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PF/IRP/8978

REQUIREMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION : A NEW CAPACITY BUILDING IN BAF

AND ITS PROBABLE CHALLENGES

CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION

“It is less demanding and more viable to demolish the adversary's airborne power by devastating his
homes and eggs on the ground than to chase his flying winged creatures noticeable all around ”
–General Giulio Douhet

Background

1. Defense of own force is a prime and foremost responsibility of a force. It ensures the
smooth conduct of operation at a given time and space. Air Force at any country is a highly
sophisticated technical service. It involves specialized technical person, high value equipment,
and dedicated communication set up. Without the security of aviators, relatives, offices and
gear in all areas and circumstance flying corps can't run its everyday capacity whether in
harmony time or war. At present Security Squadron in Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) provides
perimeter defense of all air bases. Ministry of Defense Constabulary (MODC) troops along
with airmen borrowed from different squadrons are also employed in manning the security
posts. These personnel employed in security duties are not ground warfare specialists. So,
their ability to defend BAF installations always remains cynical, especially for countering a
commando type attack during war. These elements also do not have capability of Ground
Base Air Defense Weapons. A closer look at the existing security organizations of the BAF
revels that they are quite rudimentary in nature and these elements were established to
perform primarily policing job in and around the BAF bases. Therefore, it is apparent that with
the existing security apparatus of the BAF, it would not be possible to counter any low level air
as well as ground attacks and render effective force protection during peace or war times.
With a view to counter any low level air of ground oriented threats; many Air Forces across the
world concentrated to develop their indigenous force protection capability and established own

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formations of ground warfare specialists equipped with GBAD weapons. These unique force
protection establishments are known as “Force Protection” or ‘‘Air Force Regiment". Althou

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defensive in nature, these forces are also capable of undertaking airborne operation, commando
activities, or ordnance disposal etc. - which entails an enhanced operational edge.

2. Ideally, Bangladesh Army is supposed to provides defense of the BAF bases from any
impending air attacks by proving Ground Base Air Defense weapons. With this given security
arrangement, so long, the BAF was not encouraged to develop an integral anti-aircraft/GBAD
capability to counter aerial threats. But, in reality, Bangladesh Army is equipped with very
limited number of GBAD weapons. Therefore, it becomes clear that the BAF should develop
her own GBAD capability on immediate basis and not suffer from a false sense of security.
Hence, to overcome the present limitations and meet the multidimensional security challenges
of war and peace there remains no other alternate for the BAF rather than to induct the
establishment of the “Force Protection”. This proposed Force Protection concept would mak the
BAF self-sufficient to country any low level air or ground oriented threats.

Problem Statement

3. The world is undergoing changes in terms of demographic revolutions, urbanization and

resource shortages, which have imposed the constant need for safety and security of assets of
individual or organization. Additionally, the risk of worldwide psychological oppression has
expanded mindfulness over the security of basic foundations.

4. BAF is primarily tasked for an aerial defense with a motto of “Free shall of Bangladesh”.
However, it is also required to maintain a territorial security o
safe launching of its airpower from the base and to maintain daily operations of its nature.
Since foundation, BAF has not just extended as far as air ships and staff yet additionally as far
as vast territory covering in various bases set up everywhere throughout the nation in prime
areas. Considering the present global terrorism situation and other peacetime threats, a new
capacity building in respect of Force Protection (FP) for BAF is to be recognized as a very
significant issue.

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Research Questions

5. Different questions can be asked to find out the solutions to the problem statement.
However, this research has been limited to following questions:

a. Primary Question. Is “ Force Protection” required in BAF as a new capacity

building?

b. Secondary Questions. In order to answer the primary question, the following

questions are also required to be answered:

(1) What is the present state of physical security system and its deficiency in
BAF?
(2) How force protection capacity can help enhancing the physical security?
(3) Why Force Protection is required in BAF and what are the challenges
BAF may face while implementing it?

Limitations and Assumptions

6. Force Protection concept is relatively new in Bangladesh Air Force and not widely
discussed among security personnel. As such, there are possibilities to get inexperienced
responses from them during interview. Indigenous research works are also not adequately
available and published. No book was found on the subject matter in the local libraries. The
research thus depended mostly on interview of the expertise in security field and the internet
sources. Internet based literatures and research works are basically based on western
concept where the force goal, force structure, level of threats, geo political situation etc. are
more or less different. Every individual has different perceptions regarding this issue. Samples
were taken from various security units of BAF and almost all the interviewee viewed positively
for the induction of FP in BAF in order to develop overall security situation. However, it is
assumed that they were neutral in giving their opinions. It is also assumed that, all of them
were impartial while expressing their views.

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Review of Literature
7. List of Literatures Consulted. Because of the expanded lethality of universal and

household dangers, it is basic the Aviation based armed forces take solid measures to ensure
its staff
what's more, establishments (Herbert T. Dark colored, 2001). Securing Flying corps work force
and assets is basic to the Administration's capacity to play out its central goal. How the
Aviation based armed forces ensure basic to worldwide commitment. Therefore, numerous
researches, individual papers, project studies were conducted in US Air Force and NATO to
ascertain the necessity of establishing
FP doctrine and structure. Various measures were also suggested through those
works on different dimensions. However, prior to framing research objective, few of the
literatures those were consulted are given at bibliography.

8. Findings of Review of Literatures.

a. In Current Air Base Ground Guard Principle: Are We Posed to Meet the Desires for
the AEF? (April 2001) - The specialist expressed that as the Flying corps creates responds
in due order regarding one issue, it uncovers another. With the finish of the Chilly War,
decreases to our forward-conveyed powers, and the development of Weapons of Mass
Demolition (WMD) dangers, the USAF is left with the issue of securing the Aerospace
Expeditionary Force (AEF) in a sent situation. He feels that Air Base Ground Protection
(ABGD) has dependably been a key mission for aviation powers. Since the commencement
of military aeronautics, runways and bases have been undermined with adversary assault in
some shape. He added that USAF endeavors to make a practical Air Base Ground Defense
(ABGD) framework have been a sporadic mix of episodic buildups and subsequent draw
downs of security constrain faculty and hardware. Fundamentally, the Flying corps has
battled with the idea of how to shield its air bases for a considerable length of time, from
World War I to Task Associated Power. The Air Power is trusting that they have at last
discovered the appropriate response with the enactment of the 820th Security Powers
Gathering. With their aphorism: — prepared to go anyplace, wherever, whenever,
the 820th SFG is a multidiscipline unit that offers an aggregate power assurance (FP)
bundle. He closed, as a progressive idea, the 820th SFG coordinates all parts of FP (i.e., air
base ground protection, fighting fear based oppression, physical security, activities security,
personal protective services, resource protection, intelligence, counterintelligence,
coordination, and so on.) into a solitary firm unit (Herbert T. Dark colored, 2001).

b. In Power Insurance - Flying corps Regulation Record 3-10 (July 2011), the creator
called attention to that an air and space expeditionary team ready to react to worldwide
entrusting inside hours must set up the methods and will to completely ensure its
powers. Commanders at alll evels must have an effective force protection
program. Leaders are in charge of securing their kin and the war battling assets
important to play out any military task. He distinguished that we are committed by the
moral need of securing our pilots to guarantee compel insurance and it is a piece of Air
Power culture. The Aviation based armed forces must proceed to create and refine
tenet that advances the best method to accomplish drive security. At long last, he
prescribed that understanding and utilizing this regulation will help guarantee the
effective security of our kin and assets.

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c. Comments. Having consulted all the works stated above, it was found that mostly,
the works were aimed at determining the necessity of establishing FP
doctrine in the context present global threats of terrorism. The scientists additionally
accentuated individual duty on ensuring the power in the case of revealing suspicious
movement while occupied with their essential obligations, expanding base resistance,
or aiding reaction to a catastrophic event. However, none of them chalked out how the
Force Protection can be established organizationally. They also did not depict clearly
about the charter of duties for the FP organization, its modus operandi, minimum
strength requirement, requirement of arms and ammunition and their types etc. As
such, this research is considered primary in nature.

9. Scopes of Further Research Based on the Literature Reviews. Basing on the

literatures reviewed, the following scopes are found to carry out research:

a. Establishing FP enhances the operational capability of BAF.

b. FP is both an individual and a direction duty regarding BAF.

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Objective of the Research

10. The objective of this research is to assess the requirement of Force Protection as a
new capacity building in Bangladesh Air Force.

Significance of the Research

11. Ideally, Bangladesh Army is supposed to provide defense of the BAF bases from any
impending air attacks by providing Ground Based Air Defense Weapons. With this given security
arrangement, so long the BAF was not encouraged to develop an integral anti-aircraft/GBAD
capability to counter aerial threats. However, in reality, Bangladesh Army processes limited
number of anti-aircraft artillery units and these units are equipped with very limited number of
GBAD weapons (Rahman, 2018). So, Bangladesh Army is likely to face extreme difficulty to meet
its own requirements of air defense weapons during contact of any land campaign. Therefore, it
becomes clear that BAF should develop her own GBAD capability on immediate basis and not
suffer from a false sense of security (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018). Hence, to
overcome the present limitation and meet the multi-dimensional security challenges of war and
peace there remains no other alternate for the BAF rather than
to induct “Force Protection”. This concept would make the BAF self-sufficient to c or ground
oriented threats (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).

Conceptual Framework
12. The point by point applied structure of this paper is given at Annex A.

Research Methodology

13. To assess the requirement, the effort will be made to get the answers of the above-
mentioned questions. Mainly, this answer will get through analyzing the content of existing
BAF security system and interviewing the concerned professionals from BAF. In fine, the
research was conducted following document study, personal interview and so on. So it will be
a qualitative research.

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Method of Data Collection

14. This research paper is a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection process. The
survey method was used where data were collected in the form of interview with concerned
officers (Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff, Directors at Air Headquarters, officers and provost from
different security units etc.). For secondary sources, the content analysis method was used
where data were collected from various research reports and related website etc. A
questionnaire is made to ascertain the present state of security in BAF and the necessity of
FP.

15. The data were collected through following means and sources:

a. Quantitative. Personal Interview and survey.

b. Qualitative. Unstructured Interview and document study.

16. Study Details.

a. Study Site. Air Headquarters and Air Force Bases of Dhaka and Jessore
area.

b. Study Duration. April - November 2018.

17. Ethical Considerations. The purpose and process used in the study were described to
respondents while collecting data. They were assured about the confidentiality handling of
their information.

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CHAPTER II - PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN BAF AND ITS DEFICIENCY

General

18. At present, the BAF base security squadrons provides perimeter defense of all air
bases. Ministry of Defense Constabulary (MODC) troops along with airmen detailed from
different squadrons are also employed in manning the security posts. These personnel
employed in security duties are not ground warfare specialists (Air Commodore M Khalid
Hossain, 2018). So, their ability to defend BAF installations always remains cynical, especially
for countering a commando type attack during war (Choudhury, 2018). These elements also
do not have capability of Ground Based Air Defense Weapons. That is why the primary
question was formed as ‘Is force protection required as a new capacity buildi address the
primary question of this research, it is necessary to know the present security system and its
deficiency in BAF. That is why, the first secondary question is raised which is
‘What is the present state of physical security system and its deficiency in of this secondary
question will help to assess the capability of BAF security.

Physical Security as a Concept

19. Physical security portrays safety efforts that are intended to deny unapproved access to offices,
gear, and assets and to shield staff and property from harm or damage, (for example, secret
activities, burglary, or fear monger assaults). Physical security includes the utilization of different
layers of related frameworks that incorporate CCTV reconnaissance, security monitors, defensive
hindrances, locks, get to control conventions, and numerous different strategies (Choudhury, 2018).
20. Physical security frameworks for ensured offices are by and large expected to:

a. Deflect potential interlopers (e.g. cautioning signs and border markings).

b. Distinguish interruptions and screen/record gatecrashers (e.g. gatecrasher alerts

and CCTV frameworks)

c. Trigger proper episode reactions (e.g. by security monitors and police).

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Methods Required for Ensuring Effective Physical Security

21. For effective physical security, the following methods are to be included (Air
Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018) :

a. Perimeter fencing and barriers.

b. Well-constructed entrance and exits.

c. Employment of security guards to protect entrances and exits and to control

entry as well as to patrol the perimeter both day and night.
d. Interloper alert framework to help the security protects.
e. Introduction of proper pass system to control visitors and limit their movements.

f. Proper identification of working personnel.

g. Physical protection of installations such as Bomb dump, Armory, Tarmac A/C

Hangar, Comm. Unit, fuel dump etc.

h. Arranging appropriate precautions against fire.

j. Watch tower.

k. Limited number of entrance and exit gate.

l. List of vulnerable points.

m. Proper lock and key system.

n. Security lights.

p. Security inspection/patrolling.

q. Control of visitors and vehicles.

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r. Looking of work force and vehicles.

Existing Physical Security Organizations in BAF

22. Security Squadron. Every BAF Base has a Base Security Squadron (Base Provost
Squadron) exclusively manned by base Provosts. These provosts come under the control of
the Commanding Officer. An Officer-in-Charge Provost (Base Security Officer) is posted to
each Base to assist the Commanding Officer through OC Admin Wing for the efficient
functioning of the Base Security Squadron (AFO-125).

23. P&S Unit. Matters falling outside the Base/Unit are referred to the respective Provost
& Security Units. In absence of P & S Unit, Base/Unit Provost is to act on this behalf. In terms
of Air HQ & Air House and PSO's Bungalow, Officer Commanding, Air HQ (
through Unit Security officer in coordination with OC No-1 P&S (U) and OC 41 Sqn BAF
(AFO-125).

24. PM Directorate. The role of Base Provost is to assist the Base/Unit commander in the
enforcement of discipline at Base/Unit and in the implementation of Policy issued by Air
Headquarters (Provost Marshal). The jurisdiction of Base/Unit Provost is only within the
Base/Unit limits (AFO-125).

Concerned Directorate in Air Hq for Security in BAF

25. The duty regarding security strategy in the BAF rests with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff
(Administration) at Air Headquarters. The responsibility for implementing this policy is
distributed between the Directorate of Air Intelligence. Provost Marshal Directorate and
Communication & Electronics directorate. They are as follows:
a. Elements of Directorate of Air Intelligence. The elements of Directorate of Air Intelligence
are of two folds. They are Operational Insight and Counter Knowledge. The directorate
implements its policy through the Field Intelligence Units located in the vicinity of all bases of
Air Force. The Officer Commanding of the Field units advice the Base/Unit Commanders
about the security lapses under their

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commands as well as they advise the procedure to control the security lapses and to
uphold the Air Force discipline.

b. Functions of PM Directorate. The functions of the Provost Marshal Directorate is to

formulate policy on physical security and discipline which are implemented through the
Provost and Security Units located in the vicinity of all Air Force bases, as well as by
the Provost and Security Squadron of the base.

c. Functions of Directorate of C&E. The security of signal communication and

cryptographic information are ensured by the signal centers as per policy formulated by
this directorate.

Security Personnel

26. At present, the BAF Base Security Squadron provides perimeter defense of all air
bases. Ministry of Defense Constabulary (MODC) troops along with airmen borrowed from
different squadrons are also employed in manning the security posts. These personnel
employed in security duties are not ground warfare specialists (Air Commodore M Khalid
Hossain, 2018). So, their ability to defend BAF installations always remains cynical, especially
for countering a commando type attack during war. These elements also do not have
capability of Ground Base Air Defense Weapons (Choudhury, 2018).

27. At Present BAF following personnel of different trades are dealing the matters of
security.

a. Provost. Provost tasks are formed on the basis of following military police
role :

(1) Provost Duties.

(a) General discipline.

(b) Road discipline.
(c) Vice control.
(d) Protection of vulnerable points.
(e) VIP escorts.

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(f) Criminal investigation.

(2) Traffic Control

(a) Planning of traffic circuits.

(b) Signing routes and installations.

(c) Physical control of traffic.

(d) Traffic control in forward battle areas.
(e) Information posts.

(3) Fire Fighting

(a) Domestic fire control.

(b) Emergency crash fire control.

b. Ground Combatiers (GC). Role and Task of Ground Combatiers (GC) are
as follows:

(1) Defend BAF personnel and Installation against any ground attack,
sabotage, raids, infiltration etc both in peace and emergency.

(2) Provide limited offensive action as and when called upon to do so.

(3) Provide Ground Defense Training to BAF pers.

(4) To assist Bases/Units in formulating Ground Defense Plan and organize

Ground Defense Exercise.

c. MODC. Duties and responsibilities of MODC (Air) are given below.

(1) MODC (Air) personnel are deployed to BAF installations to prevent theft,
robbery, sabotage, and subversive activities.

(2) During night or day time they guard installations. They are also detailed at
gate, patrol, checking, and observation.

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(3) Perform other duty related to the trade job.

d. Watchman. BAF civilian in watchman trade as well as other trades are deployed
in domestic area for watchman duty.

e. Other Trade Airmen. Different trade airmen up to corporal are detailed as guard
duty personnel in technical areas.

f. Fire Fighter/Fire lasker. BAF civilians in Fire fighter and Fire Laskar trade are
detailed to handle fire accidents both in domestic and crash sites

Ideal Concept of Perimeter Security

28. Perimeter Security is designed to protect the perimeter of any organization from any
external threat. Generally it refers to natural barriers or built fortifications to either keep
intruders out or to keep captives contained within the area the boundary surrounds (Rahman,
2018). It also includes any actions or measures taken to defend the inhabitants, their assets,
and smooth proceedings of their daily activities. Proper wall, dividers, lightings, insight
identification innovation and the most recent observation measures and so on are the choices
for exhaustive edge security around a property today. These components of security are more
differing and complex than any time in recent memory.

Figure 1: An Ideal Base Perimeter

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Source: Internet

29. Significance of Perimeter Security. Organizations utilize perimeter security not

only for the safety of their employees, but also to protect their visitors, property, vital
infrastructure, functions and services from threats as from vandals and terrorists (Air
Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018). Property owners and organizations of all sizes
use various man-made technologies to achieve varying degrees of perimeter security. They
add to the early acknowledgment of guilty parties and bolster the quick presentation of
countermeasures when peril is approaching.
Perimeter Security in BAF

30. Being a part of Defense Services of Bangladesh, BAF also has existing arrangements
of perimeter security due to its costly and sensitive equipment operations such as aircrafts
and various air defense weapons operations within its own base or unit territory. In airpower
characteristics, one limitation remains naturally for air force is its dependency on its base
support. As such, securing the base would be the prime requirement to safeguard vital points
from external threats (Air Vice Marshal Ehsanul Gani Choudhury, 2018).

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31. During peacetime, any terrorist activity, conspiracy or sabotage may cause a huge
damage in terms of money, equipment, morale and BAF capability. As such, perimeter
security at the ground should be well maintained (Rahman, 2018).

32. BAF has number of Bases and Units throughout Bangladesh which covers a total land
area of 6319.17 acres approximately (Rahman, 2018). Each of the BAF Bases/Units have a
considerable area (Base/Unit wise geographic land area coverage are attached as Annex B)
with vital installations and infrastructure at operational and technical area containing Runway,
Aircraft Sheds, Tarmac, ATC (Air Traffic Control) Tower, Maintenance Hangar, GCA (Ground
Controlled Approach) Radar, Air Defence Radar, AGE (Aerospace Ground Equipment) shed,
LSE (Life Saving Equipment) Bay, Ejection Seat Maintenance Bay, Explosive Stores,
Microwave LOS (Line Of Sight) Station, Telephone Exchanges, POL (Petroleum Oil Lubricant)
Store, JET Store, Maintenance Control, MT (Mechanical Transport) shed, etc along with
domestic area and training grounds for BAF personnel (Rahman, 2018).

33. The ability to counter any threat by BAF personnel at these bases practically is limited
considering the ability of the terror or vandal counterparts under present context. BAF requires
suitable countermeasure along with the existing security system to frame an effective security
solution against any peacetime threat (Rahman, 2018).

34. A survey was carried out among the Provost trade airmen of different bases and units.
They were asked whether the present security infrastructure is good enough to protect the
force. A total of 80 airmen of provost trade were asked the question. 97% of the airmen
strongly disagreed that present infrastructure is not good enough to provide protection for Air
Force.

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Figure- 2: Survey Response On The Present Security Infrastructure To Protect The

Do you think, the present security infrastructure is good enough to protect

the force?
3%

Strongly Disagree
No Opinion

97%
Force
Source: Survey Analysis

Peacetime Threats

35. Common Criminal Acts. It merits thinking about that dangers to a property can exude from
two situations. From one viewpoint, directed criminal acts, I.e. sabotage, attack,
hostage-taking, intrusion, burglary espionage (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).
On the other hand, random criminal acts, i.e. vandalism or exhibitions by individuals arranged
to utilize savagery.
36. Presently, with the increase of security threats and numerous dimension of it, BAF
Bases/Units often struggles to maintain their area under full time security coverage at the
perimeter due to shortage of security personnel and limited emphasis. In addition, it cannot
always involve specialized personnel involved in various operational duties for security duties,
which may hamper the operational activities. The probable potential threats to the security
perimeter during peacetime may be any criminal act such as theft, robbery or vandalizing
inside or close to the perimeter that can impose threat on BAF assets (Air Commodore Md
Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).

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37. Terrorism. Moreover, recent development of terrorism inside the country, and
aggression by various local or foreign assisted militant groups, BAF may be a lucrative and
potential target to those perpetrators (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018). So, it is
a matter of great concern now and time to take some steps to enhance the perimeter security
by adopting various measures on the basis of following discussions. On December 18, 2015,
something like 24 individuals, generally regular citizens, were harmed in two occurrences of
blasts at two mosques inside Bangladesh Naval force's Issa Khan Base ( bdnews24.com,
Distributed: 2015-12-18 16:54:02.0 BdST Refreshed: 2015-12-18 22:25:02.0 BdST).

Deficiency in Existing Security System in BAF

38. Security Squadron. All the BAF Bases/Units are having a Security Squadron/Section for
the internal security including perimeter security. This security squadron/section is supported
by independent Provost and Security Unit (P&S) for external security matters and Field Unit
for gathering information and intelligence. P&S Unit maintain
liaison with civil police and sister service's security units as well for detection
crimes, but these are not enough to prevent potential threats at the correct time of need
(Choudhury, 2018).

39. Guard Duty Personnel. In a Base/Unit, the perimeter security of any BAF
Base/Units are primarily maintained by the MODC (Ministry of Defense Constabulary) who
perform duties at the static posts at the perimeters and vital locations but suffer acute shortage
of manpower (Air Vice Marshal Ehsanul Gani Choudhury, 2018). To support these MODC
personnel, BAF Bases/Units deploy corporal and below airmen for guard duty along with task
forces headed by JCO (Junior Commissioned Officer) and group of sergeants.

40. Schedule of Duty. Duty officer of the day remains as in charge of these security personnel.
Few of these duty posts at various locations are safeguarded by these duty personnel by eight
hours shift duty for twenty four hours a day (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018). Some
posts are activated after sunset according to the requirement of the Bases/Units. Number of
duty personnel varies according to the area, installation security coverage and situation alert
imposed from the higher echelon.
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41. Ground Defense Plan. All bases have a ground defense plan where the Base area
is divided into number of sectors. During emergency, BAF personnel would be deployed
sector wise along with arms and ammunitions as specified in the plan and phase of alertness.
Sector Commanders are detailed and the Ground Defense Commander is detailed as overall
supervisor. However, during peacetime, this ground defense will not be activated. So, the
challenge is to maintain the surroundings with normal security state against the above
mentioned peacetime threat by optimized utilization of manpower and react in timely manner
(Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).

42. Night Surveillance. Although supplied with adequate arms and ammunitions, the security
personnel have shortage of communication equipment and detection devices suitable for night
surveillance at the perimeter. Presently, steps have been taken too install CCTV (Close Circuit
Television) networks throughout all the vital installations of various bases and units of BAF.
Already most of the larger Bases have already installed CCTV camera at various locations as
per the priority. Operational and technical areas are given the highest priority in setting up
surveillance coverage. The monitoring device is located at various points for video surveillance
as per the user requirement. This monitoring is done by the duty personnel manned for twenty
four hours (Rahman, 2018).

43. A survey was carried out among the Provost trade airmen of different bases and units.
They were asked whether the present CCTV coverage in the BAF bases are sufficient enough
for strong surveillance. A total of 80 airmen of Provost trades were asked the question. 60% of
the airmen disagreed that present CCTV coverage in the BAF bases are sufficient enough for
strong surveillance.

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Figure-3: Survey Response on the CCTV Coverage are Sufficient Enough for
Strong Surveillance

Do you think, present CCTV coverage in the BAF bases are sufficient enough
for Strong Surveillance?
Agree, 0% 2%3%
Strongly
Disagree
35%
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Strongly Agree
60%

Source: Survey Analysis

44. Details of CCTV coverage over various BAF Bases/Units are stated in the following
table (Rahman, 2018):

TABLE-1: STATE OF CCTV CAMERA INSTALLATION AT BAF BASES/UNITS

Ser No Base/Unit Location No of System No of Cameras

1. BAF BSR Dhaka 28 185
2. BAF BBD Dhaka 16 164
3. BAF ZHR Chittagong 12 117
4. BAF MTR Jessore 08 57
5. BAF PKP Tangail 07 29
6. AIR HQ(U) Dhaka 07 57
Total 78 609

45. Security Mind Set up and Professionalism. Personnel detailed to perform

guard duty from different trades are lacking of security mind set up and

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professionalism (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018). They do not take security or guard
duty sportingly. He also added that they are not trained for situational awareness and
sophisticated arms handling.

46. Sense of Responsibility. Security personnel are not taking enough initiative to check
personnel or their surroundings due to the lack of their sense of responsibility. Fatigue due to
the shortage of manpower and absence of motivation are the main reasons for this (Air
Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018) (Choudhury, 2018).

47. Peripheral Security. Perimeters of most of the BAF installations are susceptible to
intrusion due to weak security walls and patrols (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018) (Air
Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).

48. Numerous Limitations. The existing physical monitoring at the perimeter and in some
extent use of CCTV will not render complete security to the perimeter of BAF area full time.
Complete reliance on these systems of ensuring perimeter security by numerous security
personnel and a limited CCTV coverage may not be sufficient due to the advancement of
technology which might be adopted by the perpetrators posing threat. Although, vulnerable
points, operational and technical area are covered by CCTV and Guard Duty personnel, it still
leaves a loophole to enter other BAF area by perpetrators to create nuisance.

49. Protection against any planned attack would be difficult in near future. To counter such
threat, common shortcomings from the above discussion and inherent limitations of the
existing security system of all BAF Bases/Units may be consolidated as follows (Air
Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018) (Rahman, 2018):

a. Acute shortage of manpower to perform duties the security posts.

b. Fencing around the perimeter is not strong enough to protect from invaders.

c. Limited use of communication equipment, as such difficulties in coordination with

Security Squadron (Main Guard Room/ Task Force).

d. CCTV coverage merely sufficient covering only the vital area such as operational
and technical area, yet to cover the full perimeter of any of the Bases.

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g. Human visual and CCTV coverage is not suitable for detection of threat from
long distance in bushy area or any area with geographical blockade as such leaving a
blank zone for the criminal.

50. A survey was carried out among the Provost trade airmen of different bases and units.
They were asked whether the present manpower (Provost, GC,MODC, Watchman, Fire
Fighter and other trade GD personnel) are skilled enough to protect the force. A total of 80
airmen of Provost trades were asked the question. 57% of the airmen disagree that the
present manpower are skilled enough to protect the force.

Figure - 4 : Survey Response on the Present Manpower's Skill to Protect the

Do you think, the present manpower (Provost, GC,MODCC, Watchman, Fire

Fighters and other trade GD Personnel) are skilled enough to protect the
force?
5%

Strongly Disagree
35%
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Strongly Agree
0% 57%
Agree, 3%

Source: Survey Analysis

Summary

51. The above discussions may seem to be merely some probabilities in their own
characteristics, but considering the recent incidents in the country and inside BAF and the

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future perspective, it's a matter for anxiety. Ten years back, certainly an int would not dare
enough to even think of committing any act of crime against the Forces inside
the camp, but present situation says, peacetime threat to BAF exists to a great extent. Now,
time has come to think and put enough emphasis on this matter and analyze to find a suitable
security solution for BAF. These findings answer the first secondary question and thereby
justified.

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CHAPTER III – FORCE PROTECTION AS A CAPACITY BUILDER TO ENHANCE

PHYSICAL SECURITY

General

52. Since the commencement of aviation control the mission of Air Base Ground Resistance
has been specially appointed and led on a brief premise (Herbert T. Dark colored, 2001). Since the
beginning of BAF we were apathetic to set out on building up a supported, valid ground safeguard
ability. This still exists partially today, as our ABGD tenet covers the full range of guard stretching out
from inside to outside the base edge, however our current operational ideas don't enough address the
region past the lawful border of the air base. BAF security powers still watch from behind the wall,
taking cover behind a cloak of false security. This is powerful on the grounds that lopsided dangers
command the earth and interior security, as one bit of a bigger security substance, may not be
sufficient to stop hostility. Authorities' power security concerns must comprehend the intentions and
methods for the assailant and grow counter methodologies as per our expressed ground guard plan
(Herbert T. Dark colored, 2001). We should try to do we say others should do. This is how the second
secondary
question which is ‘How force protection capacity can help enhancing the physic be justified.

53. Force Protection has a large i mpact on an organization's security system.

countries have developed their own Force Protection. Sri Lanka has framed their Power Assurance
for the sake of Sril Lanka Flying corps Regiment which is in charge of catching and safeguarding
landing strips and related establishments. Notwithstanding these jobs , the regiment conveys out
airborne protect tasks and gives ground bolster, for example, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).UK
has formed The Royal Air Force Regiment (RAF Regt) which functions as a master landing strip
resistance corps. India has formed which is "The Garud Commando Force" entrusted with the
assurance of basic flying corps bases and establishments, inquiry and safeguard amid harmony and
threats and debacle alleviation amid catastrophes.

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54. Recently, separate delegation teams from UK and India visited BAF with a view to
facilitating the decision making process of establishing Air Regiment for BAF (Rahman, 2018).
That is why, it is wise to follow and study the Force Protection doctrines and fundamentals
from different Air Forces. Along these lines, this part breaks down the diverse essential parts
of Power Protection which is altogether founded on the US Air Force Doctrine Document 3-
10, 28 July 2011, NATO Standard AJP-3.14 ( Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection, April
2015) and Draft Operational Doctrine of Bangladesh Air Force, March 2014.

Foce Protection Concept

55. Air Base Ground Defense (ABGD) is a key target for all the Air Forces. All through the historical
backdrop of Air Forces, landing strips and bases have been imperiled by adversary counter assault (Air
Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).On 22 October 2007 at about 3:15 AM, a group of 21 LTTE
commandos, who are known to be suicide bombers, attacked Anuradhapura Air Base of Sri
Lanka Air Force. Two light aircraft from the Air Tigers supported the mission by conducting a
bombing run on the base and escaped undamaged. 10 military personnel, including 2 SLAF
officers, were killed in the attack and 22 were wounded. Up to 8 aircraft were destroyed in the
attack and another 10 were severely damaged. LTTE claimed to have destroyed 15 aircraft on
the day of the attack.

Figure 5 . LTTE Attack on Sri Lanka Anuradhapura Air Base

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Source: Derived from Daily News, 2007

56. Thinking about the rising dangers, it is important to have a Power Security framework in

BAF having a sporadic blend of aviation based armed forces work force and hardware with the idea of

step by step instructions to safeguard it's air bases for quite a long time. Power Assurance
coordinates all viewpoints (i.e., air ground guard, battling fear mongering, physical security, tasks
security, individual defensive administrations, asset insurance, insight, counterintelligence,
coordination's, and so forth.) into a cohesive unit (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018)

57. Before establishing such unit. It is essential that a force protection doctrine formulated
to protect Bangladesh Air Force
.
Force Protection Definition

58. Measures and intends to limit the powerlessness of work force, offices, hardware,
materiel, tasks, and exercises from dangers and risks with the end goal to protect opportunity
of activity and operational adequacy along these lines adding to mission achievement (Herbert
T Dark colored, 2001). Power insurance is expert through an arranged and incorporated use
of a security program which incorporates physical security, task security, and data security
(Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018) (DAVID S.FADOK, 2011) (Air Commodore M
Khalid Hossain, 2018).

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Force Protection Fundamentals

59. All Airmen's should know the crucial parts of FP to shield their very own lives, those of
individual Aviators, and profitable Flying corps assets. The essentials of power security are as
under:

a. Viable FP is something other than a law authorization, antiterrorism (AT), or security work.

b. Force insurance is based on the idea of full-dimensional assurance. It gives

multilayered insurance of powers and offices, at all levels.

c. Protecting the power is everyone's duty Hence, all aviators are anticipate that
contribute will compel security as both a sensor and as a warrior.

d. Power security does not make a difference to airborne soldiers drew in with a foe in battle
air activities.

e. Powerful ISR, counterintelligence; and contact endeavors are basic to recognizing,

dissecting, and scattering danger and peril data to administrators and guaranteeing power
security.

f. FP experts utilize new innovation to improve abilities.

g. Force security is both an individual and a direction duty.

Figure-6: Force Protection Fundamental Elements

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Sourse: Derived from Allied Joint Publicaiton-3.14

Power Security Danger Range
60. There are an assortment of dangers and perils confronting the Flying corps. Dangers and
perils
may emerge from psychological militants or radicals, insiders, criminal elements, foreign
intelligence and security services (FISS), contradicting military powers, dissident associations, and
normal or artificial catastrophes, real mishaps, or restorative occurrences (Air Commodore
Sharif,2018).
61. Aviation based armed forces considers the accompanying classes as genuine dangers that
require compel assurance measures:

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a. Conventional Danger. Normal military powers are arranged as ordinary

danger. Incorporated into this risk are strategic tasks including airborne, big guns, and rocket
assaults (Choudhury, 2018).
b. Flighty Danger. This risk incorporates a wide range of military and paramilitary activities,
typically of long length, transcendently directed by indigenous or surrogate powers that are
composed, prepared, prepared, bolstered, and
coordinated in differing degrees by an outside source. It incorporates guerrilla fighting and other
direct hostile, low perceivability, incognito or furtive tasks and in addition the backhanded
exercises of disruption, undermine, insight exercises and so on.
c. Fear based oppression Risk. This risk is an ascertained utilization of brutality or danger of
savagery to impart dread, and planned to force or scare governments or social orders in the quest
for objectives that are for the most part political, religious, or ideological (Air Commodore Md Sharif
Uddin Sarker, 2018).
d. Criminal Risk. Criminal threats host a scope of exercises from surprising
movement may help anticipate future activities or
examples of break-ins to taking. Criminal
give propelled signs and alerts of assault. For instance, robbery of vehicles, military recognizable
proof cards, international IDs, or establishment passage passes are potential markers of pending
threatening activity (Rahman, 2018).
e. Data/Information Risk. This risk results from endeavors made by an adversary to accomplish
data predominance by influencing aviation based armed forces data, data based procedures, data
frameworks, and PC based systems while utilizing and guarding their own data based procedures
and frameworks, and PC based systems (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).
f. Insider Threat. This risk originates from doled out or joined work force
(military or non military personnel). Any of these gatherings of individuals may undermine Aviation
based armed forces interests by revealing touchy or arranged data, by settling on choices that
support dissenter gatherings, or by unpredictable assault. They may target people, gatherings,
offices, weapon frameworks, or data frameworks (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).
g. Common turmoil Threat. This threat reflects country-specific concerns of viciousness. The
danger can show itself amid challenges, showings, exile/compassionate activities, or some other
nearby pressures that may grow into an immediate risk (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).

Levels of Danger

Run of the mill Level I dangers incorporate foe operators and psychological militants whose

62. Level I Dangers.

essential missions incorporate undercover work, damage, and disruption. Foe action and person
assaults may incorporate irregular or coordinated executing of military and non military personnel
faculty, capturing, what's more, managing uncommon reason people or groups to targets. Level I risk
strategies may likewise incorporate capturing air, land, and ocean vehicles for use in direct assaults;
the utilization of IEDs; irregular killing; VBIEDs; surface to air rocket (SAM) assaults; or individual
explosive and rocket pushed projectile assaults (DAVID S. FADOK, 2011).

63. Level II Threats.

Level II dangers incorporate little scale (viewed as not exactly organization estimated counterparts, for
the most part 75-200 work force) powers directing capricious fighting that can present genuine dangers
to military powers and regular people. These assaults can cause huge disturbances to military
activities. These powers are equipped for leading very much organized, however little scale, attempt at
manslaughter assaults, IED and VBIED assaults, and ambushes, and may incorporate critical standoff
weapons dangers, for example, mortars, rockets, rocket impelled explosives, and SAMs (DAVID S.
FADOK, 2011).

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64. Level III Threats.

Level III dangers might be experienced when a foe has the capacity to extend battle control via air,
land, or ocean anyplace into the operational zone. Particular models incorporate airborne,
heliborne, and land and/or water capable tasks; huge joined arms ground drive tasks; and
penetration activities including expansive quantities of people or on the other hand little gatherings
invaded into the operational region and submitted against well disposed targets. Air what's more,
rocket dangers to bases, base clusters,26 lines of correspondence, and non military personnel
targets may likewise present dangers to joint powers, introducing themselves with small cautioning
time (DAVID S. FADOK, 2011).
Power Insurance Arranging

65. Air Power work force ought to distinguish dangers and perils, at that point decide
approaches to counter them to secure work force and assets with the end goal to empower
mission achievement. This starts with the hazard administration process and continues to FP
countermeasure arranging contemplations.

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Figure-7: Force Protection Model

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Source: Derived from AJ Publication 3.14

Risk Management (RM) Process

66. Commandants decide how best to oversee dangers. The Aviation based armed forces
characterizes hazard administration asthe procedure of distinguishing basic resources;
understanding the risk;
understanding Flying corps vulnerabilities to the danger; deciding danger to work force, resources,
and
data; and accepting danger or applying countermeasures to redress or alleviate the hazard
(DAVID S. FADOK, 2011).

67. In all cases, the evaluations incorporate perils and also dangers. This RM procedure
comprises of the accompanying components: organizing resources and assets by a criticality
evaluation, distinguishing potential dangers through a risk appraisal, breaking down asset and
resource vulnerabilities through a weakness evaluation, deciding the dangers satisfactory to them
for a given activity by leading a hazard appraisal.
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Figure-8: . The Hazard Administration Process

Source: Derived from AF Doctrine Document 2011

Vulnerable Areas in Any Air Base

68. An air base accommodates a range of vulnerable areas which merit protections. These
may include:

a. Aircraft. During war the aircraft would be generally parked in pens in which servicing,
refuelling and armament loading activity would be in progress. Their protection is very
vital (Rahman, 2018).

b. Operational Readiness Platforms (ORP). ORP facilities provide a quick

response to the AD fighters. As such, these could be probable targets for the enemy
and as such merit protection (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).

c. Fuel Dumps. Generally, fuel storage areas are soft spot of any airfield. An attack on
fuel dumps is not only going to cause a fuel starvation, but the associated fire
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hazards can cause immeasurable damage to put an airfield out of action (Air
Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).

d. Bomb Dump. Another vulnerable place in an air base is the bomb dump. Loss of the
bomb dump may render an operational airfield ineffective. Bomb dump is highly
vulnerable to both air and ground attack (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker,
2018).

e. Base Operation Complex. This is the nerve center of an airbase from where the base
commander controls both the air and ground battles. Losing the Base Operation
Complex out of hostile action may severely degrade operational capability of an air
base (Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).

f. Water Pump and Power House Complex. A disrupted/damaged water and power
system of an airfield is a significant blow to the living essentials (Air Commodore Md
Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018).

g. Miscellaneous. Likewise, other places that need protection are unit

headquarters, dispersals, logistic depot, maintenance hangers and domestic areas.
Some of them may not be lucrative targets, but damage to these areas could
substantially affect human endurance and operational tempo (Rahman, 2018).

Principles of Force Protection

69. Power assurance on the ground must be guided by the accompanying standards:

a. Effective knowledge is critical to Estimated Evaluation of Dangers. Power assurance

intelligence and counter- deciding the dangers to the power. insight work force ought to be
equipped for investigating a wide scope of dangers. These dangers might be customary
military units, Extraordinary Powers, psychological oppressor gatherings, synthetic or organic
specialists, radioactive material, digital fear based oppressors, criminal components, fanatic
gatherings, and the weapons any of these gatherings may choose (DAVID S. FADOK, 2011).
With this greatly wide assortment of danger contemplations, it turns out to be promptly clear
that insight support to constrain assurance ought to be executed powerfully in flying corps
forms, especially risk appraisals.

b. Threat Weakness and Hazard Evaluation. Leading risk, weakness, furthermore, hazard
appraisals grants officers to distinguish potential dangers and break down vulnerabilities with
the end goal to decide the dangers at a given area for a required mission.

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c. At the core of power assurance idea Counter Measures and Mindfulness. lies the need
to counter the range of dangers. Countermeasures against one danger are frequently viable
against an assortment of comparable or lesser dangers. Authorities ought to ensure that
there is a crucial accentuation on consciousness of power security challenges. All work force,
paying little heed to rank or forte, ought to be prepared in fundamental drive insurance
aptitudes expected to survive and work. These ought to incorporate fundamental weapons
aptitudes, essential ground battle abilities, risk mindfulness, security mindfulness and so on.
Risk mindfulness preparing ought to incorporate the full range of mindfulness projects to raise
the comprehension of aviation based armed forces staff and their wards of the general range
of dangers and measures that will lessen individual helplessness (DAVID S.FADOK, 2011)
(DRAFT OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE OF BANGLADESH AIR FORCE 2014, 2014).

d. Flexibility. The force protection posture must be flexible and capable of

responding to a rapidly changing threat, although availability of resources may be a
limiting factor.

Force Protection Measures

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70. Protection of air assets on ground is achieved by a combination of protective air and
surface forces and specialized infrastructure design and construction. Therefore, three
fundamental measures are of prime importance, i.e. AD, active ground defense and passive
defense (DRAFT OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE OF BANGLADESH AIR FORCE 2014, 2014):

a. AD. An air base, with all its high value assets and facilities, has always been a
highly lucrative target of an adversary's aerial attack. The resistance again
consequently, requires both warrior interceptors and GBAD framework to invalidate and
decrease the viability of assault on air bases.
b. Ground Defense. Attacks against bases can be mounted by small groups of
highly trained enemy forces (who might be also airborne) and by saboteurs. The
damage caused by such enemy forces can be out of all proportion to their size. As a
part of force protection, the aim of ground defense must be one of prevention rather
than retribution. Since avoidance is a proceeding with prerequisite, at whatever point a
danger exists, barrier can't be attempted by powers which are available to come back
to work from a separation yet should be the obligation of those faculty on the
undermined bases. A few essentials concerning ground defense are set out below:

(1) Principles of Ground Defense. Certain principles of ground defense are

universal. These are:

(a) Close Defense. Because combatant personnel will normally be

engaged in their primary duties until an attack is imminent, they should
wherever possible defend vulnerable points (VP) located in or adjacent to
the area in which they normally work.

(b) Aggressive Defense. Barrier must be wanted to keep foe powers from
moving toward guarded positions. Every opportunity must be taken to
inflict casualties on the enemy, and a passive attitude

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towards defense should be discouraged. Forceful safeguard can be

accomplished by the reasonable work of capability and watching.
(c) Avoidance of Surprise. The enemy will endeavor to improve his
chance of success by taking the defense by surprise and this can best be
avoided by ground and air reconnaissance, patrolling and constant
vigilance at all levels.

(d) Reserve Force. Commanders must resist the temptation to deploy

all their forces initially. A reserve force must be retained centrally under
the control of the commander for use in the counter attack role. The
reserve should comprise trained and equipped personnel, and be mobile
and available to deal with any unforeseen situation.

(e) Key Terrain. Key terrain includes ground from which the enemy can
dominate an area by observation, bring aimed fire down upon VPs or
otherwise adversely affect operations. Key terrain must, therefore, be
included in the defense considerations and denied to the enemy by
physically occupying it or dominating it by fire.

(f) Defense Location. The following factors must be considered

when selecting defense locations:

i. Defensive Positions. Cautious positions ought to be sited top to

bottom to retain and dynamically debilitate an assault and
guarantee that the foe can't prevail by entering a solitary line of
barrier. Equally, defenses should be extended outwards by means
of patrols or Observation Posts (OPs) to deny to the enemy
positions from which they can observe the defensive positions or
from which they can mount attacks using mortars, rockets or other

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stand-off weapons. However, because of the fixed nature of VPs

on airfields, this principle may sometimes be difficult to observe.

ii. All Round Defense. Defensive positions must be sited to cover

the possibility of attack from any direction. However, whilst the
principle of all round defense is essential, it is wise to add defense
weight to those defensive positions which face the most likely line
of attack..

iii. Mutual Support. Defensive positions should be capable of

supporting one another by fire. The greater the degree of mutual
support the more effective will be the overall defense. However,
though mutual support must be obtained between positions in
defense of individual VPs, such support may sometimes not be
possible between all VPs on an airfield because of the distances
involved.

iv. Concealment. Though concealment of the VP itself will often be

impracticable, the effectiveness of its overall defense will be
reduced if defensive positions can be identified by the enemy and
avoided or neutralized before an attack. Positions must, therefore,
be concealed from both air and ground observation.

v. Obstacles. Every use should be made of natural and

artificial obstacles for example barbed wire, to aid the defense.
Obstacles must be covered by fire that is the defenders must be
able to fire at the enemy (by direct or indirect fire) whilst they are
attempting to negotiate an obstacle.

2. Basic Concept. Effective ground defense requires a layered system of

defenses, thereby facilitating the earliest possible detection of a threat and
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providing defense in depth, mutual support and freedom of action. Thus, a

ground defense area should be established to encompass all ground from which
an opponent could bring direct/indirect fire to the base. The final layer of defense
should be provided by close guarding and control of entry into the base and its
mission-essential facilities. Consequently, airbases should be divided into a
more manageable number of defense sectors to ensure effective control of
active ground defense. It should ensure proper provision for ground defense,
including the early deployment of specialist ground defense units such as Force
Protection team. The purpose of Force Protection is to contribute in providing a
secure ground environment within which air operations can continue unhindered.

Summary

71. Force Protection is not something that can be addressed separately or in isolation. It is
an integral part of operations and must be incorporated into the Commander's plan from the outset
(Herbert T. Brown, 2001). The production of an accurate and comprehensive threat assessment,
covering all the constituent elements mentioned, will enable the production of an initial set of
offensive or defensive Force Protection measures which address the actual threat. Proposed
measures must be judged and balanced against the mission and operational requirements, with the
emphasis on risk management. As we have seen, sound Force Protection is a cyclical process
which assesses the threat and provides appropriate measures
to reduce the risk from elements of that threat (DAVID S. FADOK, 2011). The implementation
of some measures may not be force-wide; as, the risk, and also the measures embraced, may
not be uniform and might be liable to visit survey and change. The final selection of Force
Protection measures is made by the Commander, and these must be coordinated with other
disciplines such as Battlespace Management, Information Operations and Command and
Control Warfare (Herbert T. Brown, 2001). These findings answer the second secondary
question and thereby justified.

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CHAPTER - IV: REQUIREMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION IN BAF AND ITS'

CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENT

General

72.Security, one of the standards of tasks and insurance, accept a higher significance in BAF. FP
needs to adjust the clashing needs of the need to save compel ability while amplifying opportunity
of action.[0]While the shelling of the Marine sleeping enclosure in Lebanon in October 1983
denoted the start of fear based oppressor assaults by brutal Islamic radicals upon the US military,
it was not until the point when their assault upon Khobar Towers in 1996 that securing the power
against a psychological militant foe rose to a more noticeable job in military activities. Since the
Khobar Towers assault, the pattern of fear assaults has developed in recurrence and lethality
(Herbert T. Darker, 2001). The current level of dangers to Flying corps individuals and assets
directs that the Administration take solid measures to ensure its powers at home and when
conveyed. Securing Aviation based armed forces faculty and assets is basic to its capacity to play
out its missions. Flying corps powers are ready to react to worldwide entrusting whenever;
constrain assurance empowers this capacity.

73. The weakness of existing security system in BAF and importance of Force Protection is
realized through study and analysis in previous discussion. Now it is required to address the
third and final secondary question of the research which is “ Why Force Protection is required in
BAF and what are the challenges BAF may face to implement it?” Since it was found evident that,
Force Protection is required to ensure security and protection of force to continue its operational
capabilities, so, it is now required to determine why it is required for BAF and probable challenges
BAF may face while implementing it.

Requirement to Develop FP in BAF

74. Ideally, Bangladesh Army is supposed to provides defense of the BAF Bases from any
impending air attacks by proving Ground Base Air Defense weapons. With this given security
arrangement, so long, the BAF was not encouraged to develop an integral anti-aircraft/GBAD
capability to counter aerial threats (Rahman, 2018). But, in reality, Bangladesh Army possesses
limited number of Anti-Aircraft Artillery Units and these units are equipped with very
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limited number of GBAD weapons. So, the Bangladesh Army is likely to face extreme difficulty
to meet its own requirements of air defense weapons during contact of any land campaign
(Air Vice Marshal Ehsanul Gani Choudhury, 2018) (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).
75. Garud commandos are prepared to watch flying corps bases and also battle extremists and partake
in hunt and safeguard tasks. The requirement for a particular group of aviation based armed forces
commandos was felt when aggressors endeavored to assault two air bases in Jammu and Kashmir in
2001 (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018) (Rahman, 2018). Garud commandos drove the activity
against aggressors who focused the Pathankot air base in January 2016.Right after the Pathankot
attack, the Air Force had moved in a proposal to raise the fortification of its 54 air bases around the country.
On Nov 18, 2017, Garud commando of the IAF gunned down six
terrorists in north Kashmir's Bandipora district in an encounter. Some of the main
Force Protection (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018) (Choudhury, 2018) :

a. It acts as an emergency response team in case of a terrorist attack.

b. Anti-hijacking and hostage rescue.
c. Civil aid during natural disasters.
d. Undertaking combat search and rescue missions.
e. Special reconnaissance.
f. Air assault.

76. Therefore, it becomes clear that BAF should develop her own GBAD capability on
immediate basis and not suffer from a false sense of security (Air Commodore M Khalid
Hossain, 2018) (Choudhury, 2018). Hence to overcome the present limitation and meet the
multi-dimensional security challenges of war and peace there remains no other alternate for
the BAF rather than to induct the establishment of the Force Protection (Air Commodore Md
Sharif Uddin Sarker, 2018). Force Protection would make the BAF self-sufficient to counter
any low level air or ground oriented threats (Air Vice Marshal Ehsanul Gani Choudhury, 2018).

Reach Ultimate Security Objective

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77. The motto of BAF is to keep the sky of Bangladesh secured. As such, security in the
ground is also a prime requirement to enable fully-fledged operation of air force in any time.
As such, importance of perimeter security is paramount. To maintain this security, following
targets are to be set for protection of valuable assets of BAF (Rahman, 2018; Air Commodore
M Khalid Hossain, 2018):

a. Prevention of any type of crime which has potential threat from outer periphery.

b. Keeping surveillance eye open by monitoring adjacent area of perimeter twenty

four hours.

c. Protecting BAF assets and personnel.

d. Monitoring high-risk area.

e. Providing a pleasant and secure working environment.

f. Protection against any emergency situation.

78. Functions of BAF have been increased in manifolds with the pace of global military
modernization. Numerous fighter aircrafts, radars and SAM have been included in this
connection. Besides, a good number of units and installation have also been established
(Rahman, 2018).

79. Considering the changing nature of the present security scenario and probable threats
FP system should be available in BAF to continue with the uninterrupted operational activities
and protect BAF bases, units, sensitive installations, costly equipment etc (Air Commodore M
Khalid Hossain, 2018). At present BAF Provost, MODC (Air), Watchman, Fire Fighters, Fire
Lashkar and GC trade airmen are deployed for ensuring security. We are lacking of special
training, force or arms to protect air force from any attack. Under these circumstances for
establishing FP a new trade airmen with necessary training, acquiring experience from home

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and abroad, amendment and addition on establishment of manpower and equipment is a

prime requirement (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).

80. A survey was carried out among the Provost trade airmen of different bases and units.
They were asked whether the perimeter security is well enough to prevent the intruders from
entering outside. A total of 80 airmen of Provost trades were asked the question. 62.5 % of
the airmen disagreed that the perimeter security is well enough to prevent the intruders from
entering outside.

Figure- 9: Survey Response on the Perimeter Security to Prevent the Intruders

from Entering Outside

Do you think, the prerimeter security is well enough to prevent the intruders
from entering outside?
3%
3% Agree, 0%
32% Strongly Disagree
Disagree
No Opinion
Agree
Strongly Agree
62%

Source: Survey Analysis

Encounter Multi-dimensional Threats and Achieve Self Dependency

81. There is no alternative of establishing FP to eradicate the limitation of security and

encounter multi-dimensional threats (Air Commodore Muhit, 2018). BAF would be self-dependent
and capable enough to fight the threats alone if it is established. BAF helps sustain the operational
activities of other forces by doing its day-to-day activities. By deploying rapidly at any
base/unit/installation, FP will be able to conduct its operational activities as Rapid Deployment
Force to protect personnel and resources also (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain,
2018). Following benefits would be obtained if Force Protection is established in BAF:

Primary Benefits
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a. Considering the sensitivity, strengthen its security.

b. Optimum effectiveness of ground defense system.

c. Defense of high value air assets like aircrafts, radars and other equipment.

d. Help civil administration during peace time as and when call for.

e. Conduct Search and Rescue and other airborne operation.

f. Act as Rapid Deployment force at any emergency.

g. Conduct Anti- Hijacking and Hostage Rescue Operation.

h. During Repaid Runway Repair conduct bomb defuse and provide security
cordon.

j. Conduct special reconnaissance operation.

k. Play effective role like SWAT (Special Weapon and

Tactics). Secondary Benefits

a. Prepared for any time as quick reaction force.

b. Immediate support to BAF bases and units.

c. Make a timely security force by special training from home and abroad.

D. Special contribution during wartime and train other trade airmen by them.

e. Provide protection to the local and foreign VIPS.

f. Conduct Guard of Honor by trained personnel.

g. Other trade airmen will be relieved from task force or special duty.

h. Perform special security duty in different level of BAF and national ceremonies.

j. Play role during any emergency of the country when ask for.

k. Conduct operation in case of any aircraft crash outside the base.

l. Play role during rescue of downed or distressed aircraft.

m. Provide cordon during force landing of enemy or unidentified by friendly fighter

aircraft.
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n. Provide special protection during special situation.

p. Provide support during firefighting. Proposed

Strength and Establishment of Force Protection

82. An ideal organogram for proposed Force Protection is given as Annex D. A proposed
strength, recruiting procedure and location of FP training center is given below (Rahman,
2018):

a. Strength. FP group may be consisted as per the following strength:

TABLE-2 : PROPOSED FP GROUP

Manpower / Wing Proposed Number Remarks

(a) (b) (c)

Total Strength 3000 Officer 121, Airmen-

2442, Civilian- 584

Air Headquarter 40 for headquarter

formation

Special Operation wing 200

Protection Wing 200

Force Protection Regiment 277

Centre

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Detach Unit 600

LOS Station 270

b. Recruiting. Personnel in FP may be enrolled in the following basis (Air

Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018):

(1). Fresh airmen may be enrolled in a new trade which may be named as Air
Regiment.

(2). GC trade airmen may be absorbed in the Force Protection / Air Regiment.

c. Training and Location. Proposed training system for the Force Protection
members and their location is given below (Rahman, 2018):

(1) 200 candidates may be recruited each year in first 10 years and thus
enrollment may be reduced subsequently after fulfillment of the establishment.

(2) FP candidates may be recruited separately and train them with different
curriculum in Recruits Training Centre and School.

(3) After recruit training they will complete their Basic and Advanced training
from proposed FP/Air Regiment Centre and School from BAF Shamshernagar.

(4) After special Advanced Course, GC trade airmen may join in the new
Regiment trade.

(5) 200 personnel from Force Protection Special Operation Wing may
complete commando training from special force unit. 50 men commando may
stay at Dhaka under Commando Headquarters as Quick Reaction Force to
handle emergency situation.

(6) 200 personnel may perform their duties staying at Air Headquarters as
Special Protection Force.

d. Assimilation GC Trade as FP. After abolishing GC trade, all airmen from GC trade
and 50% of MODC personnel (considering age, intelligence and physical fitness ) may
be given special training and assimilated in FP team (Air Commodore M Khalid
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Hossain, 2018). Other MODC personnel will continue with their respective charter of
duties and retire as per the existing service rule. No GC trade airmen will be enrolled
from subsequent phases.

Actions Required to Take for Establishing FP

83. Following actions may be taken to implement FP in BAF:

a. For necessary training and accommodation of FP members Air Headquarters,

different bases, detached units, proposed Regiment Centre and School may conduct
special development works.

b. In order to provide necessary facilities to the FP members like other trade

airmen, necessary steps may be taken for budget allotment.

c. To initiate and preserve necessary documents and carry out related different
activities, separate manpower and office establishment may be arranged at Air
Headquarters, different bases, detached units proposed Regiment Centre and School
and BAF Record Office.

d. Specialized and experienced officer may be detailed with respective

appointments to operate each level activity of FP members.

e. Primary members of the FP groups should be involved with regular refresher

training, exercises and demonstrations.

f. Commandos of different level from home or abroad and concerned experienced

officer and airmen may be detailed as trainer for the FP groups.

g. Necessary establishments, orders, directives, syllabus and précis may be

prepared to establish FP group.

Challenges Ahead to Implement FP in BAF

84. To carry out above mentioned actions and establish an effective FP, BAF may
encounter following challenges:

a. Formulate a New Establishment and Infrastructure. At present BAF is running with

the existing TO&E which was approved in 1986. Within this 32 years

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number of bases and units have been established. Those required plenty of time and
effort of concerned air force personnel. Lot of BofO were convened and numerous
works services were also done in this regard (Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).
Establishing infrastructure for Force Protection in BAF will require internal budget and
administrative coordination within the service and amongst the different government
bodies.

b. Obtain Government Approval and Implementation. Ministry of Defense

and Ministry of Finance deals with all type of military expenditure. They are concerned
about the total armed f orces' development. As such to implement a s

interest require lot of discussion and rational to get a government approval. The new
establishment will require more budget allotment from the national revenue (Choudhury,
2018)

c. Prepare for Training Equipment with Necessary Installations, Syllabus and

Précis. FP will require new type of training and related facilities. That will involve skilled
and experienced manpower and equipment from home and abroad. It also needs
specialized installations and school for conducting the training and course curriculum
(Air Commodore M Khalid Hossain, 2018).

d. Dedicated Officers from Different Branch and Airmen from Different Trade.
FP group needs to be trained and supervised up to the development phase by
establishing a core group consisting of experienced officer and airmen. As such
number of officers and airmen will require to be spared from their existing capacities
(Rahman, 2018).

e. Arrange Joint Exercise at Home And Abroad. As the charter of duties

and operational modus operandi will be new and different, FP will be required to get
acquainted with their job by joint exercise with sister services at home and abroad. That
will involve manpower, coordination , MOU and budget (Air Commodore M Khalid
Hossain, 2018).

f. Arrange and Usage of State of Art Training Equipment and Arms. FP group
will be required to be provided with state of art training, vehicles and equipment to

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encounter the improvised threats from different threat levels. That will be again a big
challenge for a relatively small force (Choudhury, 2018).

Summary
85. The Air Force's holistic approach to FP permits the Service to address
risks to its work force and assets from all sources, characteristic or synthetic. The evolving techniques
for assault utilized by foes require the Aviation based armed forces to consider the nontraditional
manners by which it might be assaulted and how to counter these slippery dangers. Pilots must be
progressively cautious, utilizing all the different aptitude accessible to counter dangers to Flying corps
tasks and risks to Flying corps staff and assets.

86. Because FP duty streams from warrior commandants, this obligation penetrates all levels of
direction, which at that point scopes to all pilots, all over the place. Officers at all levels ought to
forcefully execute their power assurance obligations and projects. Officers are in charge of securing
their kin and the assets used to perform military activities. During emergency or war situation, it is less
likely that BAF would get any assistance from other services for her defence against enemy surface
op. It will be very difficult to achieve that with her own manpower as well. By eradicating guard duty,
this force will enable technical manpower of BAF concentrating on their profession which will in turn
significantly contribute in BAF operational efficiency & readiness. Hence, to overcome the present
limitations and meet the multidimensional security challenges of war and peace there
remains no other alternate for the BAF rather than to induct the establishm Protection”. This
proposed Force Protection concept would make the BAF se
country any low level air or ground oriented threats.

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CHAPTER- V: FINDINGS

87. Research Findings. Basing on the major facts and figures derived from different
sample collection, this paper finds the followings:

a. From chapter-2, it has been derived that present security apparatus of BAF has
many difficulties and challenges which hinder the protection of a force during any
emergency. A survey was conducted to find out the challenges and it is, therefore,
found that lack of infrastructure, insufficient skilled manpower, weak perimeter security,
lack of adequate CCTV coverage are the major challenges for BAF to establish a strong
security in different air bases . It is, therefore, required to study the existing security
system and identify its deficiency to enhance the physical security. The first secondary
question was thereby answered.

b. From chapter-3, it has been revealed that, Force Protection is a state of art
capacity which are adopted by many countries to protect men and equipment during
peace and war. An organized Force Protection group, therefore, required to be
formulated in order to enhance the physical security of a force. The second secondary
question was thereby answered.

c. In chapter-4, the requirement of Force Protection in BAF as an alternate of

existing security system was analyzed and probable challenges were also sought out
that BAF may face while implementing it. The third secondary question was thereby
answered.

88. Analysis. The primary question of the research paper was, ‘Is Force Protection required
in BAF as a new capacity building?' Three secondary questions were inquired to find out the
answer of the primary question. The entire research paper pursued to find out the answer the
secondary questions and all three secondary questions were analytically and statistically
answered. Different sample collection was done by taking different interviews of the
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concerned Directors of Air Headquarters and Provost of different Security Squadrons of

Dhaka and Jessore areas. Different Survey was also conducted with a set of 09 questions
among 80 provost trade airmen of BAF. Most of them agreed that, establishment of a new
Force Protection Group would definitely help to enhance the physical security of BAF. These
documents also helped to identify the challenges and justify the requirements of Force
Protection for BAF. The problem statement is thereby addressed. So, the significance of
Force Protection , is therefore, justified which will enhance physical security of BAF.

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CHAPTER VI : CONCLUSIONS

89. The current security set up in BAF is quite rudimentary in nature and these elements
were established to perform primarily for policing job in and around the BAF bases. Therefore,
it is apparent that with the existing security apparatus of the BAF, it would not be possible to
counter any low level air as well as ground attacks and render effective force protection during
peace or war times. With a view to counter any low level air or ground oriented threats, many
Air Forces concentrated to develop their indigenous force protection capability and
established own formations of ground warfare specialists equipped with GBAD weapons.
Although defensive in nature, these forces are also capable of undertaking airborne operation,
commando activities, or ordnance disposal etc. which entail and enhance operational edge.

90. Ideally, Bangladesh Army is supposed to provides defense of the BAF Bases from any
impending air attacks by proving Ground Base Air Defense weapons. With this given security
arrangement, so long, the BAF was not encouraged to develop an integral anti-aircraft/GBAD
capability to counter aerial threats.
91. Physical security frameworks for ensured offices are by and large expected to prevent
potential interlopers, distinguish interruptions and screen/record gatecrashers, trigger suitable
occurrence reactions. For ensuring an effective security in a base or unit different component
like well-constructed perimeter fencing with appropriate exit-entry system, physical protection
of installations, control of visitors and vehicles etc. are required.

92. At present Base Security Squadron under the guidance of PM Directorate ensures the
physical security with limited provost personnel, MODC (Air), Watchmen, and Fire Fighters.
Airmen of different trades are also engaged with guard duty due to the shortage of manpower-
which is not sufficient for protecting a force during an emergency.

93. In airpower characteristics, one limitation remains naturally for air force is its dependency
on its base support. During peacetime, any terrorist activity, conspiracy, or sabotage may
cause a huge damage in terms of assets, equipment, morale and BAF capability. As such,
perimeter security at the ground should be well maintained. The ability to counter any threat by
BAF personnel at these bases practically is limited considering the ability

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of the terror or vandal counterparts under present context. BAF requires suitable
countermeasure along with the existing security system to frame an effective security solution
against any peacetime threat.

94. Moreover, recent development of terrorism inside the country, and aggression by various
local or foreign assisted militant groups, BAF may be a lucrative and potential target to
those perpetrators. Perimeters of most of the BAF installations are susceptible to intrusion due
to weak security walls and patrols Thinking about the rising dangers, it is important to have a
Power Assurance framework in BAF having a sporadic blend of aviation based armed forces
work force and gear with the idea of how to safeguard its air bases. Force Protection
integrates all aspects (i.e., air base ground defense, combating terrorism, physical security,
operations
security, personal protective services, resource protection, intelligence, counterintelligence,
logistics, etc.) into a durable unit.

95. There are a variety of threats and hazards facing the Air Force. Threats and hazards
may arise from terrorists or insurgents, insiders, criminal entities, foreign intelligence and
security services (FISS), opposing military forces, activist organizations, and natural or
manmade disasters, major accidents, or medical incidents.

96. Force Protection team is organized, trained and equipped for operations designed to
take actions within a ground defense area against an opponent's special, regu forces before they
can carry out direct attacks.

97. During emergency or war situation, it is less likely that BAF would get any assistance
from other services for her defence against enemy surface op. It will be very difficult to achieve
that with her own manpower as well. By eradicating guard duty, this force will enable technical
manpower of BAF concentrating on their profession which will in turn significantly contribute in
BAF operational efficiency & readiness.

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CHAPTER VI : RECOMMENDATIONS

98. Basing on the major findings of the research, the paper recommends the following
measures to be undertaken:.

a. A special team of BAF may be sent to of different countries to obtain concept of FP.

b. Assistance may be sough from foreign experts to establish force protection group.

c. A TO&E may be proposed and take a drive to get that approved by the government.

d. Training activities may be run by the specially trained and experienced officer and
airmen during development phase.

e. Special gears, dresses, and state of art arms may be arranged for the members of FP.

f. A force protection doctrine may be formulated to protect Bangladesh Air Force.

Mirpur Cantonment MOHAMMAD ARAFAT IQBAL

Squadron Leader

December 2018 Student Officer

Annexes:

A. Conceptual Framework.
B. Survey Question.
C. Base/ Unit Wise Geographic Land Area of BAF.
D. Proposed Organogram of Force Protection for BAF.

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Distribution:

Sponsor Directing Staff

Defence Services Command and Staff College

Mirpur, Dhaka

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

DRAFT OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE OF BANGLADESH AIR FORCE 2014. (2014, March).

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Air Commodore Md Sharif Uddin Sarker, G. (2018, August 28) . REQUIREMENT OF FORCE
PROTECTION : A NEW CAPACITY BUILDING IN BAF AND ITS PROBABLE
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Air Vice Marshal Ehsanul Gani Choudhury, O. (2018, August 28). REQUIREMENT OF
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Choudhury, A. C. (2018, August 28). REQUIREMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION : A NEW
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DAVID S. FADOK, M. G. (2011, July 28). Power Insurance Aviation based armed forces
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Rahman, S. L. (2018, August 12). REQUIREMENT OF FORCE PROTECTION : A NEW
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Interviewer)

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