SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220667. January 27, 2016.]

OLIVIA B. PASCUAL assisted by FLORANTE C. PASCUAL , petitioner,

vs. FORD MOTOR COMPANY PHILIPPINES, INC. and FORD GROUP
PHILIPPINES, INC. , respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 27
January 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 220667 (OLIVIA B. PASCUAL assisted by FLORANTE C.
PASCUAL, Petitioner v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY PHILIPPINES, INC. and FORD
GROUP PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents ).
THE CASE
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 16, 2015 decision 1 and September 18, 2015 resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102292, penned by Associate Justice Agnes
Reyes-Carpio, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Romeo F. Barza,
concurring.
In November 30, 2006, the petitioner Olivia Pascual (Pascual) bought a second-
hand Ford E-150 vehicle (vehicle). 3
On April 7, 2008, at around 1:30 a.m., Pascual's driver was driving the vehicle at
moderate speed along the National Highway at Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, when the
vehicle's right axle broke causing its wheel to be detached. Pascual and the other
passengers suffered physical injuries and were rushed to a hospital. 4
Pascual demanded that respondents Ford Motor Company Philippines, Inc.
(FMCI) and Ford Group Philippines, Inc. (FGPI) pay her actual and moral damages
resulting from the incident. 5 The FMCI is a Ford manufacturer, while the FGPI is a Ford
distributor in the Philippines. 6 The FMCI and the FGPI denied their liability to Pascual. 7
Pascual led a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against the FGPI
and the FMCP with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). 8 Pascual claims that the FMCI and
the FGPI are strictly liable for the defective vehicle. AaCTcI

In their answer, the FMCI and the FGPI assert that Pascual cannot claim the
manufacturer's warranty or warranty against hidden defects because: (1) the vehicle
was bought at second hand; and (2) the vehicle's warranty to the purchaser had expired
two years after the vehicle was bought from an authorized Ford dealer on November
15, 2000. 9
The FMCI and the FGPI presented their sole expert witness who investigated and
examined the vehicle and testi ed that the rear leaf spring of the vehicle had been
repaired and altered by non-Ford authorized dealer/s to enable it to carry a heavy load
beyond the vehicle's weight capacity. The heavy load stress was absorbed by the axle
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 shock which caused it to break. 10
The RTC Ruling 11

The RTC held the FMCI and the FGPI liable and ordered them to solidarily pay
Pascual moral damages, attorney's fees, exemplary damages, and costs of suit. 12
The RTC held that the FMCI and the FGPI were negligent because Pascual and
her co-passengers' physical injuries resulted from the factory defect of the vehicle's
right rear axle. 13
The RTC did not give credence to the testimony of the FMCI's and the FGPI's
expert witness because it was not corroborated; hence, his statements were mere
allegations and self-serving evidence. 14
The RTC also explained that notwithstanding the fact that the vehicle is second-
hand, the FMCI and the FGPI cannot disclaim their liability because the vehicle was
purchased from them. The FMCI and the FGPI failed to protect Pascual who was the
end-user of the vehicle at the time of the incident. 15
The FMCI and the FGPI appealed the RTC decision.
The CA Ruling 16

The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the FMCI and the FGPI are not
liable for the injuries and damages sustained by Pascual and her co-passengers. The
CA also ordered Pascual to pay the FMCI and the FGPI attorney's fees. 17
The CA explained that Pascual cannot attribute negligence to the FMCI and the
FGPI because the vehicle had undergone alterations which affected its performance
and in violation of the vehicle's maximum capacity. It was also possible that the
previous owner had altered the vehicle. 18
The CA also explained that even assuming that the FMCI and the FGPI were
negligent, the doctrine of proximate cause releases them from liability. 19 The alteration
made to the vehicle's leaf springs is an intervening cause from the time of its
manufacture until its transfer to Pascual's possession. 20
The CA held that Pascual was negligent because she failed to check the second-
hand vehicle for any defect before she purchased the vehicle. Hence, Pascual's
negligence is the proximate cause of their accident. 21
Pascual filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied. 22
THE PETITION
Pascual questions the CA decision and resolution through the present petition.
Pascual argues that the FMCI and the FGPI failed to rebut the prima facie
presumption of negligence against them. 23 The testimony of the FMCI and the FGPI's
expert witness is mere allegation and self serving-evidence. 24
Pascual also argues that her driver testi ed that the vehicle was brought to Ford
Global City for change oil and brake lining work, contrary to the FMCI and the FGPI's
claim that the vehicle was not brought to a Ford technician for repair. 25
Pascual asserts that the strict liability in torts applies against the FMCI and the
FGPI who are liable, notwithstanding that: (a) the vehicle is second-hand; (b) the vehicle
has been altered or modi ed by non-Ford technicians; (c) Pascual or the vehicle's
previous owner failed to maintain the vehicle in accordance with the preventive
maintenance procedure and schedule; (d) the vehicle's warranty had already lapsed;
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 and (e) the vehicle was subjected to misuse, abuse, unauthorized alteration or faulty
repair by non-Ford technicians. 26
The issues in the present petition are: (1) whether or not the FMCI and the FGPI
are liable to Pascual for quasi-delict; and (2) whether or not the strict liability in torts
applies against the FMCI and the FGPI.
OUR RULING
We deny the petition outright for lack of merit. The CA award of attorney's fees,
however, should be deleted.
FMCI and FGPI are not liable
Pascual claims the FMCI and the FGPI's liability is based on quasi-delict.
Jurisprudence provides that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites 27 must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was
guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage.
The CA correctly held that Pascual cannot attribute negligence to the FMCI and
the FGPI. The testimony of their expert witness was corroborated by other
documentary evidence, such as the technical report and photographs of the vehicle, to
prove that the vehicle had undergone alterations which affected its performance,
including the safety to passengers.
The expert witness explained that the non-authorized Ford technicians' alteration
of the rear axle to carry a heavier load exceeded the vehicle's maximum capacity and
the heavy load caused the axle to break. 28 Pascual, on the other hand, did not refute the
expert witness' testimony on the alterations made. 29 EcTCAD

Pascual cannot also claim that Ford repaired her vehicle since she stated that the
vehicle was brought to Ford for change oil and brake lining jobs only 30 and not for the
purpose of repair.
Pascual's claim that the FMCI and the FGPI are presumed negligent has no basis
in law or in jurisprudence. It is Pascual who has the burden to prove the FMCI's and the
FGPI's negligence. 31
The case of Nutrimix Feeds Corporation v. CA 32 provides that the following must
be present before a manufacturer or seller may be held liable for any damage caused
by the product:
first, proof that the product in question was defective;
second, the defect must be present upon the delivery or manufacture of
the product ; or when the product left the seller's or manufacturer's control; or when
the product was sold to the purchaser; and
third, the product must have reached the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition it was sold. (emphases supplied)
Pascual did not present proof that the vehicle was defective upon its
manufacture. The alteration in the vehicle's rear axle after the vehicle was sold is a
substantial change in the vehicle's condition.
Hence, the FMCI, as manufacturer, and the FGPI, as seller/distributor, cannot be
held liable for any damage caused by the vehicle's defect.
The strict liability in torts is not applicable.
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 We also nd that the strict liability in torts is not applicable against the FMCI and
the FGPI. Pascual cites the California Supreme Court Case of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc. 33 to support her claim on the applicability of strict liability in torts.
According to Greenman:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to
have a defect that causes injury to a human being. . . . The purpose of such
liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves. 34 .
. . Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however, was a
representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was built .
35 (emphases supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that foreign decisions, such as the Greenman case, are
not controlling in this jurisdiction but are, at best, only persuasive. 36 The Greenman
case, however, is not even persuasive for purposes of the present case because its
facts are different and cannot apply squarely to the present case.
Greenman involved a purchaser who bought a defective power tool rst hand
from a retailer. 37 On the other hand, the present case involves a second-hand vehicle
which was bought from an unidentified person.
Even assuming that the Greenman case is applicable, the FMCI and the FGPI are
not liable because their representation as to the vehicle's weight capacity is limited. The
vehicle will safely do the job for which it was built subject to the vehicle's weight
capacity. The alteration of the vehicle's rear axle to carry more weight beyond the
vehicle's capacity is outside the FMCI's and the FGPI's representation of its product.
Award of attorney's fees to the FMCI and the FGPI
The CA failed to justify the award of attorney's fees to the FMCI and the FGPI.
Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances speci ed in
Article 2208 38 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make ndings
of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of the enumerated instances
to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable. 39
The CA failed to state any factual, legal, or equitable justi cation for the award of
attorney's fees in favor of the FMCI and the FGPI. We also do not nd any of the
exceptions in Article 2208 applicable to the present case.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, we DENY the petition outright as we find no
error in the assailed CA decision and resolution, except as to the award of attorney's
fees.
SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTO

Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 42-54.
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 2. Id. at 56-57.
3. Id. at 42.
4. Id. at 42-43.

5. Id. at 43-45.
6. Id. at 58.

7. Id. at 45-46.
8. Civil Case No. II-4703. RTC Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan.

9. Rollo, pp. 60-61.

10. Id. at 46.
11. Dated December 9, 2013. Rollo, pp. 58-80.

12. Id. at 80.

13. Id. at 73-76.

14. Id. at 74-75.

15. Id. at 75.

16. Dated March 16, 2015. Rollo, pp. 42-54.

17. Id. at 53.
18. Id. at 49.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 50.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 57-58.

23. Id. at 24.

24. Id.
25. Id. at 25.

26. Id. at 27-28.

27. Philippine National Railways v. Brunty, et al. , G.R. No. 169891, November 2, 2006, 506
SCRA 685, 698.
28. Rollo, p. 46.

29. Id. at 51.

30. Id. at 25.
31. Huang v. Phil. Hoteliers, Inc., et al. , G.R. No. 180440, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 162,
193.
32. G.R. No. 152219, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 357, 370.
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 33. 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963).

34. Id. at 62.

35. Id. at 64.
36. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 167614, March 23, 2009, 582 SCRA
254, 280.
37. Supra note 33, at 59.

38. Article 2208 . In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
39. Philippine National Construction Corporation v. APAC Marketing Corporation , G.R. No.
190957, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 441, 450.

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