul Hafeez Lakhani, editor of Siasat Gujarat,
said that it was not possible to hold such a ‘Muslim workhsop’ anywhere in Gujarat, as no public
place would allow us to hold it. And if we managed to get some place, people would not come
fearing questioning and follow-up by the intelligence department. In any case, the security
agencies would not allow such a meet to happen. Such is the fear among the Muslims about the
security agencies. Similarly in Jammu, when the workshop was organized in a hotel, most of the
participants were suspicious of the presence of some intelligence personnel in the meeting.
During the course of study, Maharashtra Minorities Commission Chief, Munaf Hakim was
dismissed when he was about to order an enquiry to find out exact number of Muslims in
Maharashtra Jails. Also, all the accused in Maliana massacre were let free by the trial court and
the SP government of the Uttar Pradesh did not appeal in the Higher Court against the acquittal.

The Study finds that a sense of insecurity and fear prevails amongst the Muslims. Worse, people
feel that like Gujarat, where the High Court Judges were in awe of PM Modi and in private
gatherings called him ‘hero’, after the Ahmedabad riots, the entire nation may suffer under his
government. The number of communal incidents have gone up and various issues that are taken
up by the fringe right-wing groups go a long way in increasing the sense of insecurity within the
minorities. The Sangh Parivar groups are shining under naked majoritarian confidence and
bringing secret parleys on ‘Love-Jihad’, ‘Ghar-Wapsi’ ‘Gau-Prem’ in public discourse to deflect
people’s attention from the issues of inflation, rampant unemployment, and economic slow-
down. A deliberate attempt is being made to instill distrust among Muslims and Hindus. Even
tribals and Dalits are being instigated to act against Muslims.

To tackle the onslaught of the Sangh Parivar and its various agencies, people have come up with
suggestions that they wish to have interaction between Muslims and Hindus based on mutual
trust and respect. Dialogue should be established between the two communities at all levels, to
foster harmony. In border areas of Assam and West Bengal, and in parts of Bihar, there should
be a scheme for rehabilitation. The study finds that Muslim migrants are targeted, while Hindu
migrants from Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan are welcomed. This selective target
of Muslims migrants should end and poor Muslims should not be made soft targets. If non-
Muslims come from Bangladesh, they are treated as refugees, and when Muslim comes they are
treated as ‘illegal migrants’.

It was found that religious freedom of the people is being violated, particularly in BJP ruled
states. Cow-related laws should not become a tool to harass and arrest innocent Muslims, as has
happened in many cases. While dealing with issues of beef-ban, caution must be taken to not
harass people involved in tannery business. One culture should not be enforced upon the
people. Muslim girls should not become target of ‘Bhagva Prem’ and should not be stalked by
the youth. Muslim areas should be provided with police vigilance, traffic police and CCTV
installation. False arrest, and harassment of Muslim youth by Nagar Suraksha Samiti, should end.
The administration should not make construction of new mosques an issue. Only Muslims
should not be targeted during communal clashes. Muslim men and even women should not be
scared of going to the police station to lodge an FIR. Muslim youth should not be targeted by
the security forces and being branded as terrorists and extremists. Muslim identity should not be
questioned everywhere and patriotism should not be judged by fellow citizens.

264
When questioned, the respondents called for strengthening the education base amongst Muslims
at all levels. Muslim students must learn English to leverage opportunities available in a
liberalized economy. It also called for creating a positive outlook among youth. Makhtab and
Madarsa Education should be modernized and Banat Madarsas promoted to encourage girl
students. States should have Madarsa Board and all states Madarsa Boards should be integrated
under one Central Board to streamline syllabus and timely result. At places, where government
schools are not present, community initiative should be made to provide affordable quality
education. The skill development programmes would take into account local needs, available
skills and local language capabilities.

Efforts should be made to reduce the drop-out rate among boys and girls. Muslims
organizations should actively check that saffronisation of education which is taking place with
the introduction of Yoga, Surya Namaskar, Devi Vandana, Ramayana, and Mahabharata in
classes and in textbooks. If needed, the same should be placed before the government as part of
the New Education Policy. In areas where power supply is an issue, solar lamps should be
provided to families. Government schools should ensure that the student teacher ratio is good.

Small scale businesses in India run by Muslims comprise a substantial percentage of overall
business in the unorganized sector making enormous contributions to the Indian economy.
Inclusive growth should be the goal of the government. Muslim should be asked to develop
educationally and become employable. Self-employment continues to dominate, with a 52.2
percent share in total employment. An overwhelming 96 percent of the Muslims are self-
employed. Efforts should be made to cover them under health insurance and general insurance.
The fear of getting a job, no provision of reservation, followed by discrimination in the job
market – all adds up to various issues. Muslims should find opportunities in taking benefit of
schemes, run by government in regional education, skill development and vocational studies.
The community should embrace opportunities in micro-entrepreneurship, education, and adopt
IT in all walks of life.

Reservation should not be biased against Muslims. The government should amend Article 341,
extend the reservation to Muslims. If reservation can be extended to Hindus, Sikhs and
Buddhists on religious basis, why the same is not being extended to Muslims? The study finds
out that Muslims generally get opportunities as Urdu teachers or in minority institutions. The
bias in selection committees should end and Muslims should be made members of Selection
Committees to ensure there is no discrimination in the process. Efforts should be made to
safeguard the interests of Muslim artisans in traditional industries such as gems/jewellery
printing/paper industry.

Muslim leadership and organisation should work as centre and take fellow communities on the
basis of proportionate representation at all levels. Representation of Muslims in police forces
should be in proportion to population. There is caste and religion based regiments in the Army,
i.e. Sikh Regiment, Jat Regiment, Gorkha Regiment. Similarly, a Pathan or a Muslim regiment
can open the door of army to the Muslim youth. Islamic finance, one of the best models of
banking should be appreciated and implemented. Even in judiciary Muslim presence should be
increased through proper training. The study believes that the facilities given to the SCs and STs
should also be extended to the Muslims.

Political Representation

The study agrees that the delimitation commission has not done justice to the Muslims. The vote
share of Muslims has been divided in many seats and this has affected their influence. There has
to be a solution within the democratic structure Muslims should be empowered through elected
bodies. The study believed that the issue of Uniform Civil Code and other contentious issues
265
should be dealt with logic rather than emotions and sentiments. Efforts should also be made to
foster unity among Muslims and remove sectarian and heterodox differences. The community
should be highly educated, politically aware, modern, free from prejudice, and backwardness.

The study believes that radicalisation of the majority community by the RSS Parivar, VHP,
Durga Vahini, Vidya Mandirs, Bajrang Dal, Hindu Mahasabha, Shiv Sena poses greatest
challenge to the safety and security of the Muslims and other minorities in India. The
radicalisation and conversion of Dalits and Adivasis also is a threat to the other communities.
According to the findings, underdevelopment, communal riots, identity stereotyping are
challenges for the community. The authors believe that security of life and property, religion and
language, livelihood discrimination were the biggest challenge before the community. Other
challenges are poverty, conservative elements within community, right wing fascist state, lack of
support to Muslim women, and legal discrimination, Muslim disunity, leadership crisis,
sectarianism, identity crisis and terrorism.

The study believes that saffronisation of education, adulteration of science with mythology,
promotion of myth as science, rewriting of history by the central and state agencies poses huge
challenge to the national unity and integrity. The agenda of Cultural and Human Resource
Development ministries are particularly matters of concern.

It is believed that opportunities lie in inclusive democracy, economy and a vibrant civil society,
business, education, latest technology and abroad employment. The study also calls for social
and political awakening of the community and its leaders and intellectuals.

The study believes that India and Pakistan can move ahead in their relations including resolving
the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. For this to happen, SAARC nations must accept to live in
peace and harmony. Border trade, economic integration, cultural contacts, sports and people-to-
people contact can help people in resolving all issues in an atmosphere of mutual trust and
harmony.

Mainstream economy excludes Muslims from benefits of economic growth and development.
The study affirms that the condition can improve, by providing special assistance, and focus in
the areas of education, health, and employment. The study reaffirms that communal harmony is
essential to national development and Hindus and Muslims should establish regular channel of
communication to remove distrust. There should be greater research on the issues and
challenges of Muslims in India. There should be time based case studies to highlight the trust
deficit which exists among the Muslims.

The Survey Results

Break-up

The total sample size for the study was 3400, which included both Muslim and Non-Muslim
respondents, in the approximate ratio of 5:1. The states1 chosen for the survey, based on
concentration of Muslim population and other determining factors, included West Bengal (300)
and Assam (200) from the eastern zone; Gujarat (314), Maharashtra (316) and Rajasthan (100)
from the western zone; Telangana (199), Tamil Nadu (360) and Karnataka (225) from the
southern zone; Uttar Pradesh (504), Delhi-NCR (486), and Jammu and Kashmir (200) from the
northern zone; and Madhya Pradesh (100) and Chhattisgarh (96) from the central zone. The
detailed break-up of the sample has been depicted in following table:

1 The sample size for each state has been provided in brackets.
266
 Sample Break-up (Overall Sample – 3400: Muslims – 2814, Non-Muslims - 586)
Zone East West South North Central

Uttar Pradesh
Respondents

Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
(State-wise)

Delhi-NCR
Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan

Jammu &
Types of

Kashmir

Madhya
Pradesh
Gujarat
Assam
Muslim 214 148 288 221 82 178 356 187 417 347 197 85 94
Non- 86 52 26 95 18 21 4 38 87 139 3 15 2
Muslims
Total 300 200 314 316 100 199 360 225 504 486 200 100 96

Muslim Dominated Areas

State Name Muslim Dominated Areas

Telangana Hyderabad, Nizamabad

Assam Dhubri, Barpeta
Chhattisgarh Raipur, Korea
Delhi Okhla, Jama Masjid
Gujarat Ahmedabad, Vadodara
Jammu and Kashmir Kashmir, Jammu
Karnataka Mangalore, Pullakeshinagar
Madhya Pradesh Bhopal, Burhanpur
Maharashtra Dhule, Buldana
Rajasthan Ajmer, Jaipur
Tamil Nadu Ramanathapuram, Vellore
Uttar Pradesh Moradabad, Rampur
West Bengal Murshidabad, Maldah

For all the sample states, the Muslim dominated areas were listed for the purpose of the study.
These areas for all the states were specially covered to arrive at certain key results to the overall
objective of this study. The Muslim dominated areas considered for all the states have been
depicted in the table.
Demographic Profile
Age Distribution
Around 77 percent of the overall sample was
aged between 21 and 40 years. Respondents
aged 20 or below, between 41 and 60 years,
and more than 60 years formed 7 percent, 15
percent and 1 percent of the sample respectively.

267
Gender Specifications

Approximately 80 percent of the sample

comprised of male respondents, and the
remaining 20 percent respondents were females.

Education

Around 98 percent of the sample analysed were literates. Individuals educated till primary level
and middle level formed 5 percent and 9 percent of the sample, whereas matriculates and higher
secondary pass outs formed 13 percent and 23 percent of the sample respectively. Further,
around 29 percent of the overall sample was educated till graduation level, while another 13
percent completed education till post-graduation level. Technical and professional degrees were
possessed by respectively 1 percent and 5 percent of the sample.

More than half the sample respondents did their

schooling in Government establishments, and
another 29 percent went to private schools. Around
15 percent of the respondents attained their school
level education in Madrasas. The remaining 2
percent of the sample did not attend school.

Around 46 percent of the sample chosen went to

private colleges, whereas another 35 percent of
the respondents attended government colleges.
Individuals who had not been to college at all
formed approximately 19 percent of the sample.
Occupation

268
The chart depicts the occupational pattern of the sample under consideration. Individuals into
private service formed around 24 percent of the sample, whereas another 10 percent were into
government services. Approximately 12 percent respondents were self-employed. Individuals
into small businesses formed 19 percent of the sample, while another 6 percent were into large
businesses. Wage labourers formed 6 percent of the sample. Around 3 percent of the
respondents were engaged in agricultural activities.

Individuals belonging to households with annual income of INR 1,00,000 or lower formed close
to half the sample, with around 17 percent belonging to households earning less than INR
50,000 a year, the range being INR 50,001 to INR 1,00,000 for another 31 percent. Individuals
from households with annual income of INR 1,00,001 to INR 2,00,000, INR 2,00,001 to
3,00,000 and INR 3,00,001 to INR 5,00,000 formed 24 percent, 14 percent and 8 percent of the
sample respectively. Individuals from households with relatively higher income levels of INR
5,00,000 or above formed around 5 percent of the overall sample.

Identification Details

Among the identification documents listed for the purpose of the study, majority (90 percent) of
the respondents possessed Voter ID Card, followed by documents such as Aadhaar Card (69

percent), PAN Card (49 percent) and Driving License (45 percent). The availability of
documents such as Health cards and Passports was low amongst the sample respondents.

Healthcare Preferences

As per the sample, government hospitals were the most common providers of healthcare, with
50 percent preferring the same, followed by private hospitals (42 percent) and private clinics (22
percent).

269
Perception Based Feedback

Awareness regarding Sachar Committee Report

The Sachar Committee Report was arguably the

first major attempt to assess the social, economic
and educational status of the Muslim community
of India using empirical data from a multitude of
sources. The Committee, chaired by Justice
Rajinder Sachar submitted its final report to the
Prime Minister in November, 2006. The report
highlighted key issues pertaining to the status of
Muslims including analysis on parameters such as
population, education, employment, access to
bank credit, access to social and physical
infrastructure, poverty, etc. The Committee came
up with recommendations, integral to the overall development of the Muslim community, and
formed a body of work essential in terms of gauging the way forward. It was observed that the
awareness levels regarding this report were on the lower side, with only 17 percent of the total
sample responding on the affirmative when enquired. A considerable 44 percent respondent
reported that they were not aware of the report, while 39 percent reported partial awareness.

Awareness regarding Government Schemes

In the recent times, especially during the years

following the Sachar Committee
recommendations, various government
programmes were launched to directly or
indirectly facilitate overall development and
welfare of the Muslim community. The sample
analysed displayed low levels of awareness
regarding such government schemes and
benefits on offer. A mere 14 percent of the
respondents provided confirmation of being
aware of at least one scheme/umbrella
programme, while the response was negative for the remaining majority of the sample. The
various schemes/benefits recalled by the respondents who were aware, as per the responses
received, included the Mahatma Gandhi Bunkar Bima Yojana, Central Government benefits for
pilgrims through Hajj Committee, Mahila Samridhi Yojana, Multi-sectoral Development
Programme (MsDP), MOMA Scholarship and Maulana Azad National Fellowship for Minority
Students Scheme. Many important schemes/benefits such as Mid-day Meal Scheme, National
Maternity benefit Scheme, Ladli Scheme, Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme,
BPL Card, etc. did not find any mention. This lack of awareness can be attributed to the dearth
of adequate communication to create awareness, lack of education and confidence, ambiguity in
identification of minority beneficiaries through adequate data, etc.

Condition of Muslims

With a view to gauge the perception of both Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents as regards
the change in the condition of the Muslim population of India, their opinions on the extent and
areas of change were sought. The findings have been discussed in the following paragraphs:

270
 Community Perception regarding Change in Condition of Muslims in the Last Ten
Years
Considerably Slightly Not Slightly Considerably
Better Off Better Off Changed Worse Off Worse Off

Muslims (n=2814) 16% 39% 37% 7% 2%

Non-Muslims 19% 41% 35% 4% 1%
(n=586)
Overall 17% 39% 37% 6% 1%

The above table summarises the perception of the respondents – Muslims and Non-Muslims, on
the extent of overall changes in condition of the Muslim minority in India. It was observed that
cumulatively around 55 percent of the Muslim respondents and 60 percent of the Non-Muslim
respondents opined that the condition of the Muslim population underwent positive changes
over the last decade. Further, similar percentages of Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents i.e.,
37 percent and 35 percent respectively did not perceive any changes in the conditions of the
country’s Muslim population. Around 9 percent and 5 percent of the Muslim and Non-Muslim
respondents believed that the condition of the Muslims had actually worsened over the last ten
years. The table also depicts the break-up of the overall sample on the basis of their responses
on the perceived direction of change in the condition of the Muslim minority in the country
over the previous decade.

Sections of both Muslim and Non-Muslim samples further specified the areas where they
thought changes – both positive and negative, had taken place over the last decade. An effort
has been made towards summarising these responses – on the basis of importance, as depicted
below:

Positive Changes

Positive Changes Over The Last Decade (Multiple Responses)

Muslim Views (n=1509) Non-Muslim Views (n=354)
Improvement Areas Share Improvement Areas Share

Education 54.1% Education 55.1%

Employment 16.4% Employment 19.8%
Financial/Economic Condition 7.5% Lifestyle 12.7%
Health Conditions/Family Planning 6.3% Financial/Economic Condition 6.8%
Awareness about Rights and Duties 4.6% Health/Family Planning 5.6%
Overall Development in all Spheres 4.1% Awareness about Rights and Duties 5.1%
Empowerment of Women 3.9% Empowerment of Women/Girl 3.4%
Child
Thought Process 3.2% Perception towards 2.0%
Government/Political Participation
Political Awareness 2.6% Religious Freedom 1.1%
Standard of Living 2.1% Social Harmony 1.1%

271
Security 1.7% Modern Thinking 0.8%
Government Support 1.1%
Religious Freedom 0.8%
Reduced Cases of Early Marriage 0.5%
Lower Levels of Discrimination 0.4%
Access to Public Facilities 0.2%

From the relevant responses, it was gathered that education was the area where Muslims were
perceived to have improved the most over the last decade, with 54.1 percent of the Muslim
respondents and 55.1 percent of the Non-Muslim respondents indicating the same. The second
most important area where improvements have been witnessed over the last decade was on the
employment front, as expressed by 16.4 percent and 19.8 percent of the Muslim and Non-
Muslim respondents respectively. As per 7.5 percent of the Muslim respondents, improvements
in financial condition was the major positive change experienced by the Muslim minority,
making it the third most important area of development as per the Muslim responses. Further,
with 12.7 percent Non-Muslim respondents agreeing on the same, improvements in lifestyle
came out to be the third most important area of development for the Muslims according to
individuals from other communities. Further, improvements in health conditions and increased
awareness about associated aspects such as family planning were major determinants of growth
in the preceding decade as indicated by 6.3 percent of the Muslim respondents and agreed upon
by 5.6 percent of the Non-Muslim respondents. Augmented education levels in many cases had
given way to associated improvements such as increased awareness about rights and duties,
empowerment of women and greater care for the girl child, and greater political awareness as
indicated by sections of the relevant Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents. Around 56 percent
of the overall sample recognised improvements achieved by the Muslim community in various
aspects, with sections of the same indicating the improvement areas.

Negative Changes

Negative Changes Over The Last Decade (Multiple Responses)

Muslim Views (n=201) Non-Muslim Views (n=25)
Concern Areas Share Concern Areas Share

Lack of Education 33.8% Low Education Levels 36.0%

Lack of Government Support 15.4% Financial Weaknesses 20.0%
Poverty 13.9% Lack of Religious Freedom 12.0%
Unemployment 11.9% Lack of Social Harmony 8.0%
Inadequate Political 6.5% Inadequate Political Representation 8.0%
Representation
Lack of Social Harmony 5.0% Lack of Security 4.0%
Lack of Security 4.5% Lack of Employment 4.0%
Lack of Religious Freedom 4.5% Lack of Empowerment of Women 4.0%
Lack of Empowerment of Women 4.0% Lack of Health & Hygiene 4.0%
Lack of Unity 3.5%

272
Community Bias/Discrimination 2.5%
Lack of Public Facilities 1.5%
Lack of Health & Hygiene 0.5%
Early Marriage of Girls 0.5%

A considerably lower 7 percent of the overall sample opined that the condition of the Muslim
population had actually degraded over the last ten years. Sections of the aforementioned subset
indicated the various areas wherein they thought the condition of the Muslims had worsened
over the said time period. Persistently, low education levels was the major point of concern for
33.8 percent of the relevant Muslim respondents and 36 percent of the relevant Non-Muslim
respondents. Lack of administrative support and overall poverty levels came out to be the
second and third major problems as per the Muslim respondents, with respectively 15.4 percent
and 13.9 percent of the said respondents indicating these problems. The second and third most
intriguing issues facing the Muslim population as per the Non-Muslim responses came out to be
their financial weaknesses and the lack of religious freedom faced by them, with respectively 20
percent and 12 percent Non-Muslim respondents indicating these issues. Other issues indicated
by the Muslim respondents, in order of relevance included – unemployment, inadequate political
representation, dearth of social harmony, lack of security especially during riots and acts of
terrorism in any part of the country, lack of religious freedom, low levels of empowerment of
women, etc. among others. The issues indicated by the Non-Muslim respondents, again in order
of importance included - lack of social harmony, lack of capable leaders representing issues
related to the Muslim population, security concerns, lower employment levels, lack of
empowerment of women through education and work opportunities, and concerns related to
health and hygiene.

Challenges

Challenges Faced as a Minority Community

In order to understand the challenges faced by the

Muslims, it was imperative to understand if being a
minority community translated into increased
barriers towards availing equal opportunities and
producing similar outcomes as compared to other
communities. The premise was laid by the Sachar
Committee Report, which indicated that Muslims,
the largest minority in the country, were finding it
difficult to leverage the overall growth and
development being achieved by the country as a
whole, and were found lagging in terms of a majority
of the human development indicators. On enquiring
the respondents for this study on those lines, it was
gathered that around 89 percent of the overall sample including- Muslim and Non-Muslim
respondents – opined that Muslims in India did have to face challenging situations in attaining
overall development and well-being. Based on discussions with sections of the respondents, their
perceptions on instances of challenges faced by the Muslims as a minority were recorded. It was
observed that difficulties faced in attaining employment, especially public and administrative
jobs, was one of the most challenging aspects as per the respondents. Lack of government
schemes directed towards bolstering employment opportunities for the Muslim minority was
also a deterrent as indicated by them.

273
One of the major reasons for low employment level was the lack of education among
considerable sections of the Muslim population, which in itself was a challenge faced by the
Muslim minority. Education at standard institutes has been illusive and unaffordable to the
Muslims due to high levels of poverty – leading to increasing numbers of school drop-outs and
increased instances of child labour and lack of adequate scholarships for Muslims as per the
respondents. Lack of educational facilities in Muslim areas, instances of discrimination during
admission procedures and even of lack support from parents have been major bottlenecks.
Inadequate administrative support vis-a-vis other minorities was also seen as an important
reason for the overall backwardness of the Muslims. Increased reservations for Muslims in
educational institutions, civil services, etc. as well as extension and utilization of
benefits/schemes for the overall development of the community can go a long way in improving
the conditions of the Muslims, but these areas have not been adequately focused on over the
years as per the respondents.

Lower levels of political representation and dearth of leaders voicing the situation of the
Muslims has further aggravated the problem. Religious differences and lack of religious freedom
was also seen as challenging aspect by the respondents. Problems in conducting religious
activities in Non-Muslim dominated areas, communication gap in social and professional arenas,
etc. have time and again been concern areas for the Muslims. Further, negative perceptions,
instances of suspicion and apprehension among Non-Muslim individuals arising from attire and
appearance of Muslims, lack of trust leading to extra checking by the police especially during
times of unrest such as riots and terrorist activities, difficulties in attaining basic facilities such as
identification documents and housing, issues in getting bank loans, etc. were some of the
instances cited by the respondents, where greater sensitization was required.

Personal Level Discrimination Faced

The Muslim respondents in the sample were enquired for instances of discrimination faced by
them at school, at work, in finding housing facilities, in accessing public facilities, or any in any
other aspect they could indicate. It was observed that personal level discrimination was faced by
around 3 percent of the overall Muslim sample at school, by 2 percent at work, by 1 percent in
finding housing and by 1 percent in accessing public facilities. The details have been summarised
in the following sections:

Discrimination at School

Discrimination at School (n=90)

Type Share

Discrimination in Admission 55.6%

Less Attention from Teachers 17.8%
Taunts from Peers at School 12.2%
Different Treatments 10.0%
Lack of Scholarships 4.4%

Among those who faced discrimination at school, around 55.6 percent perceived that they had
been through partiality in the admission procedures. Around 17.8 percent indicated that they
received less attention from teachers at school and evaluation patterns were also different for
them vis-a-vis other students which eventually reflected in their overall performance.
Approximately 12.2 percent reported of occasions wherein being a minority they have been at

274
the receiving end of taunts and jibes from peers at school. Further, certain issues important to
the Muslims were not given the level of attention they warrant and were treated differently as per
10 percent of the relevant respondents. The areas highlighted in this context included lack of
provisions for performing Namaz at school, seclusion of Urdu from syllabus, given languages
such as Sanskrit were taught, lesser number of holidays for Eid in comparison to some of the
other festivals, etc. The dearth of relevant scholarships for Muslim students was an area of
concern for 4.4 percent of the relevant respondents.

Discrimination at Work

Discrimination at Work (n=64)

Type Share

Partiality During Interview

37.5%
Lack of Religious Freedom
25.0%
Products/Services Refused
20.3%
Lack of Support for Muslims
10.9%
Lack of Trust for Muslims
4.7%
Lack of Reservation
1.6%

Around 37.5 percent of those who faced discrimination at workplace reported of partiality in
interview processes which they perceived were due to their religious background. Lack of
religious freedom was felt by 25 percent of the relevant respondents, the various related issues
indicated at being reluctance of companies to provide time off for Friday Namaz, and lack of
provisions for wearing traditional dresses on Ramzan while such provisions were there in case of
other festivals. Around 20.3 percent of the responses revolved around discrimination faced by
teachers, shop owners, auto drivers, etc. in generating demand for their services, which
according to the relevant respondents were not availed on account of religious bias. Further, lack
of support at workplace in the form of delayed promotions and salaries was experienced by 10.9
percent of the relevant respondents, and around 4.7 percent felt a general lack of trust. Around
1.6 percent of the responses revolved around the demand for more reservations directed
towards the Muslim minority. The respondents felt that they would have been a more
competitive position, if there were more reservations and related frameworks for the Muslim
minority, as has been in the case with other backward sections of the population such as SCs,
STs and Dalits.

Discrimination in Finding Housing Facilities

Discrimination in Finding a House (n=38)

Type Share

Lack of Rented Apartments 42.1%

Problems in Buying 39.5%
Food Restriction in Housing Societies 13.2%
Hindrances from Administration 7.9%
Partiality in Government Schemes 2.6%

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Of the individuals in the sample who faced problems in availing housing facilities, around 42.1
percent cited problems faced in renting residential apartments. They felt of a general lack of trust
for them among the landlords, resulting in increased terms and conditions, and demands for
detailed documentations and identity proofs among others. Discrimination faced while buying
housing facilities was reported by 39.5 percent of the relevant respondents, and around 13.2
percent faced restrictions on having non-vegetarian food in their housing societies. Around 7.9
percent of the relevant responses indicated at resistances from administrative bodies, making it
difficult for them to buy properties in preferred areas. Further, government housing schemes
were biased as felt by 2.6 percent of the relevant respondents, and their applications were not
shortlisted due to discrimination as perceived by the relevant respondents.

Discrimination in Accessing Public Facilities

Discrimination in Accessing Public Facilities (n=32)

Type Share

Discrimination in Availing Identification Documents

50.0%
Discrimination at Institutions
28.1%
Lack of Subsidies
12.5%
Lack of Loans
9.4%

Around half of the relevant responses highlighted the discrimination faced by them in availing
identification documents such as Voter ID Cards, Ration Cards, etc. Discrimination faced at
ration shops, at airports in the form of extra security checks, in obtaining visa for international
travel, etc. were reported by 28.1 percent of the relevant respondents. Lack of subsidies for gas,
electricity, etc. was indicated in 12.5 percent of the responses. Issues related to obtaining bank
loans were faced by 9.4 percent of the relevant respondents.

Other Areas

A miniscule 0.1 percent of the overall Muslim sample indicated other areas such as extra
interrogation on various occasions by police personnel and difficulties faced in attaining
necessary documentation for various official procedures.

Key Challenges Faced by the Muslim Community

This section focusses on the key challenges faced by the Muslim community in India at today’s
date, related to eight major aspects viz. education, health, religious freedom, accessing public
facilities, employment and job opportunities, government support, security and political
representation. In an effort to understand these challenges in detail, the top three challenges
based on the frequency of responses received (overall as well as zone-wise) – have been derived.
Further, the various issues related to the above categories as reported by the respondents from
all the five zones have been represented and analysed in the segments to follow.

Top Challenges

Based on the responses received from the overall sample, the top three areas of challenge for the
Muslims have been depicted in the following chart:

276
As per the respondents, lack of adequate education was considered to be the major challenge
faced by the Muslim community, followed by lack of employment and issues faced in attaining
necessary government support for achieving overall development.

Top Challenges – Zone-wise

The following charts depict the top three areas of challenge, based on the cumulative number of
responses from the sample states highlighting the challenges listed for all the five zones i.e.
Eastern Zone (West Bengal and Assam), Western Zone (Gujarat, Maharashtra and Rajasthan),
Central Zone (Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh), Northern Zone (Delhi-NCR, Uttar Pradesh
and Jammu & Kashmir) and Southern Zone (Telangana, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka).

It was noticed that education remained amongst the top three areas facing challenges for all the
zones. Lack of employment and employability remained a top concern in the eastern, western,
northern and southern zones. Lack of administrative support was seen as a major challenge in
the western and northern zones, while lack of adequate political representation of the Muslims
was seen as a key challenge by respondents in the Central zone. The other key issues included
health concerns, which was among the principal three in the eastern and southern zones, and
lack of religious freedom, which was seen challenge in the central zone.

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Key Challenges Analysed

This segment delves into the eight major parameters in greater detail, with a view to understand
the key issues surrounding these broader concern areas. The key issues2 from each zone, based
on number of responses received indicating the same, have also been highlighted for Muslim
and Non-Muslim respondents separately to achieve greater clarity.

2 The top three issues have been highlighted, barring exceptions

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 Education

Education
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

High Cost Factor 20 40 27 81 111

Persistent Trend of Inadequate 8 9 3 49 25
Education
Religious Barriers 32 23 9 46 26
Discrimination 11 22 10 41 37
Preference for Traditional Educational 19 34 5 68 30
Muslim Institutions
Need for Government Support 34 110 31 108 76
Gender Inequality 2 7 13 105 38
Lack of Awareness 25 57 0 60 39
Weak Economic Condition of Muslims 19 14 3 4 26
Lack of Educational Institutions 24 55 16 130 67
Lack of Family Support 9 7 1 16 24
Need for More Sustained Efforts 1 15 5 14 18
Total Muslim Responses 204 393 123 722 517
Lack of Education 8 4 0 2 1
Religious Barriers 2 7 0 11 4
Weak Economic Condition of Muslims 3 17 10 33 12
Need for Government Support 7 20 0 20 3
Lack of Facilities in Government 3 3 0 11 0
Institutions
Non- Lack of Modern Education in 2 4 0 11 2
Muslim Traditional Institutions
Lack of Educational Institutions 10 6 0 16 7
Lack of Awareness 3 11 0 16 4
Gender Inequality 1 6 0 25 0
Lack of Family Support 2 4 0 9 7
Discrimination 5 0 0 8 1
Need for More Sustained Efforts 0 4 1 10 2
Total Non-Muslim Responses 46 86 11 172 43
Grand Total 250 479 134 894 673

279
There has been a persistent trend of inadequate education amongst the Muslims, which can be
attributed to factors such as weak economic condition of the Muslims, lack of awareness, lack of
family support, need for earning at a tender age due to poverty, high costs associated with
attaining modern education, etc. There is a preference for traditional educational institutions
amongst a considerable part of the Muslim population, which focus more on religious education
and often miss out on the broader spectrum of modern education. Such preferences can be
attributed to traditional mindsets and overall backwardness. Religious barriers also play a key
role in the selection of institutions, due to the problems faced by Muslims in attending Friday
Namaz, wearing Burkha at institutions (this forms a major basis for discouraging girls from
attaining education, in addition to other deterrents such as traditional ideas which doesn’t attach
much value to a girl’s education, early marriage, etc.) among others. The Muslims also face
discrimination in terms of difficulty in admission processes, disrespect from peers and biased
treatment from teachers. The Muslim respondents3across the five zones emphasized on the need
for more government support in terms of reservations and educational schemes as well as more
educational institutions with modern facilities in the Muslim areas. Non-Muslim respondents4
from a majority of the zones opined that economic backwardness prevented the Muslims from
attaining modern education, and poverty was at the root of low education levels among Muslims.
Non-Muslim respondents from a number of zones also reiterated the need for augmented
administrative support in order to address the issues related to education of the Muslim
population. Some respondents believed that sustained interest, zeal and thereby efforts on the
part of Muslims were necessary. Sections of the Muslim as well as Non-Muslim respondents
argued that there was a general lack of interest and seriousness among a considerable section of
the Muslim population, a problem that needs to be addressed through sustained efforts aimed at
attaining higher education levels as compared to the levels currently pursued.
Health
Health
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Lack of Awareness 14 12 9 28 58
Lack of Medical Infrastructure 66 32 9 110 121
Muslim Weak Economic Condition of Muslims 4 7 4 9 39
Social Restrictions 3 0 0 0 0
Lack of Government Schemes 11 1 0 19 9
Total Muslim Responses 98 52 22 166 227
Lack of Awareness 23 4 1 18 3
Lack of Medical Infrastructure 15 3 0 15 7
Non-Muslim Weak Economic Conditions 5 0 0 3 4
Social Restrictions 1 0 0 0 0
Lack of Government Schemes 2 0 0 1 1
Preference for Traditional Clinics 1 0 0 1 0
Total Non-Muslim Responses 46 7 1 37 15
Grand Total 144 59 23 203 242

3 The n values for all the eight parameters have been the Muslim sample size from each zone: East: 362, West:
591, Central: 179, North: 961, South: 721
4 The n values for all the eight parameters have been the Non-Muslim sample size from each zone: East: 138,
West: 139, Central: 17, North: 229, South: 63
280
Issues related to health and hygiene remains a core challenge faced by the Muslim population in
the country. As per Muslim as well as Non-Muslim respondents from all the zones, a general
lack of awareness related to health and hygiene, modern healthcare facilities, family planning,
government schemes, etc. was a major issue concerning the Muslims, which called for more
awareness generation and health education programmes. The infrastructural deficits highlighted
upon by Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents from a majority of the zones included dearth of
government hospitals, inadequate medical facilities and lack of experienced doctors in the
Muslim areas (especially in the rural and slum areas). Affordability factor is also not prevalent
amongst the Muslims, with considerable masses still not economically strong enough to avail
healthcare from private set-ups, as emphasized by both Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents
across zones. Therefore, the practice for a considerable section of the population is to resort to
more traditional options such as hakims and dawakhanas, and sections of the respondents
believed that they should have access to more formal treatment. Further, as indicated by certain
respondents from the eastern zone, social restrictions, especially in the case of women, call for
more hospitals dedicated to women. As per the respondents, there was a need for increased
administrative support in the form of subsidies, health cards, and free check-ups for the BPL
population among others. Further, there was a need for awareness of generation mechanisms for
the target recipients so as to reach out to the maximum number of beneficiaries.

Religious Freedom

Religious Freedom
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Issues in Performing Religious 62 55 67 114 69

Practices
Wrong Perceptions of Non-Muslim 0 0 1 1 1
Communities
Muslim Negative Mindset of Muslims 6 10 11 26 14
Religious Differences 2 52 19 25 12
Problems faced in 0 4 0 16 5
Schools/Workplaces
Religious Misrepresentations 0 9 39 24 22
Total Muslim Responses 70 130 137 206 123
Negative Mindset of Muslims 5 2 0 31 0
Cultural and Social Gap 0 1 0 0 1
Issues in Performing Religious 21 3 0 10 8
Non- Practices
Muslim Problems faced in 0 0 0 31 0
Schools/Workplaces
Lesser Freedom for Women 6 0 0 14 0
Religious Differences 8 32 0 8 1
Total Non-Muslim Responses 40 38 0 94 10
Grand Total 110 168 137 300 133

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To align their religious practices into the broader scheme of things has been a perennial problem
for the Muslims in India. As per Muslim respondents across all the zones, they faced problems
in using loudspeakers for performing Azaan/Namaaz, performing Qurbani, receiving adequate
security and administrative support, and in attaining freedom equivalent to the other
communities in expressing and practicing their religion. They further reiterated that issues such
as food habits, differences in appearance and differences in rituals, should not be a deterrent in
achieving overall coherence amongst the populations from various religious backgrounds. The
Muslim respondents believed that there should be greater tolerance for religious activities such
as performance of Namaz, wearing clothes as per religious specifications, etc. at educational
institutions and workplaces. The Non-Muslim respondents from a majority of the zones also
considered religious differences and issues related to performance of religious practices as areas
of concern which needed to be addressed. As per Muslim respondents from most of the zones
and sections of Non-Muslim respondents, refinement was required in the thinking pattern of
Muslims as well. There was a need to eradicate any possible negative mindset suggesting that the
Hindus are against their religion. Sections of Muslim respondents also suggested that all wrong
practices in the name of religion should be abolished, and such misrepresentation of Islam
should be avoided. For example, greater focus should be on key issues such as the liberation of
women, as their right to education and prospects of attaining employment get sufficiently curbed
due to backwardness and decisions taken in the name of religion, while Islam doesn’t suggest the
same.

Accessing Public Facilities

Accessing Public Facilities

Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Lack of Awareness 8 14 20 4 64
Discrimination Faced 57 15 18 58 14
Muslim
Lack of Government 31 6 2 16 2
Schemes/Benefits
Lack of Financial Assistance 15 3 2 7 5
Total Muslim Responses 111 38 42 85 85
Lack of Awareness 5 8 1 1 8
Lack of Basic Facilities in Muslim 5 4 2 5 0
Non-
Areas
Muslim
Lack of Financial Assistance 2 0 0 2 0
Lack of Government Schemes 2 0 0 0 0
Discrimination Faced 2 2 0 3 1
Total Non-Muslim Responses 16 14 3 11 9
Grand Total 127 52 45 96 94

General lack of education, leading to dearth in awareness regarding their rights and duties as
citizens, has been at the root of the inability on the part of the Muslim population in attaining
public facilities as highlighted by Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents from most of the zones.
Sections of Muslim sample from all the zones pointed at the discrimination faced by the
Muslims in attaining facilities such as electricity, water, sanitation, roads, ration from ration
282
shops, etc. as Muslim dominated areas are neglected by the concerned authorities. This was seen
as a major challenge by sections of Non-Muslim respondents from most of the zones as well.
Further, as per the Muslim respondents, there was a need for greater government support for
the Muslims, with more schemes directed towards their development, ensuring timely receipt of
dues by pensioners, ensuring hassle-free attainment of identification documents such as Ration
Cards and Voter ID Cards among others. As per sections of Non-Muslim respondents across
most of the zones, access of the Muslim population to basic facilities such as water supply,
ration shops, etc. was a primary area of focus and needed required attention. Financial assistance
in the form of hassle-free opening of bank accounts, easy access to home loans, loans for
business/self-employment, etc. was regarded as another essential factor by the respondents,
which would go a long way in providing necessary fillip to the growth prospects of the Muslim
population.

Employment

Employment
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Lack of Education and Awareness 6 6 4 0 5

Lack of Government Support 36 31 32 76 38
Discrimination 38 59 32 165 63
Muslim Lack of Empowerment of Women 5 5 2 21 10
Lack of Opportunities 35 15 2 139 26
Lack of Efforts 37 42 13 109 82
Cultural and Social Gap 3 5 0 16 14
Total Muslim Responses 160 163 85 526 238
Lack of Government Support 6 5 4 27 4
Lack of Education and Awareness 0 0 0 5 4
Non-
Muslim Lack of Adequate Opportunities 7 5 0 32 1
Discrimination 17 8 3 37 6
Lack of Empowerment of Women 4 0 0 6 1
More Efforts Required 5 6 1 37 1
Total Non-Muslim Responses 39 24 8 144 17
Grand Total 199 187 93 670 255

The government needed to take substantial strides in bringing up the employment status of the
Muslim population of the country on a priority basis, as indicated by Muslim and Non-Muslim
respondents from majority of the zones. The general opinion was that there is a need to ensure
some form of reservation for the Muslims, after duly resolving the issue of prohibition of religion
based reservations. The government should provide further guidance and encouragement to the
Muslim population in determining employment avenues, bring down discrimination (faced in
attaining job offers, receiving competent salaries, etc.), and find out means to increase the share of
Muslims in administrative and other government jobs.

283
The share of Muslims in government jobs is quite low, a situation that needed to change. The
Muslim population lags behind in terms of awareness about employment opportunities as well as
employability due to lack of modern education. The preference for attaining traditional
education in Madarsas is still widespread among the Muslim population, which doesn’t
adequately equip them to avail employment opportunities. Modern education in more
mainstream educational set-ups would go a long way in preparing them with the necessary
technical education as well as awareness regarding employment opportunities, as opined by the
respondents. Empowerment of women is also an area where the Muslims are lagging vis-a-vis
other communities, and there is a need for encouraging education for women and providing
them with increased allowance to work in order to bring in overall development.

Cultural and social gaps also create differences at workplace, a prime example being the inability
of many companies to incorporate the Friday Namaz performed by the Muslims into their
broader operational frameworks. However, as per considerable sections of the Muslim sample
across all the zones and sections of Non-Muslim respondents as well, the Muslim population has
to get rid of all preset negative mindsets preventing them from dreaming big in terms of
achieving higher success levels at work. They reiterated that strong will and concerted efforts
towards achieving desired professional goals can catapult the Muslim population towards
achieving desired results.

Government Support

Government Support
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Lack of Administrative Support 4 1 21 106 20

Lack of Policy Implementation 60 133 43 238 113
Muslim
Discrimination 2 19 6 82 17
Lack of Financial Support 0 11 0 8 7
Lack of Political Representation 20 45 2 81 22
Total Muslim Responses 86 209 72 515 179
Lack of Policy Implementation 25 42 4 66 11
Lack of Administrative Support 0 8 2 19 4
Non-
Muslim Lack of Financial Support 0 0 0 5 0
Discrimination 6 4 0 34 2
Lack of Schemes 0 0 0 9 0
Total Non-Muslim Responses 31 54 6 133 17

Grand Total 117 263 78 648 196

Opinions revolving around the lack of government interventions on issues, integral to the
Muslim population, and the perception that the Muslim community is treated as nothing but
vote bank have been evident in the responses of sections of the overall sample. The utmost need
for consistent government support in the areas of education, employment, business, healthcare,
security, power and waste management has been at the core of the feedback received from
sections of both Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents across zones. As opined by them,
284
relevant officials at all levels, from the central government to the gram panchayats should make
concerted efforts towards addressing issues related to minorities such as Muslims and lay down
an actionable framework including relevant policy measures and institutional support for
inclusive realisation of benefits, thereby leading to overall growth.

As highlighted by considerable sections of Muslim and Non-Muslim respondents from all the
zones, there were very few schemes aimed at the overall socio-economic development of the
Muslim minority, and the implementation mechanisms had their shortcomings, thereby creating
a void as far as the developmental aspects of the Muslims were concerned – a situation which
needed to change. As per indications received from the responses, minorities should not be
relegated to marginalised groups and further, there should be no discrimination at any level in
designing schemes/umbrella programmes and providing subsidies for the betterment of the
needy. Greater participation of representatives of minority communities such as the Muslims at
the administrative levels would go a long way in showcasing their issues as per sections of
Muslim respondents.

Security

Security
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Lack of Trust 6 4 4 31 9
Muslim
Lack of Support from Police 24 46 17 173 61
Lack of Administrative Support 16 18 1 31 11
Total Muslim Responses 46 68 22 235 81
Non- Lack of Trust 2 0 0 0 0
Muslim
Total Non-Muslim Responses 2 0 0 0 0
Grand Total 48 68 22 235 81

Lack of overall trust, instances of lack of support compounded by harassment from police
forces and lack of administrative support are seen as the three major security concerns for the
Indian Muslims. Less protection, extra checking for Muslims and harassment in the form of
misbehaviour from the police and arrests without valid reasoning, especially during times of riots
and terrorist activities are instances that were cited by sections of the respondents. More police
stations in Muslim areas, prudent and unbiased security framework, and greater support from
the government can go a long way in providing the necessary security assurance to the common
Muslim population.

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 Political Representation

Political Representation
Respondent Issues Zone
Type East West Central North South

Lack of Good Leaders 29 73 70 126 60

Lack of Political Knowledge 1 5 12 26 2
Muslim Low Presence in Politics 3 0 5 10 5
Need for Political Party 45 30 29 89 17
Representing Muslims
Need for Government Support 2 8 6 9 9
Total Muslim Responses 80 116 122 260 93
Need for Good Leaders 1 20 4 35 8
Need for Government Support 0 2 0 0 3
Non- Need for Political Party 4 9 0 8 3
Muslim
Need for More Opportunities 1 0 0 4 1
Need for Increased Awareness 0 2 0 1 1
Total Non-Muslim Responses 6 33 4 48 16
Grand Total 86 149 126 308 109

Lower levels of political representation and the dearth of good political leaders are having
negative bearing on the growth prospects of the Muslims as per relevant Muslim and Non-
Muslim responses received from all the zones. In other words, the presence of political parties
and individuals voicing the needs and issues of the Muslims, and addressing problems specific to
the community is imperative to bring in greater clarity to the administrative processes. Further,
these leaders should be able to improve the condition of the community as a whole, and inspire
it to reach higher levels of excellence in all spheres. Such potent representatives are majorly
absent in the existing administrative framework and the Muslim youth are not taking adequate
interest towards that end, a condition which needs to improve as per the respondents.
Government support towards this end in terms of reservation for Muslims in politics at all levels
may go a long way in ensuring greater participation of the community towards overall
developmental processes. The Muslims also needed to strengthen their knowledge base and
awareness about political issues as per sections of the respondents.

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Future Outlook

Prospective Sectors

Prospective Sectors Frequency Percentage

983 29%
Self-Employment
782 23%
Education
593 17%
Service
523 15%
Business
438 13%
Politics
337 10%
Skilled Services
240 7%
Civil Services
180 5%
Sports
149 4%
Agriculture

On enquiring the sample respondents on the prospective sectors where Muslims had the
capability of doing well, it was gathered that self-employment (in the areas of medicine, law,
engineering, handicrafts, construction, etc.), education (including teaching) and service (private
and public) were regarded as the top three avenues wherein Muslims had chances of excelling.
The other areas – in order of importance as per the responses received – included business,
politics, skilled services (including mechanical works, carpentry, labour, stitching, cooking, crafts,
etc.), civil services (defence, army, aviation, police service, etc.), sports and agriculture.

Vision 2025

On being enquired about their perceptions on the standing of the Muslim community in India
ten years hence and the vision for Muslims thereof, both positive and negative opinions were
received from the respondents, which have been summarized as follows:

Positive Views – Respondents are optimistic about the developmental prospects of the
Muslims in the recent future opine that the Muslims will emerge as a content community well
integrated into the national mosaic and would live in complete harmony with the other
communities. According to them, education would be the key driving factor for achieving
overall growth of the community in the coming decade, followed by other factors such as
economic upliftment, liberation of women, and greater political awareness and representation.

Negative Views – Respondents are circumspect about the prospects of overall growth of the
Muslim populace over the next ten years have indicated their concerns over the possibility of
registering major improvements in key socio-economic areas. As per their views, economic
weaknesses, health issues and lack of religious freedom are expected to prevail for long. They
have also displayed their scepticism regarding the possible role played by the most important
driver of change for Indian Muslims i.e. education in the following decade. They opined that
education is not likely to reach a considerable section of the Muslim population by the end of
2025, and therefore, associated problems such as unemployment, economic stagnancy,
prejudices, primitive practices and overall isolation from the national goals and perspectives are
expected to persist.

287
 Appendix I

Opinion of Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents on the Key Challenges Faced by

Muslims Today (State-wise Numbers for Relevant Responses)

Education

Education
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

High Cost Factor 20 0 4 18 18 20 7 59 22 0 61 37 13

Persistent Trend of 7 1 2 3 4 0 3 32 17 0 0 11 14
Inadequate Education
Religious Barriers 23 9 5 15 3 0 9 22 22 2 0 19 7
Discrimination 9 2 9 6 7 2 8 18 22 1 0 23 14
Preference for 19 0 24 6 4 3 2 45 13 10 0 19 11
Traditional Educational
Institutions
Need for Government 31 3 42 34 34 4 27 49 59 0 0 49 27
Muslim

Support
Gender Inequality 2 0 6 0 1 0 13 85 18 2 0 22 16
Lack of Awareness 18 7 19 17 21 0 0 25 35 0 0 26 13
Weak Economic 6 13 4 5 5 1 2 2 2 0 3 18 5
Condition of Muslims
Lack of Educational 16 8 20 18 17 3 13 97 31 2 4 41 22
Institutions
Lack of Family Support 9 0 5 1 1 1 0 14 2 0 1 20 3
Need for More 1 0 5 6 4 0 5 7 7 0 0 9 9
Sustained Efforts
Total Muslim Responses 161 43 145 129 119 34 89 455 250 17 69 294 154
Lack of Education 1 7 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
Religious Barriers 2 0 0 6 1 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 4
Weak Economic 1 2 1 12 4 9 1 20 13 0 11 0 1
Condition of Muslims
Need for Government 7 0 0 18 2 0 0 6 14 0 0 0 3
Support
Lack of Facilities in 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 0
Non-Muslim

Government Institutions
Lack of Modern 1 1 0 1 3 0 0 7 4 0 0 0 2
Education in
Traditional Institutions
Lack of Educational 4 6 2 4 0 0 0 8 8 0 1 1 5
Institutions
Lack of Awareness 1 2 3 7 1 0 0 2 14 0 0 0 4
Gender Inequality 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 18 7 0 0 0 0
Lack of Family Support 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 5 4 0 0 0 7
Discrimination 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 0 0 1
288
 Need for More 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 1
Sustained Efforts
Total Non-Muslim 23 23 7 67 12 9 0 72 100 0 12 2 29
Responses
Grand Total 184 66 152 196 131 43 0 527 350 17 81 296 296

Health

Health
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Awareness 8 6 1 7 4 0 9 19 8 1 3 47 8
Lack of Medical 60 6 21 8 3 1 8 67 25 18 1 86 34
Infrastructure
Muslim

Weak Economic 4 0 0 5 2 1 3 4 5 0 11 25 3
Condition of Muslims
Social Restrictions 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of Government 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 18 1 0 0 8 1
Schemes
Total Muslim Reponses 83 15 23 20 9 2 20 108 39 19 15 166 46
Lack of Awareness 13 10 0 0 4 0 1 10 8 0 0 0 3
Lack of Medical 10 5 1 1 1 0 0 10 5 0 0 0 7
Infrastructure
Non-Muslim

Weak Economic 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 3
Conditions
Social Restrictions 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lack of Government 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Schemes
Preference for 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Traditional Clinics
Total Non-Muslim 28 18 1 1 5 0 1 21 16 0 1 0 14
Responses
Grand Total 111 33 24 21 14 2 21 129 55 19 16 166 60

289
 Religious Freedom

Religious Freedom
Issues States (Zone-wise)
Respondent Type East West Central North South

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam
Issues in Performing 51 11 32 13 10 61 6 0 48 66 11 30 28
Religious Practices
Wrong Perceptions of 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Non-Muslim
Communities
Muslim

Negative Mind-set of 0 6 3 3 4 9 2 0 19 7 0 8 6
Muslims
Religious Differences 2 0 10 42 0 19 0 0 22 3 0 8 4
Problems faced in 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 12 4 0 1 4
Schools/Workplaces
Religious 0 0 9 0 0 34 5 0 24 0 5 6 11
Misrepresentations
Total Muslim Responses 53 17 54 58 18 124 13 0 125 81 16 54 53
Negative Mind-set of 2 3 0 1 1 0 0 9 22 0 0 0 0
Muslims
Cultural and Social 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Gap
Non-Muslim

Issues in Performing 9 12 1 2 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 3 3
Religious Practices
Problems faced in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 27 0 0 0 0
Schools/Workplaces
Lesser Freedom for 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 0
Women
Religious Differences 6 2 0 32 0 0 0 3 5 0 0 0 1
Total Non-Muslim 23 17 2 35 1 0 0 26 68 0 3 3 4
Responses
Grand Total 76 34 56 93 19 124 13 26 193 81 19 57 57

290
 Accessing Public Facilities

Accessing Public Facilities

Issues States (Zone-wise)
Respondent Type East West Central North South

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam
Lack of Awareness 6 2 3 6 5 1 19 2 1 1 43 5 16
Discrimination Faced 47 10 5 9 1 11 7 31 3 24 1 11 2
Muslim

Lack of Government 10 21 2 2 2 2 0 4 12 0 0 1 1
Schemes/Benefits
Lack of Financial 15 0 2 1 0 2 0 7 0 0 0 3 2
Assistance
Total Muslim Responses 78 33 12 18 8 16 26 44 16 25 44 20 21
Lack of Awareness 5 0 0 6 2 0 1 1 0 0 5 0 3
Lack of Basic Facilities 5 0 0 4 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0
Non-Muslim

in Muslim Areas
Lack of Financial 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Assistance
Lack of Government 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Schemes
Discrimination Faced 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1

Total Non-Muslim 14 2 1 11 2 2 1 7 4 0 5 0 4
Responses
92 35 13 29 10 18 27 51 20 25 49 20 25
Grand Total

Employment

Employment
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Education and 0 6 6 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 5

Awareness
Lack of Government 15 21 15 8 8 16 16 42 20 14 4 24 10
Muslim

Support
Discrimination 24 14 22 21 16 17 15 64 82 19 8 25 30
Lack of Empowerment 5 0 5 0 0 0 2 9 12 0 0 10 0
of Women
Lack of Opportunities 10 25 9 3 3 1 1 20 89 30 1 15 10
291
 Lack of Efforts 37 0 21 9 12 0 13 60 49 0 36 22 24
Cultural and Social Gap 3 0 3 0 2 0 0 9 6 1 3 4 7
Total Muslim Responses 94 66 81 41 41 34 51 204 258 64 52 100 86
Lack of Government 2 4 0 3 2 4 0 6 21 0 0 0 4
Support
Lack of Education and 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 4 0 0
Non-Muslim

Awareness
Lack of Adequate 4 3 0 2 3 0 0 3 29 0 0 1 0
Opportunities
Discrimination 9 8 2 4 2 2 1 9 28 0 0 0 6
Lack of Empowerment 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 1
of Women
More Efforts Required 5 0 0 4 2 1 0 12 25 0 0 0 1
Total Non-Muslim 24 15 2 13 9 7 1 33 111 0 4 1 12
Responses
Grand Total 118 81 83 54 50 41 52 237 369 64 56 101 98

Government Support
Government Support
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of 4 0 1 0 0 18 3 30 2 74 5 9 6
Administrative
Support
Lack of Policy 46 14 41 60 32 20 23 128 108 2 19 59 35
Muslim

Implementation
Discrimination 2 0 2 17 0 0 6 27 41 14 0 8 9
Lack of Financial 0 0 2 9 0 0 0 5 3 0 1 5 1
Support
Lack of Political 20 0 41 2 2 0 2 40 41 0 0 10 12
Representation
Total Muslim 72 14 87 88 34 38 34 230 195 90 25 91 63
Responses
Lack of Policy 23 2 3 35 4 4 0 26 40 0 2 0 9
Implementation
Lack of 0 0 4 4 0 2 0 4 15 0 2 0 2
Non-Muslim

Administrative
Support
Lack of Financial 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0
Support
Discrimination 6 0 0 4 0 0 0 8 26 0 0 0 2
Lack of Schemes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0

Total Non-Muslim 29 2 7 43 4 6 0 48 85 0 4 0 13
Responses
Grand Total 101 16 94 131 38 44 34 278 280 90 29 91 76

292
 Security

Security
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi -NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Trust 3 3 0 3 1 0 4 10 5 16 3 4 2
Lack of Support from 20 4 9 26 11 3 14 93 18 62 7 43 11
Muslim

Police
Lack of Administrative 1 15 13 3 2 0 1 12 16 3 0 8 3
Support
Total Muslim Responses 24 22 22 32 14 3 19 115 39 81 10 55 16
Lack of Trust 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Muslim

Total Non-Muslim 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Responses
Grand Total 24 24 22 32 14 3 19 115 39 81 10 55 16

293
 Political Representation

Political Representation
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Good Leaders 24 5 24 22 27 29 41 92 31 3 29 19 12

Lack of Political 1 0 0 3 2 0 12 21 5 0 0 0 2
Knowledge
Low Presence in 2 1 0 0 0 1 4 8 2 0 0 3 2
Muslim

Politics
Need for Political Party 16 29 6 17 7 4 25 37 9 43 4 7 6
Representing Muslims
Need for Government 2 0 0 4 4 1 5 8 1 0 8 1 0
Support
Total Muslim Responses 45 35 30 46 40 35 87 166 48 46 41 30 22
Need for Good 0 1 3 16 1 4 0 18 17 0 3 2 3
Leaders
Need for Government 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
Non-Muslim

on-Muslim

Support
Need for Political Party 0 4 0 9 0 0 0 7 1 0 0 1 2
Need for More 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1
Opportunities
Need for Increased 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Awareness
Total Non-Muslim 0 6 5 27 1 4 0 28 20 0 5 3 8
Responses
Grand Total 45 41 35 73 41 39 87 194 68 46 46 33 30

294
 Appendix II
Opinion of Muslim and Non-Muslim Respondents on the Key Challenges Faced by
Muslims Today (State-wise Percentages for Relevant Responses)5

Education
Education
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam
High Cost Factor 9 0 1 8 22 24 7 14 6 0 34 10 7
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Persistent Trend of Inadequate 3 1 1 1 5 0 3 8 5 0 0 3 7
Education % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Religious Barriers 11 6 2 7 4 0 10 5 6 1 0 5 4
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Discrimination 4 1 3 3 9 2 9 4 6 1 0 6 7
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Preference for Traditional 9 0 8 3 5 4 2 11 4 5 0 5 6
Educational Institutions % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Government 14 2 15 15 41 5 29 12 17 0 0 14 14
Muslim

Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Gender Inequality 1 0 2 0 1 0 14 20 5 1 0 6 9
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Awareness 8 5 7 8 26 0 0 6 10 0 0 7 7
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Weak Economic Condition of 3 9 1 2 6 1 2 0 1 0 2 5 3
Muslims % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Educational 7 5 7 8 21 4 14 23 9 1 2 12 12
Institutions % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Family Support 4 0 2 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 1 6 2
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for More Sustained 0 0 2 3 5 0 5 2 2 0 0 3 5
Efforts % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Education 1 13 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Religious Barriers 2 0 0 6 6 0 0 2 6 0 0 0 11
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Non-Muslim

Weak Economic Condition of 1 4 4 13 22 60 50 23 9 0 52 0 3

Muslims % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Government 8 0 0 19 11 0 0 7 10 0 0 0 8
Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Facilities in 1 4 0 2 6 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0
Government Institutions % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Modern Education in 1 2 0 1 17 0 0 8 3 0 0 0 5
Traditional Institutions % % % % % % % % % % % % %

5 Percentage for each specific issue has been calculated on Muslim or Non-Muslim sample of the respective state
for each Muslim or Non-Muslim response respectively.
295
 Lack of Educational 5 12 8 4 0 0 0 9 6 0 5 25 13
Institutions % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Awareness 1 4 12 7 6 0 0 2 10 0 0 0 11
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Gender Inequality 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 21 5 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Family Support 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 6 3 0 0 0 18
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Discrimination 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for More Sustained 0 0 4 3 0 0 50 1 6 0 0 25 3
Efforts % % % % % % % % % % % % %

Health

Health
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi -NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Awareness 4 4 0 3 5 0 10 5 2 1 2 13 4
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Medical 28 4 7 4 4 1 9 16 7 9 1 24 18
Infrastructure % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Muslim

Weak Economic Condition of 2 0 0 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 6 7 2

Muslims % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Social Restrictions 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Government Schemes 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 1
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Awareness 15 19 0 0 22 0 50 11 6 0 0 0 8
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Medical Infrastructure 12 10 4 1 6 0 0 11 4 0 0 0 18
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Non-Muslim

Weak Economic Conditions 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 5 0 8

% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Social Restrictions 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Government Schemes 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Preference for Traditional 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Clinics % % % % % % % % % % % % %

296
 Religious Freedom
Religious Freedom
Issues States (Zone-wise)
Respondent Type East West Central North South

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi -NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam
Issues in Performing Religious 24 7 11 6 12 72 6 0 14 34 6 8 15
Practices % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Wrong Perceptions of Non- 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Muslim Communities % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Negative Mind-set of Muslims 0 4 1 1 5 11 2 0 5 4 0 2 3
Muslim

% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Religious Differences 1 0 3 19 0 22 0 0 6 2 0 2 2
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Problems faced in 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 2
Schools/Workplaces % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Religious Misrepresentations 0 0 3 0 0 40 5 0 7 0 3 2 6
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Negative Mind-set of Muslims 2 6 0 1 6 0 0 10 16 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Cultural and Social Gap 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Non-Muslim

Issues in Performing Religious 10 23 4 2 0 0 0 11 0 0 10 75 8

Practices % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Problems faced in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 19 0 0 0 0
Schools/Workplaces % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lesser Freedom for Women 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Religious Differences 7 4 0 34 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %

Accessing Public Facilities

Accessing Public Facilities
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi -NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Awareness 3 1 1 3 6 1 20 0 0 1 24 1 9
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Muslim

Discrimination Faced 22 7 2 4 1 13 7 7 1 12 1 3 1
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Government 5 14 1 1 2 2 0 1 3 0 0 0 1
Schemes/Benefits % % % % % % % % % % % % %
297
 Lack of Financial Assistance 7 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 1
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Awareness 6 0 0 6 11 0 50 1 0 0 24 0 8
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Non-Muslim Lack of Basic Facilities in 6 0 0 4 0 13 0 2 2 0 0 0 0
Muslim Areas % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Financial Assistance 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Government Schemes 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Discrimination Faced 1 2 4 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %

Employment

Employment
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Education and 0 4 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3

Awareness % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Government Support 7 14 5 4 10 19 17 10 6 7 2 7 5
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Discrimination 11 9 8 10 20 20 16 15 24 10 4 7 16
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Muslim

Lack of Empowerment of 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 3 0 0 3 0
Women % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Opportunities 5 17 3 1 4 1 1 5 26 15 1 4 5
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Efforts 17 0 7 4 15 0 14 14 14 0 20 6 13
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Cultural and Social Gap 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 1 4
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Government Support 2 8 0 3 11 27 0 7 15 0 0 0 11
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Education and 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 19 0 0
Awareness % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Non-Muslim

Lack of Adequate 5 6 0 2 17 0 0 3 21 0 0 25 0
Opportunities % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Discrimination 10 15 8 4 11 13 50 10 20 0 0 0 16
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Empowerment of 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0 3
Women % % % % % % % % % % % % %
More Efforts Required 6 0 0 4 11 7 0 14 18 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %

298
 Government Support
Government Support
Issues States (Zone-wise)
Respondent Type East West Central North South

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi -NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam
Lack of Administrative 2 0 0 0 0 21 3 7 1 38 3 3 3
Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Policy Implementation 21 9 14 27 39 24 24 31 31 1 11 17 19
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Muslim

Discrimination 1 0 1 8 0 0 6 6 12 7 0 2 5
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Financial Support 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Political 9 0 14 1 2 0 2 10 12 0 0 3 6
Representation % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Policy Implementation 27 4 12 37 22 27 0 30 29 0 10 0 24
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Administrative 0 0 15 4 0 13 0 5 11 0 10 0 5
Non-Muslim

Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Financial Support 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Discrimination 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 9 19 0 0 0 5
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Schemes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Security
Security
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam

Lack of Trust 1 2 0 1 1 0 4 2 1 8 2 1 1
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Muslim

Lack of Support from Police 9 3 3 12 13 4 15 22 5 31 4 12 6

% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Administrative 0 10 5 1 2 0 1 3 5 2 0 2 2
Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Trust 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-Muslim

% % % % % % % % % % % % %

299
 Political Representation

Political Representation
Issues States (Zone-wise)
East West Central North South
Respondent Type

Jammu & Kashmir

Madhya Pradesh

Uttar Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
Maharashtra
West Bengal

Tamil Nadu
Delhi-NCR

Telangana

Karnataka
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Assam
Lack of Good Leaders 11 3 8 10 33 34 44 22 9 2 16 5 6
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Lack of Political Knowledge 0 0 0 1 2 0 13 5 1 0 0 0 1
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Muslim

Low Presence in Politics 1 1 0 0 0 1 4 2 1 0 0 1 1

% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Political Party 7 20 2 8 9 5 27 9 3 22 2 2 3
Representing Muslims % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Government 1 0 0 2 5 1 5 2 0 0 4 0 0
Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Good Leaders 0 2 12 17 6 27 0 21 12 0 14 50 8
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Government 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 3
Non-Muslim

Support % % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Political Party 0 8 0 9 0 0 0 8 1 0 0 25 5
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for More Opportunities 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 3
% % % % % % % % % % % % %
Need for Increased 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Awareness % % % % % % % % % % % % %

300
 NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS

The one-day National conference on Vision 2025 was held at the India International Centre,
New Delhi on 29 April, 2015. The conference brought together experts, researchers, scholars,
and other important persons, on the theme ‘Vision 2025: For An Inclusive India’. The conference
was divided in six sessions, with each session dedicated to a theme, followed by presentations
from scholars, suggestions from discussant and finally, discussion from the participants. The
conference was initiated after a short introduction by Dr. Amir Ullah Khan.

Dr. Rajiv Kumar, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, who chaired the first session on
‘Employment’, highlighted the key issues related to the subject. He said that job creation remains
the biggest challenge for the country. During the session, Dr. Broto Rauth Bhardwaj’s paper on
‘Influence of education in enhancing social inclusion of Muslim women through
entrepreneurship: Implications and challenges’ were presented by her research scholar. The
second paper was on ‘IT and Digital Divide Concerning Muslims’. The BRIEF team also
presented key points related to their sample survey. Prof. Zafar Mahfooz Nomani gave his view
as Discussant.

The second session on ‘Education and Modernisation’ was chaired by Prof. Madhav Nalapat,
who also shared key points of his paper ‘Imperatives of Modernisation’. He said that there was
constant improvement among the people, and to accept change was the core method of his
understanding on theology. He also stressed to talk of universality and right kind of message in
Islam. He deplored the fact that information edge has given us access to plenty of information,
but often people are bombarded with useless and baseless information, which leaves its own
imprint on young minds. Given the example of Islamic finance, he said that it was one of the
best models of banking and good for the country, but since it is associated with Islam, people do
not appreciate it. He called for education with a Capital ‘E’, where modern and meaningful
education should be given to all and no one was left behind. During the session, Md.
Shahnawaz, Reshmi Sengupta, Musarat Warsi presented their papers on education. Prof. Vibhuti
Patel in her role as a discussant, shared her opinion on the papers.

After the tea break, the participants assembled for the session on gender issues, which were
chaired by Ms. Farah Naqvi. She highlighted the role of gender parity in development and how
India was lagging behind in all development indexes because of women’s position in India.
During the session, Dr. Noorjehan Safia Niaz presented her paper on ‘Concerns about Legal
marginalization of Muslim women’, Prof. Vibhuti Patel presented her paper ‘Socio-economic
Profile of Muslim Women in Maharashtra’. The last paper was presented by Prof. Zafar
Mahfooz Nomani on ‘Imperatives of Personal Law Reform and Good Governance’. During her
role as discussant, Dr. Britta Ohm shared her views on the papers presented and also cautioned
against seeing every woman as potential gender expert.

After lunch, the guests assembled for the session on ‘Security issues’, which was chaired by
Major Gen. (Retd.) Afsir Karim. Major Gen. Karim called upon participants to look into all
aspects of security which were of concern for the nation. Three papers were presented during
the session. Mr. Deepak Parvatiyar talked of his paper on ‘Degrading Ghettos- Can Muslims
Move Beyond Margins?’, Mr. Manjur Ali presented his paper, ‘Forgotten at the Margin - Muslim
Manual Scavengers’ and Dr. Britta Ohm talked about the key points on her paper, ‘Majoritarian
Public and Democracy’, which explores the role on Live TV News in Gujarat Riots of 2002. Mr.
Atul Bhardwaj, the discussant for the session brought to the fore many lesser known facts and
shared his views on papers presented. Major Gen. (Retd.) Afsir Karim called for more papers
and research to look into aspects other than communalism.
The session on Political Representation was chaired by Former Chief Election Commissioner
and Senior Fellow, Kings College (London), Dr. S Y Quraishi, who also shared his views on all
the themes of the conference. Dr. Quraishi shared the key points of his paper ‘Muslim and
Population Issues: The Indian Context’. He challenged the existing perception with regard to
family planning among Muslims and called for greater need to understand this important issue,
which affects the development of the issue. During the session, the three papers presented were,
Gopal Agrawal’s paper ‘Ageing, self-reported health status and treatment seeking behaviour
among Muslim Older Adults in India’, Shafeeq Rahman’s paper ‘Muslim Representation in
Parliament: A Case Study of 96 Muslim Concentrated PCs’ and Mr. Abdul Bari Masoud and Mr.
Qamar Ashraf’s joint paper ‘Political Decline of Muslims’. Dr. Mujib Rehman was the discussant
for the session and shared his views on subject.

The closing session of the day was chaired by Prof. Amitabh Kundu, in which two papers were
presented. Mr. Yousuf Saeed presented his paper ‘Stereotypes of Muslim identity in the popular
media and the entertainment industry’ and Ms. Rana S.Zaman presented her paper ‘The Muslim
identity in popular culture – A case study from Bollywood’. During the session, Rehab
Foundation also presented their ‘Roadmap 2047’. In the end, Prof. Kundu called on for greater
research on the issues and challenges of Muslims in India, and wondered why non-Muslim
scholars and researchers were not showing interest in this important issue. He called for more
such studies to highlight the trust deficit which exists among the Muslims.

Earlier, Chairman IOS, Dr. Manzoor Alam shared his views on the need for conducting this
pan-India study. Amongst others also present on the occasion were, Dr. Tanweer Fazal, Dr.
Aftab Alam, Dr. Debashis Rooj, Dr. Javed Jamil, Mr. Tanweer Alam. The idea of the conference
is to prepare a roadmap and outline a vision for the Indian Muslim for the year 2025. The study
also attempts to study if any progress has been made since the submission of the Sachar
Committee Report to the Government in 2006. Apart from this conference, the workshops have
been organized in Patna (Bihar), Kolkata (West Bengal), Guwahati (Assam), Jammu (Jammu &
Kashmir), Bhopal (MP), Jaipur(Rajasthan), Mewat, and Delhi(NCR).

Workshop 1

In Assam1, the participants said that the state government failed to utilise funds meant for
minorities. Minority funds were not being released and an example was cited that in Nov 2013,
only 4.29 crore fund was released. It was revealed that the maximum beneficiaries of minority
schemes were Christians and only 10 percent were Muslims.

All the participants agreed that education holds the key for development. Teaching for
competitive examinations should be increased. There should be also provision to make a Muslim
presence in the corporate sector. Madarsas should be modernised and financially the community
should be secure. Madarsa education, including Banat Madarsa should be modernized. Girl
education should be given priority and all kinds of support should be extended. Private
institutions should be encouraged and there was also suggestion that Madarsa University should
be established. Madarsa should be divided between Higher Madarsa and Secondary Madarsa.

Muslims are backward in education and there should be some action plan. Within Assam, there
is bias against lower Assam. There are 10 / 11 universities in Guwahati, while lower Assam
which has substantial Muslim population has no university, engineering institute, or any medical
college. Technical education and skill should be main areas of thrust, and to achieve these, new
ITIs should be established. Fashion Design Institute can promote schemes like ‘Seekho Kamao’

1 Assam Workshop, Guwahati, 12/04/2015.

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among the people. Free coaching centres and pre-Matric scholarship should be opened in large
numbers.

Muslims are not getting benefits of the government schemes. To avail the scholarships, the
people have to bribe the officers. Number of institutions in Muslim areas should increase. There
are only 213 institutions in Muslim areas as against 850 in Hindu areas, 40-45 percent pass, and
number of engineering and medical graduates is negligible. It was also observed that education
medium in MCDs is only Assamese. Muslims were behind tribals, who developed because of
English medium schools. There are no English medium schools in Muslim Concentrated
Districts, and passed outs from Madarsa education are not employable. Madarsa education
should be revamped.

There are only 2.3 percent Muslims in higher education. Muslims are absent in many
departments. The literacy level in MCDs should be improved. Dhubri has 64 percent male
literacy and 53 percent female literacy. In the Swar area, schools are there but they lack
infrastructure and basic facilities. They are not getting quality education. As per 2013 data, 95
percent students of class IX cannot even write their name. Minority scholarship has increased
but teachers and principals are absent in schools, whereas, teachers are present in schools in
Hindu areas. Infrastructure should be developed and standard teacher-student-ratio should be
maintained.

It was an accepted fact that Muslims were discriminated against in the job market. To face this
challenge, Muslim youth should be counselled to study and continue to apply for the jobs. It was
observed that lower grade posts should accommodate more Muslims. Grade III & IV jobs
should be new hope for Muslims. For instance, with regard to Grade III & IV, 500 vacant posts
were there, 150 were employed out of which only 4 percent were Muslims.

There is no source of employment and outside state the labourers are tagged as ‘Bangladeshis’,
particularly in cities like Delhi and Mumbai. Efforts should be made to create skilled labour
force. Poverty and literacy of the community are the main issues. Muslims are also facing issue
of security because of ‘immigrant issue’ being highlighted by them. Discrimination against
Muslims in the jobs sector exists. In 2010, 300 Grade III employees were recruited, out of this
only 6 were Muslims. More representation in Group ‘A’ and ‘B’ Services is required. There
should be reservation for Muslims and they should be made aware about different government
schemes.

Infrastructure on health care and anganbari should be developed. There are hardly any health
related facilities in Muslim areas. Women’s health is a cause of concern like elsewhere. Maternity
death rate and infant mortality is high.

Four Assembly Seats in Upper Assam should be reserved for Muslims. Some believed that
making MLA is no use and what is required is reservation in Parliament and Assemblies. Muslim
labourers are tortured because they are illiterates. As in April 2015, there are two MPs and 27
MLAs who are Muslims. The Delimitation Commission did not work in Assam because of the
opposition from the AASU. Others argued that quality MLAs from non-Muslim community,
who is sympathetic to Muslim issue, is better than Muslim MLA and there should be quality
MLAs and MPs. Many Muslims are living in flood prone areas and affected but no scheme for
their rehabilitation is in place. Moreover, there aren’t any hospitals. Many of them are affected by
floods, rehabilitation of Muslims should be done. In most places there is problem of electricity,
and solar plants, solar lamps should be installed.

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Workshop 2

In Bhopal2, Muslims mainly dwell in urban areas but lag behind other communities in areas of
education, health and employment.

Out of 100-200 law students, one or two will be Muslims. Very few are interested in higher
education. Although, change has taken place in the last ten years, with education among women,
increased, higher education continues to be a grey area. Only one student in three years has had
completed PhD. Muslims are not aware of the educational schemes and other facilities. Their
forms are rejected as they are not able to fill them properly. Women are more aware despite
ghettoisation and saffron upsurge and have came forward in skill and technical education.

63 crore fund allotted to the Madrasas is returned, because it is not used. A call centre can be
made to provide information on scholarships, education, loan, and other schemes should be
properly made available through words.

It was also brought to notice, that very few Muslims have entered the ‘All India Service’ in last
25 years. Some improvement has taken place, and some scholarship has benefited people.
Everything is online, but no option to alter changes. Students are not using scholarship in a
proper way, and in many stances, students have bought smart phones from the scholarship
money. Muslims have assumed that they would not be selected. Elitist Muslims are ahead but
the lower classes are not getting educated.

Government is not serious and sincere about the education of Muslims. Therefore, the Muslims
should concentrate on opening their own engineering and medical college. Muslim students are
not motivated enough and have no role model. There is no transparency in scholarship and its
share with other minorities, who are better placed than Muslims. Madarsas are in a bad
condition.

Health

The condition related to health has improved, although malnutrition among children and
women still prevails. Health care and medicine is free in most states. People prefer to go to
government hospitals. Although, there is craze about private hospitals, Muslims cannot afford it.
Community participation in the health sector is required. Monthly check-up should be provided
for women and there should be awareness about hygiene and it should be shared with girl
students.

Nursing College among MCDs should be opened and it can provide them employment. Because
of government apathy, areas where Muslims live predominantly, are not very clean. In
Bundelkhand, water, sanitation and health, are issues. The question of putting an end to child
marriages are also a concern. Generally, girls are married between the age of 16 - 18. There is no
gap between the birth of two children, which affects the nutrition and health of the mother as
well as the child.

Safety / Security

Religious freedom is being violated and Muslims are constantly being monitored by security
agencies. Some Dalit became Muslim in Shivpuri, and they were forcefully re-converted to
Hindu under ‘Ghar-Vapsi’ campaign. There is no effective law to counter communal violence.

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In Chipwari, one cow died after eating polytheine/plastic. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad made this
an issue and 40 houses of Muslims were gutted in fire, and Minority Commission did nothing.
The MP Government did nothing when riots in Mimat-Indore broke out. They are scared that
anytime riots can take place. As per law every person who converts is given two months time to
register and complete the formalities.

Two months’ time is given to terrorise people who convert to Islam. In areas of Iatarsi, Bhopal,
Guharganj, Muslims girls are targeted and particularly those who do not have powerful or
influential Muslim male relatives. There is a problem in making new mosques, as they have to be
approved by the administration. During communal riots, only one community is targeted and are
discriminated against and biased by the security agencies. Hatred between Hindu and Muslims is
being promoted and communal harmony is being undermined. Minority commission should be
strengthened.

We should promote civil defence committee so that we do not feel insecure and worried about
this. False arrests are made by the government and no one is held accountable and responsible.
New Hindu festivals which were not celebrated till few years back are promoted. Ganesha Puja
is one such example. Muslim youth is terrorised and targeted. One participant said he was
singled out and terrorised by the security agencies. RSS is very active in Muslim dominated areas,
and Nagar Suraksha Samiti is packed with members of Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena, who are secure
and can walk freely violating laws and can get anyone inside bar with their influence. Even poor
people and labourers are targeted.

Political Representation

It has declined over the years. There is only one Muslim MLA in MP Legislative Assembly.
Muslim leadership has been eroded, and we need to work on inter-community relations.
Separate political party of Muslims would not work. Secular ethos should be increased, Indian
constitution should be strengthened and secularism should be strengthened.

Workshop 3

In Rajasthan3, Muslims are not getting benefits from the government schemes. The state
government is not concerned about the welfare of the Muslims, and they are left to work for
themselves. However, education among Muslims has increased particularly at the primary levels.
In Jaipur alone, 300 private institutions are being run by Muslims and this has improved the
situation. Higher education is not so good, out of 9.5 percent of state population only 2 percent
are in higher education. No aid is given to private schools run by Muslim management.

After running for years in different government departments, they stopped going there and
asking for help. Only 4 students were given support by the government. No quality of education
is maintained and girls are ahead in education. Parents are not keen for education as they find
no future for their wards in education and consider this as wastage of time. There is also
discrimination in schemes. 93 girls are getting scholarship, out of which only 4 are Muslims.
Some schools also discriminate against Muslims in giving admission. Higher education is
suffering because professional and educated Muslims have been targeted by security agencies
and there have been cases of youth being picked up. After the Batla House encounter (2008) in
New Delhi, parents are even afraid to send their children to Jamia Millia Islamia or Aligarh
Muslim University.

3 Jaipur Workshop, Muslim Musafir Khana, Jaipur, 13/05/2015

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Health

Unani Medicine and quacks are the only option for majority of Muslims for being cheaper and
easily accessible in the Mohalla. Muslim areas lack health facilities. Government is not concerned
about Muslims areas and TB and other diseases are prevalent. BPL is not going to the right
beneficiary and large of number of deserving Muslims are not covered. There is no access to
clean drinking water. Women health continues to be area of concern. Women are reluctant to go
to doctors as largely there are male doctors. Muslim areas are dirty, and Muslims have to bribe
the sweepers and Corporation staff to get their area cleaned. Slum areas face issue of drug
among children and youth. Muslim patients suffer from TB, Cancer and drug abuse.

Employment

There is no scope in Government jobs, artisans and private sector jobs are there. Private
companies do not hire Muslims, and getting a bank loan is very difficult, so they cannot open
any firm. Muslim areas are black listed for any credit. Muslims also don’t get loan for cars and
automobile. Stone/Gem/Artificial Jewellery/printing/paper industry were once being
dominated by the Muslims, now it has level playing field. Many Muslim industries have received
government notice for closure. Reservation is less effective and government is not doing
anything. Educated persons are driving auto as they don’t get any job. Muslims consider that
education is waste of time, as they will not get jobs and they will get old while waiting for the job
while youth with no education will learn, earn, marry and settle in life earlier.

Political Representation

Muslim representatives work for party and not for the community. 20 MLAs should be there
and there are only two Muslim MLAs and both are from BJP. The representation has declined,
earlier there were 12 MLAs, and there were only two MPs in the history of independent India.
Delimitation has further eroded the influence of Muslims in Municipal wards, Assembly seats
and parliament seats. Large numbers of Muslim voters name have been removed. There is
separate voter list for Panchayat, Municipal election, Assembly election, and Parliamentary
election. BLOs are biased and there are cases of photos and names being not matching as the
one’s Voter ID are different than the one in Voter list. Politics is linked to communalism, lack of
political awareness among Muslims. Because of the huge expense involved in elections, Muslims
cannot afford to contest. In many cases RSS/ Sangh, give money to Muslims to contest election
from Muslim areas so that their vote is divided and BJP Hindu candidate wins. Some Ulemas
gave Fatwa that voting is not allowed in Islam. Voter list is manipulated and deliberate attempt
to keep Muslims away from voting.

Workshop 4

The Jammu & Kashmir was a very important state for us, and we were keen to organise the
meeting in Srinagar. But unpredictable weather and rains forced us to settle for Jammu 4. Most of
the participants were young people drawn from Kashmir administrative services, Jammu
University, parties and activists.

Education

A respondent said, ‘We have only five graduates in my village; students cannot study beyond XII
class; Elite classes get their education in private schools.’ Management of education is poor and
there are more teachers than students. Elite class is selfish and in Chenab valley, where many

4 Workshop Jammu, Jammu, Hotel Premier, 2-4-2015

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have become officers, they conspire to keep other Muslims poor. In a school in Furqanabad
area, there are 40 teachers and 35 students. Most Government schools have more teachers than
the number of students. Educated class, army and militancy are responsible for this mess in
education. There is no supply of electricity after 6-7 pm. The community of the gujjar and
makarwal have different issues – their livelihood is depended on selling buffalo milk and they are
not concerned about education. Strangely, 140000 Muslims live in Kuthwa region but are not
represented in the existing political system. 6 percent Muslims are in Jammu, and there are 124
schools which have only teachers. In one school, there are 27 teachers with just 4 students.

If Muslims talk of Muslim issues they are branded communal, and the Jammu Muslims are
ignored. The issue of the gujjars against the pahari has been highlighted. There is no consensus
between Jammu and Kashmir. Madarsas should be modernised and at the Panchayat level and
District level, Muslim representatives should be promoted. Central University was given to
Jammu. It needs to be promoted and developed as a premier institution.

One participant from the Chenab valley said, ‘I was in the ninth class, and could not appear for
my exams; we were rounded up and the house was vacated. Education and the economy
suffered. The leaders were biased against us.’ One person from Kupwara said, ‘Despite
deteriorating condition, students worked hard and we are getting education. There was a bill to
close scholarships’. Another said, ‘Madarsa caters to poor students, Government schools caters
to the ones above poor, the private schools are attended by middle class students’. He called for
modern education with civilised mindset. One participant said, ‘Madarsas are about cramming
and not about education, Islam is targeted and that is why we are targeted. The quality of
teachers is very poor.

Health

Health is an issue of great concern in Jammu & Kashmir. One participant said that during
militancy, one hospital was converted in a military camp by the army. The states do not have
apparatus and infrastructure to check Swine Flu and other such diseases. Primary Health Centres
lack basic facilities and are located in far flung areas, and are unable to offer basic health services.
The rise of drugs is the new concern among youth and it is being promoted by the right young
Hindu groups.

The Doda area is marked with lack of medicines and no access to health centres. Doctors are
absent from the hospital and there are no Senior Residents in hospitals. Most hospital lack
facilities and diagnostic centres. One participant said, ‘My father has brain tumour, MRI machine
at the hospital not working, and it is lacking in infrastructure. Doctors cannot diagnose tumour
and other deadly disease. Hospitals at the district level lack basic facilities’.

Another matter of concern was supply of spurious drugs in hospitals. Pharmaceutical companies
are supplying expired medicine which is given to poor patients and at times, even wrong
medicines are prescribed to patients. Hospitals are centres of corruption. In some hospitals,
ultrasound machine is there but no one is there who can operate the machine. Doctors are not
qualified and the state is full of unqualified doctors. No doctor wants a posting in rural areas,
and hence, incentives should be provided to send doctors to rural areas. There are cases of
delayed marriages due to dowry demands and increased expenses involved at weddings. One
serving officer said, ‘the state is dependent on the centre for 80 percent of its revenues and
spends less on health, and its hospitals do not have advanced equipment and machines.

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Employment

Government and J&K bank are the only ones, providing employment to the youth. No private
sector jobs are available in the state and no capital is invested in the state. Private sector should
be promoted and self-employment opportunities should be available. Tourism and timber
industry should be promoted to create more jobs. Poonch, Rajouri and other sectors should be
developed. Medical tourism can also be developed as preferred destination for naturopathy and
healing. Saffron production should be institutionalised in Kishtwar area. Tourism is related to
safety and security and government spends more on security than on the tourism sector. In
Ladakh region, the income is more as there are no expenses on security. Power sector can be
used to generate employment and Hydro-electric power generation potential should be tapped.
Timber industry should be used for full potential and policies have to be reoriented to develop
the state and create jobs.

Security

Youth of the state was disturbed by the policy of the Central Government towards the state.
People were concerned about a division in their ranks, which was highlighted for political gains.
One person said, ‘we are divided on the lines of Gujjars, Bakkarwal and Dogras; we are afraid of
our identity. In my life I have not seen any militant, false consciousness is created to keep
Muslims backward’. There always remain issues of security and people have been victimised by
the militants and the government alike. People feel insecure, women are afraid to move out of
their homes, Kashmiri students are not safe outside the state. There is an identity crisis. There
have been cases of army men passing lewd remarks on women. Common stone pelters are inside
the jails while the leaders are roaming free. The army is deployed in Kashmir - one army man for
7 persons. It is recorded that 1070 youth were killed and they are branded as terrorists.

One participant said, ‘A friend of mine was raped by an army man…we don’t get rooms for rent
in Delhi…..there is trust deficit. Oppression is the issue and army presence should be reduced.
Self-Determination issue is related to security.’ Another participant said, ‘we are asked to show
our ID cards all the time… third degree torture is given to youth. We are not being treated at par
with other Indians. There is reasonable restriction on freedom of speech, psycho fear is there,
security outside is the main issue. Another issue is provocation and forced radicalisation. We
don’t ask Hindu about ULFA, LTTE, Parvin Togadia, still security personnel asks us to
comment on ISIS, and others!’

Political Representation

Muslims are politically excluded and they should make a front by forging alliance with the Dalits.
Sectarianism is also emerging as a challenge and is a one big issue. We have to internalise the
democracy in India. There is lack of political discourse and if we talk of proportional justice, we
are non-dominant group. If you raise your voice, it is anti India. One PDP MLC said, ‘we have
to find a solution within the democratic structure. There is an enmity between India and
Pakistan and we have to resolve this issue, Hindu-Muslim issues should be tackled. Anger should
be channelized, youth should contribute to the society, AFSPA should be removed. Teachers
should come to teach, doctors should come to cure. Plebiscite should be held, Leadership quality
should be gradually developed.’

Workshop 5

Apart from having a large Muslim population, West Bengal is the only state that claims to have
implemented the recommendations of the Sachar Committee Report. It was special for us, and
we had to organise it before the local bodies elections, which kept many busy for seeking tickets
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and others canvassing for their candidates. Still we were lucky to get pretty good audience in
Kolkata5.

Education

According to the participants, 19.2 percent of the families were illiterates. Some believed that
removal of English affected the overall education of Bengal. All the participants agreed that girl’s
education is increasing along with the gap between scheme and its implementation. The positive
fact is that girls are not getting married but are being educated. Students are getting Urdu
education. Scholarship schemes have benefited people but there is no quality in education. Out
of total number of students of 10 lakh, 2.5 lakh appeared for the High School exam. Muslim
dropout rate is high at 2 percent. There is lack of technical institutions in Bengal.

About 100 schools have opened by private companies, mostly in Non-Muslim areas. Standard of
Urdu education is very poor, and it has not improved. Madarsa education should be improved.
RTE has helped in the spread of education is lack of High Schools in MCDs, and pre-primary
education is very bad. In comparison, more schools in non-Muslims dominated districts and
lesser schools in Muslim dominated areas. Change of mindset is required. However, enrolment
has increased in rural areas.

The scholarship amount is too little, and schools and institutions are managed by illiterate
people. Higher education is worse, out of 10,000 students in Jadavpur University, only 300 are
Muslims. In 24 Parganas-Baruipur, out of 24 teachers in Polytechnic, no one is a Muslim. MSDP
programmes are being implemented, and there is a lack of awareness in rural Bengal. For
instance, in South 24 parganas: Parthur Partmo has 17 primary schools, while Canning- (Muslim
dominated area) has 4 primary schools. Aliah University should have reserved category for
Muslims. AMU branch in Murshidabad has only five teachers.

Health

Health care access has improved though there isn’t a substantial rise in the Muslim areas. Polio
immunisation and vaccination has been the main issue. District health centres too have
improved but this has not been substantial in other areas. Poverty and number of children are
related. Murshidabad-Dhuliya Municipality is one of the oldest but work is not being done in the
health sector. Cleanliness is the main issue, as dirt and litters prevails. Muslim women are
reluctant to go to hospital because there is no provision for seclusion and lady doctors are not
available. Muslim community hospitals required in nearby areas. Women do not want
pregnancies but are not aware about preventive measures. Women are scared to face doctors as
they are abused and shouted by doctors for being pregnant with choicest abuses and slangs. No
facility of curtains, and they are all asked to line up. PHC are being run from home and are in
poor shape. Children are being delivered at home, and as a result, most of these children are not
issued birth certificate, and many of them do not follow vaccination time table.

In many areas, doctors are absent, and no proper infrastructure is there. Facilities are available
but there is no implementation at ground level. Open defecation is an issue. 96 percent of
women in Calcutta are anaemic. Private health is business and expensive, so Muslim prefer to go
to quacks, because they are cheap and also give medicine. More toilets are made in Hindu
dominated areas than in Muslim dominated areas. For instance, in Bharatpur, 117 toilets were
made, while in Birbhum 420 toilets made. NRHM is not implemented in Muslim areas, as a
result Muslim patients go outside the state. Around 35 percent have to travel far to access

5 Kolkata Workshop, 9-4-2015; Venue- ARSALAAN, Circus Avenue

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doctors. Muslims are not helping each other. Muslim population is in industrial belt and lack
basic facilities.

Employment

Most of the people belong to the labour class. Although, there is some traditional skilled labour
but they face challenge from the machines. There is a need to focus on traditional skilled labour
and modernise them with latest technology. For educated persons, government, private sector
jobs are also one option. Compared to the CPI-M rule, presence of Muslim in the police is
better. 37 percent Muslims are in teaching jobs. Most of the labourers migrate to outside state.
Some change has come in the last two years because of some state government schemes.

42 percent engaged in manual labour, most of them are unemployed and engaged in agricultural
labour. Most of the sex workers are Muslims (as in 24 Parganas). Due to a new reservation
policy of state government, the presence of Muslims has increased. There is need to focus on
specialised areas and earmark that for particular industry. For instance, Hooghly is famous for
bakeries, if this is modernised it would allow more people to get into jobs. Traditional fishermen
and industry should improve. Loan facility is getting very difficult, garment industry can be
improved to make it better and compete with Chinese products. Most of the Muslims are in
unorganised sector, and not getting benefited from the National Skill Development Council
NSDC. Community polytechnic is not available. Lesser number of students are getting into the
West Bengal Public Service Commission(WBPSC), because Bengali was made compulsory. Jobs
have also declined because the MNREGA has either closed operations or reduced them
substantially under the new government at the centre. Artisans and Bidi workers not getting
proper wage.

Security

Women can’t travel alone in taxis, even if they are more than one. They have to be accompanied
by men. Muslim women do not feel safe even in police station and they are scared to report
anything or file an FIR. After the last Lok Sabha election, the issue of insecurity has further
increased. Hindu Jagriti Manch and other right wing Hindu organisation are very active and
polarising people on religious lines. If non-Muslims come from Bangladesh, they are treated as
refugees, and when Muslim comes, they are treated as ‘illegal migrants’ and refugees. Most of the
people in jails are Muslims, for instance in Murshidabad- 90 percent in jails are Muslims. The
Adivasis are being instigated against Muslims by the right wing Hindu organisations. Muslim
houses are specially targeted, and Muslims NGOs working for Muslim cause and branding them
as anti-national. Muslim areas are deprived of police vigilance, traffic violation take place in
Muslim areas, SIM cards are being issued without verifying and then innocent clients are
arrested.

Political Representation

Muslim participation in West Bengal has somewhat increased after TMC, but still is far from
being proportional to the population in the state. Anti-social elements from Muslims are being
taken into BJP, and this is a threat for the community. TMC fielded more Muslim candidates,
but there has not been a significant increase in the numbers elected. Very few Muslim MPs raise
Muslim specific issues in Parliament. They are not active in the Parliament. In 13th Lok Sabha,
there were 29 Muslim MPs, out of which 19 have never raised a question in the Parliament. Out
of 34 MPs, 3 are Muslim. Muslims are targeted with planted stories and distorted facts as
happened with the case of Ahmed Hassan Imran, who was targeted and accused of being a
members of some banned organisations. Muslim MPs / MLAs do not speak Muslim issues, but
TMC has done better for Muslims. However, even Muslim dominated districts have non-
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Muslims chiefs in local bodies and Districts boards. The Murshidabad Mayor is Brahmin, and so
are Mayors of 24 Pargana and Hooghly.

Workshop 6

In Patna6, we met on a working day, and the audience shared their views on the five issues.

Education

Children are not getting proper education and appointment of contract teachers has worsened
the situation. Some participants said that Madarsa education has been ruined over the last few
years. Bihar Madarsa has suffered over the years due to the biased policies of the government.
Many sanctioned posts in Madarsas are vacant, for instance Madarsa Shamsul Hoda, has 21
sanctioned posts and only 6 are appointed. 10 Lakh students study under the Madarsa Board.
4000 Madrasas are affiliated to Madarsa Board and 122 to the Madarsa Banat in Bihar.

Persian and Arabic departments are being closed and even the Urdu department is facing
problems and is nearly being closed down. Idara-e-Tahqiqat-e-Urdu Farsi, has 9 sanctioned
posts and only 1 director is working. Maulana Mazharul Haque Arabic & Farsi University has
deviated from its objective and is now imparting professional courses.

Bias against Muslims in admission– Ram Mohan Seminary is not taking admission of Muslim
students, this has been a trend for last few years. Only 2 percent Muslim get to higher studies.
The positive thing is that lower classes are getting their girls educated. There is rampant
nepotism in Muslim minority-run institutions and they will not allow talent to progress. There is
no scheme to make the community socially and politically aware, and there is a lack of awareness
of government schemes. Girl education has increased but overall Muslim education has declined.
Most students came from rural areas, but the introduction of ‘Test system’ has excluded them as
fewer can qualify for these tests. There is no facility for Urdu education. Girls are laborious and
studying hard because they are going to face an uncertain future and boys do not study.

Health

There is no fact in the propaganda that Muslims opposed vaccination or the pulse polio drive to
eradicate polio. Misconception has been spread about Muslims with regard to health issues. One
participant said, ‘I was associated with one study when someone remarked that mostly Muslims
are affected by polio, I asked for a proof, which there was none. We have to question existing
perceptions about communities.’

Lack of bathrooms and the living standards of Muslims and SCs are the same. Muslims do not
go to government hospitals; there is prevailed belief that government hospitals will kill patients
by giving some poisonous injection or heavy dose of injection. Pregnant women are not getting
quality food, and proper attention. Drinking water is an issue, in most places taps from where
they get drinking water are installed in some drain. One participant said, ‘When medicine is given
in schools, some students refuse saying they are barred by parents from taking any dose.
Muslims are not getting benefited from government schemes and cases of breast cancer has
increased.’

6 Workshop Patna, IOS Meeting Hall, 7-4-2015

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Security

Muslims are feeling insecure because of false propaganda to brand entire community as
terrorists. 90 percent criminals in Patna are Muslims. Compared to other states, Muslims are
feeling secure in Bihar and except for the recent Muzaffarpur riot, there has not been any major
riot. In urban areas there is a definite feeling of security, but in rural areas there is a heightened
feeling of insecurity.

Employment

The only opportunity available to Muslims is Urdu teaching. 12662 teachers were to be
employed and only 3750 were recruited, many of them were non-Muslims. Self employment has
to be promoted, and overall there are low levels of opportunity. MNREGA apart from Teaching
is the only avenues available for Muslims. Tests and new patterns were introduced to stop
Muslims from getting into jobs. No Muslims among ASHAs, no Muslims in the Nursing jobs
that were announced. Sanskrit Schools are run with full strength even if there are not enough
students and Urdu Schools are not opened even when there is a requirement.

Workshop 7

Mewat is an important region, and despite being close to the NCR, it has not done well on the
development index. We wanted a workshop in Mewat, but did this in Delhi7, where Meos shared
their views on development and other aspects.

Education has spread, girls are going to school, religious education and modern education are
required and there should be balance. We need to produce experts in many areas. Minority
University is required, a branch of AMU can be opened in Mewat. Madarsa Board should be
opened in Haryana. People made a request with former governor, A.R. Kidwai but nothing
happened. A group should be formed of concerned people who should travel to all parts and
promote education.

ITIs and technical institutions should be opened at the block level. Modern education is required
but it should be along with theological education. There has to be a balance between the two.
Government schools are not upto the mark, and teachers are not qualified. They cannot write
even an application. Earlier, there were only deeni talim (religious education) institutions but
now the general education has increased and around 60 percent are studying now, earlier this
was around 40 percent. Girl education is very scarce and there is only single Arts College, and
they have to travel long to study. There is no sports complex in Mewat, there is not even a
ground to play. Students have to come to Sohna and for a stadium they have to go Gurgaon.
Facilities for sports are not there and students who have such interests cannot develop in this
important area. Political leaders do not want people to be educated and they had even issued a
fatwa against Hindi education. Now a change is taking place.

Health

People live under unhealthy condition. Proper medical facility for women is not there and
specialized doctors are not available. Women are deprived of the right to inheritance and
therefore, dowry is prevalent in the region as parents want to the share at the time of marriage in
the form of dowry.

7 Workshop Mewat, Held on March 5, 2014

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Earlier Nageena Hospital (Referral Hospital) was known as best hospital in the area, where
referred patients used to come but now this lacks basic facilities and modern equipment. Infant
mortality rate is very high; gap between two children is not at desired level. Leukemia and
anemia are also prevalent.

Employment

An employment centre should be opened where students can come for counselling. Earlier,
Chaudhary Tayaab and Chaudhary Khurshid were two politicians who divided people. Now
there is no leadership at all. Training centres should be opened. Meos has not benefited from
reservation issue. This is because the majority of the share is taken up by Jats, Ahirs and other
backward castes, Article 341, should be removed and there should be no reservation for any
backward caste.

Security

The relationship between Hindus- Muslims in Mewat have been good. There have been very few
incidents of Love Jihad or Ghar Wapsi. The vote share of Muslims have been divided in many
seats and this has affected their influence. Palwal should be made a new MLA constituency.

Workshop 8

In Delhi, Muslims are relatively at the bottom of the society8. While Muslims living in rural areas
seem to have benefited, those living in urban areas have not. There is no merit in calls for
reservation in education. There is also no political will for reservation. Scholarship should be
given to a large number of students. There is no political leadership. Muslim politicians, who are
elected, do not represent Muslims but are working for their respective political parties.

Education

There is a flaw in the system that no attention is paid towards back benchers and drop-outs. We
should attend to those who are getting 80 percent marks, but we should also remember those
who are left behind. Maktabas should be modernized. History should be taught in objective
manner. Drop-out is the main problem and many government schemes are there for the people
but there is lack of awareness.

Health

Those who are educated have less kids and it has nothing to do with Muslims. Muslims are more
in proportion to their population at hospitals and this show by way of prevalence of many
diseases among Muslims. There are no funds for Shifa Khana/Musafir Khana. Preventive health
is a problem along with occupational health problems, TB and lack of immunization.

From 1952 to 2011, Muslim representation in Civil Services has remained to 3 percent.
Traditional artisans are finished. 70 percent contractual workers in Delhi sweepers are Muslims.
Muslim Entrepreneurship should be increased. Muslims are never represented as a community.
Muslims do not have capacity to bargain at the time of the election. Muslims should not think of
leaders as Muslim leaders, as they are representing their political parties. Reservation demand
should be raised with dignity and it should be made obvious that this demand is to give dignity
and respect to marginalized section.

8 Workshop-Delhi, PCI-26/02/2015

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 Annexure-I

INTERVIEWS

As part of the investigations, interviews were carried out across the section of society. They were
asked to share their views on specific questions regarding the conditions of the Muslims. Being
aware of the fact that most people are not reluctant to be part of any such exercise, we limited
our questions to three, with one supplementary request. And the questions were- 1) Has the
condition of Muslims changed substantially since the Sachar Committee in 2006 presented its
recommendations? 2) What are the biggest challenges faced by the Indian Muslim today? (Rank
them) 3) What are the 5 major opportunities for the Indian Muslim today? Please rank them. We
also made a request: What is your vision for Indian Muslims ten years from now? And the
experience shows that people are even reluctant to fill this up, and many promised to send it by
mail.

During seminars, workshops, meetings, visits, we asked people to share their views on this.
Muslim Parliamentarians were the worst in terms of response. Katihar MP, Tariq Anwar was
contacted four times, with no reply or feedback. He kept saying, ‘I will send’. No wonder, he
depends heavily on allies to win his own election. Lawyer Majid Memon agreed to meet and
send the feedback, it never came back. Mr. E Ahmed, agreed to meet, but it never happened.
Father–Son duo of Mr. Ajmal never responded to mail or calls. Pudduchery MP, Md Faizal PP
replied to calls but did not send the feedback. Kishanganj MP, Asrarul Haq also did not respond
to calls and emails. Among Muslim MPs, the best response came from Mr. Sultan Ahmed of the
TMC and Comrade Salim Ahmed of the CPI-M. Both of them not only agreed to send the
feedback, they did it. Sultan Ahmed was gracious enough to spare time with us and shared the
work being done by the TMC government in West Bengal for the upliftment of the Muslims.

He proudly said that the West Bengal government was the only government which implemented
the Sachar Committee recommendations. No other government has implemented the
recommendations. Salim Ahmed also helped us in spreading the word in West Bengal, which
was very useful. We tried to contact maximum number of BJP MPs, given their strength in the
Lok Sabha. This was a big challenge to contact MPs of a party whose oxygen comes from being
anti-Muslim and proponent of Hindutva. But reaching out not a bad experience, Meenakshi
Lekhi did not meet but responded to the e-mail. Most of the BJP MPs did not respond.
Amongst all the MPs, the best response was from Shri. O. P. Yadav, the MP from Siwan, which
has significant Muslim population. Yadav was exception and can be an example for other
lawmakers. I sent a message to him requesting him for a meeting. He was nice enough to call
back and invited for the meeting. RJD’s Taslimuddin, responded over phone. We also tried to
contact Rahul Gandhi, but from Rahul Gandhi office, no appointment was given.

Apart from lawmakers, we also met from former police officers, civil servants, judges and people
from other walks of life. Good part of people met was researchers and women.

The BJP MP from Siwan felt that the condition has not changed. He felt that self employment,
gulf jobs and traditional vacations were available to Muslims. He believed that the condition of
the community is very bad. ‘The condition can be improved, by providing special assistance, and
they can be promoted in the areas education, health, and employment to put them on path of
progress’.

JD (U) Secretary, Afaque Ahmed Khan was not sure about the changes. He considered
education as the biggest challenge, apart from communalism, and social and economic
conditions. He considered skilled and unskilled as top two opportunities, and others included
business. He did not have any vision as such.
One former justice of Delhi High court, did not see any change in the conditions. He considered
education, and lack of leadership as huge challenge and also found lack of seriousness. He did
not found any opportunity and called to establish dialogue between Hindus and Muslims to
remove distrust. On the issue of Uniform Civil Code, Muslims have no right to argue because
they forfeited their right by going to the Parliament against a court decision. He believed that if
people disagreed over the Delimitation Commission, there was always room for protest.

Justice Rajinder Sachar was not sure about the changes over the last few years. He defended the
government’s decision to appoint the committee and said, ‘Many people argue against Sachar
Committee. Why you did this? Why did not you study about Hindus? This is not about Muslims,
it actually compares the position of Muslims with other sections of society’. He considers
communalism, inequality, education and population figures as challenges for the Muslims. He
called for deployment of Muslim officers in Muslim-dominate areas. He also called for better
ration of Muslims in Police forces to ensure security and safety for Muslims. On the issue of
Babri Masjid, he said ‘Many People said that Muslims should move on…what move on?
According to me, whole land has to be given to Muslims. You cannot hurt psychology of such a
deep nature’.

Kritika Singh, Researcher said that there was no change in last ten years. Education, gender
equality, health and employment were challenges according to her.

Sajida Anjum, Researcher felt that no change has taken place and added, ‘Although I must say,
there is more awareness about the situation of Muslims at least among research communities’.
She considers communal conflicts, poverty, education, unemployment and religious orthodoxy
as challenges. She explained, ‘Most important thing is to note that these problems are
interrelated and works as vicious circle which needs to be broken’. On opportunities, she said,
‘These are not opportunities they are having but they have to cultivate these opportunities to
come into the mainstream of the society’.

Economist K. A. Siddique, said that no change has taken place. In his opinion education was the
challenge, and traditional services were the only opportunities available. Scribe Musarrat Warsi
was not sure about the changes. She considers lack of awareness as the challenge. She saw
opportunity in policies of the government and micro business.

Prof. Abdul Shaban believes a change has taken place in last ten years. He says, ‘Institution
building has been very important. Certain proportion of state resources going to minorities.
More awareness in civil society and government agenda created’. He considers
underdevelopment, communal riots, identity stereotyping as challenges. For him lack of
leadership and inclusion in decision making was also a challenge. For him opportunities lie in
inclusive democracy, economy and a vibrant civil society.

Journalist Abdul Bari Masoud sees some changes in last ten years. He says, ‘For the first time,
welfare measures were taken by the government’. He considers inequality, injustice and
inadequate representation as challenges. For him private sector, education sector and self-
employment were the opportunities.

Sadeque Hussain sees some changes in last decade. He considers citizenship the biggest
challenge, when Muslims are constantly branded as Pakistani, Terrorist, and Bangladeshis. He
considers RSS-which destroy Muslim leadership, as also a challenge. Police atrocity, government
jobs, and leadership was also challenge. For him, opportunities lie in contest election, participate
in media, right to education and all fundamental rights.

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M. Parwez Ahmed, said no change has taken place. For him challenges were- identity, security,
poverty and equality. He considers intellectual meet and political influence, mass mobilization at
all level as opportunities.

Purnima Menon, Senior Research Fellow was not aware about the changes. She considers
education, jobs and social exclusion as the big challenges. She advised to link Muslims with
growth agenda, and education.

Scott Schlossberg of the US Embassy, believed that there has been a change in the conditions of
the community since 2006, and it has deteriorated. For him challenges were- civil political rights,
freedom from fear and economic Necessity. He found opportunities in activism and
documentation.

Md. Jabir M. M believes somewhat change has taken. He believes the challenges were- identity
problems, Illiteracy particularly of women, economic issues, homeless, and State Terrorism
against community. He said, ‘Muslim identity is questioned everywhere, it may be in
appointments and jobs.’ He finds opportunities in Human capital, Education, Government jobs.

Muhammad Shafi, State President, SDPI considers communal violence, Identity, Social Justice
and Political discrimination as challenges for the community. He finds opportunities in
leadership and advised to cut the negative politics and create space for political party which unite
all secular forces. ‘We should end the negative politics and create positive politics among
Muslims. All Muslim parties should be united’.

Sanju Yadav, researcher felt that somewhat change took place. She said, After the Sachar
Committee report, government created Minority Commission, so now we have a Commission
that will focus on the issues of minorities that may have affected their lives. There is minority
specific scholarship started by the government’. She sees communal violence, unemployment,
and social deprivation as challenges for the community. She said that the community is deprived
in involvement in government programmes and huge crowd is moving in informal sector as in
Arabian countries.

Mamta, a researcher, said that change has taken place. She considers stigma and exclusive as twin
challenges for the community. She considers an opportunity in all minorities coming together.

Dr. Nalini Kaushik believes that somewhat changes have taken place. She considers education,
health and equitable growth as challenges. In her view, opportunities lie in quality education and
being part of development process.

Dr. Tasleem Ahmed Rahmani sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Level of deterioration is
growing up steadily & slowly in various walk of social and political life’. He finds challenges in
identity crisis, political representation, isolation from mainstream of society. He explains,
‘Though wealth is increasing in Muslim locality in urban area but this is not making any work as
all income resource are unrecognized’. He sees opportunities in adequate political representation,
dialogue in society, creating network of Muslims, and better economic conditions for Muslims.

Abdul Haque, Emeritus Professor of Urdu, Delhi University sees no change in last ten years as
the recommendations were not implemented. He believes that security of life and property,
Religion and language, livelihood Discrimination were the biggest challenge for the community.
He sees opportunities in business, Education, Technology, abroad employment. He calls for
Political Awakening.

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Sultan Ahmed, TMC leader says that change has taken place only in West Bengal, which is the
only state to have implemented the Sachar Committee recommendations. The former minister
considers security & protection, education & facilities for higher studies, employment in public
sector, and empowerment as challenges for the community. He finds a hope for opportunities in
getting skill development.

Jogiram, of Bar Council of India was not aware of the Committee. He finds challenges in
Education, Standard of Living, and Profession. He elaborates, ‘In my opinion education, are
main factor where Muslims of the country are lagging behind’. He says that Muslims should find
opportunities in taking benefit of schemes, run by government in regional education, and
vocational schooling.

Monika, Dy. Director, with CBSE said that change has taken place. She finds no challenge as all
citizens were equal. She saw an open field in opportunities as well and said, ‘I don’t think
opportunities should be differentiated. It depends upon the potential of an individual’.

NRIs Tahira Akhtar (Daughter of Late Nazir Ahmed, Padma Bhushan & Padma Shri) &
Nayeem Akhtar believed that somewhat changes have taken place. For them challenges lie in
education, poverty, security, cohesiveness, and employment. For them opportunities lie in
educational opportunities, religious tolerance, work had to be completed, political participation,
and work with religious groups to have more dialogue with majority group.

Business executive, Mashkoor R. Ghayasi sees a change and they have become more negative
and dependent. He finds challenges in education, safety & security, isolation and no
commitment. And the opportunities are in employment in Government and Private Sector. He
says, ‘They should join mainstream, contribute in the development of the country’.

Umer Ilyasi says that in 2030, Muslims will form own government at the centre.

Tanvir Haziq, of the India Islamic Cultural Centre says that the change has taken place. He
believes that challenges are leadership, education, reservation for Muslims, and job creation,
health awareness. He believes that the opportunities are in government jobs, private job,
industrial growth, priority in sports, and health issues.

Bollywood actor, Ayub Khan said that some change has taken place in last one decade.
According to him, challenges are education, employment, awareness, political vagueness, and
sound social backing. He finds opportunities in educating its people in its main stream
educational systems.

Actor Javed Jaffery, was not aware of any such report or development and he did not want to
write.

Muhammad Salim sees no change in the conditions. According to him challenges were
education, school and colleges, and hospitals. Political persons are not working.

A teacher in Government school, he sees that opportunities for them are in labour, traditional
artisan, and service in Government and private sector.

Anser K Kidwai, Former Editor National Herald and author, feels that somewhat change has
taken place in last ten years. He says, ‘Minority welfare programmes have become more possible
at the centre and in some states’. He sees challenges in security, misunderstanding about Sharia,
and ghettoisation. He finds that opportunities are in entrepreneurship. He advised, ‘Muslim

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entrepreneurship should be forthcoming about their immediate and long term needs to come
out with concrete problems for youth for economic emancipation’.

Udit Raj, BJP MP from Delhi said that somewhat changes have taken place and said, ‘increase
education and entrepreneurship’. He said that the challenges are in communalism within
community and outside. He founded Justice Party and also formed an alliance with Jamiat ul
Ulema Hind. He explains, ‘I tried to form an alliance with Jamiatul Ulema Hind, but it failed
because of communal politics of JUH’. He finds opportunities in education, entrepreneurship,
and alliance with Dalits.

Another person said that some change has taken place. ‘A number of schools have been
introduced that provide scholarships to minorities, financing to minority institutions’. According
to him, challenges are essentially the same as faced by others. These include ensuring good
health, achieving higher levels of education and obtaining employment in modern manufacturing
services. He says that opportunities are in availability of and access to higher education, growth
of the economy and opportunities.

IT guru, Osama Manzar said that no change has taken place. He explained, ‘I don’t know, but if
we take into account our work, it has changed’. He finds that the challenges are self pity, inertia,
dependence, belief that nothing can change, depending on God for miracle and not doing
anything. He added, ‘I am talking of general perspective, development is considered anti-Islam’.
According to him opportunities are micro-entrepreneurship, education/women education, local
panchayat level leadership/district, digital opportunity and IT adoption in all walks of life. His
advice is ‘we have to get out of complain mode’.

Prof. Zafar Mahfooz Nomani see somewhat change in last decade. According to him challenges
are security, education, reformation, declining population. He sees opportunities in
privatisation/ liberalisation, digital, and private universities.

Qamar Ashraf said no change has taken. He explains, ‘The small progress witnessed is largely
due to growth of economy. The Sachar Committee has little to do with it.’ He finds security,
Threat to Identity, Education, Economy, Terrorism as challenges. He finds opportunities in
Democracy, Secular approach, and efforts for betterment.

Filmmaker Yousuf Saeed finds some what changes in last decade. He says, ‘Not sure if any
organisation is attempting to implement Sachar Committee Report’. According to him, the
challenges are education, assimilation into the larger mainstream, religious liberalism, and equity
to women & minorities. According to him opportunities are entrepreneurship/self-employment,
changing of leadership, and women empowerment.

Activist Noorjehan Safia Naz, co-founder of Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA) sees no
change in last decade. She says, in fact deteriorating under right wing fascist state’. She considers
poverty, conservative elements within community, right wing fascist state, lack of support to
Muslim women, and legal discrimination as challenges. She finds opportunities in democratic,
secular values enshrined in the constitution, think of themselves as citizens & not victims,
support from other communities, judiciary to be used for addressing issues, and use of media for
raising issues.

Sadeque Hussain finds somewhat change has taken place. For him challenges are lack of
democratic Muslim leadership, discrimination at all sectors, overcoming disaster victims, school
drop outs, and misleading. He finds opportunities in education, Social Life Style, Politics, Social
Service, and administrative service.

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Prof. Vibhuti Patel sees no change. She says, ‘It has deteriorated due to structural discrimination,
systematic exclusion from development process and brutalisation this communal conflicts’. For
her, challenges are communal riots, Induction of Muslim Youth in sectarian outfits, drug abuse,
joblessness, and deprivation of development. ‘Mainstream economy excludes Muslim from
benefits of economic growth and development. Their democratic right and right to dignified
life’. According to her, opportunities are in self-moblisation, social audit of government
schemes, gender sensitivity, career counselling of youth /adolescent, and Formation of youth
organisation for peace keeping. She said that peace building socio-economic, educational and
cultural problems should be addressed at root level.

Tanweer Fazal says that no change has taken in last ten years. He finds challenges in economic
empowerment, education, political empowerment, building social and political alliance with
other communities. For him, opportunities are in need to focus on youth- relatively young
population, women- bringing to education, they performing better in drop-outs, Availability of
immense skill which needs to be strengthened and sustained.

Shafeeq Rahman said that change has taken place. According to him, challenges are identity &
security, education, employment, under representation in Legislative Bodies, and Civic
Infrastructure. He finds opportunities in education, self-employment, reform within the society
and improvement in civic infrastructure.

Ali Ahmed Khan, Secretary, Central Waqf Council said no change has taken place. According to
him, challenges are Muslim disunity, leadership, sectarianism, identity crisis and terrorism
(Islamic). According to him opportunities are literacy, establishment of minority educational
institutions in Muslim concentrated area, to get technical education and employment in Govt.
and public sector, and Modernisation of Madarsa education and to avail the benefits of schemes
implemented by Govt. of India in various departments.

Diplomat G Parthasarthy, believes that India and Pakistan can move ahead in their relation. He
said, ‘I do believe that India and Pakistan can move ahead in resolving the issue of Jammu and
Kashmir, if Pakistan accepts that we can live in peace and harmony like countries in Europe. For
this we need substantial economic integration and that the sanctity of post-partition borders is
respected’. He was hopeful of some hope in the new PDP-BJP government. He says, ‘the PDP-
BJP programme does contain elements for greater cooperation cross boundaries in Jammu and
Kashmir. Pakistan has misgoverned itself so badly that its very existence is threatened by radical
groups its military nurtured for use against India and Afghanistan. (Interview, G Parthasarathy,
15-03-2015).

Anees Ahmed said no change has taken. According to him challenges are education, small family
and political representation. For him Muslim unity is very important.

Mohd Arif Ahmed sees no change in last decade. According to him challenges are poverty,
education, Health, Representation, and Security. He called for change to positive thought.
According to him opportunities are community based organization, Education centre by
Religious elite, Zakat for welfare trust and Government schemes.

Dr. Md. Aftab Alam believes that no change has taken place. According to him challenges are
education, security, identity, overall backwardness, and Discrimination. He finds hardly any
opportunity in current political scenario. He said, ‘There is hardly any opportunity that can be
expected from political representation. It needs to empower, uplift, and modernise steps need to
be taken by each one of us for participation as stakeholders’.

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Md. Shahnawaz, Lecturer said no change has taken place. According to him challenges are
poverty, traditional thinking, language, sense of insecurity. He finds opportunities in
Demographic Dividend and Islam. Gopal Agarwal has not seen any change in last decade. He
says, ‘Government is still in process of accepting recommendation of Sachar Committee’. For
him challenges are literacy, education, political representation, access to public sustained
programmes, and boundary of ideology. He finds opportunities in universal access to education,
high fertility rate among Muslims, economic development.

Bhopal

Advocate Aadil Raza said that no change has taken place. He finds challenge in education.
According to him opportunities are in employment, education, security. Nikhat Ali, Advocate
believes change has taken place. She says, ‘There have been some improvement in education,
and Muslim should have knowledge to improve’.

Waqas Ahmed sees no change in last decade. For him challenges are illiteracy, economical crisis,
Lack of guidance and motivation. He finds opportunities in democracy, secular Politics,
educational Movements run by different organizations.

S.I. Ali, of Jan Abhiyan sees change in last decade. He finds challenges in education, skill
development, Awareness. According to him opportunities are skill development, and business
innovation.

Ghina Farough, sees somewhat change. She finds challenges in education, socio-economic
condition, lack of unity among Muslim community, lack of linkage /bonding with other parts of
society. According to her opportunities are in education, skill and vocational education,
orientation towards education, Awareness about need of education, and work at grassroot level.
She said, ‘The opportunity must give equality among all students of Muslim community.

Author Dr. Rizwan Haque with NCERT-Bhopal sees somewhat change in last decade. He says,
‘Students are getting scholarship therefore now they have better opportunities for education. But
lot of things are yet to be done’. He finds challenges in educational backwardness, social
backwardness, economic backwardness, and lack of awareness. He says, ‘Muslims are largely
prejudice regarding modern age. They live more in their past, less interested in modern
development’. He finds opportunities in better girl child ratio, girl’s economic independence,
trained and independent girls.

Tarannum said change has taken place. She sees challenges in terms of little education in the
family and in child marriage, No opportunity in jobs, community living under insecurity, and
child labour rampant.

Dr. Hishmi Jamil Husain also finds no change in last decade. For him challenges are security,
education & skill development, employment, and health. He finds opportunities in minority
schemes (education, business development), minority institutes, political representation,
government positions, and in propagating Islamic vision.

Bilal Uddin sees no change in last ten years. He finds challenge in education.

Md. Akhtar Qasmi did not see any change in last ten years. According to him challenges are
education. He finds opportunities in education.

Prof. Lata Pratibha Modhular, Visiting Faculty, Barkatullah University sees somewhat change in
last ten years. She says, ‘At least Muslims got aware, especially women got to know the rights and
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started caring formed with demands of education & empowerment’. According to her,
challenges are saffronisation, alienation/Ghettoisation, Losing their livelihood and artisanship,
traditional skilled occupation, atrocities and cannot complain to the police station due to
discrimination. She sees opportunities in education, empowerment, secular constitution and uses
it for their development, rights based interventions, skill bared vocational education.

Omar Farook Khatani sees some change taking in last decade. He says, ‘Percentage of education
& employment is not increased as it is needed by committee’. In his view challenges are,
Education, Health, Employment, and security. He explains, ‘If we can awake ourselves, we can
get anything we want. But how? Don’t know?’

M. Afaq believes somewhat change took place in last decade. He says, ‘Percentage of enrolment
education has increased, awareness of socio-economic aspects etc’. According to him challenges
are awareness regarding fundamental rights, awareness about government schemes, security,
most girl facing hygiene and health problem in early young age. He sees opportunities in
technical education, talent, and traditional work.

S Parvez Bari, journalist finds no change in last decade. He says, ‘Government schemes meant
for Muslims in minorities dominated districts are not being implemented properly due to bias.
Others are benefiting from these schemes’. According to him challenges are security, education,
employment, food, housing. He says, ‘Muslim Youth are being targeted by security forces and
being branded as terrorists and extremists’.

Dr. M Arif Juned Khan sees no change in last decade. He says ‘Awareness in education in poor
families is very poor. In middle income group family, the level of education is increasing.’ He
finds challenges in insecurity, education, employment. According to him, opportunities are in
education with financial assistance, proper guidance for their career. Muslim Talent Search
Exam, and Leadership. Azam Khan, advocate sees somewhat changes. For him, challenges are
Mainstreaming in economy, Health, and Education. He sees opportunities in education, health,
and economy.

Dr. Muhammad Najmi believes somewhat changes took place. He says, ‘Muslims particularly
females are taking them to education’. He finds challenges in unemployment, and male youth
not keen in education. He finds no opportunity and advises. ‘Muslim should come forward and
accept new challenges’.

Adil Raza Advocate finds no change in last decade. He finds challenges in education,
opportunities, employment, education, and security.

Jammu

Imran Ahmed Kichloo from Jammu finds no change in last decade. He says, ‘Recommendations
of any committee is something else, but the implementation of these recommendations needs
seriousness and sincerity in efforts’. For him challenges are political exclusion, Sectarianism,
backwardness, and discrimination. He finds opportunities in local industries, State government
service, and teaching.

Mahboob Mustafa Azad, IYC functionary sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘These
recommendations are not implemented. Yes, and recommendations are only on paper’. He finds
challenges in social growth, political growth, Economic Growth, Proper Representation. He
explains, ‘We are socially, politically, economically backward so we have to come forward for
better future of Muslims’. He finds opportunities in self employment, Private, Sports, and

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Political system. He says, ‘First of all we have to develop modern Islamic education system, then
we have to develop economic condition. We have to elect proper representative’.

Mazahir Husain Shah sees somewhat change in last decade. For him, challenges are
unemployment, poverty, lack of opportunities, and Social and economic security. According to
him opportunities are demographic change/young Muslims are coming out, educational and
economic opportunities, skill development, and to excel in each & every sphere.

Syed Azhar Tawed Hashmi believes no change took place in last decade. For him challenges are
leadership, poverty, education, unity, and faith. He finds opportunities in education, leadership,
commerce & economics, and unity.

Muzafar Ahmad Mir finds no change in last decade. For him challenges are identity crisis, Result
oriented and qualitative education, health, lack of representation, drugs, and lack of employment.
He says, ‘Today, Indian Muslims are facing the problems like identity of their own i.e. if a
Muslim is nationalist he still has to prove his nationality’. He finds opportunities in central
Government, State Government.

Zain Ul Abedin Badey, finds no change in last decade. He finds challenges in forced silence and
alienation, lack of deserving affirmative action, improper share in education & employment,
most important the overall targeting of their faith, and Intellectual Bankruptcy. He did not see
any exclusive opportunities or share in existing opportunities.

Tauseef Kamal, research scholar finds no change in last decade. He says, ‘Sachar Committee’s
recommendations have not been accepted by the government till now’. For him challenges are
ignorance, educational backwardness, socio political & economic backwardness. He says, ‘Today,
we people are ignorant that what we were and now what we are. We actually have lost our
identity. I think all opportunities are open, but we need an open playing field to grab these
opportunities’.

Toseef Ahmed, sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘We haven’t seen any implementation
of the committee’s report’. For him challenges are security, unemployment, low percent in
Armed Forces, branding Muslims anti-national, and media bias. For opportunities, he says, ‘No
doubt, opportunities are there. But we don’t see the will, both on the part of Muslims & the
government’.

Ashraf Ali sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘No doubt little changes have taken place but
because of not implementation practically, the recommendations that report fully’. For him
challenges are unemployment, no reservation in educational institution, protest &
demonstration, educational administration, belong to weaker sections. He laments,
‘Administration does not implement available policies at least’. He finds opportunities in Muslim
University, private sector should be focused, Muslim Student Organisation for aware, focus on
competitive exams, ethical education needed. He says, ‘These are very unaware and miss the
opportunities’.

Aqib Khan sees no change in last decade. Kamran Zaffar sees no change in last decade. He says,
‘On papers a lot has changed, but the fact that the development of Muslims has seen a
downward momentum which cannot be elaborated in such a short space’. For him, challenges
are political misrepresentation, educational backwardness, social representation, withering of
freedom of religion. According to him, opportunities are secure vicinity, better social treatment,
better education opportunities, enhancement of entrepreneurship skills and economy, right to
freedom of speech & suppression.

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Jaipur

Muhammad Murtaza sees no change in last decade. For him challenges are security, Islam &
believers, economics. He finds opportunities in education, reservation, politics, development,
and Tablegh-e-Islam. Anis Ansari sees no change in the last ten years. For him, challenges are
insecurity, unity, economy, politics, and injustice. He finds opportunities in vote, constitutional
rights, community efforts and educational institutions.

Mrs. Mehrunnisa Khan, finds no change in last decade. She says, ‘it has gone from bad to worse.
Government not taking any interest in improving the conditions of Muslims’. For her challenges
are security, injustice, discrimination, child labour, and illiteracy. She says, ‘Muslims are facing
insecurity of life and property. No one is safe, and everyone is earning to make a living’. She sees
opportunities in educating the young male & female, availing opportunities which are
announced, unity for common cause, awareness regarding minority policies, keeping pace with
technology.

Md. Mushtaque sees no change in last decade. For him challenges are unemployment, fear, and
defame. Azam Husain finds no change in last decade. According to him challenges are hunger,
and fear. Khalid Manzoor finds somewhat changes in last decade. He says, ‘Growth is only in
primary education, some benefits received from scholarships and RTE’. For him challenges are
saffronisation of education, security of Muslims, Maslaki divide of Muslims, political distribution
of Muslims, illiteracy about Islam and Quran. He says that all of these challenges made by the
RSS. He finds opportunities in RTE and scholarship for education, Use of Constitutional rights,
Popular Front of India, life according to Islam. He says, ‘Need an ideology to develop Muslim
community and make a common platform’.

Md. Arif Khan says no change took place in last decade. For him challenges are insecurity, lack
of unity, injustice, and poor health.

Zafrul Islam Siddique sees no change in last decade. He finds no opportunities in ‘government
service, not in business, There are no opportunities’. For him challenges are to face communal
feelings, insecurity, educational development, low income, police atrocities have developed a
feeling of fear. He finds opportunities in presenting Islam as a religion of peace, brotherhood
and equality, raise standard of education, to increase educational institutions and to establish new
institutions.

Hafiz Manzoor Ali khan believes somewhat change have taken place in decade. He says, ‘The
condition is not changing due to government but community efforts’. For him challenges are
security, behaviour of the government, biased Government, establish political leadership. He
finds opportunities in democratic atmosphere of the country, majority of non-Muslims are
secular, to be second largest population, community leadership about the situation, and
resources.

Abdul Rahim Sheikh, ACS feels somewhat changes have taken place in last few years. He says,
‘The schemes undertaken by the Ministry of Minority Affairs under MSDP only to create
infrastructure but the scheme does not include only such steps for economic upliftment,
employment, which are really important’. He finds challenges in Lack of education. He explains,
‘The society has a role to play in improving the education. The teachers are reluctant to impart
quality education in the primary and secondary education. Teachers are also involved in
providing chits to the students during final exam of HSLC and HSSLC. The mindset of the
Muslim people is required to be changed for development. They are not at all expecting
development and remain the same place where they are’. He finds opportunities in skill
development. He elaborates, ‘we should take the benefit of the MSDP/MOMA. The opinion is
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forming for development and takes opportunity. The scholarship is universal and not to limit
50% or more’.

Musharraf Husain Chaudhary, NRLM sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘Nothing has
changed except MSDP and scholarship scheme implementing by the government’. For him the
challenges are education, health (family planning, girl child marriage), economic upliftment,
access to information, and awareness. He finds opportunities in Human resource, hard labour,
and agriculture.

Sadullah Ahmed feels somewhat changes have taken. He says, ‘Education awareness has
increased all over the country. Government services found not improved, to a good extent’. For
him, challenges are identity crisis, educational backwardness, economic downtrodden, socially
deprived, and lack of proper leadership. He says, ‘Muslim faces lack of education, information,
talent should be developed’. For him, opportunities are in technical education, vocational
training, competitive training, English medium school, and computer training. He says, ‘Muslims
should be educated, trained, motivated to appear in various competitive exams’.

Assam

Mokbul Husain, Ex MLA, Assam Assembly finds no change in last decade. He finds challenges
in education, employment, security, economic problem, and political justification. For him,
opportunities are in sufficient education facilities to the students, special employment facilities as
per the population pattern, agricultural facilities as per S/L ST system especially in Defence,
Health Facilities, educational modification in Madarsa education by modern education, quality,
students by the missionary schools as like missionary school of Christians.

Dr. M S Iskender Ali finds no change in last decade. He finds challenges in education,
employment, security, political representation, and health. He finds opportunities in private
sector, self-employment and availability of bank loan, education made compulsory for modern
Scientific education, stop child labour, and health (initiative for vaccination).

Md. Tafazzal Hussain finds no change in last decade. He says, ‘No Government has not taken
necessary steps to implement the report’. He finds challenges in education, and opportunities in
free education, increase the higher education, compulsory education for girls, encourage
competitive exams, and establish the more educational institutes in backward areas.

Abdul Mannan, Retired Professor, Guwahati University finds somewhat change in last decade.
He says, ‘Sachar Committee report made Muslims conscious about the problems they are facing
and their rights. Muslim can now say yes they are deprived and nobody can raise a finger against
them’. He finds challenges in education, Livelihood, Employment in government and non-
government services, mindset of Muslims- which should be changed.

Mazedur Rahman sees no change in last decade. He complains, ‘Funds are not utilised in a
correct manner’. For him challenges are security, employment, health, education, and political
representation. He says, ‘Human Resource Development is the single most important factor
which can provide solution to almost all problems’. For him opportunities for Muslims are in
wage labourers, physical works. His advice, ‘Let us ‘be positive and liberal in outlook’. M Matiur
Rahman finds no change in the last decade. For him challenges are in job and education. He
finds opportunities in proper use of Waqf Property.

Derajuddin Ahmed, Retired DIGP Assam, sees somewhat change in last decade. He says,
‘Problems have been rightly identified and elaborated. No visible changes have been noticed in
key issues’. According to him, the challenges are employment, education, security, and health.
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He says, ‘Statistics as per Government record will speak’. For him opportunities are educational
scholarship, re-organisation of Human Resources, Unskilled Labour, and creating environment
of central and state competitive examination. His advice: ‘Indian/Assamese Muslim should learn
to avail the government schemes’.

Dr. Atowar Rahman, Retd. Professor of Physics, Guwahati, said no change has taken place. He
finds challenges in education in minority areas, economic condition of minorities, employment
in Govt and private enterprises, erosion of responsibilities, health, medical college and hospital
in minority areas & school, college and hostel for Muslims. For him, opportunities are in secular
values, facilities of establishing by government.

A H Khan Dakar, Assam Civil Service (Retd.) said no change has taken place. He says, ‘Sachar
Committee has not been implemented as well as 15 point programme reports submitted by state
government is not based on actual field studies’. For him, challenges are employment for men &
women, lack of quality education, defective Madarsa education and management. He says,
‘Kharizee Madarsa is managed by a group of people by their own. The society as a whole is not
aware of the internal policy of these. It should be given syllabus and modernised in true sense’.
According to him, opportunities lies at ‘When Muslim observe their religious activities at their will.’

Kolkata
Syed Samsun Nabi said no change has taken place. He says, ‘The resources has been good but
the development manifestation is yet to be seen’. According to him, challenges are identity crisis,
too many firqas, illiteracy, discrimination, and recognition biased.

Md. Ibrahim Sheikh said no change has taken place. According to him, challenges are education,
health, social deprivation, and employment.

Md. Shah Alam believes somewhat change has taken place. He says, ‘In West Bengal present
government has taken some good steps for the socio-economic and educational upliftment of
the Muslims, scholarship, hostels and OBC reservation are some of them’. According to him,
challenges are safety & security, employment & economic progress, education, especially
minority education, and democracy. He finds opportunities in Indian Constitutional Right, and
Democracy.

Md. Ashraf Ali believes somewhat changes have taken place. He says, ‘Still Muslim community
is very far to access education, because of political will and at their own responsibilities.’
According to him, the challenges are education, improper political awareness. He finds
opportunities in education, job, political status, housing and Waqf status. He explains,
‘Thousand crores of land is occupied by others. If all money will spend for Muslim community it
will be great support to Muslim community’.
Mohima Khan believes somewhat change has taken place. According to her, challenges are lack
of Govt services, higher education, behaviour of government workers, early marriage, high
population, and BJP. She finds opportunities in NGOs working with Muslims, West Bengal
Government of TMC under Mamta Bannerjee.

Sadia Afrin finds somewhat changes taken place in last ten years. She finds challenges in lack of
awareness, poverty, lack of education, proper education, health (family planning, institutional
delivery, immunisation, early marriage). She finds opportunities in scholarship (minority), and
OBC reservation. She calls for educated, healthy, hygienic life, and educated Muslims.

Mozammel Hossain finds no change in last decade. According to him challenges are media is
absolutely anti-Muslim, lack of unity, coordination among Muslims is very much needed,
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reluctance to adopt modern technology, education and poverty. He finds opportunities in
government, schemes to develop in education both for Government and Non-Government,
Schemes to alert the Muslim about constitutional provisions, vocational training programme for
Muslims, and reservation in government vacancies.

Syed Taha finds somewhat change in last decade. He says, ‘Initially I had seen some initiative
taken by the Government for some couple of years, but the development is very slow’. He finds
challenges in education, planning, and finance. He says, ‘On my point of view education is the
biggest challenge in India’. According to him, opportunities are in education, business, social
activity and unity, part of the growth of Indian economy, stop violence on women on poor & on
common man.

Sajjad Hossain, Asst Professor said no change has taken place. He says, ‘Muslims are lacking in
political representation. The recommendation of Muslim dominated seat should not reserve for
SC is one of the minor reason’. For him challenges are political representation, education, youth
in under trials, and media. According to him opportunities are in realisation of the situation of
the Indian Muslim, education, and various skill development programmes.

Abdul Matin said somewhat changes have taken. ‘There are lot of schemes and programmes by
the Government, especially MSDP, which is not implemented at grass root level satisfactorily’.
For him, challenges are economic marginalisation, educational deprivation, social reforms
lacking, traditional Industries need to be taken care off, and health issues. He says, ‘There are
problems which are state specific. The problem of West Bengal is somewhat different from rest
of India’. According to him, opportunities are in Maximum optimal utilization of existing
schemes and programme by both state & Central Government, make use of the infrastructure of
different universities and other educational institutions, need to coordinate among various civil
society organisations for the development of Muslim community. He also called for breaking the
eliteness of so called Muslim elite.

Dr. Nazmul Hussain feels that somewhat changes have taken place. He says, ‘The situation of
Muslim in education or illiteracy rate in elementary education programme but not up to the
mark. Job opportunities are still lacking and it has become a dream’. According to him
challenges are job scarcity or proper form of job security, proper modern education and proper
health services lacking, proper artistic training or proper selling of their products and Drop-Out
especially after Middle / Secondary Level. Awareness of Government Programmes. He finds
opportunities in utilisation of government funds in proper direction, opportunity of government
reservation in education and employment sector, education scholarship programme.

Faruk Molla sees somewhat changes taking place. He finds challenges in Act 21, Service,
Fundamental Rights. He sees opportunities in service, Education, Act 21, and Fundamental
Rights.

Sheikh Khurshid Alam sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘I feel that the conditions of
Muslims have undergone change in the natural process as other communities but nothing more’.
According to him, challenges are language- Muslims lag behind adopting working language of
the state, Think Tank- negligible think tanks of Muslim, higher education, employment in
Executive Bodies, ignorant about Muslim heritage & culture. He finds opportunities in Islamic
teachings as the driving force in the relevant field, globalisation leading to more opportunities
exposure, Various Stipend / Loan schemes from Government /NGOs.

S K Abul Kalam Azad is not aware about the change. He finds challenges in Muslim are
backward or facing some problem of communal party, educational problem, financial problem,

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awareness, environment and employment. He finds opportunities in scholarship, NGO & Trust
Works. He wants drastic change education system.

S K Abdul Hamid see somewhat change in last decade. For him, challenges are illiteracy, mental
position, financial support, area pollution, no official reservation for Muslims education.

Kaji Mainuddin sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘I think there was no change of the
condition of Muslims. The Government does not give special focus on Muslims as minority.
The Government only gives assurance, but not implement as a whole’. According to him
challenges are security, education, and poverty. He finds opportunities in demanding rights,
education, and improvement of health.

Dr. Amit Kumar, Asst Professor, Sanskrit, who also contested Bihar Assembly election from
Raniganj in 2015 said somewhat changes have taken place. For him challenges are lack of
education, financial problem, absence of honest politician, and unemployment. He finds
opportunities in Govt jobs, self employment, private jobs, and open market.

Abul Kalam Qasmi said no change has taken place. He sees challenges in education, economic
backwardness. For him opportunities are in education, economy, religious, social, and political.

Iftikhar Ahmed Khan sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Sachar Committee report has
not been implemented as yet. How one expects that the condition of Muslims will change’. He
finds challenges in Existence of Muslims in India, economic, educational and social
backwardness. Exploitation of Muslims in Government jobs and private jobs, and the majority
community tries to denigrate minority community in all spheres.

Dr. S. Fazle Rab see somewhat change in last ten years. He says, ‘Muslims of this state (Bihar)
are now exposed to various socio-educational awareness programmes launched by different Milli
organizations.’ For him, challenges are education, poverty, security, communal divide and
Ghettoisation, Extra ordinary delay in Justice and discriminatory attitude, crisis of leadership,
Maslak Divide and Dependency Syndrome. He finds opportunities in democracy, secular ethos,
and freedom to promote Leadership.

Md. Tariq Ejaz said somewhat changes have taken place. He said, ‘Literate Muslims sincerely
conscious after Sachar Committee report.’ He sees challenges in security & safety,
unemployment, unification, lack of politician, and education (both). He finds opportunities in
good education, hygiene environment, healthy society, and business.

South India

Shehryar Suhael sees no change in last decade. For him challenges are education, and
employment. He finds opportunities in education, employment, and knowledge.

Muhammad Junaid PK sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘Till the date so many Muslims
don’t know that like this one committee is there, nothing has changed’. He finds challenges in
education, shelter, job, and political backwardness. He finds opportunities in education, own
business.

Gulam Rabbani sees somewhat change in last decade. He says, ‘They hope some help may come
to them who has basic idea of Sachar Committee Report’. He finds challenges in to safeguard
waqf property and utilise them for the benefit of Muslim community, States reducing quota of
Muslims in education and jobs, cow slaughter- because poor cannot afford other meat, educating
all Muslim community, lack of leadership. He says, ‘Internal clashes within Muslims have given
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power to communal forces to amend laws in their favour. This is due to lack of Muslim
leadership’. He finds opportunities in population, well to do Muslims should spare some money
for the development of people, Muslim’s once united will be well placed. He says, ‘Communal
forces advantage is, not Muslims are getting united to some extent. So, its best opportunity of
getting united’.

S A P Abdussalam says no change has taken place. He finds challenges in disunity, the
community, its leaders and Ulema have vision & sincerity, communalism in all walk of life
specially political, educational, economical, and social backwardness. He finds opportunities in
education, rehabilitation, and empowerment of women.

Shareef Poval, sees some change in last decade. He says, ‘Major areas remaining backward, only
scholarship and other few relief givers to Muslims’. He finds challenges in security,
backwardness of education (especially primary), backward in Govt. Services and cultural
backwardness, and economic backwardness. He finds opportunities in reservation in
Government jobs (Kerala), starting educational Institutions, more NGOs should work for the
community, Parents are ready to send their children to other states.

Moosa B Cherkala thinks somewhat change have taken place. He says, ‘Sachar committee report
confirms that the actual position of Muslims, but except for some states and some activities
there is no any major steps from the government to solve the problems of Muslim around.
Whenever the government will come forward to implement the solution recommended by the
commission, nothing will happen.’ He finds challenges in Muslims should have their own
political leadership like Kerala, lack of confidence of communities, educational backwardness,
moral degradation due to lack of moral education, lack of unity among Muslims. According to
him, opportunities are in Central Government encouragement of micro finance in the budget
and make the comments, hand political experience is to form own political party, Obama’s visit
to India and his statement on minority community.

Ubedulla B sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Muslims have not developed by this
committee report. It is only a plan of action for Muslims’. He finds challenges in higher
education, unemployment. He says, ‘What facilities are being given to SCs and STs should be
also given to Muslims. Post-matric scholarship is not given to Muslims as it is given to others’.
He finds opportunities in health, para medical & nursing, no education and employment is there
for Muslims, No option of government jobs, and they are seen negative, education for good
health, facility to study para-medical & nursing, options in Police and other offices and other
officers see Muslim as ‘enemy’.

Khadri Sharif says no change has taken place. Md. Nabi said no change has taken place. He finds
challenges in education, Government employment, and health. He finds opportunities in
government job, private job, tradition job, and self-employment.

Mohd. Fareed feels no change has taken place in last decade. He finds challenges in Religion,
terrorism, reservation, education. He finds opportunities in government posts, Individual talent,
and right manner. Vision will be to bring more Indian Muslims in Business.

Mohammad Shafi sees no change in last decade because of high political instability and
corruption in our country. He finds challenges in poverty, educational backwardness, lack of job
opportunity, and political ignorance towards minority community. He finds opportunities in
improved literacy, making Indian Muslim competitive. He says, ‘Opportunities are more but
never reaching the deserving people due to scams and corruption in our country’.

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Abdul Basheer says change have taken place in last decade. He says, ‘UPA-II has more
scholarship for education, More social, economic, education work has to be done’. He finds
challenge in honesty, hardworking, education, and practical social work. He says, ‘Service to man
is service to God, Duty is beauty of life’. He finds opportunities for Muslims if they are provided
facilities par with SC/ ST as Muslim are more backward than SCs.

Syed Saleem Ahmed felt change has taken place. He says, ‘UPA II has more scholarships for
education; more social and economic evaluation workers has to be done’. He finds challenge in
honesty, hardworking, and education.

Abdul Qadir Kalkundraj sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘We only heard of Sachar
Committee finding, but nothing has been done to eradicate the shortcomings’. He finds
challenges in education, lack of setting a goal in life, imbalance between Deen and Duniya and
hygiene. He finds opportunities in government schemes. He wants to see every Muslim educated
and well versed.

Shareef Chelembra said somewhat change has taken place. He says, ‘Some policies have been
made by the government, but not enough to improve the status of Muslims’. He finds challenges
in disproportional representation in Assembly or Parliament, disproportionate in bureaucracy,
education, and isolation by branding as terrorist. He says, ‘Muslim should have good leadership
irrespective of their problems. They should not fight each other for something. Unity will give
us strength’. He feels that opportunities are in political representation, and representation in
Civil Services, representation in media, and NGO works to improve these facilities.

Mohd. Iqbal C finds some change in last decade. He says, ‘No one have any doubt about the fact
that Indian Muslims are very backward than SC/ST’. He finds challenges in lack of literacy,
political and media representative. He says, ‘We should develop a good media / English paper /
magazine / channel’. He finds opportunities from the constitution.

Mohammad Zaid Rahil said no change took place. He says, ‘Our trust needs your support and
feedback. To help the poor, needy, orphans. In the field of education & welfare programme.’ He
finds challenges in education, and Health. He sees opportunities in education, Health, Mass
Marriages, and Security.

I M Abdur Ravoof Khalid sees somewhat change in last decade. He finds challenge in unity of
Muslims, denunciation of world ideology by religious path is considered as book of small rather
book of hidayat. He sees opportunities in education.

Saheem Ahmed Sharif sees some changes in last ten years. He says, ‘People have not got such a
report but still Muslims should get more’. He finds opportunities in educated, interaction with
other communities, NGOs should be formed to work for the cause.

Abdul Rahim sees no change in last decade. He finds challenges in education, financial security,
guidance, government support.

Muhammad Rafi E E finds somewhat change in last ten years. For him Challenges are low share
in bureaucracy, negligible presence in security. He finds opportunities in NGO.

Usamath C P finds challenges in religious illiteracy, lacking secular education, weak economic
background, partiality from government, and unemployment. He says, ‘Both religious and
secular education should be provided properly in order to keep peace and morality’. He finds
opportunities in uniform platform for Muslim community, administrative level services, and
parliamentary presence according to population percentage. He says, ‘Muslim community should
330
be united on one platform. Whenever Muslim is dominated, they were united under Ulemas, this
is the major challenge’.

Md. Azmatullah sees no change in the last ten years. He says, ‘Muslim condition has not changed
we think that we are a part of developing country and be a part of this country. Muslim people’s
mind and thinking capacity should be changed before. Others changed to do’. He finds
challenge in employment, poverty, and security. According to him, opportunities are in
education, and time management.

Mohammad Zakir Ali sees somewhat change in last decade. He finds challenges in employment
in Government sector, reservation, and leadership.

Syed Rahim sees no change in last ten years. Muhammad Nisar Ahmed finds no change in last
decade and finds nothing happening at the ground level. For him, challenges are poverty,
illiteracy, safety & security. He says, ‘Poverty remain with them continually despite welfare
programmes by the centre and states. Similarly, the illiteracy hospital of so many institutes, RTEs
law etc., also the safety of the Muslim community’.

Mohd Mohtasim Qadri finds challenges in religion, terrorism, reservation, lack of education by
the government, and lack of unity. He sees opportunities in government sector. Shafakat B J sees
no change in last decade. For him the only challenge is education.

Nari Nayeemor Rahman sees somewhat change in last decade. The very awareness among the
community and the stakeholders did a marvelous job. Stray help and guidance from the state &
central government also helped in this task. Many more to achieve. For him, challenges are job
reservation according to the Muslim population of the state, people’s proportion representation
in parliament and state Legislature, education, employment, entrepreneurship should be given
priority both by the government and the community, mainstream Focus, NGOs to be oriented
in many a programs. He says, ‘A Federation in state/country level, is to formed to be mobilised
and optimal utilisation of the schemes’. He finds opportunities in education, skill development,
entrepreneurship, and empowerment. He asks to follow Kerala model politics i.e. coming under
the banner and flag of Indian Union Muslim League.

Mobinuddin sees no change in the last decade. He says, ‘After Sachar Committee I started my
Institute, taught more than 10,000 students and so many students realised their responsibility’.
For him challenges are, studying without planning, lack of economic leadership, excellent
institution. He says, ‘They are not planning for future scholars in different fields’.

Mohammad Rafiq K sees somewhat change in last decade. He finds challenges in communalism,
illiteracy, lack of unity. He sees opportunities in acquiring higher education, Government jobs,
right to follow the religion and develop them, and unity.

Syed Fazaludheen KP sees some change in last decade. He says, ‘Slowly understand for the
Muslim right. Sachar Committee report allowed people to know Muslim reservation, Muslim
rights’. He finds challenges in government Jobs. He sees opportunities in elected bodies,
Municipality, Zilla Panchayat, Legislative Assembly, and Parliament. He calls for no compromise
and sending elected members to government. ‘We have to send very good persons to Central
and State Government services’.

Ashfaq Ahmed sees no change in last ten years. He finds challenge in ignorance. For him,
opportunities are Information Technology, RTI, and RTE.

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Shaik Imran sees somewhat change in last decade. For him challenges are education, and
Support for poor and simple persons. He finds opportunities in education, job, value, and
empowerment.

Muhammad Sikandar sees somewhat change in last ten years. He says, ‘It depends upon Muslims
itself that many Muslim are BPL they have more children because of poverty and are not able to
provide them with proper education’. He finds challenges in poverty, Lack of awareness of
‘Deen’, not getting benefit from Government, and target by Police Department. He says, ‘For
example in our country any type of religious riot police department are only arresting Muslims’.
He finds opportunities in minority schemes.

Shinad Parappurle sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘Though the Sachar Committee
submitted its report, necessary actions have not been taken’. For him challenges are absence of
unity, and poverty.

Syed Abrez Ahmed sees no change in the last ten years. He finds challenges in education, health,
jobs, education and health. He finds opportunities in education, and employment.

Sidheeque, P K finds no change in last ten years. The government have no interest about the
development of Muslims. The influence of the vote of Muslims have come down. He finds
challenges in eradication of Muslims from India, living surroundings to them are going down,
avoiding from Government servants. He sees opportunities in education, central and state
government, skill development, Increase of MP’s and MLA’s in elected bodies, tie up of
different groups & Muslims for common purpose. He says, ‘By silent features we have to gain
good education, health, and tie up with every group of Muslims and arrange to get more MLAs,
MPs also government services must influence with to get more benefit to the government’.

Nuruddin Sheikh finds no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Sachar Committee report used by
the people to gain power. No genuine attempt made to change reality’. He finds challenges in
Higher education without diverting from value System tied to safety and security, falling
representation in Government, divide and rule policy, community divided be it in constituency
or using contradictory voices, and misuse of funds meant for help & charity. ‘Moral value
polluted and society is individualistic’. He finds conspiracy to malign Islam label Muslim in
general as traitor, isolation in society from childhood as the biggest challenge. ‘We are glad we
are Muslim and we are learnt to forgive and tolerant, we don’t expect return from world when
we go to society’. He finds opportunities in moral teachings comes by default (Give all to
society), Practicing Muslim can be trusted, proven to be high in integrity & honesty. Big
organisation badly head it, talent & focus on job is plenty, channelize skill and give opportunity,
Tolerant by nature. ‘Just focus on using your strength & contribute to build neighbor, village,
state and country’. He sees huge educational opportunity, achieve it anyways you already learnt
to struggle. Muslims by heart learnt to respect and help others. We are duty bound not to hurt
anyone, but also stop injustice. This in turn an opportunity for Indian Muslims –disciplined and
don’t cheat. Need of the hour for India.

Syed Abdur Rahim Syed Barey sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Sachar Committee has
presented their report stating that present condition of Muslim but government so far not
implemented except for the promises’. He finds challenges in bias in government, face partiality,
lack of education, lack of health facility, lack of financial help as service and business to
maintain.

Qazi Abdul Mohit sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘To a little extent, awareness is noted
but condition of Muslims is yet to improve.’ He finds challenges in poverty, no education,
partiality, exploitation, and unawareness. He sees opportunities in education, and NGO.
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Md. Iqbal Ali finds no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Personally I feel there is no change we
stand where we were after Sachar Committee’. He finds challenges in getting government jobs,
politics, education, and poverty. For him opportunities are in business, police and army.

Md. Abdul Khader sees some change in last decade. He finds challenges in defence, and police.
Aziz Shahiva sees somewhat change in last ten years. He says, ‘Very small change, because the
law makers and bureaucrats are not sincere in upgrading the status of Muslims’. He finds
challenges in lack of proper education, nominal share in law-making bodies, Discrimination in all
walks of life, communal clashes, lack of unity in community, lack of good employment
opportunities to community. He says, ‘The rule of communal party should end’. He finds
opportunities in improving the education level, practice and preach true religion of Allah which
we got, freedom by the Constitution, need for a good political Party at National level,
community should unite and other communities support should be taken to the political party.

Syed Mahmood Nayaz sees somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in education,
livelihood, Minority’s label, and Lack of Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha seats. He finds
opportunities in education, employment, and political representation.

Rmt Nagaj Nag, sees somewhat change in last ten years. He finds disproportionate selection in
Government jobs as the biggest challenge.

Riyazuddin sees no change in the last ten years. ‘No change after the Sachar Committee report.
After the change in Government the benefits are not being passed in full. Education, inclusive
development, health benefits, security, empowerment of all, women safety are other areas of
importance. He finds challenges in employment, education, and security. For him opportunities
are education, employment, health benefits, development, and security and justice for all.

M. N. Nisar Ahmed sees no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Not many of us know what is
Sachar Committee report, since it is not properly propagated’. He finds challenges in lack of
representation in administration, lack of education promotion, health & sanitary, and denial of
reservation.

Syed Mohammad sees no change in last decade. For him challenges are not identifying own
problems and working for eradication of same. He finds immense opportunities in Government
sector for training & development, opportunities in Public Service, proximity to the
Government Sector, experiments that succeeded in Southern states, and self-help from the
community.

Zaheer Hussain sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘This question is irrelevant when we
know that the recommendations have not been put into action’. He finds challenges in Siege
imposed by corrupt community leaders and religious Ulemas, and security. He finds
opportunities in Making irrelevant community leaders and religious leaders, Participation in the
mainstream, do not live in self made Ghettos. He says, ‘This question is irrelevant when we
know that the recommendations have not been put into action’.

M B Mahmood, (IRS) sees somewhat change in last decade. He says, ‘Most of the community
members are not aware of Sachar Committee Report 2006 and its recommendations have not
been accepted and implemented.’ He finds challenges in lack of awareness of competitive exams,
ignorance of Govt. incentives, lack of genuine leadership, drop-out at early stages, Disunity of
among various sects & groups Identity eligible & deserving candidates who can compete & join
civil services and other jobs so that they can render proper service to our community. He finds
opportunities in availing all benefits given by the Government, try to enroll more and more in
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Government departments which enforce law & order, try to give best education to our
community.

Zubair Fakhruddin Sharieff sees somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in
education, and health. He finds opportunities in education, and freedom of speech.

Saduddin M Sathb finds no change in last ten years. He says, ‘No improvement after the report
by the government’. He finds challenges in Lack of leadership at political and social, and
opportunities in Muslim Unity, and Muslims in the elected bodies, government and
administration.

Amir Pasha sees no change in last ten years. He finds challenges in identification, security,
injustice, and media. He finds opportunities in education institution opening, some related must
open hospitals, and coaching centres.

A Mohammad Fayaz finds no change in last ten years. He says, ‘Report remains in paper, it
should be implemented’. He finds challenges in awareness, political lacking, discrimination,
saffronisation, and education. He finds opportunities in coordination among Minorities.

Fareeda Khan sees change in last ten years. She wants to see at least 20 IAS officers from
Muslim community in every state. He finds challenges in education, discipline, cleanliness,
health, and poverty. She finds opportunities in representation in Assembly, good leaders, hard
work.

Dr Syeda Rehana Balqees sees no change in the last decade. She finds challenges in poverty,
illiteracy, and ill Health. He finds opportunities in education, health, and skill.

Md. Riyaz Ahmed Khan feels change has happened over the last decade. He says, ‘Muslim now
concentrating on education and quality of education’. He finds challenges in education, security,
poverty. He calls for reservation in education and government jobs.

V Prabhakaran sees no change in last ten years. He is disturbed and says, ‘The anti-Muslim
mindset is being strengthened throughout the country through all means of mind manipulating
machineries such as print media, electronic media, and educational curriculum’. He finds
challenges in the cultural identity, which is being challenged by making Muslims as mere Hindus
with Arabic names. He says that the Islamic values are replaced by dangerous brahminical values.
He finds decline in opportunity.

Nazeer Ahmed finds no change in last decade. He finds challenges in political, communal hatred
/security, social evils, lack of awareness, disunity & leadership. He urges the youth to join civil
services, education, and police department.

Abdul Azeem Khan sees no change in the last decade. He finds challenge in education, self-
employment schemes, and minority schemes.

Syed Jalaluddin Umri of Jamat-e-Islami finds challenges in riots/security, backwardness and

unemployment. He says, ‘Muslim identity is questioned everywhere, it may be in appointments
and jobs’. He finds opportunities in security, unity.

Prof. Shahnaz Parveen finds no change in last decade. She finds challenges in social security,
economic literacy and empowerment. She says, ‘Muslim identity is questioned everywhere, it
may be in appointments and jobs’. She finds opportunities in participation in all level, education,
and self-employment.
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Dr. Kausar Mazhar sees no change in last decade. She finds challenges in security, education,
health, and employment. She says, ‘Muslims do not feel secure in India, They have to fear in
every walk of life for space. Muslim identity is questioned everywhere, it may be in appointments
and jobs’). She finds opportunities in government jobs, polity, army, and vocational & technical
training.

Prof. Jamal Pasha sees no change in last decade. He says, ‘The recommendation of the Sachar
committee has not been taken seriously by the Central and State Governments. No step taken
for educational and economic empowerment of Muslims as well as representation in
government and private sectors’. He finds challenges in security, economic backwardness,
educational backwardness, discrimination, lack of unity among Muslims. He says, ‘Muslims must
be organized on secular lines and interference of Mullahs must be minimised. Muslim identity is
questioned everywhere, it may be in appointments and jobs’.

Dr. Kauser Usman says no change has taken in last decade. She finds challenges in education,
communication among various groups, gap between Mr. & Moulvi. She finds opportunities in
self-employment, and Unani Medicine. She says, ‘Strengthen the primary education, and prepare
the kids for professional courses and leadership’.

M Sadique Alam sees no change in last ten years. He finds challenges in poverty, lack of
education, No representative in Government, No Leadership, Muslim identity is questioned
everywhere, it may be in appointments and jobs.

Naved Khan finds no change in last ten years. He finds challenges in negativity in the mindset.
He says, ‘Muslim identity is questioned everywhere, it may be in appointments and jobs’. He
finds opportunities in business (small & big), skill development and education.

Sunil Mathews finds no change. He says, ‘Muslim identity is questioned everywhere, it may be in
appointments and jobs’. He finds opportunities in education, empowerment, employment,
liberal outlook, Persecution. He says, ‘A more liberal and inclusive outlook will happen and the
community would rise above parochial considerations and participate in larger causes’.

Vijay Sharma sees somewhat change in last ten years. Muslim identity is questioned everywhere,
it may be in appointments or in jobs.

Aditya Menon sees no change in last decade. For him challenges are majoritarian communalism,
poverty, unemployment, and discrimination. He finds opportunities in awareness, political
empowerment, emergence of middle class, and education. He says, ‘Please make a Talent Pool
for the help of Muslim community in education, law and health. Muslim identity is questioned
everywhere, it may be in appointments and jobs’.

Sadeque Hussain sees somewhat change in last decade. For him challenges are poverty,
terrorism, government job, availing government schemes, and low standard of living. He finds
opportunities in rights, NRI & Industry. He wants to develop National Leadership.

Raqibul Islam Rouson sees somewhat change in last decade. He finds challenges in education,
health, livelihood, and skill development. For him, opportunities are in education, skill
development, unity, and entrepreneurship. He called for unity of Muslims.

Akbar Saleh Muhammad sees no change in last ten years. For him the challenge is education. He
finds opportunity in equal opportunity. He says, ‘It will take three-four generations for Muslims
to settle’.
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Mohd Ehtisham Amir sees no change in last decade. He finds challenges in poverty, illiteracy,
and unemployment. He does not find any opportunity for the community. He calls on to take
inspiration from past.

Ghulam Jilani Qureshi feels somewhat changes have taken in last decade. He finds challenges in
poverty, education, health, communal riots, and reservation. He finds no opportunities for the
community.

Mahmood Shahid sees no change. For him the challenges are social & economic backwardness.
He finds opportunities in education, trade, polity, unity. He advises community to struggle for
educational and economic development.

Mubin Khurdi sees no change in last ten years. He finds challenges in guidance, zeal for
education, waste of money, role of women in Muslim society. He finds opportunities in media,
engineering, business. He says, ‘Vision-Develop understanding among Muslims and respect for
each other’.

Imtiyaz Bulbul sees somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in employment,
education, identity, and skill worker. He finds opportunities in skill development, and training.
He calls for technical education.

Shehnaz A Babi finds no change in last decade. She finds challenges in unity, government. She
finds opportunities in security, employment, poverty, and political status.

Shafy Shah finds challenges in education and employment. He finds Muslim Reservation under
Article 341, as a challenge.

Md Kamran Asif finds no change in last decade. He finds challenges in economic

empowerment. ‘Muslim group have to take responsibility for underprivileged Muslim’.

Pawas Soren finds no change in last ten years. He finds challenges in education, employment,
discrimination, and fear. He finds opportunities in education, skill development, brotherhood,
tolerance, and networking. He wants Muslims to be independent from social, economical,
political and religious bondage.

Prof. H Badruddin Rautiar finds change in last ten years from New Ministry of Minority Affairs,
and scholarship enhanced. He finds challenges in illiteracy, child marriage, and unemployment.
He finds opportunities in education, scholarship, and reservation.

Md. Samiullah sees somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in security, education,
employment, and Police Reforms. He finds opportunities in reservation in Education.

Nazneen Begum sees somewhat change in last ten years. She finds challenges in poverty,
security, employment, and Health facilities. She finds opportunities in education, and self
employment.

Pavitra says Indian Muslims should be active in development process of the country. She finds
challenges in education, social inclusion, gender equality. ‘Socially, and Politically Muslims active
participant in the development process of the country’.

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Md. Badruzzaman finds somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in
discrimination, lack of education, lack of unity. He sees opportunities in education,
entrepreneurship. Develop educationally and economically.

Khalid Md. Khan sees no change in last ten years. He finds challenges in security,
unemployment, illiteracy. He finds opportunities in higher education, free basic education,
scholarship scheme, and minority loan. Skill development, economical and educational
upliftment are areas of development.

Geti Khan Kidwai sees somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in mindset of
majority community (Majority community feels that Muslims are untouchable and at times also
deny renting house to them).

S M Khan finds somewhat change in last ten years. He finds challenges in education, health,
illiteracy, unemployment, and security. He finds opportunities in education, skill development,
business, and entrepreneurship.

Mazir Abbasi finds change but Sachar committee has no role in it. Khawaja Ekramuddin finds
change in last ten years. He finds challenges in education and awareness. He finds opportunities
in education and skill development.

Safdar H Khan doesn’t see much change in last ten years. He finds challenges in education,
personal security, and skill development (government should provide facilities on education and
skill development). Also provide loan for trade and business. He finds opportunities in
education, free skill training, loan for business up to Rs.5 Lakh, and IT.

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